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Jungilligens J, Perez DL. Predictive Processing and the Pathophysiology of Functional Neurological Disorder. Curr Top Behav Neurosci 2024. [PMID: 38755514 DOI: 10.1007/7854_2024_473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/18/2024]
Abstract
The contemporary neuroscience understanding of the brain as an active inference organ supports that our conscious experiences, including sensorimotor perceptions, depend on the integration of probabilistic predictions with incoming sensory input across hierarchically organized levels. As in other systems, these complex processes are prone to error under certain circumstances, which may lead to alterations in their outcomes (i.e., variations in sensations and movements). Such variations are an important aspect of functional neurological disorder, a complex disorder at the interface of brain-mind-body interactions. Thus, predictive processing frameworks offer fundamental mechanistic insights into the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder. In recent years, many of the aspects relevant to the neurobiology of functional neurological disorder - e.g., aberrant motor and sensory processes, symptom expectation, self-agency, and illness beliefs, as well as interoception, allostasis, and emotion - have been investigated through the lens of predictive processing frameworks. Here, we provide an overview of the current state of research on predictive processing and the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johannes Jungilligens
- Behavioral Neurology Research Group, Department of Neurology, University Hospital Knappschaftskrankenhaus Bochum, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
| | - David L Perez
- Division of Behavioral Neurology and Integrated Brain Medicine, Department of Neurology, Functional Neurological Disorder Unit, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
- Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
- Division of Neuropsychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
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Murphy E, Holmes E, Friston K. Natural language syntax complies with the free-energy principle. Synthese 2024; 203:154. [PMID: 38706520 PMCID: PMC11068586 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04566-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2023] [Accepted: 03/15/2024] [Indexed: 05/07/2024]
Abstract
Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design-such as "minimal search" criteria from theoretical syntax-adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP-with respect to higher language functions-and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. While we mostly focus on building new principled conceptual relations between syntax and the FEP, we also show through a sample of preliminary examples how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing-Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elliot Murphy
- Vivian L. Smith Department of Neurosurgery, McGovern Medical School, University of Texas Health Science Center, Houston, TX 77030 USA
- Texas Institute for Restorative Neurotechnologies, University of Texas Health Science Center, Houston, TX 77030 USA
| | - Emma Holmes
- Department of Speech Hearing and Phonetic Sciences, University College London, London, WC1N 1PF UK
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London, WC1N 3AR UK
| | - Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London, WC1N 3AR UK
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Popkirov S, Jungilligens J, Michaelis R. [Understanding and explaining functional movement disorders]. Nervenarzt 2024:10.1007/s00115-024-01619-3. [PMID: 38363298 DOI: 10.1007/s00115-024-01619-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/15/2024] [Indexed: 02/17/2024]
Abstract
Functional movement disorders are not uncommon in neurological consultations, hospitals and emergency departments. Although the disorder can usually be recognized clinically, the communication of the diagnosis is often unsatisfactory. Those affected are indirectly accused of a lack of insight or openness but it is often the doctors who fail to formulate a coherent and comprehensible explanation of the underlying disorder. In this review an integrative model for the development of functional movement disorders is presented, which places the motor (and nonmotor) symptoms in a neuroscientific light. In addition, explanations and metaphors are presented that have proven helpful in conveying an understanding of the disorder.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stoyan Popkirov
- Klinik für Neurologie, Universitätsklinikum Essen, Hufelandstraße 55, 45147, Essen, Deutschland.
| | - Johannes Jungilligens
- Klinik für Neurologie, Universitätsklinikum Knappschaftskrankenhaus Bochum, Bochum, Deutschland
| | - Rosa Michaelis
- Klinik für Neurologie, Universitätsklinikum Knappschaftskrankenhaus Bochum, Bochum, Deutschland
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Pezzulo G, Parr T, Friston K. Active inference as a theory of sentient behavior. Biol Psychol 2024; 186:108741. [PMID: 38182015 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2023.108741] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2023] [Revised: 12/05/2023] [Accepted: 12/29/2023] [Indexed: 01/07/2024]
Abstract
This review paper offers an overview of the history and future of active inference-a unifying perspective on action and perception. Active inference is based upon the idea that sentient behavior depends upon our brains' implicit use of internal models to predict, infer, and direct action. Our focus is upon the conceptual roots and development of this theory of (basic) sentience and does not follow a rigid chronological narrative. We trace the evolution from Helmholtzian ideas on unconscious inference, through to a contemporary understanding of action and perception. In doing so, we touch upon related perspectives, the neural underpinnings of active inference, and the opportunities for future development. Key steps in this development include the formulation of predictive coding models and related theories of neuronal message passing, the use of sequential models for planning and policy optimization, and the importance of hierarchical (temporally) deep internal (i.e., generative or world) models. Active inference has been used to account for aspects of anatomy and neurophysiology, to offer theories of psychopathology in terms of aberrant precision control, and to unify extant psychological theories. We anticipate further development in all these areas and note the exciting early work applying active inference beyond neuroscience. This suggests a future not just in biology, but in robotics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University of Oxford, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK; VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA
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Sedley W, Kumar S, Jones S, Levy A, Friston K, Griffiths T, Goldsmith P. Migraine as an allostatic reset triggered by unresolved interoceptive prediction errors. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105536. [PMID: 38185265 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2023] [Revised: 12/19/2023] [Accepted: 01/03/2024] [Indexed: 01/09/2024]
Abstract
Until now, a satisfying account of the cause and purpose of migraine has remained elusive. We explain migraine within the frameworks of allostasis (the situationally-flexible, forward-looking equivalent of homeostasis) and active inference (interacting with the environment via internally-generated predictions). Due to its multimodality, and long timescales between cause and effect, allostasis is inherently prone to catastrophic error, which might be impossible to correct once fully manifest, an early indicator which is elevated prediction error (discrepancy between prediction and sensory input) associated with internal sensations (interoception). Errors can usually be resolved in a targeted manner by action (correcting the physiological state) or perception (updating predictions in light of sensory input); persistent errors are amplified broadly and multimodally, to prioritise their resolution (the migraine premonitory phase); finally, if still unresolved, progressive amplification renders further changes to internal or external sensory inputs intolerably intense, enforcing physiological stability, and facilitating accurate allostatic prediction updating. As such, migraine is an effective 'failsafe' for allostasis, however it has potential to become excessively triggered, therefore maladaptive.
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Affiliation(s)
- William Sedley
- Translational and Clinical Research Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 4HH, United Kingdom.
| | - Sukhbinder Kumar
- Department of Neurosurgery, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
| | - Siobhan Jones
- Translational and Clinical Research Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 4HH, United Kingdom
| | - Andrew Levy
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
| | - Tim Griffiths
- Translational and Clinical Research Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 4HH, United Kingdom; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom; Department of Neurology, Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4LP, United Kingdom
| | - Paul Goldsmith
- Department of Neurology, Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4LP, United Kingdom; Institute of Global Health Innovation, Imperial College, London, United Kingdom
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Krupnik V, Danilova N. To be or not to be: The active inference of suicide. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105531. [PMID: 38176631 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105531] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2023] [Revised: 12/27/2023] [Accepted: 12/29/2023] [Indexed: 01/06/2024]
Abstract
Suicide presents an apparent paradox as a behavior whose motivation is not obvious since its outcome is non-existence and cannot be experienced. To address this paradox, we propose to frame suicide in the integrated theory of stress and active inference. We present an active inference-based cognitive model of suicide as a type of stress response hanging in cognitive balance between predicting self-preservation and self-destruction. In it, self-efficacy emerges as a meta-cognitive regulator that can bias the model toward either survival or suicide. The model suggests conditions under which cognitive homeostasis can override physiological homeostasis in motivating self-destruction. We also present a model proto-suicidal behavior, programmed cell death (apoptosis), in active inference terms to illustrate how an active inference model of self-destruction can be embodied in molecular mechanisms and to offer a hypothesis on another puzzle of suicide: why only humans among brain-endowed animals are known to practice it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valery Krupnik
- Department of Mental Health, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, Camp Pendleton, CA, USA.
| | - Nadia Danilova
- Department of Cell Biology, UCLA (retired), Los Angeles, CA, USA
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Manrique HM, Friston KJ, Walker MJ. 'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago. Phys Life Rev 2024; 49:40-70. [PMID: 38513522 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2024.01.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2024] [Accepted: 01/15/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024]
Abstract
A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.
