Synthetic Biology: State Regulation in the Biomedical Context

Synthetic biology is an emerging, interdisciplinary research field with much promise for biomedicine. Broadly defined as "the design and construction of new biological systems to perform specific tasks," researchers and clinicians are using synthetic biology to develop targeted treatments for cancer, coronaviruses, and so forth. Because of the experimental nature of synthetic biology, regulation is necessary. Current federal frameworks, such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, The Toxic Substances Act of 1976, Institutional Review Boards, and self-regulation are not enough. As a result, states have a unique opportunity to develop statutory and regulatory frameworks to develop a pathway for regulating synthetic biology. In developing legislation, state lawmakers should look to build a comprehensive framework that addresses businesses selling technology for synthesizing DNA codes, monitors orders for synthetic DNA, and develops statewide documentation systems. Additionally, public health information on treatments using synthetic biology can help to educate the public and reduce the prevalence of misconceptions about the technology. In the absence of federal regulation, states should step into the synthetic biology regulatory space to ensure that their citizens are not harmed by therapies developed using synthetic biology.

Synthetic Biology and the United Nations

Synthetic biology is a rapidly emerging interdisciplinary field of science and engineering that aims to redesign living systems through reprogramming genetic information. The field has catalysed global debate among policymakers and publics. Here we describe how synthetic biology relates to these international deliberations, particularly the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Legally Human? 'Novel Beings' and English Law

Novel beings-intelligent, conscious life-forms sapient in the same way or greater than are human beings-are no longer the preserve of science fiction. Through technologies such as artificial general intelligence, synthetic genomics, gene printing, cognitive enhancement, advanced neuroscience, and more, they are becoming ever more likely and by some definitions may already be emerging. Consideration of the nature of intelligent, conscious novel beings such as those that may result from these technologies requires analysis of the concept of the 'reasonable creature in being' in English law, as well as of the right to life as founded in the European Convention on Human Rights and the attempts to endow human status on animals in recent years. Our exploration of these issues leads us to conclude that there is a strong case to recognize such 'novel' beings as entitled to the same fundamental rights to life, freedom from inhumane treatment, and liberty as we are.

Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, and the Risk of Bioterrorism

The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three developments that raise biosecurity risks compared to the situation earlier. The developments include (1) a spread of the required know-how, (2) improved availability of the techniques, instruments and biological parts, and (3) new technical possibilities such as "resurrecting" disappeared pathogens. It is first shown that the general argument from SynBioSecurity needs to be qualified and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, most notably in the United States. Second, I suggest a new strain of the argument: the situation that most branches of synthetic biology fall under the gene technology regulation in the European Union and that this regulation in its current form does not adequately address SynBioSecurity risks together provide a weighty reason to review and possibly refine the legislation as well as the supervisory practices. Ethically speaking, the rise in the relative risk of bioterrorism brings to the fore new extrinsic issues.

Different ways of problematising biotechnology--and what it means for technology governance

To understand controversies over technologies better, we propose the concept of 'problematisation'. Drawing on Foucault's idea of problematisation and on the concept of frames in media research, we identify characteristic forms of problematising biotechnology in pertaining controversies, typically emphasising ethical, risk or economic aspects. They provide a common basis for disputes and allow participants to argue effectively. The different forms are important for how controversies are negotiated, which experts get involved, what role public engagement plays and how political decisions are legitimized--in short, for technology governance. We develop a heuristic for analysing the link between forms of problematisation and different options for technology governance. Applied to synthetic biology, we discuss different problematisations of this technology and the implications for governance.

