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Redshaw J, Suddendorf T. Can chimpanzees conceive of mutually exclusive future possibilities? A Comment on: 'Chimpanzees prepare for alternative possible outcomes' (2023), by Engelmann et al.. Biol Lett 2024; 20:20230409. [PMID: 38923947 DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2023.0409] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2023] [Accepted: 01/16/2024] [Indexed: 06/28/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Redshaw
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland , Saint Lucia, Queensland 4067, Australia
| | - Thomas Suddendorf
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland , Saint Lucia, Queensland 4067, Australia
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2
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Subias L, Katsu N, Yamada K. Metacognition in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata): does impulsivity explain unnecessary looks in the tubes task? Anim Cogn 2024; 27:41. [PMID: 38805046 PMCID: PMC11133117 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-024-01879-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2024] [Revised: 05/14/2024] [Accepted: 05/17/2024] [Indexed: 05/29/2024]
Abstract
Potential metacognitive abilities, such as monitoring and controlling cognitive processes, have been revealed in some primate species. In the tubes task, apes and macaques showed higher content-checking behavior when unaware of a reward's location, but they also periodically inspected the tubes when aware, especially when a more appealing reward was involved. Some attribute this to the pleasure of looking at the reward. This study investigates whether the unnecessary tube-checking behavior observed in nine wild Japanese macaques, previously tested for metacognition using the tubes task, can be solely attributed to impulsivity. The macaques' propensity to look inside a single tube containing food they cannot immediately reach was measured and compared to their behavior in the tubes task. Results indicated that looking inside the baited tube increased as reward quality improved. However, macaques displaying unnecessary tube inspections in metacognitive tests showed less impulsivity to look. This intriguing result counters the notion that excessive looking in the tubes task is solely due to impulsive looking, prompting us to advocate for further research into the relationship between inhibition and metacognitive performance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lorraine Subias
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, Suita, Japan.
| | - Noriko Katsu
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, Suita, Japan
| | - Kazunori Yamada
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, Suita, Japan
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3
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Subias L, Katsu N, Yamada K. Metacognition in wild Japanese macaques: cost and stakes influencing information-seeking behavior. Anim Cogn 2024; 27:22. [PMID: 38441831 PMCID: PMC10914859 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-024-01851-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2023] [Revised: 10/20/2023] [Accepted: 10/25/2023] [Indexed: 03/07/2024]
Abstract
Metacognition allows us to evaluate memories and knowledge, thus enabling us to distinguish between what we know and what we do not. Studies have shown that species other than humans may possess similar abilities. However, the number of species tested was limited. Testing ten free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on a task in which they had to find food hidden inside one of the four opaque tubes, we investigated whether these subjects would seek information when needed. The monkeys could look inside the tubes before selecting one. We varied three parameters: the baiting process, the cost that monkeys had to pay to look inside the tubes, and the reward at stake. We assessed whether and how these parameters would affect the monkeys' tendency to look inside the tube before selecting one. When they were not shown which tube contained the reward, nine monkeys looked significantly more frequently in at least one condition. Half of them tended to reduce their looks when the cost was high, but only when they already knew the location of the reward. When a high-quality reward was at stake, four monkeys tended to look more inside the tubes, even though they already knew the reward's location. Our results are consistent with those of rhesus macaques, suggesting that metacognitive-like abilities may be shared by Cercopithecidae, and that, at least some monkeys may be aware of their lack of knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lorraine Subias
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan.
