Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach

Human face as a biosocial marker in human evolution

In this article, we provide an analytical review of contemporary perspectives on the role of the human face in the system of communication and human evolution. We explore how the human face has developed throughout our evolutionary history under the influence of ecological and social processes considered in the framework of self-domestication. A significant focus of the article is the relationship between facial morphology - which serves as an important signal in human communication - and the behavioural traits that have been vital to our species' evolution. We also examine how people perceive the faces of others, the information conveyed through facial features, and the evolutionary mechanisms that have shaped the human face as a biosocial marker. As a complement, we briefly discuss the evolution of emotional facial expressions, highlighting their importance as a key channel of non-verbal communication in humans. This article not only reviews current literature on these topics but also integrates findings from our own empirical research into the existing body of knowledge.

Questioning origins: the role of ethical and metaethical claims in the debate about the evolution of morality

Research about the evolution of morality suffers from the lack of a clear, agreed-upon concept of morality. In response to this, recent accounts have become increasingly pluralist and pragmatic. In this paper, I argue that 1) both the concept of morality and the broader understanding of what makes us moral include ethical and metaethical assumptions; 2) there is no uncontroversial descriptive notion available, and therefore settling on a particular concept inevitably entails such assumptions; and 3) what is lacking is a reflection on the role that ethical and metaethical assumptions play, suggesting that the debate would benefit from making them explicit. Claims about "the true origin of morality" can fruitfully be analyzed as "mixed claims": claims that combine a causal-historical hypothesis (e.g., about the evolution of a certain ability, such as empathy or joint intentionality) with ethical or metaethical assumptions about which abilities or norms make us moral. Making such assumptions explicit advances the epistemic aims of transparency and comparability, and thereby helps to avoid rash conclusions regarding, for instance, the nature of moral progress. Finally, it helps to unpack the normative knowledge shared by behavioral scientists and comparative psychologists and to give this knowledge its proper place in research.

Resource-Rational Virtual Bargaining for Moral Judgment: Toward a Probabilistic Cognitive Model

Recent theoretical work has argued that moral psychology can be understood through the lens of "resource rational contractualism." The view posits that the best way of making a decision that affects other people is to get everyone together to negotiate under idealized conditions. The outcome of that negotiation is an arrangement (or "contract") that would lead to mutual benefit. However, this ideal is seldom (if ever) practical given the resource demands (time, information, computational processing power) that are required. Instead, the theory proposes that moral psychology is organized around a series of resource-rational approximations of the contractualist ideal, efficiently trading off between more resource-intensive, accurate mechanisms and less. This paper presents empirical evidence and a cognitive model that test a central claim of this view: when the stakes of the situation are high, then more resource-intensive processes are engaged over more approximate ones. We present subjects with a case that can be judged using virtual bargaining-a resource-intensive process that involves simulating what two people would agree to-or by simply following a standard rule. We find that about a third of our participants use the resource-rational approach, flexibly switching to virtual bargaining in high-stakes situations, but deploying the simple rule when stakes are low. A third of the participants are best modeled as consistently using the strict rule-based approach and the remaining third as consistently using virtual bargaining. A model positing the reverse resource-rational hypothesis (that participants use more resource-intensive mechanisms in lower stakes situations) fails to capture the data.

Morality in Our Mind and Across Cultures and Politics

Moral judgments differ across cultures and politics, but they share a common theme in our minds: perceptions of harm. Both cultural ethnographies on moral values and psychological research on moral cognition highlight this shared focus on harm. Perceptions of harm are constructed from universal cognitive elements-including intention, causation, and suffering-but depend on the cultural context, allowing many values to arise from a common moral mind. This review traces the concept of harm across philosophy, cultural anthropology, and psychology, then discusses how different values (e.g., purity) across various taxonomies are grounded in perceived harm. We then explore two theories connecting culture to cognition-modularity and constructionism-before outlining how pluralism across human moral judgment is explained by the constructed nature of perceived harm. We conclude by showing how different perceptions of harm help drive political disagreements and reveal how sharing stories of harm can help bridge moral divides.

Moral trade-offs reveal foundational representations that predict unique variance in political attitudes

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in moral judgements on the basis of multiple innate, intuitive foundations and has been subject to criticism over recent years. Prior research has tended to rely on explicit self-report in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, we seek to capture intuitive choices between foundations in a novel task - the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT). Across four studies, responses on this task reflect foundations measured by the MFQ (study 1), are not altered under cognitive load or reduced cognitive control (studies 2a and 2b); and explain unique variance in political orientation and related constructs (study 3). Furthermore, using responses and response times generated on the MFCT, we present a computationally explicit model of foundation-related intuitive judgements and show that these patterns are consistent with the theoretical claims of MFT. These findings show that the MFCT outperforms the MFQ and can contribute to the understanding of moral value conflicts, furthering debate on the nature of moral values.

