A bias against disconfirmatory evidence is associated with delusion proneness in a nonclinical sample

Moral learning and positive schizotypy: Social cognitive mechanisms in psychosis- proneness

BACKGROUND

Delusional thoughts such as paranoia and conspiratorial thinking reflect beliefs in others' intentions to do harm. Given the integral role of harm evaluation in moral cognition, a better understanding of how psychosis-prone individuals process others' moral characters may provide insights into social cognitive mechanisms of these types of delusions.

METHODS

An online sample of 293 participants was drawn from the general population, using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants performed a moral inference task, where they predicted and judged the binary choices of two fictitious agents ("good" or "bad") to impose harm under different levels of financial incentives. An investment game involving the same agents then examined participants' trust behavior. Psychosis-proneness was measured with the Multidimensional Schizotypy Scale Brief Edition.

RESULTS

A set of multiple regressions showed that positive schizotypy was associated with a lower yet more confident pre-experimental expectation of the agent's moral character, lower prediction accuracy of the agent's harm preferences, less belief revision, and undifferentiated perception of the good and bad agents' characters. Positive schizotypy was also related to higher expectations for reciprocity in the investment game, regardless of agent characters.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that inflexible beliefs associated with psychosis-proneness extend beyond negative prior expectations, also reflecting difficulties in moral learning. The resulting undifferentiated moral impressions might contribute to undue suspicion of benevolent individuals and increased gullibility to malicious ones, potentially further strengthening conspiratorial beliefs.

A systematic review of performance-based assessment studies on cognitive biases in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states: A summary of 40 years of research

Cognitive models of psychosis have stimulated empirical studies on cognitive biases involved in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and their symptoms. This systematic review aimed to summarize the studies on the role of cognitive biases as assessed in different performance-based tasks in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states. We focused on five cognitive biases linked to psychosis, i.e., aberrant salience, attentional biases, source monitoring biases, jumping to conclusions, and bias against disconfirmatory evidence. We identified N = 324 studies published in N = 308 articles fulfilling inclusion criteria. Most studies have been cross-sectional and confirmed that the schizophrenia spectrum psychoses are related to exaggerated cognitive biases compared to healthy controls. On the contrary, less evidence suggests a higher tendency for cognitive biases in the UHR sample. The only exceptions were source monitoring and jumping to conclusions, which were confirmed to be exaggerated in both clinical groups. Hallucinations and delusions were the most frequent symptoms studied in the context of cognitive biases. Based on the findings, we presented a hypothetical model on the role of interactions between cognitive biases or additive effects of biases in shaping the risk of psychosis. Future research is warranted for further development of cognitive models for psychosis.

[Recent developments in the modeling and psychological management of persecutory ideation]

Persecutory ideas are a major clinical problem and are associated with impaired functioning, reduced compliance with medication and increased risk of hospitalization. Persecutory ideation is defined as the false conviction that others are threatening or conspiring against one. Although persecutory delusions are mainly described and experienced in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, they also occur in other neurological and psychiatric diagnoses including Alzheimer disease, epilepsy, depression, mania, dementia and post-traumatic stress disorder. Moreover, epidemiological data from general and clinical populations indicated that paranoid beliefs occur on a hierarchy of severity and are present to a lesser degree in the general population, with paranoid delusions representing the severe end of a continuum. In this review we focus on the important advances following a decade of research from psychological sciences, and more particularly the work of Daniel Freeman and Philippa Garety in England. Their work has demonstrated that a range of causal factors are involved in the development and maintenance of delusions beyond the traditional cognitive and behavioural models. Indeed, there is now well-validated evidence that sleep disturbances, worry proneness, reasoning biases, such as failure to consider alternative explanations or belief confirmation bias, abnormal experiences such as hallucinations, negative self-beliefs, and safety behaviours, are central factors that contribute to the paranoid phenomenon. In this review, we describe each of these causal factors in detail as well as the clinical interventions developed by Freeman and his collaborators, including the integrative and modular "Feeling Safe" intervention. Broadly speaking, the aim of this psychological intervention is for patients to relearn safety by exposing them to situations they consider as potentially dangerous after reduction of the influence of the maintenance factors described above. A recent publication showed that the Feeling Safe program led to recovery in persecutory delusions for 50% of patients having poor response to antipsychotic medication, making the intervention as the most effective psychological treatment for persecutory delusions. Finally, we will critically discuss the efficacy data from the numerous clinical studies validating its effectiveness. Prospects for the implementation of the Feeling Safe program in France also is discussed.

Cognitive biases as an adaptive strategy in autism and schizophrenia spectrum: the compensation perspective on neurodiversity

This article presents a novel theoretical perspective on the role of cognitive biases within the autism and schizophrenia spectrum by integrating the evolutionary and computational approaches. Against the background of neurodiversity, cognitive biases are presented as primary adaptive strategies, while the compensation of their shortcomings is a potential cognitive advantage. The article delineates how certain subtypes of autism represent a unique cognitive strategy to manage cognitive biases at the expense of rapid and frugal heuristics. In contrast, certain subtypes of schizophrenia emerge as distinctive cognitive strategies devised to navigate social interactions, albeit with a propensity for overdetecting intentional behaviors. In conclusion, the paper emphasizes that while extreme manifestations might appear non-functional, they are merely endpoints of a broader, primarily functional spectrum of cognitive strategies. The central argument hinges on the premise that cognitive biases in both autism and schizophrenia spectrums serve as compensatory mechanisms tailored for specific ecological niches.

Resolving the Delusion Paradox

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

The neurocomputational framework of predictive processing (PP) provides a promising approach to explaining delusions, a key symptom of psychotic disorders. According to PP, the brain makes inferences about the world by weighing prior beliefs against the available sensory data. Mismatches between prior beliefs and sensory data result in prediction errors that may update the brain's model of the world. Psychosis has been associated with reduced weighting of priors relative to the sensory data. However, delusional beliefs are highly resistant to change, suggesting increased rather than decreased weighting of priors. We propose that this "delusion paradox" can be resolved within a hierarchical PP model: Reduced weighting of prior beliefs at low hierarchical levels may be compensated by an increased influence of higher-order beliefs represented at high hierarchical levels, including delusional beliefs. This may sculpt perceptual processing into conformity with delusions and foster their resistance to contradictory evidence.

STUDY DESIGN

We review several lines of experimental evidence on low- and high-level processes, and their neurocognitive underpinnings in delusion-related phenotypes and link them to predicted processing.

STUDY RESULTS

The reviewed evidence supports the notion of decreased weighting of low-level priors and increased weighting of high-level priors, in both delusional and delusion-prone individuals. Moreover, we highlight the role of prefrontal cortex as a neural basis for the increased weighting of high-level prior beliefs and discuss possible clinical implications of the proposed hierarchical predictive-processing model.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review suggests the delusion paradox can be resolved within a hierarchical PP model.

