The existence of manual mode increases human blame for AI mistakes

People are offloading many tasks to artificial intelligence (AI)-including driving, investing decisions, and medical choices-but it is human nature to want to maintain ultimate control. So even when using autonomous machines, people want a "manual mode", an option that shifts control back to themselves. Unfortunately, the mere existence of manual mode leads to more human blame when AI makes mistakes. When observers know that a human agent theoretically had the option to take control, the humans are assigned more responsibility, even when agents lack the time or ability to actually exert control, as with self-driving car crashes. Four experiments reveal that though people prefer having a manual mode, even if the AI mode is more efficient and adding the manual mode is more expensive (Study 1), the existence of a manual mode increases human blame (Studies 2a-3c). We examine two mediators for this effect: increased perceptions of causation and counterfactual cognition (Study 4). The results suggest that the human thirst for illusory control comes with real costs. Implications of AI decision-making are discussed.

Observers' motivated sensitivity to stigmatized actors' intent

Does a harmful act appear more intentional-and worthy of opprobrium-if it was committed by a member of a stigmatized group? In two studies (N = 1,451), participants read scenarios in which an actor caused a homicide. We orthogonally manipulated the relative presence or absence of distal intent (a focus on the end) and proximal intent (a focus on the means) in the actor's mind. We also varied the actor's racial (Study 1) or political (Study 2) group. In both studies, participants judged the stigmatized actor more harshly than the non-stigmatized actor when the actor's level of intent was ambiguous (i.e., one form of intent was high and the other form of intent was low). These data suggest that observers apply a sliding threshold when judging an actor's intent and moral responsibility; whereas less-stigmatized actors elicit condemnation only when they cause the outcome with both types of intent in mind, more-stigmatized actors elicit condemnation when only one type, or even neither type (Study 2) of intent is in their mind. We discuss how these results enrich the literature on lay theories of intentionality.

The origins of moral sensitivities: Probing infants' expectations, evaluations, generalization, and enforcement of moral norms

Identifying the origins of moral sensitivities, and their elaboration, within infancy and early childhood is a challenging task, given inherent limitations in infants' behavior. Here, I argue for a multi-pronged, multi-method approach that involves cleaving the moral response at its joints. Specifically, I chart the emergence of infants' moral expectations, evaluations, generalization and enforcement, demonstrating that while many moral sensitivities are present in the second year of life, these sensitivities are closely aligned with, and likely driven by, infants' everyday experience. Moreover, qualitative differences exist between the moral responses that are present in infancy and those of later childhood, particularly in terms of enforcement (i.e., a lack of punishment in infancy). These findings set the stage for addressing outstanding critical questions regarding moral development, that include identifying discrete causal inputs to early moral cognition, identifying whether moral cognition is distinct from social cognition early in life, and explaining gaps that exist between moral cognition and moral behavior in development.

The Role of Moral Foundations in Support for Sex Work Decriminalization by Venue

The criminal status of prostitution has received greater attention from policymakers and advocates in recent years, but systematic policy change has yet to take root in the United States. These efforts have been both motivated and challenged by a strong moral discourse, resulting in policies that are more reflective of ideology than efficacy. While the popularization of sex work through online avenues like social media has altered the traditional concept of sex work, there is an incomplete understanding of public attitudes toward decriminalization in this modern market. Using national data from 519 U.S. adults, the present study applied Moral Foundations Theory to investigate support for sex work decriminalization in three venues (brothel, online, street). Overall, results show lower support for decriminalization of street sex work compared to brothel and online sex work, and that the effects of moral foundations on support for decriminalization are consistent across all venues. Individualizing foundations (i.e. harm, fairness) do not predict support for decriminalization, while binding and liberty foundations explain some variation in support. Implications of the findings speak to the potential barriers to criminal justice reform in this area and the role of moral arguments in this dispute.

Anecdotes impact medical decisions even when presented with statistical information or decision aids

People are inundated with popular press reports about medical research concerning what is healthy, get advice from doctors, and hear personal anecdotes. How do people integrate conflicting anecdotal and statistical information when making medical decisions? In four experiments (N = 4126), we tested how people use conflicting information to judge the efficacy of artificial and real medical treatments. Participants read an anecdote from someone in a clinical trial, or who had undergone a medical treatment previously, for whom the medical treatment was ineffective. We found that reading anecdotes for either artificial or real medical treatments shifted participants' beliefs about the efficacy of a medical treatment. We observed this result even when the anecdote was uninformative, was paired with an icon array, or when participants were provided with thorough medical decision aids about reproductive health procedures. Our findings highlight the pervasive effect of anecdotes on medical decision making.

Adults Show Positive Moral Evaluations of Curiosity About Religion

Four experiments investigated the perceived virtue of curiosity about religion. Adults from the United States made moral judgments regarding targets who exhibited curiosity, possessed relevant knowledge, or lacked both curiosity and knowledge about religion and comparison topics (e.g., science). Participants attributed greater moral goodness to targets who displayed curiosity compared with targets who were ignorant or knowledgeable about the domain. This preference was consistent across Jewish, Protestant, Catholic, and other Christian participants but was absent when atheists evaluated religious curiosity. Perceptions of effort partially mediated judgments: Participants viewed curious characters as exerting more effort and consequently rated them as more moral. To test causality, we manipulated perceptions of effort and showed that participants viewed curious characters who exerted effort as particularly moral. This work fosters novel insights into the perceived virtue of curiosity and further illuminates similarities and differences between religious and scientific cognition.

