Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans

A new 'CFS tracking' paradigm reveals uniform suppression depth regardless of target complexity or salience

When the eyes view separate and incompatible images, the brain suppresses one image and promotes the other into visual awareness. Periods of interocular suppression can be prolonged during continuous flash suppression (CFS) - when one eye views a static 'target' while the other views a complex dynamic stimulus. Measuring the time needed for a suppressed image to break CFS (bCFS) has been widely used to investigate unconscious processing, and the results have generated controversy regarding the scope of visual processing without awareness. Here, we address this controversy with a new 'CFS tracking' paradigm (tCFS) in which the suppressed monocular target steadily increases in contrast until breaking into awareness (as in bCFS) after which it decreases until it again disappears (reCFS), with this cycle continuing for many reversals. Unlike bCFS, tCFS provides a measure of suppression depth by quantifying the difference between breakthrough and suppression thresholds. tCFS confirms that (i) breakthrough thresholds indeed differ across target types (e.g. faces vs gratings, as bCFS has shown) - but (ii) suppression depth does not vary across target types. Once the breakthrough contrast is reached for a given stimulus, all stimuli require a strikingly uniform reduction in contrast to reach the corresponding suppression threshold. This uniform suppression depth points to a single mechanism of CFS suppression, one that likely occurs early in visual processing because suppression depth was not modulated by target salience or complexity. More fundamentally, it shows that variations in bCFS thresholds alone are insufficient for inferring whether the barrier to achieving awareness exerted by interocular suppression is weaker for some categories of visual stimuli compared to others.

Neural patterns of conscious visual awareness in the Riddoch syndrome

The Riddoch syndrome is one in which patients blinded by lesions to their primary visual cortex can consciously perceive visual motion in their blind field, an ability that correlates with activity in motion area V5. Our assessment of the characteristics of this syndrome in patient ST, using multimodal MRI, showed that: 1. ST's V5 is intact, receives direct subcortical input, and decodable neural patterns emerge in it only during the conscious perception of visual motion; 2. moving stimuli activate medial visual areas but, unless associated with decodable V5 activity, they remain unperceived; 3. ST's high confidence ratings when discriminating motion at chance levels, is associated with inferior frontal gyrus activity. Finally, we report that ST's Riddoch Syndrome results in hallucinatory motion with hippocampal activity as a correlate. Our results shed new light on perceptual experiences associated with this syndrome and on the neural determinants of conscious visual experience.

Assessing awareness in severe Alzheimer's disease

There is an urgent need to understand the nature of awareness in people with severe Alzheimer's disease (AD) to ensure effective person-centered care. Objective biomarkers of awareness validated in other clinical groups (e.g., anesthesia, minimally conscious states) offer an opportunity to investigate awareness in people with severe AD. In this article we demonstrate the feasibility of using Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) combined with EEG, event related potentials (ERPs) and fMRI to assess awareness in severe AD. TMS-EEG was performed in six healthy older controls and three people with severe AD. The perturbational complexity index (PCIST) was calculated as a measure of capacity for conscious awareness. People with severe AD demonstrated a PCIST around or below the threshold for consciousness, suggesting reduced capacity for consciousness. ERPs were recorded during a visual perception paradigm. In response to viewing faces, two patients with severe AD provisionally demonstrated similar visual awareness negativity to healthy controls. Using a validated fMRI movie-viewing task, independent component analysis in two healthy controls and one patient with severe AD revealed activation in auditory, visual and fronto-parietal networks. Activation patterns in fronto-parietal networks did not significantly correlate between the patient and controls, suggesting potential differences in conscious awareness and engagement with the movie. Although methodological issues remain, these results demonstrate the feasibility of using objective measures of awareness in severe AD. We raise a number of challenges and research questions that should be addressed using these biomarkers of awareness in future studies to improve understanding and care for people with severe AD.

Sliding Scale Theory of Attention and Consciousness/Unconsciousness

Attention defined as focusing on a unit of information plays a prominent role in both consciousness and the cognitive unconscious, due to its essential role in information processing. Existing theories of consciousness invariably address the relationship between attention and conscious awareness, ranging from attention is not required to crucial. However, these theories do not adequately or even remotely consider the contribution of attention to the cognitive unconscious. A valid theory of consciousness must also be a robust theory of the cognitive unconscious, a point rarely if ever considered. Current theories also emphasize human perceptual consciousness, primarily visual, despite evidence that consciousness occurs in diverse animal species varying in cognitive capacity, and across many forms of perceptual and thought consciousness. A comprehensive and parsimonious perspective applicable to the diversity of species demonstrating consciousness and the various forms—sliding scale theory of attention and consciousness/unconsciousness—is proposed with relevant research reviewed. Consistent with the continuous organization of natural events, attention occupies a sliding scale in regards to time and space compression. Unconscious attention in the form of the “cognitive unconscious” is time and spaced diffused, whereas conscious attention is tightly time and space compressed to the present moment. Due to the special clarity derived from brief and concentrated signals, the tight time and space compression yields conscious awareness as an emergent property. The present moment enhances the time and space compression of conscious attention, and contributes to an evolutionary explanation of conscious awareness.

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

No Evidence for Neural Overlap between Unconsciously Processed and Imagined Stimuli

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any representational overlap could be because of overlap in feedback processes. In the current study, we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category representations during imagined stimuli, conscious perception, and unconscious processing using fMRI in humans of either sex. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were observed only between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, connectivity analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and in imagery compared with unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing representational overlap between purely feedforward- and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations influenced by feedback, either stimulus driven (perception) or purely internally driven (imagery), are, however, relatively similar.