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Affiliation(s)
- Héctor Marín Manrique
- Department of Psychology and Sociology, Universidad de Zaragoza, Ciudad Escolar, s/n, Teruel 44003, Spain
| | - Karl John Friston
- Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, and The Wellcome Centre for Human Imaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Michael John Walker
- Physical Anthropology, Departamento de Zoología y Antropología Física, Facultad de Biología, Universidad de Murcia, Campus Universitario de Espinardo Edificio 20, Murcia 30100, Spain.
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Friston KJ, Parr T, Heins C, Constant A, Friedman D, Isomura T, Fields C, Verbelen T, Ramstead M, Clippinger J, Frith CD. Federated inference and belief sharing. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105500. [PMID: 38056542 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105500] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2023] [Revised: 11/08/2023] [Accepted: 12/01/2023] [Indexed: 12/08/2023]
Abstract
This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world-and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs-about what they see-among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme-that attends these optimisation processes-is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language-entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent's beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)-showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, UK; VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, UK
| | - Conor Heins
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA; Department of Collective Behaviour, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; Department of Biology, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
| | - Axel Constant
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA; School of Engineering and Informatics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Daniel Friedman
- Department of Entomology and Nematology, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, USA; Active Inference Institute, Davis, CA 95616, USA
| | - Takuya Isomura
- Brain Intelligence Theory Unit, RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Wako, Saitama 351-0198, Japan
| | - Chris Fields
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA
| | - Tim Verbelen
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA
| | - Maxwell Ramstead
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, UK; VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA
| | | | - Christopher D Frith
- Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Studies, University of London, UK
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Milde C, Brinskelle LS, Glombiewski JA. Does Active Inference Provide a Comprehensive Theory of Placebo Analgesia? Biol Psychiatry Cogn Neurosci Neuroimaging 2024; 9:10-20. [PMID: 37678710 DOI: 10.1016/j.bpsc.2023.08.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2023] [Revised: 08/21/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 09/09/2023]
Abstract
Placebo interventions generate mismatches between expected pain and sensory signals from which pain states are inferred. Because we lack direct access to bodily states, we can only infer whether nociceptive activity indicates tissue damage or results from noise in sensory channels. Predictive processing models propose to make optimal inferences using prior knowledge given noisy sensory data. However, these models do not provide a satisfactory explanation of how pain relief expectations are translated into physiological manifestations of placebo responses. Furthermore, they do not account for individual differences in the ability to endogenously regulate nociceptive activity in predicting placebo analgesia. The brain not only passively integrates prior pain expectations with nociceptive activity to infer pain states (perceptual inference) but also initiates various types of actions to ensure that sensory data are consistent with prior pain expectations (active inference). We argue that depending on whether the brain interprets conflicting sensory data (prediction errors) as a signal to learn from or noise to be attenuated, the brain initiates opposing types of action to facilitate learning from sensory data or, conversely, to enhance the biasing influence of prior pain expectations on pain perception. Furthermore, we discuss the role of stress, anxiety, and unpredictability of pain in influencing the weighting of prior pain expectations and sensory data and how they relate to the individual ability to regulate nociceptive activity (endogenous pain modulation). Finally, we provide suggestions for future studies to test the implications of the active inference model of placebo analgesia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christopher Milde
- Department of Psychology, Rheinland-Pfälzische Technische Universität Kaiserslautern-Landau, Landau, Germany.
| | - Laura S Brinskelle
- Department of Psychology, Rheinland-Pfälzische Technische Universität Kaiserslautern-Landau, Landau, Germany
| | - Julia A Glombiewski
- Department of Psychology, Rheinland-Pfälzische Technische Universität Kaiserslautern-Landau, Landau, Germany
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Taylor S, Lavalley CA, Hakimi N, Stewart JL, Ironside M, Zheng H, White E, Guinjoan S, Paulus MP, Smith R. Active learning impairments in substance use disorders when resolving the explore-exploit dilemma: A replication and extension of previous computational modeling results. Drug Alcohol Depend 2023; 252:110945. [PMID: 37717307 PMCID: PMC10635739 DOI: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2023.110945] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2023] [Revised: 08/15/2023] [Accepted: 08/18/2023] [Indexed: 09/19/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Substance use disorders (SUDs) represent a major public health risk. Yet, our understanding of the mechanisms that maintain these disorders remains incomplete. In a recent computational modeling study, we found initial evidence that SUDs are associated with slower learning rates from negative outcomes and less value-sensitive choice (low "action precision"), which could help explain continued substance use despite harmful consequences. METHODS Here we aimed to replicate and extend these results in a pre-registered study with a new sample of 168 individuals with SUDs and 99 healthy comparisons (HCs). We performed the same computational modeling and group comparisons as in our prior report (doi: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2020.108208) to confirm previously observed effects. After completing all pre-registered replication analyses, we then combined the previous and current datasets (N = 468) to assess whether differences were transdiagnostic or driven by specific disorders. RESULTS Replicating prior results, SUDs showed slower learning rates for negative outcomes in both Bayesian and frequentist analyses (partial η2=.02). Previously observed differences in action precision were not confirmed. Learning rates for positive outcomes were also similar between groups. Logistic regressions including all computational parameters as predictors in the combined datasets could differentiate several specific disorders from HCs, but could not differentiate most disorders from each other. CONCLUSIONS These results provide robust evidence that individuals with SUDs adjust behavior more slowly in the face of negative outcomes than HCs. They also suggest this effect is common across several different SUDs. Future research should examine its neural basis and whether learning rates could represent a new treatment target or moderator of treatment outcome.
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Affiliation(s)
- Samuel Taylor
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | | | - Navid Hakimi
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | | | | | - Haixia Zheng
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | - Evan White
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | | | | | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA.
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Arthur T, Brosnan M, Harris D, Buckingham G, Wilson M, Williams G, Vine S. Investigating how Explicit Contextual Cues Affect Predictive Sensorimotor Control in Autistic Adults. J Autism Dev Disord 2023; 53:4368-4381. [PMID: 36063311 PMCID: PMC10539449 DOI: 10.1007/s10803-022-05718-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
Research suggests that sensorimotor difficulties in autism could be reduced by providing individuals with explicit contextual information. To test this, we examined autistic visuomotor control during a virtual racquetball task, in which participants hit normal and unexpectedly-bouncy balls using a handheld controller. The probability of facing each type of ball was varied unpredictably over time. However, during cued trials, participants received explicit information about the likelihood of facing each uncertain outcome. When compared to neurotypical controls, autistic individuals displayed poorer task performance, atypical gaze profiles, and more restricted swing kinematics. These visuomotor patterns were not significantly affected by contextual cues, indicating that autistic people exhibit underlying differences in how prior information and environmental uncertainty are dynamically modulated during movement tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tom Arthur
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK.
- Centre for Applied Autism Research, Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK.
| | - Mark Brosnan
- Centre for Applied Autism Research, Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK
| | - David Harris
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Gavin Buckingham
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Mark Wilson
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Genevieve Williams
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Sam Vine
- Department of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, St Luke's Campus, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK.
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Lersch FE, Frickmann FCS, Urman RD, Burgermeister G, Siercks K, Luedi MM, Straumann S. Analgesia for the Bayesian Brain: How Predictive Coding Offers Insights Into the Subjectivity of Pain. Curr Pain Headache Rep 2023; 27:631-638. [PMID: 37421540 PMCID: PMC10713672 DOI: 10.1007/s11916-023-01122-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/25/2023] [Indexed: 07/10/2023]
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW In order to better treat pain, we must understand its architecture and pathways. Many modulatory approaches of pain management strategies are only poorly understood. This review aims to provide a theoretical framework of pain perception and modulation in order to assist in clinical understanding and research of analgesia and anesthesia. RECENT FINDINGS Limitations of traditional models for pain have driven the application of new data analysis models. The Bayesian principle of predictive coding has found increasing application in neuroscientific research, providing a promising theoretical background for the principles of consciousness and perception. It can be applied to the subjective perception of pain. Pain perception can be viewed as a continuous hierarchical process of bottom-up sensory inputs colliding with top-down modulations and prior experiences, involving multiple cortical and subcortical hubs of the pain matrix. Predictive coding provides a mathematical model for this interplay.
