Recovery from "brain death": a neurologist's apologia

Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis

Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..

Knowledge gaps in heart and lung donation after the circulatory determination of death: Report of a workshop of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute

In a workshop sponsored by the U.S. National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, experts identified current knowledge gaps and research opportunities in the scientific, conceptual, and ethical understanding of organ donation after the circulatory determination of death and its technologies. To minimize organ injury from warm ischemia and produce better recipient outcomes, innovative techniques to perfuse and oxygenate organs postmortem in situ, such as thoracoabdominal normothermic regional perfusion, are being implemented in several medical centers in the US and elsewhere. These technologies have improved organ outcomes but have raised ethical and legal questions. Re-establishing donor circulation postmortem can be viewed as invalidating the condition of permanent cessation of circulation on which the earlier death determination was made and clamping arch vessels to exclude brain circulation can be viewed as inducing brain death. Alternatively, TA-NRP can be viewed as localized in-situ organ perfusion, not whole-body resuscitation, that does not invalidate death determination. Further scientific, conceptual, and ethical studies, such as those identified in this workshop, can inform and help resolve controversies raised by this practice.

The Understanding of Human Death by Polish Early Career Pre-Specialist Physicians

Despite the legal classification of cerebral death as the actual death of a human being and the continuous clarification of neurological criteria, the subject of death, particularly, when exactly it occurs, has been the subject of debate not only in the medical environment but also in other scientific communities for over sixty years. This issue is also present in social discourse. In Poland, as well as in other countries, the concepts of "death" and "cerebral death" have a legal basis. Considerations devoted to death are also important for tanatopedagogics, which focuses primarily on mortality. Indeed, the quality of relationships with other people depends to a large extent on the awareness of death. The study involved 113 pre-specialist physicians employed in various medical centers in Poland. An original questionnaire was used to study the understanding of human death in the light of legal and medical acts that came into force between 2007 and 2019. The study showed that only 7.08% of pre-specialist physicians could fully and correctly identify the basis for declaring a patient dead after diagnosing the irreversible cessation of brain function, and only 33.63% of all respondents understood death in accordance with legal acts currently in force in Poland. Moreover, nearly half of the study participants (47.79%) indicated that irreversible loss of consciousness is not adequate grounds for determining a patient's death, while 56.64% felt that cerebral death is equal to the biological death of a human being. Women were significantly more likely to understand the concept of death (p = 0.028) as defined by current documents and to perceive the irreversible loss of consciousness as an insufficient basis for determining a patient's death (p = 0.040) and also to correctly indicate on what basis cerebral death is identified with human death (p = 0.003), as expressed by current legal regulations in Poland.

Losing One's Head or Gaining a New Body?

A surgical head-transplant technique, HEAVEN, promises to offer significantly improved quality of life for quadriplegics and others whose minds are functional, but whose bodies require artificial support to continue living. HEAVEN putatively actualizes a thought-experiment long debated by philosophers concerning the definition of personhood and criterion of personal identity through time and change. HEAVEN's advocates presume to preserve the identity of the person whose head is transplanted onto another's living body, leaving one's previous body behind as one would their corpse. Various classical and contemporary theories of personhood and personal identity would support this presumption, while others would contest it as providing an accurate or complete view of what is essential for a human person to persist through this procedure. This paper brings such theories to bear in analyzing whether HEAVEN can indeed deliver on its promise of complete ontological survival for the person whose head is transplanted.

Brain Death as the End of a Human Organism as a Self-moving Whole

The biophilosophic justification for the idea that "brain death" (or total brain failure) is death needs to support two claims: (1) that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; (2) that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the "integrative unity" rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the "fundamental work" rationale put forward by the 2008 President's Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it.

