The evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference

Reconceptualizing complex posttraumatic stress disorder: A predictive processing framework for mechanisms and intervention

In this article, we introduce a framework for interpreting Complex Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (C-PTSD) through predictive processing, a neuroscience concept explaining the brain's interpretation and prediction of sensory information. While closely related to PTSD, C-PTSD encompasses additional symptom clusters marked by disturbances in self-organization (DSO), such as negative self-concept, affect dysregulation, and relational difficulties, typically resulting from prolonged traumatic stressors. Our model leverages advances in computational psychiatry and neuroscience, offering a mechanistic explanation for these symptoms by illustrating how prolonged trauma disrupts the brain's predictive processing. Specifically, altered predictive mechanisms contribute to C-PTSD's symptomatology, focusing on DSO: (1) Negative self-concept emerges from maladaptive priors that bias perception towards self-criticism, misaligning expected and actual interoceptive states; (2) Misalignment between predicted and actual interoceptive signals leads to affect dysregulation, with sensitivity to bodily cues; and (3) Relationship challenges arise from skewed social prediction errors, fostering mistrust and withdrawal. This precision-focused approach sheds light on the dynamics underpinning C-PTSD and highlights potential intervention targets aimed at recalibrating the predictive processing system.

The memory systems of the human brain and generative artificial intelligence

Generative Artificial Intelligence foundation models (for example Generative Pre-trained Transformer - GPT - models) can generate the next token given a sequence of tokens. How can this 'generative AI' be compared with the 'real' intelligence of the human brain, when for example a human generates a whole memory in response to an incomplete retrieval cue, and then generates further prospective thoughts? Here these two types of generative intelligence, artificial in machines and real in the human brain are compared, and it is shown how when whole memories are generated by hippocampal recall in response to an incomplete retrieval cue, what the human brain computes, and how it computes it, are very different from generative AI. Key differences are the use of local associative learning rules in the hippocampal memory system, and of non-local backpropagation of error learning in AI. Indeed, it is argued that the whole operation of the human brain is performed computationally very differently to what is implemented in generative AI. Moreover, it is emphasized that the primate including human hippocampal system includes computations about spatial view and where objects and people are in scenes, whereas in rodents the emphasis is on place cells and path integration by movements between places. This comparison with generative memory and processing in the human brain has interesting implications for the further development of generative AI and for neuroscience research.

Imagination vs. routines: festive time, weekly time, and the predictive brain

This paper examines the relationship between societal structures shaped by traditions, norms, laws, and customs, and creative expressions in arts and media through the lens of the predictive coding framework in cognitive science. The article proposes that both dimensions of culture can be viewed as adaptations designed to enhance and train the brain's predictive abilities in the social domain. Traditions, norms, laws, and customs foster shared predictions and expectations among individuals, thereby reducing uncertainty in social environments. On the other hand, arts and media expose us to simulated experiences that explore alternative social realities, allowing the predictive machinery of the brain to hone its skills through exposure to a wider array of potentially relevant social circumstances and scenarios. We first review key principles of predictive coding and active inference, and then explore the rationale of cultural traditions and artistic culture in this perspective. Finally, we draw parallels between institutionalized normative habits that stabilize social worlds and creative and imaginative acts that temporarily subvert established conventions to inject variability.

Contemporary neurocognitive models of memory: A descriptive comparative analysis

The great complexity involved in the study of memory has given rise to numerous hypotheses and models associated with various phenomena at different levels of analysis. This has allowed us to delve deeper in our knowledge about memory but has also made it difficult to synthesize and integrate data from different lines of research. In this context, this work presents a descriptive comparative analysis of contemporary models that address the structure and function of multiple memory systems. The main goal is to outline a panoramic view of the key elements that constitute these models in order to visualize both the current state of research and possible future directions. The elements that stand out from different levels of analysis are distributed neural networks, hierarchical organization, predictive coding, homeostasis, and evolutionary perspective.