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Affiliation(s)
- Friedrich E Lersch
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Cantonal Hospital of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland.
| | - Fabienne C S Frickmann
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, 3010, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Richard D Urman
- Department of Anesthesiology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA
| | - Gabriel Burgermeister
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, 3010, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Kaya Siercks
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, 3010, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Markus M Luedi
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Cantonal Hospital of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland
| | - Sven Straumann
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, 3010, Bern, Switzerland
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13
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Sprevak M, Smith R. An Introduction to Predictive Processing Models of Perception and Decision-Making. Top Cogn Sci 2023. [PMID: 37899002 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2023] [Revised: 08/30/2023] [Accepted: 10/06/2023] [Indexed: 10/31/2023]
Abstract
The predictive processing framework includes a broad set of ideas, which might be articulated and developed in a variety of ways, concerning how the brain may leverage predictive models when implementing perception, cognition, decision-making, and motor control. This article provides an up-to-date introduction to the two most influential theories within this framework: predictive coding and active inference. The first half of the paper (Sections 2-5) reviews the evolution of predictive coding, from early ideas about efficient coding in the visual system to a more general model encompassing perception, cognition, and motor control. The theory is characterized in terms of the claims it makes at Marr's computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels of description, and the conceptual and mathematical connections between predictive coding, Bayesian inference, and variational free energy (a quantity jointly evaluating model accuracy and complexity) are explored. The second half of the paper (Sections 6-8) turns to recent theories of active inference. Like predictive coding, active inference models assume that perceptual and learning processes minimize variational free energy as a means of approximating Bayesian inference in a biologically plausible manner. However, these models focus primarily on planning and decision-making processes that predictive coding models were not developed to address. Under active inference, an agent evaluates potential plans (action sequences) based on their expected free energy (a quantity that combines anticipated reward and information gain). The agent is assumed to represent the world as a partially observable Markov decision process with discrete time and discrete states. Current research applications of active inference models are described, including a range of simulation work, as well as studies fitting models to empirical data. The paper concludes by considering future research directions that will be important for further development of both models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Sprevak
- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma
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14
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Abstract
For a growing number of researchers, it is now accepted that the brain is a predictive organ that predicts the content of the sensorium and crucially the precision of-or confidence in-its own predictions. In order to predict the precision of its predictions, the brain has to infer the reliability of its own beliefs. This means that our brains have to recognise the precision of their predictions or, at least, their accuracy. In this paper, we argue that fluency is product of this recognition process. In short, to recognise fluency is to infer that we have a precise 'grip' on the unfolding processes that generate our sensations. More specifically, we propose that it is changes in fluency - from unfelt to felt - that are both recognised and realised when updating predictions about precision. Unfelt fluency orients attention to unpredicted sensations, while felt fluency supervenes on-and contextualises-unfelt fluency; thereby rendering certain attentional processes, phenomenologically opaque. As such, fluency underwrites the precision we place in our predictions and therefore acts upon our perceptual inferences. Hence, the causes of conscious subjective inference have unconscious perceptual precursors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Denis Brouillet
- University Paul Valéry-Montpellier-France, EPSYLON, France; University Paris Nanterre, LICAE, France.
| | - Karl Friston
- Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College, London, United Kingdom; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, London, United Kingdom
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15
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Friston K. The many faces of action: Comment on "An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation" by Proietti, Pezzulo, and Tessari. Phys Life Rev 2023; 46:125-128. [PMID: 37379731 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2023] [Accepted: 06/16/2023] [Indexed: 06/30/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, WC1N 3AR, London, UK; VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA 90016, USA.
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16
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Proietti R, Pezzulo G, Tessari A. An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation. Phys Life Rev 2023; 46:92-118. [PMID: 37354642 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/29/2023] [Accepted: 05/31/2023] [Indexed: 06/26/2023]
Abstract
We advance a novel active inference model of the cognitive processing that underlies the acquisition of a hierarchical action repertoire and its use for observation, understanding and imitation. We illustrate the model in four simulations of a tennis learner who observes a teacher performing tennis shots, forms hierarchical representations of the observed actions, and imitates them. Our simulations show that the agent's oculomotor activity implements an active information sampling strategy that permits inferring the kinematic aspects of the observed movement, which lie at the lowest level of the action hierarchy. In turn, this low-level kinematic inference supports higher-level inferences about deeper aspects of the observed actions: proximal goals and intentions. Finally, the inferred action representations can steer imitative responses, but interfere with the execution of different actions. Our simulations show that hierarchical active inference provides a unified account of action observation, understanding, learning and imitation and helps explain the neurobiological underpinnings of visuomotor cognition, including the multiple routes for action understanding in the dorsal and ventral streams and mirror mechanisms.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Alessia Tessari
- Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Italy; Alma Mater Research Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
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17
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Borghi AM, Gervasi AM, Brozzoli C. Language as a means to reduce uncertainty: Comment on "An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation" by R. Proietti, G. Pezzulo, A. Tessari. Phys Life Rev 2023; 46:261-263. [PMID: 37567075 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.07.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/21/2023] [Accepted: 07/24/2023] [Indexed: 08/13/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Anna M Borghi
- Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; ISTC-CNR, Rome, Italy.
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18
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Doricchi F, Lasaponara S, Pazzaglia M, Silvetti M. Anticipatory and target related "match/mismatch" activities of the TPJ: Reply to comments on "Left and right temporal-parietal junctions (TPJs) as "match/mismatch" hedonic machines: A unifying account of TPJ function". Phys Life Rev 2023; 46:286-291. [PMID: 37625330 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.07.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2023] [Accepted: 07/25/2023] [Indexed: 08/27/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Fabrizio Doricchi
- Dipartimento di Psicologia 39, Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Roma, Italy; Fondazione Santa Lucia IRCCS, Roma, Italy.
| | - Stefano Lasaponara
- Dipartimento di Psicologia 39, Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Roma, Italy; Fondazione Santa Lucia IRCCS, Roma, Italy
| | - Mariella Pazzaglia
- Dipartimento di Psicologia 39, Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Roma, Italy; Fondazione Santa Lucia IRCCS, Roma, Italy
| | - Massimo Silvetti
- Computational and Translational Neuroscience Lab (CTNLab), Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council (CNR), Rome, Italy
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19
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Fermin AS, Sasaoka T, Maekawa T, Chan HL, Machizawa MG, Okada G, Okamoto Y, Yamawaki S. Insula neuroanatomical networks predict interoceptive awareness. Heliyon 2023; 9:e18307. [PMID: 37520943 PMCID: PMC10374932 DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e18307] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2022] [Revised: 07/05/2023] [Accepted: 07/13/2023] [Indexed: 08/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Interoceptive awareness (IA), the subjective and conscious perception of visceral and physiological signals from the body, has been associated with functions of cortical and subcortical neural systems involved in emotion control, mood and anxiety disorders. We recently hypothesized that IA and its contributions to mental health are realized by a brain interoception network (BIN) linking brain regions that receive ascending interoceptive information from the brainstem, such as the amygdala, insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). However, little evidence exists to support this hypothesis. In order to test this hypothesis, we used a publicly available dataset that contained both anatomical neuroimaging data and an objective measure of IA assessed with a heartbeat detection task. Whole-brain Voxel-Based Morphometry (VBM) was used to investigate the association of IA with gray matter volume (GMV) and the structural covariance network (SCN) of the amygdala, insula and ACC. The relationship between IA and mental health was investigated with questionnaires that assessed depressive symptoms and anxiety. We found a positive correlation between IA and state anxiety, but not with depressive symptoms. In the VBM analysis, only the GMV of the left anterior insula showed a positive association with IA. A similar association was observed between the parcellated GMV of the left dorsal agranular insula, located in the anterior insula, and IA. The SCN linking the right dorsal agranular insula with the left dorsal agranular insula and left hyper-granular insula were positively correlated with IA. No association between GMV or SCN and depressive symptoms or anxiety were observed. These findings revealed a previously unknown association between IA, insula volume and intra-insula SCNs. These results may support development of non-invasive neuroimaging interventions, e.g., neurofeedback, seeking to improve IA and to prevent development of mental health problems, such anxiety disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alan S.R. Fermin
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Takafumi Sasaoka
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Toru Maekawa
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Hui-Ling Chan
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Maro G. Machizawa
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Go Okada
- Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Yasumasa Okamoto
- Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
| | - Shigeto Yamawaki
- Center for Brain, Mind and Kansei Sciences Research, Hiroshima University, 734-8553, Hiroshima city, Hiroshima, Japan
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20
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Frickmann FCS, Urman RD, Siercks K, Burgermeister G, Luedi MM, Lersch FE. The Effect of Perioperative Auditory Stimulation with Music on Procedural Pain: A Narrative Review. Curr Pain Headache Rep 2023:10.1007/s11916-023-01138-x. [PMID: 37410336 PMCID: PMC10403409 DOI: 10.1007/s11916-023-01138-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/15/2023] [Indexed: 07/07/2023]
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW Music therapy has seen increasing applications in various medical fields over the last decades. In the vast range of possibilities through which music can relieve suffering, there is a risk that-given its efficacy-the physiological underpinnings are too little understood. This review provides evidence-based neurobiological concepts for the use of music in perioperative pain management. RECENT FINDINGS The current neuroscientific literature shows a significant convergence of the pain matrix and neuronal networks of pleasure triggered by music. These functions seem to antagonize each other and can thus be brought to fruition in pain therapy. The encouraging results of fMRI and EEG studies still await full translation of this top-down modulating mechanism into broad clinical practice. We embed the current clinical literature in a neurobiological framework. This involves touching on Bayesian "predictive coding" pain theories in broad strokes and outlining functional units in the nociception and pain matrix. These will help to understand clinical findings in the literature summarized in the second part of the review. There are opportunities for perioperative practitioners, including anesthesiologists treating acute pain and anxiety in emergency and perioperative situations, where music could help bring relieve to patients.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fabienne C S Frickmann
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, Bern, 3010, Switzerland
| | - Richard D Urman
- Department of Anesthesiology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA
| | - Kaya Siercks
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, Bern, 3010, Switzerland
| | - Gabriel Burgermeister
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, Bern, 3010, Switzerland
| | - Markus M Luedi
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Cantonal Hospital of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 9007, Switzerland
| | - Friedrich E Lersch
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Freiburgstrasse, Bern, 3010, Switzerland.
