1
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McCormick DW, Konkle SL, Magleby R, Chakrabarti AK, Cherney B, Lindell K, Namageyo-Funa A, Visser S, Soto RA, Donnelly MAP, Stringer G, Austin B, Beatty ME, Stous S, Albanese BA, Chu VT, Chuey M, Dietrich EA, Drobeniuc J, Folster JM, Killerby ME, Lehman JA, McDonald EC, Ruffin J, Schwartz NG, Sheldon SW, Sleweon S, Thornburg NJ, Hughes LJ, Petway M, Tong S, Whaley MJ, Kirking HL, Tate JE, Hsu CH, Matanock A. SARS-CoV-2 infection risk among vaccinated and unvaccinated household members during the Alpha variant surge - Denver, Colorado, and San Diego, California, January-April 2021. Vaccine 2022; 40:4845-4855. [PMID: 35803846 PMCID: PMC9250903 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.06.066] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2022] [Revised: 06/17/2022] [Accepted: 06/18/2022] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND COVID-19 vaccination reduces SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission. However, evidence is emerging on the degree of protection across variants and in high-transmission settings. To better understand the protection afforded by vaccination specifically in a high-transmission setting, we examined household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during a period of high community incidence with predominant SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 (Alpha) variant, among vaccinated and unvaccinated contacts. METHODS We conducted a household transmission investigation in San Diego County, California, and Denver, Colorado, during January-April 2021. Households were enrolled if they had at least one person with documented SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected nasopharyngeal swabs, blood, demographic information, and vaccination history from all consenting household members. We compared infection risks (IRs), RT-PCR cycle threshold values, SARS-CoV-2 culture results, and antibody statuses among vaccinated and unvaccinated household contacts. RESULTS We enrolled 493 individuals from 138 households. The SARS-CoV-2 variant was identified from 121/138 households (88%). The most common variants were Alpha (75/121, 62%) and Epsilon (19/121, 16%). There were no households with discordant lineages among household members. One fully vaccinated secondary case was symptomatic (13%); the other 5 were asymptomatic (87%). Among unvaccinated secondary cases, 105/108 (97%) were symptomatic. Among 127 households with a single primary case, the IR for household contacts was 45% (146/322; 95% Confidence Interval [CI] 40-51%). The observed IR was higher in unvaccinated (130/257, 49%, 95% CI 45-57%) than fully vaccinated contacts (6/26, 23%, 95% CI 11-42%). A lower proportion of households with a fully vaccinated primary case had secondary cases (1/5, 20%) than households with an unvaccinated primary case (66/108, 62%). CONCLUSIONS Although SARS-CoV-2 infections in vaccinated household contacts were reported in this high transmission setting, full vaccination protected against SARS-CoV-2 infection. These findings further support the protective effect of COVID-19 vaccination and highlight the need for ongoing vaccination among eligible persons.
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Affiliation(s)
- David W McCormick
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Stacey L Konkle
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Reed Magleby
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Ayan K Chakrabarti
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Blake Cherney
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Kristine Lindell
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Apophia Namageyo-Funa
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Susanna Visser
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Raymond A Soto
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Marisa A P Donnelly
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Ginger Stringer
- Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment, Denver, CO, USA
| | - Brett Austin
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA, USA
| | - Mark E Beatty
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA, USA
| | - Sarah Stous
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA, USA
| | | | - Victoria T Chu
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Meagan Chuey
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA, USA
| | - Elizabeth A Dietrich
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jan Drobeniuc
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jennifer M Folster
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Marie E Killerby
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jennifer A Lehman
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric C McDonald
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA, USA
| | - Jasmine Ruffin
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Noah G Schwartz
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Sarah W Sheldon
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Sadia Sleweon
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Natalie J Thornburg
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Laura J Hughes
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Marla Petway
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Suxiang Tong
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Melissa J Whaley
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Hannah L Kirking
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jacqueline E Tate
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Christopher H Hsu
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Almea Matanock
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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2
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Waltenburg MA, Whaley MJ, Chancey RJ, Donnelly MA, Chuey MR, Soto R, Schwartz NG, Chu VT, Sleweon S, McCormick DW, Uehara A, Retchless AC, Tong S, Folster JM, Petway M, Thornburg NJ, Drobeniuc J, Austin B, Hudziec MM, Stringer G, Albanese BA, Totten SE, Matzinger SR, Staples JE, Killerby ME, Hughes LJ, Matanock A, Beatty M, Tate JE, Kirking HL, Hsu CH. Household Transmission and Symptomology of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Alpha Variant among Children-California and Colorado, 2021. J Pediatr 2022; 247:29-37.e7. [PMID: 35447121 PMCID: PMC9015725 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpeds.2022.04.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2022] [Revised: 03/30/2022] [Accepted: 04/15/2022] [Indexed: 12/11/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To assess the household secondary infection risk (SIR) of B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and non-Alpha lineages of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children. STUDY DESIGN During January to April 2021, we prospectively followed households with a SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected questionnaires, serial nasopharyngeal swabs for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing and whole genome sequencing, and serial blood samples for serology testing. We calculated SIRs by primary case age (pediatric vs adult), household contact age, and viral lineage. We evaluated risk factors associated with transmission and described symptom profiles among children. RESULTS Among 36 households with pediatric primary cases, 21 (58%) had secondary infections. Among 91 households with adult primary cases, 51 (56%) had secondary infections. SIRs among pediatric and adult primary cases were 45% and 54%, respectively (OR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.41-1.54). SIRs among pediatric primary cases with Alpha and non-Alpha lineage were 55% and 46%, respectively (OR, 1.52; 95% CI, 0.51-4.53). SIRs among pediatric and adult household contacts were 55% and 49%, respectively (OR, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.68-1.50). Among pediatric contacts, no significant differences in the odds of acquiring infection by demographic or household characteristics were observed. CONCLUSIONS Household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from children and adult primary cases to household members was frequent. The risk of secondary infection was similar among child and adult household contacts. Among children, household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the risk of secondary infection was not influenced by lineage. Continued mitigation strategies (eg, masking, physical distancing, vaccination) are needed to protect at-risk groups regardless of virus lineage circulating in communities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michelle A. Waltenburg