Neural representation in active inference: Using generative models to interact with-and understand-the lived world

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people-to action-oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities-and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation.

The Human Affectome

Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.

An active inference perspective for the amygdala complex

The amygdala is a heterogeneous network of subcortical nuclei with central importance in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Various experimental designs in human psychology and animal model research have mapped multiple conceptual frameworks (e.g., valence/salience and decision making) to ever more refined amygdala circuitry. However, these predominantly bottom up-driven accounts often rely on interpretations tailored to a specific phenomenon, thus preventing comprehensive and integrative theories. We argue here that an active inference model of amygdala function could unify these fractionated approaches into an overarching framework for clearer empirical predictions and mechanistic interpretations. This framework embeds top-down predictive models, informed by prior knowledge and belief updating, within a dynamical system distributed across amygdala circuits in which self-regulation is implemented by continuously tracking environmental and homeostatic demands.

Generating meaning: active inference and the scope and limits of passive AI

Prominent accounts of sentient behavior depict brains as generative models of organismic interaction with the world, evincing intriguing similarities with current advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI). However, because they contend with the control of purposive, life-sustaining sensorimotor interactions, the generative models of living organisms are inextricably anchored to the body and world. Unlike the passive models learned by generative AI systems, they must capture and control the sensory consequences of action. This allows embodied agents to intervene upon their worlds in ways that constantly put their best models to the test, thus providing a solid bedrock that is - we argue - essential to the development of genuine understanding. We review the resulting implications and consider future directions for generative AI.

The pulvinar as a hub of visual processing and cortical integration

The pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus is a crucial component of the visual system and plays significant roles in sensory processing and cognitive integration. The pulvinar's extensive connectivity with cortical regions allows for bidirectional communication, contributing to the integration of sensory information across the visual hierarchy. Recent findings underscore the pulvinar's involvement in attentional modulation, feature binding, and predictive coding. In this review, we highlight recent advances in clarifying the pulvinar's circuitry and function. We discuss the contributions of the pulvinar to signal modulation across the global cortical network and place these findings within theoretical frameworks of cortical processing, particularly the global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory and predictive coding.

Rhythmic temporal prediction enhances neural representations of movement intention for brain-computer interface

Objective.Detecting movement intention is a typical use of brain-computer interfaces (BCI). However, as an endogenous electroencephalography (EEG) feature, the neural representation of movement is insufficient for improving motor-based BCI. This study aimed to develop a new movement augmentation BCI encoding paradigm by incorporating the cognitive function of rhythmic temporal prediction, and test the feasibility of this new paradigm in optimizing detections of movement intention.Methods.A visual-motion synchronization task was designed with two movement intentions (left vs. right) and three rhythmic temporal prediction conditions (1000 ms vs. 1500 ms vs. no temporal prediction). Behavioural and EEG data of 24 healthy participants were recorded. Event-related potentials (ERPs), event-related spectral perturbation induced by left- and right-finger movements, the common spatial pattern (CSP) and support vector machine, Riemann tangent space algorithm and logistic regression were used and compared across the three temporal prediction conditions, aiming to test the impact of temporal prediction on movement detection.Results.Behavioural results showed significantly smaller deviation time for 1000 ms and 1500 ms conditions. ERP analyses revealed 1000 ms and 1500 ms conditions led to rhythmic oscillations with a time lag in contralateral and ipsilateral areas of movement. Compared with no temporal prediction, 1000 ms condition exhibited greater beta event-related desynchronization (ERD) lateralization in motor area (P< 0.001) and larger beta ERD in frontal area (P< 0.001). 1000 ms condition achieved an averaged left-right decoding accuracy of 89.71% using CSP and 97.30% using Riemann tangent space, both significantly higher than no temporal prediction. Moreover, movement and temporal information can be decoded simultaneously, achieving 88.51% four-classification accuracy.Significance.The results not only confirm the effectiveness of rhythmic temporal prediction in enhancing detection ability of motor-based BCI, but also highlight the dual encodings of movement and temporal information within a single BCI paradigm, which is promising to expand the range of intentions that can be decoded by the BCI.