| | - Noriko Katsu
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
| | - Kazunori Yamada
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
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4
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Tomonaga M, Kurosawa Y, Kawaguchi Y, Takiyama H. Don't look back on failure: spontaneous uncertainty monitoring in chimpanzees. Learn Behav 2023; 51:402-412. [PMID: 36959388 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-023-00581-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 03/25/2023]
Abstract
During computer-controlled cognitive tasks, chimpanzees often look up at the food dispenser, which activates at the same time as feedback for the correct choice but not for feedback for the incorrect choice. Do these "looking back" behaviors also indicate signs of spontaneous monitoring of their confidence in their choices? To address this question, we delayed the feedback for 1 s after their choice responses and observed their look-back behaviors during the delay period. Two chimpanzees looked up at the food dispenser significantly less frequently when their choice was incorrect (but the feedback was not given) than when it was correct. These look-back behaviors have not been explicitly trained under experimental contexts. Therefore, these results indicate that chimpanzees spontaneously change the frequency of their look-back behaviors in response to the correctness or incorrectness of their own choices, even without external feedback, suggesting that their look-back behaviors may reflect the level of "confidence" or "uncertainty" of their responses immediately before.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Yuri Kawaguchi
- Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Vienna, Austria
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), Tokyo, Japan
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5
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Hernández-Pacheco R, Steiner UK, Rosati AG, Tuljapurkar S. Advancing methods for the biodemography of aging within social contexts. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 153:105400. [PMID: 37739326 PMCID: PMC10591901 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105400] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/23/2022] [Revised: 08/10/2023] [Accepted: 09/18/2023] [Indexed: 09/24/2023]
Abstract
Several social dimensions including social integration, status, early-life adversity, and their interactions across the life course can predict health, reproduction, and mortality in humans. Accordingly, the social environment plays a fundamental role in the emergence of phenotypes driving the evolution of aging. Recent work placing human social gradients on a biological continuum with other species provides a useful evolutionary context for aging questions, but there is still a need for a unified evolutionary framework linking health and aging within social contexts. Here, we summarize current challenges to understand the role of the social environment in human life courses. Next, we review recent advances in comparative biodemography and propose a biodemographic perspective to address socially driven health phenotype distributions and their evolutionary consequences using a nonhuman primate population. This new comparative approach uses evolutionary demography to address the joint dynamics of populations, social dimensions, phenotypes, and life history parameters. The long-term goal is to advance our understanding of the link between individual social environments, population-level outcomes, and the evolution of aging.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raisa Hernández-Pacheco
- Department of Biological Sciences, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 N Bellflower Blvd, Long Beach, CA 90840-0004, USA.
| | - Ulrich K Steiner
- Freie Universität Berlin, Biological Institute, Königin-Luise Str. 1-3, 14195 Berlin, Germany
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Departments of Psychology and Anthropology, University of Michigan, 530 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
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6
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Tomonaga M, Uwano-Ito Y, Saito T, Sakurai N. Left or right, that is the question: use of egocentric frame of reference and the right-eye advantage for understanding gestural signs in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus). Anim Cogn 2023; 26:1551-1569. [PMID: 37318674 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-023-01799-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2023] [Revised: 05/24/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
How do bottlenose dolphins visually perceive the space around them? In particular, what cues do they use as a frame of reference for left-right perception? To address this question, we examined the dolphin's responses to various manipulations of the spatial relationship between the dolphin and the trainer by using gestural signs for actions given by the trainer, which have different meanings in the left and right hands. When the dolphins were tested with their backs to the trainer (Experiment 1) or in an inverted position underwater (Experiments 2 and 3), correct responses from the trainer's perspective were maintained for signs related to movement direction instructions. In contrast, reversed responses were frequently observed for signs that required different sounds for the left and right hands. When the movement direction instructions were presented with symmetrical graphic signs such as " × " and "●", accuracy decreased in the inverted posture (Experiment 3). Furthermore, when the signs for sounds were presented from either the left or right side of the dolphin's body, performance was better when the side of the sign movement coincided with the body side on which it was presented than when it was mismatched (Experiment 4). In the final experiment, when one eye was covered with an eyecup, the results showed that, as in the case of body-side presentation, performance was better when the open eye coincided with the side on which the sign movement was presented. These results indicate that dolphins used the egocentric frame for visuospatial cognition. In addition, they showed better performances when the gestural signs were presented to the right eye, suggesting the possibility of a left-hemispheric advantage in the dolphin's visuospatial cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Masaki Tomonaga
- University of Human Environments, Matsuyama, Ehime, 790-0825, Japan.
- Japan Monkey Centre, Inuyama, Aichi, 484-0081, Japan.
| | - Yuka Uwano-Ito
- Port of Nagoya Public Aquarium, Nagoya, Aichi, 455-0033, Japan
| | - Toyoshi Saito
- Port of Nagoya Public Aquarium, Nagoya, Aichi, 455-0033, Japan
| | - Natsuko Sakurai
- Minamichita Beachland Aquarium, Mihama, Aichi, 470-3233, Japan
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7
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Gazes RP, Templer VL, Rodgers KC, Mickelberg JL, Stoinski TS. Information seeking in western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Learn Behav 2023; 51:59-72. [PMID: 36396931 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-022-00554-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Many animals will seek information when they do not know the answer to a problem, suggesting that they monitor their knowledge state. In the classic "tubes task," subjects are presented with a set of opaque tubes and either see (visible trials) or do not see (hidden trials) which tube holds a food reward on a given trial. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and human children show information-seeking behavior on this task, looking into the tubes to find the reward more on hidden than on visible trials. However, evidence for information-seeking behavior in gorillas is limited. In Experiment 1, gorillas that were presented with a classic information-seeking tubes task showed performance patterns consistent with metacognitive behavior; they looked down tubes more on hidden than on visible trials, their accuracy on hidden trials on which they looked was higher than on hidden trials on which they did not look, and they primarily employed an appropriate search strategy when looking down the tubes. In Experiment 2, we decreased or increased the amount of effort required to look down the tubes by increasing or decreasing the height of the tubes, respectively. Gorillas were less likely to look in tubes on trials that required high effort, but continued to look more on hidden than on visible trials, indicating that their tendency to look was affected by both knowledge state and effort. Together these results provide strong evidence for logical, controlled information-seeking behavior by gorillas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Regina Paxton Gazes
- Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA.
