Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Virus in Gray Seals, Baltic Sea

A systematic review on global zoonotic virus-associated mortality events in marine mammals

Marine mammals play a critical role as sentinels for tracking the spread of zoonotic diseases, with viruses being the primary causative factor behind infectious disease induced mortality events. A systematic review was conducted to document marine mammal mortality events attributed to zoonotic viral infections in published literature across the globe. This rigorous search strategy yielded 2883 studies with 88 meeting inclusion criteria. The studies spanned from 1989 to 2023, with a peak in publications observed in 2020. Most of the included studies were retrospective, providing valuable insights into historical trends. The United States (U.S.) reported the highest number of mortality events followed by Spain, Italy, Brazil and the United Kingdom. Harbor seals were the most impacted species, particularly in regions like Anholt, Denmark and the New England Coast, U.S. Analysis revealed six main viruses responsible for mortality events, with Morbillivirus causing the highest proportion of deaths. Notably, the occurrence of these viral events varied geographically, with distinct patterns observed in different regions. Immunohistochemistry emerged as the most employed detection method. This study underscores the importance of global surveillance efforts in understanding and mitigating the impact of viral infections on marine mammal populations, thereby emphasizing the necessity of collaborative One Health approaches to address emerging threats at the human-animal-environment interface. Additionally, the potential transfer of zoonotic viruses to aquatic organisms used in food production, such as fish and shellfish, highlights the broader implications for food safety, food security and public health.

Potential biosecurity breaches in poultry farms: Presence of free-ranging mammals near laying-hen houses assessed through a camera-trap study

Diligent application and implementation of biosecurity measures stand as the most effective measures to prevent disease transmission through direct or indirect interactions between poultry and free-ranging animals. Among these, free-ranging mammals can be hosts or disseminators of several pathogens relevant to poultry and of public health concern. Moreover, evidence of susceptibility to avian influenza virus infection in non-human mammals has raised questions about their potential role in the virus' epidemiology at the domestic animal-wildlife interface. Given this background, this study aimed to identify mammal species occurring near laying-hen houses and characterize the spatiotemporal patterns of these visits. Seven camera traps were deployed for a year-long period in three commercial poultry farms in a densely populated poultry area in Northern Italy. Various methods, including time series analysis and generalized linear models, were employed to analyze daily mammal visits. A total of 1,867 camera trap nights yielded 567 videos of seven species of wild mammals, and 1,866 videos showed domestic pet species (cats and dogs). Coypus (Myocastor coypus) and cats were the two mammals more frequently observed near poultry houses. For wild mammals, visits significantly increased at night, and slightly decreased during the spring season. Overall, the data hereby provided lay the groundwork for designing novel surveillance and intervention strategies to prevent cross-species disease transmission. Moreover, the utilization of visual evidence depicting free-ranging animals approaching poultry houses could assist health authorities in educating and raising awareness among stakeholders about potential risks of pathogen spillover.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Clade 2.3.4.4b Infections in Seals, Russia, 2023

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus was detected in dead seals on Tyuleniy Island in eastern Russia, in the Sea of Okhotsk. Viruses isolated from dead northern fur seals belong to clade 2.3.4.4b and are closely related to viruses detected predominantly in the Russian Far East and Japan in 2022-2023.

Complex Evolutionary Dynamics of H5N8 Influenza A Viruses Revealed by Comprehensive Reassortment Analysis

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) circulate among different species and have the potential to cause significant pandemics in humans. This study focuses on reassortment events in the H5N8 subtype of IAV, which poses a serious threat to public health due to its high pathogenicity in birds and potential for cross-species transmission. We retrieved 2359 H5N8 IAV sequences from GISAID, and filtered and analyzed 442 complete genomic sequences for reassortment events using pairwise distance deviation matrices (PDDMs) and pairwise distance correspondence plots (PDCPs). This detailed case study of specific H5N8 viruses revealed previously undescribed reassortment events, highlighting the complex evolutionary history and potential pandemic threat of H5N8 IAVs.

Avian influenza overview March-June 2024

Between 16 March and 14 June 2024, 42 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (15) and wild (27) birds across 13 countries in Europe. Although the overall number of detections in Europe has not been this low since the 2019-2020 epidemiological year, HPAI viruses continue to circulate at a very low level. Most detections in poultry were due to indirect contact with wild birds, but there was also secondary spread. Outside Europe, the HPAI situation intensified particularly in the USA, where a new A(H5N1) virus genotype (B3.13) has been identified in >130 dairy herds in 12 states. Infection in cattle appears to be centred on the udder, with milk from infected animals showing high viral loads and representing a new vehicle of transmission. Apart from cattle, HPAI viruses were identified in two other mammal species (alpaca and walrus) for the first time. Between 13 March and 20 June 2024, 14 new human cases with avian influenza virus infection were reported from Vietnam (one A(H5N1), one A(H9N2)), Australia (with travel history to India, one A(H5N1)), USA (three A(H5N1)), China (two A(H5N6), three A(H9N2), one A(H10N3)), India (one A(H9N2)), and Mexico (one fatal A(H5N2) case). The latter case was the first laboratory-confirmed human infection with avian influenza virus subtype A(H5N2). Most of the human cases had reported exposure to poultry, live poultry markets, or dairy cattle prior to avian influenza virus detection or onset of illness. Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no human-to-human transmission has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian A(H5) influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general public in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.

Pinnipeds and avian influenza: a global timeline and review of research on the impact of highly pathogenic avian influenza on pinniped populations with particular reference to the endangered Caspian seal (Pusa caspica)

This study reviews chronologically the international scientific and health management literature and resources relating to impacts of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses on pinnipeds in order to reinforce strategies for the conservation of the endangered Caspian seal (Pusa caspica), currently under threat from the HPAI H5N1 subtype transmitted from infected avifauna which share its haul-out habitats. Many cases of mass pinniped deaths globally have occurred from HPAI spill-overs, and are attributed to infected sympatric aquatic avifauna. As the seasonal migrations of Caspian seals provide occasions for contact with viruses from infected migratory aquatic birds in many locations around the Caspian Sea, this poses a great challenge to seal conservation. These are thus critical locations for the surveillance of highly pathogenic influenza A viruses, whose future reassortments may present a pandemic threat to humans.

Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Seals, St. Lawrence Estuary, Quebec, Canada1

We describe an unusual mortality event caused by a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b involving harbor (Phoca vitulina) and gray (Halichoerus grypus) seals in the St. Lawrence Estuary, Quebec, Canada, in 2022. Fifteen (56%) of the seals submitted for necropsy were considered to be fatally infected by HPAI H5N1 containing fully Eurasian or Eurasian/North American genome constellations. Concurrently, presence of large numbers of bird carcasses infected with HPAI H5N1 at seal haul-out sites most likely contributed to the spillover of infection to the seals. Histologic changes included meningoencephalitis (100%), fibrinosuppurative alveolitis, and multiorgan acute necrotizing inflammation. This report of fatal HPAI H5N1 infection in pinnipeds in Canada raises concerns about the expanding host of this virus, the potential for the establishment of a marine mammal reservoir, and the public health risks associated with spillover to mammals.Nous décrivons un événement de mortalité inhabituelle causé par un virus de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b chez des phoques communs (Phoca vitulina) et gris (Halichoerus grypus) dans l'estuaire du Saint-Laurent au Québec, Canada, en 2022. Quinze (56%) des phoques soumis pour nécropsie ont été considérés comme étant fatalement infectés par le virus H5N1 de lignées eurasiennes ou de réassortiment eurasiennes/nord-américaines. Un grand nombre simultané de carcasses d'oiseaux infectés par le H5N1 sur les sites d'échouement a probablement contribué à la contamination de ces phoques. Les changements histologiques associés à cette infection incluaient : méningo-encéphalite (100%), alvéolite fibrinosuppurée et inflammation nécrosante aiguë multi-organique. Cette documentation soulève des préoccupations quant à l'émergence de virus mortels, à la possibilité d'établissement de réservoirs chez les mammifères marins, et aux risques pour la santé publique associés aux propagations du virus chez les mammifères.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Birds and Mammals

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are highly contagious respiratory viruses of birds, leading to significant morbidity and mortality globally and causing substantial economic losses to the poultry industry and agriculture. Since their first isolation in 2013-2014, the Asian-origin H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4b have undergone unprecedented evolution and reassortment of internal gene segments. In just a few years, it supplanted other AIV clades, and now it is widespread in the wild migratory waterfowl, spreading to Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Wild waterfowl, the natural reservoir of LPAIVs and generally more resistant to the disease, also manifested high morbidity and mortality with HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b. This clade also caused overt clinical signs and mass mortality in a variety of avian and mammalian species never reported before, such as raptors, seabirds, sealions, foxes, and others. Most notably, the recent outbreaks in dairy cattle were associated with the emergence of a few critical mutations related to mammalian adaptation, raising concerns about the possibility of jumping species and acquisition of sustained human-to-human transmission. The main clinical signs and anatomopathological findings associated with clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in birds and non-human mammals are hereby summarized.

Iceland: an underestimated hub for the spread of high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in the North Atlantic

High-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the goose/Guangdong lineage are enzootically circulating in wild bird populations worldwide. This increases the risk of entry into poultry production and spill-over to mammalian species, including humans. Better understanding of the ecological and epizootiological networks of these viruses is essential to optimize mitigation measures. Based on full genome sequences of 26 HPAIV samples from Iceland, which were collected between spring and autumn 2022, as well as 1 sample from the 2023 summer period, we show that 3 different genotypes of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were circulating within the wild bird population in Iceland in 2022. Furthermore, in 2023 we observed a novel introduction of HPAIV H5N5 of the same clade to Iceland. The data support the role of Iceland as an utmost northwestern distribution area in Europe that might act also as a potential bridging point for intercontinental spread of HPAIV across the North Atlantic.

Are all avian influenza outbreaks in poultry the same? The predicted impact of poultry species and virus subtype

AIMS

Outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry farms are currently increasing in frequency, with devastating consequences for animal welfare, farmers and supply chains. Some studies have documented the direct spread of the avian influenza virus between farms. Prevention of spread between farms relies on biosecurity surveillance and control measures. However, the evolution of an outbreak on a farm might vary depending on the virus strain and poultry species involved; this would have important implications for surveillance systems, epidemiological investigations and control measures.

METHODS AND RESULTS

In this study, we utilized existing parameter estimates from the literature to evaluate the predicted course of an epidemic in a standard poultry flock with 10,000 birds. We used a stochastic SEIR simulation model to simulate outbreaks in different species and with different virus subtypes. The simulations predicted large differences in the duration and severity of outbreaks, depending on the virus subtypes. For both turkeys and chickens, outbreaks with HPAI were of shorter duration than outbreaks with LPAI. In outbreaks involving the infection of chickens with different virus subtypes, the shortest epidemic involved H7N7 and HPAIV H5N1 (median duration of 9 and 17 days, respectively) and the longest involved H5N2 (median duration of 68 days). The most severe outbreaks (number of chickens infected) were predicted for H5N1, H7N1 and H7N3 virus subtypes, and the least severe for H5N2 and H7N7, in which outbreaks for the latter subtype were predicted to develop most slowly.

CONCLUSIONS

These simulation results suggest that surveillance of certain subtypes of avian influenza virus, in chicken flocks in particular, needs to be sensitive and timely if infection is to be detected with sufficient time to implement control measures. The variability in the predictions highlights that avian influenza outbreaks are different in severity, speed and duration, so surveillance and disease response need to be nuanced and fit the specific context of poultry species and virus subtypes.

Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have potential to cross species barriers and cause pandemics. Since 2022, HPAI A(H5N1) belonging to the goose/Guangdong 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin phylogenetic clade have infected poultry, wild birds, and mammals across North America. Continued circulation in birds and infection of multiple mammalian species with strains possessing adaptation mutations increase the risk for infection and subsequent reassortment with influenza A viruses endemic in swine. We assessed the susceptibility of swine to avian and mammalian HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains using a pathogenesis and transmission model. All strains replicated in the lung of pigs and caused lesions consistent with influenza A infection. However, viral replication in the nasal cavity and transmission was only observed with mammalian isolates. Mammalian adaptation and reassortment may increase the risk for incursion and transmission of HPAI viruses in feral, backyard, or commercial swine.