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Reprint requests: Michelle A. Waltenburg, DVM, MPH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Atlanta, GA 30329
| | - Melissa J. Whaley
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Rebecca J. Chancey
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Marisa A.P. Donnelly
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Meagan R. Chuey
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA
| | - Raymond Soto
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Noah G. Schwartz
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Victoria T. Chu
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Sadia Sleweon
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - David W. McCormick
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Anna Uehara
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Adam C. Retchless
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Suxiang Tong
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Jennifer M. Folster
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Marla Petway
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Natalie J. Thornburg
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Jan Drobeniuc
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Brett Austin
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA
| | | | - Ginger Stringer
- Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, CO
| | | | - Sarah E. Totten
- Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, CO
| | | | - J. Erin Staples
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Marie E. Killerby
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Laura J. Hughes
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Almea Matanock
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Mark Beatty
- County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, CA
| | - Jacqueline E. Tate
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Hannah L. Kirking
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
| | - Christopher H. Hsu
- Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
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3
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Currie DW, Shah MM, Salvatore PP, Ford L, Whaley MJ, Meece J, Ivacic L, Thornburg NJ, Tamin A, Harcourt JL, Folster J, Medrzycki M, Jain S, Wong P, Goffard K, Gieryn D, Kahrs J, Langolf K, Zochert T, Hsu CH, Kirking HL, Tate JE. Relationship of SARS-CoV-2 Antigen and Reverse Transcription PCR Positivity for Viral Cultures. Emerg Infect Dis 2022; 28:717-720. [PMID: 35202532 PMCID: PMC8888206 DOI: 10.3201/eid2803.211747] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
We assessed the relationship between antigen and reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) test positivity and successful virus isolation. We found that antigen test results were more predictive of virus recovery than RT-PCR results. However, virus was isolated from some antigen-negative and RT-PCR‒positive paired specimens, providing support for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention antigen testing algorithm.
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4
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Whaley MJ, Vuong JT, Topaz N, Chang HY, Thomas JD, Jenkins LT, Hu F, Schmink S, Steward-Clark E, Mathis M, Rodriguez-Rivera LD, Retchless AC, Joseph SJ, Chen A, Acosta AM, McNamara L, Soeters HM, Mbaeyi S, Marjuki H, Wang X. Genomic Insights on Variation Underlying Capsule Expression in Meningococcal Carriage Isolates From University Students, United States, 2015-2016. Front Microbiol 2022; 13:815044. [PMID: 35250931 PMCID: PMC8893959 DOI: 10.3389/fmicb.2022.815044] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2021] [Accepted: 01/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
In January and February 2015, Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (NmB) outbreaks occurred at two universities in the United States, and mass vaccination campaigns using MenB vaccines were initiated as part of a public health response. Meningococcal carriage evaluations were conducted concurrently with vaccination campaigns at these two universities and at a third university, where no NmB outbreak occurred. Meningococcal isolates (N = 1,514) obtained from these evaluations were characterized for capsule biosynthesis by whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Functional capsule polysaccharide synthesis (cps) loci belonging to one of seven capsule genogroups (B, C, E, W, X, Y, and Z) were identified in 122 isolates (8.1%). Approximately half [732 (48.4%)] of isolates could not be genogrouped because of the lack of any serogroup-specific genes. The remaining 660 isolates (43.5%) contained serogroup-specific genes for genogroup B, C, E, W, X, Y, or Z, but had mutations in the cps loci. Identified mutations included frameshift or point mutations resulting in premature stop codons, missing or fragmented genes, or disruptions due to insertion elements. Despite these mutations, 49/660 isolates expressed capsule as observed with slide agglutination, whereas 45/122 isolates with functional cps loci did not express capsule. Neither the variable capsule expression nor the genetic variation in the cps locus was limited to a certain clonal complex, except for capsule null isolates (predominantly clonal complex 198). Most of the meningococcal carriage isolates collected from student populations at three US universities were non-groupable as a result of either being capsule null or containing mutations within the capsule locus. Several mutations inhibiting expression of the genes involved with the synthesis and transport of the capsule may be reversible, allowing the bacteria to switch between an encapsulated and non-encapsulated state. These findings are particularly important as carriage is an important component of the transmission cycle of the pathogen, and understanding the impact of genetic variations on the synthesis of capsule, a meningococcal vaccine target and an important virulence factor, may ultimately inform strategies for control and prevention of disease caused by this pathogen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa J. Whaley
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Jeni T. Vuong
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Nadav Topaz
- CDC Foundation Field Employee assigned to the Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - How-Yi Chang
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Jennifer Dolan Thomas
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Laurel T. Jenkins
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Fang Hu
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Susanna Schmink
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Evelene Steward-Clark
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Marsenia Mathis
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Lorraine D. Rodriguez-Rivera
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Adam C. Retchless
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Sandeep J. Joseph
