The neurobiology of deception: evidence from neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies

The effect of lying on memory in daily life: Does motivation matter?

Recently, there has been renewed interest in the effect of lying on memory. A growing body of studies has documented that lying can impair memories and cause memory disruptions, such as forgetting and false memories, to a greater degree than telling the truth. This study aimed to investigate whether motivation plays a role in the effect of lying on memory. The present study utilized a daily life paradigm and manipulated three conditions: truth telling, internally motivated lying, and externally motivated lying. We asked participants to engage in a shopping task and to tell lies (externally motivated lying group) or to choose between telling the truth (truth-telling group) and telling lies (internally motivated lying group) in the interview. Forty-eight hours later, the participants were instructed to truthfully carry out multiple memory assessments. The principal findings of this research are that lying can result in memory impairments, and internally motivated lying can lead to greater impairment in source memory than externally motivated lying. Moreover, no significant differences between the two lying groups were found in the memory tests. The empirical findings of this study provide new insights into the effect of lying on memory.

An Examination of the Motives for Attributing and Interpreting Deception in People with Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment

The aim of the present study was to examine how a person with amnestic mild cognitive impairment perceives the phenomenon of deception. Amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) usually represents the prodromal phase of Alzheimer's disease (AD), with patients showing memory impairment but with normal activities of daily living. It was expected that aMCI patients would face difficulties in the attribution and interpretation of deceptive behavior due to deficits regarding their diagnosis. The main sample of the study consisted of 76 older adults who were patients of a daycare center diagnosed with aMCI. A sample of 55 highly educated young adults was also examined in the same experiment to qualitatively compare their performance with that of aMCI patients. Participants were assigned a scenario where a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) was engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant. The results showed that aMCI patients, even if they understood that something was going wrong, did not invest in interpretations of potential deception and tended to avoid searching for confirmative information related to the hypothetical lie of their partner compared to highly educated young adults. It seems that aMCI patients become somehow "innocent", and this is discussed in terms of cognitive impairment and/or socioemotional selectivity.

Altered neural mechanisms of deception in individuals with autistic traits

A successful deception involves making a decision, acting on it, and evaluating results. Here, we investigated deception in a non-clinical sample (n = 36) with varying autism traits using a coin-toss paradigm of active deception. The subjects were asked to react to the instructions by clicking one of the two boxes that could mislead their opponents, followed by feedback on their success or failure. During this reaction, their EEG activity was recorded, and the results suggested that people with high autistic traits exhibited longer reaction times and lower amplitude of P3 in the decision-making stage compared to individuals with low autistic traits. The feedback evaluation stage in the high autistic trait group elicited lower amplitude of FRN and P3. Overall, these results indicated that people with high autistic traits experienced difficulties in deceiving, which could be related to atypical neural mechanisms.

Functional Neurologic Disorders, disorders to be managed by neurologists, or are neurologists wandering in a dangerous field with inadequate resources?

In recent years, some neurologists reconsidered their approach to Medically Unexplained Symptoms and proposed Functional Neurologic Disorders (FND) as a new entity, claiming that neurology could offer alternative treatment options to the psychotherapies provided in psychiatry settings. FNDs, for this purpose, should include only the disorders listed as Conversion from the Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders (SSRD) group. The present review analyzes the rationale of this position and challenges the arguments provided for its support. The review also discusses the systematization of these disorders as provided by public health systems. It outlines risks stemming from economic support and public funding uncertainty, given their negligible epidemiological dimensions resulting from the parcellation of SSRD. The review underlines the unresolved issue of Factitious Disorders, which are in the same SSRD category of the international classification but are, nonetheless, overlooked by the theoretical proponents of the FND entity. Comorbidity with other psychiatric disorders is also analyzed. We propose a model that supports the continuum between different SSRD conditions, including Factitious Disorders. The model is based on the emergence of feigned death reflex and deception from frontal lobe dysfunction. Finally, the paper summarizes the wealth of historical psychiatric and psychodynamic approaches and critical reviews. The study also puts in context the categorization and interpretation efforts provided by the most eminent researchers of the past century.

Who did I lie to that day? Deception impairs memory in daily life

Research has demonstrated that deceptive responses can undermine item and source memories. However, previous studies have often randomly assigned participants to an honest or deception group and asked them to respond in specific ways in an interview, rather than providing them a choice of what response to give. Moreover, little attention has been given to destination memory in previous research. Using a daily life paradigm, we investigated the effects of deception on memory. After completing a mock shopping task, participants were told that someone would ask them questions about their shopping lists. The participants voluntarily chose to tell the truth or lie in the interview and were encouraged to respond as they would in their daily lives. An item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given 48 h after the interview. Source and destination memories but not item memories were impaired for participants who chose to lie. Specifically, liars forgot the things about which they lied and mistakenly believed that they lied about many things that they did not, and they also did not remember to whom they lied. We conclude that deception can disrupt memory in daily life.