- Department of Psychology and Program in Animal Behavior, Bucknell University, 1 Dent Dr, Lewisburg, PA, 17837, USA.
| | | | | | | | - Tara S Stoinski
- Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA
- Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Redshaw J, Ganea PA. Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210333. [PMID: 36314156 PMCID: PMC9620743 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2022] [Accepted: 09/01/2022] [Indexed: 11/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Redshaw
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072, Australia
| | - Patricia A. Ganea
- Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada M5S 1V6
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9
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Baer C, Kidd C. Learning with certainty in childhood. Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:887-896. [PMID: 36085134 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.07.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2022] [Revised: 07/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/21/2022] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
Abstract
Learners use certainty to guide learning. They maintain existing beliefs when certain, but seek further information when they feel uninformed. Here, we review developmental evidence that this metacognitive strategy does not require reportable processing. Uncertainty prompts nonverbal human infants and nonhuman animals to engage in strategies like seeking help, searching for additional information, or opting out. Certainty directs children's attention and active learning strategies and provides a common metric for comparing and integrating conflicting beliefs across people. We conclude that certainty is a continuous, domain-general signal of belief quality even early in life.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carolyn Baer
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.
| | - Celeste Kidd
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
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10
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Cai Y, Jin Z, Zhai C, Wang H, Wang J, Tang Y, Kwok SC. Time-sensitive prefrontal involvement in associating confidence with task performance illustrates metacognitive introspection in monkeys. Commun Biol 2022; 5:799. [PMID: 35945257 PMCID: PMC9363445 DOI: 10.1038/s42003-022-03762-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one's own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d' computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yudian Cai
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China.,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China
| | - Zhiyong Jin
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China.,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China
| | - Chenxi Zhai
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China
| | - Huimin Wang
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,NYU-ECNU Institute of Brain and Cognitive Science at NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Shanghai Changning Mental Health Center, Shanghai, 200335, China
| | - Jijun Wang
- Brain Science and Technology Research Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200030, China.,CAS Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (CEBSIT), Chinese Academy of Science, Shanghai, 200031, China.,Shanghai Key Laboratory of Psychotic Disorders, Shanghai Mental Health Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200030, China
| | - Yingying Tang
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Psychotic Disorders, Shanghai Mental Health Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200030, China.
| | - Sze Chai Kwok
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China. .,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China. .,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China. .,Shanghai Changning Mental Health Center, Shanghai, 200335, China.