Hasty decision making and belief inflexibility in the more delusion prone? A modified disambiguating-scenarios paradigm assessing cognitive biases implicated in delusions

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary models of psychosis imply that cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC), the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and the liberal acceptance (LA) bias play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. Most of the studies investigating the role of cognitive biases, however, have been conducted with socially neutral or abstract stimuli and have assessed patients with established psychoses. For the present study, we aimed to concurrently investigate multiple biases (i.e., the JTC, BADE, and LA biases) in a community sample with a new paradigm using more socially engaging stimuli.

METHODS

A large sample of participants (N = 874) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk was subdivided into two groups based on the frequency of their psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) according to the positive subscale score of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE) and matched based on major demographics variables, resulting in two equally sized groups called High-PLE (at least 2 SD above the mean) and Low-PLE (maximum 0.5 above the mean; n = 46 for each group). Using a modified version of the written-scenarios BADE task, which emphasized social interactions between agents embedded in the scenario, participants rated the plausibility of response options in the face of new information.

RESULTS

In line with previous findings, the High-PLE group demonstrated the JTC, BADE, and LA biases. That is, the members of this group made more decisions after the initial piece of information, were less likely to revise their beliefs in light of new information, and provided higher plausibility ratings for implausible response options compared to the Low-PLE group.

CONCLUSIONS

Results corroborate prior findings suggesting that the JTC, BADE, and LA biases may be contributing factors in delusional ideation and that metacognitive biases extend to social situations.

Neural Signatures of Predictive Strategies Track Individuals Along the Autism-Schizophrenia Continuum

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Humans develop a constellation of different representations of the external environment, even in the face of the same sensory exposure. According to the Bayesian framework, these differentiations could be grounded in a different weight assigned to prior knowledge vs. new external inputs in predictive inference. Since recent advances in computational psychiatry suggest that autism (ASD) and schizophrenia (SSD) lie on the two diametric poles of the same predictive continuum, the adoption of a specific inferential style could be routed by dispositional factors related to autistic and schizotypal traits. However, no studies have directly investigated the role of ASD-SSD dimension in shaping the neuro-behavioral markers underlying perceptual inference.

STUDY DESIGN

We used a probabilistic detection task while simultaneously recording EEG to investigate whether neurobehavioral signatures related to prior processing were diametrically shaped by ASD and SSD traits in the general population (n = 80).

RESULTS

We found that the position along the ASD-SSD continuum directed the predictive strategies adopted by the individuals in decision-making. While proximity to the positive schizotypy pole was associated with the adoption of the predictive approach associated to the hyper-weighting of prior knowledge, proximity to ASD pole was related to strategies that favored sensory evidence in decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings revealed that the weight assigned to prior knowledge is a marker of the ASD-SSD continuum, potentially useful for identifying individuals at-risk of developing mental disorders and for understanding the mechanisms contributing to the onset of symptoms observed in ASD and SSD clinical forms.

Towards a neurocomputational account of social controllability: From models to mental health

Controllability, or the influence one has over their surroundings, is crucial for decision-making and mental health. Traditionally, controllability is operationalized in sensorimotor terms as one's ability to exercise their actions to achieve an intended outcome (also termed "agency"). However, recent social neuroscience research suggests that humans also assess if and how they can exert influence over other people (i.e., their actions, outcomes, beliefs) to achieve desired outcomes ("social controllability"). In this review, we will synthesize empirical findings and neurocomputational frameworks related to social controllability. We first introduce the concepts of contextual and perceived controllability and their respective relevance for decision-making. Then, we outline neurocomputational frameworks that can be used to model social controllability, with a focus on behavioral economic paradigms and reinforcement learning approaches. Finally, we discuss the implications of social controllability for computational psychiatry research, using delusion and obsession-compulsion as examples. Taken together, we propose that social controllability could be a key area of investigation in future social neuroscience and computational psychiatry research.

Aberrant adapting of beliefs under stress: a mechanism relevant to the formation of paranoia?

BACKGROUND

Difficulties in the ability to adapt beliefs in the face of new information are associated with psychosis and its central symptom - paranoia. As cognitive processes and psychotic symptoms are both known to be sensitive to stress, the present study investigated the exact associations between stress, adapting of beliefs [reversal learning (RL), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and jumping to conclusions (JTC)] and paranoia. We hypothesized that paranoia would increase under stress and that difficulties in adapting of beliefs would mediate or moderate the link between stress and paranoia. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the investigated effects would be strongest in the group of individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.

METHODS

We exposed 155 participants (38 diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, 40 individuals with attenuated psychotic symptoms, 39 clinical controls diagnosed with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 38 healthy controls) to a control condition and a stress condition, in which we assessed their levels of paranoia and their ability to adapt beliefs. We applied multilevel models to analyze the data.

RESULTS

Paranoia was higher in the stress condition than in the control condition, b = 1.142, s.e. = 0.338, t(150) = 3.381, p < 0.001. RL, BADE, and JTC did not differ between conditions and did not mediate or moderate the association between stress and paranoia (all p_s > 0.05).

CONCLUSIONS

The results support the assumption that stress triggers paranoia. However, the link between stress and paranoia does not seem to be affected by the ability to adapt beliefs.

Reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population: A longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population.

METHODS

We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias [JTC], liberal acceptance bias [LA], bias against disconfirmatory evidence [BADE], possibility of being mistaken [PM]) and delusional ideation at baseline, and delusional ideation 7 to 8 months later.

RESULTS

A greater JTC bias was associated with a greater increase in delusional ideation over the following months. This association was better described by a positive quadratic relationship. Neither BADE, LA nor PM were associated with subsequent changes in delusional ideation.

CONCLUSIONS

This study suggests that jumping-to-conclusions predicts delusional ideation in the general population but that this association may follow a quadratic trajectory. While no other associations turned significant, future studies with shorter temporal distances may shed further light on the role of reasoning biases as risk factors for delusional ideation in non-clinical samples.

Antivax attitude in the general population along the autism-schizophrenia continuum and the impact of socio-demographic factors

Introduction

One of the most important inventions in human history is vaccines. However, to date a consistent amount of people exhibit a hesitant approach toward them and mixed results have emerged in the attempt to characterize which factors may play a role in predicting such negative attitude. Here, we aimed at investigating how the individual scoring along the autism-schizophrenic continuum component and socio-cultural factors contribute toward vaccination attitudes in the general population.

Methods

To test whether individual position along the autism-schizophrenic continuum could predict vaccine attitude, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the component showing diametric loading between the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) and Autistic Quotient (AQ) subscales. Then, we performed a series of multiple linear regression analyses to understand the relation between the ASD-SSD continuum component and Vax scores. We also included socio-demographic factors (i.e., gender, education level, and age) as predictors.

Results

Multiple regression analysis revealed that the closer the individual lied on the positive schizotypal pole, the higher was their negative attitude toward vaccines. A diametric, more favorable disposition was found for individuals closer to the autistic end of the continuum. Furthermore, we reported that among the socio-cultural factors, only age can be considered a significant predictor of vaccination attitudes, with younger participants showing a more positive attitudes toward vaccination, while the level of education is an important protective factor in mitigating the negative impact that the proximity to the SSD pole and age play against vaccination disposition.

