The neuraminidase and matrix genes of the 2009 pandemic influenza H1N1 virus cooperate functionally to facilitate efficient replication and transmissibility in pigs

The Mobility of Eurasian Avian-like M2 Is Determined by Residue E79 Which Is Essential for Pathogenicity of 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus in Mice

In 2009, a novel H1N1 influenza virus caused the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. Studies have shown that the influenza M gene played important roles in the pathogenicity and transmissibility of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic ((H1N1)pdm09), whilst the underlying mechanism remains unclear. The influenza M gene encodes two proteins, matrix protein 1 and matrix protein 2, which play important roles in viral replication and assembly. In this study, it is found that the M2 protein of the (H1N1)pdm09 virus showed a lower mobility rate than the North America triple-reassortant influenza M2 protein in Polyacrylamide Gel Electrophoresis (PAGE). The site-directed mutations of the amino acids of (H1N1)pdm09 M2 revealed that E79 is responsible for the mobility rate change. Further animal studies showed that the (H1N1)pdm09 containing a single M2-E79K was significantly attenuated compared with the wild-type virus in mice and induced lower proinflammatory cytokines and IFNs in mouse lungs. Further in vitro studies indicated that this mutation also affected NLRP3 inflammasome activation. To reveal the reason why they have different mobility rates, a circular dichroism spectra assay was employed and showed that the two M2 proteins displayed different secondary structures. Overall, our findings suggest that M2 E79 is important for the virus replication and pathogenicity of (H1N1)pdm09 through NLRP3 inflammasome and proinflammatory response.

Fitness Determinants of Influenza A Viruses

Influenza A (IAV) is a major human respiratory pathogen that causes illness, hospitalizations, and mortality annually worldwide. IAV is also a zoonotic pathogen with a multitude of hosts, allowing for interspecies transmission, reassortment events, and the emergence of novel pandemics, as was seen in 2009 with the emergence of a swine-origin H1N1 (pdmH1N1) virus into humans, causing the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. While the 2009 pandemic was considered to have high morbidity and low mortality, studies have linked the pdmH1N1 virus and its gene segments to increased disease in humans and animal models. Genetic components of the pdmH1N1 virus currently circulate in the swine population, reassorting with endemic swine viruses that co-circulate and occasionally spillover into humans. This is evidenced by the regular detection of variant swine IAVs in humans associated with state fairs and other intersections of humans and swine. Defining genetic changes that support species adaptation, virulence, and cross-species transmission, as well as mutations that enhance or attenuate these features, will improve our understanding of influenza biology. It aids in surveillance and virus risk assessment and guides the establishment of counter measures for emerging viruses. Here, we review the current understanding of the determinants of specific IAV phenotypes, focusing on the fitness, transmission, and virulence determinants that have been identified in swine IAVs and/or in relation to the 2009 pdmH1N1 virus.

Pathogenicity and anti-infection immunity of animal H3N2 and H6N6 subtype influenza virus cross-species infection with tree shrews

Animal influenza viruses can spread across species and pose a fatal threat to human health due to the high pathogenicity and mortality. Animal models are crucial for studying cross-species infection and the pathogenesis of influenza viruses. Tupaia belangeri (tree shrew) has been emerging as an animal model for multiple human virus infections recently because of the close genetic relationship and phylogeny with humans. So far, tree shrew has been reported to be susceptible to human influenza virus subtype H1N1, avian influenza viruses subtype H9N2, subtype H5N1, and subtype H7N9. However, the pathogenicity, infection, and immunity of swine and land avian influenza viruses with low pathogenicity and the potential to jump to humans remain largely unexplored in the tree shrew model. Previously, our team has successfully isolated the newly emerging swine influenza virus subtype H3N2 (A/Swine/GX/NS2783/2010, SW2783) and avian influenza virus subtype H6N6 (A/CK/ZZ/346/2014, ZZ346). In this study, we observed the pathogenicity, immune characteristics, and cross-species infection potential ability of SW2783 and ZZ346 strains in tree shrew model with 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID₅₀), hematoxylin and eosin (HE) staining, immunohistochemistry (IHC), real-time quantitative PCR (qRT-PCR) and other experimental methods. Both animal-borne influenza viruses had a strong ability on tissue infection in the turbinate and the trachea of tree shrews in vitro, in which SW2783 showed stronger replication ability than in ZZ346. SW2783 and ZZ346 both showed pathogenic ability with infected tree shrews model in vivo without prior adaptive culture, which mainly happened in the upper respiratory tract. However, the infection ability was weak, the clinical symptoms were mild, and the histopathological changes in the respiratory tract were relatively light. Furthermore, innate immune responses and adaptive immunity were observed in the tree shrew model after the infection of SW2783 and ZZ346 strains. We observed that the unadapted SW2783 and ZZ346 virus could transmit among tree shrews by direct contact. We also observed that SW2783 virus could transmit from tree shrews to guinea pigs. These results indicated that both animal-borne influenza viruses could induce similar pathogenicity and immune response to those caused by human-common influenza viruses. Tree shrews may be an excellent animal model for studying the interaction between the influenza virus and the host and the cross-species infection mechanism of the animal influenza virus.

Are pigs overestimated as a source of zoonotic influenza viruses?

Background

Swine influenza caused by influenza A viruses (IAV) directly affects respiratory health and indirectly impairs reproduction rates in pigs causing production losses. In Europe, and elsewhere, production systems have intensified featuring fewer holdings but, in turn, increased breeding herd and litter sizes. This seems to foster swine IAV (swIAV) infections with respect to the entrenchment within and spread between holdings. Disease management of swine influenza is difficult and relies on biosecurity and vaccination measures. Recently discovered and widely proliferating forms of self-sustaining modes of swIAV infections in large swine holdings challenge these preventive concepts by generating vaccine-escape mutants in rolling circles of infection.