Moral trade-offs reveal foundational representations that predict unique variance in political attitudes

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in moral judgements on the basis of multiple innate, intuitive foundations and has been subject to criticism over recent years. Prior research has tended to rely on explicit self-report in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, we seek to capture intuitive choices between foundations in a novel task - the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT). Across four studies, responses on this task reflect foundations measured by the MFQ (study 1), are not altered under cognitive load or reduced cognitive control (studies 2a and 2b); and explain unique variance in political orientation and related constructs (study 3). Furthermore, using responses and response times generated on the MFCT, we present a computationally explicit model of foundation-related intuitive judgements and show that these patterns are consistent with the theoretical claims of MFT. These findings show that the MFCT outperforms the MFQ and can contribute to the understanding of moral value conflicts, furthering debate on the nature of moral values.

Children's moral evaluations of and behaviors toward people who are curious about religion and science

Although children exhibit curiosity regarding science, questions remain regarding how children evaluate others' curiosity and whether evaluations differ across domains that prioritize faith (e.g., religion) versus those that value questioning (e.g., science). In Study 1 (n = 115 5- to 8-year-olds; 49% female; 66% White), children evaluated actors who were curious, ignorant and non-curious, or knowledgeable about religion or science; curiosity elicited relatively favorable moral evaluations (ds > .40). Study 2 (n = 62 7- to 8-year-olds; 48% female; 63% White) found that these evaluations generalized to behaviors, as children acted more pro-socially and less punitively toward curious, versus not curious, individuals (η p 2  = .37). These findings (data collected 2020-2022) demonstrate children's positive moral evaluations of curiosity and contribute to debates regarding overlap between scientific and religious cognition.

Unraveling Image and Justice Concerns: A Social Identity Account on Appraisals and Emotional Drivers of High-Status Transgressor Group Members' Solidarity With Low-Status Groups

High-status group members typically respond defensively when their ingroup members transgress against low-status groups. However, when they identify highly with transgressor groups, they sometimes also engage in solidarity with victimized low-status groups due to ingroup-focused motives. Yet, the response of low-identified transgressor group members, who can prioritize victims' plight over ingroup interests, remains underexplored. To address this gap, we conducted three preregistered studies (Ntotal = 886) concerning education-based transgressions in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, employing cross-sectional (Study 1) and experimental designs (Studies 2-3). Supporting previous research, we found that high-identifiers engage in nonradical solidarity driven by ingroup image concerns and image-related emotions. Low-identifiers, however, engage in both nonradical and radical solidarity through perceived injustice and justice-related emotions. Our findings provide insights into the roots of high-status group collective action on behalf of low-status groups against intergroup transgressions. Theoretical and societal implications were discussed.

Morality in the anthropocene: The perversion of compassion and punishment in the online world

Although much of human morality evolved in an environment of small group living, almost 6 billion people use the internet in the modern era. We argue that the technological transformation has created an entirely new ecosystem that is often mismatched with our evolved adaptations for social living. We discuss how evolved responses to moral transgressions, such as compassion for victims of transgressions and punishment of transgressors, are disrupted by two main features of the online context. First, the scale of the internet exposes us to an unnaturally large quantity of extreme moral content, causing compassion fatigue and increasing public shaming. Second, the physical and psychological distance between moral actors online can lead to ineffective collective action and virtue signaling. We discuss practical implications of these mismatches and suggest directions for future research on morality in the internet era.

Ethical Dilemmas and Countertransference in Legally Mandated Reporting of Fatal Child Neglect

In the fall of 2019, a much-publicized court case brought to national attention the issues of patient-doctor confidentiality when it comes to reporting the deaths of newborns in the United States. It is unclear whether the recent overturning of Roe v. Wade will lead to more cases like this. This article discusses issues of countertransference, as well as the ethical and legal implications were it to be a psychiatrist, in active treatment of such a patient, who would be required to make such a report. More specifically, as in the publicized court case, the patient could be a minor at the time, receiving treatment from a child psychiatrist. The implications of such a case include how countertransference affects the perception of fatal child neglect compared to intentional neonaticide; the ethical dilemma of generating a mandated report with the goal of child safety when such a report could lead to real legal consequences for a minor child; and considerations regarding continued treatment of a patient after such a report is made. It is likely that countertransference, shaped by attitudes toward mothers and idealized views on mothering, may play a large role in all these circumstances.

Perception of experience influences altruism and perception of agency influences trust in human-machine interactions

As robots become increasingly integrated into social economic interactions, it becomes crucial to understand how people perceive a robot's mind. It has been argued that minds are perceived along two dimensions: experience, i.e., the ability to feel, and agency, i.e., the ability to act and take responsibility for one's actions. However, the influence of these perceived dimensions on human-machine interactions, particularly those involving altruism and trust, remains unknown. We hypothesize that the perception of experience influences altruism, while the perception of agency influences trust. To test these hypotheses, we pair participants with bot partners in a dictator game (to measure altruism) and a trust game (to measure trust) while varying the bots' perceived experience and agency, either by manipulating the degree to which the bot resembles humans, or by manipulating the description of the bots' ability to feel and exercise self-control. The results demonstrate that the money transferred in the dictator game is influenced by the perceived experience, while the money transferred in the trust game is influenced by the perceived agency, thereby confirming our hypotheses. More broadly, our findings support the specificity of the mind hypothesis: Perceptions of different dimensions of the mind lead to different kinds of social behavior.