Discussion

These findings are relevant to improve targeted public health interventions, highlighting the crucial role of demographic, psychological, and social correlates in predicting anti-vax beliefs, which have the devasting potential to increase the spread of infectious disease.

A Computational Analysis of Abnormal Belief Updating Processes and Their Association With Psychotic Experiences and Childhood Trauma in a UK Birth Cohort

BACKGROUND

Psychotic experiences emerge from abnormalities in perception and belief formation and occur more commonly in those experiencing childhood trauma. However, which precise aspects of belief formation are atypical in psychosis is not well understood. We used a computational modeling approach to characterize belief updating in young adults in the general population, examine their relationship with psychotic outcomes and trauma, and determine the extent to which they mediate the trauma-psychosis relationship.

METHODS

We used data from 3360 individuals from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children birth cohort who completed assessments for psychotic outcomes, depression, anxiety, and two belief updating tasks at age 24 and had data available on traumatic events assessed from birth to late adolescence. Unadjusted and adjusted regression and counterfactual mediation methods were used for the analyses.

RESULTS

Basic behavioral measures of belief updating (draws-to-decision and disconfirmatory updating) were not associated with psychotic experiences. However, computational modeling revealed an association between increased decision noise with both psychotic experiences and trauma exposure, although <3% of the trauma-psychotic experience association was mediated by decision noise. Belief updating measures were also associated with intelligence and sociodemographic characteristics, confounding most of the associations with psychotic experiences. There was little evidence that belief updating parameters were differentially associated with delusions compared with hallucinations or that they were differentially associated with psychotic outcomes compared with depression or anxiety.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings challenge the hypothesis that atypical belief updating mechanisms (as indexed by the computational models and behavioral measures we used) underlie the development of psychotic phenomena.

Computational mechanisms underlying illusion of control in delusional individuals

Humans navigate complex situations that require the accurate estimation of the controllability of the environment. Aberrant controllability computation might lead to maladaptive behaviors and poor mental health outcomes. Illusion of control, which refers to a heightened sense of control while the environment is uncontrollable, is one such manifestation and has been conceptually associated with delusional ideation. Nevertheless, this association has not yet been formally characterized in a computational framework. To address this, we used a computational psychiatry approach to quantify illusion of control in human participants with high (n = 125) or low (n = 126) trait delusion. Participants played a two-party exchange game in which their choices either did ("Controllable condition") or did not ("Uncontrollable condition") influence the future monetary offers made by simulated partners. We found that the two groups behaved similarly in model-agnostic measures (i.e., offer size, rejection rate). However, computational modeling revealed that compared to the low trait delusion group, the high delusion group overestimated their influence ("expected influence" parameter) over the offers made by their partners under the Uncontrollable condition. Highly delusional individuals also reported a stronger sense of control than those with low trait delusion in the Uncontrollable condition. Furthermore, the expected influence parameter and self-reported beliefs about controllability were significantly correlated in the Controllable condition in individuals with low trait delusion, whereas this relationship was diminished in those with high trait delusion. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that delusional ideation is associated with aberrant computation of and belief about environmental controllability, as well as a belief-behavior disconnect.

COVID-19 conspiracy ideation is associated with the delusion proneness trait and resistance to update of beliefs

The rapid spread of conspiracy ideas associated with the recent COVID-19 pandemic represents a major threat to the ongoing and coming vaccination programs. Yet, the cognitive factors underlying the pandemic-related conspiracy beliefs are not well described. We hypothesized that such cognitive style is driven by delusion proneness, a trait phenotype associated with formation of delusion-like beliefs that exists on a continuum in the normal population. To probe this hypothesis, we developed a COVID-19 conspiracy questionnaire (CCQ) and assessed 577 subjects online. Their responses clustered into three factors that included Conspiracy, Distrust and Fear/Action as identified using principal component analysis. We then showed that CCQ (in particular the Conspiracy and Distrust factors) related both to general delusion proneness assessed with Peter's Delusion Inventory (PDI) as well as resistance to belief update using a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task. Further, linear regression and pathway analyses suggested a specific contribution of BADE to CCQ not directly explained by PDI. Importantly, the main results remained significant when using a truncated version of the PDI where questions on paranoia were removed (in order to avoid circular evidence), and when adjusting for ADHD- and autistic traits (that are known to be substantially related to delusion proneness). Altogether, our results strongly suggest that pandemic-related conspiracy ideation is associated with delusion proneness trait phenotype.

Association Between Failures in Perceptual Updating and the Severity of Psychosis in Schizophrenia

IMPORTANCE

Recent accounts suggest that delusions and hallucinations may result from alterations in how prior knowledge is integrated with new information, but experimental evidence supporting this idea has been complex and inconsistent. Evidence from a simpler perceptual task would make clear whether psychotic symptoms are associated with overreliance on prior information and impaired updating.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (PSZ) and healthy control individuals (HCs) differ in the ability to update their beliefs based on evidence in a relatively simple perceptual paradigm.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This case-control study included individuals who met DSM-IV criteria for PSZ and matched HC participants in 2 independent samples. The PSZ group was recruited from the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Yale University, and community clinics, and the HC group was recruited from the community. To test perceptual updating, a random dot kinematogram paradigm was implemented in which dots moving coherently in a single direction were mixed with randomly moving dots. On 50% of trials, the direction of coherent motion changed by 90° midway through the trial. Participants were asked to report the direction perceived at the end of the trial. The Peters Delusions Inventory and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) were used to quantify the severity of positive symptoms. Data were collected from September 2018 to March 2020 and were analyzed from approximately March 2020 to March 2021.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Critical measures included the proportion of responses centered around the initial direction vs the subsequent changed direction and the overall precision of motion perception and reaction times.

RESULTS

A total of 48 participants were included in the PSZ group (31 [65%] male; mean [SD] age, 36.56 [9.76] years) and 36 in the HC group (22 [61%] male; mean [SD] age, 35.67 [10.74] years) in the original sample. An independent replication sample included 42 participants in the PSZ group (29 [69%] male; mean [SD] age, 33.98 [11.03] years) and 34 in the HC group (20 [59%] male; mean [SD] age, 34.29 [10.44] years). In line with previous research, patients with PSZ were less precise and had slower reaction times overall. The key finding was that patients with PSZ were significantly more likely (original sample: mean, 27.88 [95% CI, 24.19-31.57]; replication sample: mean, 26.70 [95% CI, 23.53-29.87]) than HC participants (original sample: mean, 18.86 [95% CI, 16.56-21.16]; replication sample: mean, 15.67 [95% CI, 12.61-18.73]) to report the initial motion direction rather than the final one. Moreover, the tendency to report the direction of initial motion correlated with the degree of conviction on the Peters Delusions Inventory (original sample: r = 0.32 [P = .05]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]) and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Reality Distortion score (original sample: r = 0.55 [P = .001]; replication sample: r = 0.35 [P = .03]) and severity of hallucinations (original sample: r = 0.39 [P = .02]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

The findings of this case-control study suggest that the severity of psychotic symptoms is associated with a tendency to overweight initial information over incoming sensory evidence. These results are consistent with predictive coding accounts of the origins of positive symptoms and suggest that deficits in very elementary perceptual updating may be a critical mechanism in psychosis.

