The Impact of Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive on Cognitive Control

Control strategy under pressure situations: performance pressure conditionally enhances proactive control

Previous research and theories have demonstrated that attentional control plays a crucial role in explaining the choking phenomenon (i.e., the performance decrements) under pressure situations. Attentional control is thought to function through two distinct control strategies: proactive control (i.e., a sustained and anticipatory strategy of control) and reactive control (i.e., a transient strategy of control). However, little is known about how performance pressure affects these control strategies. The present study was designed to address this issue. Participants were instructed to complete a continuous performance task (AX-CPT40) under pressure situations. The results showed that individuals under high-pressure situations tended to use proactive control rather than reactive control. Moreover, performance pressure resulted in a more liberal response bias following an A-cue, consistent with an increased use of proactive control. Importantly, the proactive behavioral index calculated on RTs showed that the increased proactive control mainly occurred in the short interval between the cue and probe, but not in the long interval. This suggests that individuals under high-pressure situations are unlikely to employ a proactive control strategy in a situation that requires more attentional resources. In summary, our results provide initial evidence that performance pressure conditionally enhances proactive control, which contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamic adjustment of control strategies under pressure situations.

Age Differences in the Tradeoff between Proactive and Reactive Cognitive Control in Emotional Information Processing

Greater well-being in older adults stems from more effective emotion regulation strategies, highlighting the role of cognitive control. However, cognitive control involves different subsystems, and it is still unclear whether different subsystems have different effects on different emotional information processing. The Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) theory postulates that cognitive control can operate in two distinct modes, namely proactive control (a "proactive" preparatory mode) and reactive control (a "reactive" wait-and-see mode). This study created an emotional AX-CPT task to explore differences in cognitive control tradeoff between youth and older adults when processing emotional information. The results found that youth had significantly higher error rates on the emotional-neutral sequence than older adults regardless of the valence of emotional information; only in the negative condition did older adults have higher error rates on both the sad-sad and neutral-sad sequences than youth; this phenomenon was not found in the positive condition. The study showed that, in emotional information processing, youth preferred proactive control over older adults; in negative information processing, older adults preferred reactive control strategies over youth; in positive information processing, older adults showed a similar cognitive control pattern to youth, and proactive control was enhanced.

Cognitive Control as a Multivariate Optimization Problem

A hallmark of adaptation in humans and other animals is our ability to control how we think and behave across different settings. Research has characterized the various forms cognitive control can take-including enhancement of goal-relevant information, suppression of goal-irrelevant information, and overall inhibition of potential responses-and has identified computations and neural circuits that underpin this multitude of control types. Studies have also identified a wide range of situations that elicit adjustments in control allocation (e.g., those eliciting signals indicating an error or increased processing conflict), but the rules governing when a given situation will give rise to a given control adjustment remain poorly understood. Significant progress has recently been made on this front by casting the allocation of control as a decision-making problem. This approach has developed unifying and normative models that prescribe when and how a change in incentives and task demands will result in changes in a given form of control. Despite their successes, these models, and the experiments that have been developed to test them, have yet to face their greatest challenge: deciding how to select among the multiplicity of configurations that control can take at any given time. Here, we will lay out the complexities of the inverse problem inherent to cognitive control allocation, and their close parallels to inverse problems within motor control (e.g., choosing between redundant limb movements). We discuss existing solutions to motor control's inverse problems drawn from optimal control theory, which have proposed that effort costs act to regularize actions and transform motor planning into a well-posed problem. These same principles may help shed light on how our brains optimize over complex control configuration, while providing a new normative perspective on the origins of mental effort.

Can process accountability mitigate myopic biases? An experimental analysis

This paper examines the impact of process accountability on two biases causing myopic or short-sighted decision making. These biases are strong preferences for immediate and certain outcomes known as delay and risk aversion. We hypothesize that accountability alone is insufficient to undo the biases, but if coupled with a cue on subjective discount rates, it will attenuate biases. To analyze our research question, we used a within- and between-subjects experimental design (two accountability conditions compared with a non-accountability condition and with each other) with delay and probability discounting choice tasks involving 118 students of accounting, finance and management in an online experiment. In line with our hypotheses, we find that process accountability successfully reduces excessive delay and risk aversion only if it provides a cue about the subjective discount rate. We discuss the implications of our findings for management control.