Development and application of a triplex real-time PCR assay for the detection of H3, H4, and H5 subtypes of avian influenza virus

Avian influenza virus (AIV) poses a significant threat to the poultry industry and public health. Among the diverse AIV subtypes, H3, H4, and H5 are frequently detected in waterfowl and live poultry markets (LPM). The expeditious and precise identification of these subtypes is imperative in impeding the dissemination of the disease. In this study, we have developed a triplex real-time PCR assay endowed with the capacity to simultaneously discriminate AIV subtypes H3, H4, and H5. This method showcases remarkable specificity, selectively amplifying H3, H4, and H5 AIV subtypes sans any cross-reactivity with other subtypes or common avian pathogens. Furthermore, this method exhibits high sensitivity, with a detection threshold of 2.1 × 102 copies/μL for H3, H4, and H5 AIV subtypes. Additionally, the assay demonstrates reproducibility, as evidenced by intra- and interassay variability, with a coefficient of variation below 1.5%. A total of 338 cloacal swabs were collected from LPM to evaluate the performance of our assay. The obtained results evinced a high level of concordance with the sequencing data. In summary, our study has developed a triplex real-time PCR method that can be employed in laboratory-based testing and surveillance of AIV. This assay holds promise in augmenting our ability to detect and monitor AIV subtypes, thereby facilitating timely interventions and safeguarding both the poultry industry and public health.

Avian influenza overview September-December 2023

Between 2 September and 1 December 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (88) and wild (175) birds across 23 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, the increase in the number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl has been delayed, possibly due to a later start of the autumn migration of several wild bird species. Common cranes were the most frequently affected species during this reporting period with mortality events being described in several European countries. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds, with the exception of Hungary, where two clusters involving secondary spread occurred. HPAI viruses identified in Europe belonged to eleven different genotypes, seven of which were new. With regard to mammals, the serological survey conducted in all fur farms in Finland revealed 29 additional serologically positive farms during this reporting period. Wild mammals continued to be affected mostly in the Americas, from where further spread into wild birds and mammals in the Antarctic region was described for the first time. Since the last report and as of 1 December 2023, three fatal and one severe human A(H5N1) infection with clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have been reported by Cambodia, and one A(H9N2) infection was reported from China. No human infections related to the avian influenza detections in animals in fur farms in Finland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.

Alarming situation of emerging H5 and H7 avian influenza and effective control strategies

Avian influenza viruses continue to present challenges to animal and human health. Viruses bearing the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the H5 subtype and H7 subtype have caused 2634 human cases around the world, including more than 1000 deaths. These viruses have caused numerous disease outbreaks in wild birds and domestic poultry, and are responsible for the loss of at least 422 million domestic birds since 2005. The H5 influenza viruses are spread by migratory wild birds and have caused three waves of influenza outbreaks across multiple continents, and the third wave that started in 2020 is ongoing. Many countries in Europe and North America control highly pathogenic avian influenza by culling alone, whereas some countries, including China, have adopted a "cull plus vaccination" strategy. As the largest poultry-producing country in the world, China lost relatively few poultry during the three waves of global H5 avian influenza outbreaks, and nearly eliminated the pervasive H7N9 viruses that emerged in 2013. In this review, we briefly summarize the damages the H5 and H7 influenza viruses have caused to the global poultry industry and public health, analyze the origin, evolution, and spread of the H5 viruses that caused the waves, and discuss how and why the vaccination strategy in China has been a success. Given that the H5N1 viruses are widely circulating in wild birds and causing problems in domestic poultry around the world, we recommend that any unnecessary obstacles to vaccination strategies should be removed immediately and forever.

Avian influenza overview June-September 2023

Between 24 June and 1 September 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (25) and wild (482) birds across 21 countries in Europe. Most of these outbreaks appeared to be clustered along coastlines with only few HPAI virus detections inland. In poultry, all HPAI outbreaks were primary and sporadic with most of them occurring in the United Kingdom. In wild birds, colony-breeding seabirds continued to be most heavily affected, but an increasing number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl is expected in the coming weeks. The current epidemic in wild birds has already surpassed the one of the previous epidemiological year in terms of total number of HPAI virus detections. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 26 fur animal farms in Finland. Affected species included American mink, red and Arctic fox, and common raccoon dog. The most likely source of introduction was contact with gulls. Wild mammals continued to be affected worldwide, mostly red foxes and different seal species. Since the last report and as of 28 September 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans have been reported by the United Kingdom, and three human infections with A(H5N6) and two with A(H9N2) were reported from China, respectively. No human infection related to the avian influenza detections in animals on fur farms in Finland or in cats in Poland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.

Characterization of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5Nx viruses from a wild harbor seal and red foxes in Denmark, 2021 and 2022

In 2021 and 2022, clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in one harbor seal and in one adult and three fox cubs in Denmark. The viruses were closely related to contemporary viruses found in Europe, and some had obtained amino acid substitutions related to mammalian adaptation. Notably, the virus distribution appeared to have been different in the infected fox cubs, as one exclusively tested positive for the presence of HPAIV in the brain and the other two only in the lung. Collectively, these findings stress the need for increased disease surveillance of wild and farmed mammals.

Consequences of asymmetric mutational pressure for the dynamic of linear B-cell epitopes repertoire of influenza a virus neuraminidase rearrangement

Full-length nucleotide sequences of avian influenza A virus neuraminidase coding region (20,631 sequences) were analyzed and compared with those isolated from viruses infecting human and swine (63,750 sequences). If in fourfold degenerate sites there is asymmetric A-bias that may be more or less asymmetric depending on the type of neuraminidase and the host, than in twofold degenerate sites from third codon positions there is a strong asymmetric U-bias in coding regions of N4, N5, and N8 isolated from viruses infecting birds, as well as in those of N1 and N2 isolated from viruses infecting human, swine, and birds, while in coding regions of N9 isolated from birds, there is surprisingly strong C-bias, and in sequences of N3, N6, and N7 the usage of C is quite close to the level of U. Revealed stabilization of both U and C in twofold degenerate sites is the evidence of frequent changes in mutational pressure direction. Asymmetric mutational pressure was one of the sources of amino acid replacements that resulted in an equal percentage of sites with appeared and disappeared linear B-cell epitopes in N1, N2, N4, and N5 (33.62-35.33% vs. 32.41-36.45%, respectively), and controlled by the immune pressure it resulted in a stronger tendency to disappear for B-cell epitopes of N3, N6, N7, N8, and N9 of avian viruses (8.74-28.77% vs. 28.96-38.89%). The lack of correlation between nucleotide usages in fourfold and twofold degenerate sites for three nucleotides, except U, is a strong evidence of mutational pressure theory.

