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Hast M, Swanson M, Scott C, Oraka E, Espinosa C, Burnett E, Kukielka EA, Rice ME, Mehari L, McCloud J, Miller D, Franklin R, Tate JE, Kirking HL, Morris E. Prevalence of risk behaviors and correlates of SARS-CoV-2 positivity among in-school contacts of confirmed cases in a Georgia school district in the pre-vaccine era, December 2020-January 2021. BMC Public Health 2022; 22:101. [PMID: 35031000 PMCID: PMC8759220 DOI: 10.1186/s12889-021-12347-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2021] [Accepted: 10/29/2021] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND There is a continuing risk for COVID-19 transmission in school settings while transmission is ongoing in the community, particularly among unvaccinated populations. To ensure that schools continue to operate safely and to inform implementation of prevention strategies, it is imperative to gain better understanding of the risk behaviors of staff and students. This secondary analysis describes the prevalence of COVID-19 risk behaviors in an exposed population of students and school staff in the pre-vaccine era and identifies associations between these behaviors and testing positive for SARS-CoV-2. METHODS From December 2020-January 2021, school staff and students exposed to confirmed COVID-19 cases in a Georgia school district were tested for SARS-CoV-2 and surveyed regarding risk behaviors in and out of school. Prevalence of risk behaviors was described by age group and school level, and associations with SARS-CoV-2 positivity were identified using chi squared tests. RESULTS Overall, 717 students and 79 school staff participated in the investigation; SARS-CoV-2 positivity was 9.2%. In the 2 weeks prior to COVID-19 exposure, 24% of participants reported unmasked indoor time at school, 40% attended social gatherings with non-household members, and 71% visited out-of-school indoor locations, including 19% who ate indoors in restaurants. Frequencies of risk behaviors increased by age. Among students, 17% participated in school sports, of whom 86% participated without a mask. SARS-CoV-2 positivity was significantly associated with school sports and unmasked time in sports. Among K-5 students, positivity was associated with exposure to a teacher index case. CONCLUSIONS This analysis highlights the high prevalence of risk behaviors in an unvaccinated population exposed to COVID-19 in school and identifies an association between student sports participation and SARS-CoV-2 positivity. These findings illustrate the importance of school-level prevention measures to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission, including limiting close-contact indoor sports and promoting consistent mask use in unvaccinated individuals. Future research could explore the role of community vaccination programs as a strategy to reduce COVID-19 transmission and introductions into school settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marisa Hast
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Megan Swanson
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Colleen Scott
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Emeka Oraka
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA ,grid.426778.8General Dynamics Information Technology, 3150 Fairview Park Dr, Falls Church, VA 22042 USA
| | - Catherine Espinosa
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Eleanor Burnett
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Esther A. Kukielka
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA ,grid.512065.50000 0001 2297 0954Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Marion E. Rice
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Lemlem Mehari
- Cobb & Douglas Public Health, 1650 County Services Pkwy, 30008 Marietta, GA USA
| | - Jazmyn McCloud
- Cobb & Douglas Public Health, 1650 County Services Pkwy, 30008 Marietta, GA USA
| | - Danielle Miller
- Georgia Public Health Laboratory, 1749 Clairmont Rd, 30033 Decatur, GA USA
| | - Rachel Franklin
- Cobb & Douglas Public Health, 1650 County Services Pkwy, 30008 Marietta, GA USA
| | - Jacqueline E. Tate
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Hannah L. Kirking
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
| | - Elana Morris
- grid.416738.f0000 0001 2163 0069CDC COVID-19 Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, 30329 Atlanta, GA USA
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2
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Cossaboom CM, Medley AM, Spengler JR, Kukielka EA, Goryoka GW, Baird T, Bhavsar S, Campbell S, Campbell TS, Christensen D, Condrey JA, Dawson P, Doty JB, Feldpausch A, Gabel J, Jones D, Lim A, Loiacono CM, Jenkins-Moore M, Moore A, Noureddine C, Ortega J, Poulsen K, Rooney JA, Rossow J, Sheppard K, Sweet E, Stoddard R, Tell RM, Wallace RM, Williams C, Barton Behravesh C. Low SARS-CoV-2 Seroprevalence and No Active Infections among Dogs and Cats in Animal Shelters with Laboratory-Confirmed COVID-19 Human Cases among Employees. Biology (Basel) 2021; 10:898. [PMID: 34571775 PMCID: PMC8467101 DOI: 10.3390/biology10090898] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2021] [Revised: 09/08/2021] [Accepted: 09/09/2021] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
Abstract
Human-to-animal and animal-to-animal transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been documented; however, investigations into SARS-CoV-2 transmission in congregate animal settings are lacking. We investigated four animal shelters in the United States that had identified animals with exposure to shelter employees with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19. Of the 96 cats and dogs with specimens collected, only one dog had detectable SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies; no animal specimens had detectable viral RNA. These data indicate a low probability of human-to-animal transmission events in cats and dogs in shelter settings with early implementation of infection prevention interventions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Caitlin M. Cossaboom
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Alexandra M. Medley
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Jessica R. Spengler
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Esther A. Kukielka
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA
| | - Grace W. Goryoka
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Tiffany Baird
- Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; (T.B.); (T.S.C.); (A.F.); (J.G.)
