Nonbelieved memories

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence

The current study examined how people's metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust - the subjective appraisal of one's memory functioning - as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

Retracted memories in the general population: are there differences between eastern and western countries?

The main purpose of the current studies was to examine retracted experiences in the general population from various cultural backgrounds. More specifically, in two studies, we examined the details of memory retraction experiences, the reasons for retraction, and the outcomes of retraction in participants from China and other countries, mainly the United States of America. It was found that memory retraction experiences appeared to be quite common. In the sample of Chinese participants (Study 1: N = 1380), 50.58% reported at least one such an experience, whereas in respondents from other countries (Study 2; N = 425), a significantly lower but still substantial prevalence rate of 35% was found. In general, the retracted memories predominantly involved positive events and some respondents experienced pressure during the withdrawal. Social feedback and event plausibility were the two main reasons for the withdrawal. Compared to recollection scores, belief scores decreased significantly after withdrawal, and some respondents even formed nonbelieved memories. After retracting the memories, most respondents felt they gained benefits (e.g., they had resolved a psychological problem that had bothered them for years). These studies give us a more general understanding of retracted memory experiences in the general population.

Inducing emotionally negative nonbelieved memories using negative pictures

Memories that can be recalled but are no longer believed are termed nonbelieved memories. The current studies examined the creation of emotionally negative nonbelieved memories after viewing negatively valenced pictures. In both experiments, participants took part in two sessions. In Session 1, after being presented with a set of neutral and negative pictures, participants had to rate their emotional state. One week later, in Session 2, participants had to complete a recognition task to identify pictures that had appeared during the previous session. During this task, participants' memories for some pictures were challenged by telling them that their answers were incorrect in order to evoke nonbelieved memories. The experimental procedure was successful in creating nonbelieved memories in the participants. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (N = 35), we induced nonbelieved true memories for both negative and neutral pictures. We found a significant decrease in both belief and recollection after the challenge, with the change in belief being twice as large as the change in recollection. In Experiment 2 (N = 43), we successfully induced both nonbelieved true and false memories for negative pictures. Again, the reduction of belief was significantly greater than that of recollection. In general, participants evinced better memory for negative pictures, but following challenges people were just as likely to accept false social feedback and change their memories regarding other types of pictures. In both experiments, our challenges did not lead to notable changes in emotional state. In general, our findings show that emotionally negative nonbelieved memories can be successfully evoked in an experimental setting.

Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.

Recovered memories of trauma as a special (or not so special) form of involuntary autobiographical memories

Recovered memories of trauma are memories of traumatic events experienced generally during childhood, but of which the persons were unaware until they retrieved it. Legal decisions are sometimes based on such recovered memories, the validity of which is often questioned. Yet, people can recover genuine traumatic memories of childhood abuse. In this paper, we present and further discuss the idea that recovered traumatic memories can be interpreted in the context of the autobiographical memory framework. Specifically, we argue that recovered memories may be accessed after exposure to incidental cues that initiate unexpected spontaneous memory retrieval. Thus, we relate the recovered memory phenomenon to involuntary autobiographical memories and argue that it is an example of highly stressful, emotionally negative, and intense involuntary memories that were yet never recalled. This novel, evidence-based perspective leads us to reconsider the examination of the validity of eyewitness testimony as a continuum ranging from the least valid form (i.e., memories recovered in highly suggestive context facilitating its factitious reconstruction) to the most valid form (i.e., memories that were triggered by cues without any person's voluntary engagement), and this in relation with how internal (e.g., age and internal cue) or external (e.g., suggestion in therapy, suggestion during investigative interview, and contextual cue) factors may influence memory retrieval. Finally, we propose several recommendations for experts that may be useful in assessing the validity of a testimony based on recovered memories.

Memory of Fictional Information: A Theoretical Framework

Much of the information people encounter in everyday life is not factual; it originates from fictional sources, such as movies, novels, and video games, and from direct experience such as pretense, role-playing, and everyday conversation. Despite the recent increase in research on fiction, there is no theoretical account of how memory of fictional information is related to other types of memory or of which mechanisms allow people to separate fact and fiction in memory. We present a theoretical framework that places memory of fiction in relation to other cognitive phenomena as a distinct construct and argue that it is an essential component for any general theory of human memory. We show how fictionality can be integrated in an existing memory model by extending Rubin's dimensional conceptual memory model. By this means, our model can account for explicit and implicit memory of fictional information of events, places, characters, and objects. Further, we propose a set of mechanisms involving various degrees of complexity and levels of conscious processing that mostly keep fact and fiction separated but also allow information from fiction to influence real-world attitudes and beliefs: content-based reasoning, source monitoring, and an associative link from the memory to the concept of fiction.

Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?

Episodic representations can be entertained either as "remembered" or "imagined"-as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a "cognitive gadget"-a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive "feelings of remembering" from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as "I was there" or "I witnessed it myself." We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.

Challenging memories reduces intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect

This study scrutinizes the influence of attenuating beliefs about the veracity of traumatic experiences on the manifestation of intrusive recollections and the memory amplification effect. Participants were exposed to distress-inducing visual stimuli, subsequently rating their emotional status pre and post exposure. They engaged in a recognition task, identifying scenarios within the stimuli. Participants' recall was contested, casting doubt about the occurrence of certain scenes. Subsequently, they maintained a daily log of intrusive memories over a week. A second session reiterated the same process. This method effectively diminished the certainty in the participants' traumatic memories. Scenes whose occurrence was contested demonstrated a significant decline in both intrusive memories and memory amplification when juxtaposed with uncontested ones. Interestingly, no significant correlation emerged between the diminished belief in traumatic incidents and reductions in intrusive memory or memory amplification. Thus, this study advocates that interrogating the veracity of traumatic recollections can mitigate the prevalence of intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect, suggesting a novel potential therapeutic approach for trauma-related disorders.

External and internal influences yield similar memory effects: the role of deception and suggestion

In legal cases, testimonies can become contaminated because of an amalgam of external and internal influences on memory. It is well-established that external influences (e.g., suggestive interviews) can hurt memory. However, less focus has been placed on the impact of internal influences (e.g., lying) on memory. In the current review, we show that the available evidence suggests that both external and internal influences exert similar effects on memory. That is, we review studies showing that suggesting non-occurrences and suggesting non-experiences can lead to omission errors and false memories, respectively. Likewise, these memory effects are also observed when focusing on internal influences. That is, false denials, feigning amnesia and fabrication have been shown to affect memory in terms of forgetting (i.e., omissions) and false memories (i.e., commissions). Also, we show that both external and internal influences can lead to changes in the belief that an event occurred. We argue that in legal cases, triers of fact should concentrate on whether both types of influences might have affected testimonial accuracy in witnesses, victims, and suspects.

Preference for cheap-and-easy memory verification strategies is strongest among people with high memory distrust

When choosing strategies for verifying one's memory, people are more influenced by the perceived cost of using a strategy than by its likelihood of yielding reliable information (i.e., cheap-strategy bias). The current preregistered study investigated whether people with high memory distrust are less likely to exhibit this bias than their low memory distrust counterparts. Participants (N = 535) imagined a scenario in which they witnessed an accident and were then led by friends to question their memories about the accident. Participants had to propose five strategies for verifying that particular memory. Following this, they rated each strategy's cost, reliability, and their likelihood of using it, as well as completing two validated measures of trait memory distrust. Contrary to our prediction, compared with participants with low memory distrust, participants with higher memory distrust exhibited a larger cheap-strategy bias. Follow-up analyses suggested that compared with memory-trusters, memory distrusters' strategy choices were more influenced by a strategy's perceived cost, and less influenced by its perceived reliability. Our results suggest that people who are more skeptical about their memories may be more cynical about the worthwhileness of verifying their memory, which could make them especially susceptible to misinformation acceptance and false memory creation.

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

Debriefing works: Successful retraction of misinformation following a fake news study

In recent years there has been an explosion of research on misinformation, often involving experiments where participants are presented with fake news stories and subsequently debriefed. In order to avoid potential harm to participants or society, it is imperative that we establish whether debriefing procedures remove any lasting influence of misinformation. In the current study, we followed up with 1547 participants one week after they had been exposed to fake news stories about COVID-19 and then provided with a detailed debriefing. False memories and beliefs for previously-seen fake stories declined from the original study, suggesting that the debrief was effective. Moreover, the debriefing resulted in reduced false memories and beliefs for novel fake stories, suggesting a broader impact on participants' willingness to accept misinformation. Small effects of misinformation on planned health behaviours observed in the original study were also eliminated at follow-up. Our findings suggest that when a careful and thorough debriefing procedure is followed, researchers can safely and ethically conduct misinformation research on sensitive topics.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways

People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

The fabricated past: intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories in Alzheimer's disease

OBJECTIVE

We investigated intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories in Alzheimer's Disease (AD).

