Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85

Cognitive Correlates of Risky Decision-Making in Individuals with and without ADHD: A Meta-analysis

This meta-analytic study aims to investigate the cognitive correlates of risky decision-making in individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. A systematic analysis of existing literature was conducted, encompassing 38 studies (496 ADHD and 1493 TD). Findings revealed a consistent propensity for riskier decision-making in individuals with ADHD, supported by significant correlations with attention, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, time perception, and working memory. The study underscores the relevance of these cognitive functions in shaping decision-making tendencies, with nuanced patterns observed within the ADHD and TD subgroups. Individuals with ADHD often demonstrate altered patterns of correlation, reflecting the specific cognitive challenges characteristic of the disorder.

Do older adults make more risky decisions in the Hungry Donkey Task or in the Iowa Gambling Task?

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Hungry Donkey Task (HDT) are well-known tasks employed to assess decisions under ambiguity. Although the two tasks are equal in terms of wins and losses, they differ in terms of the recipient: while in the IGT participants make decisions for themselves, in the HDT decisions are made to help a hungry donkey. Decisions for themselves versus another one in a situation of ambiguity are particularly important in the field of aging because of older adults' changes in motivational and other-oriented behavior. The present study aimed to test whether older adults make different decisions under ambiguity for themselves than for another one (i.e., the hungry donkey) as compared to younger adults. Forty-five young adults (M = 23.31; SD = 1.58) and 45 older adults (M = 72.47; SD = 5.49) performed the IGT and the HDT. In addition, participants performed tasks on working memory, set-shifting, and inhibition. Results showed age-related differences in the HDT but not in the IGT. Older adults, compared to younger adults, made disadvantageous decisions to help the hungry donkey as compared to themselves. Interestingly, this pattern of results is not explained by the age-related decline in cognitive functioning. The findings seem to suggest that older adults' decisions made under the condition of ambiguity are affected by motivational and emotional changes associated with aging.

In search of the functional base of risk-taking: inexperience and safety

This study is aimed at challenging the notion that risk-taking is based merely on some mechanistic foundation like control deficiencies or process imbalances. We hypothesize that risk-taking has an adaptive function and is an optimal strategy for an agent who (1) has scarce knowledge about the current environment or (2) is in a position in which a potential loss is not threatening. We argue that the two above are related to age which, in turn, may explain association between age and risk-taking commonly reported in the developmental literature. We investigate the possible influence of the age-related variables on the risk propensity in two ways: by inducing rich or scarce knowledge and safe or unsafe position in the experimental environment with task parameters and, simultaneously by examining actual differences between adolescents and adults. The results of two experiments that used a novel compound risk task provide support for the first hypothesis concerning knowledge about the environment. On the other hand, the results falsify the second "safe position" hypothesis. Also, the second experiment reveals that one's status relative to resources can influence risk-taking, but it does so in a way that is different from our initial assumption.

Aging, uncertainty, and decision making-A review

There is a great deal of uncertainty in the world. One common source of uncertainty results from incomplete or missing information about probabilistic outcomes (i.e., outcomes that may occur), which influences how people make decisions. The impact of this type of uncertainty may particularly pronounced for older adults, who, as the primary leaders around the world, make highly impactful decisions with lasting outcomes. This review examines the ways in which uncertainty about probabilistic outcomes is perceived, handled, and represented in the aging brain, with an emphasis on how uncertainty may specifically affect decision making in later life. We describe the role of uncertainty in decision making and aging from four perspectives, including 1) theoretical, 2) self-report, 3) behavioral, and 4) neuroscientific. We report evidence of any age-related differences in uncertainty among these contexts and describe how these changes may affect decision making. We then integrate the findings across the distinct perspectives, followed by a discussion of important future directions for research on aging and uncertainty, including prospection, domain-specificity in risk-taking behaviors, and choice overload.

Is loss avoidance differentially rewarding in adolescents versus adults? Differences in ventral striatum and anterior insula activation during the anticipation of potential monetary losses

Avoiding loss is a crucial, adaptive guide to human behavior. While previous developmental research has primarily focused on gaining rewards, less attention has been paid to loss processing and its avoidance. In daily life, it is often unknown how likely an action will result in a loss, making the role of uncertainty in loss processing particularly important. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated the influence of varying outcome probabilities (12%, 34%, and 67%) on brain regions implicated in loss processing (ventral striatum (VS), anterior insula (AI)) by comparing 28 adolescents (10-18 years) and 24 adults (22-32 years) during the anticipation of potential monetary loss.Overall, results revealed slower RTs in adolescents compared to adults with both groups being faster in the experimental (monetary condition) vs. control trials (verbal condition). Fastest RTs were observed for the 67% outcome probability in both age groups. An age group × outcome probability interaction effect revealed the greatest differences between the groups for the 12% vs. the 67% outcome probability. Neurally, both age groups demonstrated a higher percent signal change in the VS and AI during the anticipation of potential monetary loss versus the verbal condition. However, adults demonstrated an even greater activation of VS and AI than adolescents during the anticipation of potential monetary loss, but not during the verbal condition. This may indicate that adolescents differ from adults regarding their experience of avoiding losing monetary rewards.