Main body

The most recent human IAV pandemic of 2009 rooted at least partly in IAV of porcine origin highlighting the zoonotic potential of swIAV. Pigs constitute a mixing vessel of IAV from different species including avian and human hosts. However, other host species such as turkey and quail but also humans themselves may also act in this way; thus, pigs are not essentially required for the generation of IAV reassortants with a multispecies origin. Since 1918, all human pandemic influenza viruses except the H2N2 virus of 1958 have been transmitted in a reverse zoonotic mode from human into swine populations. Swine populations act as long-term reservoirs of these viruses. Human-derived IAV constitute a major driver of swIAV epidemiology in pigs. Swine-to-human IAV transmissions occurred rarely and mainly sporadically as compared to avian-to-human spill-over events of avian IAV. Yet, new swIAV variants that harbor zoonotic components continue to be detected. This increases the risk that such components might eventually reassort into viruses with pandemic potential.

Conclusions

Domestic pig populations should not be globally stigmatized as the only or most important reservoir of potentially zoonotic IAV. The likely emergence from swine of the most recent human IAV pandemic in 2009, however, emphasized the principal risks of swine populations in which IAV circulate unimpededly. Implementation of regular and close-meshed IAV surveillance of domestic swine populations to follow the dynamics of swIAV evolution is clearly demanded. Improved algorithms for directly inferring zoonotic potential from whole IAV genome sequences as well as improved vaccines are still being sought.

Eurasian Avian-like M1 Plays More Important Role than M2 in Pathogenicity of 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus in Mice

Reassortant variant viruses generated between 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus [A(H1N1)pdm09] and endemic swine influenza viruses posed a potential risk to humans. Surprisingly, genetic analysis showed that almost all of these variant viruses contained the M segment from A(H1N1)pdm09, which originated from Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses. Studies have shown that the A(H1N1)pdm09 M gene is critical for the transmissibility and pathogenicity of the variant viruses. However, the M gene encodes two proteins, M1 and M2, and which of those plays a more important role in virus pathogenicity remains unknown. In this study, the M1 and M2 genes of A(H1N1)pdm09 were replaced with those of endemic H3N2 swine influenza virus, respectively. The chimeric viruses were rescued and evaluated in vitro and in mice. Both M1 and M2 of H3N2 affected the virus replication in vitro. In mice, the introduction of H3N2 M1 attenuated the chimeric virus, where all the mice survived from the infection, compared with the wild type virus that caused 100 % mortality. However, the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M2 was still virulent to mice, and caused 16.6% mortality, as well as similar body weight loss to the wild type virus infected group. Compared with the wild type virus, the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M1 induced lower levels of inflammatory cytokines and higher levels of anti-inflammatory cytokines, whereas the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M2 induced substantial pro-inflammatory responses, but higher levels of anti-inflammatory cytokines. The study demonstrated that Eurasian avian-like M1 played a more important role than M2 in the pathogenicity of A(H1N1)pdm09 in mice.

Key amino acids of M1-41 and M2-27 determine growth and pathogenicity of chimeric H17 bat influenza virus in cells and in mice

Based on our previous studies, we show that M gene is critical for viral replication and pathogenicity of the chimeric H17 bat influenza virus (Bat09:mH1mN1) by replacing bat M gene with those from human and swine influenza A viruses. However, the key amino acids of M1 and/or M2 proteins responsible for virus replication and pathogenicity remain unknown. In this study, the Eurasian avian-like M gene from the A/California/04/2009 pandemic H1N1 virus significantly decreased viral replication in both mammalian and avian cells in the background of chimeric H17 bat influenza virus by replacing the PR8 M gene. Further studies revealed that the M1 was more crucial for viral growth and pathogenicity in contrast to the M2, and amino acid residues of M1-41V and M2-27A were responsible for these characteristics in cells and in mice. These key residues of M1 and M2 proteins identified in this study might be important for influenza virus surveillance and used to produce live attenuated vaccines in the future. Importance The M1 and M2 proteins influence the morphology, replication, virulence and transmissibility of influenza viruses. Although a few key residues in M1/M2 proteins have been identified, whether other residues of M1/M2 proteins involved in viral replication and pathogenicity need to be discovered. In the background of chimeric H17 bat influenza virus, the Eurasian avian-like M gene from A/California/04/2009 significantly decreased viral growth in mammalian and avian cells. Further study showed that M1 was implicated more than M2 for viral growth and pathogenicity in vitro and in vivo, and the key amino acid residues of M1-41V and M2-27A were responsible for these characteristics in cells and in mice. These key residues of M1 and M2 proteins could be used for influenza virus surveillance and live attenuated vaccine application in the future. These findings provide important information for knowledge on the genetic basis of virulence of influenza viruses.

Limited adaptation of chimeric H9N2 viruses containing internal genes from bat influenza viruses in chickens

Influenza virus-like sequences of H17N10 and H18N11 were identified in bats, despite there has been no live virus isolated. The genetic analysis indicated that they have distinct but relatively close evolutionary relationships to known influenza A viruses. However, the infectivity and adaptation of bat influenza viruses in avian species remain unclear. In this study, two modified bat influenza viruses cH9cN2/H17 and cH9cN2/H18 containing HA and NA coding regions replaced with those of H9N2 influenza A virus were generated in the background of the H17N10 or H18N11 viruses. These two modified viruses replicated less efficiently than wild type H9N2 virus in cultured chicken cells. The mini-genome assay showed that viral ribonucleoproteins (vRNPs) of H9N2 has significantly higher polymerase activity than that of bat influenza viruses in avian cells. In chicken study, compared with H9N2 virus, which replicated and transmitted efficiently in chickens, the cH9cN2/H17 and cH9cN2/H18 viruses only replicated in chicken tracheas with lower titers. Pathological examination showed that the H9N2 caused severer lesions in lung and trachea than the modified bat influenza viruses. Notably, the cH9cN2/H18 transmitted among chickens, but not cH9cN2/H17, and chicken IFN-β antagonism results showed that H18N11 NS1 protein inhibited chicken IFN-β response more efficiently than H17N10 NS1 protein in avian cells. Taken together, our data indicated that the internal genes of bat influenza viruses adapted poorly to chickens, while the internal genes of H18N11 seemed to adapt to chickens better than H17N10.