Unequal by malice, protesters by outrage: Agent perceptions drive moralization of, and collective action against, inequality

Economic inequality does not encounter strong protests even though individuals are generally against it. One potential explanation of this paradox is that individuals do not perceive inequality as caused by intentional agents, which, in line with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018), should prevent its assessment as immoral and consequently dampen moral outrage and collective action. Across three studies, we test and confirm this hypothesis. In Studies 1 (N = 395) and 2 (N = 337), the more participants believed that inequality is human driven and caused by intentional agents, the more they moralized inequality, felt outraged and wanted to engage in collective action. This was confirmed in Study 3 (N = 243) through an experimental design. Thus, our research shows that agent perception is crucial in the moralization of economic inequality and, more broadly, that morality can be a powerful motivator and effectively mobilize people to action.

The effect of cognitive load, ego depletion, induction and time restriction on moral judgments about sacrificial dilemmas: a meta-analysis

Greene's influential dual-process model of moral cognition (mDPM) proposes that when people engage in Type 2 processing, they tend to make consequentialist moral judgments. One important source of empirical support for this claim comes from studies that ask participants to make moral judgments while experimentally manipulating Type 2 processing. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the published psychological literature on the effect of four standard cognitive-processing manipulations (cognitive load; ego depletion; induction; time restriction) on moral judgments about sacrificial moral dilemmas [n = 44; k = 68; total N = 14, 003; M(N) = 194.5]. The overall pooled effect was in the direction predicted by the mDPM, but did not reach statistical significance. Restricting the dataset to effect sizes from (high-conflict) personal sacrificial dilemmas (a type of sacrificial dilemma that is often argued to be best suited for tests of the mDPM) also did not yield a significant pooled effect. The same was true for a meta-analysis of the subset of studies that allowed for analysis using the process dissociation approach [n = 8; k = 12; total N = 2, 577; M(N) = 214.8]. I argue that these results undermine one important line of evidence for the mDPM and discuss a series of potential objections against this conclusion.

The Intergroup Value Protection Model: A Theoretically Integrative and Dynamic Approach to Intergroup Conflict Escalation in Democratic Societies

SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACT

We review social-psychological evidence for a theoretically integrative and dynamic model of intergroup conflict escalation within democratic societies. Viewing individuals as social regulators who protect their social embeddedness (e.g., in their group or in society), the intergroup value protection model (IVPM) integrates key insights and concepts from moral and group psychology (e.g., group identification, outrage, moralization, protest) into a functional intergroup value protection process. The model assumes that social regulators are continuously looking for information diagnostic of the outgroup's intentions to terminate the relationship with the ingroup, and that their specific cognitive interpretations of an outgroup's action (i.e., as a violation of ingroup or shared values) trigger this process. The visible value-protective responses of one group can trigger the other group's value-protective responses, thus dynamically increasing chances of conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications of integrating moral and group psychology and practical challenges for managing intergroup conflict within democratic societies.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

The 2021 Capitol Hill attack exemplifies a major "trigger event" for different groups to protect their values within a democratic society. Which specific perceptions generate such a triggering event, which value-protective responses does it trigger, and do such responses escalate intergroup conflict? We offer the intergroup value protection model to analyze the moral and group psychology of intergroup conflict escalation in democratic societies. It predicts that when group members cognitively interpret another group's actions as violating ingroup or shared values, this triggers the intergroup value protection process (e.g., increased ingroup identification, outrage, moralization, social protest). When such value-protective responses are visible to the outgroup, this can in turn constitute a trigger event for them to protect their values, thus increasing chances of intergroup conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications and practical challenges for managing intergroup value conflict in democratic societies, including fears of societal breakdown and scope for social change.

Ethical judgments of poverty depictions in the context of charity advertising

Aid organizations, activists, and the media often use graphic depictions of human suffering to elicit sympathy and aid. While effective, critics have condemned these practices as exploitative, objectifying, and deceptive, ultimately labeling them 'poverty porn.' This paper examines people's ethical judgments of portrayals of poverty and the criticisms surrounding them, focusing on the context of charity advertising. In Studies 1 and 2, we find that tactics that have been decried as deceptive (i.e., using an actor or staging a photograph) are judged to be less acceptable than those that have been decried as exploitative and objectifying (i.e., depicting an aid recipient's worst moments). This pattern occurs both when evaluating the tactics themselves (Studies 1a-1c) and when directly evaluating critics' arguments about them (Study 2). Studies 3 and 4 unpack the objection to deceptive tactics and find that participants' chief concern is not about manipulating the audience's responses or about distorting perceptions of reality. Participants report less concern about non-deceptive manipulation (using emotion to compel donations) and 'cherry-picked' portrayals of poverty (an ad showing an extreme, but real image) so long as there is some truth to the portrayal. Yet they are more sensitive to artificial images (e.g., an actor posing as poor), even when the image resembles reality. Thus, ethical judgments hinge more on whether poverty portrayals are genuine than whether they are representative. This work represents the first empirical investigation into ethical judgments of poverty portrayals. In doing so, this work sheds light on how people make sense of morally questionable tactics that are used to promote social welfare and deepens our understanding of reactions to deception.