Avian influenza overview April - June 2023

Between 29 April and 23 June 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus (clade 2.3.4.4b) outbreaks were reported in domestic (98) and wild (634) birds across 25 countries in Europe. A cluster of outbreaks in mulard ducks for foie gras production was concentrated in Southwest France, whereas the overall A(H5N1) situation in poultry in Europe and worldwide has eased. In wild birds, black-headed gulls and several new seabird species, mostly gulls and terns (e.g. sandwich terns), were heavily affected, with increased mortality being observed in both adults and juveniles after hatching. Compared to the same period last year, dead seabirds have been increasingly found inland and not only along European coastlines. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 24 domestic cats and one caracal in Poland between 10 and 30 June 2023. Affected animals showed neurological and respiratory signs, sometimes mortality, and were widely scattered across nine voivodeships in the country. All cases are genetically closely related and identified viruses cluster with viruses detected in poultry (since October 2022, but now only sporadic) and wild birds (December 2022-January 2023) in the past. Uncertainties still exist around their possible source of infection, with no feline-to-feline or feline-to-human transmission reported so far. Since 10 May 2023 and as of 4 July 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from the United Kingdom, and two A(H9N2) and one A(H5N6) human infections in China. In addition, one person infected with A(H3N8) in China has died. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated).

Global review of the H5N8 avian influenza virus subtype

Orthomyxoviruses are negative-sense, RNA viruses with segmented genomes that are highly unstable due to reassortment. The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N8 emerged in wild birds in China. Since its emergence, it has posed a significant threat to poultry and human health. Poultry meat is considered an inexpensive source of protein, but due to outbreaks of HPAI H5N8 from migratory birds in commercial flocks, the poultry meat industry has been facing severe financial crises. This review focuses on occasional epidemics that have damaged food security and poultry production across Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa, and America. HPAI H5N8 viral sequences have been retrieved from GISAID and analyzed. Virulent HPAI H5N8 belongs to clade 2.3.4.4b, Gs/GD lineage, and has been a threat to the poultry industry and the public in several countries since its first introduction. Continent-wide outbreaks have revealed that this virus is spreading globally. Thus, continuous sero- and viro-surveillance both in commercial and wild birds, and strict biosecurity reduces the risk of the HPAI virus appearing. Furthermore, homologous vaccination practices in commercial poultry need to be introduced to overcome the introduction of emergent strains. This review clearly indicates that HPAI H5N8 is a continuous threat to poultry and people and that further regional epidemiological studies are needed.

Ecogeographic Drivers of the Spatial Spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks in Europe and the United States, 2016-Early 2022

H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 have caused outbreaks in Europe among wild and domestic birds since 2016 and were introduced to North America via wild migratory birds in December 2021. We examined the spatiotemporal extent of HPAI viruses across continents and characterized ecological and environmental predictors of virus spread between geographic regions by constructing a Bayesian phylodynamic generalized linear model (phylodynamic-GLM). The findings demonstrate localized epidemics of H5Nx throughout Europe in the first several years of the epizootic, followed by a singular branching point where H5N1 viruses were introduced to North America, likely via stopover locations throughout the North Atlantic. Once in the United States (US), H5Nx viruses spread at a greater rate between US-based regions as compared to prior spread in Europe. We established that geographic proximity is a predictor of virus spread between regions, implying that intercontinental transport across the Atlantic Ocean is relatively rare. An increase in mean ambient temperature over time was predictive of reduced H5Nx virus spread, which may reflect the effect of climate change on declines in host species abundance, decreased persistence of the virus in the environment, or changes in migratory patterns due to ecological alterations. Our data provide new knowledge about the spread and directionality of H5Nx virus dispersal in Europe and the US during an actively evolving intercontinental outbreak, including predictors of virus movement between regions, which will contribute to surveillance and mitigation strategies as the outbreak unfolds, and in future instances of uncontained avian spread of HPAI viruses.

Avian influenza overview March - April 2023

Between 2 March and 28 April 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, outbreaks were reported in domestic (106) and wild (610) birds across 24 countries in Europe. Poultry outbreaks occurred less frequently compared to the previous reporting period and compared to spring 2022. Most of these outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks without secondary spread and some of them associated with atypical disease presentation, in particular low mortality. In wild birds, black-headed gulls continued to be heavily affected, while also other threatened wild bird species, such as the peregrine falcon, showed increased mortality. The ongoing epidemic in black-headed gulls, many of which breed inland, may increase the risk for poultry, especially in July-August, when first-year birds disperse from the breeding colonies. HPAI A(H5N1) virus also continued to expand in the Americas, including in mammalian species, and is expected to reach the Antarctic in the near future. HPAI virus infections were detected in six mammal species, particularly in marine mammals and mustelids, for the first time, while the viruses currently circulating in Europe retain a preferential binding for avian-like receptors. Since 13 March 2022 and as of 10 May 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from China (1), and Chile (1), as well as three A(H9N2) and one A(H3N8) human infections in China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

Avian influenza overview December 2022 - March 2023

Between 3 December 2022 and 1 March 2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was reported in Europe in domestic (522) and wild (1,138) birds over 24 countries. An unexpected number of HPAI virus detections in sea birds were observed, mainly in gull species and particularly in black-headed gulls (large mortality events were observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). The close genetic relationship among viruses collected from black-headed gulls suggests a southward spread of the virus. Moreover, the genetic analyses indicate that the virus persisted in Europe in residential wild birds during and after the summer months. Although the virus retained a preferential binding for avian-like receptors, several mutations associated to increased zoonotic potential were detected. The risk of HPAI virus infection for poultry due to the virus circulating in black-headed gulls and other gull species might increase during the coming months, as breeding bird colonies move inland with possible overlap with poultry production areas. Worldwide, HPAI A(H5N1) virus continued to spread southward in the Americas, from Mexico to southern Chile. The Peruvian pelican was the most frequently reported infected species with thousands of deaths being reported. The reporting of HPAI A(H5N1) in mammals also continued probably linked to feeding on infected wild birds. In Peru, a mass mortality event of sea lions was observed in January and February 2023. Since October 2022, six A(H5N1) detections in humans were reported from Cambodia (a family cluster with 2 people, clade 2.3.2.1c), China (2, clade 2.3.4.4b), Ecuador (1, clade 2.3.4.4b), and Vietnam (1, unspecified clade), as well as two A(H5N6) human infections from China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

Screening for Influenza and Morbillivirus in Seals and Porpoises in the Baltic and North Sea

Historically, the seals and harbour porpoises of the Baltic Sea and North Sea have been subjected to hunting, chemical pollutants and repeated mass mortalities, leading to significant population fluctuations. Despite the conservation implications and the zoonotic potential associated with viral disease outbreaks in wildlife, limited information is available on the circulation of viral pathogens in Baltic Sea seals and harbour porpoises. Here, we investigated the presence of the influenza A virus (IAV), the phocine distemper virus (PDV) and the cetacean morbillivirus (CeMV) in tracheal swabs and lung tissue samples from 99 harbour seals, 126 grey seals, 73 ringed seals and 78 harbour porpoises collected in the Baltic Sea and North Sea between 2002–2019. Despite screening 376 marine mammals collected over nearly two decades, we only detected one case of PDV and two cases of IAV linked to the documented viral outbreaks in seals in 2002 and 2014, respectively. Although we find no evidence of PDV and IAV during intermediate years, reports of isolated cases of PDV in North Sea harbour seals and IAV (H5N8) in Baltic and North Sea grey seals suggest introductions of those pathogens within the sampling period. Thus, to aid future monitoring efforts we highlight the need for a standardized and continuous sample collection of swabs, tissue and blood samples across Baltic Sea countries.

