The experience of agency: an interplay between prediction and postdiction

Common intentional binding effects across diverse sensory modalities in touch-free voluntary actions

The intentional binding effect refers to the phenomenon where the perceived temporal interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence is subjectively compressed. Prior research revealed the importance of tactile feedback from the keyboard on this effect. Here we examined the necessity of such tactile feedback by utilizing a touch-free key-press device without haptic feedback, and explored how initial/outcome sensory modalities (visual/auditory/tactile) and their consistency influence the intentional binding effect. Participants estimated three delay lengths (250, 550, or 850 ms) between the initial and outcome stimuli. Results showed that regardless of the combinations of sensory modalities between the initial and the outcome stimuli (i.e., modal consistency), the intentional binding effect was only observed in the 250 ms delay condition. This findings indicate a stable intentional binding effect both within and across sensory modalities, supporting the existence of a shared mechanism underlying the binding effect in touch-free voluntary actions.

Explicit and implicit sense of agency in depersonalisation experiences

The sense of agency, the feeling of controlling one's bodily actions and the world is altered in Depersonalisation (DP), a condition that makes people feel detached from one's self and body. To investigate the link between depersonalisation and both implicit and explicit sense of agency, an online study was conducted using the influential Intentional Binding paradigm in a sample of non-clinical DP participants. The results did not reveal significant differences between individuals with low and high occurrences of DP experiences on the implicit and explicit sense of agency. However, participants with high occurrences of DP experiences showed a more time-sensitive explicit sense of agency and greater temporal distortions for short intervals in the absence of self-initiated motion. These results suggest that there is a discrepancy between implicit and explicit sense of agency in people with high levels of depersonalisation. Altogether, these findings call for further investigations of the key role of time perception on altered sense of self and agency in both non-clinical and clinical populations, to disentangle the mechanisms associated with the explicit and implicit sense of agency.

Arousal, interindividual differences and temporal binding a psychophysiological study

The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants' individual differences in subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), striatal dopamine levels via eye blink rates, and psychopathy. Linear mixed models showed that sexual arousal decreased temporal binding whereas calm pleasure had no facilitation effect on binding. Striatal dopamine levels were positively linked whereas subjective and physiological arousal may be negatively associated with binding towards actions. Psychopathic traits reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the temporal binding is affected by high arousing states with positive valence.

Illusory Directional Sensation Induced by Asymmetric Vibrations Influences Sense of Agency and Velocity in Wrist Motions

Illusory directional sensations are generated through asymmetric vibrations applied to the fingertips and have been utilized to induce upper-limb motions in the rehabilitation and training of patients with visual impairment. However, its effects on motor control remain unclear. This study aimed to verify the effects of illusory directional sensations on wrist motion. We conducted objective and subjective evaluations of wrist motion during a motor task, while inducing an illusory directional sensation that was congruent or incongruent with wrist motion. We found that, when motion and illusory directional sensations were congruent, the sense of agency for motion decreased. This indicates an induction sensation of the hand being moved by the illusion. Interestingly, although no physical force was applied to the hand, the angular velocity of the wrist was higher in the congruent condition than that in the no-stimulation condition. The angular velocity of the wrist and electromyography signals of the agonist muscles were weakly positively correlated, suggesting that the participants may have increased their wrist velocity. In other words, the congruence between the direction of motion and illusory directional sensation induced the sensation of the hand being moved, even though the participants' wrist-motion velocity increased. This phenomenon can be explained by the discrepancy between the sensation of active motion predicted by the efferent copy, and that of actual motion caused by the addition of the illusion. The findings of this study can guide the design of novel rehabilitation methods.

When time does not matter: cultures differ in their use of temporal cues to infer agency over action effects

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sense of having control over one's own actions and through them events in the outside world. Sometimes temporal cues, that is temporal contiguity between action and effect, or temporal expectation regarding the occurrence of the effect are used to infer whether one has agency over an effect. This has mainly been investigated in Western cultures. However, Western and Eastern cultures differ in their time concepts and thus their usage of temporal cues may also differ. We investigated whether Western and Eastern cultures (Austrian vs. Mongolian students) use temporal cues differently. Participants performed adaption blocks in which actions were followed by immediate (immediate effect group) or by delayed (delayed effect group) effects. In subsequent test blocks the action-effect delay was varied and participants' SoA over the effect was assessed. In Austrian students, the immediate effect group experienced more SoA for short action-effect delays, whereas the reverse was true for the delayed effect group. Thus, temporal expectation rather than temporal contiguity is used as predominant agency cue. In Mongolian students, SoA did not significantly differ between different action-effect delays in both groups, indicating that Mongolian students hardly rely on temporal cues. In conclusion, due to linear time concepts in Western cultures, the timing of an effect may be an important agency cue in Austrian students. However, due to cyclical time concepts in some Eastern cultures, it may be a less important agency cue in Mongolian students. Thus, the use of temporal agency cues is culture-dependent.

An investigation of the experience of control through the sense of agency in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder: a review and meta-analysis

The construct of sense of agency (SoA) has proven useful for understanding mechanisms underlying obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) phenomenology, especially in explaining the apparent dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions. Paradoxically, people with OCD appear to experience both diminished SoA (feeling unable to control their actions) and inflated SoA (having "magical" control over events). The present review investigated the extent to which the SoA is distorted in OCD, in terms of both implicit (ie, inferred from correlates and outcomes of voluntary actions) and explicit (ie, subjective judgment of one's control over an outcome) measures of SoA. Our search resulted in 15 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in a meta-analysis, where we also examined the potential moderating effects of the type of measure (explicit versus implicit) and of the actual control participants had over the outcome. We found that participants with OCD or with high levels of OCD symptoms show lower implicit measures of SoA and at the same time tend to overestimate their control in situations where they do not actually have it. Together, these findings support the hypothesized dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions.

