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Le Denmat P, Verguts T, Desender K. A low-dimensional approximation of optimal confidence. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1012273. [PMID: 39047032 PMCID: PMC11299811 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012273] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2023] [Revised: 08/05/2024] [Accepted: 06/24/2024] [Indexed: 07/27/2024] Open
Abstract
Human decision making is accompanied by a sense of confidence. According to Bayesian decision theory, confidence reflects the learned probability of making a correct response, given available data (e.g., accumulated stimulus evidence and response time). Although optimal, independently learning these probabilities for all possible data combinations is computationally intractable. Here, we describe a novel model of confidence implementing a low-dimensional approximation of this optimal yet intractable solution. This model allows efficient estimation of confidence, while at the same time accounting for idiosyncrasies, different kinds of biases and deviation from the optimal probability correct. Our model dissociates confidence biases resulting from the estimate of the reliability of evidence by individuals (captured by parameter α), from confidence biases resulting from general stimulus independent under and overconfidence (captured by parameter β). We provide empirical evidence that this model accurately fits both choice data (accuracy, response time) and trial-by-trial confidence ratings simultaneously. Finally, we test and empirically validate two novel predictions of the model, namely that 1) changes in confidence can be independent of performance and 2) selectively manipulating each parameter of our model leads to distinct patterns of confidence judgments. As a tractable and flexible account of the computation of confidence, our model offers a clear framework to interpret and further resolve different forms of confidence biases.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Tom Verguts
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent Belgium
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2
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Pilipenko A, Samaha J. Double Dissociation of Spontaneous Alpha-Band Activity and Pupil-Linked Arousal on Additive and Multiplicative Perceptual Gain. J Neurosci 2024; 44:e1944232024. [PMID: 38548339 PMCID: PMC11079969 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.1944-23.2024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2023] [Revised: 03/06/2024] [Accepted: 03/13/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024] Open
Abstract
Perception is a probabilistic process dependent on external stimulus properties and one's internal state. However, which internal states influence perception and via what mechanisms remain debated. We studied how spontaneous alpha-band activity (8-13 Hz) and pupil fluctuations impact visual detection and confidence across stimulus contrast levels (i.e., the contrast response function, CRF). In human subjects of both sexes, we found that low prestimulus alpha power induced an "additive" shift in the CRF, whereby stimuli were reported present more frequently at all contrast levels, including contrast of zero (i.e., false alarms). Conversely, prestimulus pupil size had a "multiplicative" effect on detection such that stimuli occurring during large pupil states (putatively corresponding to higher arousal) were perceived more frequently as contrast increased. Signal detection modeling reveals that alpha power changes detection criteria equally across the CRF but not detection sensitivity (d'), whereas pupil-linked arousal modulated sensitivity, particularly for higher contrasts. Interestingly, pupil size and alpha power were positively correlated, meaning that some of the effect of alpha on detection may be mediated by pupil fluctuations. However, pupil-independent alpha still induced an additive shift in the CRF corresponding to a criterion effect. Our data imply that low alpha boosts detection and confidence by an additive factor, rather than by a multiplicative scaling of contrast responses, a profile which captures the effect of pupil-linked arousal. We suggest that alpha power and arousal fluctuations have dissociable effects on behavior. Alpha reflects the baseline level of visual excitability, which can vary independent of arousal.
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Affiliation(s)
- April Pilipenko
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064
| | - Jason Samaha
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064
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3
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Shekhar M, Rahnev D. How do humans give confidence? A comprehensive comparison of process models of perceptual metacognition. J Exp Psychol Gen 2024; 153:656-688. [PMID: 38095983 PMCID: PMC10922729 DOI: 10.1037/xge0001524] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/23/2024]
Abstract
Humans have the metacognitive ability to assess the accuracy of their decisions via confidence judgments. Several computational models of confidence have been developed but not enough has been done to compare these models, making it difficult to adjudicate between them. Here, we compare 14 popular models of confidence that make various assumptions, such as confidence being derived from postdecisional evidence, from positive (decision-congruent) evidence, from posterior probability computations, or from a separate decision-making system for metacognitive judgments. We fit all models to three large experiments in which subjects completed a basic perceptual task with confidence ratings. In Experiments 1 and 2, the best-fitting model was the lognormal meta noise (LogN) model, which postulates that confidence is selectively corrupted by signal-dependent noise. However, in Experiment 3, the positive evidence (PE) model provided the best fits. We evaluated a new model combining the two consistently best-performing models-LogN and the weighted evidence and visibility (WEV). The resulting model, which we call logWEV, outperformed its individual counterparts and the PE model across all data sets, offering a better, more generalizable explanation for these data. Parameter and model recovery analyses showed mostly good recoverability but with important exceptions carrying implications for our ability to discriminate between models. Finally, we evaluated each model's ability to explain different patterns in the data, which led to additional insight into their performances. These results comprehensively characterize the relative adequacy of current confidence models to fit data from basic perceptual tasks and highlight the most plausible mechanisms underlying confidence generation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
- Medha Shekhar
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
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4
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Olschewski S, Scheibehenne B. What's in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking. Cogn Psychol 2024; 149:101642. [PMID: 38401485 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2023] [Revised: 02/01/2024] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 02/26/2024]
Abstract
In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants' perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Olschewski
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland; Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, United Kingdom.
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5
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Katyal S, Fleming SM. The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor. Cortex 2024; 171:223-234. [PMID: 38041921 PMCID: PMC11139654 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.11.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2023] [Revised: 10/20/2023] [Accepted: 11/02/2023] [Indexed: 12/04/2023]
Abstract
Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sucharit Katyal
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK; Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK.
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6
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Sakamoto Y, Miyoshi K. A confidence framing effect: Flexible use of evidence in metacognitive monitoring. Conscious Cogn 2024; 118:103636. [PMID: 38244396 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103636] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/21/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 01/05/2024] [Indexed: 01/22/2024]
Abstract
Human behavior is flexibly regulated by specific goals of cognitive tasks. One notable example is goal-directed modulation of metacognitive behavior, where logically equivalent decision-making problems can yield different patterns of introspective confidence depending on the frame in which they are presented. While this observation highlights the important heuristic nature of metacognitive monitoring, computational mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain elusive. We confirmed the confidence framing effect in two-alternative dot-number discrimination and in previously published preference-choice data, demonstrating distinctive confidence patterns between "choose more" or "choose less" frames. Formal model comparisons revealed a simple confidence heuristic behind this phenomenon, which assigns greater weight to chosen than unchosen stimulus evidence. This computation appears to be based on internal evidence constituted under specific task demands rather than physical stimulus intensity itself, a view justified in terms of ecological rationality. These results shed light on the adaptive nature of human decision-making and metacognitive monitoring.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yosuke Sakamoto
- Graduate School of Frontier Biosciences, Osaka University, 1-3 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka 565-0871, Japan
| | - Kiyofumi Miyoshi
- Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan.