Why DCD Donors Are Dead

Critics of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) argue that, even if donors are past the point of autoresuscitation, they have not satisfied the "irreversibility" requirement in the circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death, since their circulation and respiration could be artificially restored. Thus, removing their vital organs violates the "dead-donor" rule. I defend DCD donation against this criticism. I argue that practical medical-ethical considerations, including respect for do-not-resuscitate orders, support interpreting "irreversibility" to mean permanent cessation of circulation and respiration. Assuming a consciousness-related formulation of human death, I then argue that the loss of circulation and respiration is significant, because it leads to the permanent loss of consciousness and thus to the death of the human person. The DNR request by an organ donor should thus be interpreted to mean "do not restore to consciousness." Finally, I respond to an objection that if "irreversibility" has a medical-ethical meaning, it would entail the absurd possibility that one of two individuals in the same physical state could be alive and the other dead-an implication that some think is inconsistent with understanding death as an objective biological state of the organism. I argue that advances in medical technology have created phenomena that challenge the assumption that human death can be understood in strictly biological terms. I argue that ethical and ontological considerations about our nature bear on the definition and determination of death and thus on the permissibility of DCD.

Brain death in pregnancy: a systematic review focusing on perinatal outcomes

OBJECTIVE

Brain death (BD) during pregnancy might justify in select cases maternal somatic support to obtain fetal viability and maximize perinatal outcome. This study is a systematic review of the literature on cases of brain death in pregnancy with attempt to prolong pregnancy to assess perinatal outcomes.

DATA SOURCES

We performed a systematic review of the literature using Ovid MEDLINE, Scopus, PubMed (including Cochrane database), and CINHAIL from inception to April 2020.

STUDY ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

Relevant articles describing any case report of maternal brain death were identified from the aforementioned databases without any time, language, or study limitations. Studies were deemed eligible for inclusion if they described at least 1 case of maternal brain death.

METHODS

Only cases of brain death in pregnancy with maternal somatic support aimed at maximizing perinatal outcome were included. Maternal management strategy, diagnosis, clinical course, fetal monitoring, delivery, and fetal and neonatal outcome data were collected. Mean, range, standard deviation, and percentage calculations were used as applicable.

RESULTS

After exclusion, 35 cases of brain death in pregnancy were analyzed. The mean gestational age at diagnosis of brain death was at 20.2±5.3 weeks, and most cases (68%) were associated with maternal intracranial hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhage, and hematoma. The most common maternal complications during the study were infections (69%) (eg, pneumonia, urinary tract infection, sepsis), circulatory instability (63%), diabetes insipidus (56%), thermal variability (41%), and panhypopituitarism (34%). The most common indications for delivery were maternal cardiocirculatory instability (38%) and nonreassuring fetal testing (35%). The mean gestational age at delivery was 27.2±4.7 weeks and differed depending on the gestational age at diagnosis of brain death. Most deliveries (89%) were via cesarean delivery. There were 8 cases (23%) of intrauterine fetal demise in the second trimester of pregnancy (14-25 weeks), and 27 neonates (77%) were born alive. Of the 35 cases of brain in pregnancy, 8 neonates (23%) were described as "healthy" at birth, 15 neonates (43%) had normal longer-term follow-up (>1 month to 8 years; mean, 20.3 months), 2 neonates (6%) had neurologic sequelae (born at 23 and 24 weeks of gestation), and 2 neonates (6%) died (born at 25 and 27 weeks of gestation). Mean birth weight was 1,229 grams, and small for gestational age was present in 17% of neonates. The rate of live birth differed by gestational age at diagnosis of brain death: 50% at <14 weeks, 54.5% at 14 to 19 6/7 weeks, 91.7% at 20 to 23 6/7 weeks, 100% at 24 to 27 6/7 weeks, and 100% at 28 to 31 6/7 weeks.

CONCLUSION

In 35 cases of brain death in pregnancy at a mean gestation age of 20 weeks, maternal somatic support aimed at maximizing perinatal outcome lasted for about 7 weeks, with 77% of neonates being born alive and 85% of these infants having a normal outcome at 20 months of life. The data of this study will be helpful in counseling families and practitioners faced with such rare and complex cases.

Diagnosing death 50 years after the Harvard brain death report

More than 50 years after the publication of the Harvard Committee Report that sought to define death according to whole-brain function criteria, this document continues to generate a diversity of opinions regarding how death should be defined. The various perspectives show that doubts linger regarding when brain death should be diagnosed, the criteria to pinpoint the occurrence of death, and the alignment of medical practices seeking to establish human death with these criteria. This study reviews and assesses three perspectives that have made significant contributions to the debate. Attention is also given to definitions of death that depart from the recommendations of the Harvard Report. Appraisals of various arguments lead to the conclusion that changes in the definition of death have resulted from advances in knowledge of human biology, medical technology and diagnostic techniques. A commentary is included on expediting the time of death with the view of organ donation.