Fear of Missing Out's (FoMO) relationship with moral judgment and behavior

Across three online studies, we examined the relationship between the Fear of Missing Out (FoMO) and moral cognition and behavior. Study 1 (N = 283) examined whether FoMO influenced moral awareness, judgments, and recalled and predicted behavior of first-person moral violations in either higher or lower social settings. Study 2 (N = 821) examined these relationships in third-person judgments with varying agent identities in relation to the participant (agent = stranger, friend, or someone disliked). Study 3 (N = 604) examined the influence of recalling activities either engaged in or missed out on these relationships. Using the Rubin Causal Model, we created hypothetical randomized experiments from our real-world randomized experimental data with treatment conditions for lower or higher FoMO (median split), matched for relevant covariates, and compared differences in FoMO groups on moral awareness, judgments, and several other behavioral outcomes. Using a randomization-based approach, we examined these relationships with Fisher Tests and computed 95% Fisherian intervals for constant treatment effects consistent with the matched data and the hypothetical FoMO intervention. All three studies provide evidence that FoMO is robustly related to giving less severe judgments of moral violations. Moreover, those with higher FoMO were found to report a greater likelihood of committing moral violations in the past, knowing people who have committed moral violations in the past, being more likely to commit them in the future, and knowing people who are likely to commit moral violations in the future.

Morality and political economy from the vantage point of economics

Political disagreement is increasingly moral, rather than economic, in nature, raising the question how the fields of political economy and moral psychology relate to each other. While these disciplines were initially deeply intertwined, cross-disciplinary exchange became rare throughout the 20th century. More recently, the tide has shifted again-social scientists of different backgrounds recognized that morality and politico-economic outcomes influence each other in rich bidirectional ways. Because psychologists and economists possess distinct and complementary skill sets, part of this movement consists of productive "economic imperialism"-economists leveraging their empirical toolkit to test and substantiate theories from moral psychology at scale or in the wild. To illustrate this, I present two case studies of recent economics research on prominent ideas in moral psychology. First is the theory that morality is ultimately functional-that it evolved as a form of "psychological and biological police" to enforce cooperation, such as in economic production and exchange. Second is that the structure of morality shapes political views and polarization, including on economic issues such as taxation and redistribution. I conclude from these case studies that economists have much to gain from integrating more ideas from moral psychology, and that moral psychologists will be able to make an even more compelling case if they engage with research in economics.

Mandevillian vices

Bernard Mandeville argued that traits that have traditionally been seen as detrimental or reprehensible, such as greed, ambition, vanity, and the willingness to deceive, can produce significant social goods. He went so far as to suggest that a society composed of individuals who embody these vices would, under certain constraints, be better off than one composed only of those who embody the virtues of self-restraint. In the twentieth century, Mandeville's insights were taken up in economics by John Maynard Keynes, among others. More recently, philosophers have drawn analogies to Mandeville's ideas in the domains of epistemology and morality, arguing that traits that are typically understood as epistemic or moral vices (e.g. closed-mindedness, vindictiveness) can lead to beneficial outcomes for the groups in which individuals cooperate, deliberate, and decide, for instance by propitiously dividing the cognitive labor involved in critical inquiry and introducing transient diversity. We argue that mandevillian virtues have a negative counterpart, mandevillian vices, which are traits that are beneficial to or admirable in their individual possessor, but are or can be systematically detrimental to the group to which that individual belongs. Whilst virtue ethics and epistemology prescribe character traits that are good for every moral and epistemic agent, and ideally across all situations, mandevillian virtues show that group dynamics can complicate this picture. In this paper, we provide a unifying explanation of the main mechanism responsible for mandevillian traits in general and motivate the case for the opposite of mandevillian virtues, namely mandevillian vices.

Consensus, controversy, and chaos in the attribution of characteristics to the morally exceptional

OBJECTIVE

What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.

METHOD

Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.

RESULTS

Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.

CONCLUSION

Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.