Policy on synthetic biology: deliberation, probability, and the precautionary paradox

Synthetic biology is a cutting-edge area of research that holds the promise of unprecedented health benefits. However, in tandem with these large prospective benefits, synthetic biology projects entail a risk of catastrophic consequences whose severity may exceed that of most ordinary human undertakings. This is due to the peculiar nature of synthetic biology as a 'threshold technology' which opens doors to opportunities and applications that are essentially unpredictable. Fears about these potentially unstoppable consequences have led to declarations from civil society groups calling for the use of a precautionary principle to regulate the field. Moreover, the principle is prevalent in law and international agreements. Despite widespread political recognition of a need for caution, the precautionary principle has been extensively criticized as a guide for regulatory policy. We examine a central objection to the principle: that its application entails crippling inaction and incoherence, since whatever action one takes there is always a chance that some highly improbable cataclysm will occur. In response to this difficulty, which we call the 'precautionary paradox,' we outline a deliberative means for arriving at threshold of probability below which potential dangers can be disregarded. In addition, we describe a Bayesian mechanism with which to assign probabilities to harmful outcomes. We argue that these steps resolve the paradox. The rehabilitated PP can thus provide a viable policy option to confront the uncharted waters of synthetic biology research.

Synthetic biology and biosecurity

This article discusses the conflict fields and legal questions of synthetic biology, esp. concerning biosecurity. A respective jurisprudential discussion has not taken place yet in Germany apart from few statements and recommendations. But in Germany, Europe and the USA, it is generally accepted that a broad discussion is necessary. This is esp. true for the question of biosecurity and the possible dangers arising from Synthetic Biology.

[Impact of synthetic biology on patent law in view of of European jurisprudence]

The roots of synthetic biology--the redesign of biological molecules, structures and organisms--can be traced to the research developed by Jacques L. Monod and François Jacob in 1961. This field has undergone significant growth in the past ten years and its emergence has raised the question of whether the patent system is suitable to protect inventions in emergent areas as synthetic biology. The article will analyze the numerous scientific, socio-economic, ethical and legal challenges faced by synthetic biology, introducing the European Patent Law related to biotechnology as the minimum common framework and considering if more changes are needed to adequately protect the inventor rights, while taking into account the arrival of a new research culture, characterized by embracing open-innovation and open-source initiatives. The discussion will review some biotechnological patent law cases and summarize questions as whether isolated molecules of DNA are eligible for patent or the patentability of living matter, under the terms of Directive 98/44/EC. The article will finally consider the impact of synthetic biology on the European patent system.

Governing synthetic biology in the light of the Access and Benefit Sharing regulation (ABS)

Synthetic biology is a change of paradigm, i.e. from the exploitation of natural and genetic resources to lab production of biological entities. This transitional shift represents a great challenge for developing countries, particularly those which host biodiversity, and users of genetic resources, since the latter might not be longer required to access to actual genetic resources (tangible genetic resources) but rather genetic resources' information (intangible genetic resources) in order to replicate those resources in labs. This could mean that users of genetic resource would not have to comply with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its complementary treaty, the Nagoya Protocol, known also as the Access and Benefit Sharing regime (ABS). Both international instrument demands that States create legal mechanisms to secure access and benefit sharing, i.e., users of genetic resources are required to obtain prior informed consent (PIC) from host countries of biodiversity and reach mutual agreed terms (MATs), in which users and countries agree how to share the benefits arise from the utilization of genetic resources. The ABS regime is particularly relevant since its implementation at national and regional level has created tensions between users of genetic resources and developing countries. This situation could lead to users removing interest in the exploitation of genetic resources, subsequently, meaning that their focus would move towards technologies that rely less on tangible genetic resources, including synthetic biology. This papers aim to discuss the scope of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol in the light of synthetic biology and the implications for developing countries.

How to object to radically new technologies on the basis of justice: the case of synthetic biology

A recurring objection to the exploration, development and deployment of radical new technologies is based on their implications with regards to social justice. In this article, using synthetic biology as an example, I explore this line of objection and how we ought to think about justice in the context of the development and introduction of radically new technologies. I argue that contrary to popular opinion, justice rarely provides a reason not to investigate, develop and introduce radical new technologies, although it may have significant implications for how they ought to be introduced. In particular I focus on the time dependency of justice objections and argue that often these function by looking only at the implications of the introduction of the technology at the point of introduction, rather than the more important long-term impact on patterns of distribution and opportunity.