METHOD

We invited AD patients and control participants to construct real events as well as fabricated events describing fictitious personal events that occurred in the past.

RESULTS

Results demonstrated slower retrieval time for intentionally fabricated memories than for real ones in both AD patients and control participants. The analysis also showed similar vividness for intentionally fabricated memories and real ones in AD patients but lower vividness for intentionally fabricated memories than for real ones in control participants.

CONCLUSIONS

The slow retrieval time of intentionally fabricated memories may be attributed to the cognitive effort required to retrieve elements from autobiographical memory and edit them to construct a new memory. We suggest that the vividness of intentionally fabricated memories observed in AD may induce confusion with real memories. In addition to the experimental approach of our study, we offer a theoretical rationale for intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories by situating them in the wider context of different facets of false memories in AD (e.g. confabulations, source monitoring errors).

More Lies Lead to More Memory Impairments in Daily Life

Previous studies have demonstrated that lying can undermine memory and that its memory-undermining effects could be modulated by the cognitive resources required to tell lies. We extended the investigation of the memory-undermining effect by using a daily life setting in which participants were highly involved in a mock shopping task. Participants were randomly assigned to truth-telling, denying or mixed lying conditions. After finishing the shopping task, participants were told that two people wanted to know about their shopping lists and would ask them some questions in an interview. During the interview, participants were asked whether each of ten items were on the shopping list, five of which were randomly selected from the shopping list, while the other five were not sold in the store. In answering the interview questions, the truth-telling group was asked to respond honestly, the denying group was asked to give denial responses, and the mixed lying group was asked to respond deceptively. Thus, the denying group told five lies and the mixed lying group told ten lies in the interview. The item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given in an orderly manner 48 h after the interview. We found that the mixed lying group, rather than the denying group, forgot the lies they told in the interview and mistakenly believed they had lied about something that they had not lied about. Moreover, the mixed lying group retained fewer memories about the person they responded to than the honest group. In addition, participants in the mixed lying group had more non-believed memories than those in the truth-telling group in both item and source memory tests. We conclude that more lies could result in more memory disruptions in daily life.

Who did I lie to that day? Deception impairs memory in daily life

Research has demonstrated that deceptive responses can undermine item and source memories. However, previous studies have often randomly assigned participants to an honest or deception group and asked them to respond in specific ways in an interview, rather than providing them a choice of what response to give. Moreover, little attention has been given to destination memory in previous research. Using a daily life paradigm, we investigated the effects of deception on memory. After completing a mock shopping task, participants were told that someone would ask them questions about their shopping lists. The participants voluntarily chose to tell the truth or lie in the interview and were encouraged to respond as they would in their daily lives. An item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given 48 h after the interview. Source and destination memories but not item memories were impaired for participants who chose to lie. Specifically, liars forgot the things about which they lied and mistakenly believed that they lied about many things that they did not, and they also did not remember to whom they lied. We conclude that deception can disrupt memory in daily life.

Dr James Ost's contributions to the work of the British false memory society

The British False Memory Society (BFMS) is a registered charity founded in 1993 in response to an epidemic of false claims of past childhood sexual abuse by adults in therapy. The accusers believe they have recovered unconscious memories of a hidden past, but scientific and other evidence raise the possibility of false memories or retrospective reappraisal. The BFMS aims to raise awareness about false memory and to reduce the impact of the resulting false accusations. Dr James Ost was an active member of the BFMS's Scientific and Professional Advisory Board. Three lines of his research were particularly relevant to the work of the BFMS. The first of these was his investigations of retractors. His insights provided a deeper understanding of processes involved in the formation and subsequent rejection of false memories and beliefs relating to such allegations. He also carried out experimental studies providing empirical proof that false memories can be implanted under well controlled conditions. Finally, he carried out, and produced reviews of, surveys of misconceptions about the nature of memory, thus highlighting issues that have major implications for the working of the legal system. Dr Ost also served as an expert defence witness on a number of occasions.