Reciprocity versus Self-Interest in a Competitive Interaction Context: An Experimental Study

In social interactions, the reciprocity norm implies to adjust one's behavior to that of the other agents. Conversely, behaving according to self-interest involves taking into account the reciprocity principle only if it does not hinder the achievement of one's goals. However, reciprocity and self-interest may conflict with each other, as when returning a kind action involves sacrificing the possibility to achieve a personal objective. The conflict could be exacerbated by some contextual factors, such as competitive pressures. This study investigated, in a competitive interaction context, which principle prevails when the two conflict. To this end, 276 unpaid participants (M = 138) took part in a two-stage experiment entailing a simulated interaction with a fictitious opponent, which behaved selfishly, fairly or altruistically toward them during the first stage. Participants had to decide whether or not to reciprocate the opponent's previous behavior, which in the critical experimental conditions conflicted with the goal to successfully complete the experiment. So, they were faced with a moral dilemma. Competition degree was manipulated to make the conflict between reciprocity and self-interest more or less harsh. Moreover, we tested whether the putative effect of experimental manipulation was mediated by changes in context-related affective states and personal beliefs about morality. Results showed that decision-making was principally influenced by reciprocity. Regardless of the competition degree, participants preferred to engage in reciprocal behavior even when this compromised their personal interest. Affective states and beliefs changed in response to the experimental manipulation, but they did not mediate the effect of the independent variable on decision-making.

Measuring perceived fitness interdependence between humans and non-humans

Conservation ethics (i.e. moral concern for non-human organisms) are widespread, but we lack a comprehensive explanation for why people care about other species at all, and why they express strong moral concern for some species but not others. Recent theory suggests that conservation ethics might be rooted in cooperation between humans and members of other species. Building on central predictions of this eco-evolutionary theory, we conducted an online study (N = 651) and exploratory factor analysis to develop two scales that independently measure perceived fitness interdependence (PFI) and conservation ethics. The PFI scale measures perceived shared fate as a proximate indicator of human fitness interdependence with non-human organisms (i.e. the degree to which humans and other organisms influence each other's evolutionary success, that is, survival and reproduction). We designed the conservation ethics scale to measure moral beliefs and attitudes regarding those organisms. Both scales are composed of two factors and demonstrate good internal reliability. By combining insights from various branches of the evolutionary human sciences, including evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology and human behavioural ecology, we offer empirical tools to investigate eco-evolutionary foundations of conservation ethics and behaviour.

Effects of morality and reputation on sharing behaviors in human-robot teams

Introduction

The relationship between robots and humans is becoming increasingly close and will become an inseparable part of work and life with humans and robots working together. Sharing, which involves distributing goods between individuals and others, involves individuals as potential beneficiaries and the possibility of giving up the interests of others. In human teams, individual sharing behaviors are influenced by morality and reputation. However, the impact on individuals' sharing behaviors in human-robot collaborative teams remains unclear-individuals may consider morality and reputation differently when sharing with robot or human partners. In this study, three experiments were conducted using the dictator game paradigm, aiming to compare the effects and mechanisms of morality and reputation on sharing behaviors in human and human-robot teams.

Methods

Experiment 1 involving 18 participants was conducted. Experiment 2 involving 74 participants was conducted. Experiment 3 involving 128 participants was conducted.

Results

Experiment 1 validated the differences in human sharing behaviors when the agents were robots and humans. Experiment 2 verifies that moral constraints and reputation constraints affect sharing behaviors in human-robot teams. Experiment 3 further reveals the mechanism of differences in sharing behaviors in human-robot teams, where reputation concern plays a mediating role in the impact of moral constraint on sharing behaviors, and the agent type plays a moderating role in the impact of moral constraint on reputation concern and sharing behaviors.

Discussion

The results of this study contribute to a better understanding of the interaction mechanism of human-robot teams. In the future, the formulation of human-robot collaborative team rules and the setting of interaction environments can consider the potential motivation of human behavior from both morality and reputation perspectives and achieve better work performance.

Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical activation modulated by political ideology

Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.

Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences

Commentators discussed the coherence and validity of a minimalist approach to ownership intuitions, in ways that make it possible to clarify the model, re-evaluate its cognitive underpinnings, and sketch some of its implications. This response summarizes the model; addresses issues concerning the need for a special technical lexicon when describing cognitive semantics; the psychology involved in contexts of competitive acquisition and their consequences for possession and use of rival resources; the role of cooperative expectations in creating mutually beneficial allocation of resources; the consequences of ownership psychology for social interaction and the production of social norms of property; and the relations between psychological processes and legal institutions in the domain, before proposing some final thoughts.