Are the irreversibly comatose still here? The destruction of brains and the persistence of persons

When an individual is comatose while parts of her brain remain functional, the question arises as to whether any mental characteristics are still associated with this brain, that is, whether the person still exists. Settling this uncertainty requires that one becomes clear about two issues: the type of functional loss that is associated with the respective profile of brain damage and the persistence conditions of persons. Medical case studies can answer the former question, but they are not concerned with the latter. Conversely, in the philosophical literature, various accounts of personal identity are discussed, but usually detached from any empirical basis. Only uniting the two debates and interpreting the real-life configurations of brain damage through the lens of the philosophical concepts enables one to make an informed judgment regarding the persistence of comatose persons. Especially challenging are cases in which three mental characteristics that normally occur together-wakefulness, awareness and memory storage-come apart. These shall be the focus of this paper.

Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death

Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.

How (not) to think of the 'dead-donor' rule

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don't Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Don't Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics-unlike today's critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward.

Somatic survival and organ donation among brain-dead patients in the state of Qatar

Background

The Qatari law, as in many other countries, uses brain death as the main criteria for organ donation and cessation of medical support. By contrast, most of the public in Qatar do not agree with the limitation or withdrawal of medical care until the time of cardiac death. The current study aims to examine the duration of somatic survival after brain death, organ donation rate in brain-dead patients as well as review the underlying etiologies and level of support provided in the state of Qatar.

Methods

This is a retrospective study of all patients diagnosed with brain death over a 10-year period conducted at the largest tertiary center in Qatar (Hamad General Hospital).

Results

Among the 53 patients who were diagnosed with brain death during the study period, the median and mean somatic survivals of brain-dead patients in the current study were 3 and 4.5 days respectively. The most common etiology was intracranial hemorrhage (45.3 %) followed by ischemic stroke (17 %). Ischemic stroke patients had a median survival of 11 days. Organ donation was accepted by only two families (6.6 %) of the 30 brain dead patients deemed suitable for organ donation.

Conclusion

The average somatic survival of brain-dead patients is less than one week irrespective of supportive measures provided. Organ donation rate was extremely low among brain-dead patients in Qatar. Improved public education may lead to significant improvement in resource utilization as well as organ transplant donors and should be a major target area of future health care policies.

Determination of death: Metaphysical and biomedical discourse

The prominence of biomedical criteria relying on brain death reduces the impact of metaphysical, anthropological, psychosocial, cultural, religious, and legal aspects disclosing the real value and essence of human life. The aim of this literature review is to discuss metaphysical and biomedical approaches toward death and their complimentary relationship in the determination of death. A critical appraisal of theoretical and scientific evidence and legal documents supported analytical discourse. In the metaphysical discourse of death, two main questions about what human death is and how to determine the fact of death clearly separate the ontological and epistemological aspects of death. During the 20th century, various understandings of human death distinguished two different approaches toward the human: the human is a subject of activities or a subject of the human being. Extinction of the difference between the entities and the being, emphasized as rational-logical instrumentation, is not sufficient to understand death thoroughly. Biological criteria of death are associated with biological features and irreversible loss of certain cognitive capabilities. Debating on the question "Does a brain death mean death of a human being?" two approaches are considering: the body-centrist and the mind-centrist. By bridging those two alternatives human death appears not only as biomedical, but also as metaphysical phenomenon. It was summarized that a predominance of clinical criteria for determination of death in practice leads to medicalization of death and limits the holistic perspective toward individual's death. Therefore, the balance of metaphysical and biomedical approaches toward death and its determination would decrease the medicalization of the concept of death.

Attitudes toward Death Criteria and Organ Donation among Healthcare Personnel and the General Public

Objective

To examine attitudes toward death criteria and their relation to attitudes and behaviors regarding organ donation.

Data Sources

This article reviews empirical studies on the attitudes of healthcare personnel and the general public regarding death criteria and organ donation.