Conformidade em Memória de Reconhecimento: Revisão Breve e Potenciais Direções de Pesquisa

Resumo Conformidade de memória é o fenômeno em que relatos de memória de uma pessoa são modificados após exposição aos relatos de outra pessoa. Estudos sobre conformidade de memória são importantes tanto no âmbito puro quanto aplicado, especialmente quando os estímulos são carregados emocionalmente. No entanto, estudos de conformidade de memória com estímulos emocionais ainda são escassos. Além disso, os poucos estudos sobre o tema apresentam resultados contraditórios. Nesta revisão, apresentamos um breve resumo de pesquisas sobre conformidade de memória em tarefas de reconhecimento e avaliamos o papel moderador da emocionalidade na conformidade. Sugerimos como possível direção de pesquisas futuras a avaliação de duas variáveis, intervalo de retenção e distintividade dos estímulos, que podem ser cruciais para elucidar as inconsistências empíricas.

Fool me twice: how effective is debriefing in false memory studies?

Deception is often necessary in false memory studies, especially when the study aims to explore the effect of misinformation on memory. At the end of the study, participants are debriefed, but does this eliminate the influence of misinformation? In the current study, we followed up 630 participants six months after they participated in a study in which they were exposed to fabricated political news stories. We compared the memories of these "continuing participants" for both novel and previously seen news stories to the memories of 474 newly recruited participants. Relative to new recruits, continuing participants were less likely to report a false memory for a story that they had been previously exposed to, and they were also less likely to report a false memory for a novel fake news story. Continuing participants were more likely to report a memory for previously seen true events than novel true events. Both groups of participants reported enjoying the experience and feeling confident that they understood which stories were fabricated. Importantly, this study did not find any negative long-term effects of participating in our false memory experiment, and even exhibited some positive effects.

Adopting a fictitious autobiography: fabrication inflation or deflation?

In the present experiment, we examined whether adopting a fictitious biography would make participants believe in this autobiography. Participants were split up into two conditions: forced confabulation condition and control condition. The forced confabulation condition received a snippet with the fake biography and had to adopt it through several methods (i.e., method acting, journaling, and convincing experimenters in an interview) over an extended period of time. The control condition was told that they partook in an experiment about personal childhood memories. Before, during and after lying participants completed four Life Event Inventories (LEI). Results revealed that after coming forward with the truth participants did not increase nor decrease their belief for the lied about events. Additionally, even after a one-year delay, we found no evidence for either effect. Our findings suggest that more extreme forms of fabrication do not make people believe in their lies.

The impact of false denials on forgetting and false memory

People sometimes falsely deny having experienced an event. In the current experiments, we examined the effect of false denials on forgetting and false memory formation. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with emotionally-negative and neutral associatively related word lists known to engender false memories. After encoding, half of the participants had to falsely deny having seen the words while the other half had to tell the truth. During a final memory test (recall or source monitoring task), participants who falsely denied forgot that they discussed certain words with an experimenter. Furthermore, the act of falsely denying reduced the formation of false memories. These results were partially replicated in Experiment 2 where participants also had to re-learn several words and received a second memory task. This latter design feature diminished the effect of false denials on false memory creation. Our experiments suggest that false denials not only have negative consequences (forgetting), but can have positive ones too (reduction in false memories).

Seeing or hearing one's memories: Manipulating autobiographical memory imagery in schizophrenia

The prevalence of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, and theories suggesting a link between autobiographical memory and hallucination, raise the possibility of a dominant role of auditory imagery in autobiographical remembering in patients with schizophrenia, whereas visual imagery is dominant in autobiographical memory of healthy adults. The present study explored this possibility by comparing autobiographical memory characteristics, according to sensory modality, in patients with schizophrenia versus healthy controls. Twenty-eight patients and 28 matched controls were asked to retrieve autobiographical memories that were dominated by auditory, visual, gustatory-olfactory, or tactile imagery. ANOVA analysis showed that patients rated their memories lower on specificity, contextual information, feeling of reliving, overall vividness, coherence and autobiographical me-ness (i.e. whether an autobiographical memory is experienced as belonging to the self), ps < 0.03, compared with control participants. The effects of sensory modality imagery were largely similar for patients and controls, as no interaction effects were observed. The findings did not support a dominance of auditory imagery in patients' autobiographical memory. In the patient group, reduced autobiographical me-ness was predicted by lower ratings of contextual information related to the setting of the event. Future research should examine whether these effects extend to involuntary autobiographical memory in schizophrenia.

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events, but for different reasons

The age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.

Believing does not equal remembering: The effects of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected.

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.

Episodic memory must be grounded in reality in order to be useful in communication

The primary function of episodic memory is to provide reliable information about reality that is essential for surviving and navigating in an environment. The communicative function of episodic memory "sits on top of" this basic function but does not, in itself, explain it in its totality (but may explain particular aspects such as its sensitivity to source credibility).