| | - Swity Bhavsar
- Guilford County Animal Services, Greensboro, NC 27409, USA; (S.B.); (C.N.); (J.O.)
| | - Stefanie Campbell
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Thomas S. Campbell
- Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; (T.B.); (T.S.C.); (A.F.); (J.G.)
| | - Daniel Christensen
- Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, Madison, WI 53706, USA; (D.C.); (A.L.); (K.P.); (E.S.)
| | - Jillian A. Condrey
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Patrick Dawson
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Jeffrey B. Doty
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Amanda Feldpausch
- Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; (T.B.); (T.S.C.); (A.F.); (J.G.)
| | - Julie Gabel
- Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; (T.B.); (T.S.C.); (A.F.); (J.G.)
| | - Dee Jones
- Alabama Department of Public Health, Montgomery, AL 36104, USA;
| | - Ailam Lim
- Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, Madison, WI 53706, USA; (D.C.); (A.L.); (K.P.); (E.S.)
| | - Christina M. Loiacono
- United States Department of Agriculture, National Veterinary Services Laboratory, Ames, IA 50010, USA; (C.M.L.); (M.J.-M.); (R.M.T.)
| | - Melinda Jenkins-Moore
- United States Department of Agriculture, National Veterinary Services Laboratory, Ames, IA 50010, USA; (C.M.L.); (M.J.-M.); (R.M.T.)
| | - Andrea Moore
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Clarissa Noureddine
- Guilford County Animal Services, Greensboro, NC 27409, USA; (S.B.); (C.N.); (J.O.)
| | - Jorge Ortega
- Guilford County Animal Services, Greensboro, NC 27409, USA; (S.B.); (C.N.); (J.O.)
| | - Keith Poulsen
- Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, Madison, WI 53706, USA; (D.C.); (A.L.); (K.P.); (E.S.)
| | - Jane A. Rooney
- United States Department of Agriculture, Fort Collins, CO 80526, USA;
| | - John Rossow
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | | | - Emma Sweet
- Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, Madison, WI 53706, USA; (D.C.); (A.L.); (K.P.); (E.S.)
| | - Robyn Stoddard
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Rachel M. Tell
- United States Department of Agriculture, National Veterinary Services Laboratory, Ames, IA 50010, USA; (C.M.L.); (M.J.-M.); (R.M.T.)
| | - Ryan M. Wallace
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
| | - Carl Williams
- North Carolina Division of Public Health, Raleigh, NC 27699, USA;
| | - Casey Barton Behravesh
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; (A.M.M.); (J.R.S.); (E.A.K.); (G.W.G.); (S.C.); (J.A.C.); (P.D.); (J.B.D.); (A.M.); (J.R.); (R.S.); (R.M.W.); (C.B.B.)