Study Selection and Data Extraction

The review was restricted to studies that had as a primary focus attitudes toward 1 or more of the following 3 specific criteria for determining death: (1) brain death, the irreversible loss of all functions of the entire brain; (2) higher brain death, the loss of cerebral cortex function alone; and (3) the circulatory-respiratory criteria commonly used in donation after cardiac death.

Data Synthesis

Studies consistently show that the general public and some medical personnel are inadequately familiar with the legal and medical status of brain death; attitudes toward the dead donor rule are strong predictors of willingness to donate organs using controversial criteria; concerns about donation after cardiac death surround the withdrawal of life support more than the actual death criteria used; and concerns about death criteria correlate with less favorable attitudes toward organ donation.

Conclusions

Both general and ethical education may serve to guide policy and facilitate family member requests and informed consent dialogues. Furthermore, helping families to understand and accept not only medical and legal criteria for determining death, but also ethical criteria for withdrawing life support may help them be more comfortable with their decisions.

Are Brain Dead Individuals Dead? Grounds for Reasonable Doubt

According to the biological definition of death, a human body that has not lost the capacity to holistically organize itself is the body of a living human individual. Reasonable doubt against the conclusion that it has lost the capacity exists when the body appears to express it and no evidence to the contrary is sufficient to rule out reasonable doubt against the conclusion that the apparent expression is a true expression (i.e., when the conclusion that what appears to be holistic organization is in fact holistic organization remains a reasonable explanatory hypothesis in light of the best evidence to the contrary). This essay argues that the evidence and arguments against the conclusion that the signs of complex bodily integration exhibited in ventilated brain dead bodies are true expressions of somatic integration are unpersuasive; that is, they are not adequate to exclude reasonable doubt against the conclusion that BD bodies are dead. Since we should not treat as corpses what for all we know might be living human beings, it follows that we have an obligation to treat BD individuals as if they were living human beings.

A philosophical assessment of TK's autopsy report: Implications for the debate over the brain death criteria

In recent years, there has been increasing evidence that the totally brain-dead patient is able to continue to live and to maintain some integrated functions, albeit with the necessary assistance of mechanical ventilation. Several years ago, the autopsy report of a totally brain-dead patient named TK who was kept on life support for nearly twenty years was published in the Journal of Child Neurology. He remains the individual kept on life support the longest after suffering total brain failure. In this essay, I argue that the clinical data described in the autopsy report demonstrate that TK's long-term survival after total brain failure supports the claim acknowledged by the President's Council on Bioethics that the brain-dead patient retains his bodily integrity. As such, he is not dead. He is still a living, though severely disabled, human organism, a human person made in the image and likeness of God.

LAY SUMMARY

Traditionally, the presence or absence of bodily integration has been used to definitively discern the presence or absence of life in the human being where decomposition of the body is the surest sign of death. The autopsy report of a patient named TK who was brain-dead for nearly twenty years demonstrates that brain-dead patients retain their bodily integrity. As such, TK and other brain-dead patients are not dead. They are living, though severely disabled, human organisms, who are human persons made in the image and likeness of God.

Total Brain Death and the Integration of the Body Required of a Human Being

I develop and refine an argument for the total brain death criterion of death previously advanced by Germain Grisez and me: A human being is essentially a rational animal, and so must have a radical capacity for rational operations. For rational animals, conscious sensation is a pre-requisite for rational operation. But total brain death results in the loss of the radical capacity for conscious sensation, and so also for rational operations. Hence, total brain death constitutes a substantial change-the ceasing to be of the human being. Objections are considered, including the objection that total brain death need not result in the loss of capacity for sensation, and that damage to the brain less than total brain death can result in loss of capacity for rational operations.

The Brain Dead Patient Is Still Sentient: A Further Reply to Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez

Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez have argued that the total brain dead patient is still dead because the integrated entity that remains is not even an animal, not only because he is not sentient but also, and more importantly, because he has lost the radical capacity for sentience. In this essay, written from within and as a contribution to the Catholic philosophical tradition, I respond to Lee and Grisez's argument by proposing that the brain dead patient is still sentient because an animal with an intact but severed spinal cord can still perceive and respond to external stimuli. The brain dead patient is an unconscious sentient organism.