Myth of objectivity and the origin of symbols

An age-old challenge in epistemology and moral philosophy is whether objectivity exists independent of subjective perspective. Alfred North Whitehead labeled it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"; after all, knowledge is represented elusively in symbols. I employ the free energy principle (FEP) to argue that the belief in moral objectivity, although perhaps fallacious, amounts to an ancient and universal human myth that is essential for our symbolic capacity. To perceive any object in a world of non-diminishing (perhaps irreducible) uncertainty, according to the FEP, its constituent parts must display common probabilistic tendencies, known as statistical beliefs, prior to its interpretation, or active inference, as a stable entity. Behavioral bias, subjective emotions, and social norms scale the scope of identity by coalescing agents with otherwise disparate goals and aligning their perspectives into a coherent structure. I argue that by declaring belief in norms as objective, e.g., expressing that a particular theft or infidelity was generally wrong, our ancestors psychologically constructed a type of identity bound only by shared faith in a perspective that technically transcended individual subjectivity. Signaling explicit belief in what were previously non-symbolic norms, as seen in many non-human animals, simulates a top-down point of view of our social interactions and thereby constructs our cultural niche and symbolic capacity. I demonstrate that, largely by contrasting with overly reductive analytical models that assume individual rational pursuit of extrinsic rewards, shared belief in moral conceptions, i.e., what amounts to a religious faith, remains a motivational cornerstone of our language, economic and civic institutions, stories, and psychology. Finally, I hypothesize that our bias for familiar accents (shibboleth), plausibly represents the phylogenetic and ontogenetic contextual origins of our impulse to minimize social surprise by declaring belief in the myth of objectivity.

The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind

Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgment (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and incorporating welcome corrections and extensions.

A broader theory of cooperation can better explain "purity"

Self-control provides one cooperative explanation for "purity." Other types of cooperation provide additional explanations. For example, individuals compete for status by displaying high-value social and sexual traits, which are moralised because they reduce the mutual costs of conflict. As this theory predicts, sexually unattractive traits are perceived as morally bad, aside from self-control. Moral psychology will advance more quickly by drawing on all theories of cooperation.

Subjective socioeconomic status and income inequality are associated with self-reported morality across 67 countries

Individuals can experience a lack of economic resources compared to others, which we refer to as subjective experiences of economic scarcity. While such experiences have been shown to shift cognitive focus, attention, and decision-making, their association with human morality remains debated. We conduct a comprehensive investigation of the relationship between subjective experiences of economic scarcity, as indexed by low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, and various self-reported measures linked to morality. In a pre-registered study, we analyze data from a large, cross-national survey (N = 50,396 across 67 countries) allowing us to address limitations related to cross-cultural generalizability and measurement validity in prior research. Our findings demonstrate that low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, are associated with higher levels of moral identity, higher morality-as-cooperation, a larger moral circle, and increased prosocial intentions. These results appear robust to several advanced control analyses. Finally, exploratory analyses indicate that observed income inequality at the national level is not a statistically significant moderator of the associations between subjective socioeconomic status and the included measures of morality. These findings have theoretical and practical implications for understanding human morality under experiences of resource scarcity.

Evolution of norms for judging social behavior

Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone's reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population-especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and for the evolution of social norms of judgment.

Mechanisms of Techno-Moral Change: A Taxonomy and Overview

The idea that technologies can change moral beliefs and practices is an old one. But how, exactly, does this happen? This paper builds on an emerging field of inquiry by developing a synoptic taxonomy of the mechanisms of techno-moral change. It argues that technology affects moral beliefs and practices in three main domains: decisional (how we make morally loaded decisions), relational (how we relate to others) and perceptual (how we perceive situations). It argues that across these three domains there are six primary mechanisms of techno-moral change: (i) adding options; (ii) changing decision-making costs; (iii) enabling new relationships; (iv) changing the burdens and expectations within relationships; (v) changing the balance of power in relationships; and (vi) changing perception (information, mental models and metaphors). The paper also discusses the layered, interactive and second-order effects of these mechanisms.

Research on the influence and mechanism of human-vehicle moral matching on trust in autonomous vehicles

Introduction

Autonomous vehicles can have social attributes and make ethical decisions during driving. In this study, we investigated the impact of human-vehicle moral matching on trust in autonomous vehicles and its mechanism.

Methods

A 2*2 experiment involving 200 participants was conducted.

Results

The results of the data analysis show that utilitarian moral individuals have greater trust than deontological moral individuals. Perceived value and perceived risk play a double-edged role in people's trust in autonomous vehicles. People's moral type has a positive impact on trust through perceived value and a negative impact through perceived risk. Vehicle moral type moderates the impact of human moral type on trust through perceived value and perceived risk.

Discussion

The conclusion shows that heterogeneous moral matching (people are utilitarian, vehicles are deontology) has a more positive effect on trust than homogenous moral matching (both people and vehicles are deontology or utilitarian), which is consistent with the assumption of selfish preferences of individuals. The results of this study provide theoretical expansion for the fields related to human-vehicle interaction and AI social attributes and provide exploratory suggestions for the functional design of autonomous vehicles.