The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli

The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant’s report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness. We obtained functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements from 43 subjects while they viewed masked faces and houses that were either subjectively or objectively invisible. Even for objectively invisible (perceptually indiscriminable) stimuli, we found significant category information in both early, lower-level visual areas and in higher-level visual cortex, although representations in anterior, category-selective ventrotemporal areas were less robust. For subjectively invisible stimuli, similar to visible stimuli, there was a clear posterior-to-anterior gradient in visual cortex, with stronger category information in ventrotemporal cortex than in early visual cortex. For objectively invisible stimuli, however, category information remained virtually unchanged from early visual cortex to object- and category-selective visual areas. These results demonstrate that although both objectively and subjectively invisible stimuli are represented in visual cortex, the extent of unconscious information processing is influenced by the measurement approach. Furthermore, our data show that subjective and objective approaches are associated with different neural correlates of consciousness and thus have implications for neural theories of consciousness.

This study shows that the extent of unconscious information processing in human visual cortex is determined by the measurement approach; only subjectively, but not objectively, invisible stimuli are represented at a categorical level.

Blink- and saccade-related suppression effects in early visual areas of the human brain: Intracranial EEG investigations during natural viewing conditions

Blinks and saccades, both ubiquitous in natural viewing conditions, cause rapid changes of visual inputs that are hardly consciously perceived. The neural dynamics in early visual areas of the human brain underlying this remarkable visual stability are still incompletely understood. We used electrocorticography (ECoG) from electrodes directly implanted on the human early visual areas V1, V2, V3d/v, V4d/v and the fusiform gyrus to investigate blink- and saccade-related neuronal suppression effects during non-experimental, free viewing conditions. We found a characteristic, biphasic, broadband gamma power decrease-increase pattern in all investigated visual areas. During saccades, a decrease in gamma power clearly preceded eye movement onset, at least in V1. This may indicate that cortical information processing is actively suppressed in human early visual areas before and during saccades, which then possibly mediates perceptual visual suppression. The following eye movement offset-related increase in gamma power may indicate the recovery of visual perception and the resumption of visual processing.

Now You See One Letter, Now You See Meaningless Symbols: Perceptual and Semantic Hypnotic Suggestions Reduce Stroop Errors Through Different Neurocognitive Mechanisms

Compelling literature has suggested the possibility of adopting hypnotic suggestions to override the Stroop interference effect. However, most of these studies mainly reported behavioral data and were conducted on highly hypnotizable individuals. Thus, the question of the neural locus of the effects and their generalizability remains open. In the present study, we used the Stroop task in a within-subject design to test the neurocognitive effects of two hypnotic suggestions: the perceptual request to focus only on the central letter of the words and the semantic request to observe meaningless symbols. Behavioral results indicated that the two types of suggestions did not alter response time (RT), but both favored more accurate performance compared to the control condition. Both types of suggestions increased sensory awareness and reduced discriminative visual attention, but the perceptual request selectively engaged more executive control of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the semantic request selectively suppressed the temporal cortex activity devoted to graphemic analysis of the words. The present findings demonstrated that the perceptual and the semantic hypnotic suggestions reduced Stroop errors through common and specific top-down modulations of different neurocognitive processes but left the semantic activation unaltered. Finally, as we also recruited participants with a medium level of hypnotizability, the present data might be considered potentially representative of the majority of the population.

The neural correlates of the visual consciousness in schizophrenia: an fMRI study

In the current literature, two distinct and opposite models are suggested to explain the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. The first one suggests that consciousness disorders rely on a low-level processing deficit, when the second model suggests that consciousness disorders rely on disruption in the ability to consciously access information, with preserved unconscious processing. The current study aims to understand the mechanisms associated with visual consciousness disorder in order to pave the road that will settle the debate regarding these hypotheses. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging session, 19 healthy participants (HC) and 15 patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) performed a visual detection task to compare the neural substrates associated with the conscious access to the visual inputs. The visual detection threshold was significantly higher in SCZ than in HC [t(32) = 3.37, p = 0.002]. Whole-brain ANOVA demonstrated that around the visual detection threshold patients with SCZ failed to activate a large network of brain areas compared to HC. (1) During conscious vision, HC engaged more the left cuneus and the right occipital cortex than patients with SCZ, (2) during unconscious vision, HC engaged a large network that patients with SCZ failed to activate, and finally, (3) during the access to consciousness process, patients with SCZ failed to activate the anterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest that the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia rely on specific dysfunctions depending on the consciousness stage. The disorders of the conscious vision are associated with dysfunction of occipital areas while the ones associated with unconscious vision rely on a large widespread network. Finally, the conscious access to the visual inputs is impaired by a dysfunction of the anterior cingulate cortex. The current study suggests that none of the two suggested models can explain consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. We suggest that there is an alternative model supporting that the conscious access to visual inputs is due to a disengagement of the supragenual anterior cingulate during the unconscious processing of the visual inputs associated with a sensory deficit.

Context-dependent dynamic functional connectivity alteration of lateral occipital cortex in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia has long been associated with dysfunction in visual perception. One important region underlying this is lateral occipital cortex (LOC), a mid-level visual region critical for object recognition. Although LOC of patients has exhibited structural and functional abnormalities in MR brain imaging studies, how it interacts with other networks over time under rest and with task demands remains to be clarified. The present study investigated the spatial-temporal interaction of LOC with other brain networks by examining functional connectivity communities of the brain over time. We found increased temporal instability of LOC connectivity over time under both resting and task-switching conditions in patients. In the resting state, LOC of patients had increased interaction with the frontoparietal task-control network (FPTC) and thalamus compared with controls, while during task switching, LOC showed increased interaction with the default mode network (DMN). Temporal instability of LOC connectivity was positively correlated with patients' switching cost during task performance and with hallucination severity. These results indicate that reduced stability of LOC connectivity may be an important factor underlying neurocognitive dysfunctions and symptom severity in schizophrenia.