Of wholes and parts: A Thomistic refutation of "Brain Death"

I propose a refutation of the two major arguments that support the concept of "brain death" as an ontological equivalent to death of the human organism. I begin with a critique of the notion that a body part, such as the brain, could act as "integrator" of a whole body. I then proceed with a rebuttal of the argument that destruction of a body part essential for rational operations-such as the brain-necessarily entails that the remaining whole is indisposed to accrue a rational soul. Next, I point to the equivocal use of the terms "alive" or "living" as being at the root of conceptual errors about brain death. I appeal to the Thomistic definition of life and to the hylomorphic concept of "virtual presence" to clarify this confusion. Finally, I show how the Thomistic definition of life supports the traditional criterion for the determination of death. Lay summary: By the mid-1960s, medical technology became available that could keep "alive" the bodies of patients who had sustained complete and irreversible brain injury. The concept of "brain death" emerged to describe such states. Physicians, philosophers, and ethicists then proposed that the state of brain death is equivalent to the state of death traditionally identified by the absence of spontaneous pulse and respiration. This article challenges the major philosophical arguments that have been advanced to draw this equivalence.

A Thomistic defense of whole-brain death

Michel Accad critiques the currently accepted whole-brain criterion for determining the death of a human being from a Thomistic metaphysical perspective and, in so doing, raises objections to a particular argument defending the whole-brain criterion by Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez. In this paper, I will respond to Accad's critique of the whole-brain criterion and defend its continued validity as a criterion for determining when a human being's death has occurred in accord with Thomistic metaphysical principles. I will, however, join Accad in criticizing Lee and Grisez's proposed defense of the whole-brain criterion as potentially leading to erroneous conclusions regarding the determination of human death. Lay summary: Catholic physicians and bioethicists currently debate the legally accepted clinical standard for determining when a human being has died-known as the "wholebrain criterion"-which has also been morally affirmed by the Magisterium. This paper responds to physician Michel Accad's critique of the whole-brain criterion based upon St. Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical account of human nature as a union of a rational soul and a material body. I defend the whole-brain criterion from the same Thomistic philosophical perspective, while agreeing with Accad's objection to an alternative Thomistic defense of whole-brain death by philosophers Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez.

Anaesthesia, amnesia and harm

Anaesthesia causes unconsciousness by suppressing neural mechanisms mediating arousal and awareness. It also causes amnesia by disrupting mechanisms of memory consolidation. Some patients under general anaesthesia unexpectedly become aware during surgery and form a traumatic memory of their experience. After describing the neural underpinning of phenomenal consciousness and memory, I examine the respects in which patients who experience anaesthesia awareness can be harmed by it. In cases where awareness is detected intraoperatively, I consider whether an anaesthetist would be justified in administering a drug to prevent a memory of the experience, as well as reasons for and against preoperatively informing patients of the possibility of awareness. In cases where awareness is reported postoperatively, I consider reasons for taking a drug to erase a memory of awareness against reasons for retaining the memory. A decision to take or decline such a drug would be informed by the potential harm of these memories and the potential benefits and risks of drugs intended to erase them.

Brainstem death: A comprehensive review in Indian perspective

With the advent of cardiopulmonary resuscitation techniques, the cardiopulmonary definition of death lost its significance in favor of brain death. Brain death is a permanent cessation of all functions of the brain in which though individual organs may function but lack of integrating function of the brain, lack of respiratory drive, consciousness, and cognition confirms to the definition that death is an irreversible cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole. In spite of medical and legal acceptance globally, the concept of brain death and brain-stem death is still unclear to many. Brain death is not promptly declared due to lack of awareness and doubts about the legal procedure of certification. Many brain dead patients are kept on life supporting systems needlessly. In this comprehensive review, an attempt has been made to highlight the history and concept of brain death and brain-stem death; the anatomical and physiological basis of brain-stem death, and criteria to diagnose brain-stem death in India.

Whither brain death?

