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Subias L, Katsu N, Yamada K. Metacognition in wild Japanese macaques: cost and stakes influencing information-seeking behavior. Anim Cogn 2024; 27:22. [PMID: 38441831 PMCID: PMC10914859 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-024-01851-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2023] [Revised: 10/20/2023] [Accepted: 10/25/2023] [Indexed: 03/07/2024]
Abstract
Metacognition allows us to evaluate memories and knowledge, thus enabling us to distinguish between what we know and what we do not. Studies have shown that species other than humans may possess similar abilities. However, the number of species tested was limited. Testing ten free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on a task in which they had to find food hidden inside one of the four opaque tubes, we investigated whether these subjects would seek information when needed. The monkeys could look inside the tubes before selecting one. We varied three parameters: the baiting process, the cost that monkeys had to pay to look inside the tubes, and the reward at stake. We assessed whether and how these parameters would affect the monkeys' tendency to look inside the tube before selecting one. When they were not shown which tube contained the reward, nine monkeys looked significantly more frequently in at least one condition. Half of them tended to reduce their looks when the cost was high, but only when they already knew the location of the reward. When a high-quality reward was at stake, four monkeys tended to look more inside the tubes, even though they already knew the reward's location. Our results are consistent with those of rhesus macaques, suggesting that metacognitive-like abilities may be shared by Cercopithecidae, and that, at least some monkeys may be aware of their lack of knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lorraine Subias
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan.
| | - Noriko Katsu
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
| | - Kazunori Yamada
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
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2
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Gazes RP, Templer VL, Rodgers KC, Mickelberg JL, Stoinski TS. Information seeking in western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Learn Behav 2023; 51:59-72. [PMID: 36396931 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-022-00554-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Many animals will seek information when they do not know the answer to a problem, suggesting that they monitor their knowledge state. In the classic "tubes task," subjects are presented with a set of opaque tubes and either see (visible trials) or do not see (hidden trials) which tube holds a food reward on a given trial. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and human children show information-seeking behavior on this task, looking into the tubes to find the reward more on hidden than on visible trials. However, evidence for information-seeking behavior in gorillas is limited. In Experiment 1, gorillas that were presented with a classic information-seeking tubes task showed performance patterns consistent with metacognitive behavior; they looked down tubes more on hidden than on visible trials, their accuracy on hidden trials on which they looked was higher than on hidden trials on which they did not look, and they primarily employed an appropriate search strategy when looking down the tubes. In Experiment 2, we decreased or increased the amount of effort required to look down the tubes by increasing or decreasing the height of the tubes, respectively. Gorillas were less likely to look in tubes on trials that required high effort, but continued to look more on hidden than on visible trials, indicating that their tendency to look was affected by both knowledge state and effort. Together these results provide strong evidence for logical, controlled information-seeking behavior by gorillas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Regina Paxton Gazes
- Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA.
- Department of Psychology and Program in Animal Behavior, Bucknell University, 1 Dent Dr, Lewisburg, PA, 17837, USA.
| | | | | | | | - Tara S Stoinski
- Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA
- Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International, Atlanta, GA, USA
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3
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Congratulations to Animal Cognition on its 50th birthday! Some thoughts on the last 50 years of animal cognition research. Anim Cogn 2023; 26:13-23. [PMID: 36264405 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-022-01706-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2022] [Revised: 09/11/2022] [Accepted: 10/14/2022] [Indexed: 02/01/2023]
Abstract
In this article, the author reflects on some of the key issues that have arisen in comparative cognition and the role and impact of the journal Animal Cognition through its first 25 years by pretending to look back at this period from the year 2047. Successes within comparative cognition are described and the role that Animal Cognition has played in the growth of comparative cognition are discussed. Concerns are presented about issues that affect the opportunities that researchers have to work with nonhuman species and to produce good comparative cognitive science. Prescriptions for what the author hopes will happen next also are offered all in the lens of a prospectively imagined retrospective on this field.