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7
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Fleming SM. Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis. Annu Rev Psychol 2024; 75:241-268. [PMID: 37722748 DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-022423-032425] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/20/2023]
Abstract
Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen M Fleming
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, and Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, United Kingdom;
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8
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Calder-Travis J, Bogacz R, Yeung N. Expressions for Bayesian confidence of drift diffusion observers in fluctuating stimuli tasks. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 117:102815. [PMID: 38188903 PMCID: PMC7615478 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmp.2023.102815] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/09/2024]
Abstract
We introduce a new approach to modelling decision confidence, with the aim of enabling computationally cheap predictions while taking into account, and thereby exploiting, trial-by-trial variability in stochastically fluctuating stimuli. Using the framework of the drift diffusion model of decision making, along with time-dependent thresholds and the idea of a Bayesian confidence readout, we derive expressions for the probability distribution over confidence reports. In line with current models of confidence, the derivations allow for the accumulation of "pipeline" evidence that has been received but not processed by the time of response, the effect of drift rate variability, and metacognitive noise. The expressions are valid for stimuli that change over the course of a trial with normally-distributed fluctuations in the evidence they provide. A number of approximations are made to arrive at the final expressions, and we test all approximations via simulation. The derived expressions contain only a small number of standard functions, and require evaluating only once per trial, making trial-by-trial modelling of confidence data in stochastically fluctuating stimuli tasks more feasible. We conclude by using the expressions to gain insight into the confidence of optimal observers, and empirically observed patterns.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Rafal Bogacz
- MRC Brain Network Dynamics Unit, Nuffield Department of Clinical Neuroscience, University of Oxford, UK
| | - Nick Yeung
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK
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9
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Mihali A, Broeker M, Ragalmuto FDM, Horga G. Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7826. [PMID: 38030601 PMCID: PMC10687029 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-42813-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2022] [Accepted: 10/23/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andra Mihali
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA.
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA.
| | - Marianne Broeker
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Teachers College, New York, NY, USA
- University of Oxford, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford, UK
| | - Florian D M Ragalmuto
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA
- Vrije Universiteit, Faculty of Behavioral and Movement Science, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Berliner FortbildungsAkademie, Berlin, DE, Germany
| | - Guillermo Horga
- New York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY, USA.
- Columbia University, Department of Psychiatry, New York, NY, USA.
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10
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Wang S, Falcone R, Richmond B, Averbeck BB. Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex. Nat Neurosci 2023; 26:1970-1980. [PMID: 37798412 DOI: 10.1038/s41593-023-01445-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2022] [Accepted: 08/31/2023] [Indexed: 10/07/2023]
Abstract
Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in the prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays to reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Siyu Wang
- Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
| | - Rossella Falcone
- Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
- Leo M. Davidoff Department of Neurological Surgery, Albert Einstein College of Medicine Montefiore Medical Center, Bronx, NY, USA
| | - Barry Richmond
- Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
| | - Bruno B Averbeck
- Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA.
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11
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Walker EY, Pohl S, Denison RN, Barack DL, Lee J, Block N, Ma WJ, Meyniel F. Studying the neural representations of uncertainty. Nat Neurosci 2023; 26:1857-1867. [PMID: 37814025 DOI: 10.1038/s41593-023-01444-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2022] [Accepted: 08/30/2023] [Indexed: 10/11/2023]
Abstract
The study of the brain's representations of uncertainty is a central topic in neuroscience. Unlike most quantities of which the neural representation is studied, uncertainty is a property of an observer's beliefs about the world, which poses specific methodological challenges. We analyze how the literature on the neural representations of uncertainty addresses those challenges and distinguish between 'code-driven' and 'correlational' approaches. Code-driven approaches make assumptions about the neural code for representing world states and the associated uncertainty. By contrast, correlational approaches search for relationships between uncertainty and neural activity without constraints on the neural representation of the world state that this uncertainty accompanies. To compare these two approaches, we apply several criteria for neural representations: sensitivity, specificity, invariance and functionality. Our analysis reveals that the two approaches lead to different but complementary findings, shaping new research questions and guiding future experiments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edgar Y Walker
- Department of Physiology and Biophysics, Computational Neuroscience Center, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
| | - Stephan Pohl
- Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Rachel N Denison
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - David L Barack
- Department of Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Jennifer Lee
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Ned Block
- Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Wei Ji Ma
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Florent Meyniel
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
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12
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Meijer D, Noppeney U. Metacognition in the audiovisual McGurk illusion: perceptual and causal confidence. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20220348. [PMID: 37545307 PMCID: PMC10404922 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0348] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/17/2023] [Accepted: 07/02/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Almost all decisions in everyday life rely on multiple sensory inputs that can come from common or independent causes. These situations invoke perceptual uncertainty about environmental properties and the signals' causal structure. Using the audiovisual McGurk illusion, this study investigated how observers formed perceptual and causal confidence judgements in information integration tasks under causal uncertainty. Observers were presented with spoken syllables, their corresponding articulatory lip movements or their congruent and McGurk combinations (e.g. auditory B/P with visual G/K). Observers reported their perceived auditory syllable, the causal structure and confidence for each judgement. Observers were more accurate and confident on congruent than unisensory trials. Their perceptual and causal confidence were tightly related over trials as predicted by the interactive nature of perceptual and causal inference. Further, observers assigned comparable perceptual and causal confidence to veridical 'G/K' percepts on audiovisual congruent trials and their causal and perceptual metamers on McGurk trials (i.e. illusory 'G/K' percepts). Thus, observers metacognitively evaluate the integrated audiovisual percept with limited access to the conflicting unisensory stimulus components on McGurk trials. Collectively, our results suggest that observers form meaningful perceptual and causal confidence judgements about multisensory scenes that are qualitatively consistent with principles of Bayesian causal inference. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Meijer
- Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics Centre, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
- Acoustics Research Institute, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Wohllebengasse 12-14, 1040, Wien, Austria
| | - Uta Noppeney
- Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics Centre, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Kapittelweg 29, 6525 EN, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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13
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Rong Y, Peters MAK. Toward 'Computational-Rationality' Approaches to Arbitrating Models of Cognition: A Case Study Using Perceptual Metacognition. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:652-674. [PMID: 37840765 PMCID: PMC10575558 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00100] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2023] [Accepted: 08/10/2023] [Indexed: 10/17/2023] Open
Abstract
Perceptual confidence results from a metacognitive process which evaluates how likely our percepts are to be correct. Many competing models of perceptual metacognition enjoy strong empirical support. Arbitrating these models traditionally proceeds via researchers conducting experiments and then fitting several models to the data collected. However, such a process often includes conditions or paradigms that may not best arbitrate competing models: Many models make similar predictions under typical experimental conditions. Consequently, many experiments are needed, collectively (sub-optimally) sampling the space of conditions to compare models. Here, instead, we introduce a variant of optimal experimental design which we call a computational-rationality approach to generative models of cognition, using perceptual metacognition as a case study. Instead of designing experiments and post-hoc specifying models, we began with comprehensive model comparison among four competing generative models for perceptual metacognition, drawn from literature. By simulating a simple experiment under each model, we identified conditions where these models made maximally diverging predictions for confidence. We then presented these conditions to human observers, and compared the models' capacity to predict choices and confidence. Results revealed two surprising findings: (1) two models previously reported to differently predict confidence to different degrees, with one predicting better than the other, appeared to predict confidence in a direction opposite to previous findings; and (2) two other models previously reported to equivalently predict confidence showed stark differences in the conditions tested here. Although preliminary with regards to which model is actually 'correct' for perceptual metacognition, our findings reveal the promise of this computational-rationality approach to maximizing experimental utility in model arbitration while minimizing the number of experiments necessary to reveal the winning model, both for perceptual metacognition and in other domains.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yingqi Rong
- Department of Mathematics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
| | - Megan A. K. Peters
- Department of Mathematics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
- Center for the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
- Program in Brain, Mind, & Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, Canada
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14
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Wang S, Falcone R, Richmond B, Averbeck BB. Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2023:2023.09.17.558139. [PMID: 37886489 PMCID: PMC10602028 DOI: 10.1101/2023.09.17.558139] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2023]
Abstract
Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here, we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays-to-reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.