The publicity surrounding the recent McMath and Muñoz cases has rekindled public interest in brain death: the familiar term for human death determination by showing the irreversible cessation of clinical brain functions. The concept of brain death was developed decades ago to permit withdrawal of therapy in hopeless cases and to permit organ donation. It has become widely established medical practice, and laws permit it in all U.S. jurisdictions. Brain death has a biophilosophical justification as a standard for determining human death but remains poorly understood by the public and by health professionals. The current controversies over brain death are largely restricted to the academy, but some practitioners express ambivalence over whether brain death is equivalent to human death. Brain death remains an accepted and sound concept, but more work is necessary to establish its biophilosophical justification and to educate health professionals and the public.

The definition and criterion of death

The definition and criterion of death have been rendered ambiguous by developments in organ support technology, particularly the positive-pressure ventilator and vasopressor medications, that uncouple the unitary loss of vital functions in death and create cases in which the brain has been destroyed while circulation and ventilation can be supported. Developing a biophilosophic analysis of the meaning of death before physicians can declare it requires four sequential steps: (1) agreement on the paradigm conditions that frame the analysis and clarify the task; (2) identifying the definition of death, which makes explicit the meaning of death that is accepted in our consensual usage of the term but that has become obscured by technology; (3) identifying the criterion of death that shows that the definition has been fulfilled, and that can be incorporated into a death statute; and (4) devising bedside tests of death for physicians to perform to satisfy the criterion. Although there is a strong consensus on death determination medical standards in countries around the world that has been enshrined into laws, and accepted by most societies and religions, there remains an active dispute among scholars on the precise definition and criterion of death.

Diagnosis of brain death

Brain death (BD) should be understood as the ultimate clinical expression of a brain catastrophe characterized by a complete and irreversible neurological stoppage, recognized by irreversible coma, absent brainstem reflexes, and apnea. The most common pattern is manifested by an elevation of intracranial pressure to a point beyond the mean arterial pressure, and hence cerebral perfusion pressure falls and, as a result, no net cerebral blood flow is present, in due course leading to permanent cytotoxic injury of the intracranial neuronal tissue. A second mechanism is an intrinsic injury affecting the nervous tissue at a cellular level which, if extensive and unremitting, can also lead to BD. We review here the methodology of diagnosing death, based on finding any of the signs of death. The irreversible loss of cardio-circulatory and respiratory functions can cause death only when ischemia and anoxia are prolonged enough to produce an irreversible destruction of the brain. The sign of such loss of brain functions, that is to say BD diagnosis, is fully reviewed.

Can we handle the truth? Legal fictions in the determination of death

Advances in life-saving technologies in the past few decades have challenged our traditional understandings of death. People can be maintained on life-support even after permanently losing the ability to breathe spontaneously and remaining unconscious and unable to interact meaningfully with others. In part because this group of people could help fulfill the growing need for organ donation, there has been a great deal of pressure on the way we determine death. The determination of death has been modified from the old way of understanding death as occurring when a person stops breathing, her heart stops beating, and she is cold to the touch. Today, physicians determine death by relying on a diagnosis of total brain failure or by waiting a short while after circulation stops. Evidence has emerged that the conceptual bases for these approaches to determining death are fundamentally flawed and depart substantially from our biological and common-sense understandings of death. We argue that the current approach to determining death consists of two different types of unacknowledged legal fictions. These legal fictions were developed for practices that are largely ethically legitimate but need to be reconciled with the law. However, the considerable debate over the determination of death in the medical and scientific literature has not informed the public of the fact that our current determinations of death do not adequately establish that a person has died. It seems unlikely that this information can remain hidden for long. Given the instability of the status quo and the difficulty of making the substantial legal changes required by complete transparency, we argue for a second-best policy solution of acknowledging the legal fictions involved in determining death. This move in the direction of greater transparency may someday result in allowing us to face squarely these issues and effect the legal changes necessary to permit ethically appropriate vital organ transplantation. Finally, this paper also provides the beginnings of a taxonomy of legal fictions, concluding that a more systematic theoretical treatment of legal fictions is warranted to understand their advantages and disadvantages across a variety of legal domains.

Brain death, states of impaired consciousness, and physician-assisted death for end-of-life organ donation and transplantation

In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. (1) Brain death does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. (2) Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism's death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. (3) Brain-based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. (4) Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. (5) The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs.

