Altruistic and self-serving goals modulate behavioral and neural responses in deception

Different neural correlates of deception: Crafting high and low creative scams

Deception is a complex social behavior that manifests in various forms, including scams. To successfully deceive victims, liars have to continually devise novel scams. This ability to create novel scams represents one kind of malevolent creativity, referred to as lying. This study aimed to explore different neural substrates involved in the generation of high and low creative scams. A total of 40 participants were required to design several creative scams, and their cortical activity was recorded by functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The results revealed that the right frontopolar cortex (FPC) was significantly active in scam generation. This region associated with theory of mind may be a key region for creating novel and complex scams. Moreover, creativity-related regions were positively involved in creative scams, while morality-related areas showed negative involvement. This suggests that individuals might attempt to use malevolent creativity while simultaneously minimizing the influence of moral considerations. The right FPC exhibited increased coupling with the right precentral gyrus during the design of high-harmfulness scams, suggesting a diminished control over immoral thoughts in the generation of harmful scams. Additionally, the perception of the victim's emotions (related to right pre-motor cortex) might diminish the quality of highly original scams. Furthermore, an efficient and cohesive neural coupling state appears to be a key factor in generating high-creativity scams. These findings suggest that the right FPC was crucial in scam creation, highlighting a neural basis for balancing malevolent creativity against moral considerations in high-creativity deception.

Anterior N2 enhancement is not a general electrophysiological index of concealed information

Event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used with the concealed information test (CIT) to detect concealed recognition of specific stimuli (i.e., "probes"). While most research has focused on the P300 component, which is larger for infrequent probes than for frequent control stimuli (i.e., "irrelevants"), some studies have investigated an earlier ERP component, the anterior N2, with mixed results. Although some studies have reported a larger anterior N2 for probes than irrelevants (N2 enhancement), other studies, including our own, have not found such an effect. The present study aimed to replicate and extend our previous findings using the same CIT paradigm and measurement parameters. Results of Bayesian analyses show strong evidence against the hypothesis of anterior N2 enhancement by probes, replicating our previous work. Bayesian analyses also show strong evidence against the hypothesis of N2 enhancement for the three components revealed by a temporal principal component analysis (PCA) conducted to disentangle potentially overlapping ERP effects. In conclusion, whereas the CIT has shown promise in detecting recognition of specific information, anterior N2 enhancement cannot be used as an electrophysiological measure of concealed information across CIT paradigms.

How effort-based self-interest motivation shapes altruistic donation behavior and brain responses

Prosocial behaviors are central to individual and societal well-being. Although the relationship between effort and prosocial behavior is increasingly studied, the impact of effort-based self-interested motivation on prosocial behavior has received less attention. In the current study, we carried out two experiments to examine the effect of motivation to obtain a reward for oneself on donation behavior and brain response. We observed that individuals who accumulated more money in the effort-expenditure rewards task (EEfRT) donated a lower proportion of their earnings. The sigmoid model fitted participants' choices in the EEfRT task, and the effort-reward bias and sigma parameters negatively correlated with the amount of money donated in the donation task. Additionally, the effort-reward bias and sigma parameters negatively predicted N2 amplitude during processing of charitable donation-related information. We propose that individuals who exhibit a lower level of effort-based self-interest motivation may allocate more cognitive control or attentional resources when processing information related to charitable donations. Our work adds weight to understanding the relationship between effort-based self-interest motivation and prosocial behavior and provides electrophysiological evidence.

The effect of experiences of fairness on honest behavior: a behavioral and neural study

Prior studies have investigated the relationship between fairness and honesty. However, the differences in the focus of these studies have rendered cross-comparisons between them challenging and of limited value. Thus, this study explored how fairness impacts honest decision-making, focusing specifically on the effect of individuals' experiences of fairness on their honest behavior. Experiment 1 explored the influence of different experiences of fairness on honest behavior in an altruistic context. In Experiment 2, we measured event-related potentials to further demonstrate the brain mechanisms of these experiences on altruistic dishonest behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that the reaction time for dishonest behavior was shorter for individuals who had positive unfairness experiences with high altruistic objects compared to low altruistic objects. Individuals who had negative unfairness experiences had shorter reaction times when engaging in dishonest behaviors for the sake of high altruistic objects compared to those with equitable experiences. In Experiment 2, in which there was an opportunity to lie for a highly altruistic object, those with fair experiences had greater N2 volatility and smaller P3 volatility than those with positive unfairness experiences. These findings highlight the value of integrating moral psychology and behavioral economics. Discriminant validity across fairness experiences can help illuminate the different motivations behind moral decisions.