Never mind losing the pound… still got the penny! The influence of trait greed on risky decision behavior in a mixed and gain only BART

Risk proneness and the lack of loss aversion are two different reasons to show varying degrees of risk-taking in decision situations. So far, little is known about the extent to which these two processes underly the influence of trait greed, trait anxiety, and age. The present study investigated risk- taking in decision making in these trait contexts using two variants of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) in an online study: A gain only and a mixed gambling BART. This was done to separate risk proneness from loss aversion. Individuals with high trait greed showed an increased risk decision-making behavior due to an increased risk proneness and not due to a reduced loss aversion. This is partly in contrast with previous findings in other tasks assessing risk proneness and loss aversion. These differences may be caused by the changes of perception during the gain only task. No significant effects were found for trait anxiety or age concerning risk-taking in decision-making behavior. Possible explanations for the lack of influence of these constructs are skewed distributions, omitting pathologically anxious subjects in anxiety and a restricted age range. The findings suggest that a lack of loss aversion is not a driving factor to explain elevated risk-taking in decision-making behavior in persons with high trait greed, but a higher reaction to reward in predominantly rewarding contexts.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-03553-6.

Costly avoidance of Pavlovian fear stimuli and the temporal dynamics of its decision process

Conflicts between avoiding feared stimuli versus approaching them for competing rewards are essential for functional behavior and anxious psychopathology. Yet, little is known about the underlying decision process. We examined approach-avoidance decisions and their temporal dynamics when avoiding Pavlovian fear stimuli conflicted with gaining rewards. First, a formerly neutral stimulus (CS+) was repeatedly paired with an aversive stimulus (US) to establish Pavlovian fear. Another stimulus (CS−) was never paired with the US. A control group received neutral tones instead of aversive USs. Next, in each of 324 trials, participants chose between a CS−/low reward and a CS+/high reward option. For the latter, probability of CS+ presentation (Pavlovian fear information) and reward magnitude (reward information) varied. Computer mouse movements were tracked to capture the decision dynamics. Although no more USs occurred, pronounced and persistent costly avoidance of the Pavlovian fear CS+ was found. Time-continuous multiple regression of movement trajectories revealed a stronger and faster impact of Pavlovian fear compared to reward information during decision-making. The impact of fear information, but not reward information, modestly decreased across trials. These findings suggest a persistently stronger weighting of fear compared to reward information during approach-avoidance decisions, which may facilitate the development of pathological avoidance.

Developmental differences in description-based versus experience-based decision making under risk in children

The willingness to take a risk is shaped by temperaments and cognitive abilities, both of which develop rapidly during childhood. In the adult developmental literature, a distinction is drawn between description-based tasks, which provide explicit choice-reward information, and experience-based tasks, which require decisions from past experience, each emphasizing different cognitive demands. Although developmental trends have been investigated for both types of decisions, few studies have compared description-based and experience-based decision making in the same sample of children. In the current study, children (N = 112; 5-9 years of age) completed both description-based and experience-based decision tasks tailored for use with young children. Child temperament was reported by the children's primary teacher. Behavioral measures suggested that the willingness to take a risk in a description-based task increased with age, whereas it decreased in an experience-based task. However, computational modeling alongside further inspection of the behavioral data suggested that these opposite developmental trends across the two types of tasks both were associated with related capacities: older (vs. younger) children's higher sensitivity to experienced losses and higher outcome sensitivity to described rewards and losses. From the temperamental characteristics, higher attentional focusing was linked with a higher learning rate on the experience-based task and a bias to accept gambles in the gain domain on the description-based task. Our findings demonstrate the importance of comparing children's behavior across qualitatively different tasks rather than studying a single behavior in isolation.

How Fuzzy-trace Theory Predicts Development of Risky Decision Making, with Novel Extensions to Culture and Reward Sensitivity

Comprehensive meta-analyses of risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults have revealed that age trends in disambiguated laboratory tasks confirmed fuzzy-trace theory's prediction that preference for risk decreases monotonically from childhood to adulthood. These findings are contrary to predictions of dual systems or neurobiological imbalance models. Assumptions about increasing developmental reliance on mental representations of the gist of risky options are essential to account for this developmental trend. However, dual systems theory appropriately emphasizes how cultural context changes behavioral manifestation of risk preferences across age and neurobiological imbalance models appropriately emphasize developmental changes in reward sensitivity. All of the major theories include the assumption of increasing behavioral inhibition. Here, we integrate these theoretical constructs-representation, cultural context, reward sensitivity, and behavioral inhibition-to provide a novel framework for understanding and improving risky decision making in youth. We also discuss the roles of critical tests, scientific falsification, disambiguating assessments of psychological and neurological processes, and the misuse of such concepts as ecological validity and reverse inference. We illustrate these concepts by extending fuzzy-trace theory to explain why youth are a major conduit of viral infections, including the virus that causes COVID-19. We conclude by encouraging behavioral scientists to embrace new ways of thinking about risky decision making that go beyond traditional stereotypes about adolescents and that go beyond conceptualizing ideal decision making as trading off degrees of risk and reward.