A Switch and Wave of Neuronal Activity in the Cerebral Cortex During the First Second of Conscious Perception

Conscious perception occurs within less than 1 s. To study events on this time scale we used direct electrical recordings from the human cerebral cortex during a conscious visual perception task. Faces were presented at individually titrated visual threshold for 9 subjects while measuring broadband 40-115 Hz gamma power in a total of 1621 intracranial electrodes widely distributed in both hemispheres. Surface maps and k-means clustering analysis showed initial activation of visual cortex for both perceived and non-perceived stimuli. However, only stimuli reported as perceived then elicited a forward-sweeping wave of activity throughout the cerebral cortex accompanied by large-scale network switching. Specifically, a monophasic wave of broadband gamma activation moves through bilateral association cortex at a rate of approximately 150 mm/s and eventually reenters visual cortex for perceived but not for non-perceived stimuli. Meanwhile, the default mode network and the initial visual cortex and higher association cortex networks are switched off for the duration of conscious stimulus processing. Based on these findings, we propose a new "switch-and-wave" model for the processing of consciously perceived stimuli. These findings are important for understanding normal conscious perception and may also shed light on its vulnerability to disruption by brain disorders.

Temporal variability of brain networks predicts individual differences in bistable perception

When ambiguous visual stimuli are presented to the eyes, conscious perception can spontaneously alternate across the competing interpretations - which was known as bistable perception. The spontaneous alternation of perception might indicate a connection between bistable perception and the dynamic interaction of brain networks. Here, we hypothesized that individual differences in perceptual dynamics may be reflected in dynamics of spontaneous neural activities. To test this idea, we investigated the relationship between the percept duration and the reconfiguration patterns of dynamic brain networks as measured by the functional connectivity (FC) during the resting state. Firstly, we found that individual difference of percept duration is associated with the temporal variability of the brain regions which were previously reported in studies of bistable perception, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), superior parietal lobule (SPL), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), precuneus, insula, and V5. Secondly, there is a positive relationship between the temporal variability within the frontal-parietal network (FPN) and the percept duration. Thirdly, our results indicated that individual difference of bistable perception was related to the dynamic interaction between large-scale functional networks including default mode network (DMN), FPN, cingulo-opercular network (CON), dorsal attention network (DAN), salience network (SN), memory retrieval network (MRN). Altogether, our results demonstrated that inter-individual variability in bistable perception was associated with dynamic coupling of brain regions and networks involved in primary visual processing, spatial attention, and cognitive control.

Perceptual awareness and active inference

Perceptual awareness depends upon the way in which we engage with our sensorium. This notion is central to active inference, a theoretical framework that treats perception and action as inferential processes. This variational perspective on cognition formalizes the notion of perception as hypothesis testing and treats actions as experiments that are designed (in part) to gather evidence for or against alternative hypotheses. The common treatment of perception and action affords a useful interpretation of certain perceptual phenomena whose active component is often not acknowledged. In this article, we start by considering Troxler fading - the dissipation of a peripheral percept during maintenance of fixation, and its recovery during free (saccadic) exploration. This offers an important example of the failure to maintain a percept without actively interrogating a visual scene. We argue that this may be understood in terms of the accumulation of uncertainty about a hypothesized stimulus when free exploration is disrupted by experimental instructions or pathology. Once we take this view, we can generalize the idea of using bodily (oculomotor) action to resolve uncertainty to include the use of mental (attentional) actions for the same purpose. This affords a useful way to think about binocular rivalry paradigms, in which perceptual changes need not be associated with an overt movement.

Columnar clusters in the human motion complex reflect consciously perceived motion axis

Existing knowledge of how cortical responses link to conscious content in humans is either inferred from animal models or from human studies limited by lower spatial resolution. While previous studies could relate distinct categorical percepts (faces vs. places) to signal differences across brain areas, measuring responses at submillimeter resolution allowed us to link subcategory conscious percepts (vertical vs. horizontal motion) to amplitude changes of separate populations within the same brain area. Furthermore, preferences for horizontal and vertical motion were organized into columnar clusters. We pave the way for future studies investigating if columnar clusters represent subcategorical distinctions in conscious content different from motion or in high-level perceptual and cognitive phenomena.

The specific contents of human consciousness rely on the activity of specialized neurons in cerebral cortex. We hypothesized that the conscious experience of a specific visual motion axis is reflected in response amplitudes of direction-selective clusters in the human motion complex. Using submillimeter fMRI at ultrahigh field (7 T) we identified fine-grained clusters that were tuned to either horizontal or vertical motion presented in an unambiguous motion display. We then recorded their responses while human observers reported the perceived axis of motion for an ambiguous apparent motion display. Although retinal stimulation remained constant, subjects reported recurring changes between horizontal and vertical motion percepts every 7 to 13 s. We found that these perceptual states were dissociatively reflected in the response amplitudes of the identified horizontal and vertical clusters. We also found that responses to unambiguous motion were organized in a columnar fashion such that motion preferences were stable in the direction of cortical depth and changed when moving along the cortical surface. We suggest that activity in these specialized clusters is involved in tracking the distinct conscious experience of a particular motion axis.

Awareness of perception and sensory-motor integration: ERPs from the anterior insula

The present work follows recent evidences of studies showing that visual stimuli evoke two early prefrontal event-related potentials (ERP) concomitant to the canonical occipital activities, but originating within the anterior insula (the pN1 and the pP1 components). To clarify the exogenous/endogenous nature of these components, we performed two experiments in which stimulus physical features (Experiment 1) and motor demands of the task (Experiment 2) were considered. In a simple response task (SRT), low-visibility stimuli evoked larger pN1 over the prefrontal areas (Experiment 1) with respect to high-visibility stimuli; in contrast, the occipital P1 component (concomitant to the pN1) had reduced amplitude in the low-visibility condition as expected. Furthermore, the latency of the P1, pN1 and pP1 was slower in the low-visibility condition (from 8 to 18 ms), and the motor response was slowed down as well (on average 14 ms). Pre-stimulus analysis showed that low-visibility stimuli were preceded by greater motor readiness. On the other hand, Experiment 2 showed that, compared with the SRT, the request to passively view the same stimuli was associated with smaller pP1. ERP source analysis confirmed the anterior insula source of the prefrontal ERPs; we interpreted these activities as the correlate of two top-down perceptual processing: the sensory awareness (the pN1) and the awareness of the sensory-motor integration (the pP1), associated with the subjective experience of the visual perception and the conscious experience of the sensory-motor coupling, respectively.