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15
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Arnold DH, Johnston A, Adie J, Yarrow K. On why we lack confidence in some signal-detection-based analyses of confidence. Conscious Cogn 2023; 113:103532. [PMID: 37295196 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103532] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2022] [Revised: 05/12/2023] [Accepted: 05/12/2023] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Signal-detection theory (SDT) is one of the most popular frameworks for analyzing data from studies of human behavior - including investigations of confidence. SDT-based analyses of confidence deliver both standard estimates of sensitivity (d'), and a second estimate informed by high-confidence decisions - meta d'. The extent to which meta d' estimates fall short of d' estimates is regarded as a measure of metacognitive inefficiency, quantifying the contamination of confidence by additional noise. These analyses rely on a key but questionable assumption - that repeated exposures to an input will evoke a normally-shaped distribution of perceptual experiences (the normality assumption). Here we show, via analyses inspired by an experiment and modelling, that when distributions of experience do not conform with the normality assumption, meta d' can be systematically underestimated relative to d'. Our data highlight that SDT-based analyses of confidence do not provide a ground truth measure of human metacognitive inefficiency. We explain why deviance from the normality assumption is especially a problem for some popular SDT-based analyses of confidence, in contrast to other analyses inspired by the SDT framework, which are more robust to violations of the normality assumption.
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Affiliation(s)
- Derek H Arnold
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Australia.
| | - Alan Johnston
- School of Psychology, The University of Nottingham, United Kingdom
| | - Joshua Adie
- Research Institute for Sport & Exercise, University of Canberra, Australia
| | - Kielan Yarrow
- Department of Psychology, City University London, United Kingdom
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16
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Webb TW, Miyoshi K, So TY, Rajananda S, Lau H. Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases. Nat Commun 2023; 14:3992. [PMID: 37414780 PMCID: PMC10326055 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-39737-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2022] [Accepted: 06/09/2023] [Indexed: 07/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Previous work has sought to understand decision confidence as a prediction of the probability that a decision will be correct, leading to debate over whether these predictions are optimal, and whether they rely on the same decision variable as decisions themselves. This work has generally relied on idealized, low-dimensional models, necessitating strong assumptions about the representations over which confidence is computed. To address this, we used deep neural networks to develop a model of decision confidence that operates directly over high-dimensional, naturalistic stimuli. The model accounts for a number of puzzling dissociations between decisions and confidence, reveals a rational explanation of these dissociations in terms of optimization for the statistics of sensory inputs, and makes the surprising prediction that, despite these dissociations, decisions and confidence depend on a common decision variable.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Tsz Yan So
- The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
| | | | - Hakwan Lau
- Laboratory for Consciousness, RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Saitama, Japan.
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17
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West RK, Harrison WJ, Matthews N, Mattingley JB, Sewell DK. Modality independent or modality specific? Common computations underlie confidence judgements in visual and auditory decisions. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011245. [PMID: 37450502 PMCID: PMC10426961 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011245] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/02/2022] [Revised: 08/15/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 07/18/2023] Open
Abstract
The mechanisms that enable humans to evaluate their confidence across a range of different decisions remain poorly understood. To bridge this gap in understanding, we used computational modelling to investigate the processes that underlie confidence judgements for perceptual decisions and the extent to which these computations are the same in the visual and auditory modalities. Participants completed two versions of a categorisation task with visual or auditory stimuli and made confidence judgements about their category decisions. In each modality, we varied both evidence strength, (i.e., the strength of the evidence for a particular category) and sensory uncertainty (i.e., the intensity of the sensory signal). We evaluated several classes of computational models which formalise the mapping of evidence strength and sensory uncertainty to confidence in different ways: 1) unscaled evidence strength models, 2) scaled evidence strength models, and 3) Bayesian models. Our model comparison results showed that across tasks and modalities, participants take evidence strength and sensory uncertainty into account in a way that is consistent with the scaled evidence strength class. Notably, the Bayesian class provided a relatively poor account of the data across modalities, particularly in the more complex categorisation task. Our findings suggest that a common process is used for evaluating confidence in perceptual decisions across domains, but that the parameter settings governing the process are tuned differently in each modality. Overall, our results highlight the impact of sensory uncertainty on confidence and the unity of metacognitive processing across sensory modalities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca K. West
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
| | - William J. Harrison
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
- Queensland Brain Institute, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
| | - Natasha Matthews
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
| | - Jason B. Mattingley
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
- Queensland Brain Institute, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, Canada
| | - David K. Sewell
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
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18
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Lee JL, Denison R, Ma WJ. Challenging the fixed-criterion model of perceptual decision-making. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad010. [PMID: 37089450 PMCID: PMC10118309 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2023] [Accepted: 04/04/2023] [Indexed: 04/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Perceptual decision-making is often conceptualized as the process of comparing an internal decision variable to a categorical boundary or criterion. How the mind sets such a criterion has been studied from at least two perspectives. One idea is that the criterion is a fixed quantity. In work on subjective phenomenology, the notion of a fixed criterion has been proposed to explain a phenomenon called "subjective inflation"-a form of metacognitive mismatch in which observers overestimate the quality of their sensory representation in the periphery or at unattended locations. A contrasting view emerging from studies of perceptual decision-making is that the criterion adjusts to the level sensory uncertainty and is thus sensitive to variations in attention. Here, we mathematically demonstrate that previous empirical findings supporting subjective inflation are consistent with either a fixed or a flexible decision criterion. We further lay out specific task properties that are necessary to make inferences about the flexibility of the criterion: (i) a clear mapping from decision variable space to stimulus feature space and (ii) an incentive for observers to adjust their decision criterion as uncertainty changes. Recent work satisfying these requirements has demonstrated that decision criteria flexibly adjust according to uncertainty. We conclude that the fixed-criterion model of subjective inflation is poorly tenable.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jennifer Laura Lee
- *Correspondence address. Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, 4 Washington Pl, New York City, NY 10003, United States Tel: +212 992 6530. E-mails: ;
| | - Rachel Denison
- Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, 4 Washington Pl, New York City, NY 10003, United States
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Boston University, 64 Cummington Mall, Boston, MA 02139, United States
| | - Wei Ji Ma
- *Correspondence address. Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, 4 Washington Pl, New York City, NY 10003, United States Tel: +212 992 6530. E-mails: ;
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19
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Confidence reflects a noisy decision reliability estimate. Nat Hum Behav 2023; 7:142-154. [PMID: 36344656 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-022-01464-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/07/2022] [Accepted: 09/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Decisions vary in difficulty. Humans know this and typically report more confidence in easy than in difficult decisions. However, confidence reports do not perfectly track decision accuracy, but also reflect response biases and difficulty misjudgements. To isolate the quality of confidence reports, we developed a model of the decision-making process underlying choice-confidence data. In this model, confidence reflects a subject's estimate of the reliability of their decision. The quality of this estimate is limited by the subject's uncertainty about the uncertainty of the variable that informs their decision ('meta-uncertainty'). This model provides an accurate account of choice-confidence data across a broad range of perceptual and cognitive tasks, investigated in six previous studies. We find meta-uncertainty varies across subjects, is stable over time, generalizes across some domains and can be manipulated experimentally. The model offers a parsimonious explanation for the computational processes that underlie and constrain the sense of confidence.
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20
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Neurocomputational mechanisms of confidence in self and others. Nat Commun 2022; 13:4238. [PMID: 35869044 PMCID: PMC9307648 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-31674-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/05/2021] [Accepted: 06/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
AbstractComputing confidence in one’s own and others’ decisions is critical for social success. While there has been substantial progress in our understanding of confidence estimates about oneself, little is known about how people form confidence estimates about others. Here, we address this question by asking participants undergoing fMRI to place bets on perceptual decisions made by themselves or one of three other players of varying ability. We show that participants compute confidence in another player’s decisions by combining distinct estimates of player ability and decision difficulty – allowing them to predict that a good player may get a difficult decision wrong and that a bad player may get an easy decision right. We find that this computation is associated with an interaction between brain systems implicated in decision-making (LIP) and theory of mind (TPJ and dmPFC). These results reveal an interplay between self- and other-related processes during a social confidence computation.