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11
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Carruthers P, Williams DM. Model-free metacognition. Cognition 2022; 225:105117. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2021] [Revised: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 03/31/2022] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
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12
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O'Madagain C, Helming KA, Schmidt MFH, Shupe E, Call J, Tomasello M. Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions. Proc Biol Sci 2022; 289:20212686. [PMID: 35317676 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2021.2686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cathal O'Madagain
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Collective Intelligence, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique, Ben Guérir, Morocco
| | - Katharina A Helming
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
| | - Marco F H Schmidt
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany
| | - Eli Shupe
- Department of Philosophy and the Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA
| | - Josep Call
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
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13
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Aguirre M, Brun M, Couderc A, Reboul A, Senez P, Mascaro O. Knowledge in Sight: Toddlers Plan Efficient Epistemic Actions by Anticipating Learning Gains. Cogn Sci 2022; 46:e13103. [PMID: 35122298 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13103] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2021] [Revised: 11/12/2021] [Accepted: 01/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Anticipating the learning consequences of actions is crucial to plan efficient information seeking. Such a capacity is needed for learners to determine which actions are most likely to result in learning. Here, we tested the early ontogeny of the human capacity to anticipate the amount of learning gained from seeing. In study 1, we tested infants' capacity to anticipate the availability of sight. Fourteen-month-old infants (N = 72) were invited to search for a toy hidden inside a container. The participants were faster to attempt at opening a shutter when this action allowed them to see inside the container. Moreover, this effect was specifically observed when seeing inside the container was potentially useful to the participants' goals. Thus, infants anticipated the availability of sight, and they calibrated their information-seeking behaviors accordingly. In studies 2 and 3, we tested toddlers' capacity to anticipate whether data would be cognitively useful for their goals. Two-and-a-half-year-olds (N = 72) had to locate a target character hidden among distractors. The participants flipped the characters more often, and were comparatively faster to initiate this action when it yielded access to visual data allowing them to locate the target. Thus, toddlers planned their information-seeking behaviors by anticipating the cognitive utility of sight. In contrast, toddlers did not calibrate their behaviors to the cognitive usefulness of auditory data. These results suggest that cognitive models of learning guide toddlers' search for information. The early developmental onset of the capacity to anticipate future learning gains is crucial for active learning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marie Aguirre
- Université de Paris, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center
| | - Mélanie Brun
- Université de Paris, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center
| | - Auriane Couderc
- Université de Paris, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center
| | - Anne Reboul
- Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology, UMR 7290, CNRS and Aix-Marseille University
| | - Philomène Senez
- Université de Paris, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center
| | - Olivier Mascaro
- Université de Paris, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center
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14
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Zoh Y, Chang SWC, Crockett MJ. The prefrontal cortex and (uniquely) human cooperation: a comparative perspective. Neuropsychopharmacology 2022; 47:119-133. [PMID: 34413478 PMCID: PMC8617274 DOI: 10.1038/s41386-021-01092-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2021] [Revised: 06/03/2021] [Accepted: 06/24/2021] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
Humans have an exceptional ability to cooperate relative to many other species. We review the neural mechanisms supporting human cooperation, focusing on the prefrontal cortex. One key feature of human social life is the prevalence of cooperative norms that guide social behavior and prescribe punishment for noncompliance. Taking a comparative approach, we consider shared and unique aspects of cooperative behaviors in humans relative to nonhuman primates, as well as divergences in brain structure that might support uniquely human aspects of cooperation. We highlight a medial prefrontal network common to nonhuman primates and humans supporting a foundational process in cooperative decision-making: valuing outcomes for oneself and others. This medial prefrontal network interacts with lateral prefrontal areas that are thought to represent cooperative norms and modulate value representations to guide behavior appropriate to the local social context. Finally, we propose that more recently evolved anterior regions of prefrontal cortex play a role in arbitrating between cooperative norms across social contexts, and suggest how future research might fruitfully examine the neural basis of norm arbitration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yoonseo Zoh
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
| | - Steve W. C. Chang
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
| | - Molly J. Crockett
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
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15
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Lage CA, Wolmarans DW, Mograbi DC. An evolutionary view of self-awareness. Behav Processes 2021; 194:104543. [PMID: 34800608 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2021.104543] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2021] [Revised: 10/28/2021] [Accepted: 11/11/2021] [Indexed: 12/28/2022]
Abstract
The capacity to be self-aware is regarded as a fundamental difference between humans and other species. However, growing evidence challenges this notion, indicating that many animals show complex signs and behaviors that are consonant with self-awareness. In this review, we suggest that many animals are indeed self-aware, but that the complexity of this process differs among species. We discuss this topic by addressing several different questions regarding self-awareness: what is self-awareness, how has self-awareness been studied experimentally, which species may be self-aware, what are its potential adaptive advantages. We conclude by proposing alternative models for the emergence of self-awareness in relation to species evolutionary paths, indicating future research questions to advance this field further.
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Affiliation(s)
- Caio A Lage
- Department of Psychology, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Brazil; University of Perugia, Italy
| | - De Wet Wolmarans
- Centre of Excellence for Pharmaceutical Sciences, Department of Pharmacology, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa
| | - Daniel C Mograbi
- Department of Psychology, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Brazil; Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King's College London, United Kingdom.