- Department of Anaesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Cantonal Hospital of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 9007, Switzerland.
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21
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Abstract
This paper aims to integrate some key constructs in the cognitive neuroscience of cognitive control and executive function by formalising the notion of cognitive (or mental) effort in terms of active inference. To do so, we call upon a task used in neuropsychology to assess impulse inhibition-a Stroop task. In this task, participants must suppress the impulse to read a colour word and instead report the colour of the text of the word. The Stroop task is characteristically effortful, and we unpack a theory of mental effort in which, to perform this task accurately, participants must overcome prior beliefs about how they would normally act. However, our interest here is not in overt action, but in covert (mental) action. Mental actions change our beliefs but have no (direct) effect on the outside world-much like deploying covert attention. This account of effort as mental action lets us generate multimodal (choice, reaction time, and electrophysiological) data of the sort we might expect from a human participant engaging in this task. We analyse how parameters determining cognitive effort influence simulated responses and demonstrate that-when provided only with performance data-these parameters can be recovered, provided they are within a certain range.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, UK.
| | - Emma Holmes
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, UK
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, UK
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
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22
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Kato A, Shimomura K, Ognibene D, Parvaz MA, Berner LA, Morita K, Fiore VG. Computational models of behavioral addictions: State of the art and future directions. Addict Behav 2023; 140:107595. [PMID: 36621045 DOI: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2022.107595] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2022] [Revised: 11/23/2022] [Accepted: 12/19/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Non-pharmacological behavioral addictions, such as pathological gambling, videogaming, social networking, or internet use, are becoming major public health concerns. It is not yet clear how behavioral addictions could share many major neurobiological and behavioral characteristics with substance use disorders, despite the absence of direct pharmacological influences. A deeper understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms of addictive behavior is needed, and computational modeling could be one promising approach to explain intricately entwined cognitive and neural dynamics. This review describes computational models of addiction based on reinforcement learning algorithms, Bayesian inference, and biophysical neural simulations. We discuss whether computational frameworks originally conceived to explain maladaptive behavior in substance use disorders can be effectively extended to non-substance-related behavioral addictions. Moreover, we introduce recent studies on behavioral addictions that exemplify the possibility of such extension and propose future directions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ayaka Kato
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako, Saitama 351-0198, Japan; Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
| | - Kanji Shimomura
- Physical and Health Education, Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
| | - Dimitri Ognibene
- Department of Psychology, Università degli Studi Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy; School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
| | - Muhammad A Parvaz
- Departments of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA
| | - Laura A Berner
- Center of Excellence in Eating and Weight Disorders, Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA; Center for Computational Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA
| | - Kenji Morita
- Physical and Health Education, Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan; International Research Center for Neurointelligence (WPI-IRCN), The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
| | - Vincenzo G Fiore
- Center for Computational Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA.
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23
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Laukkonen RE, Sacchet MD, Barendregt H, Devaney KJ, Chowdhury A, Slagter HA. Cessations of consciousness in meditation: Advancing a scientific understanding of nirodha samāpatti. Prog Brain Res 2023; 280:61-87. [PMID: 37714573 DOI: 10.1016/bs.pbr.2022.12.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/17/2023]
Abstract
Absence of consciousness can occur due to a concussion, anesthetization, intoxication, epileptic seizure, or other fainting/syncope episode caused by lack of blood flow to the brain. However, some meditation practitioners also report that it is possible to undergo a total absence of consciousness during meditation, lasting up to 7 days, and that these "cessations" can be consistently induced. One form of extended cessation (i.e., nirodha samāpatti) is thought to be different from sleep because practitioners are said to be completely impervious to external stimulation. That is, they cannot be 'woken up' from the cessation state as one might be from a dream. Cessations are also associated with the absence of any time experience or tiredness, and are said to involve a stiff rather than a relaxed body. Emergence from meditation-induced cessations is said to have profound effects on subsequent cognition and experience (e.g., resulting in a sudden sense of clarity, openness, and possibly insights). In this paper, we briefly outline the historical context for cessation events, present preliminary data from two labs, set a research agenda for their study, and provide an initial framework for understanding what meditation induced cessation may reveal about the mind and brain. We conclude by integrating these so-called nirodha and nirodha samāpatti experiences-as they are known in classical Buddhism-into current cognitive-neurocomputational and active inference frameworks of meditation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ruben E Laukkonen
- Faculty of Health, Southern Cross University, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia.
| | - Matthew D Sacchet
- Meditation Research Program, Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Henk Barendregt
- Faculty of Science, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Kathryn J Devaney
- UC Berkeley Center for the Science of Psychedelics, Berkeley, CA, United States
| | - Avijit Chowdhury
- Meditation Research Program, Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Heleen A Slagter
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands & Institute for Brain and Behavior, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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24
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Harris DJ, Wilkinson S, Ellmers TJ. From fear of falling to choking under pressure: A predictive processing perspective of disrupted motor control under anxiety. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 148:105115. [PMID: 36906243 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Revised: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/28/2023] [Indexed: 03/11/2023]
Abstract
Under the Predictive Processing Framework, perception is guided by internal models that map the probabilistic relationship between sensory states and their causes. Predictive processing has contributed to a new understanding of both emotional states and motor control but is yet to be fully applied to their interaction during the breakdown of motor movements under heightened anxiety or threat. We bring together literature on anxiety and motor control to propose that predictive processing provides a unifying principle for understanding motor breakdowns as a disruption to the neuromodulatory control mechanisms that regulate the interactions of top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory signals. We illustrate this account using examples from disrupted balance and gait in populations who are anxious/fearful of falling, as well as 'choking' in elite sport. This approach can explain both rigid and inflexible movement strategies, as well as highly variable and imprecise action and conscious movement processing, and may also unite the apparently opposing self-focus and distraction approaches to choking. We generate predictions to guide future work and propose practical recommendations.