Decomposing the motivation to exert mental effort

Achieving most goals demands cognitive control, yet people vary widely in their success at meeting these demands. While motivation is known to be fundamental to determining these successes, what determines one's motivation to perform a given task remains poorly understood. Here, we describe recent efforts towards addressing this question using the Expected Value of Control model, which simulates the process by which people weigh the costs and benefits of exerting mental effort. By functionally decomposing this cost-benefit analysis, this model has been used to fill gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms of mental effort and to generate novel predictions about the sources of variability in real-world performance. We discuss the opportunities the model provides for formalizing hypotheses about why people vary in their motivation to perform tasks, as well as for understanding limitations in our ability to test these hypotheses based on a given measure of performance.

Engaging proactive control: Influences of diverse language experiences using insights from machine learning

We used insights from machine learning to address an important but contentious question: Is bilingual language experience associated with executive control abilities? Specifically, we assess proactive executive control for over 400 young adult bilinguals via reaction time (RT) on an AX continuous performance task (AX-CPT). We measured bilingual experience as a continuous, multidimensional spectrum (i.e., age of acquisition, language entropy, and sheer second language exposure). Linear mixed effects regression analyses indicated significant associations between bilingual language experience and proactive control, consistent with previous work. Information criteria (e.g., AIC) and cross-validation further suggested that these models are robust in predicting data from novel, unmodeled participants. These results were bolstered by cross-validated LASSO regression, a form of penalized regression. However, the results of both cross-validation procedures also indicated that similar predictive performance could be achieved through simpler models that only included information about the AX-CPT (i.e., trial type). Collectively, these results suggest that the effects of bilingual experience on proactive control, to the extent that they exist in younger adults, are likely small. Thus, future studies will require even larger or qualitatively different samples (e.g., older adults or children) in combination with valid, granular quantifications of language experience to reveal predictive effects on novel participants. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Dissociable Effects of Monetary, Liquid, and Social Incentives on Motivation and Cognitive Control

Humans are social creatures and, as such, can be motivated by aspects of social life (e.g., approval from others) to guide decision-making in everyday contexts. Indeed, a common view is that people may have stronger orientation toward social goals or incentives relative to other incentive modalities, such as food or money. However, current studies have only rarely addressed how social incentives compare to other types of rewards in motivating goal-directed behavior. The current study tested this claim; across two separate experiments, the effects of liquid and social incentives were compared in terms of their subsequent impact on task performance and self-reported affect and motivation. Critically, valenced social incentives offered both ecological validity (short video clips—Experiment 1) and continuity with prior stimuli used in the social reward and motivation literature (static images—Experiment 2) when examining their effect on behavior. Across both studies, the results replicate and extend prior work, demonstrating robust effects of liquid incentives on task performance and self-reported affect and motivation, while also supporting an interpretation of weaker motivational and affective effects for social incentives. These patterns of results highlight the complex and wide-ranging effects of social incentives and call into question the effectiveness of social incentives, relative to other incentive modalities, in motivating behavior.

Multiscale Computation and Dynamic Attention in Biological and Artificial Intelligence

Biological and artificial intelligence (AI) are often defined by their capacity to achieve a hierarchy of short-term and long-term goals that require incorporating information over time and space at both local and global scales. More advanced forms of this capacity involve the adaptive modulation of integration across scales, which resolve computational inefficiency and explore-exploit dilemmas at the same time. Research in neuroscience and AI have both made progress towards understanding architectures that achieve this. Insight into biological computations come from phenomena such as decision inertia, habit formation, information search, risky choices and foraging. Across these domains, the brain is equipped with mechanisms (such as the dorsal anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) that can represent and modulate across scales, both with top-down control processes and by local to global consolidation as information progresses from sensory to prefrontal areas. Paralleling these biological architectures, progress in AI is marked by innovations in dynamic multiscale modulation, moving from recurrent and convolutional neural networks-with fixed scalings-to attention, transformers, dynamic convolutions, and consciousness priors-which modulate scale to input and increase scale breadth. The use and development of these multiscale innovations in robotic agents, game AI, and natural language processing (NLP) are pushing the boundaries of AI achievements. By juxtaposing biological and artificial intelligence, the present work underscores the critical importance of multiscale processing to general intelligence, as well as highlighting innovations and differences between the future of biological and artificial intelligence.