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16
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Allritz M, McEwen ES, Call J. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show subtle signs of uncertainty when choices are more difficult. Cognition 2021; 214:104766. [PMID: 34051422 PMCID: PMC8346948 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2020] [Revised: 05/04/2021] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Humans can tell when they find a task difficult. Subtle uncertainty behaviors like changes in motor speed and muscle tension precede and affect these experiences. Theories of animal metacognition likewise stress the importance of endogenous signals of uncertainty as cues that motivate metacognitive behaviors. However, while researchers have investigated second-order behaviors like information seeking and declining difficult trials in nonhuman animals, they have devoted little attention to the behaviors that express the cognitive conflict that gives rise to such behaviors in the first place. Here we explored whether three chimpanzees would, like humans, show hand wavering more when faced with more difficult choices in a touch screen transitive inference task. While accuracy was very high across all conditions, all chimpanzees wavered more frequently in trials that were objectively more difficult, demonstrating a signature behavior which accompanies experiences of difficulty in humans. This lends plausibility to the idea that feelings of uncertainty, like other emotions, can be studied in nonhuman animals. We propose to routinely assess uncertainty behaviors to inform models of procedural metacognition in nonhuman animals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Allritz
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany.
| | - Emma Suvi McEwen
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
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17
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Disentangling perceptual awareness from nonconscious processing in rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta). Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:2017543118. [PMID: 33785543 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2017543118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.
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18
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Brady RJ, Hampton RR. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) monitor evolving decisions to control adaptive information seeking. Anim Cogn 2021; 24:777-785. [PMID: 33474674 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-021-01477-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2020] [Revised: 01/06/2021] [Accepted: 01/11/2021] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Adaptive decision making in humans depends on feedback between monitoring, which assesses mental states, and control, by which cognitive processes are modified. We investigated the extent to which monitoring and control interact iteratively in monkeys. Monkeys classified images as birds, fish, flowers, or people. At the beginning of each trial, to-be-classified images were not visible. Monkeys touched the image area to incrementally brighten the image, referred to as the brighten response. The amount by which brightness increased with each brighten response was unpredictable, and the monkeys could choose to classify the images at any time during a trial. We hypothesized that if monkeys monitored the status of their classification decision then they would seek information depending on the amount of information available. In Experiment 1, monkeys rarely used the brighten response when images were bright initially, and they used the brighten response more when earlier uses in a given trial yielded smaller amounts of information. In Experiment 2, monkeys made more brighten responses when the presented image did not belong in any of the trained categories, suggesting monkeys were sensitive to the fact that they could not reach a classification decision despite the image brightening. In Experiment 3, we found that the probability that monkeys used the brighten response correlated with their ability to correctly classify when the brighten response was not available. These findings add to the literature documenting the metacognitive skills of nonhuman primates by demonstrating an iterative feedback loop between cognitive monitoring and cognitive control that allows for adaptive information-seeking behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan J Brady
- Emory University, Atlanta, USA. .,Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Atlanta, USA.
| | - Robert R Hampton
- Emory University, Atlanta, USA.,Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Atlanta, USA
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19
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Bliss-Moreau E, Rudebeck PH. Animal models of human mood. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 120:574-582. [PMID: 33007355 PMCID: PMC10474843 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.06.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2019] [Revised: 06/16/2020] [Accepted: 06/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Humans' everyday experience of the world is influenced by our moods. Moods are consciously accessible affective states that extend over time that are characterized by their valence and arousal. They also likely have a long evolutionary heritage and serve as an important adaptive affective mechanism. When they become maladaptive or overly biased, pathological affective states such as depression can emerge. Despite the importance of moods for human experience, little is known about their causal neurobiological mechanisms. In humans, limitations related to methods and interpretations of the data prevent causal investigations into the origins of mood, highlighting the importance of animal models. Nonhuman primates that share key neuroanatomical, affective, and social features with humans will be essential to uncovering their foundation. Identifying and validating mood-like states in animals is, however, challenging not least because mood is a human construct requiring verbal communication. Here we outline a theoretical framework for animal models of human mood, drawing upon established psychological literature where it exists before reviewing the extant studies of non-human primate models of mood-like states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eliza Bliss-Moreau
- Department of Psychology, California National Primate Research Center, University of California, Davis, CA, 95616, USA.
| | - Peter H Rudebeck
- Nash Family Department of Neuroscience and Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, One Gustave L. Levy Place, New York, NY, 10029, USA.