Linking Judging Moral to Acting Moral: A Relational Motivations Approach to Judging and Practicing Covid-19 Behaviors

Building on the Relational Motivation Theory, the present research argues that relational motivations (RM) underlie both the regulation and the moral judgment of socially (un)responsive Covid-19 behaviors (e.g., physical distancing) and links these two via moral identity. We hypothesize that different types of socially unresponsive behaviors are judged morally wrong through perceptions of RM violations and that a stronger concern for unity predicts the extent to which individuals self-report to perform socially responsive Covid-19 behaviors. Additionally, the role of moral identity as an individual-level moderator variable linking perceptions about RM violation to the practice of Covid-19 responsible behaviors is explored. The results support the predictions with data collected from participants living in Turkey and the USA. In both cultures, socially unresponsive Covid-19 behaviors of others were judged morally wrong through RMs, plus individuals' general concern for unity predicted their self-reported socially responsive Covid-19 behaviors. Additionally, for the sample from Turkey, results revealed that the general concern for unity was positively associated with self-reported tendencies to perform Covid-19 socially responsive behaviors only among individuals with a low or moderate moral identity, but not when moral identity was high.

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1-4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.

Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation

In many biological populations, such as human groups, individuals face a complex strategic setting, where they need to make strategic decisions over a diverse set of issues and their behavior in one strategic context can affect their decisions in another. This raises the question of how the interaction between different strategic contexts affects individuals’ strategic choices and social norms? To address this question, I introduce a framework where individuals play two games with different structures and decide upon their strategy in a second game based on their knowledge of their opponent’s strategy in the first game. I consider both multistage games, where the same opponents play the two games consecutively, and reputation-based model, where individuals play their two games with different opponents but receive information about their opponent’s strategy. By considering a case where the first game is a social dilemma, I show that when the second game is a coordination or anti-coordination game, the Nash equilibrium of the coupled game can be decomposed into two classes, a defective equilibrium which is composed of two simple equilibrium of the two games, and a cooperative equilibrium, in which coupling between the two games emerge and sustain cooperation in the social dilemma. For the existence of the cooperative equilibrium, the cost of cooperation should be smaller than a value determined by the structure of the second game. Investigation of the evolutionary dynamics shows that a cooperative fixed point exists when the second game belongs to coordination or anti-coordination class in a mixed population. However, the basin of attraction of the cooperative fixed point is much smaller for the coordination class, and this fixed point disappears in a structured population. When the second game belongs to the anti-coordination class, the system possesses a spontaneous symmetry-breaking phase transition above which the symmetry between cooperation and defection breaks. A set of cooperation supporting moral norms emerges according to which cooperation stands out as a valuable trait. Notably, the moral system also brings a more efficient allocation of resources in the second game. This observation suggests a moral system has two different roles: Promotion of cooperation, which is against individuals’ self-interest but beneficial for the population, and promotion of organization and order, which is at both the population’s and the individual’s self-interest. Interestingly, the latter acts like a Trojan horse: Once established out of individuals’ self-interest, it brings the former with itself. Importantly, the fact that the evolution of moral norms depends only on the cost of cooperation and is independent of the benefit of cooperation implies that moral norms can be harmful and incur a pure collective cost, yet they are just as effective in promoting order and organization. Finally, the model predicts that recognition noise can have a surprisingly positive effect on the evolution of moral norms and facilitates cooperation in the Snow Drift game in structured populations.

How do moral norms spontaneously evolve in the presence of selfish incentives? An answer to this question is provided by the observation that moral systems have two distinct functions: Besides encouraging self-sacrificing cooperation, they also bring organization and order into the societies. In contrast to the former, which is costly for the individuals but beneficial for the group, the latter is beneficial for both the group and the individuals. A simple evolutionary model suggests this latter aspect is what makes a moral system evolve based on the individuals’ self-interest. However, a moral system behaves like a Trojan horse: Once established out of the individuals’ self-interest to promote order and organization, it also brings self-sacrificing cooperation.

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.

Age- and sex-based differences in the moral intuitions of American early adolescents

This study sought to explore the validity of a latent-factor model of moral intuition development during early adolescence. The 3-Factor Character Foundations Survey (CFS-3) was used to assess the moral intuitions of early adolescents (n = 850, mean = 12.4 years old, SD = 0.96) under a moral foundations theory framework. Confirmatory factor analysis supported the psychometric validity of the three latent factor constructs (autonomy, loyalty and empathy), and partial metric invariance was established to allow for the comparison of latent factor means between four age- and sex-based groups coinciding with averages for pubertal onset. Results support prior findings of greater latent factor means for females in all three factors when compared with males in the 11-12-year-old age group. Additionally, 13-14-year-old females exhibited lower latent factor means in autonomy and loyalty factors when compared with 11-12-year-old females. This resulted in 13-14-year-old females remaining higher in empathy and autonomy but showing no difference in loyalty when compared with 13-14-year-old males. The results are interpreted through the lens of attachment theory, socio-cultural influence and certain limitations of the survey instrument itself. Suggestions for future studies are proposed.