Neural regions associated with gain-loss frequency and average reward in older and younger adults

Research on the biological basis of reinforcement-learning has focused on how brain regions track expected value based on average reward. However, recent work suggests that humans are more attuned to reward frequency. Furthermore, older adults are less likely to use expected values to guide choice than younger adults. This raises the question of whether brain regions assumed to be sensitive to average reward, like the medial and lateral PFC, also track reward frequency, and whether there are age-based differences. Older (60-81 years) and younger (18-30 years) adults performed the Soochow Gambling task, which separates reward frequency from average reward, while undergoing fMRI. Overall, participants preferred options that provided negative net payoffs, but frequent gains. Older adults improved less over time, were more reactive to recent negative outcomes, and showed greater frequency-related activation in several regions, including DLPFC. We also found broader recruitment of prefrontal and parietal regions associated with frequency value and reward prediction errors in older adults, which may indicate compensation. The results suggest greater reliance on average reward for younger adults than older adults.

Age Influences Loss Aversion Through Effects on Posterior Cingulate Cortical Thickness

Decision-making strategies shift during normal aging and can profoundly affect wellbeing. Although overweighing losses compared to gains, termed "loss aversion," plays an important role in choice selection, the age trajectory of this effect and how it may be influenced by associated changes in brain structure remain unclear. We therefore investigated the relationship between age and loss aversion, and tested for its mediation by cortical thinning in brain regions that are susceptible to age-related declines and are implicated in loss aversion - the insular, orbitofrontal, and anterior and posterior cingulate cortices. Healthy participants (n = 106, 17-54 years) performed the Loss Aversion Task. A subgroup (n = 78) provided structural magnetic resonance imaging scans. Loss aversion followed a curvilinear trajectory, declining in young adulthood and increasing in middle-age, and thinning of the posterior cingulate cortex mediated this trajectory. The findings suggest that beyond a threshold in middle adulthood, atrophy of the posterior cingulate cortex influences loss aversion.

Applying Behavioral Economics to Improve Adolescent and Young Adult Health: A Developmentally-Sensitive Approach

Each day, adolescents and young adults (AYAs) choose to engage in behaviors that impact their current and future health. Behavioral economics represents an innovative lens through which to explore decision-making among AYAs. Behavioral economics outlines a diverse set of phenomena that influence decision-making and can be leveraged to develop interventions that may support behavior change. Up to this point, behavioral economic interventions have predominantly been studied in adults. This article provides an integrative review of how behavioral economic phenomena can be leveraged to motivate health-related behavior change among AYAs. We contextualize these phenomena in the physical and social environments unique to AYAs and the neurodevelopmental changes they undergo, highlighting opportunities to intervene in AYA-specific contexts. Our review of the literature suggests behavioral economic phenomena leveraging social choice are particularly promising for AYA health. Behavioral economic interventions that take advantage of AYA learning and development have the potential to positively impact youth health and well-being over the lifespan.

Risk-taking unmasked: Using risky choice and temporal discounting to explain COVID-19 preventative behaviors

To reduce the spread of COVID-19 transmission, government agencies in the United States (US) recommended precautionary guidelines, including wearing masks and social distancing to encourage the prevention of the disease. However, compliance with these guidelines has been inconsistent. This correlational study examined whether individual differences in risky decision-making and motivational propensities predicted compliance with COVID-19 preventative behaviors in a sample of US adults (N = 404). Participants completed an online study from September through December 2020 that included a risky choice decision-making task, temporal discounting task, and measures of appropriate mask-wearing, social distancing, and perceived risk of engaging in public activities. Linear regression results indicated that greater temporal discounting and risky decision-making were associated with less appropriate mask-wearing behavior and social distancing. Additionally, demographic factors, including personal experience with COVID-19 and financial difficulties due to COVID-19, were also associated with differences in COVID-19 preventative behaviors. Path analysis results showed that risky decision-making behavior, temporal discounting, and risk perception collectively predicted 55% of the variance in appropriate mask-wearing behavior. Individual differences in general decision-making patterns are therefore highly predictive of who complies with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.

The Appraisal Approach to Aging and Emotion: An Integrative Theoretical Framework

To advance our understanding of how emotional experience changes across the adult life span, we propose an integrative theoretical framework: the appraisal approach to aging and emotion (AAAE). AAAE posits that (a) age-related cognitive, motivational, and physical changes fundamentally change the appraisal system in certain ways, and that (b) older adults often deploy appraisal processes in different ways relative to their younger counterparts. As such, we hypothesize that these age-related changes to the appraisal process underlie the finding that older and younger adults tend to experience different emotions. In this paper we integrate findings from the aging literature with appraisal theory, grounding AAAE in theoretical and empirical work relevant to the relationship between aging and appraisal processes. Using our theoretical framework, it is possible to identify critical points of investigation for aging and emotion researchers to further develop our understanding of the proximal-level determinants of age differences in emotion.