Mothers exhibit higher neural activity in gaining rewards for their children than for themselves

Are people willing to exert greater effort to obtain rewards for their children than they are for themselves? Although previous studies have demonstrated that social distance influences neural responses to altruistic reward processing, the distinction between winning rewards for oneself and winning them for one's child is unclear. In the present study, a group of 31 mothers performed a monetary incentive delay task in which cue-induced reward anticipations of winning a reward for themselves, their children and donation to a charity program were manipulated trial-wise, followed by performance-contingent feedback. Behaviorally, the anticipation of winning a reward for their children accelerated participants' responses. Importantly, the electroencephalogram results revealed that across the reward anticipation and consumption phases, the child condition elicited comparable or higher brain responses of participants than the self condition did. The source localization results showed that participants' reward anticipations for their children were associated with more activation in the social brain regions, compared to winning a reward for themselves or a charity donation. Overall, these findings advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms of altruistic reward processing and suggest that the priority of winning a reward for one's child may transcend the limits of the self-advantage effect in reward processing.

Does deception involve more cognitive control than truth-telling? Meta-analyses of N2 and MFN ERP studies

A number of psychological theories propose that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Over the last decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to unravel this question, but the findings are mixed. To address this controversy, two meta-analyses were conducted to quantify the results of existing studies reporting N2 or medial frontal negativity (MFN) associated with deception. In total, 32 papers consisting of 1091 participants were included, which yielded 32 effect sizes for N2 and 7 effect sizes for MFN. We found that deception was associated with a more negative N2 and MFN than truth-telling with medium and large effect sizes (r = .25 and .51, respectively). We also found that the deception paradigm modulated the results (p = .043), but found no evidence for publication bias. Our findings indicate that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Our review also identifies gaps in this literature, including a need for more ERP studies using spontaneous deception.

The influence of altruistic personality, interpersonal distance and social observation on prosocial behavior: An event-related potential (ERP) study

The psychological mechanisms that high and low altruists exhibit in different contexts remain unknown. This study examined the underlying mechanisms of the effect of altruistic personality, social observation, and interpersonal distance on prosocial behavior using event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants with high and low altruism were asked to make prosocial or non-prosocial choices toward different interpersonal distances (friends, acquaintances, or strangers) under the (non)observer condition. The electrophysiological responses to the choice stimuli were simultaneously recorded. The behavioral results demonstrated that high altruists had more prosocial choices, and these choices were unaffected by interpersonal distance and social observation. However, low altruists made more prosocial choices toward friends and acquaintances under the observer than nonobserver conditions, whereas their prosocial choices toward strangers showed no difference. The ERP results demonstrated that low altruists showed more negative N2 when the choice stimuli were toward strangers and acquaintances or under the nonobserver condition. Furthermore, low altruists showed larger P3 under the observer than nonobserver conditions when the choice stimuli were toward friends and acquaintances, while this difference was absent when the choice stimuli were toward strangers. However, for high altruists, no effect of interpersonal distance and social observation was observed in N2 and P3. These results suggest that the prosocial behavior of low altruists is mainly driven by reputational incentives, whereas high altruists are primarily motivated by concern about the well-being of others. Our findings provide insights into the prosocial behavior of high and low altruists in different contexts and support the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

The effects of ritual and self-control resources depletion on deceptive behavior: Evidence from behavioral and ERPs studies

Although researchers have indicated that individuals with depleted self-control resources have lower self-control behavior and exhibit more deceptive behaviors, recent psychological studies have shown that ritual can improve self-control and increase the likelihood that the individual makes prosocial decisions. However, little is known about whether ritual can regulate an individual's engagement in deceptive behavior when their self-control resources are depleted. This study adopted the spot-the-difference task to investigate the influences of ritual and self-control resources depletion on simple self-control behavior and deceptive behavior (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2); furthermore, relevant neural processes were explored using event-related potentials (Experiment 3). Experiment 1 showed that individuals with depleted self-control resources had lower self-control behavior and individuals performing a ritual had higher self-control behavior. Experiment 2 showed that individuals with depleted self-control resources exhibited more deceptive behaviors and individuals performing a ritual exhibited fewer deceptive behaviors; furthermore, ritual reduced deceptive behaviors in individuals with depleted self-control resources. Experiment 3 found that individuals with depleted self-control resources had larger P2 amplitudes after performing a ritual. Moreover, individuals with depleted self-control resources had larger LPP amplitudes over parietal sites after performing a ritual. These findings suggested that performing ritual may be an effective measure of inhibiting individuals with depleted self-control resources from engaging in deceptive behavior. Our findings verify the ego-depletion model and provide a new perspective for reducing deceptive behaviors in individuals with depleted self-control resources. We provide evidence that rituals could modulate deceptive behaviors in individuals with depleted self-control resources. This reveals that performing rituals may be an effective measure for inhibiting individuals with depleted self-control resources from engaging in deceptive behavior.