Neuromolecular basis of faded perception associated with unreality experience

Perceptual changes in shape, size, or color are observed in patients with derealization symptoms; however, the underlying neural and molecular mechanisms are not well understood. The current study explored the relationship between neural activity associated with altered colorfulness perception assessed by fMRI and striatal dopamine D₂ receptor availability measured by [¹¹C]raclopride PET in healthy participants. Inside an fMRI scanner, participants performed the saturation adaptation task, where they rated how much vivid/faded visual objects looked like real/unreal ones using a visual analog scale. We found that participants experienced greater unreality when they perceived fadedness than vividness despite physically identical saturation. The combined fMRI and PET analyses revealed that the faded perception-related activities of the dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal cortex were positively correlated with striatal D₂ receptor availability. This finding may help to understand the neuromolecular mechanisms of faded perception associated with feeling unreal in derealization symptoms.

The relationship between semantic access and introspective awareness

There have long been speculations about the relationship between consciousness and language. This study aimed to determine whether an individual's level of introspective awareness, based on self-report, relates to accessibility of their semantic system as evaluated by the N400. Thirty-five university students completed the study. All were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, without known neurological or psychological health issues. They first performed on a lexical decision task while their brain electrophysiological responses were recorded. Then, they provided assessment ratings about their levels of introspective awareness. Analysis revealed moderate to strong correlations (Pearson's rs = 0.49-0.62) between awareness self-ratings and ease of semantic access as indexed by the N400. Correlation between the self-report measure and the objective neurophysiological measure suggests that subjective assessment of awareness may deserve more credibility, which in addition to reflecting subjective perception and evaluation about one's own higher order mental functioning, may also interact with the neurophysiological processes contributive and subject to such awareness. Implications for future research on the role of semantic network in the mechanism of introspective awareness are discussed.

When attended and conscious perception deactivates fronto-parietal regions

The finding of increased fronto-parietal activity during conscious and attended perception forms a key basis for theories of consciousness and attention. However, this finding comes largely from studies that required explicit detection of events in a way that made detection the goal of the ongoing task. This is an important confound because goal completion itself elicits fronto-parietal activity. In everyday life attended and conscious perception is instrumental in achieving our goals but rarely a goal in itself. Here we examined whether conscious perception that was instrumental to participants' current goals, but not a goal in itself, elicited increased fronto-parietal activity. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants attended to a stream of letters (1 per second) to detect occasional targets in their midst. We found that consciousness of, and attention to, these highly visible non-targets events deactivated fronto-parietal regions. In Experiment 3 participants heard a loud auditory cue that had to be retained in memory for up to 9 sec before being used to select the correct rule for completing the goal. No increased fronto-parietal activity was observed even for such salient, attended and remembered event. In contrast, robust fronto-parietal activation was observed across all the experiments for goal completion events. The results indicate that increased fronto-parietal activity is not a necessary correlate of conscious and attended perception. We speculate that fronto-parietal deactivation during non-target events may be related to the suppression of potential interference from salient, conscious, but non-goal stimuli.

Information and the Origin of Qualia

This article argues that qualia are a likely outcome of the processing of information in local cortical networks. It uses an information-based approach and makes a distinction between information structures (the physical embodiment of information in the brain, primarily patterns of action potentials), and information messages (the meaning of those structures to the brain, and the basis of qualia). It develops formal relationships between these two kinds of information, showing how information structures can represent messages, and how information messages can be identified from structures. The article applies this perspective to basic processing in cortical networks or ensembles, showing how networks can transform between the two kinds of information. The article argues that an input pattern of firing is identified by a network as an information message, and that the output pattern of firing generated is a representation of that message. If a network is encouraged to develop an attractor state through attention or other re-entrant processes, then the message identified each time physical information is cycled through the network becomes “representation of the previous message”. Using an example of olfactory perception, it is shown how this piggy-backing of messages on top of previous messages could lead to olfactory qualia. The message identified on each pass of information could evolve from inner identity, to inner form, to inner likeness or image. The outcome is an olfactory quale. It is shown that the same outcome could result from information cycled through a hierarchy of networks in a resonant state. The argument for qualia generation is applied to other sensory modalities, showing how, through a process of brain-wide constraint satisfaction, a particular state of consciousness could develop at any given moment. Evidence for some of the key predictions of the theory is presented, using ECoG data and studies of gamma oscillations and attractors, together with an outline of what further evidence is needed to provide support for the theory.