Age differences in risk taking: now you see them, now you don't

Older age has often, but not always, been associated with less risk taking. Inconsistencies may be due to diversity in the risk-taking measures used and/or individual differences in cognitive abilities. We investigated the robustness of age differences in risk taking across three measures, and tested whether age differences in risk taking remained after accounting for cognitive abilities. Younger (aged 25-36) and older (aged 60+) adults completed behavioral (i.e., Balloon Analogue Risk Task, BART) and self-report (i.e., framing tasks and Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire) measures of risk, as well as several measures of cognitive ability (i.e., analytic thinking, numeracy, processing speed, memory, and attention). Older adults showed significantly less risk taking than younger adults on the behavioral measure of risk, but not on the two self-report measures. Older adults also had significantly lower analytic thinking, slower processing speed, and worse executive control compared to younger adults. Less risk taking on the BART was associated with lower analytic thinking and numeracy, slower processing speed, and worse shifting of attention. Age differences in risk taking on the BART remained after accounting for older adults' lower scores on tests of cognitive abilities. Implications for measuring age differences in risk taking are discussed.

Non-human primates use combined rules when deciding under ambiguity

Decision outcomes in unpredictable environments may not have exact known probabilities. Yet the predictability level of outcomes matters in decisions, and animals, including humans, generally avoid ambiguous options. Managing ambiguity may be more challenging and requires stronger cognitive skills than decision-making under risk, where decisions involve known probabilities. Here we compare decision-making in capuchins, macaques, orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos in risky and ambiguous contexts. Subjects were shown lotteries (a tray of potential rewards, some large, some small) and could gamble a medium-sized food item to obtain one of the displayed rewards. The odds of winning and losing varied and were accessible in the risky context (all rewards were visible) or partially available in the ambiguous context (some rewards were covered). In the latter case, the level of information varied from fully ambiguous (individuals could not guess what was under the covers) to predictable (individuals could guess). None of the species avoided gambling in ambiguous lotteries and gambling rates were high if at least two large rewards were visible. Capuchins and bonobos ignored the covered items and gorillas and macaques took the presence of potential rewards into account, but only chimpanzees and orangutans could consistently build correct expectations about the size of the covered rewards. Chimpanzees and orangutans combined decision rules according to the number of large visible rewards and the level of predictability, a process resembling conditional probabilities assessment in humans. Despite a low sample size, this is the first evidence in non-human primates that a combination of several rules can underlie choices made in an unpredictable environment. Our finding that non-human primates can deal with the uncertainty of an outcome when exchanging one food item for another is a key element to the understanding of the evolutionary origins of economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Who Is Willing to Engage in Social Gatherings During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Lockdown? A Curvilinear Relationship Between Age and Heuristic Processing

BACKGROUND

The Chinese government implemented a lockdown to contain the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic during the Chinese Lunar New Year when people have the tradition to visit families and friends. Previous research suggested that heuristic processing increased risky behavioral willingness (e.g., desire to have social gatherings despite the pandemic) and that people's tendency to use heuristic processing varied across different adulthood stages. This study thus investigated the relationships among age, heuristic processing of COVID-19-related information, and the willingness to have social gatherings during the lockdown.

METHODS

A sample of 1,651 participants was recruited from an online crowdsourcing platform between January 31 and February 04 in 2020, with a mean age of 30.69, 47.9% being women. Participants completed an online questionnaire about heuristic processing of COVID-19-related information, willingness to engage in social gatherings during the lockdown, age, and other demographic information.

RESULTS

Age was found to have a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with heuristic processing, and heuristic processing was positively correlated with the willingness to have social gatherings. Further analyses showed that heuristic processing curvilinearly mediated the relationship between age and the willingness to have social gatherings.

CONCLUSION

Compared with young adults, emerging and older adults are more likely to engage in heuristic processing, which in turn, increases the willingness to have social gatherings. Heuristic processing serves as an underlying mechanism to explain the relationship between age and risky behavioral willingness.

Spatial migration of human reward processing with functional development: Evidence from quantitative meta-analyses

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown notable age‐dependent differences in reward processing. We analyzed data from a total of 554 children, 1,059 adolescents, and 1,831 adults from 70 articles. Quantitative meta‐analyses results show that adults engage an extended set of regions that include anterior and posterior cingulate gyri, insula, basal ganglia, and thalamus. Adolescents engage the posterior cingulate and middle frontal gyri as well as the insula and amygdala, whereas children show concordance in right insula and striatal regions almost exclusively. Our data support the notion of reorganization of function over childhood and adolescence and may inform current hypotheses relating to decision‐making across age.

The Role of Emotional vs. Cognitive Intelligence in Economic Decision-Making Amongst Older Adults

The links between emotions, bio-regulatory processes, and economic decision-making are well-established in the context of age-related changes in fluid, real-time, decision competency. The objective of the research reported here is to assess the relative contributions, interactions, and impacts of affective and cognitive intelligence in economic, value-based decision-making amongst older adults. Additionally, we explored this decision-making competency in the context of the neurobiology of aging by examining the neuroanatomical correlates of intelligence and decision-making in an aging cohort. Thirty-nine, healthy, community dwelling older adults were administered the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), an ecologically valid laboratory measure of complex, economic decision-making; along with standardized, performance-based measures of cognitive and emotional intelligence (EI). A smaller subset of this group underwent structural brain scans from which thicknesses of the frontal, parietal, temporal, occipital, cingulate cortices and their sub-sections, were computed. Fluid (online processing) aspects of Perceptual Reasoning cognitive intelligence predicted superior choices on the IGT. However, older adults with higher overall emotional intelligence (EI) and higher Experiential EI area/sub-scores learned faster to make better choices on the IGT, even after controlling for cognitive intelligence and its area scores. Thickness of the left rostral anterior cingulate (associated with fluid affective, processing) mediated the relationship between age and Experiential EI. Thickness of the right transverse temporal gyrus moderated the rate of learning on the IGT. In conclusion, our data suggest that fluid processing, which involves "online," bottom-up, cognitive processing, predicts value-based decision-making amongst older adults, while crystallized intelligence, which relies on "offline" previously acquired knowledge, does not. However, only emotional intelligence, especially its fluid "online" aspects of affective processing predicts the rate of learning in situations of complex choice, especially when there is a paucity of cues/information available to guide decision-making. Age-related effects on these cognitive, affective and decision mechanisms may have neuroanatomical correlates, especially in regions that form a subset of the human mirror-neuron and mentalizing systems. While superior decision-making may be stereotypically associated with "smarter people" (i.e., higher cognitive intelligence), our data indicate that emotional intelligence has a significant role to play in the economic decisions of older adults.