False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.

Reflecting on how we remember the personal past: missing components in the study of memory appraisal and theoretical implications

The current paper offers a selective review of the study of memory appraisal, focusing on recollections of the personal past, with the goal to bring attention to a missing component in this study. To date, memory appraisal studies have concentrated on participants' assessments of the content of their personal recollections (e.g., their perceptual detail and story-like feel), including beliefs about the accuracy of that content. Participants' assessments of reflection processes accompanying their recollections (e.g., a sense of piecing-together recollection fragments) have yet to be extensively examined. The lack of information on process-based appraisals is related to prior studies' procedural constraints (e.g., kinds of cue prompts and their timing, minimal opportunities for reflection). Reasons for addressing this missing component provide the central themes of the paper. The reasons emerge from the analysis of autobiographical cueing studies, including integration of narrative research studies and autobiographical works. The analysis leads to suggestions for future research involving the use of personal narratives that are intended to address critiques of reconstruction accounts and unresolved questions in the study of memory appraisal.

Make it real: Belief in occurrence within episodic future thought

While the cognitive and neural bases of episodic future thinking are well documented, questions remain as to what gives the sense that an imagined event belongs to one's personal future. Capitalizing on previous research on metacognitive appraisals in autobiographical remembering, we propose that episodic future thinking involves, in varying degrees, a subjective belief in the potential occurrence of imagined future events and we explore the nature and determinants of such belief. To this aim, participants provided justifications for belief in occurrence for a series of past and future events. For each event, they also assessed their subjective feelings (belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy) and rated various characteristics of mental representations that might contribute to these feelings. Results showed that belief in the occurrence of future events mostly related to their integration in a broader autobiographical context, especially their relevance to personal goals and their personal plausibility. We also found that belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy represented distinct subjective appraisals of future events, which depended in part on different determinants. Based on these findings, we propose a new theoretical model of subjective feelings associated with episodic future thinking that conceives of belief in occurrence as arising from metacognitive appraisals that shape the sense that imagined events belong to one's personal future.

Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

What Is the Correct Answer about The Dress' Colors? Investigating the Relation between Optimism, Previous Experience, and Answerability

The Dress photograph, first displayed on the internet in 2015, revealed stunning individual differences in color perception. The aim of this study was to investigate if lay-persons believed that the question about The Dress colors was answerable. Past research has found that optimism is related to judgments of how answerable knowledge questions with controversial answers are (Karlsson et al., 2016). Furthermore, familiarity with a question can create a feeling of knowing the answer (Reder and Ritter, 1992). Building on these findings, 186 participants saw the photo of The Dress and were asked about the correct answer to the question about The Dress’ colors (“blue and black,” “white and gold,” “other, namely…,” or “there is no correct answer”). Choice of the alternative “there is no correct answer” was interpreted as believing the question was not answerable. This answer was chosen more often by optimists and by people who reported they had not seen The Dress before. We also found that among participants who had seen The Dress photo before, 19%, perceived The Dress as “white and gold” but believed that the correct answer was “blue and black.” This, in analogy to previous findings about non-believed memories (Scoboria and Pascal, 2016), shows that people sometimes do not believe the colors they have perceived are correct. Our results suggest that individual differences related to optimism and previous experience may contribute to if the judgment of the individual perception of a photograph is enough to serve as a decision basis for valid conclusions about colors. Further research about color judgments under ambiguous circumstances could benefit from separating individual perceptual experience from beliefs about the correct answer to the color question. Including the option “there is no correct answer” may also be beneficial.

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

Recollection, belief and metacognition: a reality check

Non-believed autobiographical memories [e.g. Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Nonbelieved memories. Psychological Science, 21, 1334-1340] are striking examples of divergences between recollective experiences and beliefs in their correspondence to real events. After reviewing a broader range of similar phenomena, I argue that recollection-belief divergences can arise from normal, "healthy" metacognitive monitoring and control processes that balance memory recollections and reality constraints. Such validating "reality checks" draw on general world knowledge and external/social information. Importantly, changes in (perceived) reality constraints can lead to changes in memory beliefs. More generally, both recollection and (external) reality are keys to the past. In many cases, more or less automatic (System 1-type) reliance on recollection is sufficient (or memory would be useless as a system), but sometimes more elaborate (System 2-type) reality checks are needed. I conclude with some ideas about memory-driven and reality-driven recollection-belief divergences.