Resistance to Extinction of Evaluative Fear Conditioning in Delusion Proneness

Delusional beliefs consist of strong priors characterized by resistance to change even when evidence supporting another view is overwhelming. Such bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) has been experimentally demonstrated in patients with psychosis as well as in delusion proneness. In this fMRI-study, we tested for similar resistance to change and associated brain processes in extinction of fear learning, involving a well-described mechanism dependent of evidence updating. A social fear conditioning paradigm was used in which four faces had either been coupled to an unconditioned aversive stimulus (CS+) or not (CS-). For two of the faces, instructions had been given about the fear contingencies (iCS+/iCS-) while for two other faces no such instructions had been given (niCS+/niCS-). Interaction analysis suggested that individuals who score high on delusion-proneness (hDP; n = 20) displayed less extinction of evaluative fear compared to those with low delusion proneness (lDP; n = 23; n = 19 in fMRI-analysis) for non-instructed faces (F = 5.469, P = .024). The resistance to extinction was supported by a difference in extinction related activity between the two groups in medial prefrontal cortex and its connectivity with amygdala, as well as in a cortical network supporting fear processing. For instructed faces no extinction was noted, but there was a larger evaluative fear (F = 5.048, P = 0.03) and an increased functional connectivity between lateral orbitofrontal cortex and fear processing regions for hDP than lDP. Our study links previous explored BADE-effects in delusion associated phenotypes to fear extinction, and suggest that effects of instructions on evaluative fear learning are more pronounced in delusion prone subjects.

Conspiratorial Thinking During COVID-19: The Roles of Paranoia, Delusion-Proneness, and Intolerance of Uncertainty

The COVID-19 global pandemic has left many feeling a sense of profound uncertainty about their world, safety, and livelihood. Sources espousing misinformation and conspiracy theories frequently offer information that can help make sense of this uncertainty. Individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may be particularly impacted by the impoverished epistemic environment and may thus be more drawn to conspiratorial thinking (CT). In the present work, we show across 2 studies (N = 519) that COVID-19-specific CT is associated with higher levels of IU as well as delusion-proneness, and paranoia. Furthermore, delusion-proneness and paranoia explained the relationship between IU and CT and emerged as independent partial correlates of CT even when controlling for other facets of schizotypy. In contrast, anxiety did not explain the relationship between IU and CT. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of individual differences in IU, delusion-proneness and paranoia in the development of CT in the context of the acute uncertainty of a global crisis, in which conspiracy theories are more prevalent and salient. Informational intervention designs may benefit from leveraging the body of work demonstrating the efficacy of targeting IU to incite meaningful changes in thinking.

Psychedelic drug use and schizotypy in young adults

Despite recently resurrected scientific interest in classical psychedelics, few studies have focused on potential harms associated with abuse of these substances. In particular, the link between psychedelic use and psychotic symptoms has been debated while no conclusive evidence has been presented. Here, we studied an adult population (n = 1032) with a special focus on young (18–35 years) and healthy individuals (n = 701) to evaluate the association of psychedelic drug use with schizotypy and evidence integration impairment typically observed in psychosis-spectrum disorders. Experimental behavioural testing was performed in a subsample of the subjects (n = 39). We observed higher schizotypy scores in psychedelic users in the total sample. However, the effect size was notably small and only marginally significant when considering young and healthy subjects (Cohen’s d = 0.13). Controlling for concomitant drug use, none of our analyses found significant associations between psychedelic use and schizotypal traits. Results from experimental testing showed that total exposure to psychedelics (frequency and temporal proximity of use) was associated with better evidence integration (Cohen’s d = 0.13) and a higher sensitivity of fear responses (Cohen’s d = 1.05) to the effects instructed knowledge in a reversal aversive learning task modelled computationally with skin conductance response and pupillometry. This effect was present even when controlling for demographics and concomitant drug use. On a group level, however, only difference in sensitivity of fear responses to instructed knowledge reached statistical significance. Taken together, our findings suggest that psychedelic drug use is only weakly associated with psychosis-like symptoms, which, in turn, is to a large extent explained by psychiatric comorbidities and use of other psychoactive substances. Our results also suggest that psychedelics may have an effect on flexibility of evidence integration and aversive learning processes, that may be linked to recently suggested therapeutic effects of psychedelic drugs in non-psychotic psychiatric populations.

Modelling delusions as temporally-evolving beliefs

Introduction: Delusions demand an explanation in terms of their neural, psychological, and sociological mechanisms. We must bridge these levels of explanation in order to understand and ultimately treat delusions. To this end, debates continue as to the number of contributing factors, how those factors interact, and their underlying computational mechanisms.Methods: One popular family of models suggests that two separate insults are necessary, a problem with perception and an independent problem with belief. In particular, new work proposes that the belief problem entails a bias against disconfirmatory evidence - yielding the characteristic fixity of delusions. Here, we evaluate that claim, as well as explanations of delusions more broadly.Results: We suggest that such a bias may not explain enough of the variance in belief updating in delusional participants, and, more fundamentally, it might rule out specific accounts of delusions, since, such a bias might prevent them from forming in the first place, under particular assumptions about cognitive architectures.Conclusion: We suggest conceptualising delusions as an evolving uncertainty driven negotiation between beliefs and evidence, in which initial formation is fuelled by unexpected uncertainty, but, once formed, the delusion engenders new expectations about uncertainty that tune down updating but also facilitate the elastic assimilation of contradictory evidence.

Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

INTRODUCTION

In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.

METHODS

In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.

RESULTS

We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.

CONCLUSIONS

In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

A population-based cross-sectional study of cognitive deficits in paranoia

This study sought to investigate the association between paranoia and performance in a range of neurocognitive domains using a large community sample. We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 4507 individuals within the PISMA-ep Study. We used a large community sample selected after multistage sampling using standard stratification techniques. Socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, educational level, urbanicity, and geographical region were recorded. The Spanish version of the Green Paranoid Thought Scale (S-GPTS) was used to assess paranoid thoughts. The Screening for Cognitive Impairment in Psychiatry (SCIP) was used to assess neurocognitive performance both globally and by domains (i.e., immediate and delayed verbal learning, working memory, verbal fluency and processing speed). Individuals with high S-GPTS paranoia scores showed significantly lower performance on global cognitive function and also on immediate (but not delayed) verbal learning, working memory, verbal fluency and processing speed. These results held statistical significance even after controlling for the effects of education and estimated IQ. We propose that cognitive deficits may be mediators of paranoid thinking formation and need to be considered when assessing patients with high levels of paranoia.

The Interplay Between Postsynaptic Striatal D2/3 Receptor Availability, Adversity Exposure and Odd Beliefs: A [11C]-Raclopride PET Study

BACKGROUND

Between unaffected mental health and diagnosable psychiatric disorders, there is a vast continuum of functioning. The hypothesized link between striatal dopamine signaling and psychosis has guided a prolific body of research. However, it has been understudied in the context of multiple interacting factors, subclinical phenotypes, and pre-postsynaptic dynamics.