The Effect of Task-Irrelevant Emotional Valence on Limited Attentional Resources During Deception: An ERPs Study

Deception is a complex and cognitively draining dyadic process that simultaneously involves cognitive and emotional processes, both of which demand/capture attentional resources. However, few studies have investigated the allocation of attentional resources between cognitive and emotional processes during deception. The current study presented facial expressions of different valences to 36 participants. While an electroencephalogram was recording, they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to preceding cues. The results showed that deceptive responses induced smaller P300 amplitudes than did truthful responses. Task-irrelevant negative emotional information (TiN) elicited larger P300 amplitudes than did task-irrelevant positive emotional information (TiP). Furthermore, the results showed that TiN elicited larger LPP amplitudes than did TiP in deceptive responses, but not in truthful ones. The results suggested that attentional resources were directed away to deception-related cognitive processes and TiN, but not TiP, was consistently able to compete for and obtain attentional resources during deception. The results indicated that TiN could disrupt with deception and may facilitate deception detection.

The factitious/malingering continuum and its burden on public health costs: a review and experience in an Italian neurology setting

Factitious disorder is classified as one of the five aspects of somatic symptom disorders. The fundamental element of factitious disorder is deception, i.e., pretending to have a medical or psychiatric disorder, but the enactment of deception is considered unconscious. Indeed, volition, i.e., the perception of deliberate deception, is blurred in patients presenting with factitious disorder. In the USA and the UK, factitious disorder has received constant media attention because of its forensic implications and outrageous costs for the National Health Systems. Unfortunately, a comparable level of attention is not present in Italian National Health System or the Italian mass media. The review analyzes the classifications, disorder mechanisms, costs, and medico-legal implications in the hope of raising awareness on this disturbing issue. Moreover, the review depicts 13 exemplification cases, anonymized and fictionalized by expert writers. Finally, our paper also evaluates the National Health System's expenditures for each patient, outlandish costs in the range between 50,000 and 1 million euros.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Human moral decision-making through the lens of Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by the loss of dopaminergic neurons in the basal ganglia (BG) and thalamocortical circuitry. While defective motor control has long been considered the defining symptom of PD, mounting evidence indicates that the BG are fundamentally important for a multitude of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes in addition to motor function. Here, we review alterations in moral decision-making in people with PD, specifically in the context of deceptive behavior. We report that PD patients exhibit two opposite behavioral patterns: hyper- and hypo-honesty. The hyper-honest subgroup engages in deception less often than matched controls, even when lying is associated with a monetary payoff. This behavioral pattern seems to be linked to dopaminergic hypo-activity, implying enhanced harm avoidance, risk aversion, non-impulsivity, and reduced reward sensitivity. On the contrary, the hypo-honest subgroup-often characterized by the additional diagnosis of impulse control disorders (ICDs) and dopamine dysregulation syndrome (DDS)-deceives more often than both PD patients without ICDs/DDS and controls. This behavioral pattern appears to be associated with dopaminergic hyperactivity, which underpins enhanced novelty-seeking, risk-proneness, impulsivity, and reward sensitivity. We posit that these two complementary behavioral patterns might be related to dysfunction of the dopaminergic reward system, leading to reduced or enhanced motivation to deceive. Only a few studies have directly investigated moral decision-making in PD and other neurodegenerative disorders affecting the BG, and further research on the causal role of subcortical structures in shaping moral behavior is needed.

Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes-valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

Neural alignment during face-to-face spontaneous deception: Does gender make a difference?

This study investigated the gender differences in deception and their neural basis in the perspective of two‐person neuroscience. Both male and female dyads were asked to perform a face‐to‐face spontaneous sender–receiver deception task, while their neural activities in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and right temporal parietal junction (rTPJ) were recorded simultaneously using functional near‐infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)‐based hyperscanning. Male and female dyads displayed similar deception rate, successful deception rate, and eye contact in deception trials. Moreover, eye contact in deception trials was positively correlated with the success rate of deception in both genders. The fNIRS data showed that the interpersonal neural synchronization (INS) in PFC was significantly enhanced only in female dyads when performed the deception task, while INS in rTPJ was increased only in male dyads. Such INS was correlated with the success rate of deception in both dyads. Granger causality analysis showed that no significant directionality between time series of PFC (or rTPJ) in each dyad, which could indicate that sender and receiver played equally important role during deception task. Finally, enhanced INS in PFC in female dyads mediated the contribution of eye contact to the success rate of deception. All findings in this study suggest that differential patterns of INS are recruited when male and female dyads perform the face‐to‐face deception task. To our knowledge, this is the first interbrain evidence for gender difference of successful deception, which could make us a deeper understanding of spontaneous face‐to‐face deception.