Alcohol attention bias modulates neural engagement during moral processing

The neurobiology of typical moral cognition involves the interaction of frontal, limbic, and temporoparietal networks. There is still much to be understood mechanistically about how moral processing is disrupted; such understanding is key to combating antisociality. Neuroscientific models suggest a key role for attention mechanisms in atypical moral processing. We hypothesized that attention-bias toward alcohol cues in alcohol use disorder (AUD) leads to a failure to properly engage with morally relevant stimuli, reducing moral processing. We recruited patients with AUD (n = 30) and controls (n = 30). During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants viewed pairs of images consisting of a moral or neutral cue and an alcohol or neutral distractor. When viewing moral cues paired with alcohol distractors, individuals with AUD had lower medial prefrontal cortex engagement; this pattern was also seen for left amygdala in younger iAUDs. Across groups, individuals had less engagement of middle/superior temporal gyri. These findings provide initial support for AUD-related attention bias interference in sociomoral processing. If supported in future longitudinal and causal study designs, this finding carries potential societal and clinical benefits by suggesting a novel, leverageable mechanism and in providing a cognitive explanation that may help combat persistent stigma.

Valence-Dependent Implicit Action Generalization Among Group Members

People implicitly generalize the actions of known individuals in a social group to unknown members. However, actions have social goals and evaluative valences, and the extent to which actions with different valences (helpful and harmful) are implicitly generalized among group members remains unclear. We used computer animations to simulate social group actions, where helping and hindering actions were represented by aiding and obstructing another's climb up a hill. Study 1 found that helpful actions are implicitly expected to be shared among members of the same group but not among members of different groups, but no such effect was found for harmful actions. This suggests that helpful actions are more likely than harmful actions to be implicitly generalized to group members. This finding was replicated in Study 2 by increasing the group size from three to five. Study 3 found that the null effect for generalizing harmful actions among group members is not due to the difficulty of detecting action generalization, as both helpful and harmful actions are similarly generalized within particular individuals. Moreover, Study 4 demonstrated that weakening social group information resulted in the absence of implicit generalization for helpful actions, suggesting the specificity of group membership. Study 5 revealed that the generalization of helping actions occurred when actions were performed by multiple group members rather than being repeated by one group member, showing group-based inductive generalization. Overall, these findings support valence-dependent implicit action generalization among group members. This implies that people may possess different knowledge regarding valenced actions on category-based generalization.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Ethics and Health Security in the Australian COVID-19 Context: A Critical Interpretive Literature Review

Background The concept of "health security" is often used to motivate public health responses, yet the ethical values that underpin this concept remain largely unexamined. The recent Australian responses to COVID-19 serve as an important case study by which we can analyse the pre-existing literature to see what ethical values shaped, and continue to shape, Australia's response. Methods We conducted a critical interpretive literature review of academic and grey literatures within key databases, resulting in 2,220 sources. After screening for duplicates and relevance, we analysed ninety-six sources. Results First, risk and uncertainty are a leading focus, with a heavy concentration on risks to life and health. Second, free movement, safety, and security were recurringly emphasized, albeit narrowly focused upon the safety of the population. Third, legitimacy was a recurring theme, and it is here that discussions of "health security" figured highly. Conclusion Discussions of harm from government and associated official bodies fail to adequately distinguish between various senses of harm. Moreover, while the literature often discusses the balancing of rights, the steps involved in the weighing of these rights is rarely adequately explained and defended. We suggest that decision-makers should endeavour to clearly identify and defend the values undergirding their decisions in the public sphere.

The puzzle of wrongless injustice: Reflections on Kürthy and Sousa

The Database of Exemplars (DOE) account of moral cognition emerged in part to explain how wrongless harms could arise (Royzman & Borislow, 2022; henceforth, RB) in spite of being denied by most traditional models (Schein & Gray, 2018; Turiel, 1983; Shweder, 1997; Haidt, 2012). Herein, we defend this account against a set of results that have been claimed to disprove it (Kurthy & Sousa, this issue; henceforth, KS). We argue that DOE is in line with all the findings KS perceive as uniquely supportive of their own account (appraising an act as unjust engenders a judgment of wrong) while RB's findings (Royzman & Borislow, 2022, Studies 2 and 3) do challenge KS under varied conceptions of what it would take for an agent to be or appear unjust in his or her treatment of others, affirming that wrongless injustice is an empirical fact that one must strive to explain and that DOE helps us explain.

The deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing: A rejoinder to Royzman & Borislow

With a series of studies, Royzman and Borislow (2022) purport to show that extant models about the conditions under which harmful actions are deemed morally wrong do not have explanatory power-for any proposed condition, various harmful actions meet the condition but are not deemed immoral. And they reach the following conclusion: judgments of moral wrongdoing in the context of harmful actions (or judgments of moral wrongdoing more generally) are not reducible to an explanatory template. However, they did not address the main claim of the deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing, which is that intuitions of injustice connect harmful actions to judgments of moral wrongdoing (Sousa & Piazza, 2014). Our first study adjusts Royzman and Borislow' design to include a measure of perceived injustice, while our second elaborates their design to manipulate perceived injustice. The results undermine their conclusion and support the deflationary model, which we further refine here in light of the results of Royzman and Borislow's studies and ours.