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Rens N, Lancia GL, Eluchans M, Schwartenbeck P, Cunnington R, Pezzulo G. Evidence for entropy maximisation in human free choice behaviour. Cognition 2023; 232:105328. [PMID: 36463639 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2021] [Revised: 11/10/2022] [Accepted: 11/12/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022]
Abstract
The freedom to choose between options is strongly linked to notions of free will. Accordingly, several studies have shown that individuals demonstrate a preference for choice, or the availability of multiple options, over and above utilitarian value. Yet we lack a decision-making framework that integrates preference for choice with traditional utility maximisation in free choice behaviour. Here we test the predictions of an inference-based model of decision-making in which an agent actively seeks states yielding entropy (availability of options) in addition to utility (economic reward). We designed a study in which participants freely navigated a virtual environment consisting of two consecutive choices leading to reward locations in separate rooms. Critically, the choice of one room always led to two final doors while, in the second room, only one door was permissible to choose. This design allowed us to separately determine the influence of utility and entropy on participants' choice behaviour and their self-evaluation of free will. We found that choice behaviour was better predicted by an inference-based model than by expected utility alone, and that both the availability of options and the value of the context positively influenced participants' perceived freedom of choice. Moreover, this consideration of options was apparent in the ongoing motion dynamics as individuals navigated the environment. In a second study, in which participants selected between rooms that gave access to three or four doors, we observed a similar pattern of results, with participants preferring the room that gave access to more options and feeling freer in it. These results suggest that free choice behaviour is well explained by an inference-based framework in which both utility and entropy are optimised and supports the idea that the feeling of having free will is tightly related to options availability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Natalie Rens
- Queensland Brain Institute, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
| | - Gian Luca Lancia
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Via S. Martino della Battaglia, 44, 00185 Rome, Italy; University of Rome "La Sapienza", Rome, Italy
| | - Mattia Eluchans
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Via S. Martino della Battaglia, 44, 00185 Rome, Italy; University of Rome "La Sapienza", Rome, Italy
| | - Philipp Schwartenbeck
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom; Oxford Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain, Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany; Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany
| | - Ross Cunnington
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Via S. Martino della Battaglia, 44, 00185 Rome, Italy.
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26
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Herzog P, Kube T, Fassbinder E. How childhood maltreatment alters perception and cognition - the predictive processing account of borderline personality disorder. Psychol Med 2022; 52:2899-2916. [PMID: 35979924 PMCID: PMC9693729 DOI: 10.1017/s0033291722002458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2022] [Revised: 06/24/2022] [Accepted: 07/18/2022] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others - leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philipp Herzog
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Lübeck, Ratzeburger Allee 160, D-23562 Lübeck, Germany
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Niemannsweg 147, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
- Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Ostbahnstr. 10, 76829 Landau, Germany
| | - Tobias Kube
- Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Ostbahnstr. 10, 76829 Landau, Germany
| | - Eva Fassbinder
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Niemannsweg 147, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
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Berg M, Feldmann M, Kirchner L, Kube T. Oversampled and undersolved: Depressive rumination from an active inference perspective. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104873. [PMID: 36116573 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2022] [Revised: 09/12/2022] [Accepted: 09/12/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Rumination is a widely recognized cognitive deviation in depression. Despite the recognition, researchers have struggled to explain why patients cannot disengage from the process, although it depresses their mood and fails to lead to effective problem-solving. We rethink rumination as repetitive but unsuccessful problem-solving attempts. Appealing to an active inference account, we suggest that adaptive problem-solving is based on the generation, evaluation, and performance of candidate policies that increase an organism's knowledge of its environment. We argue that the problem-solving process is distorted during rumination. Specifically, rumination is understood as engaging in excessive yet unsuccessful oversampling of policy candidates that do not resolve uncertainty. Because candidates are sampled from policies that were selected in states resembling one's current state, "bad" starting points (e.g., depressed mood, physical inactivity) make the problem-solving process vulnerable for generating a ruminative "halting problem". This problem leads to high opportunity costs, learned helplessness and diminished overt behavior. Besides reviewing evidence for the conceptual paths of this model, we discuss its neurophysiological correlates and point towards clinical implications.
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Bottemanne H, Barberousse A, Fossati P. [Multidimensional and computational theory of mood]. Encephale 2022; 48:682-699. [PMID: 35987716 DOI: 10.1016/j.encep.2022.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2021] [Revised: 01/31/2022] [Accepted: 02/04/2022] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
What is mood? Despite its crucial place in psychiatric nosography and cognitive science, it is still difficult to delimit its conceptual ground. The distinction between emotion and mood is ambiguous: mood is often presented as an affective state that is more prolonged and less intense than emotion, or as an affective polarity distinguishing high and low mood swinging around a baseline. However, these definitions do not match the clinical reality of mood disorders such as unipolar depression and bipolar disorder, and do not allow us to understand the effect of mood on behaviour, perception and cognition. In this paper, we propose a multidimensional and computational theory of mood inspired by contemporary hypotheses in theoretical neuroscience and philosophy of emotion. After suggesting an operational distinction between emotion and mood, we show how a succession of emotions can cumulatively generate congruent mood over time, making mood an emerging state from emotion. We then present how mood determines mental and behavioral states when interacting with the environment, constituting a dispositional state of emotion, perception, belief, and action. Using this theoretical framework, we propose a computational representation of the emerging and dispositional dimensions of mood by formalizing mood as a layer of third-order Bayesian beliefs encoding the precision of emotion, and regulated by prediction errors associated with interoceptive predictions. Finally, we show how this theoretical framework sheds light on the processes involved in mood disorders, the emergence of mood congruent beliefs, or the mechanisms of antidepressant treatments in clinical psychiatry.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hugo Bottemanne
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), Sorbonne University/CNRS/Inserm, Paris, France; Department of philosophy, Sciences Normes Démocratie research unit, Sorbonne university/CNRS, Paris, France; Department of psychiatry, DMU Neuroscience, Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital, Sorbonne university/Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Paris, France.
| | - Anouk Barberousse
- Department of philosophy, Sciences Normes Démocratie research unit, Sorbonne university/CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Philippe Fossati
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), Sorbonne University/CNRS/Inserm, Paris, France; Department of psychiatry, DMU Neuroscience, Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital, Sorbonne university/Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Paris, France
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29
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Deane G. Machines That Feel and Think: The Role of Affective Feelings and Mental Action in (Artificial) General Intelligence. Artif Life 2022; 28:289-309. [PMID: 35881678 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00368] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
What role do affective feelings (feelings/emotions/moods) play in adaptive behaviour? What are the implications of this for understanding and developing artificial general intelligence? Leading theoretical models of brain function are beginning to shed light on these questions. While artificial agents have excelled within narrowly circumscribed and specialised domains, domain-general intelligence has remained an elusive goal in artificial intelligence research. By contrast, humans and nonhuman animals are characterised by a capacity for flexible behaviour and general intelligence. In this article I argue that computational models of mental phenomena in predictive processing theories of the brain are starting to reveal the mechanisms underpinning domain-general intelligence in biological agents, and can inform the understanding and development of artificial general intelligence. I focus particularly on approaches to computational phenomenology in the active inference framework. Specifically, I argue that computational mechanisms of affective feelings in active inference-affective self-modelling-are revealing of how biological agents are able to achieve flexible behavioural repertoires and general intelligence. I argue that (i) affective self-modelling functions to "tune" organisms to the most tractable goals in the environmental context; and (ii) affective and agentic self-modelling is central to the capacity to perform mental actions in goal-directed imagination and creative cognition. I use this account as a basis to argue that general intelligence of the level and kind found in biological agents will likely require machines to be implemented with analogues of affective self-modelling.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Deane
- University of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences.
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Putica A, Felmingham KL, Garrido MI, O'Donnell ML, Van Dam NT. A predictive coding account of value-based learning in PTSD: Implications for precision treatments. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 138:104704. [PMID: 35609683 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2021] [Revised: 04/05/2022] [Accepted: 05/17/2022] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
While there are a number of recommended first-line interventions for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), treatment efficacy has been less than ideal. Generally, PTSD treatment models explain symptom manifestation via associative learning, treating the individual as a passive organism - acted upon - rather than self as agent. At their core, predictive coding (PC) models introduce the fundamental role of self-conceptualisation and hierarchical processing of one's sensory context in safety learning. This theoretical article outlines how predictive coding models of emotion offer a parsimonious framework to explain PTSD treatment response within a value-based decision-making framework. Our model integrates the predictive coding elements of the perceived: self, world and self-in the world and how they impact upon one or more discrete stages of value-based decision-making: (1) mental representation; (2) emotional valuation; (3) action selection and (4) outcome valuation. We discuss treatment and research implications stemming from our hypotheses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Putica
- Phoenix Australia Centre for Post-traumatic Mental Health, Department of Psychiatry, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia.
| | - Kim L Felmingham
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
| | - Marta I Garrido
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
| | - Meaghan L O'Donnell
- Phoenix Australia Centre for Post-traumatic Mental Health, Department of Psychiatry, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
| | - Nicholas T Van Dam
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
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Adams RA, Vincent P, Benrimoh D, Friston KJ, Parr T. Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions. Schizophr Res 2022; 245:5-22. [PMID: 34384664 DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2021.07.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 07/23/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.