Neural mechanisms of deception in a social context: an fMRI replication study

Deception is a form of manipulation aimed at misleading another person by conveying false or truthful messages. Manipulative truthful statements could be considered as sophisticated deception and elicit an increased cognitive load. However, only one fMRI study reported its neural correlates. To provide independent evidence for sophisticated deception, we carried out an fMRI study replicating the experimental paradigm and Bayesian statistical approach utilized in that study. During the experiment, participants played a game against an opponent by sending deliberate deceptive or honest messages. Compared to truth-telling, deceptive intentions, regardless of how they were fulfilled, were associated with increased BOLD signals in the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left precuneus, and right superior temporal sulcus (STS). The right TPJ participates in the attribution of mental states, acting in a social context, and moral behaviour. Moreover, the other revealed brain areas have been considered nodes in the theory of mind brain neural system. Therefore, the obtained results reflect an increased demand for socio‑cognitive processes associated with deceptive intentions. We replicated the original study showing the involvement of the right TPJ and expanded upon it by revealing the involvement of the left TPJ, left precuneus and right STS in actions with deceptive intentions.

Does Abstract Mindset Decrease or Increase Deception?

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.

Detecting Concealed Information with Fused Electroencephalography and Functional Near-infrared Spectroscopy

In this study, fused electroencephalography (EEG) and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) techniques were utilized to examine the relationship between the ERP (event-related potential) component P300 and fNIRS hemodynamic signals for high-accuracy deception detection. During the performance of a modified concealed information test (CIT) task, a series of Chinese names were presented, which served as the target, irrelevant, or the probe stimuli for both the guilty and innocent groups. For participants in the guilty group, the probe stimulus was their individual name, whereas for the innocent group, the probe stimulus was one irrelevant name. In particular, data from concurrent fNIRS and ERP recordings were carefully inspected for participants from the two groups. Interestingly, we discovered that for the guilty group, the probe stimulus elicited significantly higher P300 amplitude at parietal site and also evoked significantly stronger oxyhemoglobin (HbO) concentration changes in the bilateral superior frontal gyrus and bilateral middle frontal gyrus than the irrelevant stimuli. However, this is not the case for the innocent group, in which participants exhibited no significant differences in both ERP and fNIRS measures between the probe and irrelevant stimuli. More importantly, our findings also demonstrated that the combined ERP and fNIRS feature was able to differentiate the guilty and innocent groups with enhanced sensitivity, in which AUC (the area under Receiver Operating Characteristic curve) is 0.94 for deception detection based on the combined indicator, much higher than that based on the ERP component P300 only (0.85) or HbO measure only (0.84).

Do Patients With Parkinson's Disease Exhibit Reduced Cheating Behavior? A Neuropsychological Study

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a common neurodegenerative disorder characterized by loss of dopamine neurons. Since a seminal report was published in the early twentieth century, a growing body of literature has suggested that patients with PD display characteristic personality traits, such as cautiousness and inflexibility. Notably, PD patients have also been described as "honest," indicating that they have a remarkable tendency to avoid behaving dishonestly. In this study, we predicted that PD patients show reduced cheating behavior in opportunities for dishonest gain due to dysfunction of the dopaminergic reward system. Thirty-two PD patients without dementia and 20 healthy controls (HC) completed an incentivized prediction task where participants were rewarded based on their self-reported accuracy, affording them the opportunity to behave dishonestly. Compared with HC, PD patients showed significantly lower accuracy in the prediction task. Furthermore, the mean accuracy of PD patients was virtually equivalent to the chance level. These results indicate that PD patients exhibit reduced cheating behavior when confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain.

Effects of task-irrelevant emotional information on deception

Deception has been reported to be influenced by task-relevant emotional information from an external stimulus. However, it remains unclear how task-irrelevant emotional information would influence deception. In the present study, facial expressions of different valence and emotion intensity were presented to participants, where they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to the preceding cues. We observed the influence of facial expression intensity upon individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving (mean difference of individuals' truthful and deceptive response times). Larger cost was observed for high intensity faces compared to low intensity faces. These results provided insights on how automatic attraction of attention evoked by task-irrelevant emotional information in facial expressions influenced individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving.

Neural correlates of deception: lying about past events and personal beliefs

Although a growing body of literature suggests that cognitive control processes are involved in deception, much about the neural correlates of lying remains unknown. In this study, we tested whether brain activation associated with deception, as measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), can be detected either in preparation for or during the execution of a lie, and whether they depend on the content of the lie. We scanned participants while they lied or told the truth about either their personal experiences (episodic memories) or personal beliefs. Regions in the frontal and parietal cortex showed higher activation when participants lied compared with when they were telling the truth, regardless of whether they were asked about their past experiences or opinions. In contrast, lie-related activation in the right temporal pole, precuneus and the right amygdala differed by the content of the lie. Preparing to lie activated parietal and frontal brain regions that were distinct from those activated while participants executed lies. Our findings concur with previous reports on the involvement of frontal and parietal regions in deception, but specify brain regions involved in the preparation vs execution of deception, and those involved in deceiving about experiences vs opinions.