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4
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Kret ME, Massen JJM, de Waal FBM. My Fear Is Not, and Never Will Be, Your Fear: On Emotions and Feelings in Animals. AFFECTIVE SCIENCE 2022; 3:182-189. [PMID: 36042781 PMCID: PMC9382921 DOI: 10.1007/s42761-021-00099-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2021] [Accepted: 12/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Do nonhuman animals (henceforth, animals) have emotions, and if so, are these similar to ours? This opinion piece aims to add to the recent debate about this question and provides a critical re-evaluation of what can be concluded about animal and human emotions. Emotions, and their cognitive interpretation, i.e., feelings, serve important survival functions. Emotions, we believe, can exist without feelings and are unconsciously influencing our behavior more than we think, and possibly more so than feelings do. Given that emotions are expressed in body and brain, they can be inferred from these measures. We view feelings primarily as private states, which may be similar across closely related species but remain mostly inaccessible to science. Still, combining data acquired through behavioral observation with data obtained from noninvasive techniques (e.g., eyetracking, thermography, hormonal samples) and from cognitive tasks (e.g., decision-making paradigms, cognitive bias, attentional bias) provides new information about the inner states of animals, and possibly about their feelings as well. Given that many other species show behavioral, neurophysiological, hormonal, and cognitive responses to valenced stimuli equivalent to human responses, it seems logical to speak of animal emotions and sometimes even of animal feelings. At the very least, the contemporary multi-method approach allows us to get closer than ever before. We conclude with recommendations on how the field should move forward.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mariska E. Kret
- Cognitive Psychology Unit, Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Comparative Psychology & Affective Neuroscience Lab, Cognitive Psychology Department, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition (LIBC), Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Jorg J. M. Massen
- Animal Behaviour and Cognition, Department of Biology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
| | - Frans B. M. de Waal
- Animal Behaviour and Cognition, Department of Biology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
- Psychology Department, Emory University, Atlanta, GA USA
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5
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Bliss-Moreau E, Rudebeck PH. Animal models of human mood. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 120:574-582. [PMID: 33007355 PMCID: PMC10474843 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.06.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2019] [Revised: 06/16/2020] [Accepted: 06/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Humans' everyday experience of the world is influenced by our moods. Moods are consciously accessible affective states that extend over time that are characterized by their valence and arousal. They also likely have a long evolutionary heritage and serve as an important adaptive affective mechanism. When they become maladaptive or overly biased, pathological affective states such as depression can emerge. Despite the importance of moods for human experience, little is known about their causal neurobiological mechanisms. In humans, limitations related to methods and interpretations of the data prevent causal investigations into the origins of mood, highlighting the importance of animal models. Nonhuman primates that share key neuroanatomical, affective, and social features with humans will be essential to uncovering their foundation. Identifying and validating mood-like states in animals is, however, challenging not least because mood is a human construct requiring verbal communication. Here we outline a theoretical framework for animal models of human mood, drawing upon established psychological literature where it exists before reviewing the extant studies of non-human primate models of mood-like states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eliza Bliss-Moreau
- Department of Psychology, California National Primate Research Center, University of California, Davis, CA, 95616, USA.
| | - Peter H Rudebeck
- Nash Family Department of Neuroscience and Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, One Gustave L. Levy Place, New York, NY, 10029, USA.
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6
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Smith TR, Parrish AE, Creamer C, Rossettie M, Beran MJ. Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella. Cognition 2020; 199:104237. [PMID: 32112968 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104237] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2019] [Revised: 02/09/2020] [Accepted: 02/11/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
To test for evidence of metacognition in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), we analyzed confidence movements using a paradigm adapted from research with chimpanzees. Capuchin monkeys provide an interesting model species for the comparative assessment of metacognition as they show limited evidence of such cognitive-monitoring processes in a variety of metacognition paradigms. Here, monkeys were presented with a computerized delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) memory test in one location but were rewarded for correct responses in a separate location. Movements could be made from one location to the other at any time, but movements between a response and reward feedback may reflect confidence in the accuracy of the response. Critically, DMTS tests included occasional "no sample" trials where monkeys' performance was at chance when the trial started without a sample and a 1-s interval to the response options. We predicted that monkeys would (1) perform less accurately (and less confidently) at longer retention intervals, (2) move to the dispenser early more often on trials completed correctly than incorrectly, and (3) show a relation between faster response latency and early movements. Analyses of response times and "go" or "no go" confidence movements before feedback to the reward location suggested that the monkeys were capable of monitoring confidence in their responses. However, their confidence movements were less precise and less flexible than chimpanzees. Overall, this paradigm can reveal potential metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals that otherwise demonstrate these abilities inconsistently.