METHOD

This work investigated psychotic-like experiences and D2/3 dopamine postsynaptic receptor availability in the dorsal striatum, quantified by in vivo [11C]-raclopride positron emission tomography, in a sample of 24 healthy male individuals. Additional mediation and moderation effects with childhood trauma and key dopamine-regulating genes were examined.

RESULTS

An inverse relationship between nondisplaceable binding potential and subclinical symptoms was identified. D2/3 receptor availability in the left putamen fully mediated the association between traumatic childhood experiences and odd beliefs, that is, inclinations to see meaning in randomness and unfounded interpretations. Moreover, the effect of early adversity was moderated by a DRD2 functional variant (rs1076560). The results link environmental and neurobiological influences in the striatum to the origination of psychosis spectrum symptomology, consistent with the social defeat and diathesis-stress models.

CONCLUSIONS

Adversity exposure may affect the dopamine system as in association with biases in probabilistic reasoning, attributional style, and salience processing. The inverse relationship between D2/3 availability and symptomology may be explained by endogenous dopamine occupying the receptor, postsynaptic compensatory mechanisms, and/or altered receptor sensitivity. This may also reflect a cognitively stabilizing mechanism in non-help-seeking individuals. Future research should comprehensively characterize molecular parameters of dopamine neurotransmission along the psychosis spectrum and according to subtype profiling.

Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in the German-speaking general population: endorsement rates and links to reasoning biases and paranoia

BACKGROUND

Coronavirus-related conspiracy theories (CT) have been found to be associated with fewer pandemic containment-focused behaviors. It is therefore important to evaluate associated cognitive factors. We aimed to obtain first endorsement rate estimates of coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs in a German-speaking general population sample and investigate whether delusion-related reasoning biases and paranoid ideation are associated with such beliefs.

METHODS

We conducted a cross-sectional non-probability online study, quota-sampled for age and gender, with 1684 adults from Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. We assessed general and specific coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, reasoning biases [jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC), liberal acceptance bias (LA), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), possibility of being mistaken (PM)], and paranoid ideation, using established experimental paradigms and self-report questionnaires.

RESULTS

Around 10% of our sample endorsed coronavirus-related CT beliefs at least strongly, and another 20% to some degree. Overall endorsement was similar to levels observed in a UK-based study (Freeman et al., 2020b). Higher levels of conspiracy belief endorsement were associated with greater JTC, greater LA, greater BADE, higher PM, and greater paranoid ideation. Associations were mostly small to moderate and best described by non-linear relationships.

CONCLUSIONS

A noticeable proportion of our sample recruited in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland endorsed coronavirus conspiracy beliefs strongly or to some degree. These beliefs are associated with reasoning biases studied in delusion research. The non-probability sampling approach limits the generalizability of findings. Future longitudinal and experimental studies investigating conspiracy beliefs along the lines of reasoning are encouraged to validate reasoning aberrations as risk factors.

The tendency to stop collecting information is linked to illusions of causality

Previous research proposed that cognitive biases contribute to produce and maintain the symptoms exhibited by deluded patients. Specifically, the tendency to jump to conclusions (i.e., to stop collecting evidence soon before making a decision) has been claimed to contribute to delusion formation. Additionally, deluded patients show an abnormal understanding of cause-effect relationships, often leading to causal illusions (i.e., the belief that two events are causally connected, when they are not). Both types of bias appear in psychotic disorders, but also in healthy individuals. In two studies, we test the hypothesis that the two biases (jumping to conclusions and causal illusions) appear in the general population and correlate with each other. The rationale is based on current theories of associative learning that explain causal illusions as the result of a learning bias that tends to wear off as additional information is incorporated. We propose that participants with higher tendency to jump to conclusions will stop collecting information sooner in a causal learning study than those participants with lower tendency to jump to conclusions, which means that the former will not reach the learning asymptote, leading to biased judgments. The studies provide evidence in favour that the two biases are correlated but suggest that the proposed mechanism is not responsible for this association.

Probing the Hypersalience Hypothesis-An Adapted Judge-Advisor System Tested in Individuals With Psychotic-Like Experiences

Individuals with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis gather and use information differently than controls; in particular they seek and rely on less information or over-weight currently available information. A new paradigm, the judge-advisor system, has previously been used to investigate these processes. Results showed that psychosis-prone individuals tend to seek less advice but at the same time use the available advice more. Some theoretical models, like the hypersalience of evidence-matching hypothesis, predict that psychosis-prone individuals weight recently available information to a greater extent and thus provide an explanation for increased advice-weighting scores in psychosis-prone individuals. To test this model, we adapted the previously used judge-advisor system by letting participants receive consecutively multiple pieces of advice. To meet this aim, we recruited a large MTurk community sample (N = 1,396), which we split in a group with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 80) and a group with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1,107), using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences' positive subscale. First, participants estimated five people's age based on photographs. Then, they received consecutive advice in the form of manipulated age estimates by allegedly previous participants, with outliers in some trials. After each advice, participants could adjust their estimate. This procedure allowed us to investigate how participants weighted each currently presented advice. In addition to being more confident in their final estimates and in line with our preregistered hypothesis, participants with more frequent psychotic-like experiences did weight currently available advice more than participants with less frequent psychotic-like experiences. This effect was especially pronounced in response to outliers, as fine-grained post-hoc analysis suggested. Result thus support models predicting an overcorrection in response to new incoming information and challenges an assumed general belief inflexibility in people with psychotic experiences.

COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs and their relationship with perceived stress and pre-existing conspiracy beliefs

Previous studies have down that erroneous Conspiracy Theory (CT) beliefs develop more strongly in people who have underlying conspiratorial reasoning styles and psychopathological traits and particularly when they are faced with stressful external events (Swami et al., 2013; van Prooijen, 2018). In this study, we test this proposition by examining the individual differences associated with the development of COVID-19-related CT beliefs during the pandemic. A total of 660 adults completed a survey that captured COVID–related CT beliefs and broader conspiracy beliefs, education, perceived stress and attitudes towards government responses. The results showed that COVID-19 related CT beliefs were: strongly related to broader CT beliefs, higher in those with lower levels of education; and, positively (although weakly) correlated with more negative attitudes towards government responses. However, no relationship was found between COVID-19 beliefs and self-reported stress. These findings hold implications for why some people are more likely to be resistant to public health interventions relating to COVID-19. The findings encourage more detailed exploration of the causes and sources of CTs and, in particular, the role of social media use and other information sources in the development and perpetuation of health-related CT beliefs.