Adaptation of Human Influenza Viruses to Swine

A large diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) within the H1N1/N2 and H3N2 subtypes circulates in pigs globally, with different lineages predominating in specific regions of the globe. A common characteristic of the ecology of IAV in swine in different regions is the periodic spillover of human seasonal viruses. Such human viruses resulted in sustained transmission in swine in several countries, leading to the establishment of novel IAV lineages in the swine host and contributing to the genetic and antigenic diversity of influenza observed in pigs. In this review we discuss the frequent occurrence of reverse-zoonosis of IAV from humans to pigs that have contributed to the global viral diversity in swine in a continuous manner, describe host-range factors that may be related to the adaptation of these human-origin viruses to pigs, and how these events could affect the swine industry.

Comparison of the virulence of three H3N2 canine influenza virus isolates from Korea and China in mouse and Guinea pig models

Background

Avian-origin H3N2 canine influenza virus (CIV) has been the most common subtype in Korea and China since 2007. Here, we compared the pathogenicity and transmissibility of three H3N2 CIV strains [Chinese CIV (JS/10), Korean CIV (KR/07), and Korean recombinant CIV between the classic H3N2 CIV and the pandemic H1N1 virus (MV/12)] in BALB/c mouse and guinea pig models. The pandemic H1N1 (CA/09) strain served as the control.

Results

BALB/c mice infected with H1N1 had high mortality and obvious body weight loss, whereas no overt disease symptoms were observed in mice inoculated with H3N2 CIV strains. The viral titers were higher in the group MV/12 than those in groups JS/10 and KR/07, while the mice infected with JS/10 showed higher viral titers in all tissues (except for the lung) than the mice infected with KR/07. The data obtained in guinea pigs also demonstrated that group MV/12 presented the highest loads in most of the tissues, followed by group JS/10 and KR/07. Also, direct contact transmissions of all the three CIV strains could be observed in guinea pigs, and for the inoculated and the contact groups, the viral titer of group MV/12 and KR/07 was higher than that of group JS/10 in nasal swabs. These findings indicated that the matrix (M) gene obtained from the pandemic H1N1 may enhance viral replication of classic H3N2 CIV; JS/10 has stronger viral replication ability in tissues as compared to KR/07, whereas KR/07 infected guinea pigs have more viral shedding than JS/10 infected guinea pigs.

Conclusions

There exists a discrepancy in pathobiology among CIV isolates. Reverse genetics regarding the genomes of CIV isolates will be helpful to further explain the virus characteristics.

Reassortment between Swine H3N2 and 2009 Pandemic H1N1 in the United States Resulted in Influenza A Viruses with Diverse Genetic Constellations with Variable Virulence in Pigs

Repeated spillovers of the H1N1 pandemic virus (H1N1pdm09) from humans to pigs resulted in substantial evolution of influenza A viruses infecting swine, contributing to the genetic and antigenic diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) currently circulating in swine. The reassortment with endemic swine viruses and maintenance of some of the H1N1pdm09 internal genes resulted in the circulation of different genomic constellations in pigs. Here, we performed a whole-genome phylogenetic analysis of 368 IAV circulating in swine from 2009 to 2016 in the United States. We identified 44 different genotypes, with the most common genotype (32.33%) containing a clade IV-A HA gene, a 2002-lineage NA gene, an M-pdm09 gene, and remaining gene segments of triple reassortant internal gene (TRIG) origin. To understand how different genetic constellations may relate to viral fitness, we compared the pathogenesis and transmission in pigs of six representative genotypes. Although all six genotypes efficiently infected pigs, they resulted in different degrees of pathology and viral shedding. These results highlight the vast H3N2 genetic diversity circulating in U.S. swine after 2009. This diversity has important implications in the control of this disease by the swine industry, as well as a potential risk for public health if swine-adapted viruses with H1N1pdm09 genes have an increased risk to humans, as occurred in the 2011-2012 and 2016 human variant H3N2v cases associated with exhibition swine.

IMPORTANCE

People continue to spread the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (H1N1pdm09) IAV to pigs, allowing H1N1pdm09 to reassort with endemic swine IAV. In this study, we determined the 8 gene combinations of swine H3N2 IAV detected from 2009 to 2016. We identified 44 different genotypes of H3N2, the majority of which contained at least one H1N1pdm09 gene segment. We compared six representative genotypes of H3N2 in pigs. All six genotypes efficiently infected pigs, but they resulted in different degrees of lung damage and viral shedding. These results highlight the vast genetic diversity of H3N2 circulating in U.S. swine after 2009, with important implications for the control of IAV for the swine industry. Because H1N1pdm09 is also highly adapted to humans, these swine viruses pose a potential risk to public health if swine-adapted viruses with H1N1pdm09 genes also have an increased risk for human infection.

Rapid control of pandemic H1N1 influenza by targeting NKT-cells

Swine influenza A viruses (IAV) are a major cause of respiratory disease in pigs and humans. Currently approved anti-influenza therapies directly target the virus, but these approaches are losing effectiveness as new viral strains quickly develop drug resistance. To over come this challenge, there is an urgent need for more effective antiviral drugs. Here we tested the anti-influenza efficacy of the invariant natural killer T (NKT) cell superagonist, α-galactosylceramide (α-GalCer), which stimulates a wide array of anti-viral immune responses. We show that intranasal but not systemic administration of α-GalCer to piglets infected with pandemic A/California/04/2009 (CA04) H1N1 IAV ameliorated disease symptoms and resulted in the restoration of weight gain to the level of uninfected pigs. Correspondingly, viral titers in the upper-and lower-respiratory tract were reduced only in piglets that had received intranasal α-GalCer. Most significantly, lung inflammation as a consequence of virus persistence was largely prevented when NKT-cells were targeted via the respiratory route. Thus, targeting mucosal NKT-cells may provide a novel and potent platform for improving the course of disease in swine infected with seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses, and leads to the suggestion that this may also be true in humans and therefore deserves further study.