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20
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Porot N, Mandelbaum E. The science of belief: A progress report. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2020; 12:e1539. [PMID: 32627423 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1539] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2019] [Revised: 04/30/2020] [Accepted: 05/24/2020] [Indexed: 01/19/2023]
Abstract
The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our understanding of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicolas Porot
- Philosophy, The Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
| | - Eric Mandelbaum
- Baruch College, The Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, New York, USA
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21
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Bettle R, Rosati AG. The evolutionary origins of natural pedagogy: Rhesus monkeys show sustained attention following nonsocial cues versus social communicative signals. Dev Sci 2020; 24:e12987. [PMID: 32412163 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12987] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2019] [Revised: 04/09/2020] [Accepted: 05/05/2020] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
Abstract
The natural pedagogy hypothesis proposes that human infants preferentially attend to communicative signals from others, facilitating rapid cultural learning. In this view, sensitivity to such signals is a uniquely human adaptation and as such nonhuman animals should not produce or utilize these communicative signals. We test these evolutionary predictions by examining sensitivity to communicative cues in 206 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) using an expectancy looking time task modeled on prior work with infants. Monkeys observed a human actor who either made eye contact and vocalized to the monkey (social cue), or waved a fruit in front of her face and produced a tapping sound (nonsocial cue). The actor then either looked at an object (referential look) or looked toward empty space (look away). We found that, unlike human infants in analogous situations, rhesus monkeys looked longer at events following nonsocial cues, regardless of the demonstrator's subsequent looking behavior. Moreover younger and older monkeys showed similar patterns of responses across development. These results provide support for the natural pedagogy hypothesis, while also highlighting evolutionary changes in human sensitivity to communicative signals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rosemary Bettle
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.,Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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22
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Hampton RR, Engelberg JWM, Brady RJ. Explicit memory and cognition in monkeys. Neuropsychologia 2020; 138:107326. [PMID: 31917205 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107326] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2019] [Revised: 12/16/2019] [Accepted: 12/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Taxonomies of human memory, influenced heavily by Endel Tulving, make a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Humans are aware of explicit memories, whereas implicit memories control behavior even though we are not aware of them. Efforts to understand the evolution of memory, and to use nonhuman animals to model human memory, will be facilitated by better understanding the extent to which this critical distinction exists in nonhuman animals. Work with metacognition paradigms in the past 20 years has produced a strong case for the existence of explicit memory in nonhuman primates and possibly other nonhuman animals. Clear dissociations of explicit and implicit memory by metacognition have yet to be demonstrated in nonhumans, although dissociations between memory systems by other behavioral techniques, and by brain manipulations, suggest that the explicit-implicit distinction applies to nonhumans. Neurobehavioral studies of metamemory are beginning to identify neural substrates for memory monitoring in the frontal cortex of monkeys. We have strong evidence that at least some memory systems are explicit in rhesus monkeys, but we need to learn more about the distribution of explicit processes across cognitive systems within monkeys, and across species.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Jonathan W M Engelberg
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Ryan J Brady
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
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23
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Bettle R, Rosati AG. Flexible gaze-following in rhesus monkeys. Anim Cogn 2019; 22:673-686. [PMID: 31098850 PMCID: PMC6937777 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-019-01263-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2018] [Revised: 04/18/2019] [Accepted: 04/29/2019] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Humans are characterized by complex social cognitive abilities that emerge early in development. Comparative studies of nonhuman primates can illuminate the evolutionary history of these social capacities. We examined the cognitive skills that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) use to follow gaze, a foundational skill in human social development. While rhesus monkeys can make inferences about others' gaze when competing, it is unclear how they think about gaze information in other contexts. In study 1, monkeys (n = 64) observed a demonstrator look upwards either in a barrier condition where a box was overhead, so that monkeys could not see the target of her gaze, or a no barrier condition where nothing blocked her view. In study 2, monkeys (n = 59) could approach to observe the target of the demonstrator's gaze when the demonstrator looked behind a barrier on the ground or, in the no barrier condition, behind a window frame in the same location. Monkeys were more likely to directly look up in study 1 if they could initially see the location where the demonstrator was looking, but they did not preferentially reorient their bodies to observe the out-of-view location when they could not see that location. In study 2, monkeys did preferentially reorient, but at low rates. This indicates that rhesus monkeys can use social cognitive processes outside of competitive contexts to model what others can or cannot see, but may not be especially motivated to see what others look at in non-competitive contexts, as they reorient infrequently or in an inconsistent fashion. These similarities and differences between gaze-following in monkeys and children can help to illuminate the evolution of human social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rosemary Bettle
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA.