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21
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Peters MA. Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104903. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104903] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2022] [Revised: 09/27/2022] [Accepted: 10/01/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
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22
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Rahnev D, Balsdon T, Charles L, de Gardelle V, Denison R, Desender K, Faivre N, Filevich E, Fleming SM, Jehee J, Lau H, Lee ALF, Locke SM, Mamassian P, Odegaard B, Peters M, Reyes G, Rouault M, Sackur J, Samaha J, Sergent C, Sherman MT, Siedlecka M, Soto D, Vlassova A, Zylberberg A. Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1746-1765. [PMID: 35839099 PMCID: PMC9633335 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221075615] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Tarryn Balsdon
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Lucie Charles
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK
| | | | - Rachel Denison
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, USA
| | | | - Nathan Faivre
- Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Univ. Savoie Mont Blanc, CNRS, LPNC, 38000 Grenoble, France
| | - Elisa Filevich
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin, Philippstraβe 13 Haus 6, 10115 Berlin, Germany
| | - Stephen M. Fleming
- Department of Experimental Psychology and Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | | | | | - Alan L. F. Lee
- Department of Applied Psychology and Wofoo Joseph Lee Consulting and Counselling Psychology Research Centre, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
| | - Shannon M. Locke
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des systèmes perceptifs, Département d’études cognitives, École normale supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Brian Odegaard
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA
| | - Megan Peters
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA USA
| | - Gabriel Reyes
- Facultad de Psicología, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile
| | - Marion Rouault
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jerome Sackur
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences & Lettres (PSL University), Paris, France
| | - Jason Samaha
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz
| | - Claire Sergent
- Université de Paris, INCC UMR 8002, 75006, Paris, France
| | - Maxine T. Sherman
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Marta Siedlecka
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - David Soto
- Basque Center on Cognition Brain and Language, San Sebastián, Spain. Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Alexandra Vlassova
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Ariel Zylberberg
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, USA
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23
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Abstract
The human ability to introspect on thoughts, perceptions or actions − metacognitive ability − has become a focal topic of both cognitive basic and clinical research. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that currently available quantitative tools are limited in their ability to make unconfounded inferences about metacognition. As a step forward, the present work introduces a comprehensive modeling framework of metacognition that allows for inferences about metacognitive noise and metacognitive biases during the readout of decision values or at the confidence reporting stage. The model assumes that confidence results from a continuous but noisy and potentially biased transformation of decision values, described by a confidence link function. A canonical set of metacognitive noise distributions is introduced which differ, amongst others, in their predictions about metacognitive sign flips of decision values. Successful recovery of model parameters is demonstrated, and the model is validated on an empirical data set. In particular, it is shown that metacognitive noise and bias parameters correlate with conventional behavioral measures. Crucially, in contrast to these conventional measures, metacognitive noise parameters inferred from the model are shown to be independent of performance. This work is accompanied by a toolbox (ReMeta) that allows researchers to estimate key parameters of metacognition in confidence datasets. Metacognition is a person’s ability to think about their own thoughts. For example, imagine you are walking in a dark forest when you see an elongated object. You think it is a stick rather than a snake, but how sure are you? Reflecting on one’s certainty about own thoughts or perceptions – confidence – is a prime example of metacognition. While our ability to think about our own thoughts in this way provides many, perhaps uniquely human, advantages, confidence judgements are prone to biases. Often, humans tend to be overconfident: we think we are right more often than we actually are. Internal noise of neural processes can also affect confidence. Understanding these imperfections in metacognition could shed light on how humans think, but studying this phenomenon is challenging. Current methods are lacking either mechanistic insight about the sources of metacognitive biases and noise or rely on unrealistic assumptions. A better model for how metacognition works could provide a clearer picture. Guggenmos developed a mathematical model and a computer toolbox to help researchers investigate how humans or animals estimate confidence in their own thoughts and resulting decisions . The model splits metacognition apart, allowing scientists to explore biases and sources of noise at different phases in the process. It takes two kinds of data: the decisions study participants make, and how sure they are about their decision being correct. It then recreates metacognition in three phases: the primary decision, the metacognitive readout of the evidence, and the confidence report. This allows investigators to see where and when noise and bias come into play. Guggenmos tested the model using independent data from a visual discrimination task and found that it was able to predict how confident participants reported to be in their decisions. Metacognitive ability can change in people with mental illness. People with schizophrenia have often been found to be overconfident in their decisions, while people with depression can be underconfident. Using this model to separate the various facets of metacognition could help to explain why. It could also shed light on human thinking in general.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Guggenmos
- Health and Medical University, Institute for Mind, Brain and Behavior
- Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
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24
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Locke SM, Landy MS, Mamassian P. Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010318. [PMID: 35895747 PMCID: PMC9359550 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010318] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2021] [Revised: 08/08/2022] [Accepted: 06/19/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shannon M. Locke
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Michael S. Landy
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York, United States of America
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France
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25
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Tremmel C, Fernandez-Vargas J, Stamos D, Cinel C, Pontil M, Citi L, Poli R. A meta-learning BCI for estimating decision confidence. J Neural Eng 2022; 19. [PMID: 35738232 DOI: 10.1088/1741-2552/ac7ba8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2022] [Accepted: 06/23/2022] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE We investigated whether a recently introduced transfer-learning technique based on meta-learning could improve the performance of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) for decision-confidence prediction with respect to more traditional machine learning methods. APPROACH We adapted the meta-learning by biased regularisation algorithm to the problem of predicting decision confidence from EEG and EOG data on a decision-by-decision basis in a difficult target discrimination task based on video feeds. The method exploits previous participants' data to produce a prediction algorithm that is then quickly tuned to new participants. We compared it with with the traditional single-subject training almost universally adopted in BCIs, a state-of-the-art transfer learning technique called Domain Adversarial Neural Networks (DANN), a transfer-learning adaptation of a zero-training method we used recently for a similar task, and with a simple baseline algorithm. MAIN RESULTS The meta-learning approach was significantly better than other approaches in most conditions, and much better in situations where limited data from a new participant are available for training/tuning. Meta-learning by biased regularisation allowed our BCI to seamlessly integrate information from past participants with data from a specific user to produce high-performance predictors. Its robustness in the presence of small training sets is a real-plus in BCI applications, as new users need to train the BCI for a much shorter period. SIGNIFICANCE Due to the variability and noise of EEG/EOG data, BCIs need to be normally trained with data from a specific participant. This work shows that even better performance can be obtained using our version of meta-learning by biased regularisation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christoph Tremmel
- School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Jacobo Fernandez-Vargas
- School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Dimitrios Stamos
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, Malet Place, London, London, WC1E 6BT, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Caterina Cinel
- School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Massimiliano Pontil
- University College London, Malet Place, London, London, WC1E 6BT, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Luca Citi
- School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Riccardo Poli
- School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
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26
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Martinez-Saito M. Probing doors to visual awareness: Choice set, visibility, and confidence. VISUAL COGNITION 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/13506285.2022.2086333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Mario Martinez-Saito
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, HSE University, Moscow, Russian Federation
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Japan
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27
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Subjective confidence reflects representation of Bayesian probability in cortex. Nat Hum Behav 2022; 6:294-305. [PMID: 35058641 PMCID: PMC7612428 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-021-01247-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2021] [Accepted: 11/02/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
What gives rise to the human sense of confidence? Here, we tested the Bayesian hypothesis that confidence is based on a probability distribution represented in neural population activity. We implemented several computational models of confidence, and tested their predictions using psychophysics and fMRI. Using a generative model-based fMRI decoding approach, we extracted probability distributions from neural population activity in human visual cortex. We found that subjective confidence tracks the shape of the decoded distribution. That is, when sensory evidence was more precise, as indicated by the decoded distribution, observers reported higher levels of confidence. We furthermore found that neural activity in the insula, anterior cingulate, and prefrontal cortex was linked to both the shape of the decoded distribution and reported confidence, in ways consistent with the Bayesian model. Altogether, our findings support recent statistical theories of confidence and suggest that probabilistic information guides the computation of one’s sense of confidence.