Combined Neurocognitive And Metacognitive Rehabilitation In Schizophrenia: Effects On Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence

Background

A Metacognitive Training for Schizophrenia patients (MCT) was developed to target the cognitive biases that characterize the illness. Results suggest positive MCT effects encompassing several aspects of psychopathology and subjective well-being. There are still open questions concerning the effect on different cognitive biases and the interplay between them and both psychopathology and neurocognition. Specifically, the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) has never been tested in previous trials on MCT. In this study we evaluated the feasibility of MCT combined with a cognitive remediation therapy (CACR) in schizophrenia and its effect on BADE. Moreover, we investigated the relationships between BADE and both neuropsychology and psychopathology, taking into account mutual influences on the degree of improvement.

Methods

Fifty-seven schizophrenia outpatients were randomly assigned to CACR + control group or MCT+CACR and assessed at baseline and after treatment for psychopathology, neurocognition and BADE.

Results

After MCT+CACR patients showed significantly greater improvements on BADE. Although BADE baseline performances correlated with several cognitive domains, no association was found between BADE improvement and neurocognitive nor psychopathological measures.

Conclusions

This study enlightened for the first time the efficacy of MCT+CACR on BADE in schizophrenia, suggesting the importance to develop a more specific intervention tailored on individual needs of patients.

Attentional focus moderates the relationship between attention to threat bias and delusion-like experiences in healthy adults

Background

The role of cognitive biases in delusion and delusion-like experiences has been widely investigated in recent years. However, little is known about individual differences, which may influence association between cognitive biases and formation of delusional beliefs. The aim of this study was to examine the moderating effect of self-reported attentional control on the relationship between attention to threat bias (ATB) and delusion-like experiences (DLEs) in healthy adults.

Methods

Participants (n = 138) completed the Davos Assessment of the Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS), the Attentional Control Scale (ACS) and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI). The moderation analysis was performed to check the influence of different components of attentional control (i.e. general ability to allocate attention, focusing, shifting and divide attention) on the interplay between ATB and DLEs.

Results

The results supported the moderation model. Specifically, we found that a higher level of ability to focus attention is associated with a stronger effect of attention to threat bias on the overall frequency of DLEs. Our results indicate that ATB contributes to the number of DLEs only in individuals with high and moderate capacity to focus attention, whereas in those who scored low on the ACS focusing attention subscale, the presence of attentional bias does not influence the frequency of DLEs.

Conclusions

Our findings show that the individual difference variable, such as ability to voluntarily focus attention, may moderate the relationship between attention to threat bias and delusion-like experiences in healthy adults.

Advice weighting as a novel measure for belief flexibility in people with psychotic-like experiences

Jumping to conclusions and bias against disconfirmatory evidence are two cognitive biases common in people with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis. However, many participants show comprehension problems doing traditional tasks; new paradigms with additional applied scenarios are thus needed. A large MTurk community sample (N = 1422) was recruited and subdivided into participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 79) and participants with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1110), based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). In the context of a judge-advisor system, participants made an initial estimate and then received advice that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Participants then gave a new, possibly revised estimate and were allowed to seek additional advice. Participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences gave their final assessment after receiving significantly less advice and were significantly more confident in their decision than participants with low psychotic-like experiences, in line with previous studies on jumping to conclusions and overconfidence. Contrary to the hypothesis and earlier studies, however, no deficit in belief revision was found. In fact, participants with high psychotic-like experiences weighted advice significantly higher in the condition with disconfirmatory advice, but only for the first advice they received. The increased weighting of a single piece of disconfirmatory advice can be explained by the hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches theory, according to which more weight is attached to the most recently available information.

Functional brain networks underlying evidence integration and delusional ideation

Cognitive biases affecting evidence integration contribute to delusions and delusional ideation in the psychosis continuum. In previously published work we observed hyperactivity in a visual attention network (VsAN) during confirmatory evidence integration, and hypoactivity in a cognitive evaluation network (CEN) during disconfirmatory evidence integration in schizophrenia patients with delusions, suggesting that a task-specific imbalance of these networks may contribute to delusion maintenance. In the current study, we investigated whether patterns of aberrant functional connectivity observed in past work were associated with delusional ideation in 41 healthy individuals by examining associations between cognitive biases, subclinical schizotypal traits, and functional brain activity during evidence integration. Behaviourally, we replicated positive associations between schizotypal traits and cognitive biases and further showed that this association was driven by delusional ideation specifically. Constrained principal component analysis for fMRI (fMRI-CPCA) revealed recruitment of the brain networks observed in our previous clinical and non-clinical evidence integration studies: default-mode network (DMN); cognitive evaluation network (CEN); and visual attention (VsAN) network. Moreover, as with clinically-significant delusions, delusional ideation was associated with decreased CEN activity during the processing of disconfirmatory evidence and increased VsAN activity during the processing of confirmatory evidence. These findings suggest that this altered pattern of activation across networks during evidence integration may underlie delusional ideation and delusions in the psychosis continuum.

Functional Brain Networks Underlying Evidence Integration and Delusions in Schizophrenia

Integrating evidence that contradicts a belief is a fundamental aspect of belief revision and is closely linked to delusions in schizophrenia. In a previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study on healthy individuals, we identified functional brain networks underlying evidence integration as visual attention network (VsAN; dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula, occipital regions), default-mode network (DMN), and cognitive evaluation network (CEN; orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, parietal cortex). In the current clinical fMRI study, we compared network-based activity during evidence integration between healthy controls (n = 41), nondelusional (n = 37), and delusional (n = 33) patients with schizophrenia, and related this activity to cognitive processing involved in evidence integration measured outside the scanner. Task-induced coordinated activation was measured using group-constrained principal component analysis for fMRI. Increased VsAN activation, reduced DMN deactivation, and reduced CEN activation were observed for schizophrenia, with this pattern being most pronounced for the delusional group. Importantly, poor evidence integration comprehensively measured outside the scanner was significantly associated with increased VsAN activation and reduced DMN deactivation when processing confirmatory evidence, and with reduced CEN activation when processing disconfirmatory evidence. This is the first comprehensive study of the functional brain networks associated with evidence integration in schizophrenia and highlights how an imbalance of functional brain networks responding to confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence may underlie delusions in schizophrenia.

Stress and cognitive biases in schizotypy: A two-site study of bias against disconfirmatory evidence and jumping to conclusions

The dysfunctional cognitive and reasoning biases which underpin psychotic symptoms are likely to present prior to the onset of a diagnosable disorder and should therefore be detectable along the psychosis continuum in individuals with schizotypal traits. Two reasoning biases, Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) and Jumping to Conclusions (JTC), describe how information is selected and weighed under conditions of uncertainty during decision making. It is likely that states such as elevated stress exacerbates JTC and BADE in individuals with high schizotypal traits vulnerable to displaying these information gathering styles. Therefore, we evaluated whether stress and schizotypy interacted to predict these reasoning biases using separate samples from the US (JTC) and England (BADE). Generally speaking, schizotypal traits and stress were not independently associated with dysfunctional reasoning biases. However, across both studies, the interaction between schizotypy traits and stress significantly predicted reasoning biases such that increased stress was associated with increased reasoning biases, but only for individuals low in schizotypal traits. These patterns were observed for positive schizotypal traits (in both samples), for negative traits (in the England sample only), but not for disorganization traits. For both samples, our findings suggest that the presence of states such as stress is associated with, though not necessarily dysfunctional, reasoning biases in individuals with low schizotypy. These reasoning biases seemed, in some ways, relatively immutable to stress in individuals endorsing high levels of positive schizotypal traits.