The role of self-related information in the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.

The Human Affectome

Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.

The enhancement of temporal binding effect after negative social feedback

The present study investigated the effect of social feedback on the experiences of our actions and the outcomes (e.g. temporal binding between an action and its outcome, reflecting individuals' causal beliefs modulated by their agency judgments). In Experiment 1a, participants freely decided (voluntary action) their action timing to cause an outcome, which was followed by social feedback. A larger temporal binding (TB) following negative vs. positive events was found. This effect appeared neither in the random context where the causal belief between the action and outcome was absent (Experiment 1b) nor in the involuntary action context where participants' action timing was instructed (Experiment 1c). Experiments 2a and 2b examined the effect when the action-outcome was occluded, including reversing the order of outcome and feedback in Experiment 2b. Experiments 3a and 3b investigated the effect with only social feedback or only action-outcome presented. Results revealed that the effect found in Experiment 1 was driven by social feedback and independent of the availability of the action-outcome and the position of social feedback. Our findings demonstrate a stronger temporal integration of the action and its outcome following negative social feedback, reflecting fluctuations in sense of agency when faced with social feedback.

Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

The Seeking Proxies for Internal States (SPIS) Model of OCD - A Comprehensive Review of Current Findings and Implications for Future Directions

The Seeking Proxies for Internal States (SPIS) model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) explains symptoms of OCD as stemming from attenuated access to internal states, which is compensated for by using proxies, which are indices of these states that are more discernible or less ambiguous. Internal states in the SPIS model are subjective states that are not accessible to others, encompassing physiological states, motivations, preferences, memories, and emotions. Compensatory proxies in OCD include fixed rules and rituals as well as seeking and relying on external information. In the present review, we outline the SPIS model and describe its basic tenets. We then use the SPIS conceptualization to explain two pivotal OCD-related phenomena - obsessive doubt and compulsive rituals. Next, we provide a detailed overview of current empirical evidence supporting the SPIS in several domains, including physiological states, emotions, sense of understanding, decision-making, and sense of agency. We conclude by discussing possible neural correlates of the difficulty in accessing internal states, focusing on the anterior insular cortex (AIC) and highlighting potential clinical implications of the model to the treatment of OCD.

Reduced neural connectivity in the caudate anterior head predicts hallucination severity in schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Caudate functional abnormalities have been identified as one critical neural substrate underlying sensory gating impairments that lead to auditory phantom hallucinations in both patients with schizophrenia (SZ) and tinnitus, characterized by the perception of internally generated sounds in the absence of external environmental auditory stimuli. In this study, we tested the hypothesis as to whether functional connectivity abnormalities in distinct caudate subdivisions implicated in sensory gating and auditory phantom percepts in tinnitus, which are currently being localized for neuromodulation targeting using deep brain stimulation techniques, would be associated with auditory phantom hallucination severity in SZ.

METHODS

Twenty five SZ and twenty eight demographically-matched healthy control (HC) participants, completed this fMRI resting-state study and clinical assessments.

RESULTS

Between-group seed-to-voxel analyses revealed only one region, the caudate anterior head, which showed reduced functional connectivity with the thalamus that survived whole-brain multiple comparison corrections. Importantly, connectivity between the caudate anterior head with thalamus negatively correlated with hallucination severity.

CONCLUSIONS

In the present study, we deliver the first evidence of caudate subdivision specificity for the neural pathophysiology underlying hallucinations in schizophrenia within a sensory gating framework that has been developed for auditory phantoms in patients with tinnitus. Our findings provide transdiagnostic convergent evidence for the role of the caudate in the gating of auditory phantom hallucinations, observed across patients with SZ and tinnitus by specifying the anterior caudate division is key to mediation of hallucinations, and creating a path towards personalized treatment approaches to arrest auditory phantom hallucinations from reaching perceptual awareness.

Action-outcome Regularity Perceptual Sensitivity in Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder

PURPOSE

An internal model deficit is considered to underlie developmental coordination disorder (DCD); thus, children with DCD have an altered sense of agency (SoA), which is associated with depressive symptoms. Furthermore, the perception of action-outcome regularity is present in early development, is involved in the generation of SoA, and has roles in adaptive motor learning and coordinated motor skills. However, perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity has not been examined in children with DCD.

METHODS

We investigated perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity in 6-15-year-old children with DCD and age- and sex-matched typically developing (TD) children. Both groups were assessed for coordinated motor skills with the Movement Assessment Battery for Children-2nd Edition, while the DCD group was assessed with the DCD Questionnaire, Social Communication Questionnaire, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder-Rating Scale, and Depression Self- Rating Scale for Children.

RESULTS

Perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity was significantly reduced in children with DCD. However, there was a significant correlation between perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity and age in DCD and TD children. Perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity was significantly lower in younger children with DCD than in younger and older TD children, but there were no significant differences between older children with DCD and younger and older TD children.

CONCLUSION

The current results suggest that children with DCD have significantly reduced perceptual sensitivity to action-outcome regularity at younger ages, which may alter SoA and inhibit internal model development, thereby reducing motor skill coordination.