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3
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Chevinsky JR, Tao G, Lavery AM, Kukielka EA, Click ES, Malec D, Kompaniyets L, Bruce BB, Yusuf H, Goodman AB, Dixon MG, Nakao JH, Datta SD, MacKenzie WR, Kadri SS, Saydah S, Giovanni JE, Gundlapalli AV. Late Conditions Diagnosed 1-4 Months Following an Initial Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Encounter: A Matched-Cohort Study Using Inpatient and Outpatient Administrative Data-United States, 1 March-30 June 2020. Clin Infect Dis 2021; 73:S5-S16. [PMID: 33909072 PMCID: PMC8135331 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciab338] [Citation(s) in RCA: 60] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Late sequelae of COVID-19 have been reported; however, few studies have investigated the time course or incidence of late new COVID-19-related health conditions (post-COVID conditions) after COVID-19 diagnosis. Studies distinguishing post-COVID conditions from late conditions caused by other etiologies are lacking. Using data from a large administrative all-payer database, we assessed type, association, and timing of post-COVID conditions following COVID-19 diagnosis. METHODS Using the Premier Healthcare Database Special COVID-19 Release (release date, 20 October 2020) data, during March-June 2020, 27 589 inpatients and 46 857 outpatients diagnosed with COVID-19 (case-patients) were 1:1 matched with patients without COVID-19 through the 4-month follow-up period (control-patients) by using propensity score matching. In this matched-cohort study, adjusted ORs were calculated to assess for late conditions that were more common in case-patients than control-patients. Incidence proportion was calculated for conditions that were more common in case-patients than control-patients during 31-120 days following a COVID-19 encounter. RESULTS During 31-120 days after an initial COVID-19 inpatient hospitalization, 7.0% of adults experienced ≥1 of 5 post-COVID conditions. Among adult outpatients with COVID-19, 7.7% experienced ≥1 of 10 post-COVID conditions. During 31-60 days after an initial outpatient encounter, adults with COVID-19 were 2.8 times as likely to experience acute pulmonary embolism as outpatient control-patients and also more likely to experience a range of conditions affecting multiple body systems (eg, nonspecific chest pain, fatigue, headache, and respiratory, nervous, circulatory, and gastrointestinal symptoms) than outpatient control-patients. CONCLUSIONS These findings add to the evidence of late health conditions possibly related to COVID-19 in adults following COVID-19 diagnosis and can inform healthcare practice and resource planning for follow-up COVID-19 care.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jennifer R Chevinsky
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Guoyu Tao
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Amy M Lavery
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Esther A Kukielka
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Eleanor S Click
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Donald Malec
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Lyudmyla Kompaniyets
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Beau B Bruce
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Hussain Yusuf
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Alyson B Goodman
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Meredith G Dixon
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jolene H Nakao
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - S Deblina Datta
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - William R MacKenzie
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sameer S Kadri
- Clinical Epidemiology Section, Critical Care Medicine Department, National Institutes of Health Clinical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, USA
| | - Sharon Saydah
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jennifer E Giovanni
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Adi V Gundlapalli
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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4
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Kukielka EA, MartÍnez‐lÓpez B, Ballweber LR, Buttke D, Patrick K, Wold EB, Mazur R. Spatial‐Mark‐Resight Model to Estimate Raccoon Abundance in Yosemite Valley, California. WILDLIFE SOC B 2021. [DOI: 10.1002/wsb.1182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Esther A. Kukielka
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance, Dept. Medicine & Epidemiology, School of Veterinary Medicine University of California Davis, One Shields Avenue, 2108 Tupper Hall Davis CA 95616 USA
| | - Beatriz MartÍnez‐lÓpez
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance, Dept. Medicine & Epidemiology, School of Veterinary Medicine University of California Davis, One Shields Avenue, 2108 Tupper Hall Davis CA 95616 USA
| | - Lora R. Ballweber
- College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences Colorado State University Fort Collins 80523‐1682
| | - Danielle Buttke
- Biological Resources Division/Wildlife Health Branch and Office of Public Health National Park Service 1201 Oakridge Drive, Suite 200 Fort Collins CO 80525
| | - Katie Patrick
- Division of Resources Management and Science Yosemite National Park 9039 Village Drive Yosemite CA 95389 USA
| | - E. Binta Wold
- Division of Resources Management and Science Yosemite National Park 9039 Village Drive Yosemite CA 95389 USA
| | - Rachel Mazur