Zoonotic Mutation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus Identified in the Brain of Multiple Wild Carnivore Species

Wild carnivore species infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus subtype H5N1 during the 2021-2022 outbreak in the Netherlands included red fox (Vulpes vulpes), polecat (Mustela putorius), otter (Lutra lutra), and badger (Meles meles). Most of the animals were submitted for testing because they showed neurological signs. In this study, the HPAI H5N1 virus was detected by PCR and/or immunohistochemistry in 11 animals and was primarily present in brain tissue, often associated with a (meningo) encephalitis in the cerebrum. In contrast, the virus was rarely detected in the respiratory tract and intestinal tract and associated lesions were minimal. Full genome sequencing followed by phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that these carnivore viruses were related to viruses detected in wild birds in the Netherlands. The carnivore viruses themselves were not closely related, and the infected carnivores did not cluster geographically, suggesting that they were infected separately. The mutation PB2-E627K was identified in most carnivore virus genomes, providing evidence for mammalian adaptation. This study showed that brain samples should be included in wild life surveillance programs for the reliable detection of the HPAI H5N1 virus in mammals. Surveillance of the wild carnivore population and notification to the Veterinary Authority are important from a one-heath perspective, and instrumental to pandemic preparedness.

Avian influenza overview September - December 2022

Between October 2021 and September 2022 Europe has suffered the most devastating highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic with a total of 2,520 outbreaks in poultry, 227 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,867 HPAI virus detections in wild birds. The unprecedent geographical extent (37 European countries affected) resulted in 50 million birds culled in affected establishments. In the current reporting period, between 10 September and 2 December 2022, 1,163 HPAI virus detections were reported in 27 European countries in poultry (398), captive (151) and wild birds (613). A decrease in HPAI virus detections in colony-breeding seabirds species and an increase in the number of detections in waterfowl has been observed. The continuous circulation of the virus in the wild reservoir has led to the frequent introduction of the virus into poultry populations. It is suspected that waterfowl might be more involved than seabirds in the incursion of HPAI virus into poultry establishments. In the coming months, the increasing infection pressure on poultry establishments might increase the risk of incursions in poultry, with potential further spread, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. The viruses detected since September 2022 (clade 2.3.4.4b) belong to eleven genotypes, three of which have circulated in Europe during the summer months, while eight represent new genotypes. HPAI viruses were also detected in wild and farmed mammal species in Europe and North America, showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N1) detections in humans in Spain, one A(H5N1), one A(H5N6) and one A(H9N2) human infection in China as well as one A(H5) infection without NA-type result in Vietnam were reported, respectively. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Pathogen Exposure in White Whales (Delphinapterus leucas) in Svalbard, Norway

The Svalbard white whale (Delphinapterus leucas) population is one of the smallest in the world, making it particularly vulnerable to challenges such as climate change and pathogens. In this study, serum samples from live captured (2001−2016) white whales from this region were investigated for influenza A virus (IAV) antibodies (Abs) (n = 27) and RNA (n = 25); morbillivirus (MV) Abs (n = 3) and RNA (n = 25); Brucella spp. Abs; and Toxoplasma gondii Abs (n = 27). IAV Abs were found in a single adult male that was captured in Van Mijenfjorden in 2001, although no IAV RNA was detected. Brucella spp. Abs were found in 59% of the sample group (16/27). All MV and T. gondii results were negative. The results show that Svalbard white whales have been exposed to IAV and Brucella spp., although evidence of disease is lacking. However, dramatic changes in climate and marine ecosystems are taking place in the Arctic, so surveillance of health parameters, including pathogens, is critical for tracking changes in the status of this vulnerable population.

Exploring surface water as a transmission medium of avian influenza viruses - systematic infection studies in mallards

Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) are an abundant anseriform migratory wild bird species worldwide and an important reservoir for the maintenance of low pathogenicity (LP) avian influenza viruses (AIV). They have also been implicated in the spread of high pathogenicity (HP) AIV after spill-over events from HPAIV-infected poultry. The spread of HPAIV within wild water bird populations may lead to viral contamination of natural habitats. The role of small shallow water bodies as a transmission medium of AIV among mallards is investigated here in three experimental settings. (i) Delayed onset but rapid progression of infection seeded by two mallards inoculated with either LP or HP AIV to each eight sentinel mallards was observed in groups with access to a small 100 L water pool. In contrast, groups with a bell drinker as the sole source of drinking water showed a rapid onset but lengthened course of infection. (ii) HPAIV infection also set off when virus was dispersed in the water pool; titres as low as 10² TCID₅₀ L^-1 (translating to 0.1 TCID₅₀ mL^-1) proved to be sufficient. (iii) Substantial loads of viral RNA (and infectivity) were also found on the surface of the birds' breast plumage. "Unloading" of virus infectivity from contaminated plumage into water bodies may be an efficient mechanism of virus spread by infected mallards. However, transposure of HPAIV via the plumage of an uninfected mallard failed. We conclude, surface water in small shallow water bodies may play an important role as a mediator of AIV infection of aquatic wild birds.

Infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAIV) H5N8 in harbor seals at the German North Sea coast, 2021

In brain tissue of three harbor seals of the German North Sea coast, high virus loads of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N8 were detected. Identification of different virus variants indicates high exposure to HPAIV circulating in wild birds, but there is no evidence for H5 specific antibodies in healthy seals. Replication of avian viruses in seals may allow HPAIV to acquire mutations needed to adapt to mammalian hosts as shown by PB2 627K variants detected in these cases.