Functional neural networks of honesty and dishonesty in children: Evidence from graph theory analysis

The present study examined how different brain regions interact with each other during spontaneous honest vs. dishonest communication. More specifically, we took a complex network approach based on the graph-theory to analyze neural response data when children are spontaneously engaged in honest or dishonest acts. Fifty-nine right-handed children between 7 and 12 years of age participated in the study. They lied or told the truth out of their own volition. We found that lying decreased both the global and local efficiencies of children’s functional neural network. This finding, for the first time, suggests that lying disrupts the efficiency of children’s cortical network functioning. Further, it suggests that the graph theory based network analysis is a viable approach to study the neural development of deception.

Deceptive but Not Honest Manipulative Actions Are Associated with Increased Interaction between Middle and Inferior Frontal gyri

The prefrontal cortex is believed to be responsible for execution of deceptive behavior and its involvement is associated with greater cognitive efforts. It is also generally assumed that deception is associated with the inhibition of default honest actions. However, the precise neurophysiological mechanisms underlying this process remain largely unknown. The present study was aimed to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal the underlying functional integration within the prefrontal cortex during the task which requires that subjects to deliberately mislead an opponent through the sequential execution of deceptive and honest claims. To address this issue, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which allows for statistical assessment of changes in functional relationships between active brain areas in changing psychological contexts. As a result the whole brain PPI-analysis established that both manipulative honest and deceptive claiming were associated with an increase in connectivity between the left middle frontal gyrus and right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Taking into account the role played by rTPJ in processes associated with the theory of mind the revealed data can reflect possible influence of socio-cognitive context on the process of selecting manipulative claiming regardless their honest or deceptive nature. Direct comparison between deceptive and honest claims revealed pattern enhancement of coupling between the left middle frontal gyrus and the left inferior frontal gyrus. This finding provided evidence that the execution of deception relies to a greater extent on higher-order hierarchically-organized brain mechanisms of executive control required to select between two competing deceptive or honest task sets.

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying deceptive hazard evaluation: An event-related potentials investigation

Deceptive behavior is common in human social interactions. Researchers have been trying to uncover the cognitive process and neural basis underlying deception due to its theoretical and practical significance. We used Event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neural correlates of deception when the participants completed a hazard judgment task. Pictures conveying or not conveying hazard information were presented to the participants who were then requested to discriminate the hazard content (safe or hazardous) and make a response corresponding to the cues (truthful or deceptive). Behavioral and electrophysiological data were recorded during the entire experiment. Results showed that deceptive responses, compared to truthful responses, were associated with longer reaction time (RT), lower accuracy, increased N2 and reduced late positive potential (LPP), suggesting a cognitively more demanding process to respond deceptively. The decrement in LPP correlated negatively with the increment in RT for deceptive relative to truthful responses, regardless of hazard content. In addition, hazardous information evoked larger N1 and P300 than safe information, reflecting an early processing bias and a later evaluative categorization process based on motivational significance, respectively. Finally, the interaction between honesty (truthful/deceptive) and safety (safe/hazardous) on accuracy and LPP indicated that deceptive responses towards safe information required more effort than deceptive responses towards hazardous information. Overall, these results demonstrate the neurocognitive substrates underlying deception about hazard information.

Gender difference in spontaneous deception: A hyperscanning study using functional near-infrared spectroscopy

Previous studies have demonstrated that the neural basis of deception involves a network of regions including the medial frontal cortex (MFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), etc. However, to test the actual activity of the brain in the act of deceptive practice itself, existing studies have mainly adopted paradigms of passive deception, where participants are told to lie in certain conditions, and have focused on intra-brain mechanisms in single participants. In order to examine the neural substrates underlying more natural, spontaneous deception in real social interactions, the present study employed a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) hyperscanning technique to simultaneously measure pairs of participants' fronto-temporal activations in a two-person gambling card-game. We demonstrated higher TPJ activation in deceptive compared to honest acts. Analysis of participants' inter-brain correlation further revealed that the STS is uniquely involved in deception but not in honesty, especially in females. These results suggest that the STS may play a critical role in spontaneous deception due to mentalizing requirements relating to modulating opponents' thoughts. To our knowledge, this study was the first to investigate such inter-brain correlates of deception in real face-to-face interactions, and thus is hoped to provide a new path for future complex social behavior research.