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Gandolfi D, Puglisi FM, Boiani GM, Pagnoni G, Friston KJ, D'Angelo EU, Mapelli J. Emergence of associative learning in a neuromorphic inference network. J Neural Eng 2022; 19. [PMID: 35508120 DOI: 10.1088/1741-2552/ac6ca7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2021] [Accepted: 05/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE In the theoretical framework of predictive coding and active inference, the brain can be viewed as instantiating a rich generative model of the world that predicts incoming sensory data while continuously updating its parameters via minimization of prediction errors. While this theory has been successfully applied to cognitive processes - by modelling the activity of functional neural networks at a mesoscopic scale - the validity of the approach when modelling neurons as an ensemble of inferring agents, in a biologically plausible architecture, remained to be explored. APPROACH We modelled a simplified cerebellar circuit with individual neurons acting as Bayesian agents to simulate the classical delayed eyeblink conditioning protocol. Neurons and synapses adjusted their activity to minimize their prediction error, which was used as the network cost function. This cerebellar network was then implemented in hardware by replicating digital neuronal elements via a low-power microcontroller. MAIN RESULTS Persistent changes of synaptic strength - that mirrored neurophysiological observations - emerged via local (neurocentric) prediction error minimization, leading to the expression of associative learning. The same paradigm was effectively emulated in low-power hardware showing remarkably efficient performance compared to conventional neuromorphic architectures. SIGNIFICANCE These findings show that: i) an ensemble of free energy minimizing neurons - organized in a biological plausible architecture - can recapitulate functional self-organization observed in nature, such as associative plasticity, and ii) a neuromorphic network of inference units can learn unsupervised tasks without embedding predefined learning rules in the circuit, thus providing a potential avenue to a novel form of brain-inspired artificial intelligence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniela Gandolfi
- Department Biomedical, Metabolic and Neural Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Via Campi 287, Modena, Emilia-Romagna, 41121, ITALY
| | - Francesco Maria Puglisi
- DIEF, Universita degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Via P. Vivarelli 10/1, Modena, MO, 41121, ITALY
| | - Giulia Maria Boiani
- Department Biomedical, Metabolic and Neural Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Via Campi 287, Modena, Emilia-Romagna, 41121, ITALY
| | - Giuseppe Pagnoni
- Department Biomedical, Metabolic and Neural Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Via Campi 287, Modena, Emilia-Romagna, 41121, ITALY
| | - Karl J Friston
- Institute of Neurology, University College London, 23 Queen Square, LONDON, WC1N 3BG, London, WC1N 3AR, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
| | - Egidio Ugo D'Angelo
- Department Brain and Behavioral Sciences, University of Pavia, Via Forlanini 6, Pavia, Pavia, Lombardia, 27100, ITALY
| | - Jonathan Mapelli
- Department Biomedical, Metabolic and Neural Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Via Campi 287, Modena, 41125, ITALY
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Champion T, Da Costa L, Bowman H, Grześ M. Branching Time Active Inference: The theory and its generality. Neural Netw 2022; 151:295-316. [PMID: 35468491 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2022.03.036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/23/2021] [Revised: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 03/28/2022] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Théophile Champion
- University of Kent, School of Computing, Canterbury CT2 7NZ, United Kingdom.
| | - Lancelot Da Costa
- Imperial College London, Department of Mathematics, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom.
| | - Howard Bowman
- University of Birmingham, School of Psychology, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom; University of Kent, School of Computing, Canterbury CT2 7NZ, United Kingdom.
| | - Marek Grześ
- University of Kent, School of Computing, Canterbury CT2 7NZ, United Kingdom.
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Abstract
The active inference framework, and in particular its recent formulation as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), has gained increasing popularity in recent years as a useful approach for modeling neurocognitive processes. This framework is highly general and flexible in its ability to be customized to model any cognitive process, as well as simulate predicted neuronal responses based on its accompanying neural process theory. It also affords both simulation experiments for proof of principle and behavioral modeling for empirical studies. However, there are limited resources that explain how to build and run these models in practice, which limits their widespread use. Most introductions assume a technical background in programming, mathematics, and machine learning. In this paper we offer a step-by-step tutorial on how to build POMDPs, run simulations using standard MATLAB routines, and fit these models to empirical data. We assume a minimal background in programming and mathematics, thoroughly explain all equations, and provide exemplar scripts that can be customized for both theoretical and empirical studies. Our goal is to provide the reader with the requisite background knowledge and practical tools to apply active inference to their own research. We also provide optional technical sections and multiple appendices, which offer the interested reader additional technical details. This tutorial should provide the reader with all the tools necessary to use these models and to follow emerging advances in active inference research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3AR, UK
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35
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Whyte CJ, Hohwy J, Smith R. An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms. Curr Res Neurobiol 2022; 3:100036. [PMID: 36304590 PMCID: PMC9593308 DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2022] [Revised: 03/08/2022] [Accepted: 03/18/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christopher J. Whyte
- MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
- Corresponding author. MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Rd, Cambridge, CB2 7EF, UK.
| | - Jakob Hohwy
- Centre for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA
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36
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Abstract
The neuronal substrates that implement the free-energy principle and ensuing active inference at the neuron and synapse level have not been fully elucidated. This Review considers possible neuronal substrates underlying the principle. First, the foundations of the free-energy principle are introduced, and then its ability to empirically explain various brain functions and psychological and biological phenomena in terms of Bayesian inference is described. Mathematically, the dynamics of neural activity and plasticity that minimise a cost function can be cast as performing Bayesian inference that minimises variational free energy. This equivalence licenses the adoption of the free-energy principle as a universal characterisation of neural networks. Further, the neural network structure itself represents a generative model under which an agent operates. A virtue of this perspective is that it enables the formal association of neural network properties with prior beliefs that regulate inference and learning. The possible neuronal substrates that implement prior beliefs and how to empirically examine the theory are discussed. This perspective renders brain activity explainable, leading to a deeper understanding of the neuronal mechanisms underlying basic psychology and psychiatric disorders in terms of an implicit generative model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Takuya Isomura
- Brain Intelligence Theory Unit, RIKEN Center for Brain Science, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako, Saitama 351-0198, Japan.
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37
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Raja V, Valluri D, Baggs E, Chemero A, Anderson ML. The Markov blanket trick: On the scope of the free energy principle and active inference. Phys Life Rev 2021; 39:49-72. [PMID: 34563472 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2021.09.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2021] [Accepted: 09/10/2021] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
The free energy principle (FEP) has been presented as a unified brain theory, as a general principle for the self-organization of biological systems, and most recently as a principle for a theory of every thing. Additionally, active inference has been proposed as the process theory entailed by FEP that is able to model the full range of biological and cognitive events. In this paper, we challenge these two claims. We argue that FEP is not the general principle it is claimed to be, and that active inference is not the all-encompassing process theory it is purported to be either. The core aspects of our argumentation are that (i) FEP is just a way to generalize Bayesian inference to all domains by the use of a Markov blanket formalism, a generalization we call the Markov blanket trick; and that (ii) active inference presupposes successful perception and action instead of explaining them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vicente Raja
- Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, Canada.
| | - Dinesh Valluri
- Department of Computer Science, Western University, Canada
| | - Edward Baggs
- Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, Canada
| | - Anthony Chemero
- Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, USA; Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, USA
| | - Michael L Anderson
- Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, Canada; Department of Philosophy, Western University, Canada; Brain and Mind Institute, Western University, Canada
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38
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Yao B, Thakkar K. Interoception abnormalities in schizophrenia: A review of preliminary evidence and an integration with Bayesian accounts of psychosis. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021:S0149-7634(21)00509-1. [PMID: 34823914 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.11.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2021] [Revised: 10/31/2021] [Accepted: 11/13/2021] [Indexed: 01/07/2023]
Abstract
Schizophrenia research has traditionally focused almost exclusively on how the brain interprets the outside world. However, our internal bodily milieu is also central to how we interpret the world and construct our reality: signals from within the body are critical for not only basic survival, but also a wide range of brain functions from basic perception, emotion, and motivation, to sense of self. In this article, we propose that interoception-the processing of bodily signals-may have implications for a wide range of clinical symptoms in schizophrenia and may thus provide key insights into illness mechanisms. We start with an overview of interoception pathways. Then we provide a review of direct and indirect findings in various interoceptive systems in schizophrenia and interpret these findings in the context of computational frameworks that model interoception as hierarchical Bayesian inference. Finally, we propose a conceptual model of how altered interoceptive inference may contribute to specific schizophrenia symptoms-negative symptoms in particular-and suggest directions for future research, including potential new avenues of treatment.