Social exclusion modulates dual mechanisms of cognitive control: Evidence from ERPs

Many studies have investigated how social exclusion influences cognitive control but reported inconsistent findings. Based on the dual mechanisms of control framework, this study investigated how social exclusion influences proactive and reactive modes of control (Experiment 1) and the underlying mechanisms (Experiment 2). The Cyberball game was used to manipulate social exclusion. Eighty-six female participants (about 40 for each experiment) performed cognitive control tasks while event-related potentials were recorded. In Experiment 1, an AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) was adopted to differentiate between proactive and reactive control. Results showed that social exclusion weakened proactive control but enhanced reactive control, as reflected by the weaker proactive control indicators (i.e., P3b and CNV), but strengthened reactive control indicators (accuracy and N2) in excluded individuals. More importantly, in Experiment 2, through varying in whether task cues were available before or after target onset in a cued-flanker task, we further manipulated the possibility of engaging proactive control, and found the weakened proactive control could be attributed to both impaired cognitive ability and lowered motivation to engage proactive control in excluded individuals. Together, these results provide insight on how social exclusion influences cognitive control and suggest promising implications for designing effective interventions to relieve the negative impact of social exclusion.

How sequential changes in reward expectation modulate cognitive control: Pupillometry as a tool to monitor dynamic changes in reward expectation

Much evidence suggests that positive affect associated with performance-contingent reward modulates cognitive flexibility and stability. For example, in voluntary task switching, it has been shown that unchanged high reward promotes cognitive stability whereas increases or decreases in reward prospect as well as unchanged low reward promote cognitive flexibility (higher voluntary switch rate, VSR). Pupil diameter has been shown to respond to reward prospect, to task switching manipulations, and more generally to effort in cognitive control tasks and thus appears to be the ideal tool to learn more about the processes underlying these reward-modulated decisions. Therefore, we measured pupillary activity in two voluntary task switching experiments with randomly changing reward magnitudes. Behaviorally, VSR was again lowest when reward remained high as compared to all other reward sequences. Baseline pupil diameter was generally higher following switch trials as compared to repetition trials. Furthermore, the pupil responded dynamically to the reward manipulation: Phasic cue- and target-locked pupil dilation was larger in the reward phase as compared to the non-reward baseline block. Most importantly, phasic pupil dilation in the target interval was highest when reward prospect increased and lowest when reward prospect decreased, suggesting that motivational arousal fluctuates in sync with changes in reward expectation. These results are discussed with respect to current theories on cognitive control as a form of affect regulation.

Age-Related Differences in Motivational Integration and Cognitive Control

Motivational incentives play an influential role in value-based decision-making and cognitive control. A compelling hypothesis in the literature suggests that the motivational value of diverse incentives are integrated in the brain into a common currency value signal that influences decision-making and behavior. To investigate whether motivational integration processes change during healthy aging, we tested older (N = 44) and younger (N = 54) adults in an innovative incentive integration task paradigm that establishes dissociable and additive effects of liquid (e.g., juice, neutral, saltwater) and monetary incentives on cognitive task performance. The results reveal that motivational incentives improve cognitive task performance in both older and younger adults, providing novel evidence demonstrating that age-related cognitive control deficits can be ameliorated with sufficient incentive motivation. Additional analyses revealed clear age-related differences in motivational integration. Younger adult task performance was modulated by both monetary and liquid incentives, whereas monetary reward effects were more gradual in older adults and more strongly impacted by trial-by-trial performance feedback. A surprising discovery was that older adults shifted attention from liquid valence toward monetary reward throughout task performance, but younger adults shifted attention from monetary reward toward integrating both monetary reward and liquid valence by the end of the task, suggesting differential strategic utilization of incentives. These data suggest that older adults may have impairments in incentive integration and employ different motivational strategies to improve cognitive task performance. The findings suggest potential candidate neural mechanisms that may serve as the locus of age-related change, providing targets for future cognitive neuroscience investigations.

The Motivation-Based Promotion of Proactive Control: The Role of Salience Network

It has been shown that reward motivation can facilitate proactive control, a cognitive control mode that is characterized of prior preparation and sustained holding of the goal-relevant information in working memory. However, it remains to be established the neural networks that may be involved in this promotion effect. In this study, participants underwent the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) that measures relative proactive control during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning. We employed independent component analysis to decompose multiple brain networks and identified the task related network. Results showed that the salience network (SN) was engaged in the AX-CPT protocol. Importantly, our data demonstrated that reward modulated the association between task engagement of SN and proactive control, whereby the positive correlation was particularly observed in the reward condition. Moreover, reward modulated task engagement of the SN in a proactive manner, which may contribute to the behavioral proactive performance. Overall, our data suggest the involvement of SN in the reward facilitation effect of proactive control.