Moralizing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Self-Interest Predicts Moral Condemnation of Other's Compliance, Distancing, and Vaccination

The emergence of the novel coronavirus has put societies under tremendous pressure to instigate massive and rapid behavior change. Throughout history, an effective strategy to facilitate novel behaviors has been to morally condemn those who do not behave in an appropriate way. Accordingly, here, we investigate if complying with the advice of health authorities-for example, to physically distance or vaccinate-has emerged as a moralized issue during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Study 1, we rely on data (N = 94K) from quota-sampled rolling cross-sectional online surveys from eight countries (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and the United States). We find that large majorities find it justified to condemn those who do not keep a distance to others in public and around half of respondents blame ordinary citizens for the severity of the pandemic. Furthermore, we identify the most important predictors of condemnation to be behavior change and personal concern, while institutional trust and social distrust also play large but less consistent roles. Study 2 offers a registered replication of our findings on a representative sample of Britons (N = 1.5K). It shows that both moralization and condemnation of both vaccination and general compliance are best predicted by self-interested considerations.

Trust and Cooperation

We AI researchers are concerned about the potential impact of artificially intelligent systems on humanity. In the first half of this essay, I argue that ethics is an evolved body of cultural knowledge that (among other things) encourages individual behavior that promotes the welfare of the society (which in turn promotes the welfare of its individual members). The causal paths involved suggest that trust and cooperation play key roles in this process. In the second half of the essay, I consider whether the key role of trust exposes our society to existential threats. This possibility arises because decision-making agents (humans, AIs, and others) necessarily rely on simplified models to cope with the unbounded complexity of our physical and social world. By selecting actions to maximize a utility measure, a well-formulated game theory model can be a powerful and valuable tool. However, a poorly-formulated game theory model may be uniquely harmful, in cases where the action it recommends deliberately exploits the vulnerability and violates the trust of cooperative partners. Widespread use of such models can erode the overall levels of trust in the society. Cooperation is reduced, resources are constrained, and there is less ability to meet challenges or take advantage of opportunities. Loss of trust will affect humanity's ability to respond to existential threats such as climate change.

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.

Universality and Cultural Diversity in Moral Reasoning and Judgment

Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners' individualistic culture and Easterners' collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist "moralities" thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each society develops a moral system emphasizing several moral orientations. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality from a cross-cultural perspective. Consequently, we shed light on future descriptive work on morality to identify the cultural characteristics likely to impact the expression or development of reasoning, justification, argumentation, and moral judgment in Westerners' individualistic culture and Easterners' collectivist culture.

Moral realism, disagreement, and conceptual ethics

Moral disagreement is often thought to be of great metaethical significance for moral realists. I explore what remains of that significance when we look at moral disagreement through the lens of a combination of two influential and independently plausible hypotheses about moral language. The Morality-As-Cooperation (MAC) hypothesis says that our capacity for and use of moral language is an adaptation to increase mutualistic cooperation. The Concepts-As-Tools (CAT) hypothesis says that we often engage in disputes about language use and that many apparent moral disagreements are linguistic disagreements in disguise. The combined MAC-CAT view that I explore suggests that we frequently engage in linguistic disputes to find optimal means for mutualistic cooperation. I show that this perspective weakens sceptical claims based on moral disagreements, that is offers a novel way for moral realists to explain the apparent genuineness of moral disagreements without the need to accept theses borrowed from non-cognitivism.

Moral progress: Recent developments

Societies change over time. Chattel slavery and foot-binding have been abolished, democracy has become increasingly widespread, gay rights have become established in some countries, and the animal rights movement continues to gain momentum. Do these changes count as moral progress? Is there such a thing? If so, how should we understand it? These questions have been receiving increasing attention from philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and sociologists in recent decades. This survey provides a systematic account of recent developments in the understanding of moral progress. We outline the concept of moral progress and describe the different types of moral progress identified in the literature. We review the normative criteria that have been used in judging whether various developments count as morally progressive or not. We discuss the prospects of moral progress in the face of challenges that claim that moral progress is not psychologically possible for human beings, and we explore the metaethical implications of moral progress.