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA
- Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA
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24
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Abstract
Humans can use an intuitive sense of statistics to make predictions about uncertain future events, a cognitive skill that underpins logical and mathematical reasoning. Recent research shows that some of these abilities for statistical inferences can emerge in preverbal infants and non-human primates such as apes and capuchins. An important question is therefore whether animals share the full complement of intuitive reasoning abilities demonstrated by humans, as well as what evolutionary contexts promote the emergence of such skills. Here, we examined whether free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) can use probability information to infer the most likely outcome of a random lottery, in the first test of whether primates can make such inferences in the absence of direct prior experience. We developed a novel expectancy-violation looking time task, adapted from prior studies of infants, in order to assess the monkeys' expectations. In Study 1, we confirmed that monkeys (n = 20) looked similarly at different sampled items if they had no prior knowledge about the population they were drawn from. In Study 2, monkeys (n = 80) saw a dynamic 'lottery' machine containing a mix of two types of fruit outcomes, and then saw either the more common fruit (expected trial) or the relatively rare fruit (unexpected trial) fall from the machine. We found that monkeys looked longer when they witnessed the unexpected outcome. In Study 3, we confirmed that this effect depended on the causal relationship between the sample and the population, not visual mismatch: monkeys (n = 80) looked equally at both outcomes if the experimenter pulled the sampled item from her pocket. These results reveal that rhesus monkeys spontaneously use information about probability to reason about likely outcomes, and show how comparative studies of nonhumans can disentangle the evolutionary history of logical reasoning capacities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesca De Petrillo
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA.,Institute for Advance Study in Toulouse, Manufacture des Tabacs, 21, Allée de Brienne, 31015 Toulouse, France
| | - Alexandra G Rosati
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA.,Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan
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25
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Abstract
In the current study, we investigated the question of whether dogs were sensitive to the information that they themselves had or had not acquired. For this purpose, we conducted three consecutive experiments in which dogs had to find a reward that was hidden behind one of two V-shaped fences with a gap at the point of the V. This setup allowed us to distinguish between selecting one of the fences by walking around it and seeking additional information by checking through the gap in the fence. We varied whether dogs had visual access to the baiting procedure or not. In addition, we manipulated the type and quality of reward as well as the time delay between baiting and choosing to analyze if the dogs' searching behavior was affected. Our results were partly consistent with the findings of Call (Animal Cognition, 13 (5), 689-700, 2010) with great apes, on whose findings we based our experiments. We found that dogs checked more often through the corner of the V-shaped fence when they had not seen where the reward was hidden. Interestingly, dogs rewarded with toys selected the correct fence more often than dogs rewarded with food. Even though dogs' performance was not affected by the food quality condition, dogs were significantly faster in fetching a high-quality food reward as opposed to a low-quality food reward. When testing whether forgetting and checking would increase as a function of delay, we found that although dogs slightly decreased in their success in finding the food when time delays were longer, they were not more likely to check before choosing. We show that - similar to apes - dogs seek additional information in uncertain situations, but their behavior in uncertain situations is less flexible compared to great apes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julia Belger
- Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Department of Linguistic and Cultural Evolution, Dogstudies, Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745, Jena, Germany.
- Department for General Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany.
| | - Juliane Bräuer
- Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Department of Linguistic and Cultural Evolution, Dogstudies, Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745, Jena, Germany
- Department for General Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany
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26
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Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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27
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28
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Ferrigno S, Kornell N, Cantlon JF. A metacognitive illusion in monkeys. Proc Biol Sci 2017; 284:20171541. [PMID: 28878068 PMCID: PMC5597844 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2017.1541] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2017] [Accepted: 07/31/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Like humans, monkeys can make accurate judgements about their own memory by reporting their confidence during cognitive tasks. Some have suggested that animals use associative learning to make accurate confidence judgements, while others have suggested animals directly access and estimate the strength of their memories. Here we test a third, non-exclusive possibility: perhaps monkeys, like humans, base metacognitive inferences on heuristic cues. Humans are known to use cues like perceptual fluency (e.g. how easy something is to see) when making metacognitive judgements. We tested monkeys using a match-to-sample task in which the perceptual fluency of the stimuli was manipulated. The monkeys made confidence wagers on their accuracy before or after each trial. We found that monkeys' wagers were affected by perceptual fluency even when their accuracy was not. This is novel evidence that animals are susceptible to metacognitive illusions similar to those experienced by humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen Ferrigno
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
| | - Nate Kornell
- Department of Psychology, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, USA
| | - Jessica F Cantlon
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
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29
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Bohn M, Allritz M, Call J, Völter CJ. Information seeking about tool properties in great apes. Sci Rep 2017; 7:10923. [PMID: 28883523 PMCID: PMC5589724 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-11400-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2017] [Accepted: 08/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Evidence suggests that great apes engage in metacognitive information seeking for food items. To support the claim that a domain-general cognitive process underlies ape metacognition one needs to show that selective information seeking extends to non-food items. In this study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo abelii) either had to determine the location of a desired food item or a property of a non-food item (length of a tool). We manipulated whether subjects received prior information about the item's location or property. During the test, subjects had the opportunity to seek the respective information. Results show that apes engaged in more information seeking when they had no prior knowledge. Importantly, this selective pattern of information seeking applied to food as well as to tools.