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Holmes E, Parr T, Griffiths TD, Friston KJ. Active inference, selective attention, and the cocktail party problem. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 131:1288-1304. [PMID: 34687699 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.09.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2021] [Revised: 08/27/2021] [Accepted: 09/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new generative model for an active inference account of preparatory and selective attention, in the context of a classic 'cocktail party' paradigm. In this setup, pairs of words are presented simultaneously to the left and right ears and an instructive spatial cue directs attention to the left or right. We use this generative model to test competing hypotheses about the way that human listeners direct preparatory and selective attention. We show that assigning low precision to words at attended-relative to unattended-locations can explain why a listener reports words from a competing sentence. Under this model, temporal changes in sensory precision were not needed to account for faster reaction times with longer cue-target intervals, but were necessary to explain ramping effects on event-related potentials (ERPs)-resembling the contingent negative variation (CNV)-during the preparatory interval. These simulations reveal that different processes are likely to underlie the improvement in reaction times and the ramping of ERPs that are associated with spatial cueing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emma Holmes
- Department of Speech Hearing and Phonetic Sciences, UCL, London, WC1N 1PF, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, London, WC1N 3AR, UK.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Timothy D Griffiths
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, London, WC1N 3AR, UK; Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
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40
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Bottemanne H, Friston KJ. An active inference account of protective behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 2021; 21:1117-29. [PMID: 34652601 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00947-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Newly emerging infectious diseases, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19), create new challenges for public healthcare systems. Before effective treatments, countering the spread of these infections depends on mitigating, protective behaviours such as social distancing, respecting lockdown, wearing masks, frequent handwashing, travel restrictions, and vaccine acceptance. Previous work has shown that the enacting protective behaviours depends on beliefs about individual vulnerability, threat severity, and one’s ability to engage in such protective actions. However, little is known about the genesis of these beliefs in response to an infectious disease epidemic, and the cognitive mechanisms that may link these beliefs to decision making. Active inference (AI) is a recent approach to behavioural modelling that integrates embodied perception, action, belief updating, and decision making. This approach provides a framework to understand the behaviour of agents in situations that require planning under uncertainty. It assumes that the brain infers the hidden states that cause sensations, predicts the perceptual feedback produced by adaptive actions, and chooses actions that minimize expected surprise in the future. In this paper, we present a computational account describing how individuals update their beliefs about the risks and thereby commit to protective behaviours. We show how perceived risks, beliefs about future states, sensory uncertainty, and outcomes under each policy can determine individual protective behaviours. We suggest that these mechanisms are crucial to assess how individuals cope with uncertainty during a pandemic, and we show the interest of these new perspectives for public health policies.
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41
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Arthur T, Harris DJ. Predictive eye movements are adjusted in a Bayes-optimal fashion in response to unexpectedly changing environmental probabilities. Cortex 2021; 145:212-225. [PMID: 34749190 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2021.09.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2021] [Revised: 08/18/2021] [Accepted: 09/27/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
This study examined the application of active inference to dynamic visuomotor control. Active inference proposes that actions are dynamically planned according to uncertainty about sensory information, prior expectations, and the environment, with motor adjustments serving to minimise future prediction errors. We investigated whether predictive gaze behaviours are indeed adjusted in this Bayes-optimal fashion during a virtual racquetball task. In this task, participants intercepted bouncing balls with varying levels of elasticity, under conditions of higher or lower environmental volatility. Participants' gaze patterns differed between stable and volatile conditions in a manner consistent with generative models of Bayes-optimal behaviour. Partially observable Markov models also revealed an increased rate of associative learning in response to unpredictable shifts in environmental probabilities, although there was no overall effect of volatility on this parameter. Findings extend active inference frameworks into complex and unconstrained visuomotor tasks and present important implications for a neurocomputational understanding of the visual guidance of action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tom Arthur
- School of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK; Centre for Applied Autism Research, Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK
| | - David J Harris
- School of Sport and Health Sciences, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK.
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Mannella F, Maggiore F, Baltieri M, Pezzulo G. Active inference through whiskers. Neural Netw 2021; 144:428-437. [PMID: 34563752 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.08.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 08/29/2021] [Accepted: 08/31/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Rodents use whisking to probe actively their environment and to locate objects in space, hence providing a paradigmatic biological example of active sensing. Numerous studies show that the control of whisking has anticipatory aspects. For example, rodents target their whisker protraction to the distance at which they expect objects, rather than just reacting fast to contacts with unexpected objects. Here we characterize the anticipatory control of whisking in rodents as an active inference process. In this perspective, the rodent is endowed with a prior belief that it will touch something at the end of the whisker protraction, and it continuously modulates its whisking amplitude to minimize (proprioceptive and somatosensory) prediction errors arising from an unexpected whisker-object contact, or from a lack of an expected contact. We will use the model to qualitatively reproduce key empirical findings about the ways rodents modulate their whisker amplitude during exploration and the scanning of (expected or unexpected) objects. Furthermore, we will discuss how the components of active inference model can in principle map to the neurobiological circuits of rodent whisking.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Mannella
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Federico Maggiore
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Manuel Baltieri
- Laboratory for Neural Computation and Adaptation, RIKEN Centre for Brain Science, Wako-shi, Japan.
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
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43
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Marković D, Stojić H, Schwöbel S, Kiebel SJ. An empirical evaluation of active inference in multi-armed bandits. Neural Netw 2021; 144:229-246. [PMID: 34507043 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.08.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2021] [Revised: 07/07/2021] [Accepted: 08/11/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
A key feature of sequential decision making under uncertainty is a need to balance between exploiting-choosing the best action according to the current knowledge, and exploring-obtaining information about values of other actions. The multi-armed bandit problem, a classical task that captures this trade-off, served as a vehicle in machine learning for developing bandit algorithms that proved to be useful in numerous industrial applications. The active inference framework, an approach to sequential decision making recently developed in neuroscience for understanding human and animal behaviour, is distinguished by its sophisticated strategy for resolving the exploration-exploitation trade-off. This makes active inference an exciting alternative to already established bandit algorithms. Here we derive an efficient and scalable approximate active inference algorithm and compare it to two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms: Bayesian upper confidence bound and optimistic Thompson sampling. This comparison is done on two types of bandit problems: a stationary and a dynamic switching bandit. Our empirical evaluation shows that the active inference algorithm does not produce efficient long-term behaviour in stationary bandits. However, in the more challenging switching bandit problem active inference performs substantially better than the two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms. The results open exciting venues for further research in theoretical and applied machine learning, as well as lend additional credibility to active inference as a general framework for studying human and animal behaviour.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dimitrije Marković
- Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany; Centre for Tactile Internet with Human-in-the-Loop (CeTI), Technische Universität Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany.
| | - Hrvoje Stojić
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, 10-12 Russell Square, London, WC1B 5EH, United Kingdom; Secondmind, 72 Hills Rd, Cambridge, CB2 1LA, United Kingdom
| | - Sarah Schwöbel
- Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany
| | - Stefan J Kiebel
- Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany; Centre for Tactile Internet with Human-in-the-Loop (CeTI), Technische Universität Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany
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44
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Smith R, Mayeli A, Taylor S, Al Zoubi O, Naegele J, Khalsa SS. Gut inference: A computational modelling approach. Biol Psychol 2021; 164:108152. [PMID: 34311031 PMCID: PMC8429276 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2021] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
Neurocomputational theories have hypothesized that Bayesian inference underlies interoception, which has become a topic of recent experimental work in heartbeat perception. To extend this approach beyond cardiac interoception, we describe the application of a Bayesian computational model to a recently developed gastrointestinal interoception task completed by 40 healthy individuals undergoing simultaneous electroencephalogram (EEG) and peripheral physiological recording. We first present results that support the validity of this modelling approach. Second, we provide a test of, and confirmatory evidence supporting, the neural process theory associated with a particular Bayesian framework (active inference) that predicts specific relationships between computational parameters and event-related potentials in EEG. We also offer some exploratory evidence suggesting that computational parameters may influence the regulation of peripheral physiological states. We conclude that this computational approach offers promise as a tool for studying individual differences in gastrointestinal interoception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States.
| | - Ahmad Mayeli
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Samuel Taylor
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Obada Al Zoubi
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Jessyca Naegele
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Sahib S Khalsa
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States; Oxley College of Health Sciences, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK, United States.