- IHRC Inc., Contractor to Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Alexander Chen
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Anna M. Acosta
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Lucy McNamara
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Heidi M. Soeters
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Sarah Mbaeyi
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Henju Marjuki
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Xin Wang
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
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5
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Ford L, Whaley MJ, Shah MM, Salvatore PP, Segaloff HE, Delaney A, Currie DW, Boyle-Estheimer L, O'Hegarty M, Morgan CN, Meece J, Ivacic L, Thornburg NJ, Tamin A, Harcourt JL, Folster JM, Medrzycki M, Jain S, Wong P, Goffard K, Gieryn D, Kahrs J, Langolf K, Zochert T, Tate JE, Hsu CH, Kirking HL. Antigen Test Performance Among Children and Adults at a SARS-CoV-2 Community Testing Site. J Pediatric Infect Dis Soc 2021; 10:1052-1061. [PMID: 34468732 PMCID: PMC8932441 DOI: 10.1093/jpids/piab081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2021] [Accepted: 08/18/2021] [Indexed: 01/02/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Performance characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 antigen tests among children are limited despite the need for point-of-care testing in school and childcare settings. We describe children seeking SARS-CoV-2 testing at a community site and compare antigen test performance to real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture. METHODS Two anterior nasal specimens were self-collected for BinaxNOW antigen and RT-PCR testing, along with demographics, symptoms, and exposure information from individuals ≥5 years at a community testing site. Viral culture was attempted on residual antigen or RT-PCR-positive specimens. Demographic and clinical characteristics, and the performance of SARS-CoV-2 antigen tests, were compared among children (<18 years) and adults. RESULTS About 1 in 10 included specimens were from children (225/2110); 16.4% (37/225) were RT-PCR-positive. Cycle threshold values were similar among RT-PCR-positive specimens from children and adults (22.5 vs 21.3, P = .46) and among specimens from symptomatic and asymptomatic children (22.5 vs 23.2, P = .39). Sensitivity of antigen test compared to RT-PCR was 73.0% (27/37) among specimens from children and 80.8% (240/297) among specimens from adults; among specimens from children, specificity was 100% (188/188), positive and negative predictive values were 100% (27/27) and 94.9% (188/198), respectively. Virus was isolated from 51.4% (19/37) of RT-PCR-positive pediatric specimens; all 19 had positive antigen test results. CONCLUSIONS With lower sensitivity relative to RT-PCR, antigen tests may not diagnose all positive COVID-19 cases; however, antigen testing identified children with live SARS-CoV-2 virus.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Ford
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Melissa J. Whaley
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Melisa M. Shah
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Phillip P. Salvatore
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Hannah E. Segaloff
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Bureau of Communicable Diseases, Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Augustina Delaney
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Dustin W. Currie
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Lauren Boyle-Estheimer
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Michelle O'Hegarty
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Clint N. Morgan
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jennifer Meece
- Integrated Research and Development Laboratory, Marshfield Clinic Research Institute, Marshfield, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Lynn Ivacic
- Integrated Research and Development Laboratory, Marshfield Clinic Research Institute, Marshfield, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Natalie J. Thornburg
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Azaibi Tamin
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jennifer L. Harcourt
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jennifer M. Folster
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Magdalena Medrzycki
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Shilpi Jain
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Phili Wong
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | | | - Douglas Gieryn
- Winnebago County Health Department, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Juliana Kahrs
- Student Recreation and Wellness, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Kimberly Langolf
- Sponsored Programs and Risk and Safety, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Tara Zochert
- Sponsored Programs and Risk and Safety, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Jacqueline E. Tate
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Christopher H. Hsu
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Hannah L. Kirking
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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6
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Shah MM, Salvatore PP, Ford L, Kamitani E, Whaley MJ, Mitchell K, Currie DW, Morgan CN, Segaloff HE, Lecher S, Somers T, Van Dyke ME, Bigouette JP, Delaney A, DaSilva J, O'Hegarty M, Boyle-Estheimer L, Abdirizak F, Karpathy SE, Meece J, Ivanic L, Goffard K, Gieryn D, Sterkel A, Bateman A, Kahrs J, Langolf K, Zochert T, Knight NW, Hsu CH, Kirking HL, Tate JE. Performance of Repeat BinaxNOW Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Antigen Testing in a Community Setting, Wisconsin, November 2020-December 2020. Clin Infect Dis 2021; 73:S54-S57. [PMID: 33909068 PMCID: PMC8135465 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciab309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Repeating the BinaxNOW antigen test for SARS-CoV-2 by two groups of readers within 30 minutes resulted in high concordance (98.9%) in 2,110 encounters. BinaxNOW test sensitivity was 77.2% (258/334) compared to real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. Same day antigen testing did not significantly improve test sensitivity while specificity remained high.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melisa M Shah
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Phillip P Salvatore
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Laura Ford
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Emiko Kamitani
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Melissa J Whaley
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Kaitlin Mitchell
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Laboratory Leadership Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Dustin W Currie
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Clint N Morgan
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Hannah E Segaloff
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Shirley Lecher
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Tarah Somers
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Miriam E Van Dyke
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - John Paul Bigouette
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Augustina Delaney
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Juliana DaSilva
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Michelle O'Hegarty
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Lauren Boyle-Estheimer
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Fatima Abdirizak
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sandor E Karpathy
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jennifer Meece