Influence of advisees' facial feedback on subsequent advice-giving by advisors: Evidence from the behavioral and neurophysiological approach

Previous work has demonstrated the interpersonal implications of advisees' decisions (acceptance or rejection) on advisors' advice-giving behavior in subsequent exchanges. Here, using an ERP technique, we investigated how advisees' facial feedback (smiling, neutral, or frowning) accompanying their decisions (acceptance or rejection) influenced advisors' feedback evaluation from advisees and their advice-giving in subsequent exchanges. Behaviorally, regardless of whether the advice was accepted or rejected, advisors who received smiling-expression feedback would show higher willingness rates in subsequent advice-giving decisions, while advisors who received frowning-expression feedback would show lower willingness rates. On the neural level, in the feedback evaluation stage, the FRN and P3 responses were not sensitive to facial feedback. In contrast, frowning-expression feedback elicited a larger LPC amplitude than neutral- and smiling-expression feedback, regardless of whether the advice was accepted or rejected. In the advice decision stage, advisors who received neutral-expression feedback showed a larger N2 in making decisions than advisors who received frowning-expression feedback only after the advice was rejected. Additionally, Advisors who received smiling- and neutral-expression feedback showed a larger P3 in making decisions than advisors who received frowning-expression feedback only after the advice was accepted. In sum, the current findings extended previous research findings by showing that the effect of advisees' facial expressions on the advisors' advice-giving existed in multiple stages, including both the feedback evaluation stage and the advice decision stage.

Self-deception: Distorted metacognitive process in ambiguous contexts

As one of the commonly used folk psychological concepts, self-deception has been intensively discussed yet is short of solid ground from cognitive neuroscience. Self-deception is a biased cognitive process of information to obtain or maintain a false belief that could be both self-enhancing or self-diminishing. Study 1 (N = 152) captured self-deception by adopting a modified numerical discrimination task that provided cheating opportunities, quantifying errors in predicting future performance (via item-response theory model), and measuring the belief of how good they are at solving the task (i.e., self-efficacy belief). By examining whether self-efficacy belief is based upon actual ability (true belief) or prediction errors (false belief), Study 1 showed that self-deception occurred in the effortless (easier access to answer cues) rather than effortful (harder access to answer cues) cheating opportunity conditions, suggesting high ambiguity in attributions facilitates self-deception. Studies 2 and 3 probed the neural source of self-deception, linking self-deception with the metacognitive process. Both studies replicated behavioral results from Study 1. Study 2 (ERP study; N = 55) found that the amplitude of frontal slow wave significantly differed between participants with positive/self-enhancing and negative/self-diminishing self-deceiving tendencies in incorrect predictions while remaining similar in correct predictions. Study 3 (functional magnetic resonance imaging study; N = 33) identified self-deceiving associated activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and showed that effortless cheating context increased cheating behaviors that further facilitated self-deception. Our findings suggest self-deception is a false belief associated with a distorted metacognitive mental process that requires ambiguity in attributions of behaviors.

Brain Regions Activity During a Deceitful Monetary Game: An fMRI Study

: Finding neural correlates underlying deception may have implementations in judicial, security, and financial settings. Telling a successful lie may activate different brain regions associated with risk evaluation, subsequent reward/punishment possibility, decision-making, and theory of mind (ToM). Many other protocols have been developed to study individuals who proceed with deception under instructed laboratory conditions. However, no protocol has practiced lying in a real-life environment. We performed a functional MRI using a 3Tesla machine on 31 healthy individuals to detect the participants who successfully lie in a previously-designed game to earn or lose the monetary reward. The results revealed that lying results in an augmented activity in the right dorsolateral and right dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, the right inferior parietal lobule, bilateral inferior frontal gyri, and right anterior cingulate cortex. The findings would contribute to forensic practices regarding the detection of a deliberate lie. They may also have implications for guilt detection, social cognition, and the societal notions of responsibility.