Avian influenza overview June - September 2022

The 2021-2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest HPAI epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,467 outbreaks in poultry, 47.7 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 187 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,573 HPAI virus detections in wild birds with an unprecedent geographical extent reaching from Svalbard islands to South Portugal and Ukraine, affecting 37 European countries. Between 11 June and 9 September 2022, 788 HPAI virus detections were reported in 16 European countries in poultry (56), captive (22) and wild birds (710). Several colony-breeding seabird species exhibited widespread and massive mortality from HPAI A(H5N1) virus along the northwest coast of Europe. This resulted in an unprecedentedly high level of HPAI virus detections in wild birds between June and August 2022 and represents an ongoing risk of infection for domestic birds. HPAI outbreaks were still observed in poultry from June to September with five-fold more infected premises than observed during the same period in 2021 and mostly distributed along the Atlantic coast. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection in the different poultry production systems. The viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b with seven genotypes, three of which identified for the first time during this time period, being detected during summer. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Europe and North America and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and one A(H10N3) human infections were reported in China. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Epidemiology and Ecology of Influenza A Viruses among Wildlife in the Arctic

Arctic regions are ecologically significant for the environmental persistence and geographic dissemination of influenza A viruses (IAVs) by avian hosts and other wildlife species. Data describing the epidemiology and ecology of IAVs among wildlife in the arctic are less frequently published compared to southern temperate regions, where prevalence and subtype diversity are more routinely documented. Following PRISMA guidelines, this systematic review addresses this gap by describing the prevalence, spatiotemporal distribution, and ecological characteristics of IAVs detected among wildlife and the environment in this understudied region of the globe. The literature search was performed in PubMed and Google Scholar using a set of pre-defined search terms to identify publications reporting on IAVs in Arctic regions between 1978 and February 2022. A total of 2125 articles were initially screened, 267 were assessed for eligibility, and 71 articles met inclusion criteria. IAVs have been detected in multiple wildlife species in all Arctic regions, including seabirds, shorebirds, waterfowl, seals, sea lions, whales, and terrestrial mammals, and in the environment. Isolates from wild birds comprise the majority of documented viruses derived from wildlife; however, among all animals and environmental matrices, 26 unique low and highly pathogenic subtypes have been characterized in the scientific literature from Arctic regions. Pooled prevalence across studies indicates 4.23% for wild birds, 3.42% among tested environmental matrices, and seroprevalences of 9.29% and 1.69% among marine and terrestrial mammals, respectively. Surveillance data are geographically biased, with most data from the Alaskan Arctic and many fewer reports from the Russian, Canadian, North Atlantic, and Western European Arctic. We highlight multiple important aspects of wildlife host, pathogen, and environmental ecology of IAVs in Arctic regions, including the role of avian migration and breeding cycles for the global spread of IAVs, evidence of inter-species and inter-continental reassortment at high latitudes, and how climate change-driven ecosystem shifts, including changes in the seasonal availability and distribution of dietary resources, have the potential to alter host-pathogen-environment dynamics in Arctic regions. We conclude by identifying gaps in knowledge and propose priorities for future research.

Isolation of Genetically Diverse H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses in Poultry in Egypt, 2019–2021

The global spread of avian influenza virus (AIV) of clade 2.3.4.4b since 2016 has caused severe losses in wild birds and poultry and has posed a risk for the infection of mammals including humans. The vaccination of poultry has been used to limit the spread of the virus and mitigate its socioeconomic impact. Here, we describe H5N8 epidemics in chickens, turkeys and ducks from different localities in Egypt from 2019 to 2021. About 41.7% (n = 88/211) flocks were tested positive by RT-qPCR for H5N8 viruses with prevalence rates of 45.1% (n = 65/144) and 34.3% (n = 23/67) in vaccinated and non-vaccinated flocks, respectively. A sequence analysis of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes indicated not only the multiple introduction events of H5N8 viruses in Egypt but also the establishment of endemic viruses in commercial poultry in 2020/2021. The recent H5N8 viruses in poultry in Egypt are genetically distinct from the majority of licensed vaccines used in the field. Together, our findings indicate that poultry in Egypt is an endemic center for clade 2.3.4.4b in the Middle East. The efficiency of current vaccines should be regularly evaluated and updated to fully protect poultry flocks in Egypt against H5N8 viruses.

Evolutionary and Mutational Characterization of the First H5N8 Subtype Influenza A Virus in Humans

Highly pathogenic influenza A virus H5 subtype remains a risk for transmission in humans. The H5N8 subtype has caused multiple outbreaks in poultry in Europe over the past few winters. During one recent outbreak in poultry in Astrakhan, workers on the farm were also infected. So far, little is known about how this virus evolves and adapts to infect humans. Here, we performed a time-resolved phylogenetic analysis of 129 HA sequences representing all 1891 available H5N8 viruses collected from 2010 to 2020. We also conducted a whole-genome scan on the human virus at the protein level. We found that H5N8 viruses have spilled over in 34 European countries during the flu season of 2020–2021. These viruses underwent two significant evolutionary steps during 2015–2016 and after 2018. Furthermore, we characterized a number of critical mutations in all viral proteins except PB1-F2, which contribute to increased virulence and avian-to-human adaptation. Our findings suggested that the accumulated mutations under evolution led to quantitative and qualitative changes, likely allowing the virus to spread to humans. Given that the H5N8 virus is co-circulating with other H5 viruses in Europe, the risk of a pandemic should not be underestimated. Continental surveillance and pandemic preparedness are to be established.

Primary harbor seal (Phoca vitulina) airway epithelial cells show high susceptibility to infection by a seal-derived influenza A virus (H5N8)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N8 subtype have been circulating in Europe and Asia since 2016, causing huge economic losses to the poultry industry. A new wave of H5Nx infections has begun in 2020. The viruses mainly infect wild birds and waterfowl; from there they spread to poultry and cause disease. Previous studies have shown that the H5N8 viruses have seldom spread to mammals; however, reports in early 2021 indicate that humans may be infected, and some incident reports indicate that H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4B virus may be transmitted to wild mammals, such as red foxes and seals. In order to get more information on how the H5N8 virus affects seals and other marine animals, here, we used primary cultures to analyze the cell tropism of the H5N8 virus, which was isolated from an infected gray seal (H5N8/Seal-2016). Primary tracheal epithelial cells were readily infected by H5N8/Seal -2016 virus; in contrast, the commonly used primary seal kidney cells required the presence of exogenous trypsin to initiate virus infection. When applied to an ex vivo precision-cut lung slice model, compared with recombinant human H3N2 virus or H9N2 LPAI virus, the H5N8/Seal-2016 virus replicated to a high titer and caused a strong detrimental effect; with these characteristics, the virus was superior to a human H3N2 virus and to an H9N2 LPAI virus. By using well-differentiated air-liquid interface cultures, we have observed that ALI cultures of canines, ferrets, and harbor seals are more sensitive to H5N8/Seal-2016 virus than are human or porcine ALI cultures, which cannot be fully explained by sialic acid distribution. Our results indicate that the airway epithelium of carnivores may be the main target of H5N8 viruses. Consideration should be given to an increased monitoring of the distribution of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in wild animals. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Blast injury on harbour porpoises (Phocoena phocoena) from the Baltic Sea after explosions of deposits of World War II ammunition