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45
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Gumbsch C, Adam M, Elsner B, Butz MV. Emergent Goal-Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event-Predictive Learning and Inference. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e13016. [PMID: 34379329 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2020] [Revised: 05/17/2021] [Accepted: 06/16/2021] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
Abstract
From about 7 months of age onward, infants start to reliably fixate the goal of an observed action, such as a grasp, before the action is complete. The available research has identified a variety of factors that influence such goal-anticipatory gaze shifts, including the experience with the shown action events and familiarity with the observed agents. However, the underlying cognitive processes are still heavily debated. We propose that our minds (i) tend to structure sensorimotor dynamics into probabilistic, generative event-predictive, and event boundary predictive models, and, meanwhile, (ii) choose actions with the objective to minimize predicted uncertainty. We implement this proposition by means of event-predictive learning and active inference. The implemented learning mechanism induces an inductive, event-predictive bias, thus developing schematic encodings of experienced events and event boundaries. The implemented active inference principle chooses actions by aiming at minimizing expected future uncertainty. We train our system on multiple object-manipulation events. As a result, the generation of goal-anticipatory gaze shifts emerges while learning about object manipulations: the model starts fixating the inferred goal already at the start of an observed event after having sampled some experience with possible events and when a familiar agent (i.e., a hand) is involved. Meanwhile, the model keeps reactively tracking an unfamiliar agent (i.e., a mechanical claw) that is performing the same movement. We qualitatively compare these modeling results to behavioral data of infants and conclude that event-predictive learning combined with active inference may be critical for eliciting goal-anticipatory gaze behavior in infants.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christian Gumbsch
- Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen.,Autonomous Learning Group, Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems
| | | | | | - Martin V Butz
- Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen
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46
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Annabi L, Pitti A, Quoy M. Bidirectional interaction between visual and motor generative models using Predictive Coding and Active Inference. Neural Netw 2021; 143:638-56. [PMID: 34343777 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.07.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2021] [Revised: 07/09/2021] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
In this work, we build upon the Active Inference (AIF) and Predictive Coding (PC) frameworks to propose a neural architecture comprising a generative model for sensory prediction, and a distinct generative model for motor trajectories. We highlight how sequences of sensory predictions can act as rails guiding learning, control and online adaptation of motor trajectories. We furthermore inquire the effects of bidirectional interactions between the motor and the visual modules. The architecture is tested on the control of a simulated robotic arm learning to reproduce handwritten letters.
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Van de Cruys S, Van Dessel P. Mental distress through the prism of predictive processing theory. Curr Opin Psychol 2021; 41:107-112. [PMID: 34388670 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2020] [Revised: 06/10/2021] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
We review the predictive processing theory's take on goals and affect, to shed new light on mental distress and how it develops into psychopathology such as in affective and motivational disorders. This analysis recovers many of the classical factors known to be important in those disorders, like uncertainty and control, but integrates them in a mechanistic model of adaptive and maladaptive cognition and behavior. We derive implications for treatment that have so far remained underexposed in existing predictive processing accounts of mental disorder, specifically with regard to the model-dependent construction of value, the importance of model validation (evidence), and the introduction and learning of new, adaptive beliefs that relieve suffering.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sander Van de Cruys
- Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, KU Leuven, Belgium; Antwerp Social Lab, University of Antwerp, Belgium.
| | - Pieter Van Dessel
- Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
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48
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Constant A, Hesp C, Davey CG, Friston KJ, Badcock PB. Why Depressed Mood is Adaptive: A Numerical Proof of Principle for an Evolutionary Systems Theory of Depression. Comput Psychiatr 2021; 5:60-80. [PMID: 34113717 PMCID: PMC7610949 DOI: 10.5334/cpsy.70] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
We provide a proof of principle for an evolutionary systems theory (EST) of depression. This theory suggests that normative depressive symptoms counter socioenvironmental volatility by increasing interpersonal support via social signalling and that this response depends upon the encoding of uncertainty about social contingencies, which can be targeted by neuromodulatory antidepressants. We simulated agents that committed to a series of decisions in a social two-arm bandit task before and after social adversity, which precipitated depressive symptoms. Responses to social adversity were modelled under various combinations of social support and pharmacotherapy. The normative depressive phenotype responded positively to social support and simulated treatments with antidepressants. Attracting social support and administering antidepressants also alleviated anhedonia and social withdrawal, speaking to improvements in interpersonal relationships. These results support the EST of depression by demonstrating that following adversity, normative depressed mood preserved social inclusion with appropriate interpersonal support or pharmacotherapy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, AU; Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, CA; Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK; Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, NL; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, NL; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, NL
| | - Christopher G Davey
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, AU; Department of Psychiatry, The University of Melbourne, AU
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | - Paul B Badcock
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, AU; Department of Psychiatry, The University of Melbourne, AU; Orygen, AU
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49
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Marković D, Goschke T, Kiebel SJ. Meta-control of the exploration-exploitation dilemma emerges from probabilistic inference over a hierarchy of time scales. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 2021; 21:509-533. [PMID: 33372237 PMCID: PMC8208938 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-020-00837-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 09/17/2020] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive control is typically understood as a set of mechanisms that enable humans to reach goals that require integrating the consequences of actions over longer time scales. Importantly, using routine behaviour or making choices beneficial only at short time scales would prevent one from attaining these goals. During the past two decades, researchers have proposed various computational cognitive models that successfully account for behaviour related to cognitive control in a wide range of laboratory tasks. As humans operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment, making elaborate plans and integrating experience over multiple time scales is computationally expensive. Importantly, it remains poorly understood how uncertain consequences at different time scales are integrated into adaptive decisions. Here, we pursue the idea that cognitive control can be cast as active inference over a hierarchy of time scales, where inference, i.e., planning, at higher levels of the hierarchy controls inference at lower levels. We introduce the novel concept of meta-control states, which link higher-level beliefs with lower-level policy inference. Specifically, we conceptualize cognitive control as inference over these meta-control states, where solutions to cognitive control dilemmas emerge through surprisal minimisation at different hierarchy levels. We illustrate this concept using the exploration-exploitation dilemma based on a variant of a restless multi-armed bandit task. We demonstrate that beliefs about contexts and meta-control states at a higher level dynamically modulate the balance of exploration and exploitation at the lower level of a single action. Finally, we discuss the generalisation of this meta-control concept to other control dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dimitrije Marković
- Chair of Neuroimaging, Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062, Dresden, Germany
| | - Thomas Goschke
- Chair of General Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062, Dresden, Germany
- Centre for Tactile Internet with Human-in-the-Loop (CeTI), Technische Universität Dresden, 01062, Dresden, Germany
| | - Stefan J Kiebel
- Chair of Neuroimaging, Faculty of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, 01062, Dresden, Germany.
- Centre for Tactile Internet with Human-in-the-Loop (CeTI), Technische Universität Dresden, 01062, Dresden, Germany.
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50
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Çatal O, Verbelen T, Van de Maele T, Dhoedt B, Safron A. Robot navigation as hierarchical active inference. Neural Netw 2021; 142:192-204. [PMID: 34022669 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.05.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2021] [Revised: 03/30/2021] [Accepted: 05/06/2021] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
Localization and mapping has been a long standing area of research, both in neuroscience, to understand how mammals navigate their environment, as well as in robotics, to enable autonomous mobile robots. In this paper, we treat navigation as inferring actions that minimize (expected) variational free energy under a hierarchical generative model. We find that familiar concepts like perception, path integration, localization and mapping naturally emerge from this active inference formulation. Moreover, we show that this model is consistent with models of hippocampal functions, and can be implemented in silico on a real-world robot. Our experiments illustrate that a robot equipped with our hierarchical model is able to generate topologically consistent maps, and correct navigation behaviour is inferred when a goal location is provided to the system.
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