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Affiliation(s)
- Manuel Bohn
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany.
| | - Matthias Allritz
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, UK
| | - Josep Call
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, UK
| | - Christoph J Völter
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, UK
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30
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Templer VL, Lee KA, Preston AJ. Rats know when they remember: transfer of metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests. Anim Cogn 2017; 20:891-906. [PMID: 28669115 PMCID: PMC5709207 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1109-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2016] [Revised: 06/15/2017] [Accepted: 06/23/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Metamemory entails cognitively assessing the strength of one's memories. We tested the ability of nine Long-Evans rats to distinguish between remembering and forgetting by presenting a decline option that allowed a four-choice odor-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) tests to be by-passed. Rats performed significantly better on tests they chose to take than on tests they were forced to take, indicating metacognitive responding. However, rather than control by internal mnemonic cues, one alternative explanation is that decline use is based on external test-specific cues that become associated with increased rewards overtime. To examine this possibility, we tested rats on three generalization tests in which external contingencies were inconsistent and therefore could not serve as discriminative cues. Rats transferred adaptive use of the decline response in tests that eliminated memory by presenting no sample, increased memory by presenting multiple samples, and both weakened and strengthened memory by varying the retention interval. Further, subjects chose to take or decline the test before encountering the memory test, providing evidence that rats based their metacognitive responding on internal cues rather than external ones. To our knowledge, this is the first robust evidence for metamemory in rats using the DMTS decline-test paradigm in which several possible sources of external stimulus control can be ruled out.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA.
| | - Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
| | - Aidan J Preston
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
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31
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Language Evolution: A Changing Perspective. Trends Cogn Sci 2017; 21:229-236. [PMID: 28214132 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2016] [Revised: 01/23/2017] [Accepted: 01/26/2017] [Indexed: 02/04/2023]
Abstract
From ancient times, religion and philosophy have regarded language as a faculty bestowed uniquely and suddenly on our own species, primarily as a mode of thought with communication as a byproduct. This view persists among some scientists and linguists and is counter to the theory of evolution, which implies that the evolution of complex structures is incremental. I argue here that language derives from mental processes with gradual evolutionary trajectories, including the generative capacities to travel mentally in time and space and into the minds of others. What may be distinctive in humans is the means to communicate these mental experiences along with knowledge gained from them.
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32
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The evolution of analytic thought? Behav Brain Sci 2017; 40:e215. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x16001746] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractWe argue that the truly unique aspect of human intelligence is not the variety of cognitive skills that are ontogenetically constructed, but rather the capacity to decide when to develop and apply said skills. Even if there is good evidence for g in nonhuman animals, we are left with major questions about how the disposition to think analytically can evolve.
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Snow PJ. The Structural and Functional Organization of Cognition. Front Hum Neurosci 2016; 10:501. [PMID: 27799901 PMCID: PMC5065967 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00501] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2016] [Accepted: 09/22/2016] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This article proposes that what have been historically and contemporarily defined as different domains of human cognition are served by one of four functionally- and structurally-distinct areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Their contributions to human intelligence are as follows: (a) BA9, enables our emotional intelligence, engaging the psychosocial domain; (b) BA47, enables our practical intelligence, engaging the material domain; (c) BA46 (or BA46-9/46), enables our abstract intelligence, engaging the hypothetical domain; and (d) BA10, enables our temporal intelligence, engaging in planning within any of the other three domains. Given their unique contribution to human cognition, it is proposed that these areas be called the, social (BA9), material (BA47), abstract (BA46-9/46) and temporal (BA10) mind. The evidence that BA47 participates strongly in verbal and gestural communication suggests that language evolved primarily as a consequence of the extreme selective pressure for practicality; an observation supported by the functional connectivity between BA47 and orbital areas that negatively reinforce lying. It is further proposed that the abstract mind (BA46-9/46) is the primary seat of metacognition charged with creating adaptive behavioral strategies by generating higher-order concepts (hypotheses) from lower-order concepts originating from the other three domains of cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter J Snow
- School of Medical Science, Griffith University Gold Coast, QLD, Australia
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