Moral conformity in a digital world: Human and nonhuman agents as a source of social pressure for judgments of moral character

Could judgments about others' moral character be changed under group pressure produced by human and virtual agents? In Study 1 (N = 103), participants first judged targets' moral character privately and two weeks later in the presence of real humans. Analysis of how many times participants changed their private moral judgments under group pressure showed that moral conformity occurred, on average, 43% of the time. In Study 2 (N = 138), we extended this using Virtual Reality, where group pressure was produced either by avatars allegedly controlled by humans or AI. While replicating the effect of moral conformity (at 28% of the time), we find that the moral conformity for the human and AI-controlled avatars did not differ. Our results suggest that human and nonhuman groups shape moral character judgments in both the physical and virtual worlds, shedding new light on the potential social consequences of moral conformity in the modern digital world.

Values in Context: The (Dis)connections Between Moral Foundations and Moral Conviction

Moral foundations theory (MFT) argues that liberals and conservatives form different moral positions because liberals emphasize the values of harm and fairness, whereas conservatives emphasize the values of group loyalty, authority, and purity. In five studies (total N = 3,327), we investigated whether political orientation moderated the relationship between the perceived relevance of each moral foundation and moral conviction (i.e., the extent to which one perceives their attitude as based on morality) across four issues. Political differences in this relationship emerged but were inconsistent across issues and did not always align with the predictions of MFT or several other theoretical explanations. Our findings together with previous research indicate that MFT may do a better job predicting attitude position than it does predicting whether people perceive that their attitudes are moral convictions, and that some foundations may reflect conventional rather than moral values (e.g., authority).

Myth of objectivity and the origin of symbols

An age-old challenge in epistemology and moral philosophy is whether objectivity exists independent of subjective perspective. Alfred North Whitehead labeled it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"; after all, knowledge is represented elusively in symbols. I employ the free energy principle (FEP) to argue that the belief in moral objectivity, although perhaps fallacious, amounts to an ancient and universal human myth that is essential for our symbolic capacity. To perceive any object in a world of non-diminishing (perhaps irreducible) uncertainty, according to the FEP, its constituent parts must display common probabilistic tendencies, known as statistical beliefs, prior to its interpretation, or active inference, as a stable entity. Behavioral bias, subjective emotions, and social norms scale the scope of identity by coalescing agents with otherwise disparate goals and aligning their perspectives into a coherent structure. I argue that by declaring belief in norms as objective, e.g., expressing that a particular theft or infidelity was generally wrong, our ancestors psychologically constructed a type of identity bound only by shared faith in a perspective that technically transcended individual subjectivity. Signaling explicit belief in what were previously non-symbolic norms, as seen in many non-human animals, simulates a top-down point of view of our social interactions and thereby constructs our cultural niche and symbolic capacity. I demonstrate that, largely by contrasting with overly reductive analytical models that assume individual rational pursuit of extrinsic rewards, shared belief in moral conceptions, i.e., what amounts to a religious faith, remains a motivational cornerstone of our language, economic and civic institutions, stories, and psychology. Finally, I hypothesize that our bias for familiar accents (shibboleth), plausibly represents the phylogenetic and ontogenetic contextual origins of our impulse to minimize social surprise by declaring belief in the myth of objectivity.

There are no beautiful surfaces without a terrible depth

Fitouchi et al. persuasively argue against popular disgust-based accounts of puritanical morality. However, they do not consider alternative account of moral condemnation that is also based on the psychology of disgust. We argue that these other disgust-based accounts are more promising than those dismissed in the target article.

Purity is still a problem

Our recent review demonstrates that "purity" is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify some of these understandings, but much messiness remains. The harm-centric theory of dyadic morality suggests that purity violations can be comprehensively understood as abstract harms, acts perceived by some people (and not others) to indirectly cause suffering.

Alcohol and morality: one alcoholic drink is enough to make people declare to harm others and behave impurely

We aimed to understand if alcohol intoxication affects the willingness to violate moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity). We conducted a laboratory study (N = 387) with three randomized groups: alcohol intoxication, placebo, and control, measuring the sacralization of moral foundations via the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale. The study showed intoxicated participants sacralized moral foundations of care and purity more often than participants from control and placebo groups. It means participants declared more willing to physically harm other people and animals and behave impurely, e.g., doing deviant sexual behaviors or selling their souls. No differences related to fairness, authority, and loyalty were found. Our study helps to understand the decision processes underlying immoral behaviors, including crimes. We showed that even one drink makes people change their judgments about what is right and wrong (in the cases of harmful and impure behaviors), and because this kind of judgment precedes immoral behaviors, our results may help explain why some people under the influence of alcohol break the rules by doing things which they would never do when sober.

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It)

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

Do Companies Think and Feel? Mind Perception of Organizations

How do people perceive the minds of organizations? Existing work on organizational mind perception highlights two key debates: whether organizational groups are ascribed more agency than experience, and whether people are really perceiving minds in organizational groups at all. Our current paper and its data weigh in on these debates and suggest that organizations can indeed be ascribed experiential minds. We present a "member and goals" framework for systematically understanding the mind perception of organization. This framework suggests that people can perceive the organizational mind through its elemental building blocks: members (people who form the organization) and goals (its aims). Four studies reveal that people ascribe agency and experience to organizations based on whether the members of organizations and the goals of the organization are characterized by agency or experience. Study 1 finds that past work on mind perception often examines for-profit corporations, which consist of agentic members (corporate professionals) and agentic goals (market competition). Studies 2 and 3 reveal that when an organization with members and goals high (vs. low) in experience, people imbue its mind with perceived experience-equal to that of a person-and that even emotions low in warmth (i.e., anger) can imbue an organization with such perceptions. Study 4 shows the moral consequences of emphasizing experience: after organizational wrongdoing, experiential organizations are seen to deliver more sincere apologies and are more forgiven.