Governance strategies for living technologies: bridging the gap between stimulating and regulating technoscience

The life sciences present a politically and ethically sensitive area of technology development. NBIC convergence-the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, and information and cognitive technology-presents an increased interaction between the biological and physical sciences. As a result the bio-debate is no longer dominated by biotechnology, but driven by NBIC convergence. NBIC convergence enables two bioengineering megatrends: "biology becoming technology" and "technology becoming biology." The notion of living technologies captures the latter megatrend. Accordingly, living technology presents a politically and ethically sensitive area. This implies that governments sooner or later are faced with the challenge of both promoting and regulating the development of living technology. This article describes four current political models to deal with innovation promotion and risk regulation. Based on two specific developments in the field of living technologies-(psycho)physiological computing and synthetic biology-we reflect on appropriate governance strategies for living technologies. We conclude that recent pleas for anticipatory and deliberative governance tend to neglect the need for anticipatory regulation as a key factor in guiding the development of the life sciences from a societal perspective. In particular, when it is expected that a certain living technology will radically challenge current regulatory systems, one should opt for just such a more active biopolitical approach.

Synthetic biology and personalized medicine

Synthetic biology, application of synthetic chemistry to biology, is a broad term that covers the engineering of biological systems with structures and functions not found in nature to process information, manipulate chemicals, produce energy, maintain cell environment and enhance human health. Synthetic biology devices contribute not only to improve our understanding of disease mechanisms, but also provide novel diagnostic tools. Methods based on synthetic biology enable the design of novel strategies for the treatment of cancer, immune diseases metabolic disorders and infectious diseases as well as the production of cheap drugs. The potential of synthetic genome, using an expanded genetic code that is designed for specific drug synthesis as well as delivery and activation of the drug in vivo by a pathological signal, was already pointed out during a lecture delivered at Kuwait University in 2005. Of two approaches to synthetic biology, top-down and bottom-up, the latter is more relevant to the development of personalized medicines as it provides more flexibility in constructing a partially synthetic cell from basic building blocks for a desired task.

Synthetic biology between challenges and risks: suggestions for a model of governance and a regulatory framework, based on fundamental rights

This paper deals with the emerging synthetic biology, its challenges and risks, and tries to design a model for the governance and regulation of the field. The model is called of "prudent vigilance" (inspired by the report about synthetic biology, drafted by the U.S. Presidential Commission on Bioethics, 2010), and it entails (a) an ongoing and periodically revised process of assessment and management of all the risks and concerns, and (b) the adoption of policies - taken through "hard law" and "soft law" sources - that are based on the principle of proportionality (among benefits and risks), on a reasonable balancing between different interests and rights at stake, and are oriented by a constitutional frame, which is represented by the protection of fundamental human rights emerging in the field of synthetic biology (right to life, right to health, dignity, freedom of scientific research, right to environment). After the theoretical explanation of the model, its operability is "checked", by considering its application with reference to only one specific risk brought up by synthetic biology - biosecurity risk, i.e. the risk of bioterrorism.

To be or not IP? Exploring limits within patent law for the constitutionalization of intellectual property rights and the governance of synthetic biology in human health

The article explores limits within patent law for the constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Rights and the governance of synthetic biology in human health. To this end, it starts by explaining the inherent rationales of two fundamental limits within European patent law, namely (1) the boundary between discovery and invention (Art. 52 EPC); (2) the ordre public and public policy clause (Art. 53 (a) EPC). Both these exclusions from patent eligibility bear a normative function but rely on opposing inherent logics, functions, and regulatory aims. While in the first type of logics, "enabling access for all" is the guiding principle, in the second, converse logics, no one should have access to the technological knowledge in question. The second part contends that decisions on whether and how to grant patents in synthetic biology are not independent from institutional frameworks: The arena in which synthetic biology patenting will be dealt with will be decisive for whether and how boundaries will be deployed. From a political science perspective, the administrative, legislative and judicial arena can be distinguished. If synthetic biology will be negotiated in the legislative arena, in particular in the European Parliament, the probabilities will be higher that either the discovery clause or the ordre public clause will be applied. In contrast, patent offices and courts have, at least in the past decades, employed a narrow interpretation of these absolute exemptions from patentability and hardly ever used them. The third part asserts that metaphoric framing of synthetic biology is another crucial factor for patentability questions. Semantic framing may relate to the articulation and mobilization of consent or dissent, and thus public acceptance of synthetic biology. Whether applications of synthetic biology are conceived as "natural" or "synthetic" DNA may have an influence on whether patenting might become contested as "patenting life" or accepted as novel, and also on passing the inventive step and industrial application tests. Proceeding in such a manner can be regarded as "upstreaming" ethics, anticipatory impact assessment, and policy analysis in the biosciences and as a tool for constitutionalizing intellectual property rights.