α-Galactosylceramide protects swine against influenza infection when administered as a vaccine adjuvant

Natural killer T (NKT) -cells activated with the glycolipid ligand α-galactosylceramide (α-GalCer) stimulate a wide array of immune responses with many promising immunotherapeutic applications, including the enhancement of vaccines against infectious diseases and cancer. In the current study, we evaluated whether α-GalCer generates protective immunity against a swine influenza (SI) virus infection when applied as an intramuscular vaccine adjuvant. Immunization of newly weaned piglets with UV-killed pandemic H1N1 A/California/04/2009 (kCA04) SI virus and α-GalCer induced high titers of anti-hemagglutinin antibodies and generated virus-specific T cells that localized in intrapulmonary airways and in alveolar walls. Vaccination with α-GalCer resulted in a systemic increase in NKT-cell concentrations, including in the respiratory tract, which was associated with complete inhibition of viral replication in the upper and lower respiratory tract and much reduced viral shedding. These results indicate that NKT-cell agonists could be used to improve swine vaccine formulations in order to reduce the clinical signs of SI infection and limit the spread of influenza viruses amongst commercial pigs.

Molecular requirements for a pandemic influenza virus: An acid-stable hemagglutinin protein

Influenza pandemics require that a virus containing a hemagglutinin (HA) surface antigen previously unseen by a majority of the population becomes airborne-transmissible between humans. Although the HA protein is central to the emergence of a pandemic influenza virus, its required molecular properties for sustained transmission between humans are poorly defined. During virus entry, the HA protein binds receptors and is triggered by low pH in the endosome to cause membrane fusion; during egress, HA contributes to virus assembly and morphology. In 2009, a swine influenza virus (pH1N1) jumped to humans and spread globally. Here we link the pandemic potential of pH1N1 to its HA acid stability, or the pH at which this one-time-use nanomachine is either triggered to cause fusion or becomes inactivated in the absence of a target membrane. In surveillance isolates, our data show HA activation pH values decreased during the evolution of H1N1 from precursors in swine (pH 5.5-6.0), to early 2009 human cases (pH 5.5), and then to later human isolates (pH 5.2-5.4). A loss-of-function pH1N1 virus with a destabilizing HA1-Y17H mutation (pH 6.0) was less pathogenic in mice and ferrets, less transmissible by contact, and no longer airborne-transmissible. A ferret-adapted revertant (HA1-H17Y/HA2-R106K) regained airborne transmissibility by stabilizing HA to an activation pH of 5.3, similar to that of human-adapted isolates from late 2009-2014. Overall, these studies reveal that a stable HA (activation pH ≤ 5.5) is necessary for pH1N1 influenza virus pathogenicity and airborne transmissibility in ferrets and is associated with pandemic potential in humans.

Influenza A virus transmission via respiratory aerosols or droplets as it relates to pandemic potential

Many respiratory viruses of humans originate from animals. For instance, there are now eight paramyxoviruses, four coronaviruses and four orthomxoviruses that cause recurrent epidemics in humans but were once confined to other hosts. In the last decade, several members of the same virus families have jumped the species barrier from animals to humans. Fortunately, these viruses have not become established in humans, because they lacked the ability of sustained transmission between humans. However, these outbreaks highlighted the lack of understanding of what makes a virus transmissible. In part triggered by the relatively high frequency of occurrence of influenza A virus zoonoses and pandemics, the influenza research community has started to investigate the viral genetic and biological traits that drive virus transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets between mammals. Here we summarize recent discoveries on the genetic and phenotypic traits required for airborne transmission of zoonotic influenza viruses of subtypes H5, H7 and H9 and pandemic viruses of subtypes H1, H2 and H3. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of respiratory virus transmission is not only key from a basic scientific perspective, but may also aid in assessing the risks posed by zoonotic viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks.

One health, multiple challenges: The inter-species transmission of influenza A virus

Influenza A viruses are amongst the most challenging viruses that threaten both human and animal health. Influenza A viruses are unique in many ways. Firstly, they are unique in the diversity of host species that they infect. This includes waterfowl (the original reservoir), terrestrial and aquatic poultry, swine, humans, horses, dog, cats, whales, seals and several other mammalian species. Secondly, they are unique in their capacity to evolve and adapt, following crossing the species barrier, in order to replicate and spread to other individuals within the new species. Finally, they are unique in the frequency of inter-species transmission events that occur. Indeed, the consequences of novel influenza virus strain in an immunologically naïve population can be devastating. The problems that influenza A viruses present for human and animal health are numerous. For example, influenza A viruses in humans represent a major economic and disease burden, whilst the poultry industry has suffered colossal damage due to repeated outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of influenza A viruses by shedding light on interspecies virus transmission and summarising the current knowledge regarding how influenza viruses can adapt to a new host.