- Division of Resources Management and Science Yosemite National Park 5083 Foresta Road El Portal CA 95318 USA
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5
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Gettings JR, Gold JAW, Kimball A, Forsberg K, Scott C, Uehara A, Tong S, Hast M, Swanson MR, Morris E, Oraka E, Almendares O, Thomas ES, Mehari L, McCloud J, Roberts G, Crosby D, Balajee A, Burnett E, Chancey RJ, Cook P, Donadel M, Espinosa C, Evans ME, Fleming-Dutra KE, Forero C, Kukielka EA, Li Y, Marcet PL, Mitruka K, Nakayama JY, Nakazawa Y, O'Hegarty M, Pratt C, Rice ME, Rodriguez Stewart RM, Sabogal R, Sanchez E, Velasco-Villa A, Weng MK, Zhang J, Rivera G, Parrott T, Franklin R, Memark J, Drenzek C, Hall AJ, Kirking HL, Tate JE, Vallabhaneni S. SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a Georgia school district - United States, December 2020-January 2021. Clin Infect Dis 2021; 74:319-326. [PMID: 33864375 PMCID: PMC8083290 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciab332] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND To inform prevention strategies, we assessed the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and settings in which transmission occurred in a Georgia public school district. METHODS During December 1, 2020-January 22, 2021, SARS-CoV-2-infected index cases and their close contacts in schools were identified by school and public health officials. For in-school contacts, we assessed symptoms and offered SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR testing; performed epidemiologic investigations and whole-genome sequencing to identify in-school transmission; and calculated secondary attack rate (SAR) by school setting (e.g., sports, elementary school classroom), index case role (i.e., staff, student), and index case symptomatic status. RESULTS We identified 86 index cases and 1,119 contacts, 688 (63.1%) of whom received testing. Fifty-nine (8.7%) of 679 contacts tested positive; 15 (17.4%) of 86 index cases resulted in ≥2 positive contacts. Among 55 persons testing positive with available symptom data, 31 (56.4%) were asymptomatic. Highest SAR were in indoor, high-contact sports settings (23.8%, 95% confidence interval [CI] 12.7, 33.3), staff meetings/lunches (18.2%, CI 4.5-31.8), and elementary school classrooms (9.5%, CI 6.5-12.5). SAR was higher for staff (13.1%, CI 9.0-17.2) versus student index cases (5.8%, CI 3.6-8.0) and for symptomatic (10.9%, CI 8.1-13.9) versus asymptomatic index cases (3.0%, CI 1.0-5.5). CONCLUSIONS Indoor sports may pose a risk to the safe operation of in-person learning. Preventing infection in staff members, through measures that include COVID-19 vaccination, is critical to reducing in-school transmission. Because many positive contacts were asymptomatic, contact tracing should be paired with testing, regardless of symptoms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jenna R Gettings
- Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, GA, USA.,COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jeremy A W Gold
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Anne Kimball
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Emeka Oraka
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,General Dynamics Information Technology, Falls Church, VA, USA
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Abirami Balajee
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Maximus Federal, Reston, VA, USA
| | | | | | - Peter Cook
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | | | | | | | | - Esther A Kukielka
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Yan Li
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | | - Jasmine Y Nakayama
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | | - Caroline Pratt
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Jing Zhang
- COVID-19 Response, CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA
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6
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Beltrán-Alcrudo D, Kukielka EA, de Groot N, Dietze K, Sokhadze M, Martínez-López B. Descriptive and multivariate analysis of the pig sector in Georgia and its implications for disease transmission. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0202800. [PMID: 30142224 PMCID: PMC6108502 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0202800] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/11/2018] [Accepted: 08/09/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Georgia is a country in the Caucasus region with a traditional backyard and highly variable pig farming system. The practices of such sectors have seldom been described and analyzed to better understand their implication in the introduction and spread of infectious pig diseases. Moreover, the Georgian pig sector was badly hit by an epidemic of African swine fever in 2007 that quickly spread throughout the region. MATERIALS AND METHODS We interviewed 487 pig farmers and 116 butchers using closed questionnaires on socioeconomic issues related to pig production, husbandry practices, biosecurity, marketing and movements, and disease awareness. Surveys were conducted in four regions of Georgia and descriptive statistics were computed. Factorial analyses of mixed data and hierarchical clustering on principal components were applied to study the relationship among collected variables for both farmers and butchers. RESULTS Results show that pig farming in Georgia is a non-professional sector, highly heterogeneous by region, characterized by smallholdings of few animals, with low inputs, outdated technologies, and poor biosecurity, which all translates into low outputs and productivity. The hierarchical clustering on principal components confirmed that there are five major production and husbandry strategies, which match the four regions where the study was conducted. CONCLUSIONS Our results are the first step to quantify biosecurity gaps and risky behaviours, develop risk profiles, and identify critical control points across the market chain where to implement mitigation measures. This study provides the baseline information needed to design realistic and sustainable prevention, surveillance and control strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo
- Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia, Food and Agriculture Organization, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Esther A. Kukielka
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS), Department of Medicine & Epidemiology, School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis, CA, United States of America
| | | | - Klaas Dietze
- Institut für Epidemiologie, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI), Greifswald—Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Mikheil Sokhadze
- National Food Agency, Tbilisi, Georgia
- FAO Representation in Georgia, Food and Agriculture Organization, Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Beatriz Martínez-López
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS), Department of Medicine & Epidemiology, School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis, CA, United States of America
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Kukielka EA, Jori F, Martínez-López B, Chenais E, Masembe C, Chavernac D, Ståhl K. Wild and Domestic Pig Interactions at the Wildlife-Livestock Interface of Murchison Falls National Park, Uganda, and the Potential Association with African Swine Fever Outbreaks. Front Vet Sci 2016; 3:31. [PMID: 27148545 PMCID: PMC4831202 DOI: 10.3389/fvets.2016.00031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2015] [Accepted: 03/31/2016] [Indexed: 12/27/2022] Open
Abstract
Bushpigs (BPs) (Potamochoerus larvatus) and warthogs (WHs) (Phacochoerus africanus), which are widely distributed in Eastern Africa, are likely to cohabitate in the same environment with domestic pigs (DPs), facilitating the transmission of shared pathogens. However, potential interactions between BP, WH, and DP, and the resulting potential circulation of infectious diseases have rarely been investigated in Africa to date. In order to understand the dynamics of such interactions and the potential influence of human behavior and husbandry practices on them, individual interviews (n = 233) and participatory rural appraisals (n = 11) were carried out among Ugandan pig farmers at the edge of Murchison Falls National Park, northern Uganda. In addition, as an example of possible implications of wild and DP interactions, non-linear multivariate analysis (multiple correspondence analyses) was used to investigate the potential association between the aforementioned factors (interactions and human behavior and practices) and farmer reported African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks. No direct interactions between wild pigs (WPs) and DP were reported in our study area. However, indirect interactions were described by 83 (35.6%) of the participants and were identified to be more common at water sources during the dry season. Equally, eight (3.4%) farmers declared exposing their DP to raw hunting leftovers of WPs. The exploratory analysis performed suggested possible associations between the farmer reported ASF outbreaks and indirect interactions, free-range housing systems, dry season, and having a WH burrow less than 3 km from the household. Our study was useful to gather local knowledge and to identify knowledge gaps about potential interactions between wild and DP in this area. This information could be useful to facilitate the design of future observational studies to better understand the potential transmission of pathogens between wild and DPs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Esther A Kukielka
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS), VM: Medicine & Epidemiology, University of California Davis , Davis, CA , USA
| | - Ferran Jori
- Integrated Animal Risk Management (AGIRs), CIRAD Campus International de Baillarguet, Montpellier, France; Department of Animal Science and Production, Botswana University of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Gaborone, Botswana
| | - Beatriz Martínez-López
- Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS), VM: Medicine & Epidemiology, University of California Davis , Davis, CA , USA
| | - Erika Chenais
- Department of Disease Control and Epidemiology, National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Uppsala, Sweden; Department of Biomedical Sciences and Veterinary Public Health, Swedish University of Agricultural Science (SLU), Uppsala, Sweden
| | - Charles Masembe
- Department of Biological Sciences, Makerere University , Kampala , Uganda
| | - David Chavernac
- Control of Exotic and Emerging Animal Diseases (CMAEE), CIRAD Campus International de Baillarguet , Montpellier , France
| | - Karl Ståhl
- Department of Disease Control and Epidemiology, National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Uppsala, Sweden; Department of Biomedical Sciences and Veterinary Public Health, Swedish University of Agricultural Science (SLU), Uppsala, Sweden
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