Hierarchical network structure as the source of hierarchical dynamics (power-law frequency spectra) in living and non-living systems: How state-trait continua (body plans, personalities) emerge from first principles in biophysics

Living systems are hierarchical control systems that display a small world network structure. In such structures, many smaller clusters are nested within fewer larger ones, producing a fractal-like structure with a 'power-law' cluster size distribution (a mereology). Just like their structure, the dynamics of living systems shows fractal-like qualities: the timeseries of inner message passing and overt behavior contain high frequencies or 'states' (treble) that are nested within lower frequencies or 'traits' (bass), producing a power-law frequency spectrum that is known as a 'state-trait continuum' in the behavioral sciences. Here, we argue that the power-law dynamics of living systems results from their power-law network structure: organisms 'vertically encode' the deep spatiotemporal structure of their (anticipated) environments, to the effect that many small clusters near the base of the hierarchy produce high frequency signal changes and fewer larger clusters at its top produce ultra-low frequencies. Such ultra-low frequencies exert a tonic regulatory pressure that produces morphological as well as behavioral traits (i.e., body plans and personalities). Nested-modular structure causes higher frequencies to be embedded within lower frequencies, producing a power-law state-trait continuum. At the heart of such dynamics lies the need for efficient energy dissipation through networks of coupled oscillators, which also governs the dynamics of non-living systems (e.q., earthquakes, stock market fluctuations). Since hierarchical structure produces hierarchical dynamics, the development and collapse of hierarchical structure (e.g., during maturation and disease) should leave specific traces in system dynamics (shifts in lower frequencies, i.e. morphological and behavioral traits) that may serve as early warning signs to system failure. The applications of this idea range from (bio)physics and phylogenesis to ontogenesis and clinical medicine.

Distinctive properties of biological neural networks and recent advances in bottom-up approaches toward a better biologically plausible neural network

Although it may appear infeasible and impractical, building artificial intelligence (AI) using a bottom-up approach based on the understanding of neuroscience is straightforward. The lack of a generalized governing principle for biological neural networks (BNNs) forces us to address this problem by converting piecemeal information on the diverse features of neurons, synapses, and neural circuits into AI. In this review, we described recent attempts to build a biologically plausible neural network by following neuroscientifically similar strategies of neural network optimization or by implanting the outcome of the optimization, such as the properties of single computational units and the characteristics of the network architecture. In addition, we proposed a formalism of the relationship between the set of objectives that neural networks attempt to achieve, and neural network classes categorized by how closely their architectural features resemble those of BNN. This formalism is expected to define the potential roles of top-down and bottom-up approaches for building a biologically plausible neural network and offer a map helping the navigation of the gap between neuroscience and AI engineering.

Acute exercise as active inference in chronic musculoskeletal pain, effects on gait kinematics and muscular activity in patients and healthy participants: a study protocol for a randomised controlled laboratory trial

INTRODUCTION

Chronic musculoskeletal pain is a highly prevalent, complex and distressing condition that may negatively affect all domains of life. In view of an active inference framework, and resting on the concept of allostasis, human movement per se becomes a prerequisite for health and well-being while chronic pain becomes a sign of a system unable to attenuate an allostatic load. Previous studies on different subgroups of chronic pain conditions have demonstrated alterations in gait kinematics and muscle activity, indicating shared disturbances in the motor system from long-term allostatic load. We hypothesise that such alterations exist in heterogenous populations with chronic musculoskeletal pain, and that exposure to acute and controlled exercise may attenuate these alterations. Therefore, the main aim of this study is to investigate the acute effects of exercise on gait kinematics and activity of the back and neck muscles during diverse walking conditions in patients with chronic musculoskeletal pain compared with a reference sample consisting of healthy participants.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This two-sample two-armed parallel randomised controlled laboratory trial will include 40 participants with chronic musculoskeletal pain (>3 months) and 40 healthy participants. Participants will be randomly allocated to either 30 min of aerobic exercise or rest. Primary outcomes are gait kinematics (walking speed, step frequency, stride length, lumbar rotation, gait stability) and muscular activity (spatial and temporal) of the back and neck during diverse walking conditions. Secondary outcomes are variability of gait kinematics and muscle activity and subjective pain ratings assessed regularly during the trial.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

