The description-experience gap: a challenge for the neuroeconomics of decision-making under uncertainty

Comparing experience- and description-based economic preferences across 11 countries

Recent evidence indicates that reward value encoding in humans is highly context dependent, leading to suboptimal decisions in some cases, but whether this computational constraint on valuation is a shared feature of human cognition remains unknown. Here we studied the behaviour of n = 561 individuals from 11 countries of markedly different socioeconomic and cultural makeup. Our findings show that context sensitivity was present in all 11 countries. Suboptimal decisions generated by context manipulation were not explained by risk aversion, as estimated through a separate description-based choice task (that is, lotteries) consisting of matched decision offers. Conversely, risk aversion significantly differed across countries. Overall, our findings suggest that context-dependent reward value encoding is a feature of human cognition that remains consistently present across different countries, as opposed to description-based decision-making, which is more permeable to cultural factors.

A critical review of risk-sensitive foraging

Foraging is risk sensitive if choices depend on the variability of returns from the options as well as their mean return. Risk-sensitive foraging is important in behavioural ecology, psychology and neurophysiology. It has been explained both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of evolutionary advantage. We provide a critical review, evaluating both mechanistic and evolutionary accounts. Some derivations of risk sensitivity from mechanistic models based on psychophysics are not convincing because they depend on an inappropriate use of Jensen's inequality. Attempts have been made to link risk sensitivity to the ecology of a species, but again these are not convincing. The field of risk-sensitive foraging has provided a focus for theoretical and empirical work and has yielded important insights, but we lack a simple and empirically defendable general account of it in either mechanistic or evolutionary terms. However, empirical analysis of choice sequences under theoretically motivated experimental designs and environmental settings appears a promising avenue for mapping the scope and relative merits of existing theories. Simply put, the devil is in the sequence.

The parieto-occipital cortex is a candidate neural substrate for the human ability to approximate Bayesian inference

Adaptive decision-making often requires one to infer unobservable states based on incomplete information. Bayesian logic prescribes that individuals should do so by estimating the posterior probability by integrating the prior probability with new information, but the neural basis of this integration is incompletely understood. We record fMRI during a task in which participants infer the posterior probability of a hidden state while we independently modulate the prior probability and likelihood of evidence regarding the state; the task incentivizes participants to make accurate inferences and dissociates expected value from posterior probability. Here we show that activation in a region of left parieto-occipital cortex independently tracks the subjective posterior probability, combining its subcomponents of prior probability and evidence likelihood, and reflecting the individual participants' systematic deviations from objective probabilities. The parieto-occipital cortex is thus a candidate neural substrate for humans' ability to approximate Bayesian inference by integrating prior beliefs with new information.

A Distinct Neural Code Supports Prospection of Future Probabilities During Instrumental Information-Seeking

To make adaptive decisions, we must actively demand information, but relatively little is known about the mechanisms of active information gathering. An open question is how the brain estimates expected information gains (EIG) when comparing the current decision uncertainty with the uncertainty that is expected after gathering information. We examined this question using fMRI in a task in which people placed bids to obtain information in conditions that varied independently by prior decision uncertainty, information diagnosticity, and the penalty for an erroneous choice. Consistent with value of information theory, bids were sensitive to EIG and its components of prior certainty and expected posterior certainty. Expected posterior certainty was decoded above chance from multivoxel activation patterns in the posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices. This representation was independent of instrumental rewards and overlapped with distinct representations of EIG and prior certainty. Thus, posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices are candidates for mediating the prospection of posterior probabilities as a key step to estimate EIG during active information gathering.

The rat frontal orienting field dynamically encodes value for economic decisions under risk

Frontal and parietal cortex are implicated in economic decision-making, but their causal roles are untested. Here we silenced the frontal orienting field (FOF) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) while rats chose between a cued lottery and a small stable surebet. PPC inactivations produced minimal short-lived effects. FOF inactivations reliably reduced lottery choices. A mixed-agent model of choice indicated that silencing the FOF caused a change in the curvature of the rats' utility function (U = Vρ). Consistent with this finding, single-neuron and population analyses of neural activity confirmed that the FOF encodes the lottery value on each trial. A dynamical model, which accounts for electrophysiological and silencing results, suggests that the FOF represents the current lottery value to compare against the remembered surebet value. These results demonstrate that the FOF is a critical node in the neural circuit for the dynamic representation of action values for choice under risk.

Vulnerability or resilience? Examining trust asymmetry from the perspective of risk sources under descriptive versus experiential decision

Introduction

The investigation of trust vulnerability is important to the understanding of the potential mechanisms of trust formation and erosion. However, more effective exploration of trust vulnerability has been hindered due to the lack of consideration of risk sources and types of information.

Methods

This study extended the investigation of asymmetry to both social and natural risk under experiential and descriptive decisions. Using the trust game as the decision-making paradigm and money as the subject matter, the research employed experimental methods to examine how people perceive and make decisions after being positively and negatively affected by natural and social risks. A total of 286 college students were participated in our study. Study 1 (n = 138) and Study 2 (n = 148) explored asymmetry in experiential and descriptive decision separately.