Deactivation in the posterior mid-cingulate cortex reflects perceptual transitions during binocular rivalry: Evidence from simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Binocular rivalry is a phenomenon in which perception spontaneously shifts between two different images that are dichoptically presented to the viewer. By elucidating the cortical networks responsible for these stochastic fluctuations in perception, we can potentially learn much about the neural correlates of visual awareness. We obtained concurrent EEG-fMRI data for a group of 20 healthy human subjects during the continuous presentation of dichoptic visual stimuli. The two eyes’ images were tagged with different temporal frequencies so that eye specific steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEP) signals could be extracted from the EEG data for direct comparison with changes in fMRI BOLD activity associated with binocular rivalry. We additionally included a smooth replay condition that emulated the perceptual transitions experienced during binocular rivalry as a control stimulus. We evaluated a novel SSVEP-informed fMRI analysis in this study in order to delineate the temporal dynamics of rivalry-related BOLD activity from both an electrophysiological and behavioral perspective. In this manner, we assessed BOLD activity during rivalry that was directly correlated with peaks and crosses of the two rivaling, frequency-tagged SSVEP signals, for comparison with BOLD activity associated with subject reported perceptual transitions. Our findings point to a critical role of a right lateralized fronto-parietal network in the processing of bistable stimuli, given that BOLD activity in the right superior/inferior parietal lobules was significantly elevated throughout binocular rivalry and in particular during perceptual transitions, compared with the replay condition. Based on the SSVEP-informed analysis, rivalry was further associated with significantly enhanced BOLD suppression in the posterior mid-cingulate cortex during perceptual transitions, compared with SSVEP crosses. Overall, this work points to a careful interplay between early visual areas, the right posterior parietal cortex and the mid-cingulate cortex in mediating the spontaneous perceptual changes associated with binocular rivalry and has significant implications for future multimodal imaging studies of perception and awareness.

Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal or parietal cortex does not impair metacognitive visual awareness

Neuroimaging studies commonly associate dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex with conscious perception. However, such studies only investigate correlation, rather than causation. In addition, many studies conflate objective performance with subjective awareness. In an influential recent paper, Rounis and colleagues addressed these issues by showing that continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) applied to the DLPFC impaired metacognitive (subjective) awareness for a perceptual task, while objective performance was kept constant. We attempted to replicate this finding, with minor modifications, including an active cTBS control site. Using a between-subjects design for both DLPFC and posterior parietal cortices, we found no evidence of a cTBS-induced metacognitive impairment. In a second experiment, we devised a highly rigorous within-subjects cTBS design for DLPFC, but again failed to find any evidence of metacognitive impairment. One crucial difference between our results and the Rounis study is our strict exclusion of data deemed unsuitable for a signal detection theory analysis. Indeed, when we included this unstable data, a significant, though invalid, metacognitive impairment was found. These results cast doubt on previous findings relating metacognitive awareness to DLPFC, and inform the current debate concerning whether or not prefrontal regions are preferentially implicated in conscious perception.

Distinct frontal and amygdala correlates of change detection for facial identity and expression

Recruitment of 'top-down' frontal attentional mechanisms is held to support detection of changes in task-relevant stimuli. Fluctuations in intrinsic frontal activity have been shown to impact task performance more generally. Meanwhile, the amygdala has been implicated in 'bottom-up' attentional capture by threat. Here, 22 adult human participants took part in a functional magnetic resonance change detection study aimed at investigating the correlates of successful (vs failed) detection of changes in facial identity vs expression. For identity changes, we expected prefrontal recruitment to differentiate 'hit' from 'miss' trials, in line with previous reports. Meanwhile, we postulated that a different mechanism would support detection of emotionally salient changes. Specifically, elevated amygdala activation was predicted to be associated with successful detection of threat-related changes in expression, over-riding the influence of fluctuations in top-down attention. Our findings revealed that fusiform activity tracked change detection across conditions. Ventrolateral prefrontal cortical activity was uniquely linked to detection of changes in identity not expression, and amygdala activity to detection of changes from neutral to fearful expressions. These results are consistent with distinct mechanisms supporting detection of changes in face identity vs expression, the former potentially reflecting top-down attention, the latter bottom-up attentional capture by stimulus emotional salience.

Role of the first and second person perspective for control of behaviour: Understanding other people's facial expressions

Humans typically make probabilistic inferences about another person's affective state based on her/his bodily movements such as emotional facial expressions, emblematic gestures and whole body movements. Furthermore, humans deduce tentative predictions about the other person's intentions. Thus, the first person perspective of a subject is supplemented by the second person perspective involving theory of mind and empathy. Neuroimaging investigations have shown that the medial and lateral frontal cortex are critical nodes in the circuits underlying theory of mind, empathy, as well as intention of action. It is suggested that personal perspective taking in social interactions is paradigmatic for the capability of humans to generate probabilistic accounts of the outside world that underlie a person's control of behaviour.

Hypnosis modulates behavioural measures and subjective ratings about external and internal awareness

In altered subjective states, the behavioural quantification of external and internal awareness remains challenging due to the need for reports on the subjects' behalf. With the aim to characterize the behavioural counterpart of external and internal awareness in a modified subjective condition, we used hypnosis during which subjects remain fully responsive. Eleven right-handed subjects reached a satisfactory level of hypnotisability as evidenced by subjective reports on arousal, absorption and dissociation. Compared to normal wakefulness, in hypnosis (a) participants' self-ratings for internal awareness increased and self-ratings for external awareness decreased, (b) the two awareness components tended to anticorrelate less and the switches between external and internal awareness self-ratings were less frequent, and (c) participants' reaction times were higher and lapses in key presses were more frequent. The identified imbalance between the two components of awareness is considered as of functional relevance to subjective (meta)cognition, possibly mediated by allocated attentional properties brought about by hypnosis. Our results highlight the presence of a cognitive counterpart in resting state, indicate that the modified contents of awareness are measurable behaviourally, and provide leverage for investigations of more challenging altered conscious states, such as anaesthesia, sleep and disorders of consciousness.

From sensation to perception: Using multivariate classification of visual illusions to identify neural correlates of conscious awareness in space and time

An important goal of cognitive neuroscience is understanding the neural underpinnings of conscious awareness. Although the low-level processing of sensory input is well understood in most modalities, it remains a challenge to understand how the brain translates such input into conscious awareness. Here, I argue that the application of multivariate pattern classification techniques to neuroimaging data acquired while observers experience perceptual illusions provides a unique way to dissociate sensory mechanisms from mechanisms underlying conscious awareness. Using this approach, it is possible to directly compare patterns of neural activity that correspond to the contents of awareness, independent from changes in sensory input, and to track these neural representations over time at high temporal resolution. I highlight five recent studies using this approach, and provide practical considerations and limitations for future implementations.