Worth the Risk? Greater Acceptance of Instrumental Harm Befalling Men than Women

Scientific and organizational interventions often involve trade-offs whereby they benefit some but entail costs to others (i.e., instrumental harm; IH). We hypothesized that the gender of the persons incurring those costs would influence intervention endorsement, such that people would more readily support interventions inflicting IH onto men than onto women. We also hypothesized that women would exhibit greater asymmetries in their acceptance of IH to men versus women. Three experimental studies (two pre-registered) tested these hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 granted support for these predictions using a variety of interventions and contexts. Study 3 tested a possible boundary condition of these asymmetries using contexts in which women have traditionally been expected to sacrifice more than men: caring for infants, children, the elderly, and the ill. Even in these traditionally female contexts, participants still more readily accepted IH to men than women. Findings indicate people (especially women) are less willing to accept instrumental harm befalling women (vs. men). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of our findings.

The Problem of Purity in Moral Psychology

Academic AbstractThe idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity-unlike other moral constructs-is not understood by what it is but what it isn't: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm-the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.

Do Bad People Deserve Empathy? Selective Empathy Based on Targets' Moral Characteristics

The relation between empathy and morality is a widely discussed topic. However, previous discussions mainly focused on whether and how empathy influences moral cognition and moral behaviors, with limited attention to the reverse influence of morality on empathy. This review summarized how morality influences empathy by drawing together a number of hitherto scattered studies illustrating the influence of targets' moral characteristics on empathy. To explain why empathy is morally selective, we discuss its ultimate cause, to increase survival rates, and five proximate causes based on similarity, affective bonds, the appraisal of deservingness, dehumanization, and potential group membership. To explain how empathy becomes morally selective, we consider three different pathways (automatic, regulative, and mixed) based on previous findings. Finally, we discuss future directions, including the reverse influence of selective empathy on moral cognition, the moral selectivity of positive empathy, and the role of selective empathy in selective helping and third-party punishment.

Moral foundations of pro-choice and pro-life women

Opinions on abortion are more polarized than opinions on most other moral issues. Why are some people pro-choice and some pro-life? Religious and political preferences play a role here, but pro-choice and pro-life people may also differ in other aspects. In the current preregistered study (N = 479), we investigated how pro-choice women differ in their moral foundations from pro-life women. When the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) was applied (i.e., when declared moral principles were measured), pro-life women scored higher than pro-choice women in loyalty, authority, and purity. However, when women were asked about moral judgments indirectly via more real-life problems from the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFV), pro-choice women scored higher than pro-life women in emotional and physical care and liberty but lower in loyalty. When we additionally controlled for religious practice and political views, we found no differences between groups in declaring moral foundations (MFQ). However, in the case of real-life moral judgments (MFV), we observed higher care, fairness, and liberty among pro-choice and higher authority and purity among pro-life. Our results show intriguing nuances between women pro-choice and pro-life as we found a different pattern of moral foundations in those groups depending on whether we measured their declared abstract moral principles or moral judgment about real-life situations. We also showed how religious practice and political views might play a role in such differences. We conclude that attitudes to abortion "go beyond" abstract moral principles, and the real-life context matters in moral judgments.

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Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04800-0.

People are curious about immoral and morally ambiguous others

Looking to the popularity of superheroes, true crime stories, and anti-heroic characters like Tony Soprano, we investigated whether moral extremity, especially moral badness, piques curiosity. Across five experiments (N = 2429), we examine moral curiosity, testing under what conditions the moral minds of others spark explanation-seeking behavior. In Experiment 1, we find that among the most widely watched Netflix shows in the US over a five-month period, the more immoral the protagonist, the more hours people spent watching. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we find that when given a choice to learn more about morally good, bad, ambiguous, or average others, people preferred to learn more about morally extreme people, both good and bad. Experiment 3 reveals that people are more curious for explanations about (vs. descriptions of) morally bad and ambiguous people compared to morally good ones. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the uniqueness of curiosity for moral ambiguity. We find that people are more drawn to moral rather than aesthetic ambiguity, suggesting that ambiguity, which is cognitively taxing and sometimes avoided, preferentially engenders information seeking in the moral domain. These findings suggest deviations from moral normativity, especially badness, spur curiosity. People are curious about immorality and agents who differ from the norm.

Ordinary citizens are more severe towards verbal than nonverbal hate-motivated incidents with identical consequences

Do we judge hate incidents similarly when they are performed using words or bodily actions? Hate speech incidents are rarely reported by bystanders, and whether or how much they should be punished remains a matter of legal, theoretical and social disagreement. In a pre-registered study (N = 1309), participants read about verbal and nonverbal attacks stemming from identical hateful intent, which created the same consequences for the victims. We asked them how much punishment the perpetrator should receive, how likely they would be to denounce such an incident and how much harm they judged the victim suffered. The results contradicted our pre-registered hypotheses and the predictions of dual moral theories, which hold that intention and harmful consequences are the sole psychological determinants of punishment. Instead, participants consistently rated verbal hate attacks as more deserving of punishment, denunciation and being more harmful to the victim than nonverbal attacks. This difference is explained by the concept of action aversion, suggesting that lay observers have different intrinsic associations with interactions involving words compared to bodily actions, regardless of consequences. This explanation has implications for social psychology, moral theories, and legislative efforts to sanction hate speech, which are considered. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 29/06/2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/Z86TV .