[Study of agency in the discourse of women suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder in the aftermath of domestic violence]

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of appropriate care, psychotraumatic consequences (revival, hyperarousal, avoidance strategies, dissociation and other clinical forms of post traumatic symptoms) can take control of a large part of the subject's existence (psychological, physical, social) and affect the ability of the victim to regain ground on the intrusions that harass, and to take up new life projects. More objective than the current semiological and psychometric approaches, and in the absence of biomarkers that may be used in clinical practice, psycholinguistics opens up an epistemological renewal of the conception of trauma and its clinical consequences, in particular through the definition of the Psycho Linguistic Traumatic Syndrome (SPLIT). If such conceptions have been developed based on the analysis of traumatic accounts of subjects injured in war and attacks, other forms of psychotraumatic confrontations also deserve to be considered. In this paper, our objective was to better characterize the pronominal forms of agency in the traumatic and non-traumatic narratives produced by women victims of domestic and/or sexual violence.

METHODS

Nineteen women aged 20 to 60 victims of domestic violence and diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview) as well as a matched control group participated in the study. The subjects completed the French versions of Post Traumatic Checklist (PCL-5), Dissociative Experience Scale (DES) and Hospital and Anxiety Depression Scale (HAD). Traumatic and non-traumatic narratives were linguistically coded and scored on the SPLIT-10 scale.

RESULTS

Traumatic narratives contained significantly more first person singular pronouns than the non-traumatic narratives of controls or the non-traumatic narratives of psychically injured people. Traumatic narratives contained significantly more of the direct object pronoun "me" as well as indirect object pronouns. In traumatic narratives, the frequency of use of the subject pronoun "I" tended to correlate negatively with the HAD-A, HAD-D and SPLIT-10, while the frequency of use of the direct object pronoun "me" tended to correlate positively with DES, HAD-A, HAD-D as well as SPLIT-10. Finally, traumatic narratives contained significantly more verbs in the passive voice than non-traumatic narratives.

DISCUSSION

There was a gradient in the use of the first person singular pronoun that was inversely correlated to the degree of traumatic valence of the narratives: the control group used "I" less often than the psychically injured people who appeared to use this pronoun all the more as their narratives had a traumatic valence. In other words, even in the so-called "non-traumatic" narratives produced by subjects suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, the trauma seemed to be inscribed in the discourse, testimony to dissociation, as the seen in the correlation of this pronominal expression dimension of "I" with the SPLIT-10 scale. The use of the direct object complement was correlated with greater psycho-traumatic morbidity (dissociative, depressive and anxious) than the use of the "I", the latter remaining however a pathological mark instead of the use of the pronouns "we" or "one". Saying "I" translated less symptomatology than saying "me", but it was when the subject said "we" or "one" that he appeared to have returned to a normal discourse, no longer suffering from the torments of reliving or pathological dissociation. The identification of linguistic markers deserves to be pursued in order to better objectively describe post-traumatic psychiatric disorders, to better identify them in clinical practice in the field and to monitor the efficiency of the recommended psychotherapies. More generally, we may put forward the hypothesis that the direct modification of the patient's language, thanks to the intervention of the practitioner, from a speech composed of linguistic markers testifying to the trauma towards a normalized speech could help to treat post-traumatic symptoms.

The reliability of assistance systems modulates the sense of control and acceptability of human operators

Individuals are increasingly required to interact with complex and autonomous technologies, which often has a significant impact on the control they experience over their actions and choices. A better characterization of the factors responsible for modulating the control experience of human operators is therefore a major challenge to improve the quality of human-system interactions. Using a decision-making task performed in interaction with an automated system, we investigated the influence of two key properties of automated systems, their reliability and explicability, on participants' sense of agency (SoA), as well as the perceived acceptability of system choices. The results show an increase in SoA associated with the most explicable system. Importantly, the increase in system explicability influenced participants' ability to regulate the control resources they engaged in the current decision. In particular, we observed that participants' SoA varied with system reliability in the "explained" condition, whereas no variation was observed in the "non-explained" condition. Finally, we found that system reliability had a direct impact on system acceptability, such that the most reliable systems were also considered the most acceptable systems. These results highlight the importance of studying agency in human-computer interaction in order to define more acceptable automation technologies.

Non-contingent affective outcomes influence judgments of control

Our main goal in these experiments was to examine whether affective valence plays a role in judgments of control (JoC) in intentional action. To test this, we asked participants to completevariationsofasimple aiming task in which words appeared in place of clicked targets. The affective content of the words was manipulated during the experiments but was not contingent on participants' performance. Throughout the task, participants were periodically asked to judge their JoC.Thus, JoC judgments in this task included contributions of a well-established cue to judgments of control, task performance, and a source of affect that was not related to task performance. We found thatmetacognitions of controlvaried consistentlyacross levels of affect, with stronger judgments of being in control for conditions with positive outcome words (e.g., 'puppy') and the weaker judgments of being in control for conditions with negative outcome words (e.g.,'killer').These results suggestaffective outcomes can influence JoC, even though the outcomes are not related to performance.

The impact of facial expression and communicative gaze of a humanoid robot on individual Sense of Agency

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one's actions and their outcomes. A well-established implicit measure of SoA is the temporal interval estimation paradigm, in which participants estimate the time interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence. In the present study, we aimed to investigate whether the valence of action outcome modulated implicit SoA. The valence was manipulated through interaction partner's (i) positive/negative facial expression, or (ii) type of gaze (gaze contact or averted gaze). The interaction partner was the humanoid robot iCub. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time interval between the onset of their action (head movement towards the robot), and the robot's facial expression (happy vs. sad face). Experiment 2 was identical, but the outcome of participants' action was the type of robot's gaze (gaze contact vs. averted). In Experiment 3, we assessed-in a within-subject design-the combined effect of robot's type of facial expression and type of gaze. Results showed that, while the robot's facial expression did not affect participants' SoA (Experiment 1), the type of gaze affected SoA in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Overall, our findings showed that the robot's gaze is a more potent factor than facial expression in modulating participants' implicit SoA.