An invisible touch: Body-related multisensory conflicts modulate visual consciousness

The majority of scientific studies on consciousness have focused on vision, exploring the cognitive and neural mechanisms of conscious access to visual stimuli. In parallel, studies on bodily consciousness have revealed that bodily (i.e. tactile, proprioceptive, visceral, vestibular) signals are the basis for the sense of self. However, the role of bodily signals in the formation of visual consciousness is not well understood. Here we investigated how body-related visuo-tactile stimulation modulates conscious access to visual stimuli. We used a robotic platform to apply controlled tactile stimulation to the participants' back while they viewed a dot moving either in synchrony or asynchrony with the touch on their back. Critically, the dot was rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Manipulating the visual context by presenting the dot moving on either a body form, or a non-bodily object we show that: (i) conflict induced by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in a body context is associated with a delayed conscious access compared to asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, (ii) this effect occurs only in the context of a visual body form, and (iii) is not due to detection or response biases. The results indicate that body-related visuo-tactile conflicts impact visual consciousness by facilitating access of non-conflicting visual information to awareness, and that these are sensitive to the visual context in which they are presented, highlighting the interplay between bodily signals and visual experience.

Psychophysical "blinding" methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing

Numerous non-invasive experimental "blinding" methods exist for suppressing the phenomenal awareness of visual stimuli. Not all of these suppressive methods occur at, and thus index, the same level of unconscious visual processing. This suggests that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can in principle be established. The empirical results of extant studies that have used a number of different methods and additional reasonable theoretical considerations suggest the following tentative hierarchy. At the highest levels in this hierarchy is unconscious processing indexed by object-substitution masking. The functional levels indexed by crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich masking, and single-flash interocular suppression, fall at progressively lower levels, while unconscious processing at the lowest levels is indexed by eye-based binocular-rivalry suppression. Although unconscious processing levels indexed by additional blinding methods is yet to be determined, a tentative placement at lower levels in the hierarchy is also given for unconscious processing indexed by Troxler fading and adaptation-induced blindness, and at higher levels in the hierarchy indexed by attentional blinding effects in addition to the level indexed by the attentional blink. The full mapping of levels in the functional hierarchy onto cortical activation sites and levels is yet to be determined. The existence of such a hierarchy bears importantly on the search for, and the distinctions between, neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision.

To see or not to see--thalamo-cortical networks during blindsight and perceptual suppression

Even during moments when we fail to be fully aware of our environment, our brains never go silent. Instead, it appears that the brain can also operate in an alternate, unconscious mode. Delineating unconscious from conscious neural processes is a promising first step toward investigating how awareness emerges from brain activity. Here we focus on recent insights into the neuronal processes that contribute to visual function in the absence of a conscious visual percept. Drawing on insights from findings on the phenomenon of blindsight that results from injury to primary visual cortex and the results of experimentally induced perceptual suppression, we describe what kind of visual information the visual system analyzes unconsciously and we discuss the neuronal routing and responses that accompany this process. We conclude that unconscious processing of certain visual stimulus attributes, such as the presence of visual motion or the emotional expression of a face can occur in a geniculo-cortical circuit that runs independent from and in parallel to the predominant route through primary visual cortex. We speculate that in contrast, bidirectional neuronal interactions between cortex and the thalamic pulvinar nucleus that support large-scale neuronal integration and visual awareness are impeded during blindsight and perceptual suppression.

Brain activity dynamics in human parietal regions during spontaneous switches in bistable perception

The neural mechanisms underlying conscious visual perception have been extensively investigated using bistable perception paradigms. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies suggest that the right anterior superior parietal (r-aSPL) and the right posterior superior parietal lobule (r-pSPL) have opposite roles in triggering perceptual reversals. It has been proposed that these two areas are part of a hierarchical network whose dynamics determine perceptual switches. However, how these two parietal regions interact with each other and with the rest of the brain during bistable perception is not known. Here, we investigated such a model by recording brain activity using fMRI while participants viewed a bistable structure-from-motion stimulus. Using dynamic causal modeling (DCM), we found that resolving such perceptual ambiguity was specifically associated with reciprocal interactions between these parietal regions and V5/MT. Strikingly, the strength of bottom-up coupling between V5/MT to r-pSPL and from r-pSPL to r-aSPL predicted individual mean dominance duration. Our findings are consistent with a hierarchical predictive coding model of parietal involvement in bistable perception and suggest that visual information processing underlying spontaneous perceptual switches can be described as changes in connectivity strength between parietal and visual cortical regions.

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Two parietal regions involve spontaneous perceptual switches.

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The two parietal regions and V5/MT form hierarchical model.

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Strength of DCM parameters predicts individual switch frequency.

Using brain stimulation to disentangle neural correlates of conscious vision

Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) has blossomed, due to the advent of new and increasingly sophisticated brain research tools. Neuroimaging has uncovered a variety of brain processes that relate to conscious perception, obtained in a range of experimental paradigms. But methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging or electroencephalography do not always afford inference on the functional role these brain processes play in conscious vision. Such empirical NCCs could reflect neural prerequisites, neural consequences, or neural substrates of a conscious experience. Here, we take a closer look at the use of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques in this context. We discuss and review how NIBS methodology can enlighten our understanding of brain mechanisms underlying conscious vision by disentangling the empirical NCCs.

The cognitive neurology of the vestibular system

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The aim is to reappraise the current state about what we know of vestibular cognition. The review focuses on cognition and perception, and hence the stress on human studies. In addition, the cerebral cortex is the main but not exclusive brain region of interest. There is a brief mention of vestibular ocular function if only to demonstrate the differential processing between reflex and perception. The effect of vestibular activation on some aspects of cognition, for example neglect, is not reviewed, as there have been no recent landmark findings in this area.