When Deception Influences Memory: The Implication of Theory of Mind

When deceiving, one should remember to whom a falsified story was previously told; otherwise he or she may include inconsistencies, and the deception will probably be discovered. Bearing this in mind, we investigated the potential relationship between deception and the ability to remember to whom a piece of information was previously told (i.e., destination memory). Forty-one adults were given a destination memory task in which they had to decide to whom proverbs had previously been told. They were also given a questionnaire about deception (e.g., “I sometimes tell lies if I have to) and a cognitive theory of mind task in which they had to predict the behaviour of protagonists who hold a mistaken belief about the state of the world. Results showed a positive correlation between deception and destination memory ( p < .001), a relationship that was further mediated by cognitive theory of mind ability ( p < .01). Deception requires monitoring and inferring what targets know, suspect, and believe. This monitoring ability (i.e., cognitive theory of mind) results in better processing of the target and consequently better destination memory. By showing the involvement of deception and theory of mind in destination memory, our findings emphasize the memory variations in social and interpersonal interactions.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: A signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.

Prefrontal connections express individual differences in intrinsic resistance to trading off honesty values against economic benefits

Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest, particularly in situations where moral motives clash with economic motives, i.e., when truthfulness comes at a monetary cost. These differences should be expressed in the decision network, particularly in prefrontal cortex. However, the interactions between the core players of the decision network during honesty-related decisions involving trade-offs with economic costs remain poorly understood. To investigate brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in responding to economic costs of truthfulness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured brain activations, while participants made decisions concerning honesty. We found that in participants who valued honesty highly, dorsolateral and dorsomedial parts of prefrontal cortex were more tightly coupled with the inferior frontal cortex when economic costs were high compared to when they were low. Finer-grained analysis revealed that information flow from the inferior frontal cortex to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bidirectional information flow between the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a reduced tendency to trade off honesty for economic benefits. Our findings provide a novel account of the neural circuitry that underlies honest decisions in the face of economic temptations.

Hemodynamic Pattern Recognition During Deception Process Using Functional Near-infrared Spectroscopy

Deception is considered a psychological process by which one individual deliberately attempts to convince another person to accept as true what the liar knows to be false. This paper presents the use of functional near-infrared spectroscopy for deception detection. This technique measures hemodynamic variations in the cortical regions induced by neural activations. The experimental setup involved a mock theft paradigm with ten subjects, where the subjects responded to a set of questions, with each of their answers belonging to one of three categories: Induced Lies, Induced Truths, and Non-Induced responses. The relative changes of the hemodynamic activity in the subject’s prefrontal cortex were recorded during the experiment. From this data, the changes in blood volume were derived and represented as false color topograms. Finally, a human evaluator used these topograms as a guide to classify each answer into one of the three categories. His performance was compared with that of a support vector machine (SVM) classifier in terms of accuracy, specificity, and sensitivity. The human evaluator achieved an accuracy of 84.33 % in a tri-class problem and 92 % in a bi-class problem (induced vs. non-induced responses). In comparison, the SVM classifier correctly classified 95.63 % of the answers in a tri-class problem using cross-validation for the selection of the best features. These results suggest a tradeoff between accuracy and computational burden. In other words, it is possible for an interviewer to classify each response by only looking at the topogram of the hemodynamic activity, but at the cost of reduced prediction accuracy.

The inhibitory spillover effect: Controlling the bladder makes better liars

The Inhibitory-Spillover-Effect (ISE) on a deception task was investigated. The ISE occurs when performance in one self-control task facilitates performance in another (simultaneously conducted) self-control task. Deceiving requires increased access to inhibitory control. We hypothesized that inducing liars to control urination urgency (physical inhibition) would facilitate control during deceptive interviews (cognitive inhibition). Participants drank small (low-control) or large (high-control) amounts of water. Next, they lied or told the truth to an interviewer. Third-party observers assessed the presence of behavioral cues and made true/lie judgments. In the high-control, but not the low-control condition, liars displayed significantly fewer behavioral cues to deception, more behavioral cues signaling truth, and provided longer and more complex accounts than truth-tellers. Accuracy detecting liars in the high-control condition was significantly impaired; observers revealed bias toward perceiving liars as truth-tellers. The ISE can operate in complex behaviors. Acts of deception can be facilitated by covert manipulations of self-control.

Mentira: Aspectos Sociais e Neurobiológicos

RESUMONo contexto da interação interpessoal, no qual são utilizados recursos comportamentais como gestos, expressões faciais, postura corporal e modulação de voz, destaca-se o fenômeno da mentira, que é caracterizada pela dissimulação de ideias, sentimentos e emoções. No presente trabalho foi realizado um levantamento teórico acerca da mentira, sendo descritos alguns de seus aspectos comportamentais e neurobiológicos e também analisadas as publicações relacionadas ao tema no Brasil. As implicações do uso de técnicas de avaliação da mentira no âmbito judicial, bem como as crenças infundadas utilizadas em julgamentos são discutidas. A revisão identificou poucos estudos sobre a temática no contexto brasileiro, o que indica a necessidade de ampliação desse campo de investigação no país.