The study has been approved by the Regional Ethics Review Board in Uppsala, Sweden (#2018/307). Findings will be disseminated via conference presentations, publications in peer-reviewed journals and engagement with patient support groups and clinicians.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

NCT03882333.

A cultural-ecosocial systems view for psychiatry

While contemporary psychiatry seeks the mechanisms of mental disorders in neurobiology, mental health problems clearly depend on developmental processes of learning and adaptation through ongoing interactions with the social environment. Symptoms or disorders emerge in specific social contexts and involve predicaments that cannot be fully characterized in terms of brain function but require a larger social-ecological view. Causal processes that result in mental health problems can begin anywhere within the extended system of body-person-environment. In particular, individuals' narrative self-construal, culturally mediated interpretations of symptoms and coping strategies as well as the responses of others in the social world contribute to the mechanisms of mental disorders, illness experience, and recovery. In this paper, we outline the conceptual basis and practical implications of a hierarchical ecosocial systems view for an integrative approach to psychiatric theory and practice. The cultural-ecosocial systems view we propose understands mind, brain and person as situated in the social world and as constituted by cultural and self-reflexive processes. This view can be incorporated into a pragmatic approach to clinical assessment and case formulation that characterizes mechanisms of pathology and identifies targets for intervention.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful 'toolkit' or 'starter pack' that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.

Metacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales

Evolution is full of coevolving systems characterized by complex spatio-temporal interactions that lead to intertwined processes of adaptation. Yet, how adaptation across multiple levels of temporal scales and biological complexity is achieved remains unclear. Here, we formalize how evolutionary multi-scale processing underlying adaptation constitutes a form of metacognition flowing from definitions of metaprocessing in machine learning. We show (1) how the evolution of metacognitive systems can be expected when fitness landscapes vary on multiple time scales, and (2) how multiple time scales emerge during coevolutionary processes of sufficiently complex interactions. After defining a metaprocessor as a regulator with local memory, we prove that metacognition is more energetically efficient than purely object-level cognition when selection operates at multiple timescales in evolution. Furthermore, we show that existing modeling approaches to coadaptation and coevolution-here active inference networks, predator-prey interactions, coupled genetic algorithms, and generative adversarial networks-lead to multiple emergent timescales underlying forms of metacognition. Lastly, we show how coarse-grained structures emerge naturally in any resource-limited system, providing sufficient evidence for metacognitive systems to be a prevalent and vital component of (co-)evolution. Therefore, multi-scale processing is a necessary requirement for many evolutionary scenarios, leading to de facto metacognitive evolutionary outcomes.

Neuroscience needs evolution

The nervous system is a product of evolution. That is, it was constructed through a long series of modifications, within the strong constraints of heredity, and continuously subjected to intense selection pressures. As a result, the organization and functions of the brain are shaped by its history. We believe that this fact, underappreciated in contemporary systems neuroscience, offers an invaluable aid for helping us resolve the brain's mysteries. Indeed, we think that the consideration of evolutionary history ought to take its place alongside other intellectual tools used to understand the brain, such as behavioural experiments, studies of anatomical structure and functional characterization based on recordings of neural activity. In this introduction, we argue for the importance of evolution by highlighting specific examples of ways that evolutionary theory can enhance neuroscience. The rest of the theme issue elaborates this point, emphasizing the conservative nature of neural evolution, the important consequences of specific transitions that occurred in our history, and the ways in which considerations of evolution can shed light on issues ranging from specific mechanisms to fundamental principles of brain organization.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.