Results

The findings indicated that when considering experiential information, negative information had a greater effect in reducing trust compared to the enhancing effect of positive information (t = -1.95, p = 0.050). Moreover, the study revealed that negative information had a stronger negative impact in the context of social risks rather than natural risks (t = -3.26, p = 0.002), suggesting that trust is vulnerable both internally and externally. Conversely, when considering descriptive information, the effect of both positive and negative information on trust was symmetrical, and the impact of negative information was less significant compared to that of natural risks, indicating that trust has a certain level of resilience (t = 2.25, p = 0.028).

Discussion

The study emphasizes the importance of refining risk sources and information characteristics in complex scenarios in order to improve understanding of trust enhancement and repair.

Dynamic prospect theory: Two core decision theories coexist in the gambling behavior of monkeys and humans

Research in the multidisciplinary field of neuroeconomics has mainly been driven by two influential theories regarding human economic choice: prospect theory, which describes decision-making under risk, and reinforcement learning theory, which describes learning for decision-making. We hypothesized that these two distinct theories guide decision-making in a comprehensive manner. Here, we propose and test a decision-making theory under uncertainty that combines these highly influential theories. Collecting many gambling decisions from laboratory monkeys allowed for reliable testing of our model and revealed a systematic violation of prospect theory's assumption that probability weighting is static. Using the same experimental paradigm in humans, substantial similarities between these species were uncovered by various econometric analyses of our dynamic prospect theory model, which incorporates decision-by-decision learning dynamics of prediction errors into static prospect theory. Our model provides a unified theoretical framework for exploring a neurobiological model of economic choice in human and nonhuman primates.

Experiential values are underweighted in decisions involving symbolic options

Standard models of decision-making assume each option is associated with subjective value, regardless of whether this value is inferred from experience (experiential) or explicitly instructed probabilistic outcomes (symbolic). In this study, we present results that challenge the assumption of unified representation of experiential and symbolic value. Across nine experiments, we presented participants with hybrid decisions between experiential and symbolic options. Participants' choices exhibited a pattern consistent with a systematic neglect of the experiential values. This normatively irrational decision strategy held after accounting for alternative explanations, and persisted even when it bore an economic cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that experiential and symbolic values are not symmetrically considered in hybrid decisions, suggesting they recruit different representational systems that may be assigned different priority levels in the decision process. These findings challenge the dominant models commonly used in value-based decision-making research.

Computational markers of experience- but not description-based decision-making are associated with future depressive symptoms in young adults

BACKGROUND

Early prediction of high depressive symptoms is crucial for selective intervention and the minimization of functional impairment. Recent cross-sectional studies indicated decision-making deficits in depression, which may be an important contributor to the disorder. Our goal was to test whether description- and experience-based decision making, two major neuroeconomic paradigms of decision-making under uncertainty, predict future depressive symptoms in young adults.

METHODS

One hundred young adults performed two decision-making tasks, one description-based, in which subjects chose between two gambling options given explicitly stated rewards and their probabilities, and the other experience-based, in which subjects were shown rewards but had to learn the probability of those rewards (or cue-outcome contingencies) via trial-and-error experience. We evaluated subjects' depressive symptoms with BDI-II at baseline (T1) and half a year later (T2).

RESULTS

Comparing subjects with low versus high levels of depressive symptoms at T2 showed that the latter performed worse on the experience- but not description-based task at T1. Computational modeling of the decision-making process suggested that subjects with high levels of depressive symptoms had a more concave utility function, indicating enhanced risk aversion. Furthermore, a more concave utility function at T1 increased the odds of high depressive symptoms at T2, even after controlling depressive symptoms at T1, perceived stress at T2, and several covariates (OR = 0.251, 95% CI [0.085, 0.741]).

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first study to demonstrate a prospective link between experience-based decision-making and depressive symptoms. Our results suggest that enhanced risk aversion in experience-based decision-making may be an important contributor to the development of depressive symptoms.

The computational roots of positivity and confirmation biases in reinforcement learning

Humans do not integrate new information objectively: outcomes carrying a positive affective value and evidence confirming one's own prior belief are overweighed. Until recently, theoretical and empirical accounts of the positivity and confirmation biases assumed them to be specific to 'high-level' belief updates. We present evidence against this account. Learning rates in reinforcement learning (RL) tasks, estimated across different contexts and species, generally present the same characteristic asymmetry, suggesting that belief and value updating processes share key computational principles and distortions. This bias generates over-optimistic expectations about the probability of making the right choices and, consequently, generates over-optimistic reward expectations. We discuss the normative and neurobiological roots of these RL biases and their position within the greater picture of behavioral decision-making theories.

Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges

In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.

Trusting and learning from others: immediate and long-term effects of learning from observation and advice

Social learning underpins our species's extraordinary success. Learning through observation has been investigated in several species, but learning from advice-where information is intentionally broadcast-is less understood. We used a pre-registered, online experiment (n = 1492) combined with computational modelling to examine learning through observation and advice. Participants were more likely to immediately follow advice than to copy an observed choice, but this was dependent upon trust in the adviser: highly paranoid participants were less likely to follow advice in the short term. Reinforcement learning modelling revealed two distinct patterns regarding the long-term effects of social information: some individuals relied fully on social information, whereas others reverted to trial-and-error learning. This variation may affect the prevalence and fidelity of socially transmitted information. Our results highlight the privileged status of advice relative to observation and how the assimilation of intentionally broadcast information is affected by trust in others.