- Marshfield Clinic Research Institute, Marshfield, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Lynn Ivanic
- Marshfield Clinic Research Institute, Marshfield, Wisconsin, USA
| | | | - Doug Gieryn
- Winnebago County Health Department, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Alana Sterkel
- Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Allen Bateman
- Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Juliana Kahrs
- University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | | | - Tara Zochert
- University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, USA
| | - Nancy W Knight
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Christopher H Hsu
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Hannah L Kirking
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jacqueline E Tate
- COVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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7
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Soeters HM, Oliver SE, Plumb ID, Blain AE, Zulz T, Simons BC, Barnes M, Farley MM, Harrison LH, Lynfield R, Massay S, McLaughlin J, Muse AG, Petit S, Schaffner W, Thomas A, Torres S, Watt J, Pondo T, Whaley MJ, Hu F, Wang X, Briere EC, Bruce MG. Epidemiology of Invasive Haemophilus influenzae Serotype a Disease-United States, 2008-2017. Clin Infect Dis 2021; 73:e371-e379. [PMID: 32589699 PMCID: PMC9628811 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciaa875] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2020] [Accepted: 06/19/2020] [Indexed: 08/23/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Haemophilus influenzae serotype a (Hia) can cause invasive disease similar to serotype b; no Hia vaccine is available. We describe the epidemiology of invasive Hia disease in the United States overall and specifically in Alaska during 2008-2017. METHODS Active population- and laboratory-based surveillance for invasive Hia disease was conducted through Active Bacterial Core surveillance sites and from Alaska statewide invasive bacterial disease surveillance. Sterile-site isolates were serotyped via slide agglutination or real-time polymerase chain reaction. Incidences in cases per 100 000 were calculated. RESULTS From 2008 to 2017, an estimated average of 306 invasive Hia disease cases occurred annually in the United States (estimated annual incidence: 0.10); incidence increased by an average of 11.1% annually. Overall, 42.7% of cases were in children aged <5 years (incidence: 0.64), with highest incidence among children aged <1 year (1.60). Case fatality was 7.8% overall and was highest among adults aged ≥65 years (15.1%). Among children aged <5 years, the incidence was 17 times higher among American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) children (8.29) than among children of all other races combined (0.49). In Alaska, incidences among all ages (0.68) and among children aged <1 year (24.73) were nearly 6 and 14 times higher, respectively, than corresponding US incidences. Case fatality in Alaska was 10.2%, and the vast majority (93.9%) of cases occurred among AI/AN. CONCLUSIONS Incidence of invasive Hia disease has increased since 2008, with the highest burden among AI/AN children. These data can inform prevention strategies, including Hia vaccine development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Heidi M. Soeters
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Sara E. Oliver
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Ian D. Plumb
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Amy E. Blain
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Tammy Zulz
- Arctic Investigations Program, CDC, Anchorage, AK, USA
| | | | - Meghan Barnes
- Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, CO, USA
| | - Monica M. Farley
- Emory University School of Medicine and The Atlanta VA Medical Center, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Lee H. Harrison
- Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA
| | | | | | | | | | - Susan Petit
- Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, CT, USA
| | | | - Ann Thomas
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, OR, USA
| | | | - James Watt
- California Department of Public Health, Richmond, CA, USA
| | - Tracy Pondo
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Fang Hu
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Xin Wang
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA
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8
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Brown NE, Blain AE, Burzlaff K, Harrison LH, Petit S, Schaffner W, Smelser C, Thomas A, Triden L, Watt JP, Pondo T, Whaley MJ, Hu F, Wang X, Oliver S, Soeters HM. Racial disparities in invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease - United States, 2008-2017. Clin Infect Dis 2021; 73:1617-1624. [PMID: 33993217 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciab449] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Since the introduction of Haemophilus influenzae serotype b (Hib) conjugate vaccines in the United States, invasive H. influenzae disease (Hi) epidemiology has changed and racial disparities have not been recently described. METHODS Active population- and laboratory-based surveillance for Hi was conducted through Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) at 10 U.S. sites. Data from 2008-2017 was used to estimate projected nationwide annual incidence in cases/100,000. RESULTS During 2008-2017, ABCs identified 7379 Hi cases. Of 6705 (90.9%) patients with reported race, 76.2% were White, 18.6% were Black, 2.8% were Asian/Pacific Islander (PI), and 2.4% were American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN). Nationwide annual incidence was 1.8 cases/100,000. By race, incidence was highest among AI/AN populations (3.1) and lowest among Asian/PI populations (0.8). Nontypeable Hi (NTHi) caused the largest incidence within all races (1.3), with no striking disparities identified. Among AI/AN children aged <5 years, incidence of Hi serotype a (Hia) was 16.7 times higher and Hib incidence was 22.4 times higher than among White children. Though Hia incidence was lower among White and Black populations compared to AI/AN, Hia incidence increased 13.6% annually among White children and 40.4% annually among Black children aged <5 years. CONCLUSIONS While NTHi causes the largest Hi burden overall, AI/AN populations experience disproportionately high rates of Hia and Hib, with the greatest disparity among AI/AN children aged <5 years. Prevention tools are needed to reduce disparities affecting AI/AN children and address increasing Hia incidence in other communities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicole E Brown
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Amy E Blain
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Kari Burzlaff
- New York State Department of Health, Albany, NY, United States
| | - Lee H Harrison
- Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, United States
| | - Susan Petit
- Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, CT, United States
| | - William Schaffner
- Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN, United States
| | - Chad Smelser
- New Mexico Department of Health, Santa Fe, NM, United States
| | - Ann Thomas
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, OR, United States
| | - Lori Triden
- Minnesota Department of Health, St. Paul, MN, United States
| | - James P Watt
- California Department of Public Health, Richmond, CA, United States
| | - Tracy Pondo
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Melissa J Whaley
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Fang Hu
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Xin Wang
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Sara Oliver
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Heidi M Soeters
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, GA, United States