Empathic concern induction modulates behavioral ratings and neural responses to harm-related moral judgment: An event-related potentials study

Although empathic concern is critical in harm-related moral judgment, the temporal dynamics underlying the impact of empathic concern on moral judgment remain unclear. This study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate how empathic concern induction shaped the way individuals perceive harmful/helpful behaviors. Behavioral results showed that participants assigned more blame to harmful behaviors in the empathic concern priming condition compared to those in the control condition. ERP results showed that helpful behaviors elicited larger N1 than did harmful behaviors. Additionally, harmful behaviors in the empathic concern priming condition elicited more negative N2 than did harmful behaviors in the control condition. Moreover, harmful behaviors elicited larger late positive potential (LPP) than did helpful behaviors in the control condition. These findings suggest that (1) empathic concern induction might increase moral sensitivity about harm-related norms; (2) participants independent of the empathic concern manipulation can distinguish between harmful behaviors and helpful behaviors similarly, as indicated by the early ERP component (N1); (3) empathic concern especially influences the intermediate (N2) and later (LPP) ERP components.

Supernatural explanations across 114 societies are more common for natural than social phenomena

Humans across the globe use supernatural beliefs to explain the world around them. This article explores whether cultural groups invoke the supernatural more to explain natural phenomena (for example, storms, disease outbreaks) or social phenomena (for example, murder, warfare). Quantitative analysis of ethnographic text across 114 geographically and culturally diverse societies found that supernatural explanations are more prevalent for natural than for social phenomena, consistent with theories that ground the origin of religious belief in a human tendency to perceive intent and agency in the natural world. Despite the dominance of supernatural explanations of natural phenomena, supernatural explanations of social phenomena were especially prevalent in urbanized societies with more socially complex and anonymous groups. Our results show how people use supernatural beliefs as explanatory tools in non-industrial societies, and how these applications vary across small-scale communities versus large and urbanized groups.

Reasons for Moral-Based Opposition to Pornography in a U.S. Nationally Representative Sample

Pornography use is a common-but-controversial activity that many people object to or morally disapprove of. Despite this, there is a limited understanding of the reasons for such moral opposition. Although some prior research has assessed characteristics that influence moral opposition to pornography, most research has done so using various forced-choice methods. The present study aimed to better understand the reasoning behind moral-based opposition to pornography by using open-ended questioning and exploring the relationship between these reasons and pornography use habits. To achieve these aims, we analyzed data from a nationally representative U.S. sample, specifically studying individuals who reported moral beliefs opposing pornography (N = 1,020). Results revealed 14 general themes (e.g., religion/spirituality; concerns about abuse; disgust) in the reasons participants reported for their moral disapproval of pornography, many of which were related to individual difference variables such as gender, age, religiousness, and political preferences. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are also discussed.

Am I being dehumanized? Development and validation of the experience of dehumanization measurement

Scholarly interest in the experience of dehumanization, the perception that one is being dehumanized, has increased significantly in recent years, yet the construct lacks a validated measurement. The purpose of this research is therefore to develop and validate a theoretically grounded experience of dehumanization measurement (EDHM) using item response theory. Evidence from five studies using data collected from participants in the United Kingdom (N = 2082) and Spain (N = 1427), shows that (a) a unidimensional structure replicates and fits well; (b) the measurement demonstrates high precision and reliability across a broad range of the latent trait; (c) the measurement demonstrates evidence for nomological and discriminant validity with constructs in the experience of dehumanization nomological network; (d) the measurement is invariant across gender and cultures; (e) the measurement demonstrates incremental validity in the prediction of important outcomes over and above conceptually overlapping constructs and prior measurements. Overall, our findings suggest the EDHM is a psychometrically sound measurement that can advance research relating to the experience of dehumanization.

Mindfulness training reduces slippery slope effects in moral decision-making and moral judgment

Extant research has demonstrated the positive intrapersonal effects of mindfulness training. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of mindfulness training on interpersonal processes are less clear. Here, we combined a randomized control mindfulness training design with computational approach to moral decision-making and moral judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to a Training group (N = 32) who received an 8-week mindfulness training or a Control group (N = 26) who waited for the same period of time. Before and after the 8-week period, participants completed a moral decision-making task, where they made tradeoff between money for themselves and unpleasant electric shocks to another person, and a moral judgment task, where they evaluated the blameworthiness of someone else's choices in the same moral decision-making task. Trait mindfulness, as measured by the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, significantly increased from the pre- to post-training session for the Training group, but not the Control group, demonstrating the effectiveness of the mindfulness manipulation. For the Control group, participants' moral preference in both the decision-making task and the judgment task declined over time, exhibiting a "slippery slope" effect. In contrast, for the Training group, mindfulness training prevented moral preferences from declining. Computational modeling revealed that mindfulness training specifically reduced the increase in the weights of money over time in both the decision-making and judgment tasks, thereby curbing the "slippery slope" effects. These findings provide a cognitive account of the prosocial effects of mindfulness training on moral decision-making and moral judgments.