An association between prediction errors and risk-seeking: Theory and behavioral evidence

Reward prediction errors (RPEs) and risk preferences have two things in common: both can shape decision making behavior, and both are commonly associated with dopamine. RPEs drive value learning and are thought to be represented in the phasic release of striatal dopamine. Risk preferences bias choices towards or away from uncertainty; they can be manipulated with drugs that target the dopaminergic system. Based on the common neural substrate, we hypothesize that RPEs and risk preferences are linked on the level of behavior as well. Here, we develop this hypothesis theoretically and test it empirically. First, we apply a recent theory of learning in the basal ganglia to predict how RPEs influence risk preferences. We find that positive RPEs should cause increased risk-seeking, while negative RPEs should cause risk-aversion. We then test our behavioral predictions using a novel bandit task in which value and risk vary independently across options. Critically, conditions are included where options vary in risk but are matched for value. We find that our prediction was correct: participants become more risk-seeking if choices are preceded by positive RPEs, and more risk-averse if choices are preceded by negative RPEs. These findings cannot be explained by other known effects, such as nonlinear utility curves or dynamic learning rates.

The adaptive value of probability distortion and risk-seeking in macaques' decision-making

In humans, the attitude toward risk is not neutral and is dissimilar between bets involving gains and bets involving losses. The existence and prevalence of these decision features in non-human primates are unclear. In addition, only a few studies have tried to simulate the evolution of agents based on their attitude toward risk. Therefore, we still ignore to what extent Prospect theory's claims are evolutionarily rooted. To shed light on this issue, we collected data from nine macaques that performed bets involving gains or losses. We confirmed that their overall behaviour is coherent with Prospect theory's claims. In parallel, we used a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of a population of agents across several generations. We showed that the algorithm selects progressively agents that exhibit risk-seeking, and has an inverted S-shape distorted perception of probability. We compared these two results and found that monkeys' attitude toward risk is only congruent with the simulation when they are facing losses. This result is consistent with the idea that gambling in the loss domain is analogous to deciding in a context of life-threatening challenges where a certain level of risk-seeking behaviour and probability distortion may be adaptive. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Economic behaviours among non-human primates

Do we have any valid reasons to affirm that non-human primates display economic behaviour in a sufficiently rich and precise sense of the phrase? To address this question, we have to develop a set of criteria to assess the vast array of experimental studies and field observations on individual cognitive and behavioural competences as well as the collective organization of non-human primates. We review a sample of these studies and assess how they answer to the following four main challenges. (i) Do we see any economic organization or institutions emerge among groups of non-human primates? (ii) Are the cognitive abilities, and often biases, that have been evidenced as underlying typical economic decision-making among humans, also present among non-human primates? (iii) Can we draw positive lessons from performance comparisons among primate species, humans and non-humans but also across non-human primate species, as elicited by canonical game-theoretical experimental paradigms, especially as far as economic cooperation and coordination are concerned? And (iv) in which way should we improve models and paradigms to obtain more ecological data and conclusions? Articles discussed in this paper most often bring about positive answers and promising perspectives to support the existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Impact of internal and external factors on prosocial choices in rhesus macaques

While traditional economic models assume that agents are self-interested, humans and most non-human primates are social species. Therefore, many of decisions they make require the integration of information about other social agents. This study asks to what extent information about social status and the social context in which decisions are taken impact on reward-guided decisions in rhesus macaques. We tested 12 monkeys of varying dominance status in several experimental versions of a two-choice task in which reward could be delivered to self only, only another monkey, both the self and another monkey, or neither. Results showed dominant animals were more prone to make prosocial choices than subordinates, but only when the decision was between a reward for self only and a reward for both self and other. If the choice was between a reward for self only and a reward for other only, no animal expressed altruistic behaviour. Finally, prosocial choices were true social decisions as they were strikingly reduced when the social partner was replaced by a non-social object. These results showed that as in humans, rhesus macaques' social decisions are adaptive and modulated by social status and the cost associated with being prosocial. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees in a zero-outcome game

A key component of economic decisions is the integration of information about reward outcomes and probabilities in selecting between competing options. In many species, risky choice is influenced by the magnitude of available outcomes, probability of success and the possibility of extreme outcomes. Chimpanzees are generally regarded to be risk-seeking. In this study, we examined two aspects of chimpanzees' risk preferences: first, whether setting the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes chimpanzees’ risk preferences, and second, whether individual risk preferences are stable across two different measures. Across two experiments, we found chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, n = 23) as a group to be risk-neutral to risk-avoidant with highly stable individual risk preferences. We discuss how the possibility of going empty-handed might reduce chimpanzees' risk-seeking relative to previous studies. This malleability in risk preferences as a function of experimental parameters and individual differences raises interesting questions about whether it is appropriate or helpful to categorize a species as a whole as risk-seeking or risk-avoidant.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.