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9
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Lafond KE, Porter RM, Whaley MJ, Suizan Z, Ran Z, Aleem MA, Thapa B, Sar B, Proschle VS, Peng Z, Feng L, Coulibaly D, Nkwembe E, Olmedo A, Ampofo W, Saha S, Chadha M, Mangiri A, Setiawaty V, Ali SS, Chaves SS, Otorbaeva D, Keosavanh O, Saleh M, Ho A, Alexander B, Oumzil H, Baral KP, Huang QS, Adebayo AA, Al-Abaidani I, von Horoch M, Cohen C, Tempia S, Mmbaga V, Chittaganpitch M, Casal M, Dang DA, Couto P, Nair H, Bresee JS, Olsen SJ, Azziz-Baumgartner E, Nuorti JP, Widdowson MA. Global burden of influenza-associated lower respiratory tract infections and hospitalizations among adults: A systematic review and meta-analysis. PLoS Med 2021; 18:e1003550. [PMID: 33647033 PMCID: PMC7959367 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1003550] [Citation(s) in RCA: 82] [Impact Index Per Article: 27.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2020] [Revised: 03/15/2021] [Accepted: 01/27/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Influenza illness burden is substantial, particularly among young children, older adults, and those with underlying conditions. Initiatives are underway to develop better global estimates for influenza-associated hospitalizations and deaths. Knowledge gaps remain regarding the role of influenza viruses in severe respiratory disease and hospitalizations among adults, particularly in lower-income settings. METHODS AND FINDINGS We aggregated published data from a systematic review and unpublished data from surveillance platforms to generate global meta-analytic estimates for the proportion of acute respiratory hospitalizations associated with influenza viruses among adults. We searched 9 online databases (Medline, Embase, CINAHL, Cochrane Library, Scopus, Global Health, LILACS, WHOLIS, and CNKI; 1 January 1996-31 December 2016) to identify observational studies of influenza-associated hospitalizations in adults, and assessed eligible papers for bias using a simplified Newcastle-Ottawa scale for observational data. We applied meta-analytic proportions to global estimates of lower respiratory infections (LRIs) and hospitalizations from the Global Burden of Disease study in adults ≥20 years and by age groups (20-64 years and ≥65 years) to obtain the number of influenza-associated LRI episodes and hospitalizations for 2016. Data from 63 sources showed that influenza was associated with 14.1% (95% CI 12.1%-16.5%) of acute respiratory hospitalizations among all adults, with no significant differences by age group. The 63 data sources represent published observational studies (n = 28) and unpublished surveillance data (n = 35), from all World Health Organization regions (Africa, n = 8; Americas, n = 11; Eastern Mediterranean, n = 7; Europe, n = 8; Southeast Asia, n = 11; Western Pacific, n = 18). Data quality for published data sources was predominantly moderate or high (75%, n = 56/75). We estimate 32,126,000 (95% CI 20,484,000-46,129,000) influenza-associated LRI episodes and 5,678,000 (95% CI 3,205,000-9,432,000) LRI hospitalizations occur each year among adults. While adults <65 years contribute most influenza-associated LRI hospitalizations and episodes (3,464,000 [95% CI 1,885,000-5,978,000] LRI hospitalizations and 31,087,000 [95% CI 19,987,000-44,444,000] LRI episodes), hospitalization rates were highest in those ≥65 years (437/100,000 person-years [95% CI 265-612/100,000 person-years]). For this analysis, published articles were limited in their inclusion of stratified testing data by year and age group. Lack of information regarding influenza vaccination of the study population was also a limitation across both types of data sources. CONCLUSIONS In this meta-analysis, we estimated that influenza viruses are associated with over 5 million hospitalizations worldwide per year. Inclusion of both published and unpublished findings allowed for increased power to generate stratified estimates, and improved representation from lower-income countries. Together, the available data demonstrate the importance of influenza viruses as a cause of severe disease and hospitalizations in younger and older adults worldwide.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kathryn E. Lafond
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
- Health Sciences Unit, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
- * E-mail: (KEL); (MAW)
| | - Rachael M. Porter
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Melissa J. Whaley
- US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Zhou Suizan
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
| | - Zhang Ran
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
| | - Mohammad Abdul Aleem
- Program for Emerging Infections, Infectious Diseases Division, icddr,b, Dhaka, Bangladesh
| | - Binay Thapa
- Royal Centre for Disease Control, Thimphu, Bhutan
| | - Borann Sar
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
| | | | - Zhibin Peng
- Division of Infectious Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China
| | - Luzhao Feng
- School of Population Medicine & Public Health, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences/Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China
| | | | - Edith Nkwembe
- Institut National de Recherches Biomédicales, Kinshasa, République Démocratique du Congo
| | | | - William Ampofo
- Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research, College of Health Sciences, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
| | - Siddhartha Saha
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New Delhi, India
| | | | - Amalya Mangiri
- US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Jakarta, Indonesia
| | - Vivi Setiawaty
- National Institute of Health Research and Development, Jakarta, Indonesia
| | | | - Sandra S. Chaves
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nairobi, Kenya
| | - Dinagul Otorbaeva
- Department of State Sanitary Epidemiological Surveillance, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
| | - Onechanh Keosavanh
- National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology, Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic
| | - Majd Saleh
- Epidemiological Surveillance Program, Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, Beirut, Lebanon
| | - Antonia Ho
- MRC–University of Glasgow Centre for Virus Research, Glasgow, United Kingdom
- Malawi–Liverpool–Wellcome Trust Clinical Research Programme, Blantyre, Malawi
| | | | - Hicham Oumzil
- Virology Department, Institut National d’Hygiène, Rabat, Morocco
- Faculty of Medicine, Microbiology RPU, Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco
| | | | - Q. Sue Huang
- WHO National Influenza Centre, Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - Adedeji A. Adebayo
- Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria
| | - Idris Al-Abaidani
- Directorate General of Disease Surveillance and Control, Ministry of Health, Muscat, Oman
| | - Marta von Horoch
- Ministerio de Salud Publica y Bienestar Social, Asunción, Paraguay
| | - Cheryl Cohen
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Stefano Tempia
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
- MassGenics, Duluth, Georgia, United States of America
- School of Public Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | | | - Malinee Chittaganpitch
- National Institute of Health, Department of Medical Sciences, Ministry of Public Health, Nonthaburi, Thailand
| | - Mariana Casal
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, United States of America
| | - Duc Anh Dang
- National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi, Vietnam
| | - Paula Couto
- Pan American Health Organization, Washington, District of Columbia, United States of America
| | - Harish Nair
- Centre for Global Health, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
| | - Joseph S. Bresee
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Sonja J. Olsen