When negative interpretations persist, positive emotions don't! Inflexible negative interpretations encourage depression and social anxiety by dampening positive emotions

Research on emotion regulation difficulties has been instrumental in understanding hallmark features of depression and social anxiety. Yet, the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to maladaptive patterns of emotion regulation strategy use remain underspecified. This investigation examined the association of negative interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases with the use of common emotion regulation strategies in response to negative and positive emotional experiences (repetitive negative thinking, positive reappraisal, and dampening). Study 1 (N = 250) found that inflexibility in revising negative interpretations in response to disconfirmatory positive information was related to the dampening of positive emotions, but not to repetitive negative thinking or positive reappraisal. Importantly, dampening mediated the relation between inflexible negative interpretations and symptoms of both depression and social anxiety. This mediation model was further supported by the data from Study 2 (N = 294). Across both studies, negative interpretation bias was related to repetitive negative thinking and dampening, whereas positive interpretation bias was related to positive reappraisal. Collectively, these results suggest that both interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases may contribute to difficulties in emotion regulation related to depression and social anxiety.

Dual-process theory, conflict processing, and delusional belief

Many reasoning biases that may contribute to delusion formation and/or maintenance are common in healthy individuals. Research indicating that reasoning in the general population proceeds via analytic processes (which depend upon working memory and support hypothetical thought) and intuitive processes (which are autonomous and independent of working memory) may therefore help uncover the source of these biases. Consistent with this possibility, recent studies imply that impaired conflict processing might reduce engagement in analytic reasoning, thereby producing reasoning biases and promoting delusions in individuals with schizophrenia. Progress toward understanding this potential pathway to delusions is currently impeded by ambiguity about whether any of these deficits or biases is necessary or sufficient for the formation and maintenance of delusions. Resolving this ambiguity requires consideration of whether particular cognitive deficits or biases in this putative pathway have causal primacy over other processes that may also participate in the causation of delusions. Accordingly, the present manuscript critically evaluates whether impaired conflict processing is the primary initiating deficit in the generation of reasoning biases that may promote the development and/or maintenance of delusions. Suggestions for future research that may elucidate mechanistic pathways by which reasoning deficits might engender and maintain delusions are subsequently offered.

A distinct inferential mechanism for delusions in schizophrenia

Delusions, a core symptom of psychosis, are false beliefs that are rigidly held with strong conviction despite contradictory evidence. Alterations in inferential processes have long been proposed to underlie delusional pathology, but previous attempts to show this have failed to yield compelling evidence for a specific relationship between inferential abnormalities and delusional severity in schizophrenia. Using a novel, incentivized information-sampling task (a modified version of the beads task), alongside well-characterized decision-making tasks, we sought a mechanistic understanding of delusions in a sample of medicated and unmedicated patients with schizophrenia who exhibited a wide range of delusion severity. In this novel task, participants chose whether to draw beads from one of two hidden jars or to guess the identity of the hidden jar, in order to minimize financial loss from a monetary endowment, and concurrently reported their probability estimates for the hidden jar. We found that patients with higher delusion severity exhibited increased information seeking (i.e. increased draws-to-decision behaviour). This increase was highly specific to delusion severity as compared to the severity of other psychotic symptoms, working-memory capacity, and other clinical and socio-demographic characteristics. Delusion-related increases in information seeking were present in unmedicated patients, indicating that they were unlikely due to antipsychotic medication. In addition, after adjusting for delusion severity, patients as a whole exhibited decreased information seeking relative to healthy individuals, a decrease that correlated with lower socioeconomic status. Computational analyses of reported probability estimates further showed that more delusional patients exhibited abnormal belief updating characterized by stronger reliance on prior beliefs formed early in the inferential process, a feature that correlated with increased information seeking in patients. Other decision-making parameters that could have theoretically explained the delusion effects, such as those related to subjective valuation, were uncorrelated with both delusional severity and information seeking among the patients. In turn, we found some preliminary evidence that subjective valuation (rather than belief updating) may explain group differences in information seeking unrelated to delusions. Together, these results suggest that abnormalities in belief updating, characterized by stronger reliance on prior beliefs formed by incorporating information presented earlier in the inferential process, may be a core computational mechanism of delusional ideation in psychosis. Our results thus provide direct empirical support for an inferential mechanism that naturally captures the characteristic rigidity associated with delusional beliefs.

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

In the past few decades, sex differences have been identified in a number of clinical, cognitive and functional outcomes in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. However, to date, sex differences in higher-order cognitive biases have not been systematically studied. The present study aimed to examine sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment based on data collected in two previous studies in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. For this purpose, data from n = 58 patients and n = 60 healthy controls on the Fish Task (as a measure of jumping to conclusions) and bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; as a measure of evidence integration) task were analyzed. Results indicated a lack of sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment both in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. Although the present study was adequately powered to detect sex differences of a low medium effect size, larger studies are warranted to exclude differences of a smaller magnitude between men and women regarding delusion-associated cognitive biases.

Thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection performance in schizotypy

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.

The relationship between anomalistic belief and biases of evidence integration and jumping to conclusions

Biases in the assessment and integration of evidence are likely contributors to anomalistic (e.g., paranormal, extra-terrestrial) beliefs because of the non-evidence based nature of these beliefs. However, little research has examined the relationship between anomalistic beliefs and evidence integration biases. The current study addressed this gap by examining the relationship between anomalistic belief and four such biases; bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), bias against confirmatory evidence (BACE), liberal acceptance bias, and the jumping to conclusions bias (JTC). Standard BADE scenarios were used to measure BADE, BACE, and the liberal acceptance bias: Participants were given three pieces of evidence, one at a time, and required to rate several alternative explanations. The JTC was measured using two draws-to-decisions tasks (beads and emotionally salient), and participants also completed measures of anomalistic belief and delusion-proneness. Results showed that liberal acceptance was the only evidence integration bias that significantly predicted greater overall anomalistic belief. However, this relationship was no longer significant once delusion proneness was controlled for. Additionally, BADE significantly predicted experiential (but not other types of) anomalistic beliefs even after controlling for delusion proneness. We propose that liberal acceptance may lead people to form anomalistic beliefs on the basis of little evidence, and that stronger BADE may make these beliefs highly resistant to change.