Physical Attractiveness Biases Judgments Pertaining to the Moral Domain of Purity

Research on the Beauty-is-Good stereotype shows that unattractive people are perceived to have worse moral character than attractive individuals. Yet research has not explored what kinds of moral character judgments are particularly biased by attractiveness. In this work, we tested whether attractiveness particularly biases moral character judgments pertaining to the moral domain of purity, beyond a more general halo effect. Across four preregistered studies (N = 1,778), we found that unattractive (vs. attractive) individuals were judged to be more likely to engage in purity violations compared with harm violations and that this was not due to differences in perceived moral wrongness, weirdness, or sociality between purity and harm violations. The findings shed light on how physical attractiveness influences moral character attributions, suggesting that physical attractiveness particularly biases character judgments pertaining to the moral domain of purity.

Interpersonal relationships modulate subjective ratings and electrophysiological responses of moral evaluations

This study explored how interpersonal relationships modulate moral evaluations in moral dilemmas. Participants rated moral acceptability in response to altruistic (prescriptive) and selfish (proscriptive) behavior conducted by allocators (i.e., a friend or stranger), toward the participants themselves or another stranger in a modified Dictator Game (Experiments 1 and 2). Event-related potential (ERP) data were recorded as participants observed the allocators' behavior (Experiment 2). Moral acceptability ratings showed that when the allocator was a friend, participants evaluated the friend's altruistic and selfish behavior toward another stranger as being less morally acceptable than when their friend showed the respective behavior toward the participants themselves. The ERP results showed that participants exhibited more negative medial frontal negativity (MFN) amplitude whether observing a friend's altruistic or selfish behavior toward a stranger (vs. participant oneself), indicating that friends' altruistic and selfish behaviors toward strangers (vs. participants) were processed as being less acceptable at the earlier and semi-automatic processing stage in brains. However, this effect did not emerge when the allocator was a stranger in subjective ratings and MFN results. In the later-occurring P3 component, no interpersonal relationship modulation occurred in moral evaluations. These findings suggest that interpersonal relationships affect moral evaluations from the second-party perspective.

Just wrong? Or just WEIRD? Investigating the prevalence of moral dumbfounding in non-Western samples

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgment. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("It's just wrong") as justification for a judgment. Published evidence for dumbfounding has drawn exclusively on samples of WEIRD backgrounds (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), and it remains unclear to what extent the phenomenon is generalizable to other populations. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of moral dumbfounding have been disputed in recent years. In three studies we apply a standardized moral dumbfounding task, and show evidence for moral dumbfounding in a Chinese sample (Study 1, N = 165), an Indian sample (Study 2, N = 181), and a mixed sample primarily (but not exclusively) from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA region, Study 3, N = 264). These findings are consistent with a categorization theories of moral judgment.

Individual differences in harm-related moral values are associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation

Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient ('PC') to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations-the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values.

Responses of the public towards the government in times of crisis

We experimentally investigate how and when the public responds to government actions during times of crisis. Public reactions are shown to follow different processes, depending on whether government performs in exemplary or unsatisfactory ways to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 'how' question is addressed by proposing that negative moral emotions mediate public reactions to bad government actions, and positive moral emotions mediate reactions to good government actions. Tests of mediation are conducted while taking into account attitudes and trust in the government as rival hypotheses. The 'when' question is studied by examining self-regulatory moderators governing the experience of moral emotions and their effects. These include conspiracy beliefs, political ideology, attachment coping styles and collective values. A total of 357 citizens of a representative sample of adult Norwegians were randomly assigned to two experimental groups and a control group, where complaining, putting pressure on the government and compliance to Covid-19 policies were dependent variables. The findings show that negative moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing badly on complaining and pressuring the government, with conspiracy beliefs moderating the experience of negative moral emotions and attachment coping moderating the effects of negative moral emotions. The results also show that positive moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing well on compliance with COVID-19 regulations, with political ideology moderating the experience of positive moral emotions and collective values moderating the effects of positive moral emotions.

The effect of faith in intuition on moral judgment: The mediating role of perceived harm

This study aimed to explore the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment and the underlying mechanism among Chinese college students using a questionnaire and experimental method. The results showed that levels of faith in intuition predicted more moral wrongness regarding ambiguous hurtful behaviors than unambiguous ones. Additionally, the perceived harm mediated the effect of individuals' levels of faith in intuition on moral wrongness regarding ambiguous harm behaviors but not regarding unambiguous harm behaviors. The results of this study provide empirical evidence on the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment in Chinese culture and have implications for future studies of moral judgments.

Perceptions of Farm Animal Sentience and Suffering: Evidence from the BRIC Countries and the United States

In this study, we examined how beliefs about farm animal sentience and their suffering vary across culture and demographic characteristics. A total of N = 5027) questionnaires were administered in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the USA. Brazilians showed higher and Chinese lower levels of perceived animal sentience. In Russia and India, the perception of suffering and sentience increases with age, with similar levels to those observed in the USA. In all the countries, more people agreed than disagreed that animals are sentient. Men in India show higher levels of agreement with the relation between eating meat and animal suffering, followed by women in Brazil and China. Lower levels of agreement are observed in Americans and Chinese. Women show higher levels of compassion than men. In Russia, there is a slightly higher level of agreement between men and in the USA younger men agree more. Young American men show higher levels of agreement, while in India and China age has the opposite effect. For fair trading competition, it is important to standardize procedures and respect the demand for both animal protein and its ethical production. Overall, our results showed that perceptions of farm animal sentience and suffering vary substantially across countries and demographic groups. These differences could have important consequences for the perceived ethicality of meat production and consumption, and for global trade in animal products.