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Eduardo Azziz-Baumgartner
- Influenza Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - J. Pekka Nuorti
- Health Sciences Unit, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Marc-Alain Widdowson
- Division of Global Health Protection, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nairobi, Kenya
- Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium
- * E-mail: (KEL); (MAW)
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10
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Joseph SJ, Topaz N, Chang HY, Whaley MJ, Vuong JT, Chen A, Hu F, Schmink SE, Jenkins LT, Rodriguez-Rivera LD, Thomas JD, Acosta AM, McNamara L, Soeters HM, Mbaeyi S, Wang X. Insights on Population Structure and Within-Host Genetic Changes among Meningococcal Carriage Isolates from U.S. Universities. mSphere 2020; 5:e00197-20. [PMID: 32269159 PMCID: PMC7142301 DOI: 10.1128/msphere.00197-20] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2020] [Accepted: 03/17/2020] [Indexed: 01/15/2023] Open
Abstract
In 2015 and 2016, meningococcal carriage evaluations were conducted at two universities in the United States following mass vaccination campaigns in response to Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (NmB) disease outbreaks. A simultaneous carriage evaluation was also conducted at a university near one of the outbreaks, where no NmB cases were reported and no mass vaccination occurred. A total of ten cross-sectional carriage evaluation rounds were conducted, resulting in 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates collected from 7,001 unique participants; 1,587 individuals were swabbed at multiple time points (repeat participants). All isolates underwent whole-genome sequencing. The most frequently observed clonal complexes (CC) were CC198 (27.3%), followed by CC1157 (17.4%), CC41/44 (9.8%), CC35 (7.4%), and CC32 (5.6%). Phylogenetic analysis identified carriage isolates that were highly similar to the NmB outbreak strains; comparative genomics between these outbreak and carriage isolates revealed genetic changes in virulence genes. Among repeat participants, 348 individuals carried meningococcal bacteria during at least one carriage evaluation round; 50.3% retained N. meningitidis carriage of a strain with the same sequence type (ST) and CC across rounds, 44.3% only carried N. meningitidis in one round, and 5.4% acquired a new N. meningitidis strain between rounds. Recombination, point mutations, deletions, and simple sequence repeats were the most frequent genetic mechanisms found in isolates collected from hosts carrying a strain of the same ST and CC across rounds. Our findings provide insight on the dynamics of meningococcal carriage among a population that is at higher risk for invasive meningococcal disease than the general population.IMPORTANCE U.S. university students are at a higher risk of invasive meningococcal disease than the general population. The responsible pathogen, Neisseria meningitidis, can be carried asymptomatically in the oropharynx; the dynamics of meningococcal carriage and the genetic features that distinguish carriage versus disease states are not completely understood. Through our analyses, we aimed to provide data to address these topics. We whole-genome sequenced 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates from individuals at three U.S. universities, two of which underwent mass vaccination campaigns following recent meningococcal outbreaks. We describe the within-host genetic changes among individuals carrying a strain with the same molecular type over time, the primary strains being carried in this population, and the genetic differences between closely related outbreak and carriage strains. Our results provide detailed information on the dynamics of meningococcal carriage and the genetic differences in carriage and outbreak strains, which can inform future efforts to reduce the incidence of invasive meningococcal disease.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Melissa J Whaley
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jeni T Vuong
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Alexander Chen
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Fang Hu
- IHRC Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Susanna E Schmink
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Laurel T Jenkins
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | | | - Jennifer D Thomas
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Anna M Acosta
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Lucy McNamara
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Heidi M Soeters
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sarah Mbaeyi
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Xin Wang
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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11
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Mbaeyi SA, Blain A, Whaley MJ, Wang X, Cohn AC, MacNeil JR. Epidemiology of Meningococcal Disease Outbreaks in the United States, 2009-2013. Clin Infect Dis 2020; 68:580-585. [PMID: 29982382 DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciy548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2018] [Accepted: 06/28/2018] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Background Although the incidence of meningococcal disease is low in the United States, outbreaks remain a serious public health concern. In this evaluation, we identify and describe outbreaks of meningococcal disease. Methods A retrospective review of all meningococcal disease cases reported from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2013 was performed by state health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to identify meningococcal disease outbreaks. An outbreak was defined as ≥2 primary cases of the same serogroup within <3 months in an organization, or a ≥2-fold increase in disease rates in a community. Results From 2009 to 2013, a total of 3686 cases of meningococcal disease were reported in the United States. Among these, 180 primary cases (4.9%) occurred as part of 36 outbreaks (17 organization-based and 19 community-based). Serogroup B accounted for 8 (47.1%) of the organization-based outbreaks, including 6 of 8 university outbreaks. Serogroup C accounted for 10 (52.6%) of the community-based outbreaks, including both of 2 outbreaks identified among men who have sex with men. Organization- and community-based outbreaks differed in predominant serogroup, age distribution of cases, and clinical syndrome. Among 33 outbreaks with known information, a vaccination and/or expanded chemoprophylaxis campaign was conducted in 16 (48.5%). Conclusions Outbreak-associated cases account for approximately 5% of all meningococcal disease cases in the United States. Serogroup B is the primary cause of organization-based outbreaks, with the majority of university outbreaks due to serogroup B, and serogroup C is the primary cause of community-based outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sarah A Mbaeyi
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Amy Blain
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Melissa J Whaley
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Xin Wang
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Amanda C Cohn
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Jessica R MacNeil
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
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12