Is there a continuum of agentive awareness across physical and mental actions? The case of quasi-movements

While humans routinely distinguish between physical and mental actions, overt movements (OM) and kinesthetically imagined movements (IM) are often viewed as forming a continuum of activities. Here, we theoretically conceptualized this continuum hypothesis for agentive awareness related to OM and IM and tested it experimentally using quasi-movements (QM), a little studied type of covert actions, which is considered as an inner part of the OM-IM continuum. QM are performed when a movement attempt is minimized down to full extinction of overt movement and muscle activity. We asked participants to perform OM, IM and QM and collected their electromyography data. According to participants' reports, they experienced QM as OM in terms of intentions and expected sensory feedback, while the verbal descriptors were independent from muscle activation. These results do not fit the OM-QM-IM continuum and suggest qualitative distinction for agentive awareness between IM and QM/OM.

Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and dissociative experiences: Suggested underlying mechanisms and implications for science and practice

A strong and specific link between obsessive-compulsive disorder or symptoms (OCD/S) and a tendency for dissociative experiences (e.g., depersonalization-derealization, absorption and imaginative involvement) cannot be explained by trauma and is poorly understood. The present theoretical formulation proposes five different models conceptualizing the relationship. According to Model 1, dissociative experiences result from OCD/S through inward-focused attention and repetition. According to Model 2, dissociative absorption causally brings about both OCD/S and associated cognitive risk factors, such as thought-action fusion, partly through impoverished sense of agency. The remaining models highlight common underlying causal mechanisms: temporo-parietal abnormalities impairing embodiment and sensory integration (Model 3); sleep alterations causing sleepiness and dreamlike thought or mixed sleep-wake states (Model 4); and a hyperactive, intrusive imagery system with a tendency for pictorial thinking (Model 5). The latter model relates to Maladaptive Daydreaming, a suggested dissociative syndrome with strong ties to the obsessive-compulsive spectrum. These five models point to potential directions for future research, as these theoretical accounts may aid the two fields in interacting with each other, to the benefit of both. Finally, several dissociation-informed paths for further developing clinical intervention in OCD are identified.

Synchronous motor imagery and visual feedback of finger movement elicit the moving rubber hand illusion, at least in illusion-susceptible individuals

Recent evidence suggests that imagined auditory and visual sensory stimuli can be integrated with real sensory information from a different sensory modality to change the perception of external events via cross-modal multisensory integration mechanisms. Here, we explored whether imagined voluntary movements can integrate visual and proprioceptive cues to change how we perceive our own limbs in space. Participants viewed a robotic hand wearing a glove repetitively moving its right index finger up and down at a frequency of 1 Hz, while they imagined executing the corresponding movements synchronously or asynchronously (kinesthetic-motor imagery); electromyography (EMG) from the participants' right index flexor muscle confirmed that the participants kept their hand relaxed while imagining the movements. The questionnaire results revealed that the synchronously imagined movements elicited illusory ownership and a sense of agency over the moving robotic hand-the moving rubber hand illusion-compared with asynchronously imagined movements; individuals who affirmed experiencing the illusion with real synchronous movement also did so with synchronous imagined movements. The results from a proprioceptive drift task further demonstrated a shift in the perceived location of the participants' real hand toward the robotic hand in the synchronous versus the asynchronous motor imagery condition. These results suggest that kinesthetic motor imagery can be used to replace veridical congruent somatosensory feedback from a moving finger in the moving rubber hand illusion to trigger illusory body ownership and agency, but only if the temporal congruence rule of the illusion is obeyed. This observation extends previous studies on the integration of mental imagery and sensory perception to the case of multisensory bodily awareness, which has potentially important implications for research into embodiment of brain-computer interface controlled robotic prostheses and computer-generated limbs in virtual reality.

Modulations of one's sense of agency during human-machine interactions: A behavioural study using a full humanoid robot

Although previous investigations reported a reduced sense of agency when individuals act with traditional machines, little is known about the mechanisms underpinning interactions with human-like automata. The aim of this study was twofold: (1) to investigate the effect of the machine's physical appearance on the individuals' sense of agency and (2) to explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individuals' sense of agency when they are engaged in a joint task. Twenty-eight participants performed a joint Simon task together with another human or an automated artificial system as a co-agent. The physical appearance of the automated artificial system was manipulated so that participants could cooperate either with a servomotor or a full humanoid robot during the joint task. Both participants' response times and temporal estimations of action-output delays (i.e., an implicit measure of agency) were collected. Results showed that participants' sense of agency for self- and other-generated actions sharply declined during interactions with the servomotor compared with the human-human interactions. Interestingly, participants' sense of agency for self- and other-generated actions was reinforced when participants interacted with the humanoid robot compared with the servomotor. These results are discussed further.

Distracted to a fault: Attention, actions, and time perception

In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.

Depressive traits are associated with a reduced effect of choice on intentional binding

A sense of agency (SoA) over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants (N = 151) completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum.