A survey to determine the understanding of the conceptual basis and diagnostic tests used for brain death by neurosurgeons in Canada

OBJECTIVE

To determine the understanding of the conceptual basis and diagnostic tests used for brain death (BD) by neurosurgeons in Canada.

METHODS

Between February and June 2006, a previously developed survey was mailed to every neurosurgeon in Canada.

RESULTS

Of 223 surveys mailed, 147 (66%) were returned; of these, 128 (87%) were completed and analyzed. When asked to choose a conceptual reason to explain why BD is equivalent to death, 50 (39%) chose a higher brain concept, 50 (39%) chose a prognosis concept, and 33 (26%) chose a loss of integration of the organism concept. More than half of respondents answered that BD is not compatible with electroencephalographic activity or brainstem evoked potential activity. More than one-third of respondents answered that some cerebral blood flow or a brainstem with minimal microscopic damage was not compatible with BD. Of the 90 respondents who answered that they were comfortable diagnosing BD because the conceptual basis of BD makes it equivalent to death of the patient, in their own words, 14 (16%) used a loss of integration concept, 20 (22%) used a prognosis concept, 25 (28%) used a higher brain concept, and 39 (43%) did not articulate a concept. When asked, "Are brain death and cardiac death the same state (i.e., are both death of the patient)?," 57 (45%) answered "No."

CONCLUSION

Within the neurosurgical community, a stand-alone concept of BD does not exist. There is also significant variability in the understanding of the tests that are compatible with the criterion of BD.

'Brain death': should it be reconsidered?

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate whether current clinical criteria and confirmatory tests for the diagnosis of 'brain death' satisfy the requirements for the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain including the brainstem.

DATA SOURCES

Medical, philosophical and legal literature on the subject of 'brain death'.

DATA EXTRACTION/SYNTHESIS

We present four arguments to support the view that patients who meet the current operational criteria of 'brain death' do not necessarily have the irreversible loss of all brain (or brainstem) functions. First, many clinically 'brain-dead' patients maintain residual vegetative functions that are mediated or coordinated by the brain or the brainstem. Second, it is impossible to test for any cerebral function by clinical bedside exam, because the tracts of passage to and from the cerebrum through the brainstem are destroyed or nonfunctional. Furthermore, since there are limitations of clinical assessment of internal awareness in patients who otherwise lack the motor function to show their awareness, the diagnosis of 'brain death' is based on an unproved hypothesis. Third, many patients maintain several stereotyped movements (the so-called complex spinal cord responses and automatisms) which may originate in the brainstem. Fourth, not one of the current confirmatory tests has the necessary positive predictive value for the reliable pronouncement of human death.

CONCLUSION

According to the above arguments, the assumption that all functions of the entire brain (or those of the brainstem) in 'brain-dead' patients have ceased, is invalidated. Reconsideration of the current concept of 'brain death' is perhaps inevitable.

Ethics review: dark angels--the problem of death in intensive care

Critical care medicine has expanded the envelope of debilitating disease through the application of an aggressive and invasive care plan, part of which is designed to identify and reverse organ dysfunction before it proceeds to organ failure. For a select patient population, this care plan has been remarkably successful. But because patient selection is very broad, critical care sometimes yields amalgams of life in death: the state of being unable to participate in human life, unable to die, at least in the traditional sense. This work examines the emerging paradox of somatic versus brain death and why it matters to medical science.

The death of whole-brain death: the plague of the disaggregators, somaticists, and mentalists

In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration-a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view-can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major themes. First, it accepts the claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death.

Potentiality, irreversibility, and death

There has been growing concern about whether individuals who satisfy neurological criteria for death or who become non-heart-beating organ donors are really dead. This concern has focused on the issue of the potential for recovery that these individuals may still have and whether their conditions are irreversible. In this article I examine the concepts of potentiality and irreversibility that have been invoked in the discussions of the definition of death and non-heart-beating organ donation. I initially focus on the recent challenge by D. Alan Shewmon to accepting any neurological criterion of death. I argue that Shewmon relies on a problematic and unrealistic concept of potentiality, and that a better, more realistic concept of potentiality is consistent with accepting a neurological criterion for death. I then turn to an analysis of how the concept of irreversibility has been used in discussion of non-heart-beating organ donation. Similarly, I argue that some participants in this discussion have invoked a problematic and unrealistic concept of irreversibility. I then propose an alternative, more realistic account of irreversibility that explains how "irreversibility" should be understood in the definition and criteria of death.