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Hampton RR, Engelberg JWM, Brady RJ. Explicit memory and cognition in monkeys. Neuropsychologia 2020; 138:107326. [PMID: 31917205 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107326] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2019] [Revised: 12/16/2019] [Accepted: 12/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Taxonomies of human memory, influenced heavily by Endel Tulving, make a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Humans are aware of explicit memories, whereas implicit memories control behavior even though we are not aware of them. Efforts to understand the evolution of memory, and to use nonhuman animals to model human memory, will be facilitated by better understanding the extent to which this critical distinction exists in nonhuman animals. Work with metacognition paradigms in the past 20 years has produced a strong case for the existence of explicit memory in nonhuman primates and possibly other nonhuman animals. Clear dissociations of explicit and implicit memory by metacognition have yet to be demonstrated in nonhumans, although dissociations between memory systems by other behavioral techniques, and by brain manipulations, suggest that the explicit-implicit distinction applies to nonhumans. Neurobehavioral studies of metamemory are beginning to identify neural substrates for memory monitoring in the frontal cortex of monkeys. We have strong evidence that at least some memory systems are explicit in rhesus monkeys, but we need to learn more about the distribution of explicit processes across cognitive systems within monkeys, and across species.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Jonathan W M Engelberg
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Ryan J Brady
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Hampton RR. Monkey Metacognition Could Generate More Insight. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION 2019; 6:230-235. [PMID: 33834091 DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.02.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Monkeys demonstrate metacognition by avoiding memory tests when they forget, seeking information when ignorant, and gambling sensibly after making judgments. Some of this metacognition appears to be based on introspection of private mental states. It is likely that nonhuman cognitive systems, like human systems, differ in accessibility to such introspective metacognition, and the extent to which differences in access map to explicit and implicit cognition will be an important topic for future work. It will be exciting to learn more about the distribution of metacognition among species, and the conditions under which metacognition evolves.
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9
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Smith JD, Jackson BN, Church BA. The Cognitive Architecture of Uncertainty. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION 2019; 6:236-246. [PMID: 33335976 DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.03.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
| | - Brooke N Jackson
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
| | - Barbara A Church
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
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10
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Templer VL. Slow Progress with the Most Widely Used Animal Model: Ten Years of Metacognition Research in Rats, 2009-2019. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION 2019; 6:273-277. [PMID: 34056076 DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.07.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Until recently, demonstrations of metacognition in primates have been frequent and robust, while in rodents they have been few and equivocal. However, the past few years have seen a change in this trend with the introduction of novel methods to determine whether metacognitive responding is governed by internal or external sources of stimulus control in rats. Such studies suggest that like primates, rats can indeed use internal assessment of memory strengths to guide metacognitive responding. Strong behavioral paradigms suitable for rodents support the development of easily-accessible animal models for the neurobiology of metamemory and translational studies on diseases of memory. They also allow for a more complete comparative study of the evolution of metacognition, as the presence of this ability in rodents would suggest that metacognition evolved ~80 rather than ~25 million years ago.
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11
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Dissociation of memory signals for metamemory in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Anim Cogn 2019; 22:331-341. [PMID: 30762160 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-019-01246-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2018] [Revised: 01/28/2019] [Accepted: 01/31/2019] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Some nonhuman species demonstrate metamemory, the ability to monitor and control memory. Here, we identify memory signals that control metamemory judgments in rhesus monkeys by directly comparing performance in two metamemory paradigms while holding the availability of one memory signal constant and manipulating another. Monkeys performed a four-choice match-to-sample memory task. In Experiment 1, monkeys could decline memory tests on some trials for a small, guaranteed reward. In Experiment 2, monkeys could review the sample on some trials. In both experiments, monkeys improved accuracy by selectively declining tests or reviewing samples when memory was poor. To assess the degree to which different memory signals made independent contributions to the metamemory judgement, we made the decline-test or review-sample response available either prospectively, before the test, or concurrently with test stimuli. Prospective metamemory judgements are likely controlled by the current contents of working memory, whereas concurrent metamemory judgements may also be controlled by additional relative familiarity signals evoked by the sight of the test stimuli. In both paradigms, metacognitive responding enhanced accuracy more on concurrent than on prospective tests, suggesting additive contributions of working memory and stimulus-evoked familiarity. Consistent with the hypothesis that working memory and stimulus-evoked familiarity both control metamemory judgments when available, metacognitive choice latencies were longer in the concurrent condition, when both were available. Together, these data demonstrate that multiple memory signals can additively control metacognitive judgements in monkeys and provide a framework for mapping the interaction of explicit memory signals in primate memory.