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28
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Fiore VG, Gu X. Similar network compositions, but distinct neural dynamics underlying belief updating in environments with and without explicit outcomes. Neuroimage 2021; 247:118821. [PMID: 34920087 PMCID: PMC8823284 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118821] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/05/2021] [Revised: 12/10/2021] [Accepted: 12/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Classic decision theories typically assume the presence of explicit value-based outcomes after action selections to update beliefs about action-outcome contingencies. However, ecological environments are often opaque, and it remains unclear whether the neural dynamics underlying belief updating vary under conditions characterized by the presence or absence of such explicit value-based information, after each choice selection. We investigated this question in healthy humans (n = 28) using Bayesian inference and two multi-option fMRI tasks: a multi-armed bandit task, and a probabilistic perceptual task, respectively with and without explicit value-based feedback after choice selections. Model-based fMRI analysis revealed a network encoding belief updating which did not change depending on the task. More precisely, we found a confidence-building network that included anterior hippocampus, amygdala, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which became more active as beliefs about action-outcome probabilities were confirmed by newly acquired information. Despite these consistent responses across tasks, dynamic causal modeling estimated that the network dynamics changed depending on the presence or absence of trial-by-trial value-based outcomes. In the task deprived of immediate feedback, the hippocampus increased its influence towards both amygdala and mPFC, in association with increased strength in the confidence signal. However, the opposite causal relations were found (i.e., from both mPFC and amygdala towards the hippocampus), in presence of immediate outcomes. This finding revealed an asymmetric relationship between decision confidence computations, which were based on similar computational models across tasks, and neural implementation, which varied depending on the availability of outcomes after choice selections.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vincenzo G Fiore
- Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, United States; Center for Computational Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10027, United States.
| | - Xiaosi Gu
- Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, United States; Center for Computational Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10027, United States; Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, United States.
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29
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Zylberberg A. Decision prioritization and causal reasoning in decision hierarchies. PLoS Comput Biol 2021; 17:e1009688. [PMID: 34971552 PMCID: PMC8719712 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009688] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2021] [Accepted: 11/28/2021] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
From cooking a meal to finding a route to a destination, many real life decisions can be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-decisions. In a hierarchy, choosing which decision to think about requires planning over a potentially vast space of possible decision sequences. To gain insight into how people decide what to decide on, we studied a novel task that combines perceptual decision making, active sensing and hierarchical and counterfactual reasoning. Human participants had to find a target hidden at the lowest level of a decision tree. They could solicit information from the different nodes of the decision tree to gather noisy evidence about the target's location. Feedback was given only after errors at the leaf nodes and provided ambiguous evidence about the cause of the error. Despite the complexity of task (with 107 latent states) participants were able to plan efficiently in the task. A computational model of this process identified a small number of heuristics of low computational complexity that accounted for human behavior. These heuristics include making categorical decisions at the branching points of the decision tree rather than carrying forward entire probability distributions, discarding sensory evidence deemed unreliable to make a choice, and using choice confidence to infer the cause of the error after an initial plan failed. Plans based on probabilistic inference or myopic sampling norms could not capture participants' behavior. Our results show that it is possible to identify hallmarks of heuristic planning with sensing in human behavior and that the use of tasks of intermediate complexity helps identify the rules underlying human ability to reason over decision hierarchies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ariel Zylberberg
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York, United States of America
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America
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30
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Chanda S, Fitwe K, Deshpande G, Schuller BW, Patel S. A Deep Audiovisual Approach for Human Confidence Classification. FRONTIERS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 2021. [DOI: 10.3389/fcomp.2021.674533] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Research on self-efficacy and confidence has spread across several subfields of psychology and neuroscience. The role of one’s confidence is very crucial in the formation of attitude and communication skills. The importance of differentiating the levels of confidence is quite visible in this domain. With the recent advances in extracting behavioral insight from a signal in multiple applications, detecting confidence is found to have great importance. One such prominent application is detecting confidence in interview conversations. We have collected an audiovisual data set of interview conversations with 34 candidates. Every response (from each of the candidate) of this data set is labeled with three levels of confidence: high, medium, and low. Furthermore, we have also developed algorithms to efficiently compute such behavioral confidence from speech and video. A deep learning architecture is proposed for detecting confidence levels (high, medium, and low) from an audiovisual clip recorded during an interview. The achieved unweighted average recall (UAR) reaches 85.9% on audio data and 73.6% on video data captured from an interview session.
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Variance misperception under skewed empirical noise statistics explains overconfidence in the visual periphery. Atten Percept Psychophys 2021; 84:161-178. [PMID: 34426932 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-021-02358-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Perceptual confidence typically corresponds to accuracy. However, observers can be overconfident relative to accuracy, termed "subjective inflation." Inflation is stronger in the visual periphery relative to central vision, especially under conditions of peripheral inattention. Previous literature suggests inflation stems from errors in estimating noise (i.e., "variance misperception"). However, despite previous Bayesian hypotheses about metacognitive noise estimation, no work has systematically explored how noise estimation may critically depend on empirical noise statistics, which may differ across the visual field, with central noise distributed symmetrically but peripheral noise positively skewed. Here, we examined central and peripheral vision predictions from five Bayesian-inspired noise-estimation algorithms under varying usage of noise priors, including effects of attention. Models that failed to optimally estimate noise exhibited peripheral inflation, but only models that explicitly used peripheral noise priors-but used them incorrectly-showed increasing peripheral inflation under increasing peripheral inattention. Further, only one model successfully captured previous empirical results, which showed a selective increase in confidence in incorrect responses under performance reductions due to inattention accompanied by no change in confidence in correct responses; this was the model that implemented Bayesian estimation of peripheral noise, but using an (incorrect) symmetric rather than the correct positively skewed peripheral noise prior. Our findings explain peripheral inflation, especially under inattention, and suggest future experiments that might reveal the noise expectations used by the visual metacognitive system.