Harbour porpoises are under pressure from increasing human activities. This includes the detonation of ammunition that was dumped in large amounts into the sea during and after World War II. In this context, forty-two British ground mines from World War II were cleared by means of blasting in the period from 28 to 31 August 2019 by a NATO unit in the German Exclusive Economic Zone within the marine protected area of Fehmarn Belt in the Baltic Sea, Germany. Between September and November 2019, 24 harbour porpoises were found dead in the period after those clearing events along the coastline of the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein and were investigated for direct and indirect effects of blast injury. Health evaluations were conducted including examinations of the brain, the air-filled (lungs and gastrointestinal tract) and acoustic organs (melon, acoustic fat in the lower jaw, ears and their surrounding tissues). The bone structure of the tympano-periotic complexes was examined using high-resolution peripheral quantitative computed tomography (HR-pQCT). In 8/24 harbour porpoises, microfractures of the malleus, dislocation of middle ear bones, bleeding, and haemorrhages in the melon, lower jaw and peribullar acoustic fat were detected, suggesting blast injury. In addition, one bycaught animal and another porpoise with signs of blunt force trauma also showed evidence of blast injury. The cause of death of the other 14 animals varied and remained unclear in two individuals. Due to the vulnerability and the conservation status of harbour porpoise populations in the Baltic Sea, noise mitigation measures must be improved to prevent any risk of injury. The data presented here highlight the importance of systematic investigations into the acute and chronic effects of blast and acoustic trauma in harbour porpoises, improving the understanding of underwater noise effects and herewith develop effective measures to protect the population level.

Emergence, prevalence, and evolution of H5N8 avian influenza viruses in central China, 2020

Highly pathogenic influenza A(H5N8) viruses have caused several worldwide outbreaks in birds and are able cross the species barrier to infect humans, posing a substantial threat to public health. After the first detection of H5N8 viruses in deceased swans in Inner Mongolia, we performed early warning and active monitoring along swan migration routes in central China. We isolated and sequenced 42 avian influenza viruses, including 40 H5N8 viruses, 1 H5N2 virus, and 1 H9N2 virus, in central China. Our H5N8 viruses isolated in swan stopover sites and wintering grounds showed high nucleotide homologies in the whole genome, revealing a common evolutionary source. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the H5 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b prevalent in 2020 have further diverged into two sub-clades: b1 and b2. The phylogeographic analysis also showed that the viruses of sub-clade b2 most likely originated from poultry in Russia. Notably, whooper swans were found to be responsible for the introduction of sub-clade b2 viruses in central China; whooper and tundra swans play a role in viral spread in the Yellow River Basin and the Yangtze River Basin, respectively. Our findings highlight swans as an indicator species for transborder spreading and monitoring of the H5N8 virus.

Genetic and biological characteristics of the globally circulating H5N8 avian influenza viruses and the protective efficacy offered by the poultry vaccine currently used in China

The H5N8 avian influenza viruses have been widely circulating in wild birds and are responsible for the loss of over 33 million domestic poultry in Europe, Russia, Middle East, and Asia since January 2020. To monitor the invasion and spread of the H5N8 virus in China, we performed active surveillance by analyzing 317 wild bird samples and swab samples collected from 41,172 poultry all over the country. We isolated 22 H5N8 viruses from wild birds and 14 H5N8 viruses from waterfowls. Genetic analysis indicated that the 36 viruses formed two different genotypes: one genotype viruses were widely detected from different wild birds and domestic waterfowls; the other genotype was isolated from a whopper swan. We further revealed the origin and spatiotemporal spread of these two distinct H5N8 virus genotypes in 2020 and 2021. Animal studies indicated that the H5N8 isolates are highly pathogenic to chickens, mildly pathogenic in ducks, but have distinct pathotypes in mice. Moreover, we found that vaccinated poultry in China could be completely protected against H5N8 virus challenge. Given that the H5N8 viruses are likely to continue to spread in wild birds, vaccination of poultry is highly recommended in high-risk countries to prevent H5N8 avian influenza.

Encephalitis and Death in Wild Mammals at a Rehabilitation Center after Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Virus, United Kingdom

We report a disease and mortality event involving swans, seals, and a fox at a wildlife rehabilitation center in the United Kingdom during late 2020. Five swans had onset of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infection while in captivity. Subsequently, 5 seals and a fox died (or were euthanized) after onset of clinical disease. Avian-origin influenza A virus subtype H5N8 was retrospectively determined as the cause of disease. Infection in the seals manifested as seizures, and immunohistochemical and molecular testing on postmortem samples detected a neurologic distribution of viral products. The fox died overnight after sudden onset of inappetence, and postmortem tissues revealed neurologic and respiratory distribution of viral products. Live virus was isolated from the swans, seals, and the fox, and a single genetic change was detected as a potential adaptive mutation in the mammalian-derived viral sequences. No human influenza-like illness was reported in the weeks after the event.

ANTIBODIES AGAINST INFLUENZA VIRUS TYPES A AND B IN CANADIAN SEALS

Influenza viruses have been reported from marine mammals worldwide, particularly in pinnipeds, and have caused mass mortalities of seals in North America and Europe. Because influenza viruses in marine mammals can be zoonotic, our objective was to examine Canadian phocids for exposure to influenza A and B viruses in order to understand health risks to wild populations as well as to humans who consume or handle these animals. Blood was collected from 394 seals in eastern Canada from 1994 to 2005. Sera were screened for exposure to influenza viruses in three resident species of seals: harbour, Phoca vitulina (n=66); grey, Halichoerus grypus (n=82); ringed, Phoca hispida (n=2); and two migrant species: harp, Pagophilus groenlandica (n=206) and hooded, Cystophora cristata (n=38). Included were samples from captive grey (n=1) and harbour seals (n=8) at two aquaria. Sera were prescreened using indirect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and antibodies against influenza A virus were confirmed using a commercial competitive ELISA (IDEXX Europe B.V.). A subset of influenza A virus positive sera was used to determine common virus subtypes recognized by sera using reference strains. All positive sera in the indirect ELISA reacted with influenza A virus subtypes H3, H4, and H10 using a hemagglutination inhibition assay. Sera from harbour, grey, harp, and hooded seals had antibodies against influenza A and influenza B viruses (some cross-reactivity occurred). Overall, 33% (128/385) of wild seals were seropositive to influenza viruses, with the highest seroprevalence in harp (42%) followed by harbour (33%), grey (23%), and hooded (11%) seals. Antibodies were detected in both sexes and most age classes of wild seals. Two of eight captive harbour seals were seropositive to influenza B virus and four had cross-reactions to influenza A and B viruses. This study reports antibodies against influenza A and B viruses in four seal species from the same geographic area in eastern Canada.