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12
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A computerized testing system for primates: Cognition, welfare, and the Rumbaughx. Behav Processes 2018; 156:37-50. [DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2017.12.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2017] [Revised: 11/08/2017] [Accepted: 12/19/2017] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
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13
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Abstract
Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans' capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change-in concert-the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 30303-5010, USA.
| | - Barbara A Church
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 30303-5010, USA
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14
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Templer VL, Brown EK, Hampton RR. Rhesus monkeys metacognitively monitor memories of the order of events. Sci Rep 2018; 8:11541. [PMID: 30068995 PMCID: PMC6070473 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-30001-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2018] [Accepted: 07/16/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Human working memory is a capacity- and duration-limited system in which retention and manipulation of information is subject to metacognitive monitoring and control. At least some nonhuman animals appear to also monitor and control the contents of working memory, but only relatively simple cases where animals monitor or control the presence or absence of single memories have been studied. Here we combine a comparatively complex order memory task with methodology that assesses the capacity to introspect about memory. Monkeys observed sequential presentations of five images, and at test, reported which of two images from the list had appeared first during study. Concurrently, they chose to complete or avoid these tests on a trial-by-trial basis. Monkeys "knew when they knew" the correct response. They were less accurate discriminating images that had appeared close in time to one another during study and were more likely to avoid these difficult tests than they were to avoid easier tests. These results indicate that monkeys can metacognitively monitor relatively complex properties of the contents of working memory, including the quality of representations of temporal relations among images.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Sq., Providence, RI, 02918, USA.
| | - Emily Kathryn Brown
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Dowman Dr., Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
| | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Dowman Dr., Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
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15
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Lee KA, Preston AJ, Wise TB, Templer VL. Testing for Metacognitive Responding Using an Odor-based Delayed Match-to-Sample Test in Rats. J Vis Exp 2018. [PMID: 29985304 PMCID: PMC6101758 DOI: 10.3791/57489] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Metamemory involves the cognitive ability to assess the strength of one's memories. To explore the possibility of metamemory in non-human animals, numerous behavioral tasks have been created, many of which utilize an option to decline memory tests. To assess metamemory in rats, we utilized this decline-test option paradigm by adapting previous visual delayed-match-to-sample tests (DMTS)12 developed for primate species to an odor-based test suitable for rodents. First, rats are given a sample to remember by digging in a cup of scented sand. After a delay, the rat is presented with four distinctly scented cups, one of which contains the identical scent experienced during the sample; if this matching cup is selected, then the rat obtains a preferred, larger reward. Selection of any of the other three non-matching sand-filled scented cups results in no reward. Retention intervals are individually titrated such that subjects perform between 40 and 70% correct, therefore ensuring rats sometimes remember and sometimes forget the sample. Here, the operational definition of metamemory is the ability to distinguish between the presence and absence of memory through behavioral responding. Towards this end, on two-thirds of trials, a decline option is presented in addition to the four choice cups (choice trials). If the decline-test option- an unscented colored sand cup, is selected, the subject receives a smaller less-preferred reward and avoids the memory test. On the remaining third of trials, the decline-test option is not available (forced trials), causing subjects to guess the correct cup when the sample is forgotten. On choice tests, subjects that know when they remember should select the decline option when memory is weak rather than take the test and choose incorrectly. Therefore, significantly higher performance on chosen tests as compared to forced memory tests is indicative of the adaptive use of the decline-test response and metacognitive responding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College
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16