Irreversible apnoeic coma 35 years later. Towards a more rigorous definition of brain death?

The concept of brain death (BD) has been widely accepted by medical and lay communities in the Western world and is the basis of policies of organ retrieval for transplantation from brain-dead donors. Nevertheless, concerns still exist over various aspects of the clinical condition it refers to. They include the utilitarian origin of the concept, the substantial international variation in BD definitions and criteria, the equivalence between BD and the donor's biological death, the practice of retrieving organs from donors who are not brain-dead (as in non-heart-beating organ donor protocols), the proposal to abandon the dead donor rule and attempts to overcome these problems by adapting rules and definitions. Suggesting that BD, as it was originally proposed by the Harvard Committee, is more a moral than a scientific concept, we argue that current criteria do not empirically justify the definition of BD; yet they consistently identify a clinical condition in which organ retrieval can be morally and socially justified. We propose to revert to the old term of "irreversible coma" or, better yet, of "irreversible apnoeic coma", thus abandoning the presumption of diagnosing the death of all intracranial neurons and/or the patient's biological death. On the other hand, we think that a (re)definition of the vital status of donors identified on neurological criteria can only occur through a prior (re)definition of death, a task which is not only medical but societal.

Role of brain death and the dead-donor rule in the ethics of organ transplantation

The "dead-donor rule" requires patients to be declared dead before the removal of life-sustaining organs for transplantation. The concept of brain death was developed, in part, to allow patients with devastating neurologic injury to be declared dead before the occurrence of cardiopulmonary arrest. Brain death is essential to current practices of organ retrieval because it legitimates organ removal from bodies that continue to have circulation and respiration, thereby avoiding ischemic injury to the organs. The concept of brain death has long been recognized, however, to be plagued with serious inconsistencies and contradictions. Indeed, the concept fails to correspond to any coherent biological or philosophical understanding of death. We review the evidence and arguments that expose these problems and present an alternative ethical framework to guide the procurement of transplantable organs. This alternative is based not on brain death and the dead-donor rule, but on the ethical principles of nonmaleficence (the duty not to harm, or primum non nocere) and respect for persons. We propose that individuals who desire to donate their organs and who are either neurologically devastated or imminently dying should be allowed to donate their organs, without first being declared dead. Advantages of this approach are that (unlike the dead-donor rule) it focuses on the most salient ethical issues at stake, and (unlike the concept of brain death) it avoids conceptual confusion and inconsistencies. Finally, we point out parallel developments, both domestically and abroad, that reflect both implicit and explicit support for our proposal.

Interview with Dr Joseph Murray (by Francis L Delmonico)

The Editors asked Dr Delmonico to interview Dr Joseph Murray, winner of the Nobel prize in Medicine 1990 for performing the first successful renal transplant, to record recollections of the issues of the 1950s, when clinical transplantation was born, on Dr Murray's medical career in transplantation, and on some contemporary issues.

Consciousness as a definition of death: its appeal and complexity

A new formulation of death proposed in this study is based on the basic physiopathological mechanisms of consciousness generation in human beings. Two physiological components control conscious behavior: arousal and awareness (content of consciousness). We cannot simply differentiate and locate arousal as a function of the ascending reticular activating system and awareness as a function of the cerebral cortex. Substantial interconnections among the brainstem, subcortical structures and the neocortex, are essential for subserving and integrating both components of human consciousness. Therefore, consciousness does not bear a simple one-to-one relationship with higher or lower brain structures, because the physical substratum for consciousness is based on anatomy and physiology throughout the brain. This new account of human death is based on the irreversible loss of consciousness because it provides the key human attributes and the highest level of control in the hierarchy of integrating functions within the organism. The notion of consciousness as the ultimate integrative function is more consistent with the biologically-based systems than the more philosophically-based notions of personhood.