Never run a changing system: Action-effect contingency shapes prospective agency

Human action control is highly sensitive to action-effect contingencies in the agent's environment. Here we show that the subjective sense of agency (SoA) contributes to this sensitivity as a subjective counterpart to instrumental action decisions. Participants (N = 556) experienced varying reward probabilities and were prompted to give summary evaluations of their SoA after a series of action-effect episodes. Results first revealed a quadratic relation of contingency and SoA, driven by a disproportionally strong impact of perfect action-effect contingencies. In addition to this strong situational determinant of SoA, we observed small but reliable interindividual differences as a function of gender, assertiveness, and neuroticism that applied especially at imperfect action-effect contingencies. Crucially, SoA not only reflected the reward structure of the environment but was also associated with the agent's future action decisions across situational and personal factors. These findings call for a paradigm shift in research on perceived agency, away from the retrospective assessment of single behavioral episodes and towards a prospective view that draws on statistical regularities of an agent's environment.

Mistakes strengthen the temporal binding effect in the context of goal-directed actions

Temporal binding is an illusion in which the temporal interval between two events appears compressed. In the context of intentional actions, this effect is observed as a compression of the perceived interval between these actions and their causal outcomes. This 'intentional binding effect' has been used to investigate the Sense of Agency, which is the experience of intentionally causing an outcome through volitional action. Intentional binding is reduced for negative outcomes such as error feedback, but the role of mistakes (e.g., errors of commission) for binding and agency has not been extensively studied. In our study, participants played a virtual game in which they attempted to 'splat' (hit) visual stimuli that looked like coloured bugs, using mouse clicks. On some trials, stimulus colours changed unpredictably immediately before actions were made, sometimes inducing mistakes. Actions were thus clearly identifiable as mistakes at the time of their onset before any outcome feedback had been provided. Participants reported shorter action-outcome intervals when stimuli changed, but only when this change caused a mistake according to the game's rules. This suggests that intentional binding is strengthened by errors of commission. We discuss how this effect may be accounted for by agency itself and via more general processes such as changes in arousal.

I Hear My Voice; Therefore I Spoke: The Sense of Agency Over Speech Is Enhanced by Hearing One's Own Voice

The subjective experience of causing an action is known as the sense of agency. Dysfunctional sense of agency over speech has been suggested as a cause of auditory hallucinations. However, agency over speech has not been extensively characterized in previous empirical studies. Here, we manipulated self-voice identity, an indicator of self, embedded in the acoustic quality of voice and examined implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Experiment 1 (N = 29 adults) demonstrated more compression of a perceived interval between action and outcome when participants heard their undistorted voices than their pitch-distorted voices. Experiment 2 (N = 28 adults) revealed a strong top-down effect of self-voice identity: Specifically, the judgment of agency over speech was more resistant than the judgment of agency over hand/limb movement to low-level sensorimotor inconsistency. Our findings provide new insight into the sense of agency over speech and an informative perspective for understanding aberrant experience in auditory hallucinations.

Computational mechanisms underlying illusion of control in delusional individuals

Humans navigate complex situations that require the accurate estimation of the controllability of the environment. Aberrant controllability computation might lead to maladaptive behaviors and poor mental health outcomes. Illusion of control, which refers to a heightened sense of control while the environment is uncontrollable, is one such manifestation and has been conceptually associated with delusional ideation. Nevertheless, this association has not yet been formally characterized in a computational framework. To address this, we used a computational psychiatry approach to quantify illusion of control in human participants with high (n = 125) or low (n = 126) trait delusion. Participants played a two-party exchange game in which their choices either did ("Controllable condition") or did not ("Uncontrollable condition") influence the future monetary offers made by simulated partners. We found that the two groups behaved similarly in model-agnostic measures (i.e., offer size, rejection rate). However, computational modeling revealed that compared to the low trait delusion group, the high delusion group overestimated their influence ("expected influence" parameter) over the offers made by their partners under the Uncontrollable condition. Highly delusional individuals also reported a stronger sense of control than those with low trait delusion in the Uncontrollable condition. Furthermore, the expected influence parameter and self-reported beliefs about controllability were significantly correlated in the Controllable condition in individuals with low trait delusion, whereas this relationship was diminished in those with high trait delusion. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that delusional ideation is associated with aberrant computation of and belief about environmental controllability, as well as a belief-behavior disconnect.

Impaired Relationship between Sense of Agency and Prediction Error Due to Post-Stroke Sensorimotor Deficits

Sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s actions. Studies on healthy people indicated that their self-other attribution can be realized based on prediction error which is an inconsistency between the internal prediction and sensory feedback of the movements. However, studies on patients with post-stroke sensorimotor deficits hypothesized that their self-other attribution can be based on different attribution strategies. This preliminary study examined this hypothesis by investigating whether post-stroke sensorimotor deficits can diminish the correlation between prediction errors and self-other judgments. Participants performed sinusoidal movements with visual feedback and judged if it represented their or another’s movements (i.e., self-other judgment). The results indicated that the patient who had worse upper limb sensorimotor deficits and lesser paretic upper limb activity compared with the other patient made more misattributions and showed a lower correlation between prediction errors and self-other judgments. This finding suggests that post-stroke sensorimotor deficits can impair the relationship between prediction error and self-other attribution, supporting the hypothesis that patients with such deficits can have altered strategies for the registration of agency.