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Potts CC, Topaz N, Rodriguez-Rivera LD, Hu F, Chang HY, Whaley MJ, Schmink S, Retchless AC, Chen A, Ramos E, Doho GH, Wang X. Genomic characterization of Haemophilus influenzae: a focus on the capsule locus. BMC Genomics 2019; 20:733. [PMID: 31606037 PMCID: PMC6790013 DOI: 10.1186/s12864-019-6145-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2019] [Accepted: 09/26/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Haemophilus influenzae (Hi) can cause invasive diseases such as meningitis, pneumonia, or sepsis. Typeable Hi includes six serotypes (a through f), each expressing a unique capsular polysaccharide. The capsule, encoded by the genes within the capsule locus, is a major virulence factor of typeable Hi. Non-typeable (NTHi) does not express capsule and is associated with invasive and non-invasive diseases. Methods A total of 395 typeable and 293 NTHi isolates were characterized by whole genome sequencing (WGS). Phylogenetic analysis and multilocus sequence typing were used to characterize the overall genetic diversity. Pair-wise comparisons were used to evaluate the capsule loci. A WGS serotyping method was developed to predict the Hi serotype. WGS serotyping results were compared to slide agglutination (SAST) or real-time PCR (rt-PCR) serotyping. Results Isolates of each Hi serotype clustered into one or two subclades, with each subclade being associated with a distinct sequence type (ST). NTHi isolates were genetically diverse, with seven subclades and 125 STs being detected. Regions I and III of the capsule locus were conserved among the six serotypes (≥82% nucleotide identity). In contrast, genes in Region II were less conserved, with only six gene pairs from all serotypes showing ≥56% nucleotide identity. The WGS serotyping method was 99.9% concordant with SAST and 100% concordant with rt-PCR in determining the Hi serotype. Conclusions Genomic analysis revealed a higher degree of genetic diversity among NTHi compared to typeable Hi. The WGS serotyping method accurately predicted the Hi capsule type and can serve as an alternative method for Hi serotyping.
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Affiliation(s)
- Caelin C Potts
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA
| | | | | | | | | | - Melissa J Whaley
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA
| | - Susanna Schmink
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA
| | - Adam C Retchless
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA
| | - Alexander Chen
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA
| | | | | | - Xin Wang
- Bacterial Meningitis Laboratory, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop H17-2, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA.
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Ouattara M, Whaley MJ, Jenkins LT, Schwartz SB, Traoré RO, Diarra S, Collard JM, Sacchi CT, Wang X. Triplex real-time PCR assay for the detection of Streptococcus pneumoniae, Neisseria meningitidis and Haemophilus influenzae directly from clinical specimens without extraction of DNA. Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis 2019; 93:188-190. [DOI: 10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2018.10.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2018] [Revised: 09/17/2018] [Accepted: 10/09/2018] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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14
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Whaley MJ, Joseph SJ, Retchless AC, Kretz CB, Blain A, Hu F, Chang HY, Mbaeyi SA, MacNeil JR, Read TD, Wang X. Whole genome sequencing for investigations of meningococcal outbreaks in the United States: a retrospective analysis. Sci Rep 2018; 8:15803. [PMID: 30361650 PMCID: PMC6202316 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-33622-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2018] [Accepted: 09/13/2018] [Indexed: 01/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Although rare in the U.S., outbreaks due to Neisseria meningitidis do occur. Rapid, early outbreak detection is important for timely public health response. In this study, we characterized U.S. meningococcal isolates (N = 201) from 15 epidemiologically defined outbreaks (2009-2015) along with temporally and geographically matched sporadic isolates using multilocus sequence typing, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), and six whole genome sequencing (WGS) based methods. Recombination-corrected maximum likelihood (ML) and Bayesian phylogenies were reconstructed to identify genetically related outbreak isolates. All WGS analysis methods showed high degree of agreement and distinguished isolates with similar or indistinguishable PFGE patterns, or the same strain genotype. Ten outbreaks were caused by a single strain; 5 were due to multiple strains. Five sporadic isolates were phylogenetically related to 2 outbreaks. Analysis of 9 outbreaks using timed phylogenies identified the possible origin and estimated the approximate time that the most recent common ancestor emerged for outbreaks analyzed. U.S. meningococcal outbreaks were caused by single- or multiple-strain introduction, with organizational outbreaks mainly caused by a clonal strain and community outbreaks by divergent strains. WGS can infer linkage of meningococcal cases when epidemiological links are uncertain. Accurate identification of outbreak-associated cases requires both WGS typing and epidemiological data.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa J Whaley
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sandeep J Joseph
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Adam C Retchless
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Cecilia B Kretz
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Amy Blain
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Fang Hu
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - How-Yi Chang
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sarah A Mbaeyi
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jessica R MacNeil
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Timothy D Read
- Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Xin Wang
- Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
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15
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Whaley MJ, Jenkins LT, Hu F, Chen A, Diarra S, Ouédraogo-Traoré R, Sacchi CT, Wang X. Triplex Real-Time PCR without DNA Extraction for the Monitoring of Meningococcal Disease. Diagnostics (Basel) 2018; 8:diagnostics8030058. [PMID: 30200184 PMCID: PMC6163423 DOI: 10.3390/diagnostics8030058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/30/2018] [Revised: 08/22/2018] [Accepted: 08/26/2018] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Detection of Neisseria meningitidis has become less time- and resource-intensive with a monoplex direct real-time PCR (drt-PCR) to amplify genes from clinical specimens without DNA extraction. To further improve efficiency, we evaluated two triplex drt-PCR assays for the detection of meningococcal serogroups AWX and BCY. The sensitivity and specificity of the triplex assays were assessed using 228 cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) specimens from meningitis patients and compared to the monoplex for six serogroups. The lower limit of detection range for six serogroup-specific drt-PCR assays was 178–5264 CFU/mL by monoplex and 68–2221 CFU/mL by triplex. The triplex and monoplex showed 100% agreement for six serogroups and the triplex assays achieved similar sensitivity and specificity estimates as the monoplex drt-PCR assays. Our triplex method reduces the time and cost of processing CSF specimens by characterizing six serogroups with only two assays, which is particularly important for testing large numbers of specimens for N. meningitidis surveillance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa J Whaley
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
| | - Laurel T Jenkins
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
| | - Fang Hu
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
| | - Alexander Chen
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
| | - Seydou Diarra
- Institut National de Recherche en Santé Publique, Bamako 00223, Mali.