RECENT FINDINGS

The vestibular cerebellum is pivotal in the differential gating of vestibular perceptual and ocular signals to the cerebral cortex. The neuroanatomical correlates mediating vestibular sensations of self-motion ('am I moving?') and spatial orientation ('where am I now?') are distinct. Vestibular-motion perception is supported by a widespread white matter network. Vestibular activation specifically reduces visual motion cortical excitability, whereas other visual cortical regions show an increase in excitability.

SUMMARY

As the vestibular ocular reflex (VOR) and self-motion perception can be uncoupled both behaviourally and in neural correlate, deficits underlying vestibular patients' symptoms may not be revealed by simple VOR assessment. Given the pivotal cerebellar role in gating vestibular signals to perceptual regions, modulating mechanisms of cerebellar plasticity, for example by combining training with medication or brain stimulation, may prove fruitful in treating the symptoms of chronic dizzy patients.

Neural processing of visual information under interocular suppression: a critical review

When dissimilar stimuli are presented to the two eyes, only one stimulus dominates at a time while the other stimulus is invisible due to interocular suppression. When both stimuli are equally potent in competing for awareness, perception alternates spontaneously between the two stimuli, a phenomenon called binocular rivalry. However, when one stimulus is much stronger, e.g., due to higher contrast, the weaker stimulus can be suppressed for prolonged periods of time. A technique that has recently become very popular for the investigation of unconscious visual processing is continuous flash suppression (CFS): High-contrast dynamic patterns shown to one eye can render a low-contrast stimulus shown to the other eye invisible for up to minutes. Studies using CFS have produced new insights but also controversies regarding the types of visual information that can be processed unconsciously as well as the neural sites and the relevance of such unconscious processing. Here, we review the current state of knowledge in regard to neural processing of interocularly suppressed information. Focusing on recent neuroimaging findings, we discuss whether and to what degree such suppressed visual information is processed at early and more advanced levels of the visual processing hierarchy. We review controversial findings related to the influence of attention on early visual processing under interocular suppression, the putative differential roles of dorsal and ventral areas in unconscious object processing, and evidence suggesting privileged unconscious processing of emotional and other socially relevant information. On a more general note, we discuss methodological and conceptual issues, from practical issues of how unawareness of a stimulus is assessed to the overarching question of what constitutes an adequate operational definition of unawareness. Finally, we propose approaches for future research to resolve current controversies in this exciting research area.

Caudate dopaminergic denervation and visual hallucinations: evidence from a ¹²³I-FP-CIT SPECT study

OBJECTIVE

The pathogenesis of visual hallucinations (VHs) in Parkinson's disease (PD) has been considered multifactorial. In the pathophysiology of VHs a combination of impaired visual processing and attention has been reported. Imaging studies evidenced a role of the primary visual system and visual association areas as well as a dysfunctional activation of frontal areas in the occurrence of VHs. Due to the functional connections between basal ganglia and frontal areas, a role of basal ganglia and of the fronto-striatal circuits in the pathogenesis of VHs may be postulated. Aim of this study is to unveil whether a presynaptic dopamine deficiency at baseline may predict the development of VHs.

METHODS

A group of 18 non demented PD patients with VHs was matched with 18 non demented PD patients without VHs as regards age of onset of disease, disease duration and severity and levodopa equivalent dose. We retrospectively analyzed the (123)I-FP CIT SPECT performed on the two groups at the onset of their disease. The striatal uptake values in the two groups were examined, in order to evaluate nigrostriatal differences between the groups with different behavioral phenotype.

RESULTS

The group of patients with VHs had a significant reduction (p < 0.05) in right caudate uptake values at baseline when compared with patients without VHs. No significant differences were found between the groups regarding left caudate and putaminal uptake values.

CONCLUSIONS

The frontal impairment reported in PD patients with VHs may be due to a right caudate dysfunction, as it is connected to the frontal brain areas via neuronal loops.

Can the meaning of multiple words be integrated unconsciously?

What are the limits of unconscious language processing? Can language circuits process simple grammatical constructions unconsciously and integrate the meaning of several unseen words? Using behavioural priming and electroencephalography (EEG), we studied a specific rule-based linguistic operation traditionally thought to require conscious cognitive control: the negation of valence. In a masked priming paradigm, two masked words were successively (Experiment 1) or simultaneously presented (Experiment 2), a modifier ('not'/'very') and an adjective (e.g. 'good'/'bad'), followed by a visible target noun (e.g. 'peace'/'murder'). Subjects indicated whether the target noun had a positive or negative valence. The combination of these three words could either be contextually consistent (e.g. 'very bad - murder') or inconsistent (e.g. 'not bad - murder'). EEG recordings revealed that grammatical negations could unfold partly unconsciously, as reflected in similar occipito-parietal N400 effects for conscious and unconscious three-word sequences forming inconsistent combinations. However, only conscious word sequences elicited P600 effects, later in time. Overall, these results suggest that multiple unconscious words can be rapidly integrated and that an unconscious negation can automatically 'flip the sign' of an unconscious adjective. These findings not only extend the limits of subliminal combinatorial language processes, but also highlight how consciousness modulates the grammatical integration of multiple words.