The "good cop, bad cop" effect in the RT-based concealed information test: exploring the effect of emotional expressions displayed by a virtual investigator

Concealing the possession of relevant information represents a complex cognitive process, shaped by contextual demands and individual differences in cognitive and socio-emotional functioning. The Reaction Time-based Concealed Information Test (RT-CIT) is used to detect concealed knowledge based on the difference in RTs between denying recognition of critical (probes) and newly encountered (irrelevant) information. Several research questions were addressed in this scenario implemented after a mock crime. First, we were interested whether the introduction of a social stimulus (facial identity) simulating a virtual investigator would facilitate the process of deception detection. Next, we explored whether his emotional displays (friendly, hostile or neutral) would have a differential impact on speed of responses to probe versus irrelevant items. We also compared the impact of introducing similar stimuli in a working memory (WM) updating context without requirements to conceal information. Finally, we explored the association between deceptive behavior and individual differences in WM updating proficiency or in internalizing problems (state / trait anxiety and depression). Results indicated that the mere presence of a neutral virtual investigator slowed down participants' responses, but not the appended lie-specific time (difference between probes and irrelevants). Emotional expression was shown to differentially affect speed of responses to critical items, with positive displays from the virtual examiner enhancing lie-specific time, compared to negative facial expressions, which had an opposite impact. This valence-specific effect was not visible in the WM updating context. Higher levels of trait / state anxiety were related to faster responses to probes in the negative condition (hostile facial expression) of the RT-CIT. These preliminary findings further emphasize the need to take into account motivational and emotional factors when considering the transfer of deception detection techniques from the laboratory to real-life settings.

Are Computers Effective Lie Detectors? A Meta-Analysis of Linguistic Cues to Deception

This meta-analysis investigates linguistic cues to deception and whether these cues can be detected with computer programs. We integrated operational definitions for 79 cues from 44 studies where software had been used to identify linguistic deception cues. These cues were allocated to six research questions. As expected, the meta-analyses demonstrated that, relative to truth-tellers, liars experienced greater cognitive load, expressed more negative emotions, distanced themselves more from events, expressed fewer sensory–perceptual words, and referred less often to cognitive processes. However, liars were not more uncertain than truth-tellers. These effects were moderated by event type, involvement, emotional valence, intensity of interaction, motivation, and other moderators. Although the overall effect size was small, theory-driven predictions for certain cues received support. These findings not only further our knowledge about the usefulness of linguistic cues to detect deception with computers in applied settings but also elucidate the relationship between language and deception.

Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens predicts behavior in an independent test of honesty

This study examines the cognitive and neural determinants of honesty and dishonesty. Human subjects undergoing fMRI completed a monetary incentive delay task eliciting responses to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens. Subjects next performed an incentivized prediction task, giving them real and repeated opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects attempted to predict the outcomes of random computerized coin-flips and were financially rewarded for accuracy. In some trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying. Dishonest behavior was indexed by improbably high levels of self-reported accuracy. Nucleus accumbens response in the first task, involving only honest rewards, accounted for ∼25% of the variance in dishonest behavior in the prediction task. Individuals showing relatively strong nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward also exhibited increased dorsolateral prefrontal activity (bilateral) in response to opportunities for dishonest gain. These results address two hypotheses concerning (dis)honesty. According to the "Will" hypothesis, honesty results from the active deployment of self-control. According to the "Grace" hypothesis, honesty flows more automatically. The present results suggest a reconciliation between these two hypotheses while explaining (dis)honesty in terms of more basic neural mechanisms: relatively weak responses to anticipated rewards make people morally "Graceful," but individuals who respond more strongly may resist temptation by force of Will.

The neural basis of dishonest decisions that serve to harm or help the target

We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms of harmful and helpful dishonest decisions. During scanning, the subjects read scenarios concerning events that could occur in real-life situations and were asked to decide whether to tell a lie as though they were experiencing those events. Half of the scenarios consisted of harmful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as bad lies, and the other half consisted of helpful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as good lies. In contrast to the control decision-making task, we found that the decision-making tasks that involved honesty or dishonesty recruited a network of brain regions that included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In the harmful stories, the right temporoparietal junction and the right medial frontal cortex were activated when the subjects made dishonest decisions compared with honest decisions. No region discriminated between the honest and dishonest decisions made in the helpful stories. These preliminary findings suggest that the neural basis of dishonest decisions is modulated by whether the lying serves to harm or help the target.