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Fernandez-Vargas J, Tremmel C, Valeriani D, Bhattacharyya S, Cinel C, Citi L, Poli R. Subject- and task-independent neural correlates and prediction of decision confidence in perceptual decision making. J Neural Eng 2021; 18. [PMID: 33780913 DOI: 10.1088/1741-2552/abf2e4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2020] [Accepted: 03/29/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Abstract
Objective.In many real-world decision tasks, the information available to the decision maker is incomplete. To account for this uncertainty, we associate a degree of confidence to every decision, representing the likelihood of that decision being correct. In this study, we analyse electroencephalography (EEG) data from 68 participants undertaking eight different perceptual decision-making experiments. Our goals are to investigate (1) whether subject- and task-independent neural correlates of decision confidence exist, and (2) to what degree it is possible to build brain computer interfaces that can estimate confidence on a trial-by-trial basis. The experiments cover a wide range of perceptual tasks, which allowed to separate the task-related, decision-making features from the task-independent ones.Approach.Our systems train artificial neural networks to predict the confidence in each decision from EEG data and response times. We compare the decoding performance with three training approaches: (1) single subject, where both training and testing data were acquired from the same person; (2) multi-subject, where all the data pertained to the same task, but the training and testing data came from different users; and (3) multi-task, where the training and testing data came from different tasks and subjects. Finally, we validated our multi-task approach using data from two additional experiments, in which confidence was not reported.Main results.We found significant differences in the EEG data for different confidence levels in both stimulus-locked and response-locked epochs. All our approaches were able to predict the confidence between 15% and 35% better than the corresponding reference baselines.Significance.Our results suggest that confidence in perceptual decision making tasks could be reconstructed from neural signals even when using transfer learning approaches. These confidence estimates are based on the decision-making process rather than just the confidence-reporting process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jacobo Fernandez-Vargas
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
| | - Christoph Tremmel
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
| | - Davide Valeriani
- Department of Otolaryngology
- Head and Neck Surgery, Massachusetts Eye and Ear, Boston, MA, United States of America.,Department of Otolaryngology
- Head and Neck Surgery, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, United States of America
| | - Saugat Bhattacharyya
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom.,School of Computing, Engineering & Intelligent Systems, Ulster University, Londonderry, United Kingdom
| | - Caterina Cinel
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
| | - Luca Citi
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
| | - Riccardo Poli
- Brain-Computer Interfaces and Neural Engineering laboratory, School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Essex, United Kingdom
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Abstract
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the role of noisy cognition in perceptual judgment, focusing on the central tendency effect: the well-known empirical regularity that perceptual judgments are biased towards the center of the stimulus distribution. Based on a formal Bayesian framework, we generate predictions about the relationships between subjective confidence, central tendency, and response variability. Specifically, our model clarifies that lower subjective confidence as a measure of posterior uncertainty about a judgment should predict (i) a lower sensitivity of magnitude estimates to objective stimuli; (ii) a higher sensitivity to the mean of the stimulus distribution; (iii) a stronger central tendency effect at higher stimulus magnitudes; and (iv) higher response variability. To test these predictions, we collect a large-scale experimental data set and additionally re-analyze perceptual judgment data from several previous experiments. Across data sets, subjective confidence is strongly predictive of the central tendency effect and response variability, both correlationally and when we exogenously manipulate the magnitude of sensory noise. Our results are consistent with (but not necessarily uniquely explained by) Bayesian models of confidence and the central tendency.
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Abstract
Priors and payoffs are known to affect perceptual decision-making, but little is understood about how they influence confidence judgments. For optimal perceptual decision-making, both priors and payoffs should be considered when selecting a response. However, for confidence to reflect the probability of being correct in a perceptual decision, priors should affect confidence but payoffs should not. To experimentally test whether human observers follow this normative behavior for natural confidence judgments, we conducted an orientation-discrimination task with varied priors and payoffs that probed both perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. The placement of discrimination and confidence criteria were examined according to several plausible Signal Detection Theory models. In the normative model, observers use the optimal discrimination criterion (i.e., the criterion that maximizes expected gain) and confidence criteria that shift with the discrimination criterion that maximizes accuracy (i.e., are not affected by payoffs). No observer was consistent with this model, with the majority exhibiting non-normative confidence behavior. One subset of observers ignored both priors and payoffs for confidence, always fixing the confidence criteria around the neutral discrimination criterion. The other group of observers incorrectly incorporated payoffs into their confidence by always shifting their confidence criteria with the same gains-maximizing criterion used for discrimination. Such metacognitive mistakes could have negative consequences outside the laboratory setting, particularly when priors or payoffs are not matched for all the possible decision alternatives.
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The role of sensory uncertainty in simple contour integration. PLoS Comput Biol 2020; 16:e1006308. [PMID: 33253195 PMCID: PMC7728286 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2018] [Revised: 12/10/2020] [Accepted: 10/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptual organization is the process of grouping scene elements into whole entities. A classic example is contour integration, in which separate line segments are perceived as continuous contours. Uncertainty in such grouping arises from scene ambiguity and sensory noise. Some classic Gestalt principles of contour integration, and more broadly, of perceptual organization, have been re-framed in terms of Bayesian inference, whereby the observer computes the probability that the whole entity is present. Previous studies that proposed a Bayesian interpretation of perceptual organization, however, have ignored sensory uncertainty, despite the fact that accounting for the current level of perceptual uncertainty is one of the main signatures of Bayesian decision making. Crucially, trial-by-trial manipulation of sensory uncertainty is a key test to whether humans perform near-optimal Bayesian inference in contour integration, as opposed to using some manifestly non-Bayesian heuristic. We distinguish between these hypotheses in a simplified form of contour integration, namely judging whether two line segments separated by an occluder are collinear. We manipulate sensory uncertainty by varying retinal eccentricity. A Bayes-optimal observer would take the level of sensory uncertainty into account—in a very specific way—in deciding whether a measured offset between the line segments is due to non-collinearity or to sensory noise. We find that people deviate slightly but systematically from Bayesian optimality, while still performing “probabilistic computation” in the sense that they take into account sensory uncertainty via a heuristic rule. Our work contributes to an understanding of the role of sensory uncertainty in higher-order perception. Our percept of the world is governed not only by the sensory information we have access to, but also by the way we interpret this information. When presented with a visual scene, our visual system undergoes a process of grouping visual elements together to form coherent entities so that we can interpret the scene more readily and meaningfully. For example, when looking at a pile of autumn leaves, one can still perceive and identify a whole leaf even when it is partially covered by another leaf. While Gestalt psychologists have long described perceptual organization with a set of qualitative laws, recent studies offered a statistically-optimal—Bayesian, in statistical jargon—interpretation of this process, whereby the observer chooses the scene configuration with the highest probability given the available sensory inputs. However, these studies drew their conclusions without considering a key actor in this kind of statistically-optimal computations, that is the role of sensory uncertainty. One can easily imagine that our decision on whether two contours belong to the same leaf or different leaves is likely going to change when we move from viewing the pile of leaves at a great distance (high sensory uncertainty), to viewing very closely (low sensory uncertainty). Our study examines whether and how people incorporate uncertainty into contour integration, an elementary form of perceptual organization, by varying sensory uncertainty from trial to trial in a simple contour integration task. We found that people indeed take into account sensory uncertainty, however in a way that subtly deviates from optimal behavior.
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Locke SM, Mamassian P, Landy MS. Performance monitoring for sensorimotor confidence: A visuomotor tracking study. Cognition 2020; 205:104396. [PMID: 32771212 PMCID: PMC7669557 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104396] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/03/2019] [Revised: 07/01/2020] [Accepted: 07/03/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
To best interact with the external world, humans are often required to consider the quality of their actions. Sometimes the environment furnishes rewards or punishments to signal action efficacy. However, when such feedback is absent or only partial, we must rely on internally generated signals to evaluate our performance (i.e., metacognition). Yet, very little is known about how humans form such judgements of sensorimotor confidence. Do they monitor their actual performance or do they rely on cues to sensorimotor uncertainty? We investigated sensorimotor metacognition in two visuomotor tracking experiments, where participants followed an unpredictably moving dot cloud with a mouse cursor as it followed a random horizontal trajectory. Their goal was to infer the underlying target generating the dots, track it for several seconds, and then report their confidence in their tracking as better or worse than their average. In Experiment 1, we manipulated task difficulty with two methods: varying the size of the dot cloud and varying the stability of the target's velocity. In Experiment 2, the stimulus statistics were fixed and duration of the stimulus presentation was varied. We found similar levels of metacognitive sensitivity in all experiments, which was evidence against the cue-based strategy. The temporal analysis of metacognitive sensitivity revealed a recency effect, where error later in the trial had a greater influence on the sensorimotor confidence, consistent with a performance-monitoring strategy. From these results, we conclude that humans predominantly monitored their tracking performance, albeit inefficiently, to build a sense of sensorimotor confidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shannon M Locke
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d'Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France; Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, United States.
| | - Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, Département d'Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France
| | - Michael S Landy
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, United States; Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, United States
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37
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Sources of Metacognitive Inefficiency. Trends Cogn Sci 2020; 25:12-23. [PMID: 33214066 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2020.10.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2020] [Revised: 10/22/2020] [Accepted: 10/23/2020] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
Confidence judgments are typically less informative about one's accuracy than they could be; a phenomenon we call metacognitive inefficiency. We review the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency and classify them into four categories based on whether the corruption is due to: (i) systematic or nonsystematic influences, and (ii) the input to or the computation of the metacognitive system. Critically, the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency provides an alternative explanation for behavioral findings typically interpreted as evidence for domain-specific (and against domain-general) metacognitive systems. We argue that, contrary to the dominant assumption in the field, metacognitive failures are not monolithic and suggest that understanding the sources of metacognitive inefficiency should be a primary goal of the science of metacognition.