The sense of agency in joint action: An integrative review

When people perform joint actions together, their individual actions (e.g., moving one end of a heavy couch) must be coordinated to achieve a collective goal (e.g., moving the couch across the room). Joint actions pose unique challenges for understanding people's sense of agency, because each person engaged in the joint action can have a sense of agency not only at the individual level (a sense that "I moved my end of the couch" or "My partner moved their end of the couch"), but also at the collective level (a sense that "We moved the couch together"). This review surveys research that has examined people's sense of agency in joint action, including explicit judgments of agency, implicit measures of agency, and first-hand accounts of agency in real-world settings. The review provides a comprehensive summary of the factors that influence individual- and collective-level agency in joint action; reveals the progress that has been made toward understanding different forms of collective-level agency in joint action, including the sense that agency is shared among co-actors and the sense that co-actors are acting as a single unit; and synthesizes evidence concerning the relationships between different measures of implicit agency and individual- versus collective-level agency in joint action. The review concludes by highlighting numerous outstanding questions and promising avenues for future research.

Actions of a Shaken Heart: Interoception Interacts with Action Processing

In the present study, we investigated the modulatory influence of the unconscious, bodily arousal on motor-related embodied information. Specifically, we examined how the interoceptive prediction error interacts with the event-related potentials linked to action-effect processing. Participants were asked to perform a task with self-initiated or externally-triggered sounds while receiving synchronous or false auditory cardiac feedback. The results found that interaction of interoceptive manipulation and action-effect processing modulates the frontal subcomponent of the P3 response. During the synchronous cardiac feedback, the P3 response to self-initiated tones was enhanced. During the false cardiac feedback, the frontal cortical response was reversed. N1 and P2 components were affected by the interoceptive manipulation, but not by the interaction of interoception and action processing. These findings provide experimental support for the theoretical accounts of the interaction between interoception and action processing within a framework of predictive coding, manifested particularly in the higher stages of action processing.

Judgments of agency are affected by sensory noise without recruiting metacognitive processing

Acting in the world is accompanied by a sense of agency, or experience of control over our actions and their outcomes. As humans, we can report on this experience through judgments of agency. These judgments often occur under noisy conditions. We examined the computations underlying judgments of agency, in particular under the influence of sensory noise. Building on previous literature, we studied whether judgments of agency incorporate uncertainty in the same way that confidence judgments do, which would imply that the former share computational mechanisms with metacognitive judgments. In two tasks, participants rated agency, or confidence in a decision about their agency, over a virtual hand that tracked their movements, either synchronously or with a delay and either under high or low noise. We compared the predictions of two computational models to participants’ ratings and found that agency ratings, unlike confidence, were best explained by a model involving no estimates of sensory noise. We propose that agency judgments reflect first-order measures of the internal signal, without involving metacognitive computations, challenging the assumed link between the two cognitive processes.

Behavioural evidence of altered sensory attenuation in obesity

Body ownership (i.e., the conscious belief of owning a body) and sense of agency (i.e., being the agent of one's own movements) are part of a pre-reflective experience of bodily self, which grounds on low-level complex sensory-motor processes. Although previous literature had already investigated body ownership in obesity, sense of agency was never explored. Here, we exploited the sensory attenuation effect (i.e., an implicit marker of the sense of agency; SA effect) to investigate whether the sense of agency was altered in a sample of 18 individuals affected by obesity as compared with 18 healthy-weight individuals. In our experiment, participants were asked to rate the perceived intensity of self-generated and other-generated tactile stimuli. Healthy-weight individuals showed a significantly greater SA effect than participants affected by obesity. Indeed, while healthy-weight participants perceived self-generated stimuli as significantly less intense as compared to externally generated ones, this difference between stimuli was not reported by affected participants. Our results relative to the SA effect pinpointed an altered sense of agency in obesity. We discussed this finding within the motor control framework with reference to obesity. We encouraged future research to further explore such effect and its role in shaping the clinical features of obesity.

The Role of the Medial Prefontal Cortex in Self-Agency in Schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is a disorder of the self. In particular, patients show cardinal deficits in self-agency (i.e., the experience and awareness of being the agent of one’s own thoughts and actions) that directly contribute to positive psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and delusions and distort reality monitoring (defined as distinguishing self-generated information from externally-derived information). Predictive coding models suggest that the experience of self-agency results from a minimal prediction error between the predicted sensory consequence of a self-generated action and the actual outcome. In other words, the experience of self-agency is thought to be driven by making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one’s own actions. Most of the agency literature has focused on the motor system; here we present a novel viewpoint that examines agency from a different lens using distinct tasks of reality monitoring and speech monitoring. The self-prediction mechanism that leads to self-agency is necessary for reality monitoring in that self-predictions represent a critical precursor for the successful encoding and memory retrieval of one’s own thoughts and actions during reality monitoring to enable accurate self-agency judgments (i.e., accurate identification of self-generated information). This self-prediction mechanism is also critical for speech monitoring where we continually compare auditory feedback (i.e., what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear. Prior research has shown that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) may represent one potential neural substrate of this self-prediction mechanism. Unfortunately, patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show mPFC hypoactivity associated with self-agency impairments on reality and speech monitoring tasks, as well as aberrant mPFC functional connectivity during intrinsic measures of agency during resting states that predicted worsening psychotic symptoms. Causal neurostimulation and neurofeedback techniques can move the frontiers of schizophrenia research into a new era where we implement techniques to manipulate excitability in key neural regions, such as the mPFC, to modulate patients’ reliance on self-prediction mechanisms on distinct tasks of reality and speech monitoring. We hypothesize these findings will show that mPFC provides a unitary basis for self-agency, driven by reliance on self-prediction mechanisms, which will facilitate the development of new targeted treatments in patients with schizophrenia.