Age, executive functioning, and decision-making styles in adults: a moderated mediation model

The current study aimed to assess: i) whether executive functioning (EF) mediates the association of age with different decision-making (DM) styles in adults, and ii) whether these mediational associations change with age in adulthood. Our sample included 195 adults (110 young adults and 85 middle-aged adults; 95 males) selected from different government, semi-government, and private sector organizations. They were assessed on a self-report measure of General Decision-making Styles and on two EF tests: the Design Fluency Test and the Color-Word Interference Test from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Functions System. Results indicated that EF mediated the association of age with three decision-making styles including dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous DM. However, a conditional indirect effect of EF was significant only for spontaneous DM, indicating stronger indirect effects for middle-aged adults than for young adults. The findings highlight the idea that EF is an important factor in DM, particularly during middle adulthood.

Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence?

Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.

Deficient Decision Making in Pathological Gamblers Correlates With Gray Matter Volume in Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex

Individuals suffering from pathological gambling (PG) show impaired decision making, but it is still not clear how this impairment is related to other traits and neuroanatomical characteristics. In this study, we investigated how the influence of PG on decision making (1) is connected to different impulsivity facets and (2) how it is related to gray matter volume (GMV) in various brain regions. Twenty-eight diagnosed PG patients and 23 healthy controls completed the cups task to measure decision making. In this task, participants had to decide between safe and risky options, which varied in expected value (EV) between risk advantageous, equal EV, and risk disadvantageous choices. A delay discounting task and the Barrant Impulsiveness Scale were applied to assess multiple impulsivity facets. In addition, structural magnetic resonance images were acquired. In comparison to the control group PG patients demonstrated more deficits in decision making, indicated by less EV sensitivity, but there was no significant difference in number of overall risky choices. Also, PG patients showed increased impulsivity in nearly every dimension. Results revealed (1) a positive correlation between decision making impairments and non-planning impulsivity but no significant relation to other impulsivity facets. Although we found no GMV differences between PG patients and controls, (2) a regions of interest analysis showed a correlation between medial orbitofrontal GMV and EV sensitivity in PG patients. Our findings showed that (1) the association between decision making and impulsivity can also be found in PG patients, but only for certain impulsivity facets. This suggests that it is essential to consider measuring different dimensions, when investigating impulsivity in a PG sample. Secondly, our findings revealed that (2) dysfunctional decision making-particularly the component of risk evaluation-is related to decreased GMV in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region concerned with processing of rewards. Interestingly, we did not find more risky choices for PG patients, and thus, we assume that decision making deficits in PG are primarily related to risk evaluation, not risk seeking, which is in line with our GMV findings.

RDMTk

Research into risky decision making (RDM) has become a multidisciplinary effort. Conversations cut across fields such as psychology, economics, insurance, and marketing. This broad interest highlights the necessity for collaborative investigation of RDM to understand and manipulate the situations within which it manifests. A holistic understanding of RDM has been impeded by the independent development of diverse RDM research methodologies across different fields. There is no software specific to RDM that combines paradigms and analytical tools based on recent developments in high-performance computing technologies. This paper presents a toolkit called RDMTk, developed specifically for the study of risky decision making. RDMTk provides a free environment that can be used to manage globally-based experiments while fostering collaborative research. The incorporation of machine learning and high-performance computing (HPC) technologies in the toolkit further open additional possibilities such as scalable algorithms and big data problems arising from global scale experiments.

Developmental perspectives on risky and impulsive choice

Epidemiological data suggest that risk taking in the real world increases from childhood into adolescence and declines into adulthood. However, developmental patterns of behaviour in laboratory assays of risk taking and impulsive choice are inconsistent. In this article, we review a growing literature using behavioural economic approaches to understand developmental changes in risk taking and impulsivity. We present findings that have begun to elucidate both the cognitive and neural processes that contribute to risky and impulsive choice, as well as how age-related changes in these neurocognitive processes give rise to shifts in choice behaviour. We highlight how variability in task parameters can be used to identify specific aspects of decision contexts that may differentially influence risky and impulsive choice behaviour across development. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications'.

Can We Infer Inter-Individual Differences in Risk-Taking From Behavioral Tasks?