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38
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Discrete confidence levels revealed by sequential decisions. Nat Hum Behav 2020; 5:273-280. [PMID: 32958899 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-00953-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/03/2018] [Accepted: 08/19/2020] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Humans can meaningfully express their confidence about uncertain events. Normatively, these beliefs should correspond to Bayesian probabilities. However, it is unclear whether the normative theory provides an accurate description of the human sense of confidence, partly because the self-report measures used in most studies hinder quantitative comparison with normative predictions. To measure confidence objectively, we developed a dual-decision task in which the correctness of a first decision determines the correct answer of a second decision, thus mimicking real-life situations in which confidence guides future choices. While participants were able to use confidence to improve performance, they fell short of the ideal Bayesian strategy. Instead, behaviour was better explained by a model with a few discrete confidence levels. These findings question the descriptive validity of normative accounts, and suggest that confidence judgments might be based on point estimates of the relevant variables, rather than on their full probability distributions.
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Yu JC, Fiore VG, Briggs RW, Braud J, Rubia K, Adinoff B, Gu X. An insula-driven network computes decision uncertainty and promotes abstinence in chronic cocaine users. Eur J Neurosci 2020; 52:4923-4936. [PMID: 33439518 DOI: 10.1111/ejn.14917] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2020] [Revised: 06/26/2020] [Accepted: 07/19/2020] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
The anterior insular cortex (AIC) and its interconnected brain regions have been associated with both addiction and decision-making under uncertainty. However, the causal interactions in this uncertainty-encoding neurocircuitry and how these neural dynamics impact relapse remain elusive. Here, we used model-based fMRI to measure choice uncertainty in a motor decision task in 61 individuals with cocaine use disorder (CUD) and 25 healthy controls. CUD participants were assessed before discharge from a residential treatment program and followed for up to 24 weeks. We found that choice uncertainty was tracked by the AIC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and ventral striatum (VS), across participants. Stronger activations in these regions measured pre-discharge predicted longer abstinence after discharge in individuals with CUD. Dynamic causal modeling revealed an AIC-to-dACC-directed connectivity modulated by uncertainty in controls, but a dACC-to-AIC connectivity in CUD participants. This reversal was mostly driven by early relapsers (<30 days). Furthermore, CUD individuals who displayed a stronger AIC-to-dACC excitatory connection during uncertainty encoding remained abstinent for longer periods. These findings reveal a critical role of an AIC-driven, uncertainty-encoding neurocircuitry in protecting against relapse and promoting abstinence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ju-Chi Yu
- School of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA
| | - Vincenzo G Fiore
- Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA
| | - Richard W Briggs
- Department of Aging and Geriatric Research, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
| | - Jacquelyn Braud
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX, USA
| | - Katya Rubia
- Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
| | - Bryon Adinoff
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX, USA.,VA North Texas Health Care System, Dallas, TX, USA.,Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of Colorado, Denver, CO, USA
| | - Xiaosi Gu
- Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA.,Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA
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40
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Uppal A, Ferdinand V, Marzen S. Inferring an Observer's Prediction Strategy in Sequence Learning Experiments. ENTROPY 2020; 22:e22080896. [PMID: 33286665 PMCID: PMC7517522 DOI: 10.3390/e22080896] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2020] [Revised: 08/10/2020] [Accepted: 08/12/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive systems exhibit astounding prediction capabilities that allow them to reap rewards from regularities in their environment. How do organisms predict environmental input and how well do they do it? As a prerequisite to answering that question, we first address the limits on prediction strategy inference, given a series of inputs and predictions from an observer. We study the special case of Bayesian observers, allowing for a probability that the observer randomly ignores data when building her model. We demonstrate that an observer's prediction model can be correctly inferred for binary stimuli generated from a finite-order Markov model. However, we can not necessarily infer the model's parameter values unless we have access to several "clones" of the observer. As stimuli become increasingly complicated, correct inference requires exponentially more data points, computational power, and computational time. These factors place a practical limit on how well we are able to infer an observer's prediction strategy in an experimental or observational setting.
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Affiliation(s)
- Abhinuv Uppal
- W.M. Keck Science Department, Pitzer, Scripps, and Claremont McKenna Colleges, Claremont, CA 91711, USA;
| | - Vanessa Ferdinand
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3050, Australia;
| | - Sarah Marzen
- W.M. Keck Science Department, Pitzer, Scripps, and Claremont McKenna Colleges, Claremont, CA 91711, USA;
- Correspondence: or
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Berlemont K, Martin JR, Sackur J, Nadal JP. Nonlinear neural network dynamics accounts for human confidence in a sequence of perceptual decisions. Sci Rep 2020; 10:7940. [PMID: 32409634 PMCID: PMC7224191 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-63582-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2019] [Accepted: 03/27/2020] [Indexed: 12/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Electrophysiological recordings during perceptual decision tasks in monkeys suggest that the degree of confidence in a decision is based on a simple neural signal produced by the neural decision process. Attractor neural networks provide an appropriate biophysical modeling framework, and account for the experimental results very well. However, it remains unclear whether attractor neural networks can account for confidence reports in humans. We present the results from an experiment in which participants are asked to perform an orientation discrimination task, followed by a confidence judgment. Here we show that an attractor neural network model quantitatively reproduces, for each participant, the relations between accuracy, response times and confidence. We show that the attractor neural network also accounts for confidence-specific sequential effects observed in the experiment (participants are faster on trials following high confidence trials). Remarkably, this is obtained as an inevitable outcome of the network dynamics, without any feedback specific to the previous decision (that would result in, e.g., a change in the model parameters before the onset of the next trial). Our results thus suggest that a metacognitive process such as confidence in one's decision is linked to the intrinsically nonlinear dynamics of the decision-making neural network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kevin Berlemont
- Laboratoire de Physique de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Sorbonne University, Université de Paris, 75005, Paris, France.
| | - Jean-Rémy Martin
- Centre for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, Faculté des Sciences Psychologiques et de l'Education, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Jérôme Sackur
- Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), PSL University, Département d'études cognitives, (CNRS/ENS/EHESS), 75005, Paris, France
| | - Jean-Pierre Nadal
- Laboratoire de Physique de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL University, CNRS, Sorbonne University, Université de Paris, 75005, Paris, France
- Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique Sociales, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, CNRS, 75006, Paris, France
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42
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Confidence reports in decision-making with multiple alternatives violate the Bayesian confidence hypothesis. Nat Commun 2020; 11:2004. [PMID: 32332712 PMCID: PMC7181620 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-15581-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/20/2019] [Accepted: 03/12/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Decision confidence reflects our ability to evaluate the quality of decisions and guides subsequent behavior. Experiments on confidence reports have almost exclusively focused on two-alternative decision-making. In this realm, the leading theory is that confidence reflects the probability that a decision is correct (the posterior probability of the chosen option). There is, however, another possibility, namely that people are less confident if the best two options are closer to each other in posterior probability, regardless of how probable they are in absolute terms. This possibility has not previously been considered because in two-alternative decisions, it reduces to the leading theory. Here, we test this alternative theory in a three-alternative visual categorization task. We found that confidence reports are best explained by the difference between the posterior probabilities of the best and the next-best options, rather than by the posterior probability of the chosen (best) option alone, or by the overall uncertainty (entropy) of the posterior distribution. Our results upend the leading notion of decision confidence and instead suggest that confidence reflects the observer’s subjective probability that they made the best possible decision. Conventional theory suggests that people’s confidence about a decision reflects their subjective probability that the decision was correct. By studying decisions with multiple alternatives, the authors show that confidence reports instead reflect the difference in probabilities between the chosen and the next-best alternative.