Synthetic biology in the view of European public funding organisations

We analysed the decisions of major European public funding organisations to fund or not to fund synthetic biology (SB) and related ethical, legal and social implication (ELSI) studies. We investigated the reaction of public organisations in six countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K.) towards SB that may influence SB's further development in Europe. We examined R&D and ELSI communities and their particular funding situation. Our results show that the funding situation for SB varies considerably among the analysed countries, with the U.K. as the only country with an established funding scheme for R&D and ELSI that successfully integrates these research communities. Elsewhere, we determined a general lack of funding (France), difficulties in funding ELSI work (Switzerland), lack of an R&D community (Austria), too small ELSI communities (France, Switzerland, Netherlands), or difficulties in linking existing communities with available funding sources (Germany), partly due to an unclear SB definition.

Calling controversy: assessing synthetic biology's conflict potential

Will synthetic biology elicit controversies similar to those of genetically modified crops before? Maybe, but where exactly are the analogies, and how can we gain substantial insights rather than mere guesses? We argue that as well as the intrinsic properties of the technologies at stake, the context of their implementation is decisive. To assess mechanisms of past and potential controversies, an investigative tool is presented. The Gate Resonance model, derived from older models of societal conflict, allows the identification of key elements of conflict generating processes. In monitoring the developing debate on synthetic biology using this model, analogies to the case of genetically modified crops appear less convincing. So far, there are only few indications that a controversy is imminent.

Synthetic biology: a Jewish view

The discipline of synthetic biology may be one of the most dramatic advances of the past few decades. It represents a radical upgrading of humankind's ability to manipulate the world in which we live. The potential for benefits to society is enormous, but the risks for deliberate abuse or dangerous miscalculations are no less great. There are serious ethical issues, legitimate concerns for biosafety, and fears of bioterrorism. The ethical dilemmas posed are new and challenging and are being addressed by various groups and commissions. The present paper presents a Jewish approach to some of the ethical issues posed by this new technology. Judaism traditionally looks favorably on man as a co-creator with God and encourages research for the benefit of humankind. Thus it would have a positive attitude towards the current goals of synthetic biology. But in the Jewish tradition man is also charged with stewardship over nature and is admonished to preserve and nurture, not just to exploit and destroy. In line with the Presidential Commission on Bioethics, it would support a carefully weighed balance between the precautionary and the "proactionary" approaches.

Ethical and regulatory challenges posed by synthetic biology

Synthetic biology is a relatively new science with tremendous potential to change how we view and know the life sciences, but like many developing technologies, it has provoked ethical concerns from the scientific community and the public and confronts demands for new regulatory measures. The concerns raised involve the danger of "dual use," in which results for improving human well-being and the environment may be misappropriated for bioterror. To counteract these dangers, many governments, but the United States and Israel in particular, have introduced new laws and redoubled measures for biosafety and biosecurity. In the United States, the recent H5N1 results achieved by two groups of NIH-funded investigators highlighted the dilemma of balancing the risk of dual-use research and the freedom of science. In Israel, concern for unconventional terrorism is long-standing, and the country is constantly engaged in improving biosecurity and biodefense measures. In 2008, the Israeli parliament passed the Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents Law, a legislative framework for safeguarding research into biological disease agents. This article summarizes and analyzes the current state of affairs in the United States and Israel, ethical attitudes, and regulatory responses to synthetic biology.