Investigating the bases of inter-individual differences in risk-taking is necessary to refine our cognitive and neural models of decision-making and to ultimately counter risky behaviors in real-life policy settings. However, recent evidence suggests that behavioral tasks fare poorly compared to standard questionnaires to measure individual differences in risk-taking. Crucially, using model-based measures of risk taking does not seem to improve reliability. Here, we put forward two possible - not mutually exclusive - explanations for these results and suggest future avenues of research to improve the assessment of inter-individual differences in risk-taking by combining repeated online testing and mechanistic computational models.

Time-varying risk behavior and prior investment outcomes: Evidence from Italy

Risk behavior can be capricious and may vary from month to month. We study 62 clients of a private bank in Northern Italy. The individuals are of special interest for several reasons. As active traders, they manage the value-at-risk (VaR) of a portion of their wealth portfolios. In addition, they act alone, i.e., without input from a financial adviser. Based on VaR-statistics, we find that, in general, the subjects become more risk-averse after suffering losses and more risk-seeking after experiencing gains. The monthly gains and losses that alter investor risk behavior represent true changes in wealth but are “on paper” only, i.e., not immediately realized. Our results allow several interpretations, but they are not at odds with a house money effect, or the possibility that overconfident investors trade on illusions. Rapidly shifting risk behavior in fast response to unstable circumstances weakens individual risk tolerance as a deep parameter and key construct of finance theory.

The development of perceptual averaging: Efficiency metrics in children and adults using a multiple-observation sound-localization task

This study examined the ability of older children to integrate spatial information across sequential observations of bandpass noise. In experiment I, twelve adults and twelve 8-14 yr olds localized 1-5 sounds, all presented at the same location along a 34° speaker array. Rate of gain in response precision (as a function of N observations) was used to measure integration efficiency. Children were no worse at localizing a single sound than adults, and-unexpectedly-were no less efficient at integrating information across observations. Experiment II repeated the task using a Reverse Correlation paradigm. The number of observations was fixed (N = 5), and the location of each sound was independently randomly jittered. Relative weights were computed for each observation interval. Distance from the ideal weight-vector was used to index integration efficiency. The data showed that children were significantly less efficient integrators than adults: only reaching adult-like performance by around 11 yrs. The developmental effect was small, however, relative to the amount of individual variability, with some younger children exhibiting greater efficiency than some adults. This work indicates that sensory integration continues to mature into late childhood, but that this development is relatively gradual.

Influential Cognitive Processes on Framing Biases in Aging

Factors that contribute to overcoming decision-making biases in later life pose an important investigational question given the increasing older adult population. Limited empirical evidence exists and the literature remains equivocal of whether increasing age is associated with elevated susceptibility to decision-making biases such as framing effects. Research into the individual differences contributing to decision-making ability may offer better understanding of the influence of age in decision-making ability. Changes in cognition underlying decision-making have been shown with increased age and may contribute to individual variability in decision-making abilities. This study had three aims; (1) to understand the influence of age on susceptibility to decision-making biases as measured by framing effects across a large, continuous age range; (2) to examine influence of cognitive abilities that change with age; and (3) to understand the influence of individual factors such as gender and education on susceptibility to framing effects. 200 individuals (28-79 years of age) were tested on a large battery of cognitive measures in the domains of executive function, memory and complex attention. Findings from this study demonstrated that cognitive abilities such as strategic control and delayed memory better predicted susceptibility to framing biases than age. The current findings demonstrate that age may not be as influential a factor in decision-making as cognitive ability and cognitive reserve. These findings motivate future studies to better characterize cognitive ability to determine decision-making susceptibilities in aging populations.

Decision Making under Ambiguity and Objective Risk in Higher Age - A Review on Cognitive and Emotional Contributions

The ability of decision making plays a highly relevant role in our survival, but is adversely affected during the process of aging. The present review aims to provide a better understanding of age-related differences in decision making and the role of cognitive and emotional factors in this context. We reviewed the literature about age-effects on decision-making performance, focusing on decision making under ambiguous and objective risk. In decisions under ambiguous risks, as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task, decisions are based on the experiences with consequences. In this case, many articles have attributed age-related impairments in decision making to changes in emotional and somatic reward- and punishment processing. In decisions under objective risks, as measured for example by the Game of Dice Task, decisions can be based on explicit information about risks and consequences. In this case, age-related changes have been attributed mainly to a cognitive decline, particularly impaired executive functions. However, recent findings challenge these conclusions. The present review summarizes neuropsychological and neurophysiological findings of age-related differences in decision making under ambiguous and objective risk. In this context, the relevance of learning, but also of cognitive and emotional contributors – responsible for age-related differences in decision making – are additionally pointed out.

Use of descriptive and experiential information in decision making by young and older adults

Age differences involving decision by description versus decision by experience were examined using the same general task structure to facilitate comparisons across decision types. Experiment 1 compared younger (19-43 years) and older (65-85 years) adults in four different experimental conditions involving a choice between a low-risk, low-return bet versus a high-risk, high-return bet. Experiment 2 compared young (18-27 years) to older (60-87 years) adults using similar experimental conditions, but with decisions involving a risky versus a certain option. Contrary to expectations, minimal differences were observed between ages in either study. Higher levels of ability and numeracy were associated with better performance and greater ability to benefit from experience, but the impact of these factors was not moderated by age. The results suggest that factors other than the simple distinction between decisions by description versus experience are necessary to characterize the nature of age effects in decision-making.