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.

Two faces of temporal binding: Action- and effect-binding are not correlated

Research on the sense of agency has proliferated a range of explicit and implicit measures. However, the relation of different measures is poorly understood with especially mixed findings on the correlation between explicit judgments of agency and the implicit perceptual bias of temporal binding. Here, we add to the conundrum by showing that the two sub-components of temporal binding - action-binding and effect-binding, respectively - are not correlated across participants either, suggesting independent processes for both components. Research on inter-individual differences regarding the sense of agency is thus well-advised to rely on other implicit measures until the phenomenon of temporal binding is better understood.

Physical load reduces synchrony effects on agency and ownership in the virtual hand illusion

We used the virtual hand illusion paradigm to investigate the effect of physical load on perceived agency and body ownership. Participants pulled a resistance band that required exerting a force of 1 N, 10 N, or 20 N while operating a virtual hand that moved in synchronous or out of sync with their own hand. Explicit agency and ownership ratings were obtained, in addition to intentional binding and skin conductance as implicit measures of agency and ownership. Physical load increased perceived subjective load but showed no main effect, while synchrony effects were found on all agency and ownership measures. Interestingly, load did interact with synchrony in implicit agency and explicit ownership, by reducing and eliminating synchrony effects as movement synchrony was reduced with higher physical load. Furthermore, consistent with previous claims, implicit agency increased with perceived effort associated with higher physical load.

Transparency in Human-Machine Mutual Action

Recent advances in human-computer integration (HInt) have focused on the development of human-machine systems, where both human and machine autonomously act upon each other. However, a key challenge in designing such systems is augmenting the user’s physical abilities while maintaining their sense of self-attribution. This challenge is particularly prevalent when both human and machine are capable of acting upon each other, thereby creating a human-machine mutual action (HMMA) system. To address this challenge, we present a design framework that is based on the concept of transparency. We define transparency in HInt as the degree to which users can self-attribute an experience when machines intervene in the users’ action. Using this framework, we form a set of design guidelines and an approach for designing HMMA systems. By using transparency as our focus, we aim to provide a design approach for not only achieving human-machine fusion into a single agent, but also controlling the degrees of fusion at will. This study also highlights the effectiveness of our design approach through an analysis of existing studies that developed HMMA systems. Further development of our design approach is discussed, and future prospects for HInt and HMMA system designs are presented.

The Cognitive, Ecological, and Developmental Origins of Self-Disturbance in Borderline Personality Disorder

Self-disturbance is recognized as a key symptom of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Although it is the source of significant distress and significant costs to society, it is still poorly specified. In addition, current research and models on the etiology of BPD do not provide sufficient evidence or predictions about who is at risk of developing BPD and self-disturbance, and why. The aim of this review is to lay the foundations of a new model inspired by recent developments at the intersection of social cognition, behavioral ecology, and developmental biology. We argue that the sense of agency is an important dimension to consider when characterizing self-disturbances in BPD. Second, we address the poorly characterized relation between self-disturbances and adverse life conditions encountered early in life. We highlight the potential relevance of Life-History Theory-a major framework in evolutionary developmental biology-to make sense of this association. We put forward the idea that the effect of early life adversity on BPD symptomatology depends on the way individuals trade their limited resources between competing biological functions during development.

The Interplay Between Affective Processing and Sense of Agency During Action Regulation: A Review

Sense of agency is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their perceivable effects. Most previous research identified cognitive or sensory determinants of agency experience. However, it has been proposed that sense of agency is also bound to the processing of affective information. For example, during goal-directed actions or instrumental learning we often rely on positive feedback (e.g., rewards) or negative feedback (e.g., error messages) to determine our level of control over the current task. Nevertheless, we still lack a scientific model which adequately explains the relation between affective processing and sense of agency. In this article, we review current empirical findings on how affective information modulates agency experience, and, conversely, how sense of agency changes the processing of affective action outcomes. Furthermore, we discuss in how far agency-related changes in affective processing might influence the ability to enact cognitive control and action regulation during goal-directed behavior. A preliminary model is presented for describing the interplay between sense of agency, affective processing, and action regulation. We propose that affective processing could play a role in mediating the influence between subjective sense of agency and the objective ability to regulate one's behavior. Thus, determining the interrelation between affective processing and sense of agency will help us to understand the potential mechanistic basis of agency experience, as well as its functional significance for goal-directed behavior.

Volition in prospective Memory: Evidence against differences between free and fixed target events

Volition is the extent to which actions are generated as a result of internal states in contrast to responses to external conditions or dictated by external events. Delayed intentions about future action are stored in prospective memory until the intended action has to be formed at a later point in time. It is unknown how voluntary choice affects prospective memory. We compared the difference between freely chosen and fixed targets on the reaction times and task performance in the ongoing task and for the target stimuli in a prospective memory task. The task performance and the reaction time was modelled using a Bayesian hierarchical drift-diffusion model. The analysis showed no differences between self-chosen and fixed prospective memory cues on task responses. The result suggests that volition in choosing the cue to act upon or given a fixed cue does not make a difference for prospective memory task performance.