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43
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Rausch M, Zehetleitner M. The folded X-pattern is not necessarily a statistical signature of decision confidence. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007456. [PMID: 31634359 PMCID: PMC6822779 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007456] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2019] [Revised: 10/31/2019] [Accepted: 10/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent studies have traced the neural correlates of confidence in perceptual choices using statistical signatures of confidence. The most widely used statistical signature is the folded X-pattern, which was derived from a standard model of confidence assuming an objective definition of confidence as the posterior probability of making the correct choice given the evidence. The folded X-pattern entails that confidence as the subjective probability of being correct equals the probability of 0.75 if the stimulus in neutral about the choice options, increases with discriminability of the stimulus in correct trials, and decreases with discriminability in incorrect trials. Here, we show that the standard model of confidence is a special case in which there is no reliable trial-by-trial evidence about discriminability itself. According to a more general model, if there is enough evidence about discriminability, objective confidence is characterised by different pattern: For both correct and incorrect choices, confidence increases with discriminability. In addition, we demonstrate the consequence if discriminability is varied in discrete steps within the standard model: confidence in choices about neutral stimuli is no longer .75. Overall, identifying neural correlates of confidence by presupposing the folded X-pattern as a statistical signature of confidence is not legitimate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Manuel Rausch
- Allgemeine Psychologie II, Philosophisch-Pädagogische Fakultät, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany
| | - Michael Zehetleitner
- Allgemeine Psychologie II, Philosophisch-Pädagogische Fakultät, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany
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44
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Lebreton M, Bacily K, Palminteri S, Engelmann JB. Contextual influence on confidence judgments in human reinforcement learning. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1006973. [PMID: 30958826 PMCID: PMC6472836 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006973] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2018] [Revised: 04/18/2019] [Accepted: 03/22/2019] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
The ability to correctly estimate the probability of one’s choices being correct is fundamental to optimally re-evaluate previous choices or to arbitrate between different decision strategies. Experimental evidence nonetheless suggests that this metacognitive process—confidence judgment- is susceptible to numerous biases. Here, we investigate the effect of outcome valence (gains or losses) on confidence while participants learned stimulus-outcome associations by trial-and-error. In two experiments, participants were more confident in their choices when learning to seek gains compared to avoiding losses, despite equal difficulty and performance between those two contexts. Computational modelling revealed that this bias is driven by the context-value, a dynamically updated estimate of the average expected-value of choice options, necessary to explain equal performance in the gain and loss domain. The biasing effect of context-value on confidence, revealed here for the first time in a reinforcement-learning context, is therefore domain-general, with likely important functional consequences. We show that one such consequence emerges in volatile environments, where the (in)flexibility of individuals’ learning strategies differs when outcomes are framed as gains or losses. Despite apparent similar behavior- profound asymmetries might therefore exist between learning to avoid losses and learning to seek gains. In order to arbitrate between different decision strategies, as well as to inform future choices, a decision maker needs to estimate the probability of her choices being correct as precisely as possible. Surprisingly, this metacognitive operation, known as confidence judgment, has not been systematically investigated in the context of simple instrumental-learning tasks. Here, we assessed how confident individuals are in their choices when learning stimulus-outcome associations by trial-and-errors to maximize gains or to minimize losses. In two experiments, we show that individuals are more confident in their choices when learning to seek gains compared to avoiding losses, despite equal difficulty and performance between those two contexts. To simultaneously account for this pattern of choices and confidence judgments, we propose that individuals learn context-values, which approximate the average expected-value of choice options. We finally show that, in volatile environments, the biasing effect of context-value on confidence induces difference in learning flexibility when outcomes are framed as gains or losses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maël Lebreton
- CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Neurology and Imaging of Cognition (LabNIC), Department of Basic Neurosciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- Swiss Center for Affective Science (CISA), University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- * E-mail:
| | - Karin Bacily
- CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Stefano Palminteri
- Human Reinforcement Learning team, Université de Recherche Paris Sciences et Lettres, Paris, France
- Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
- Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Computationnelles, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Paris, France
| | - Jan B. Engelmann
- CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- The Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Stengård E, van den Berg R. Imperfect Bayesian inference in visual perception. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1006465. [PMID: 30998675 PMCID: PMC6472731 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006465] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2018] [Accepted: 03/08/2019] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Optimal Bayesian models have been highly successful in describing human performance on perceptual decision-making tasks, such as cue combination and visual search. However, recent studies have argued that these models are often overly flexible and therefore lack explanatory power. Moreover, there are indications that neural computation is inherently imprecise, which makes it implausible that humans would perform optimally on any non-trivial task. Here, we reconsider human performance on a visual-search task by using an approach that constrains model flexibility and tests for computational imperfections. Subjects performed a target detection task in which targets and distractors were tilted ellipses with orientations drawn from Gaussian distributions with different means. We varied the amount of overlap between these distributions to create multiple levels of external uncertainty. We also varied the level of sensory noise, by testing subjects under both short and unlimited display times. On average, empirical performance-measured as d'-fell 18.1% short of optimal performance. We found no evidence that the magnitude of this suboptimality was affected by the level of internal or external uncertainty. The data were well accounted for by a Bayesian model with imperfections in its computations. This "imperfect Bayesian" model convincingly outperformed the "flawless Bayesian" model as well as all ten heuristic models that we tested. These results suggest that perception is founded on Bayesian principles, but with suboptimalities in the implementation of these principles. The view of perception as imperfect Bayesian inference can provide a middle ground between traditional Bayesian and anti-Bayesian views.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elina Stengård
- Department of Psychology, University of Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden
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Abstract
The Bayesian model of confidence posits that confidence reflects the observer's posterior probability that the decision is correct. Hangya, Sanders, and Kepecs ( 2016 ) have proposed that researchers can test the Bayesian model by deriving qualitative signatures of Bayesian confidence (i.e., patterns that one would expect to see if an observer were Bayesian) and looking for those signatures in human or animal data. We examine two proposed signatures, showing that their derivations contain hidden assumptions that limit their applicability and that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for Bayesian confidence. One signature is an average confidence of 0.75 on trials with neutral evidence. This signature holds only when class-conditioned stimulus distributions do not overlap and when internal noise is very low. Another signature is that as stimulus magnitude increases, confidence increases on correct trials but decreases on incorrect trials. This divergence signature holds only when stimulus distributions do not overlap or when noise is high. Navajas et al. ( 2017 ) have proposed an alternative form of this signature; we find no indication that this alternative form is expected under Bayesian confidence. Our observations give us pause about the usefulness of the qualitative signatures of Bayesian confidence. To determine the nature of the computations underlying confidence reports, there may be no shortcut to quantitative model comparison.
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Affiliation(s)
- William T. Adler
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003, U.S.A
| | - Wei Ji Ma
- Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, U.S.A
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