Five-year-olds do not show ambiguity aversion in a risk and ambiguity task with physical objects

Ambiguity aversion arises when a decision maker prefers risky gambles with known probabilities over equivalent ambiguous gambles with unknown probabilities. This phenomenon has been consistently observed in adults across a large body of empirical work. Evaluating ambiguity aversion in young children, however, has posed methodological challenges because probabilistic representations appropriate for adults might not be understood by young children. Here, we established a novel method for representing risk and ambiguity with physical objects that overcomes previous methodological limitations and allows us to measure ambiguity aversion in young children. We found that individual 5-year-olds exhibited consistent choice preferences and, as a group, exhibited no ambiguity aversion in a task that evokes ambiguity aversion in adults. Across individuals, 5-year-olds exhibited greater variance in ambiguity preferences compared with adults tested under similar conditions. This suggests that ambiguity aversion is absent during early childhood and emerges over the course of development.

Who Dares, Who Errs? Disentangling Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Age Differences in Decisions Under Risk

We separate for the first time the roles of cognitive and motivational factors in shaping age differences in decision making under risk. Younger and older adults completed gain, loss, and mixed-domain choice problems as well as measures of cognitive functioning and affect. The older adults’ decision quality was lower than the younger adults’ in the loss domain, and this age difference was attributable to the older adults’ lower cognitive abilities. In addition, the older adults chose the more risky option more often than the younger adults in the gain and mixed domains; this difference in risk aversion was attributable to less pronounced negative affect among the older adults. Computational modeling with a hierarchical Bayesian implementation of cumulative prospect theory revealed that the older adults had higher response noise and more optimistic decision weights for gains than did the younger adults. Moreover, the older adults showed no loss aversion, a finding that supports a positivity-focus (rather than a loss-prevention) view of motivational reorientation in older age.

Rank among Peers during Game Competition Affects the Tendency to Make Risky Choices in Adolescent Males

It has been shown that adolescents take more risks when they are with peers than when they are alone, presumably because the presence of peers can be a social reward/punishment that can bias decision making. Competition is inherent in peer interactions, and recent work has demonstrated that winning/losing is an intrinsic social reward/punishment. Taken together, it can be hypothesized that competition amongst peers affects adolescents’ risky behavior. While there is much evidence that status amongst peers can relate to antisocial/aggressive behavior, it remains unclear whether risky behavior is affected. Moreover, the degree to which ‘temporary status,’ such as ranking in a short-term competitive game, affects behavior is uncertain, an important issue because adolescents might be sensitive to situations or factors which potentially destabilize existing hierarchies. In this experiment, these issues were directly explored in the classroom environment using smartphone technology and Wi-Fi setup. Male junior high school students (aged 14–15) performed a roulette game task on smartphones, playing either independently or against five classmates. In the latter case, the students’ current ranks within the group of six were constantly presented on smartphone screens. To dissociate the effects of the students’ reactions to ranks from their actual performances, unknown to the students, the ranks presented were actually predetermined so that about half of the students were continuously presented with high ranks whereas the other half were continuously presented with low ranks. We found that the students presented with low ranks made more risky plays than those not presented with ranks or those presented with high ranks. This result suggests that even temporary status significantly affects adolescents’ risky behavior, and also demonstrates the usefulness of smartphones in examining and manipulating peer interactions in classroom experiments.

Comparación de adultos y adolescentes con respecto al alcance de insensibilidad de las curvas de valor: Un método de medición de funcionamiento

The curvature of the value/utility function has been understood, since D. Bernouilli, as the expression of an attitude towards risk. This perspectivewas kept in such influential theories of judgment and decision as Prospect Theory, in both its original and cumulative versions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). More recently, dualprocess interpretations of the value function as a mix of affect and deliberation (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) have proposed that function curvature reflects the operation of affect-based evaluations via an affective focus coefficient indexed by “α” (varying between 0 and 1) in the equation v = A αS 1-α (with “v” the subjective value, “A” the intensity of the affective response, and “S” the scope of the stimuli). According to this view, evaluating more hedonic targets results in more curved (scopeinsensitive) functions than evaluating instrumental/utilitarian targets, and more affect-oriented subjects exhibit more pronounced curvatures (lower 1α) than deliberation-oriented subjects. These predictions are evaluated in this study and additionally used for an exploratory evaluation of Reyna and Farley’s (2006, 2007) proposal that analytical processing and gist/affect-based processing predominate, respectively, in adolescents’ and in adults’ judgment and decision making. Information Integration Theory was used to establish a model allowing for the functional measurement of subjective value at the (ratio) level required for comparing curvature parameters and computing Loss Aversion coefficients. The outcomes partially favored the prediction of larger curvatures (lower 1- α) and larger loss aversion in more hedonic tasks. However, they did not support the prediction of more scope insensitivity and larger values of loss aversion in adults than in adolescents. As the main suggested difference between adults and adolescents, individual differences in risk attitude appeared to be less polarized towards loss aversion among adolescents in more hedonic tasks.