Bilingual experience and resting-state brain connectivity: Impacts of L2 age of acquisition and social diversity of language use on control networks

We investigated the independent contributions of second language (L2) age of acquisition (AoA) and social diversity of language use on intrinsic brain organization using seed-based resting-state functional connectivity among highly proficient French-English bilinguals. There were two key findings. First, earlier L2 AoA related to greater interhemispheric functional connectivity between homologous frontal brain regions, and to decreased reliance on proactive executive control in an AX-Continuous Performance Task completed outside the scanner. Second, greater diversity in social language use in daily life related to greater connectivity between the anterior cingulate cortex and the putamen bilaterally, and to increased reliance on proactive control in the same task. These findings suggest that early vs. late L2 AoA links to a specialized neural framework for processing two languages that may engage a specific type of executive control (e.g., reactive control). In contrast, higher vs. lower degrees of diversity in social language use link to a broadly distributed set of brain networks implicated in proactive control and context monitoring.

Reward circuitry activation reflects social preferences in the face of cognitive effort

Research at the intersection of social neuroscience and cognitive effort is an interesting new area for exploration. There is great potential to broaden our understanding of how social context and cognitive effort processes, currently addressed in disparate literatures, interact with one another. In this paper, we briefly review the literature on cognitive effort, focusing on effort-linked valuation and the gap in the literature regarding cognitive effort in the social domain. Next, we present a study designed to explore valuation processes linked to cognitive effort within the social context of an inequality manipulation. More specifically, we created monetary inequality among the participant (SELF, endowed with $50) and two confederates: one also endowed with $50 (OTHER HIGH) and another with only $5 (OTHER LOW). We then scanned participants using fMRI as they attempted to earn bonus payments for themselves and others through a cognitively effortful feedback-based learning task. Positive feedback produced significantly greater activation than negative feedback in key valuation regions, the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), both when participants were performing the task on their own behalf and when earning rewards for others. While reward-related activity in the VS was exaggerated for SELF compared to OTHER HIGH for both positive and negative feedback, activity in the vmPFC did not distinguish between recipients in the group-level results. Furthermore, participants naturally fell into two groups: those most engaged when playing for themselves and those who reported engagement for others. While Self-Engaged participants showed differences between the SELF and both OTHER conditions in the VS and vmPFC, Other-Engaged participants only showed an attenuated response to negative feedback for OTHER HIGH compared to SELF in the VS and no differences between recipient conditions in the vmPFC. Together, this work shows the importance of individual differences and the fragility of advantageous inequality aversion in the face of cognitive effort, highlighting the need to study cognitive effort in the social domain.

Thinking and Action: A Cognitive Perspective on Self-Regulation during Endurance Performance

Self-regulation reflects an individual's efforts to bring behavior and thinking into line with often consciously desired goals. During endurance activity, self-regulation requires an athlete to balance their speed or power output appropriately to achieve an optimal level of performance. Considering that both behavior and thinking are core elements of self-regulation, this article provides a cognitive perspective on the processes required for effective pace-regulation during endurance performance. We also integrate this viewpoint with physiological and performance outcomes during activity. As such, evidence is presented to suggest that what an athlete thinks about has an important influence on effort perceptions, physiological outcomes, and, consequently, endurance performance. This article also provides an account of how an athlete might control their cognition and focus attention during an endurance event. We propose that effective cognitive control during performance requires both proactive, goal-driven processes and reactive, stimulus-driven processes. In addition, the role of metacognition—or thinking about thinking—in pace-regulation will also be considered. Metacognition is an essential component of self-regulation and its primary functions are to monitor and control the thoughts and actions required for task completion. To illustrate these processes in action, a metacognitive framework of attentional focus and cognitive control is applied to an endurance performance setting: specifically, Bradley Wiggins' successful 2015 Hour record attempt in cycling. Finally, future perspectives will consider the potentially deleterious effects of the sustained cognitive effort required during prolonged and strenuous endurance tasks.