Association of Schizotypy With Dimensions of Cognitive Control: A Meta-Analysis

Schizotypy is defined as a time-stable multidimensional personality trait consisting of positive, negative, and disorganized facets. Schizotypy is considered as a model system of psychosis, as there is considerable overlap between the 2 constructs. High schizotypy is associated with subtle but fairly widespread cognitive alterations, which include poorer performance in tasks measuring cognitive control. Similar but more pronounced impairments in cognitive control have been described extensively in psychosis. We here sought to provide a quantitative estimation of the effect size of impairments in schizotypy in the updating, shifting, and inhibition dimensions of cognitive control. We included studies of healthy adults from both general population and college samples, which used either categorical or correlative designs. Negative schizotypy was associated with significantly poorer performance on shifting (g = 0.32) and updating (g = 0.11). Positive schizotypy was associated with significantly poorer performance on shifting (g = 0.18). There were no significant associations between schizotypy and inhibition. The divergence in results for positive, negative, and disorganized schizotypy emphasizes the importance of examining relationships between cognition and the facets of schizotypy rather than using the overall score. Our findings also underline the importance of more detailed research to further understand and define this complex personality construct, which will also be of importance when applying schizotypy as a model system for psychosis.

Psychotic Symptoms Predicting Evidence Integration in Schizophrenia

Abstract. A bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) is a cognitive bias associated with delusions in schizophrenia. Previous studies reporting an association between reduced evidence integration and delusions used a single measure of delusion severity, typically to form patient groups. In the current study we perform an exploratory analysis to investigate whether BADE is specific to delusions or extends to other symptoms of psychosis. To address this, we used constrained principal component analysis (CPCA) on four merged BADE studies on schizophrenia to explore the component structure in the BADE task measures that is predictable from symptoms. A component reflecting evidence integration emerged, and was predicted by delusions as expected, but also by thought disorder. This provides novel methodology for cognitive neuropsychiatric investigations into the underpinnings of the symptoms of schizophrenia by enabling investigators to consider a range of symptoms alongside the one that is the target of their investigation.

An Investigation of Module-Specific Effects of Metacognitive Training for Psychosis

Abstract. Metacognitive training for psychosis (MCT) is a group training program that targets cognitive biases, which play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. It remains unclear to what extent individual MCT modules lead to within- or between-session changes in positive symptoms, sadness, cognitive biases, or theory of mind (ToM) distortions. A one-armed open-label intervention study was conducted with 176 psychiatric inpatients with psychotic symptoms. Patients were asked to fill out a questionnaire on cognitive biases, symptoms, and ToM distortions before and after each session. Multilevel (ML) modeling was used to assess associations between participation in a respective module and subsequent changes in self-reported symptoms. ML analyses indicated an overall improvement in all outcomes as well as within-session decreases in positive symptoms for a module addressing ToM distortions with a small effect. Two MCT modules addressing cognitive biases (jumping to conclusions, a bias against disconfirmatory evidence) were associated with reductions in the module-specific bias with a small and small to medium effect, respectively. The study provides initial evidence regarding module-specific associations with positive symptoms, cognitive biases, and ToM distortions in MCT.

How Do Delusion-Prone Individuals Respond to Disconfirmatory Evidence?

Abstract. Research employing the beads task suggests that people with delusional tendencies over-adjust to disconfirmatory evidence compared to low-delusion-prone individuals. This interpretation is in tension with studies using the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) task, which provide evidence that people with delusional tendencies are less receptive to disconfirmatory evidence. It has been suggested that over-adjustment on the beads task may be driven by miscomprehension of the task. The current preliminary study aimed to minimize miscomprehension on the beads task and determine how high-delusion-prone people respond to disconfirmatory evidence on both tasks. Fifty-one undergraduate participants completed the BADE task and an adapted version of the beads task. We expected that corrective feedback on the beads task would reduce miscomprehension, and that high-delusion-prone participants would be less receptive to disconfirmatory evidence on both tasks. Our results suggest this version of the beads task improved rates of comprehension relative to previous research. However, we found no evidence that the high-delusion-prone group demonstrated elevated over-adjustment or belief inflexibility in either task. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

Data gathering ability contributes to visual organization and probabilistic reasoning

Individuals use data gathering methods to inform judgments and behaviors. Effective interaction with the environment depends on these having high accuracy and low noise, but when they become abnormal, aberrant thoughts and perceptions can occur. In this study, we examined if data gathering methods were consistent across tasks that relied on different cognitive abilities, specifically visual perception and probabilistic reasoning. Thirty-four non-clinical participants engaged in the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks, while also completing questionnaires concerning aspects of delusion formation. A significant, positive correlation was observed between performance on the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks. Both tasks were negatively correlated with the General Conspiracy Belief Scale. The results suggest an underlying mechanism for data gathering that is consistent across behavioral domains and exists on a continuum in the general population.

Self-reported Cognitive Biases Moderate the Associations Between Social Stress and Paranoid Ideation in a Virtual Reality Experimental Study

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive biases are associated with psychosis liability and paranoid ideation. This study investigated the moderating relationship between pre-existing self-reported cognitive biases and the occurrence of paranoid ideation in response to different levels of social stress in a virtual reality environment.

METHODS

This study included 170 participants with different levels of psychosis liability (55 recent onset psychosis, 20 ultrahigh risk for psychosis, 42 siblings of psychotic patients, and 53 controls). All participants were exposed to virtual environments with different levels of social stress. The level of experienced paranoia in the virtual environments was measured with the State Social Paranoia Scale. Cognitive biases were assessed with a self-report continuous measure. Also, cumulative number of cognitive biases was calculated using dichotomous measures of the separate biases, based on general population norm scores.

RESULTS

Higher belief inflexibility bias (Z = 2.83, P < .001), attention to threat bias (Z = 3.40, P < .001), external attribution bias (Z = 2.60, P < .001), and data-gathering bias (Z = 2.07, P < .05) were all positively associated with reported paranoid ideation in the social virtual environments. Level of paranoid response increased with number of cognitive biases present (B = 1.73, P < .001). The effect of environmental stressors on paranoid ideation was moderated by attention to threat bias (Z = 2.78, P < .01) and external attribution bias (Z = 2.75, P < .01), whereas data-gathering bias and belief inflexibility did not moderate the relationship.

CONCLUSION

There is an additive effect of separate cognitive biases on paranoid response to social stress. The effect of social environmental stressors on paranoid ideation is further enhanced by attention to threat bias and external attribution bias.

Differential relationship of jumping-to-conclusions and incorrigibility with delusion severity

Reasoning biases such as jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) and incorrigibility have been suggested to contribute to the generation and maintenance of delusions. However, it is still debated whether these biases represent stable traits of patients with delusions, or are related to state fluctuations of delusion severity. The present study aimed to elucidate this question by combining a cross-sectional with a longitudinal approach. JTC, incorrigibility and delusion severity were assessed in 79 patients with a history of delusions over a 6-month period. To allow for a differentiated look into effects of time vs. symptom changes, patients were divided into patients with (D+) and without (D-) current delusions at baseline. Significant improvement of delusions was noted in D+ at follow-up. JTC did not differ between the two patient groups either at baseline or over time. In contrast, incorrigibility was significantly higher in D+ than D- at baseline; this difference remained stable throughout the 6-month follow-up period. The two biases did not significantly co-vary over time. Our results suggest a dissociation between incorrigibility and JTC as regards their relation to current presence of delusions, and tentatively support theoretical accounts attributing different roles to the two biases in the generation (JTC) and maintenance (incorrigibility) of delusions.