Replication and transmission of mammalian-adapted H9 subtype influenza virus in pigs and quail

Influenza A virus is a major pathogen of birds, swine and humans. Strains can jump between species in a process often requiring mutations and reassortment, resulting in outbreaks and, potentially, pandemics. H9N2 avian influenza is predominant in poultry across Asia and occasionally infects humans and swine. Pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) is endemic in humans and swine and has a history of reassortment in pigs. Previous studies have shown the compatibility of H9N2 and H1N1pdm for reassortment in ferrets, a model for human infection and transmission. Here, the effects of ferret adaptation of H9 surface gene segments on the infectivity and transmission in at-risk natural hosts, specifically swine and quail, were analysed. Reassortant H9N1 and H9N2 viruses, carrying seven or six gene segments from H1N1pdm, showed infectivity and transmissibility in swine, unlike the wholly avian H9N2 virus with ferret-adapted surface genes. In quail, only the reassortant H9N2 with the six internal gene segments from the H1N1pdm strain was able to infect and transmit, although less efficiently than the wholly avian H9N2 virus with ferret-adapted surface genes. These results highlight that ferret-adapted mutations on the haemagglutinin of H9 subtype virus do not restrict the ability of the virus to infect swine and quail, and that the ability to transmit in these species depends on the context of the whole virus. As such, this study emphasizes the threat that H9N2 reassortant viruses pose to humans and agricultural species and the importance of the genetic constellation of the virus to its ability to replicate and transmit in natural hosts of influenza.

Cross-Reactive Neuraminidase-Inhibiting Antibodies Elicited by Immunization with Recombinant Neuraminidase Proteins of H5N1 and Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A Viruses

Neuraminidase (NA), an influenza virus envelope glycoprotein, removes sialic acid from receptors for virus release from infected cells. For this study, we used a baculovirus-insect cell expression system to construct and purify recombinant NA (rNA) proteins of H5N1 (A/Vietnam/1203/2004) and pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) (A/Texas/05/2009) influenza viruses. BALB/c mice immunized with these proteins had high titers of NA-specific IgG and NA-inhibiting (NI) antibodies against H5N1, pH1N1, H3N2, and H7N9 viruses. H5N1 rNA immunization resulted in higher quantities of NA-specific antibody-secreting B cells against H5N1 and heterologous pH1N1 viruses in the spleen. H5N1 rNA and pH1N1 rNA immunizations both provided complete protection against homologous virus challenges, with H5N1 rNA immunization providing better protection against pH1N1 virus challenges. Cross-reactive NI antibodies were further dissected via pH1N1 rNA protein immunizations with I149V (NA with a change of Ile to Val at position 149), N344Y, and I365T/S366N NA mutations. The I365T/S366N mutation of pH1N1 rNA enhanced cross-reactive NI antibodies against H5N1, H3N2, and H7N9 viruses. It is our hope that these findings provide useful information for the development of an NA-based universal influenza vaccine.

IMPORTANCE

Neuraminidase (NA) is an influenza virus enzymatic protein that cleaves sialic acid linkages on infected cell surfaces, thus facilitating viral release and contributing to viral transmission and mucus infection. In currently available inactivated or live, attenuated influenza vaccines based on the antigenic content of hemagglutinin proteins, vaccine efficacy can be contributed partly through NA-elicited immune responses. We investigated the NA immunity of different recombinant NA (rNA) proteins associated with pH1N1 and H5N1 viruses. Our results indicate that H5N1 rNA immunization induced more potent cross-protective immunity than pH1N1 rNA immunization, and three mutated residues, I149V, I365T, and S366N, near the NA enzyme active site(s) are linked to enhanced cross-reactive NA-inhibiting antibodies against heterologous and heterosubtypic influenza A viruses. These findings provide useful information for the development of an NA-based universal influenza vaccine.

Investigation of an Outbreak of Variant Influenza A(H3N2) Virus Infection Associated With an Agricultural Fair-Ohio, August 2012

BACKGROUND

In 2012, one third of cases in a multistate outbreak of variant influenza A(H3N2) virus ([H3N2]v) infection occurred in Ohio. We conducted an investigation of (H3N2)v cases associated with agricultural Fair A in Ohio.

METHODS

We surveyed Fair A swine exhibitors and their household members. Confirmed cases had influenza-like illness (ILI) and a positive laboratory test for (H3N2)v, and probable cases had ILI. We calculated attack rates. We determined risk factors for infection, using multivariable log-binomial regression.

RESULTS

We identified 20 confirmed and 94 probable cases associated with Fair A. Among 114 cases, the median age was 10 years, there were no hospitalizations or deaths, and 82% had swine exposure. In the exhibitor household cohort of 359 persons (83 households), we identified 6 confirmed cases (2%) and 40 probable cases (11%). An age of <10 years was a significant risk factor (P < .01) for illness. One instance of likely human-to-human transmission was identified.

CONCLUSIONS

In this (H3N2)v outbreak, no evidence of sustained human-to-human (H3N2)v transmission was found. Our risk factor analysis contributed to the development of the recommendation that people at increased risk of influenza-associated complications, including children aged <5 years, avoid swine barns at fairs during the 2012 fair season.

Transmission of influenza A viruses

Influenza A viruses cause respiratory infections that range from asymptomatic to deadly in humans. Widespread outbreaks (pandemics) are attributable to 'novel' viruses that possess a viral hemagglutinin (HA) gene to which humans lack immunity. After a pandemic, these novel viruses form stable virus lineages in humans and circulate until they are replaced by other novel viruses. The factors and mechanisms that facilitate virus transmission among hosts and the establishment of novel lineages are not completely understood, but the HA and basic polymerase 2 (PB2) proteins are thought to play essential roles in these processes by enabling avian influenza viruses to infect mammals and replicate efficiently in their new host. Here, we summarize our current knowledge of the contributions of HA, PB2, and other viral components to virus transmission and the formation of new virus lineages.