Plasticity of risky decision making among maltreated adolescents: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial

Childhood maltreatment has lasting negative effects throughout the life span. Early intervention research has demonstrated that these effects can be remediated through skill-based, family-centered interventions. However, less is known about plasticity during adolescence, and whether interventions are effective many years after children experience maltreatment. This study investigated this question by examining adolescent girls' ability to make advantageous decisions in the face of risk using a validated decision-making task; performance on this task has been associated with key neural regions involved in affective processing and executive functioning. Maltreated foster girls (n = 92), randomly assigned at age 11 to either an intervention designed to prevent risk-taking behaviors or services as usual (SAU), and nonmaltreated age and socioeconomic status matched girls living with their biological parent(s) (n = 80) completed a decision-making task (at age 15-17) that assessed risk taking and sensitivity to expected value, an index of advantageous decision making. Girls in the SAU condition demonstrated the greatest decision-making difficulties, primarily for risks to avoid losses. In the SAU group, frequency of neglect was related to greater difficulties in this area. Girls in the intervention condition with less neglect performed similarly to nonmaltreated peers. This research suggests that early maltreatment may impact decision-making abilities into adolescence and that enriched environments during early adolescence provide a window of plasticity that may ameliorate these negative effects.

On the generality of the effect of experiencing prior gains and losses on the Iowa Gambling Task: A study on young and old adults

Prospect Theory predicts that people tend to be more risk seeking if their reference point is perceived as a loss and more risk averse when the reference point is perceived as a gain. In line with this prediction, Franken, Georgieva, Muris and Dijksterhuis (2006) showed that young adults who had a prior experience of monetary gains make more safe choices on subsequent decisions than subjects who had an early experience of losses. There are no experimental studies on how experiencing prior gains and losses differently influences young and older adults on a subsequent decision-making task (the Iowa Gambling Task). Hence, in the current paper, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.’s (2006), we intended to test the generality of their effect across the life span. Overall, we found that subjects who experienced prior monetary gains or prior monetary losses did not display significant differences in safe/risky choices on subsequent performance in the Iowa Gambling task. Furthermore, the impact of prior gains and losses on risky/safe card selection did not significantly differ between young and older adults. These results showed that the effect found in the Franken et al.’s study (2006) is limited in its generality.

Future-Oriented Thought Patterns Associated With Anxiety and Depression in Later Life: The Intriguing Prospects of Prospection

Anxiety and mood disorders in later life are the focus of an increasing amount of intervention research, however basic mechanisms and paradigms explaining etiology and maintenance warrant further exploration. Research on future-oriented thought patterns associated with anxiety and depression in this age group may prove useful, as these disorders are both characterized by a tendency to generate and fixate on threat-related future scenarios that may or may not materialize. Additionally, depression is associated with a reduced expectancy of positive future events. In this paper, we review the literature relevant to future thinking in anxiety and depression in older adults. We focus on the mental construction and anticipation of negative future events, and their underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. We then consider clinical and research implications of anxious and depressive future-oriented thought patterns for older adults. We believe that more research investigating future-oriented thought patterns associated with emotional disorders in later life could improve conceptualization, measurement, and perhaps potential treatments for late-life anxiety and depression.

Divergence and Convergence of Risky Decision Making Across Prospective Gains and Losses: Preferences and Strategies

People choose differently when facing potential gains than when facing potential losses. Clear gross differences in decision making between gains and losses have been empirically demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g., framing effect, risk preference, loss aversion). However, theories maintain that there are strong underlying connections (e.g., reflection effect). We investigated the relationship between gains and losses decision making, examining risk preferences, and choice strategies (the reliance on option information) using a monetary gamble task with interleaved trials. For risk preferences, participants were on average risk averse in the gains domain and risk neutral/seeking in the losses domain. We specifically tested for a theoretically hypothesized correlation between individual risk preferences across the gains and losses domains (the reflection effect), but found no significant relationship in the predicted direction. Interestingly, despite the lack of reflected risk preferences, cross-domain risk preferences were still informative of individual choice behavior. For choice strategies, in both domains participants relied more heavily on the maximizing strategy than the satisficing strategy, with increased reliance on the maximizing strategy in the losses domain. Additionally, while there is no mathematical reliance between the risk preference and strategy metrics, within both domains there were significant relationships between risk preferences and strategies-the more participants relied upon the maximizing strategy the more risk neutral they were (equating value and utility maximization). These results demonstrate the complexity of gains and losses decision making, indicating the apparent contradiction that their underlying cognitive/neural processes are both dissociable and overlapping.

How Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making are Colored by Gist-based Intuition: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach

Fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes verbatim (literal, exact) from gist (meaningful) representations, predicting that reliance on gist increases with experience and expertise. Thus, many judgment-and-decision-making biases increase with development, such that cognition is colored by context in ways that violate logical coherence and probability theories. Nevertheless, this increase in gist-based intuition is adaptive: Gist is stable, less sensitive to interference, and easier to manipulate. Moreover, gist captures the functionally significant essence of information, supporting healthier and more robust decision processes. We describe how fuzzy-trace theory accounts for judgment-and-decision making phenomena, predicting the paradoxical arc of these processes with the development of experience and expertise. We present data linking gist memory processes to gist processing in decision making and provide illustrations of gist reliance in medicine, public health, and intelligence analysis.