Using fMRI to decode true thoughts independent of intention to conceal

Multi-variate pattern analysis (MVPA) applied to BOLD-fMRI has proven successful at decoding complicated fMRI signal patterns associated with a variety of cognitive processes. One cognitive process, not yet investigated, is the mental representation of "Yes/No" thoughts that precede the actual overt response to a binary "Yes/No" question. In this study, we focus on examining: (1) whether spatial patterns of the hemodynamic response carry sufficient information to allow reliable decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts; and (2) whether decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts is independent of the intention to respond honestly or dishonestly. To achieve this goal, we conducted two separate experiments. Experiment 1, collected on a 3T scanner, examined the whole brain to identify regions that carry sufficient information to permit significantly above-chance prediction of "Yes/No" thoughts at the group level. In Experiment 2, collected on a 7T scanner, we focused on the regions identified in Experiment 1 to examine the capability of achieving high decoding accuracy at the single subject level. A set of regions--namely right superior temporal gyrus, left supra-marginal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus--exhibited high decoding power. Decoding accuracy for these regions increased with trial averaging. When 18 trials were averaged, the median accuracies were 82.5%, 77.5%, and 79.5%, respectively. When trials were separated according to deceptive intentions (set via experimental cues), and classifiers were trained on honest trials, but tested on trials where subjects were asked to deceive, the median accuracies of these regions still reached 66%, 75%, and 78.5%. These results provide evidence that concealed "Yes/No" thoughts are encoded in the BOLD signal, retaining some level of independence from the subject's intentions to answer honestly or dishonestly. These findings also suggest the theoretical possibility for more efficient brain-computer interfaces where subjects only need to think their answers to communicate.

Functional MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges

Functional MRI (fMRI)-based lie detection has been marketed as a tool for enhancing personnel selection, strengthening national security and protecting personal reputations, and at least three US courts have been asked to admit the results of lie detection scans as evidence during trials. How well does fMRI-based lie detection perform, and how should the courts, and society more generally, respond? Here, we address various questions — some of which are based on a meta-analysis of published studies — concerning the scientific state of the art in fMRI-based lie detection and its legal status, and discuss broader ethical and societal implications. We close with three general policy recommendations.

Dissociable neural systems for moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying

Pro-social lying, which serves to benefit listeners, is considered more socially and morally acceptable than anti-social lying, which serves to harm listeners. However, it is still unclear whether the neural mechanisms underlying the moral judgment of pro-social lying differ from those underlying the moral judgment of anti-social lying. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural activities associated with moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. During fMRI scanning, subjects were provided with scenarios describing a protagonist's anti- and pro-social lying and were then asked to judge whether the protagonist's act was morally appropriate. The behavioral data showed that anti-social lying was mostly judged to be morally inappropriate and that pro-social lying was mainly judged to be morally appropriate. The functional imaging data revealed dissociable neural systems for moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. The anti-social lying, which was judged to be morally inappropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex, right middle frontal gyrus, right precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral temporoparietal junction when compared with the control condition. The pro-social lying, which was judged to be morally appropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right middle temporal gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, and the left middle cingulate gyrus when compared with the control condition. No overlapping activity was observed during the moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying. Our data suggest that cognitive and neural processes for the moral judgment of lying are modulated by whether the lie serves to harm or benefit listeners.

Right inferior frontal gyrus activation as a neural marker of successful lying

There is evidence to suggest that successful lying necessitates cognitive effort. We tested this hypothesis by instructing participants to lie or tell the truth under conditions of high and low working memory (WM) load. The task required participants to register a response on 80 trials of identical structure within a 2 (WM Load: high, low) × 2 (Instruction: truth or lie) repeated-measures design. Participants were less accurate and responded more slowly when WM load was high, and also when they lied. High WM load activated the fronto-parietal WM network including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), middle frontal gyrus, precuneus, and intraparietal cortex. Lying activated areas previously shown to underlie deception, including middle and superior frontal gyrus and precuneus. Critically, successful lying in the high vs. low WM load condition was associated with longer response latency, and it activated the right inferior frontal gyrus—a key brain region regulating inhibition. The same pattern of activation in the inferior frontal gyrus was absent when participants told the truth. These findings demonstrate that lying under high cognitive load places a burden on inhibition, and that the right inferior frontal gyrus may provide a neural marker for successful lying.

Neural correlates of spontaneous deception: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)study

Deception is commonly seen in everyday social interactions. However, most of the knowledge about the underlying neural mechanism of deception comes from studies where participants were instructed when and how to lie. To study spontaneous deception, we designed a guessing game modeled after Greene and Paxton (2009) "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(30), 12506-12511", in which lying is the only way to achieve the performance level needed to end the game. We recorded neural responses during the game using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). We found that when compared to truth-telling, spontaneous deception, like instructed deception, engenders greater involvement of such prefrontal regions as the left superior frontal gyrus. We also found that the correct-truth trials produced greater neural activities in the left middle frontal gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus than the incorrect-truth trials, suggesting the involvement of the reward system. Furthermore, the present study confirmed the feasibility of using NIRS to study spontaneous deception.