Identity fusion predicts violent pro-group behavior when it is morally justifiable

Identity fusion is a visceral feeling of oneness with a group that predicts extreme pro-group behaviors. However, the effects of fusion depending on the nature of such behaviors -violent versus nonviolent- and the factors that may incline strongly fused individuals to display them still remain unexplored. To fill this gap, we performed two correlational studies in which we examined whether moral beliefs regarding the justifiability of violence moderate the relationship between fusion with the family (Study 1), or with the country (Study 2), and willingness to engage in violent and nonviolent pro-group acts. Results showed that strongly fused participants were more willing to act violently than weakly fused participants, but only when their beliefs in the moral justifiability of violence were high. In contrast, their willingness to engage in nonviolent acts was not influenced by moral beliefs.

Tell Me Who You Vote for, and I'll Tell You Who You Are? The Associations of Political Orientation With Personality and Prosocial Behavior and the Plausibility of Evolutionary Approaches

Blatantly observable in the U.S. currently, the political chasm grows, representing a prototype of political polarization in most if not all western democratic political systems. Differential political psychology strives to trace back increasingly polarized political convictions to differences on the individual level. Recent evolutionary informed approaches suggest that interindividual differences in political orientation reflect differences in group-mindedness and cooperativeness. Contrarily, the existence of meaningful associations between political orientation, personality traits, and interpersonal behavior has been questioned critically. Here, we shortly review evidence showing that these relationships do exist, which supports the assumption that political orientation is deeply rooted in the human condition. Potential reasons for the premature rejection of these relationships and directions for future research are outlined and implications for refinements and extensions of evolutionary informed approaches are derived.

Shifting prosocial intuitions: neurocognitive evidence for a value-based account of group-based cooperation

Cooperation is necessary for solving numerous social issues, including climate change, effective governance and economic stability. Value-based decision models contend that prosocial tendencies and social context shape people’s preferences for cooperative or selfish behavior. Using functional neuroimaging and computational modeling, we tested these predictions by comparing activity in brain regions previously linked to valuation and executive function during decision-making—the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), respectively. Participants played Public Goods Games with students from fictitious universities, where social norms were selfish or cooperative. Prosocial participants showed greater vmPFC activity when cooperating and dlPFC-vmPFC connectivity when acting selfishly, whereas selfish participants displayed the opposite pattern. Norm-sensitive participants showed greater dlPFC-vmPFC connectivity when defying group norms. Modeling expectations of cooperation was associated with activity near the right temporoparietal junction. Consistent with value-based models, this suggests that prosocial tendencies and contextual norms flexibly determine whether people prefer cooperation or defection.

Validation of Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire in Turkey, and Its Relation to Prosociality, Ideology, and Resource Scarcity

Abstract. The theory of morality as cooperation (MAC) argues that there are seven distinct and evolved universal moral foundations. Curry, Chesters, and Van Lissa (2019) developed a scale to test this theoretical approach and showed that the Relevance subscale of the MAC questionnaire (MAC-Q) fits data well, unlike the Judgment and full-form. However, an independent test of the validity of this questionnaire has not been hitherto conducted, and its relation with ideology is unknown. In the first study, we attempted to validate the Turkish form of MAC-Q and then examined the relationship with prosociality and political ideology. The results showed that the fit indices of MAC-Q Relevance are above the standard criteria, unlike the Judgment and full form ( n = 445), and significant relationships with prosociality and political ideology provided additional evidence for the validity. We used the MAC-Q Relevance in Study 2 ( n = 576, Turkey) and Study 3 ( n = 921, US), and investigated whether manipulating resource scarcity influences the endorsement of MAC. Although there was no effect of the manipulation, correlational findings provided some support for the predictive validity of MAC-Q. Overall, MAC-Q Relevance performs well in representing the lay notions of morality in both Turkey and the US, unlike full-form.

Morality as a Regulator of Divergence: Protecting Against Deviance While Promoting Diversity

Living together cooperatively in groups requires creating and maintaining healthy socio-cultural normative structures (i.e., shared “normed” beliefs, values, practices, and so on) that allow all members of the group to function well, both as individuals and as a part of the communal whole. This requires maintaining a delicate and dynamic balance between protecting members of the group from undue harm, while allowing for individual freedom, choice, and creativity—for example, determining when a new belief, value, or practice is a form of acceptable (even desirable) diversity to be allowed, and when it is a form of deviance to be shut down. I will argue that maintaining this balance is the primary function of morality—and that it requires an understanding of ourselves as moral beings oriented towards “the good” that is stable enough to be shared and passed down to future generations, yet flexible enough to adapt and change as our cumulative experiences expand and alter that understanding.