Transmission in the guinea pig model

The ability of an influenza virus to transmit efficiently from human-to-human is a major factor in determining the epidemiological impact of that strain. The use of a relevant animal model to identify viral determinants of transmission, as well as host and environmental factors affecting transmission efficiency, is therefore critical for public health. The characterization of newly emerging influenza viruses in terms of their potential to transmit in a mammalian host is furthermore an important part of pandemic risk assessment. For these reasons, a guinea pig model of influenza virus transmission was developed in 2006. The guinea pig provides an important alternative to preexisting models for influenza. Most influenza viruses do not readily transmit among mice. Ferrets, while highly relevant, are expensive and can be difficult to obtain in high numbers. Moreover, it is generally accepted that efforts to accurately model human disease are strengthened by the use of multiple animal species. Herein, we provide an overview of influenza virus infectivity, growth, and transmission in the guinea pig and highlight knowledge gained on the topic of influenza virus transmission using the guinea pig model.

Influenza A virus acquires enhanced pathogenicity and transmissibility after serial passages in swine

Genetic and phylogenetic analyses suggest that the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus was derived from well-established swine influenza lineages; however, there is no convincing evidence that the pandemic virus was generated from a direct precursor in pigs. Furthermore, the evolutionary dynamics of influenza virus in pigs have not been well documented. Here, we subjected a recombinant virus (rH1N1) with the same constellation makeup as the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus to nine serial passages in pigs. The severity of infection sequentially increased with each passage. Deep sequencing of viral quasispecies from the ninth passage found five consensus amino acid mutations: PB1 A469T, PA 1129T, NA N329D, NS1 N205K, and NEP T48N. Mutations in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein, however, differed greatly between the upper and lower respiratory tracts. Three representative viral clones with the five consensus mutations were selected for functional evaluation. Relative to the parental virus, the three viral clones showed enhanced replication and polymerase activity in vitro and enhanced replication, pathogenicity, and transmissibility in pigs, guinea pigs, and ferrets in vivo. Specifically, two mutants of rH1N1 (PB1 A469T and a combination of NS1 N205K and NEP T48N) were identified as determinants of transmissibility in guinea pigs. Crucially, one mutant viral clone with the five consensus mutations, which also carried D187E, K211E, and S289N mutations in its HA, additionally was able to infect ferrets by airborne transmission as effectively as the pandemic virus. Our findings demonstrate that influenza virus can acquire viral characteristics that are similar to those of the pandemic virus after limited serial passages in pigs. Importance: We demonstrate here that an engineered reassortant swine influenza virus, with the same gene constellation pattern as the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus and subjected to only nine serial passages in pigs, acquired greatly enhanced virulence and transmissibility. In particular, one representative pathogenic passaged virus clone, which carried three mutations in the HA gene and five consensus mutations in PB1, PA, NA, NS1, and NEP genes, additionally was able to confer respiratory droplet transmission as effectively as the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus. Our findings suggest that pigs can readily induce adaptive mutational changes to a precursor pandemic-like virus to transform it into a highly virulent and infectious form akin to that of the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus, which underlines the potential direct role of pigs in promoting influenza A virus pathogenicity and transmissibility.

Residue 41 of the Eurasian avian-like swine influenza a virus matrix protein modulates virion filament length and efficiency of contact transmission

Position 41 of the influenza A virus matrix protein encodes a highly conserved alanine in human and avian lineages. Nonetheless, strains of the Eurasian avian-like swine (Easw) lineage contain a change at this position: position 41 of A/swine/Spain/53207/04 (H1N1) (SPN04) encodes a proline. To assess the impact of this naturally occurring polymorphism on viral fitness, we utilized reverse genetics to produce recombinant viruses encoding wild-type M1 41P (rSPN04-P) and consensus 41A (rSPN04-A) residues. Relative to rSPN04-A, rSPN04-P virus displayed reduced growth in vitro. In the guinea pig model, rSPN04-P was transmitted to fewer contact animals than rSPN04-A and failed to infect guinea pigs that received a low-dose inoculum. Moreover, the P41A change altered virion morphology, reducing the number and length of filamentous virions, as well as reducing the neuraminidase activity of virions. The lab-adapted human isolate, A/PR/8/34 (H1N1) (PR8), is nontransmissible in the guinea pig model, making it a useful background in which to identify certain viral factors that enhance transmissibility. We assessed transmission in the context of single-, double-, and triple-reassortant viruses between PR8 and SPN04; PR8/SPN04 M, PR8/SPN04 M+NA, and PR8/SPN04 M+NA+HA, encoding either matrix 41 A or P, were generated. In each case, the virus possessing 41P transmitted less well than the corresponding 41A-encoding virus. In summary, we have identified a naturally occurring mutation in the influenza A virus matrix protein that impacts transmission efficiency and can alter virion morphology and neuraminidase activity.

IMPORTANCE

We have developed a practical model for examining the genetics underlying transmissibility of the Eurasian avian-like swine lineage viruses, which contributed M and NA segments to the 2009 pandemic strain. Here, we use our system to investigate the impact on viral fitness of a naturally occurring polymorphism at matrix (M1) position 41 in an Easw isolate. Position 41 has been implicated previously in adaptation to laboratory substrates and to mice. Here we show that the polymorphism at M1 41 has a limited effect on growth in vitro but changes the morphology of the virus and impacts growth and transmission in the guinea pig model.

The M segment of the 2009 pandemic influenza virus confers increased neuraminidase activity, filamentous morphology, and efficient contact transmissibility to A/Puerto Rico/8/1934-based reassortant viruses

The 2009 H1N1 lineage represented the first detection of a novel, highly transmissible influenza A virus genotype: six gene segments originated from the North American triple-reassortant swine lineage, and two segments, NA and M, derived from the Eurasian avian-like swine lineage. As neither parental lineage transmits efficiently between humans, the adaptations and mechanisms underlying the pandemic spread of the swine-origin 2009 strain are not clear. To help identify determinants of transmission, we used reverse genetics to introduce gene segments of an early pandemic isolate, A/Netherlands/602/2009 [H1N1] (NL602), into the background of A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 [H1N1] (PR8) and evaluated the resultant viruses in a guinea pig transmission model. Whereas the NL602 virus spread efficiently, the PR8 virus did not transmit. Swapping of the HA, NA, and M segments of NL602 into the PR8 background yielded a virus with indistinguishable contact transmissibility to the wild-type pandemic strain. Consistent with earlier reports, the pandemic M segment alone accounted for much of the improvement in transmission. To aid in understanding how the M segment might affect transmission, we evaluated neuraminidase activity and virion morphology of reassortant viruses. Transmission was found to correlate with higher neuraminidase activity and a more filamentous morphology. Importantly, we found that introduction of the pandemic M segment alone resulted in an increase in the neuraminidase activity of two pairs of otherwise isogenic PR8-based viruses. Thus, our data demonstrate the surprising result that functions encoded by the influenza A virus M segment impact neuraminidase activity and, perhaps through this mechanism, have a potent effect on transmissibility.