Fooling the kickers but not the goalkeepers: behavioral and neurophysiological correlates of fake action detection in soccer

Studies demonstrate that elite athletes are able to extract kinematic information of observed domain-specific actions to predict their future course. Little is known, however, on the perceptuo-motor processes and neural correlates of the athletes' ability to predict fooling actions. Combining psychophysics and transcranial magnetic stimulation, we explored the impact of motor and perceptual expertise on the ability to predict the fate of observed actual or fake soccer penalty kicks. We manipulated the congruence between the model's body kinematics and the subsequent ball trajectory and investigated the prediction performance and cortico-spinal reactivity of expert kickers, goalkeepers, and novices. Kickers and goalkeepers outperformed novices by anticipating the actual kick direction from the model's initial body movements. However, kickers were more often fooled than goalkeepers and novices in cases of incongruent actions. Congruent and incongruent actions engendered a comparable facilitation of kickers' lower limb motor representation, but their neurophysiological response was correlated with their greater susceptibility to be fooled. Moreover, when compared with actual actions, motor facilitation for incongruent actions was lower among goalkeepers and higher among novices. Thus, responding to fooling actions requires updation of simulative motor representations of others' actions and is facilitated by visual rather than by motor expertise.

Sex, lies and fMRI--gender differences in neural basis of deception

Deception has always been a part of human communication as it helps to promote self-presentation. Although both men and women are equally prone to try to manage their appearance, their strategies, motivation and eagerness may be different. Here, we asked if lying could be influenced by gender on both the behavioral and neural levels. To test whether the hypothesized gender differences in brain activity related to deceptive responses were caused by differential socialization in men and women, we administered the Gender Identity Inventory probing the participants’ subjective social sex role. In an fMRI session, participants were instructed either to lie or to tell the truth while answering a questionnaire focusing on general and personal information. Only for personal information, we found differences in neural responses during instructed deception in men and women. The women vs. men direct contrast revealed no significant differences in areas of activation, but men showed higher BOLD signal compared to women in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Moreover, this effect remained unchanged when self-reported psychological gender was controlled for. Thus, our study showed that gender differences in the neural processes engaged during falsifying personal information might be independent from socialization.

The contribution of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the preparation for deception and truth-telling

Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with creating deceptive responses. However, the neural basis of the preparatory processes that create deception has yet to be explored. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the preparation for a certain task activates brain areas relevant to the execution of that task, leading to the question of whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity is observed during the preparation for deception. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity, which increases during the execution of deception compared with the execution of truth-telling, also increases during the preparation for deception compared with the preparation for truth-telling. Our data show that the execution of deception was associated with increased activity in several brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, compared with truth-telling, confirming the contribution of this region to the production of deceptive responses. The results also reveal that the preparations for both deception and truth-telling were associated with increased activity in certain brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that the preparations for truth-telling and deception make similar demands on the brain and that the dorsolateral prefrontal activity identified in the preparation phase is associated with general preparatory processes, regardless of whether one is telling a lie or the truth.

Receivers limit the prevalence of deception in humans: evidence from diving behaviour in soccer players

Deception remains a hotly debated topic in evolutionary and behavioural research. Our understanding of what impedes or facilitates the use and detection of deceptive signals in humans is still largely limited to studies of verbal deception under laboratory conditions. Recent theoretical models of non-human behaviour have suggested that the potential outcome for deceivers and the ability of receivers to discriminate signals can effectively maintain their honesty. In this paper, we empirically test these predictions in a real-world case of human deception, simulation in soccer. In support of theoretical predictions in signalling theory, we show that cost-free deceit by soccer players decreases as the potential outcome for the signaller becomes more costly. We further show that the ability of receivers (referees) to detect deceptive signals may limit the prevalence of deception by soccer players. Our study provides empirical support to recent theoretical models in signalling theory, and identifies conditions that may facilitate human deception and hinder its detection.

How the brain shapes deception: an integrated review of the literature

How do people tell a lie? One useful approach to addressing this question is to elucidate the neural substrates for deception. Recent conceptual and technical advances in functional neuroimaging have enabled exploration of the psychology of deception more precisely in terms of the specific neuroanatomical mechanisms involved. A growing body of evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in deception, and some researchers have recently emphasized the importance of other brain regions, such as those responsible for emotion and reward. However, it is still unclear how these regions play a role in making effective decisions to tell a lie. To provide a framework for considering this issue, the present article reviews current accomplishments in the study of the neural basis of deception. First, evolutionary and developmental perspectives are provided to better understand how and when people can make use of deception. The ensuing section introduces several findings on pathological lying and its neural correlate. Next, recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience of deception based on functional neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies are summarized, and possible neural mechanisms underlying deception are proposed. Finally, the priority areas of future neuroscience research-human honesty and dishonesty-are discussed.