Computational models of the "active self" and its disturbances in schizophrenia

The notion that self-disorders are at the root of the emergence of schizophrenia rather than a symptom of the disease, is getting more traction in the cognitive sciences. This is in line with philosophical approaches that consider an enactive self, constituted through action and interaction with the environment. We thereby analyze different definitions of the self and evaluate various computational theories lending to these ideas. Bayesian and predictive processing are promising approaches for computational modeling of the "active self". We evaluate their implementation and challenges in computational psychiatry and cognitive developmental robotics. We describe how and why embodied robotic systems provide a valuable tool in psychiatry to assess, validate, and simulate mechanisms of self-disorders. Specifically, mechanisms involving sensorimotor learning, prediction, and self-other distinction, can be assessed with artificial agents. This link can provide essential insights to the formation of the self and new avenues in the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

Deceleration Assistance Mitigated the Trade-off Between Sense of Agency and Driving Performance

Driving assistance technology has gained traction in recent years and is becoming more widely used in vehicles. However, drivers usually experience a reduced sense of agency when driving assistance is active even though automated assistance improves driving performance by reducing human error and ensuring quick reactions. The present study examined whether driving assistance can maintain human sense of agency during early deceleration in the face of collision risk, compared with manual deceleration. In the experimental task, participants decelerate their vehicle in a driving simulator to avoid collision with a vehicle that suddenly cut in front of them and decelerated. In the assisted condition, the system performed deceleration 100 ms after the cut-in. Participants were instructed to decelerate their vehicle and follow the vehicle that cut-in. This design ensured that the deceleration assistance applied a similar control to the vehicle as the drivers intended to, only faster and smoother. Participants rated their sense of agency and their driving performance. The results showed that drivers maintained their sense of agency and improved driving performance under driving assistance. The findings provided insights into designing driving assistance that can maintain drivers' sense of agency while improving future driving performance. It is important to establish a mode of joint-control in which the system shares the intention of human drivers and provides improved execution of control.

Temporal binding past the Libet clock: testing design factors for an auditory timer

Voluntary actions and causally linked sensory stimuli are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. This so-called temporal binding is commonly assessed in paradigms using the Libet Clock. In such experiments, participants have to estimate the timing of actions performed or ensuing sensory stimuli (usually tones) by means of a rotating clock hand presented on a screen. The aforementioned task setup is however ill-suited for many conceivable setups, especially when they involve visual effects. To address this shortcoming, the line of research presented here establishes an alternative measure for temporal binding by using a sequence of timed sounds. This method uses an auditory timer, a sequence of letters presented during task execution, which serve as anchors for temporal judgments. In four experiments, we manipulated four design factors of this auditory timer, namely interval length, interval filling, sequence predictability, and sequence length, to determine the most effective and economic method for measuring temporal binding with an auditory timer.

Intended emotions influence intentional binding with emotional faces: Larger binding for intended negative emotions

The effect of emotions on Intentional binding (IB) is equivocal. In addition, most studies on IB have not manipulated emotional content of intentions. This study investigates the effect of intended and outcome emotions using emotional faces (happy or disgust face in experiment 1 and a happy or angry face in experiment 3). To see whether the effects are due to priming, we used instructions with a happy-disgust pair in experiment 2 and happy-angry pair in experiment 4. Outcome emotional faces were not predictable. Results showed that intending a negative emotional face resulted in shorter action-outcome interval judgments compared to a happy face irrespective of the emotional content of the outcome face. This effect was absent in experiments 2 and 4 with instructed emotions. In addition to showing the importance of having explicit intentions, the results show that emotional content of our intentions does influence IB possibly due to prospective mechanisms.

What am I doing? It depends: agency and action identification

Actions can be identified at a range of levels, from higher level, outcome-related descriptions to lower level, movement-related descriptions. But how do these levels of identification influence the experience of control (agency) over a task? We addressed the relation between the level of action identification and agency using a hierarchical task modeled from typing. Participants memorized letter sequences and reported them by moving a cursor to targets that contained letters. To manipulate lower level (aiming) difficulty, the targets were either large or small. To manipulate higher level (memory) difficulty, the letter sequences were either constant or random within a block. We found effects of higher and lower level difficulty on agency and action identification. Moreover, we found interactive effects of higher and lower level difficulty on performance. We discuss these findings in terms of contributions to the study of agency, and some differences from the results of previous studies of action identification.

Mind Control Tricks: Magicians' Forcing and Free Will

A new research program has recently emerged that investigates magicians' mind control tricks, also called forces. This research highlights the psychological processes that underpin decision-making, illustrates the ease by which our decisions can be covertly influenced, and helps answer questions about our sense of free will and agency over choices.

Illusion of control affects ERP amplitude reductions for auditory outcomes of self-generated actions

The reduction of neural responses to self-generated stimuli compared to external stimuli is thought to result from the matching of motor-based sensory predictions and sensory reafferences and to serve the identification of changes in the environment as caused by oneself. The amplitude of the auditory event-related potential (ERP) component N1 seems to closely reflect this matching process, while the later positive component (P2/ P3a) has been associated with judgments of agency, which are also sensitive to contextual top-down information. In this study, we examined the effect of perceived control over sound production on the processing of self-generated and external stimuli, as reflected in these components. We used a new version of a classic two-button choice task to induce different degrees of the illusion of control (IoC) and recorded ERPs for the processing of self-generated and external sounds in a subsequent task. N1 amplitudes were reduced for self-generated compared to external sounds, but not significantly affected by IoC. P2/3a amplitudes were affected by IoC: We found reduced P2/3a amplitudes after a high compared to a low IoC induction training, but only for self-generated, not for external sounds. These findings suggest that prior contextual belief information induced by an IoC affects later processing as reflected in the P2/P3a, possibly for the formation of agency judgments, while early processing reflecting motor-based predictions is not affected.