IMPORTANCE

Our work uncovers a previously unappreciated mechanism through which the influenza A virus M segment can alter the receptor-destroying activity of an influenza virus. Concomitant with changes to neuraminidase activity, the M segment impacts the morphology of the influenza A virion and transmissibility of the virus in the guinea pig model. We suggest that changes in NA activity underlie the ability of the influenza M segment to influence virus transmissibility. Furthermore, we show that coadapted M, NA, and HA segments are required to provide optimal transmissibility to an influenza virus. The M-NA functional interaction we describe appears to underlie the prominent role of the 2009 pandemic M segment in supporting efficient transmission and may be a highly important means by which influenza A viruses restore HA/NA balance following reassortment or transfer to new host environments.

Alternative reassortment events leading to transmissible H9N1 influenza viruses in the ferret model

Influenza A H9N2 viruses are common poultry pathogens that occasionally infect swine and humans. It has been shown previously with H9N2 viruses that reassortment can generate novel viruses with increased transmissibility. Here, we demonstrate the modeling power of a novel transfection-based inoculation system to select reassortant viruses under in vivo selective pressure. Plasmids containing the genes from an H9N2 virus and a pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus were transfected into HEK 293T cells to potentially generate the full panel of possible H9 reassortants. These cells were then used to inoculate ferrets, and the population dynamics were studied. Two respiratory-droplet-transmissible H9N1 viruses were selected by this method, indicating a selective pressure in ferrets for the novel combination of surface genes. These results show that a transfection-based inoculation system is a fast and efficient method to model reassortment and highlight the risk of reassortment between H9N2 and pH1N1 viruses.

Outbreak of variant influenza A(H3N2) virus in the United States

Background. Variant influenza virus infections are rare but may have pandemic potential if person-to-person transmission is efficient. We describe the epidemiology of a multistate outbreak of an influenza A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) first identified in 2011.

Methods. We identified laboratory-confirmed cases of H3N2v and used a standard case report form to characterize illness and exposures. We considered illness to result from person-to-person H3N2v transmission if swine contact was not identified within 4 days prior to illness onset.

Results. From 9 July to 7 September 2012, we identified 306 cases of H3N2v in 10 states. The median age of all patients was 7 years. Commonly reported signs and symptoms included fever (98%), cough (85%), and fatigue (83%). Sixteen patients (5.2%) were hospitalized, and 1 fatal case was identified. The majority of those infected reported agricultural fair attendance (93%) and/or contact with swine (95%) prior to illness. We identified 15 cases of possible person-to-person transmission of H3N2v. Viruses recovered from patients were 93%–100% identical and similar to viruses recovered from previous cases of H3N2v. All H3N2v viruses examined were susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir and resistant to adamantane antiviral medications.

Conclusions. In a large outbreak of variant influenza, the majority of infected persons reported exposures, suggesting that swine contact at an agricultural fair was a risk for H3N2v infection. We identified limited person-to-person H3N2v virus transmission, but found no evidence of efficient or sustained person-to-person transmission. Fair managers and attendees should be aware of the risk of swine-to-human transmission of influenza viruses in these settings.

Molecular basis for broad neuraminidase immunity: conserved epitopes in seasonal and pandemic H1N1 as well as H5N1 influenza viruses

Influenza A viruses, including H1N1 and H5N1 subtypes, pose a serious threat to public health. Neuraminidase (NA)-related immunity contributes to protection against influenza virus infection. Antibodies to the N1 subtype provide protection against homologous and heterologous H1N1 as well as H5N1 virus challenge. Since neither the strain-specific nor conserved epitopes of N1 have been identified, we generated a panel of mouse monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) that exhibit different reactivity spectra with H1N1 and H5N1 viruses and used these MAbs to map N1 antigenic domains. We identified 12 amino acids essential for MAb binding to the NA of a recent seasonal H1N1 virus, A/Brisbane/59/2007. Of these, residues 248, 249, 250, 341, and 343 are recognized by strain-specific group A MAbs, while residues 273, 338, and 339 are within conserved epitope(s), which allows cross-reactive group B MAbs to bind the NAs of seasonal H1N1 and the 1918 and 2009 pandemic (09pdm) H1N1 as well as H5N1 viruses. A single dose of group B MAbs administered prophylactically fully protected mice against lethal challenge with seasonal and 09pdm H1N1 viruses and resulted in significant protection against the highly pathogenic wild-type H5N1 virus. Another three N1 residues (at positions 396, 397, and 456) are essential for binding of cross-reactive group E MAbs, which differ from group B MAbs in that they do not bind 09pdm H1N1 viruses. The identification of conserved N1 epitopes reveals the molecular basis for NA-mediated immunity between H1N1 and H5N1 viruses and demonstrates the potential for developing broadly protective NA-specific antibody treatments for influenza.