The C-terminus of non-structural protein 1 (NS1) in H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 avian influenza virus affects virus fitness in human cells and virulence in mice

Avian influenza viruses (AIV) H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 pose a public health threat but the viral factors relevant for its potential adaptation to mammals are largely unknown. The non-structural protein 1 (NS1) of influenza viruses is an essential interferon antagonist. It commonly consists of 230 amino acids, but variations in the disordered C-terminus resulted in truncation or extension of NS1 with a possible impact on virus fitness in mammals. Here, we analysed NS1 sequences from 1902 to 2020 representing human influenza viruses (hIAV) as well as AIV in birds, humans and other mammals and with an emphasis on the panzootic AIV subtype H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4A (H5N8-A) from 2013 to 2015 and clade 2.3.4.4B (H5N8-B) since 2016. We found a high degree of prevalence for short NS1 sequences among hIAV, zoonotic AIV and H5N8-B, while AIV and H5N8-A had longer NS1 sequences. We assessed the fitness of recombinant H5N8-A and H5N8-B viruses carrying NS1 proteins with different lengths in human cells and in mice. H5N8-B with a short NS1, similar to hIAV or AIV from a human or other mammal-origins, was more efficient at blocking apoptosis and interferon-induction without a significant impact on virus replication in human cells. In mice, shortening of the NS1 of H5N8-A increased virus virulence, while the extension of NS1 of H5N8-B reduced virus virulence and replication. Taken together, we have described the biological impact of variation in the NS1 C-terminus in hIAV and AIV and shown that this affects virus fitness in vitro and in vivo.

Genetic Characterization of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Virus in Pakistani Live Bird Markets Reveals Rapid Diversification of Clade 2.3.4.4b Viruses

The highly pathogenic (HPAI) avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have undergone reassortment with multiple non-N1-subtype neuraminidase genes since 2008, leading to the emergence of H5Nx viruses. H5Nx viruses established themselves quickly in birds and disseminated from China to Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America. Multiple genetic clades have successively evolved through frequent mutations and reassortment, posing a continuous threat to domestic poultry and causing substantial economic losses. Live bird markets are recognized as major sources of avian-to-human infection and for the emergence of zoonotic influenza. In Pakistan, the A(H5N1) virus was first reported in domestic birds in 2007; however, avian influenza surveillance is limited and there is a lack of knowledge on the evolution and transmission of the A(H5) virus in the country. We collected oropharyngeal swabs from domestic poultry and environmental samples from six different live bird markets during 2018–2019. We detected and sequenced HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from two chickens, one quail and one environmental sample in two markets. Temporal phylogenetics indicated that all novel HPAI A(H5N8) viruses belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, with all eight genes of Pakistan A(H5N8) viruses most closely related to 2017 Saudi Arabia A(H5N8) viruses, which were likely introduced via cross-border transmission from neighboring regions approximately three months prior to virus detection into domestic poultry. Our data further revealed that clade 2.3.4.4b viruses underwent rapid lineage expansion in 2017 and acquired significant amino acid mutations, including mutations associated with increased haemagglutinin affinity to human α-2,6 receptors, prior to the first human A(H5N8) infection in Russian poultry workers in 2020. These results highlight the need for systematic avian influenza surveillance in live bird markets in Pakistan to monitor for potential A(H5Nx) variants that may arise from poultry populations.

Avian influenza overview August - November2019

Between 16 August and 15 November 2019, one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5) outbreak in poultry in France was reported in Europe. Genetic characterisation reveals that the virusclusterswith Eurasian LPAI viruses. No highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in birds were notified in Europe in the relevant period for this report. HPAI A(H5N6) viruswas identified in chickens in Nigeria, this isthe first report of HPAI A(H5N6) from the African continent.FewerHPAI outbreaks in Asia and Africa were reported during the time period for this report compared with the previous reporting period. Apart from the long‐term epidemic of HPAI A(H5N2)in Taiwan, only six HPAI outbreakswere reported in domestic birds from Nepal, South Africa and Taiwan. Furthermore, no HPAI detections fromwild birds were reported worldwide in the relevant time period forthis report.Even if the risk of incursion of HPAI from wild birds into poultryestablishments in Europe is currently assessed as low, it is important to maintain passive surveillance activities. The focus should be on wild bird species that are in the revised list of target species in order to detect any incursion of HPAI virus early and initiate a warning.Despite the decrease in the number of avian influenza outbreaks over recent months, it is important to maintain a high alert level andhigh standard of biosecurity onpoultry establishments.In Europe, no human infections due toHPAI viruses detected in wild bird or poultry outbreaks, have been reported. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low.

Avian Influenza A Virus Infects Swine Airway Epithelial Cells without Prior Adaptation

Pigs play an important role in the interspecies transmission of influenza A viruses (IAV). The porcine airway epithelium contains binding sites for both swine/human IAV (α2,6-linked sialic acids) and avian IAV (α2,3-linked sialic acids) and therefore is suited for adaptation of viruses from other species as suggested by the “mixing vessel theory”. Here, we applied well-differentiated swine airway epithelial cells to find out whether efficient infection by avian IAV requires prior adaption. Furthermore, we analyzed the influence of the sialic acid-binding activity and the virus-induced detrimental effects. Surprisingly, an avian IAV H1N1 strain circulating in European poultry and waterfowl shows increased and prolonged viral replication without inducing a strong innate immune response. This virus could infect the lower respiratory tract in our precision cut-lung slice model. Pretreating the cells with poly (I:C) and/or JAK/STAT pathway inhibitors revealed that the interferon-stimulated innate immune response influences the replication of avian IAV in swine airway epitheliums but not that of swine IAV. Further studies indicated that in the infection by IAVs, the binding affinity of sialic acid is not the sole factor affecting the virus infectivity for swine or human airway epithelial cells, whereas it may be crucial in well-differentiated ferret tracheal epithelial cells. Taken together, our results suggest that the role of pigs being the vessel of interspecies transmission should be reconsidered, and the potential of avian H1N1 viruses to infect mammals needs to be characterized in more detail.