The Good and Evil of Health Policy: Medicaid Expansion, Republican Governors, and Moral Intuitions

Using moral foundations theory (MFT), this study analyzes how Republican governors employed moral concepts to either build support or opposition to Medicaid expansion. The study examined statements about Medicaid expansion made by all Republican governors as reported in two large newspapers in each governor's state from 28 June 2012 to 31 December 2018. A slight majority of the statements (183 or 58.5%) used moral arguments in support of Medicaid expansion. Governors from both policy camps most frequently used the moral foundations shared by liberals and conservatives: care/harm and fairness/cheating. Those supporting expansion also used loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Those opposing expansion used liberty/oppression. Policymakers recognize that activating the public's moral intuitions can be an effective way to advance a policy of interest. Those interested in advancing health policies would do well to better understand the kind of moral arguments that are used with potential supporters and arguments that may be used by opponents.

Character Strengths Involving an Orientation to Promote Good Can Help Your Health and Well-Being. Evidence From two Longitudinal Studies

Purpose:

We examined the impact of an orientation to promote good—one aspect of strengths of character, understood as having consistent thoughts and taking actions that contribute to the good of oneself and others—on flourishing outcomes.

Design:

We used data from 2 longitudinal observational studies. The primary study used 2 waves of data collected in June 2018 and July 2019. The secondary study used 3 waves of data collected in February 2017, March 2018, and March 2019.

Setting:

Two culturally different populations of adults were examined: (1) a large service organization based in the United States and (2) a Mexican apparel company in the supply chain of a major global brand.

Subjects:

1,209 U.S. employees and 495 Mexican apparel workers were included in the study.

Measures:

Self-reports of orientation to promote good, Well-Being Assessment, Flourishing Index, the CDC Health-Related Quality of Life and the Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale were used.

Analysis:

An outcome-wide approach and lagged regression analyses were applied. To combine the estimates across samples meta-analytic estimates were computed. Bonferroni correction was used to correct for multiple testing. Robustness of the results to potential unmeasured confounding was examined using E-values.

Results:

Orientation to promote good was positively associated with subsequently higher levels of life satisfaction and happiness (β = 0.14, 95% CI: 0.09, 0.19), self-assessed mental health (β = 0.11, 95% CI: 0.06, 0.15) and physical health (β = 0.08, 95% CI: 0.04, 0.12), social connectedness (β = 0.102, 95% CI: 0.06, 0.15) and purpose in life (β = 0.07, 95% CI: 0.03, 0.11). It was also associated with decreased anxiety (β = -0.11, 95% CI: -0.17, -0.06), depression (β = -0.07, 95% CI: -0.1, -0.02) and loneliness (β = -0.09, 95% CI: -0.13, -0.04). Possible effects on both positive affect (feeling happy) and negative affect (feeling sad, stressed and lonely) in general and while-at-work were also identified.

Conclusions:

Policymakers and practitioners should consider orientation to promote good as an important factor for improving population health and human flourishing while also at work.

Vaccination as a social contract

Most vaccines protect both the vaccinated individual and the society by reducing the transmission of infectious diseases. In order to eliminate infectious diseases, individuals need to consider social welfare beyond mere self-interest-regardless of ethnic, religious, or national group borders. It has therefore been proposed that vaccination poses a social contract in which individuals are morally obliged to get vaccinated. However, little is known about whether individuals indeed act upon this social contract. If so, vaccinated individuals should reciprocate by being more generous to a vaccinated other. On the contrary, if the other doesn't vaccinate and violates the social contract, generosity should decline. Three preregistered experiments investigated how a person's own vaccination behavior, others' vaccination behavior, and others' group membership influenced a person's generosity toward respective others. The experiments consistently showed that especially compliant (i.e., vaccinated) individuals showed less generosity toward nonvaccinated individuals. This effect was independent of the others' group membership, suggesting an unconditional moral principle. An internal metaanalysis (n = 1,032) confirmed the overall social contract effect. In a fourth experiment (n = 1,212), this pattern was especially pronounced among vaccinated individuals who perceived vaccination as a moral obligation. It is concluded that vaccination is a social contract in which cooperation is the morally right choice. Individuals act upon the social contract, and more so the stronger they perceive it as a moral obligation. Emphasizing the social contract could be a promising intervention to increase vaccine uptake, prevent free riding, and, eventually, support the elimination of infectious diseases.

“Do the right thing” for whom? An experiment on ingroup favouritism, group assorting and moral suasion

In this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered, two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer a set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assorting on non-moral preferences), and morally relevant issues in another treatment (assorting on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assorting and four pre-registered individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).