Resting-state functional connectivity of social brain regions predicts motivated dishonesty

Motivated dishonesty is a typical social behavior varying from person to person. Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) is capable of identifying unique patterns from functional connectivity (FC) between brain regions. Recent work has built a link between brain networks in resting state to dishonesty in Western participants. To determine and reproduce the relevant neural patterns and build an interpretable model to predict dishonesty, we analyzed two conceptually similar datasets containing rsfMRI data with different dishonesty tasks. Both tasks implemented the information-passing paradigm, in which monetary rewards were employed to induce dishonesty. We applied connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) to build a model among FC within and between four social brain networks (reward, self-referential, moral, and cognitive control). The CPM analysis indicated that FCs of social brain networks are predictive of dishonesty rate, especially FCs within reward network, and between self-referential and cognitive control networks. Our study offers an conceptual replication with integrated model to predict dishonesty with rsfMRI, and the results suggest that frequent motivated dishonest decisions may require the higher engagement of social brain regions.

Mentalizing During Social Interaction: The Development and Validation of the Interactive Mentalizing Questionnaire

Studies have shown that during social interaction a shared system underlies inferring one’s own mental state, and the mental states of others – processes often referred to as mentalization. However, no validated assessment has been developed to measure second order mentalization (one’s beliefs about how transparent one’s thoughts are to others), or whether this capacity plays a significant role in social interaction. The current work presents a interactive mentalization theory, which divides these directional and second order aspects of mentalization, and investigates whether these constructs are measurable, stable, and meaningful in social interactions. We developed a 20-item, self-report interactive mentalization questionnaire (IMQ) in order to assess the different sub-components of mentalization: self–self, self–other, and other–self mentalization (Study 1). We then tested this scale on a large, online sample, and report convergent and discriminant validity in the form of correlations with other measures (Study 2), as well as correlations with social deception behaviors in real online interaction with Mturk studies (Study 3 and Study 4). These results validate the IMQ, and support the idea that these three factors can predict mentalization in social interaction.

Exposure to money modulates the processing of charitable donation: An event-related potentials study

Exposure to monetary cues might affect charitable donations, but little is known about how monetary cues affect charitable donations from the neural perspective. The present study examined the effect of monetary cues on charitable donations by means of event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants primed with monetary or neutral images decided whether to accept donation offers with the high, moderate, and low costs. The behavioural results showed that in the money-primed condition, participants took more time to decide for the high-cost than for the moderate and low-cost donation offers. The ERP results showed that the P2 and P3 were larger in the money-primed condition relative to the neutral images condition. Notably, participants primed with money demonstrated larger P3 for the high-cost donation offers than for the moderate and low-cost offers, but this difference was not observed in the control condition. These findings indicate that people primed with money may pay more attention to the cost-relevant information related to their self-interests when conducting prosocial behaviours.

Neural Representation in mPFC Reveals Hidden Selfish Motivation in White Lies

Identifying true motivation for Pareto lies, which are mutually beneficial for both the liar and others, can be challenging because different covert motivations can lead to identical overt behavior. In this study, we adopted a brain-fingerprinting approach, combining both univariate and multivariate analyses to estimate individual measures of selfish motivation in Pareto lies by the degree of multivoxel neural representation in the mPFC for Pareto lies conforming with those for selfish versus altruistic lies in human participants of either sex. An increase in selfish motivation for Pareto lies was associated with higher mean-level activity in both ventral and rostral mPFC. The former showed an increased pattern similarity to selfish lies, and the latter showed a decreased pattern similarity to altruistic lies. Higher ventral mPFC pattern similarity predicted faster response time in Pareto lies. Our findings demonstrated that hidden selfish motivation in white lies can be revealed by neural representation in the mPFC.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT True motivation for dishonesty serving both self and others cannot be accurately discerned from observed behaviors. Here we showed that fMRI combining both univariate and multivariate analyses can be effectively used to reveal hidden selfish motivation of Pareto lies serving both self and others. The present study suggests that selfish motivation for prosocial dishonesty is encoded primarily by increased activity of the ventromedial and the rostromedial prefrontal cortex, representing intuitive self-serving valuation and strategic switching of motivation depending on beneficiary of dishonesty, respectively.