| | | | | | - Xin Wang
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
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16
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Folaranmi TA, Kretz CB, Kamiya H, MacNeil JR, Whaley MJ, Blain A, Antwi M, Dorsinville M, Pacilli M, Smith S, Civen R, Ngo V, Winter K, Harriman K, Wang X, Bowen VB, Patel M, Martin S, Misegades L, Meyer SA. Increased Risk for Meningococcal Disease Among Men Who Have Sex With Men in the United States, 2012-2015. Clin Infect Dis 2018; 65:756-763. [PMID: 28505234 DOI: 10.1093/cid/cix438] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2017] [Accepted: 05/06/2017] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Several clusters of serogroup C meningococcal disease among men who have sex with men (MSM) have been reported in the United States in recent years. The epidemiology and risk of meningococcal disease among MSM is not well described. Methods All meningococcal disease cases among men aged 18-64 years reported to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System between January 2012 and June 2015 were reviewed. Characteristics of meningococcal disease cases among MSM and men not known to be MSM (non-MSM) were described. Annualized incidence rates among MSM and non-MSM were compared through calculation of the relative risk and 95% confidence intervals. Isolates from meningococcal disease cases among MSM were characterized using standard microbiological methods and whole-genome sequencing. Results Seventy-four cases of meningococcal disease were reported among MSM and 453 among non-MSM. Annualized incidence of meningococcal disease among MSM was 0.56 cases per 100000 population, compared to 0.14 among non-MSM, for a relative risk of 4.0 (95% confidence interval [CI], 3.1-5.1). Among the 64 MSM with known status, 38 (59%) were infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). HIV-infected MSM had 10.1 times (95% CI, 6.1-16.6) the risk of HIV-uninfected MSM. All isolates from cluster-associated cases were serogroup C sequence type 11. Conclusions MSM are at increased risk for meningococcal disease, although the incidence of disease remains low. HIV infection may be an important factor for this increased risk. Routine vaccination of HIV-infected persons with a quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine in accordance with Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations should be encouraged.
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Affiliation(s)
- Temitope A Folaranmi
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | | | - Hajime Kamiya
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases.,Epidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | | | | | - Amy Blain
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
| | - Mike Antwi
- New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
| | | | | | | | | | - Van Ngo
- Los Angeles Department of Public Health
| | | | | | - Xin Wang
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
| | - Virginia B Bowen
- National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Manisha Patel
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
| | - Stacey Martin
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
| | - Lara Misegades
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
| | - Sarah A Meyer
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
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17
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McCord AM, Burgess AWO, Whaley MJ, Anderson BE. Interaction of Bartonella henselae with endothelial cells promotes monocyte/macrophage chemoattractant protein 1 gene expression and protein production and triggers monocyte migration. Infect Immun 2005; 73:5735-42. [PMID: 16113290 PMCID: PMC1231114 DOI: 10.1128/iai.73.9.5735-5742.2005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Bacillary angiomatosis (BA), one of the many clinical manifestations resulting from infection with the facultative intracellular bacterium Bartonella henselae, is characterized by angiogenic lesions. Macrophages have been identified as important effector cells contributing to the angiogenic process during B. henselae infection by infiltrating BA lesions and secreting vascular endothelial growth factor. Monocyte-macrophage chemoattractant protein 1 (MCP-1) recruits macrophages to sites of inflammation. In this study, we investigated the ability of B. henselae to upregulate MCP-1 gene expression and protein production in the human microvascular endothelial cell line HMEC-1. MCP-1 mRNA was induced at 6 and 24 h after treatment with bacteria, whereas protein production was elevated at 6, 24, and 48 h. This induction was not dependent on the presence of bacterial lipopolysaccharide or endothelial cell toll-like receptor 4. However, MCP-1 production was dependent on NF-kappaB activity. Outer membrane proteins of low molecular weight were able to upregulate MCP-1 production. Furthermore, supernatants from B. henselae-infected HMEC-1 were able to induce chemotaxis of THP-1 monocytes. These data suggest a mechanism by which the macrophage effector cell is recruited to the endothelium during B. henselae infection and then contributes to bacterial-induced angiogenesis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amy M McCord
- Department of Medical Microbiology and Immunology, College of Medicine, University of South Florida, MDC10, 12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd., Tampa, FL 33612, USA
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