Emergence of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential: open issues which need to be addressed. A review

The real and perceived impact of influenza infections in animals has changed dramatically over the last 10 years, due mainly to the better understanding of the public health implications of avian and swine influenza viruses. On a number of occasions in the last decade avian-to-human transmissions of H5, H7 and H9 virus subtypes have occurred, and the first influenza pandemic of the new millennium occurred as a result of the emergence and spread of a virus from pigs. Although the mechanisms that allow influenza viruses to jump from one host species to another are not fully understood, several genetic signatures linked to the crossing of species barriers have been identified. This has led to a re-evaluation of the importance of understanding these viruses in the animal reservoir, to the extent that millions of euros have been invested in surveillance, research and capacity building worldwide. This has resulted in an enhanced collaboration with our medical counterparts, leading to many discoveries that will contribute to an understanding of the complex mechanisms that lead to the emergence of a pandemic virus.

In vivo selection of H1N2 influenza virus reassortants in the ferret model

Although the ferret model has been extensively used to study pathogenesis and transmission of influenza viruses, little has been done to determine whether ferrets are a good surrogate animal model to study influenza virus reassortment. It has been previously shown that the pandemic 2009 H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus was able to transmit efficiently in ferrets. In coinfection studies with either seasonal H1N1 or H3N2 strains (H1N1s or H3N2s, respectively), the H1N1pdm virus was able to outcompete these strains and become the dominant transmissible virus. However, lack of reassortment could have been the result of differences in the cell or tissue tropism of these viruses in the ferret. To address this issue, we performed coinfection studies with recombinant influenza viruses carrying the surface genes of a seasonal H3N2 strain in the background of an H1N1pdm strain and vice versa. After serial passages in ferrets, a dominant H1N2 virus population was obtained with a constellation of gene segments, most of which, except for the neuraminidase (NA) and PB1 segments, were from the H1N1pdm strain. Our studies suggest that ferrets recapitulate influenza virus reassortment events. The H1N2 virus generated through this process resembles similar viruses that are emerging in nature, particularly in pigs.

In vitro and in vivo replication of influenza A H1N1 WSN33 viruses with different M1 proteins

The M1 protein is a major structural protein that has multiple functions in various steps within the life cycle of the influenza A virus (IAV). However, little is currently known about the role of M1 in IAV replication in vivo and the associated pathogenesis. In this study, six isogenic H1N1 WSN33 viruses, constructed to express unique M1 proteins derived from various strains, subtypes or WSN33 itself, were tested to determine in vitro and in vivo functional exchangeability of M1 proteins in the replication and pathogenesis of the WSN33 virus. Despite five chimeric M1 viruses replicating to levels similar to those of the parental WSN33 virus in cell cultures, all M1 chimeras exhibited improved replication and enhanced virulence in mice when compared with the WSN33 virus. Interestingly, M1 proteins derived from swine viruses caused more severe clinical diseases than those from human or quail. These data indicate that the M1 protein is an important determinant of viral replication and pathogenic properties in mice, although the functions of M1 observed in vivo are not adequately reflected in simple infections of cultured cells. Chimeric M1 viruses that are variable in their clinical manifestations described here will aid future understanding of the role of M1 in IAV pathogenesis.

2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus elicits similar clinical course but differential host transcriptional response in mouse, macaque, and swine infection models

Background

The 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus emerged in swine and quickly became a major global health threat. In mouse, non human primate, and swine infection models, the pH1N1 virus efficiently replicates in the lung and induces pro-inflammatory host responses; however, whether similar or different cellular pathways were impacted by pH1N1 virus across independent infection models remains to be further defined. To address this we have performed a comparative transcriptomic analysis of acute phase responses to a single pH1N1 influenza virus, A/California/04/2009 (CA04), in the lung of mice, macaques and swine.

Results

Despite similarities in the clinical course, we observed differences in inflammatory molecules elicited, and the kinetics of their gene expression changes across all three species. We found genes associated with the retinoid X receptor (RXR) signaling pathway known to control pro-inflammatory and metabolic processes that were differentially regulated during infection in each species, though the heterodimeric RXR partner, pathway associated signaling molecules, and gene expression patterns varied among the three species.

Conclusions

By comparing transcriptional changes in the context of clinical and virological measures, we identified differences in the host transcriptional response to pH1N1 virus across independent models of acute infection. Antiviral resistance and the emergence of new influenza viruses have placed more focus on developing drugs that target the immune system. Underlying overt clinical disease are molecular events that suggest therapeutic targets identified in one host may not be appropriate in another.

In vitro reassortment between endemic H1N2 and 2009 H1N1 pandemic swine influenza viruses generates attenuated viruses

The pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus was first reported in humans in the spring of 2009 and soon thereafter was identified in numerous species, including swine. Reassortant viruses, presumably arising from the co-infection of pH1N1 and endemic swine influenza virus (SIV), were subsequently identified from diagnostic samples collected from swine. In this study, co-infection of swine testicle (ST) cells with swine-derived endemic H1N2 (MN745) and pH1N1 (MN432) yielded two reassortant H1N2 viruses (R1 and R2), both possessing a matrix gene derived from pH1N1. In ST cells, the reassortant viruses had growth kinetics similar to the parental H1N2 virus and reached titers approximately 2 log(10) TCID(50)/mL higher than the pH1N1 virus, while in A549 cells these viruses had similar growth kinetics. Intranasal challenge of pigs with H1N2, pH1N1, R1 or R2 found that all viruses were capable of infecting and transmitting between direct contact pigs as measured by real time reverse transcription PCR of nasal swabs. Lung samples were also PCR-positive for all challenge groups and influenza-associated microscopic lesions were detected by histology. Interestingly, infectious virus was detected in lung samples for pigs challenged with the parental H1N2 and pH1N1 at levels significantly higher than either reassortant virus despite similar levels of viral RNA. Results of our experiment suggested that the reassortant viruses generated through in vitro cell culture system were attenuated without gaining any selective growth advantage in pigs over the parental lineages. Thus, reassortant influenza viruses described in this study may provide a good system to study genetic basis of the attenuation and its mechanism.