Intranasal vasopressin expedites dishonesty in women

As an integral ingredient of human sociality, dishonesty can be both egocentric and altruistic, as well as gradually escalate. Here, we examined the influence of arginine vasopressin (AVP), a neuropeptide associated with human prosocial behaviors, on dishonest behaviors in men and women. In this double-blind and placebo-controlled study, 101 participants were randomized to administration of either 20 IU intranasal AVP or placebo. We used a two-party task to manipulate the incentive structure of dishonesty in the way of self-/other-serving repeatedly. For lies that benefit both themselves and others, women receiving intranasal AVP lied more than women receiving intranasal placebo and men receiving intranasal AVP. The dishonest behavior of women treated with AVP gradually escalated with repetition over time. These results suggest that AVP selectively regulates the escalation of dishonesty in women, contingent on the motivation of dishonesty. Our findings provide insight into gender-specific modulations of AVP on human dishonest behavior.

Neural responses of in-group "favoritism" and out-group "discrimination" toward moral behaviors

People hate being deceived. However, what would it be if lies come from in-group members compared with that from out-group members? In the current Electroencephalography (EEG) study, we recruited thirty-six participants to play a modified estimator and advisor game to investigate the mental and neural processes to lies and truth conveyed by in-group and out-group members. At the behavioral level, lies are less morally acceptable, arose less positive emotion, and made participants distribute less money to the advisor in a dictator game. Meanwhile, participants liked the in-group university more than the out-group university and they thought they were more similar to in-group members than to out-group members. However, there were no significant interactions of group type (i.e., in-group and out-group) and message type (i.e., lies and truth) in the aforementioned behavioral assessments. At the neural level, significant interaction effects were found in the parietal N1 and P3 amplitude. More importantly, no significant N1 and P3 amplitude differences between in-group lies and truth were found, while outgroup lies elicited larger P3 amplitude than outgroup truth and out-group truth elicited larger N1 amplitude than outgroup lies. What's more, P3 amplitude differences between lies vs. truth positively correlated with fairness scores only in the in-group condition but not in the out-group condition. Current study showed that the P3 component was sensitive in capturing subtle differences when participants were processing different types of lies and truth that could not be captured by behavioral measurements. Besides, the fairness trait modulated the in-group bias related P3 patterns. The current study provides insight into the neurobiological mechanism underlying the mental process of in-group and out-group lies and truth, and suggests individuals' tendency of general in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination toward moral behaviors.

Social hierarchies in third-party punishment: A behavioral and ERP study

Third-party punishment refers to the punishment imposed by a party whose benefit is not directly affected by any norm violations. The present study using a modified Dictator Game explored how social statuses of the involved parties modulate punishment decisions of a third-party. Systematic manipulation of the dictators' and recipients' status revealed that: higher recipient status correlated with more severe punishment, but no effect of the dictator's. We further focused on the neural underlying of this effect using ERPs. An interaction of recipient's status × fairness was observed on MFN such that only for a high-status recipient, larger amplitude was triggered by unfair offers comparing to fair offers. On LPC, the largest amplitude was observed when the offer was fair and the recipient had medium-status. These findings suggested: participants consider unfair offers proposed to high-status recipients as more norm-violating and they may evaluate the offers from the perspective of the recipient.

The effect of air pollution on convenience-based or other-oriented lies

Besides endangering human health, air pollution has profound effects on individuals’ cognition, emotions, and behavior. Previous studies have found that air pollution could increase self-oriented lies. We summarized two explanations for this phenomenon: (1) air pollution makes people less likely to regard lies as unethical, and (2) air pollution makes people more likely to approach materials rewards. The present study mainly measured three kinds of lies—self-convenience, other-convenience, and other-material lies—to investigate these two explanations. Participants were asked to imagine living in either a polluted or a clean situation in two online studies and one laboratory study. The results showed that air pollution did not influence self-convenience lies (Studies 1 and 2), and clean air increased both other-convenience and other-material lies (Studies 2 and 3). According to these results, both explanations are supported. The theoretical implications of the present study are discussed.

Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image Concerns in Appearing Fair

Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The present research explored how individual difference measured by social value orientations, and situations, affect deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments, participants made allocations between themselves and recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1 demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair, especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2 showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.