Contributions of magno- and parvocellular channels to conscious and non-conscious vision

The dorsal and ventral cortical pathways, driven predominantly by magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) inputs, respectively, assume leading roles in models of visual information processing. Although in prior proposals, the dorsal and ventral pathways support non-conscious and conscious vision, respectively, recent modelling and empirical developments indicate that each pathway plays important roles in both non-conscious and conscious vision. In these models, the ventral P-pathway consists of one subpathway processing an object's contour features, e.g. curvature, the other processing its surface attributes, e.g. colour. Masked priming studies have shown that feed-forward activity in the ventral P-pathway on its own supports non-conscious processing of contour and surface features. The dorsal M-pathway activity contributes directly to conscious vision of motion and indirectly to object vision by projecting to prefrontal cortex, which in turn injects top-down neural activity into the ventral P-pathway and there 'ignites' feed-forward-re-entrant loops deemed necessary for conscious vision. Moreover, an object's shape or contour remains invisible without the prior conscious registration of its surface properties, which for that reason are taken to comprise fundamental visual qualia. Besides suggesting avenues for future research, these developments bear on several recent and past philosophical issues.

Varieties of perceptual instability and their neural correlates

We report experiments designed to learn whether different kinds of perceptually unstable visual images engage different neural mechanisms. 21 subjects viewed two types of bi-stable images while we scanned the activity in their brains with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); in one (intra-categorical type) the two percepts remained within the same category (e.g. face–face) while in the other (cross-categorical type) they crossed categorical boundaries (e.g. face–body). The results showed that cross- and intra-categorical reversals share a common reversal-related neural circuitry, which includes fronto-parietal cortex and primary visual cortex (area V1). Cross-categorical reversals alone engaged additional areas, notably anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal gyrus, which have been posited to be involved in conflict resolution.

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fMRI reveals brain mechanisms involved in viewing different types of unstable stimuli.

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Fronto-parietal cortex and V1 are activated by all visually unstable stimuli.

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Perception of different categories in unstable stimuli activates ACC and STG.

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Studies of unstable stimuli give insights into how brain resolves sensory conflicts.

Activity in early visual areas predicts interindividual differences in binocular rivalry dynamics

When dissimilar images are presented to the two eyes, binocular rivalry (BR) occurs, and perception alternates spontaneously between the images. Although neural correlates of the oscillating perception during BR have been found in multiple sites along the visual pathway, the source of BR dynamics is unclear. Psychophysical and modeling studies suggest that both low- and high-level cortical processes underlie BR dynamics. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the involvement of high-level regions by showing that frontal and parietal cortices responded time locked to spontaneous perceptual alternation in BR. However, a potential contribution of early visual areas to BR dynamics has been overlooked, because these areas also responded to the physical stimulus alternation mimicking BR. In the present study, instead of focusing on activity during perceptual switches, we highlighted brain activity during suppression periods to investigate a potential link between activity in human early visual areas and BR dynamics. We used a strong interocular suppression paradigm called continuous flash suppression to suppress and fluctuate the visibility of a probe stimulus and measured retinotopic responses to the onset of the invisible probe using functional MRI. There were ∼130-fold differences in the median suppression durations across 12 subjects. The individual differences in suppression durations could be predicted by the amplitudes of the retinotopic activity in extrastriate visual areas (V3 and V4v) evoked by the invisible probe. Weaker responses were associated with longer suppression durations. These results demonstrate that retinotopic representations in early visual areas play a role in the dynamics of perceptual alternations during BR.

Neural correlates of consciousness

Jon Driver's scientific work was characterized by an innovative combination of new methods for studying mental processes in the human brain in an integrative manner. In our collaborative work, he applied this approach to the study of attention and awareness, and their relationship to neural activity in the human brain. Here I review Jon's scientific work that relates to the neural basis of human consciousness, relating our collaborative work to a broader scientific context. I seek to show how his insights led to a deeper understanding of the causal connections between distant brain structures that are now believed to characterize the neural underpinnings of human consciousness.

Neural correlates of visual extinction or awareness in a series of patients with right temporoparietal damage

Patients with visual extinction following right-hemisphere damage can typically detect left visual field stimulation when it is presented in isolation, but tend to miss this when it is paired with competing concurrent right visual stimulation. Some single-case studies have provided preliminary evidence that right visual cortex may show residual activation for contralesional, extinguished visual stimuli. Here we go beyond prior work by using individual retinotopic mapping and online eye-tracking during fMRI to study activity in stimulus-responsive retinotopic visual cortex for a case series of four extinction patients. We found consistent activation of retinotopic right visual cortex for bilateral visual stimulation that resulted in left extinction. This residual unconscious activation included areas V1 to V3 and was not due to inadvertent eye movements. We also provide further evidence for the emerging view that awareness may require activity of frontal and parietal regions well beyond visual cortex.

Emotional processing of personally familiar faces in the vegetative state

Background

The Vegetative State (VS) is a severe disorder of consciousness in which patients are awake but display no signs of awareness. Yet, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated evidence for covert awareness in VS patients by recording specific brain activations during a cognitive task. However, the possible existence of incommunicable subjective emotional experiences in VS patients remains largely unexplored. This study aimed to probe the question of whether VS patients retain a brain ability to selectively process external stimuli according to their emotional value and look for evidence of covert emotional awareness in patients.

Methods and Findings

In order to explore these questions we employed the emotive impact of observing personally familiar faces, known to provoke specific perceptual as well as emotional brain activations. Four VS patients and thirteen healthy controls first underwent an fMRI scan while viewing pictures of non-familiar faces, personally familiar faces and pictures of themselves. In a subsequent imagery task participants were asked to actively imagine one of their parent's faces. Analyses focused on face and familiarity selective regional brain activations and inter-regional functional connectivity. Similar to controls, all patients displayed face selective brain responses with further limbic and cortical activations elicited by familiar faces. In patients as well as controls, Connectivity was observed between emotional, visual and face specific areas, suggesting aware emotional perception. This connectivity was strongest in the two patients who later recovered. Notably, these two patients also displayed selective amygdala activation during familiar face imagery, with one further exhibiting face selective activations, indistinguishable from healthy controls.

Conclusions

Taken together, these results show that selective emotional processing can be elicited in VS patients both by external emotionally salient stimuli and by internal cognitive processes, suggesting the ability for covert emotional awareness of self and the environment in VS patients.