Resting-state Functional Connectivity and Deception: Exploring Individualized Deceptive Propensity by Machine Learning

Individuals show marked variability in determining to be honest or deceptive in daily life. A large number of studies have investigated the neural substrates of deception; however, the brain networks contributing to the individual differences in deception remain unclear. In this study, we sought to address this issue by employing a machine-learning approach to predict individuals' deceptive propensity based on the topological properties of whole-brain resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC). Participants finished the resting-state functional MRI (fMRI) data acquisition, and then, one week later, participated as proposers in a modified ultimatum game in which they spontaneously chose to be honest or deceptive. A linear relevance vector regression (RVR) model was trained and validated to examine the relationship between topological properties of networks of RSFC and actual deceptive behaviors. The machine-learning model sufficiently decoded individual differences in deception using three brain networks based on RSFC, including the executive controlling network (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, middle frontal cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex), the social and mentalizing network (the temporal lobe, temporo-parietal junction, and inferior parietal lobule), and the reward network (putamen and thalamus). These networks have been found to form a signaling cognitive framework of deception by coding the mental states of others and the reward or values of deception or honesty, and integrating this information to make a final decision about being deceptive or honest. These findings suggest the potential of using RSFC as a task-independent neural trait for predicting deceptive propensity, and shed light on using machine-learning approaches in deception detection.

I lie, why don't you: Neural mechanisms of individual differences in self-serving lying

People tend to lie in varying degrees. To advance our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms of this heterogeneity, we investigated individual differences in self-serving lying. We performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in 37 participants and introduced a color-reporting game where lying about the color would in general lead to higher monetary payoffs but would also be punished if get caught. At the behavioral level, individuals lied to different extents. Besides, individuals who are more dishonest showed shorter lying response time, whereas no significant correlation was found between truth-telling response time and the degree of dishonesty. At the neural level, the left caudate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) were key regions reflecting individual differences in making dishonest decisions. The dishonesty associated activity in these regions decreased with increased dishonesty. Subsequent generalized psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that individual differences in self-serving lying were associated with the functional connectivity among the caudate, vmPFC, IFG, and dlPFC. More importantly, regardless of the decision types, the neural patterns of the left caudate and vmPFC during the decision-making phase could be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty. The present study demonstrated that lying decisions differ substantially from person to person in the functional connectivity and neural activation patterns which can be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty.

Telling a truth to deceive: Examining executive control and reward-related processes underlying interpersonal deception

Does deception necessarily involve false statements that are incompatible with the truth? In some cases, people choose truthful statements in order to mislead others. This type of deception has been investigated less. The current study employed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neurocognitive processes when both truthful and false statements were used to deceive others. We focused our ERP analysis on two stages: a decision making stage during which participants decided whether to tell a false or a truthful statement, and an outcome evaluation stage during which participants evaluated whether their deception had succeeded or not. Results showed that in the decision making stage, intentions to deceive elicited larger N200s and smaller P300s than an honest control condition. During the outcome evaluation stage, success/failure feedback in the deception condition elicited larger Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P300 than feedback after honest responses. Importantly, whether participants chose to tell false or true statements, did not further modulate executive control or reward-related processes. Taken together, these results suggest that during interpersonal deception, having deceptive intentions engages executive control and reward-related processes regardless of the veracity of statements.

Common and distinct neural correlates of self-serving and prosocial dishonesty

People often anticipate certain benefits when making dishonest decisions. In this article, we aim to dissociate the neural-cognitive processes of (1) dishonest decisions that focus on overall benefits of being dishonest (regardless of whether the benefits are self-serving or prosocial) from (2) those that distinguish between self-serving and prosocial benefits. Thirty-one participants had the opportunity to maximize their monetary benefits by voluntarily making dishonest decisions while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In each trial, the monetary benefit of being dishonest was either self-serving or prosocial. Behaviorally, we found dissociable patterns of dishonest decisions: some participants were dishonest for overall benefits, while others were primarily dishonest for self-serving (compared with prosocial) benefits. When provided an opportunity to be dishonest for either self-serving or prosocial benefits, participants with a stronger overall tendency to be dishonest had stronger vmPFC activity, as well as stronger functional connectivity between the vmPFC and dlPFC. Furthermore, vmPFC activity was associated with decisions to be dishonest both when the benefits of being dishonest were self-serving and prosocial. Conversely, high self-serving-biased participants had stronger striatum activity and stronger functional connectivity between the striatum and middle-mPFC when they had a chance to be dishonest for self-serving (compared with prosocial) benefits. Altogether, we showed that activity in (and functional connectivity between) regions in the valuation (e.g., vmPFC and Str) and executive control (e.g., dlPFC and mmPFC) systems play a key role in registering the social-related goal of dishonest decisions.