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Smith JD, Boomer J, Church BA, Zakrzewski AC, Beran MJ, Baum ML. I scan, therefore I decline: The time course of difficulty monitoring in humans (homo sapiens) and macaques (macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol 2018; 132:152-165. [PMID: 29658725 PMCID: PMC5945321 DOI: 10.1037/com0000100] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The study of nonhumans' metacognitive judgments about trial difficulty has grown into an important comparative literature. However, the potential for associative-learning confounds in this area has left room for behaviorist interpretations that are strongly asserted and hotly debated. This article considers how researchers may be able to observe animals' strategic cognitive processes more clearly by creating temporally extended problems within which associative cues are not always immediately available. We asked humans and rhesus macaques to commit to completing spatially extended mazes or to decline completing them through a trial-decline response. The mazes could sometimes be completed successfully, but other times had a constriction that blocked completion. A deliberate, systematic scanning process could preevaluate a maze and determine the appropriate response. Latency analyses charted the time course of the evaluative process. Both humans and macaques appeared, from the pattern of their latencies, to scan the mazes through before committing to completing them. Thus monkeys, too, can base trial-decline responses on temporally extended evaluation processes, confirming that those responses have strategic cognitive-processing bases in addition to behavioral-reactive bases. The results also show the value of temporally and spatially extended problems to let researchers study the trajectory of animals' online cognitive processes. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Language Research Center, Georgia State University
| | - Joseph Boomer
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
| | | | | | | | - Michael L Baum
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
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17
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Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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Morgan's canon is not evidence. Behav Brain Sci 2018; 41:e31. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x17001509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractMahr & Csibra's (M&C's) account of the communicative function of episodic memory relies more heavily on the case against episodic memory in nonhumans than their description suggests. Although the communicative function of episodic memory may be accurate as it pertains to human behaviour, we question whether Morgan's canon is a suitable foundation on which to build theories of supposedly human-specific traits.
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Formal models in animal-metacognition research: the problem of interpreting animals' behavior. Psychon Bull Rev 2017; 23:1341-1353. [PMID: 26669600 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-015-0985-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Ongoing research explores whether animals have precursors to metacognition-that is, the capacity to monitor mental states or cognitive processes. Comparative psychologists have tested apes, monkeys, rats, pigeons, and a dolphin using perceptual, memory, foraging, and information-seeking paradigms. The consensus is that some species have a functional analog to human metacognition. Recently, though, associative modelers have used formal-mathematical models hoping to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in associative-behaviorist ways. We evaluate these attempts to reify formal models as proof of particular explanations of animal cognition. These attempts misunderstand the content and proper application of models. They embody mistakes of scientific reasoning. They blur fundamental distinctions in understanding animal cognition. They impede theoretical development. In contrast, an energetic empirical enterprise is achieving strong success in describing the psychology underlying animals' metacognitive performances. We argue that this careful empirical work is the clear path to useful theoretical development. The issues raised here about formal modeling-in the domain of animal metacognition-potentially extend to biobehavioral research more broadly.
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Templer VL, Lee KA, Preston AJ. Rats know when they remember: transfer of metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests. Anim Cogn 2017; 20:891-906. [PMID: 28669115 PMCID: PMC5709207 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1109-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2016] [Revised: 06/15/2017] [Accepted: 06/23/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Metamemory entails cognitively assessing the strength of one's memories. We tested the ability of nine Long-Evans rats to distinguish between remembering and forgetting by presenting a decline option that allowed a four-choice odor-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) tests to be by-passed. Rats performed significantly better on tests they chose to take than on tests they were forced to take, indicating metacognitive responding. However, rather than control by internal mnemonic cues, one alternative explanation is that decline use is based on external test-specific cues that become associated with increased rewards overtime. To examine this possibility, we tested rats on three generalization tests in which external contingencies were inconsistent and therefore could not serve as discriminative cues. Rats transferred adaptive use of the decline response in tests that eliminated memory by presenting no sample, increased memory by presenting multiple samples, and both weakened and strengthened memory by varying the retention interval. Further, subjects chose to take or decline the test before encountering the memory test, providing evidence that rats based their metacognitive responding on internal cues rather than external ones. To our knowledge, this is the first robust evidence for metamemory in rats using the DMTS decline-test paradigm in which several possible sources of external stimulus control can be ruled out.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA.
| | - Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
| | - Aidan J Preston
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
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Bonzon P. Towards neuro-inspired symbolic models of cognition: linking neural dynamics to behaviors through asynchronous communications. Cogn Neurodyn 2017; 11:327-353. [PMID: 28761554 PMCID: PMC5509613 DOI: 10.1007/s11571-017-9435-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2016] [Revised: 02/19/2017] [Accepted: 03/08/2017] [Indexed: 12/12/2022] Open
Abstract
A computational architecture modeling the relation between perception and action is proposed. Basic brain processes representing synaptic plasticity are first abstracted through asynchronous communication protocols and implemented as virtual microcircuits. These are used in turn to build mesoscale circuits embodying parallel cognitive processes. Encoding these circuits into symbolic expressions gives finally rise to neuro-inspired programs that are compiled into pseudo-code to be interpreted by a virtual machine. Quantitative evaluation measures are given by the modification of synapse weights over time. This approach is illustrated by models of simple forms of behaviors exhibiting cognition up to the third level of animal awareness. As a potential benefit, symbolic models of emergent psychological mechanisms could lead to the discovery of the learning processes involved in the development of cognition. The executable specifications of an experimental platform allowing for the reproduction of simulated experiments are given in “Appendix”.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pierre Bonzon
- Department of Information Systems, Faculty of HEC, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
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Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. An assessment of domain-general metacognitive responding in rhesus monkeys. Behav Processes 2016; 135:132-144. [PMID: 27939856 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2016.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2016] [Revised: 10/25/2016] [Accepted: 12/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control one's cognition. Monitoring may involve either public cues or introspection of private cognitive states. We tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a series of generalization tests to determine which type of cues control metacognition. In Experiment 1, monkeys learned a perceptual discrimination in which a "decline-test" response allowed them to avoid tests and receive a guaranteed small reward. Monkeys declined more difficult than easy tests. In Experiments 2-4, we evaluated whether monkeys generalized this metacognitive responding to new perceptual tests. Monkeys showed a trend toward generalization in Experiments 2 & 3, and reliable generalization in Experiment 4. In Experiments 5 & 6, we presented the decline-test response in a delayed matching-to-sample task. Memory tests differed from perceptual tests in that the appearance of the test display could not control metacognitive responding. In Experiment 6, monkeys made prospective metamemory judgments before seeing the tests. Generalization across perceptual tests with different visual properties and mixed generalization from perceptual to memory tests provide provisional evidence that domain-general, private cues controlled metacognition in some monkeys. We observed individual differences in generalization, suggesting that monkeys differ in use of public and private metacognitive cues.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emily Kathryn Brown
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
| | | | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
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Beran MJ, Menzel CR, Parrish AE, Perdue BM, Sayers K, Smith JD, Washburn DA. Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2016; 7:294-316. [PMID: 27284790 PMCID: PMC5173379 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1397] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2016] [Revised: 04/21/2016] [Accepted: 04/28/2016] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Charles R Menzel
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, GA, USA
| | - Ken Sayers
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - David A Washburn
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Church BA, Smith JD. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2016; 42:32-43. [PMID: 26551351 PMCID: PMC4710549 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.
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25
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Tu HW, Pani AA, Hampton RR. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) adaptively adjust information seeking in response to information accumulated. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2015; 129:347-55. [PMID: 26280597 DOI: 10.1037/a0039595] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition consists of monitoring and control processes. Monitoring has been inferred when nonhumans use a "decline test" response to selectively escape difficult test trials. Cognitive control has been inferred from selective information-seeking behavior by nonhumans ignorant of needed knowledge. Here we describe a computerized paradigm that extends previous work and assesses dynamic interactions between monitoring and control. Monkeys classified images as containing birds, fish, flowers, or people. To-be-classified images were initially masked, and monkeys were trained to gradually reveal the images by touching a "reveal button." Monkeys could choose to classify images at any time or to reveal more of the images. Thus, they had the opportunity to assess when enough of an image had been revealed to support accurate classification. In Experiment 1, monkeys made more reveal responses before classifying when smaller amounts of the image were revealed by each button touch. In Experiment 2, to-be-classified images were shrunk and covered by 1 critical blocker among other blockers that did not provide information when removed. Monkeys made more reveal responses as the critical blocker was removed later in the trial. In Experiment 3, monkeys were presented with previously classified images with either more or fewer blockers obscuring the image than was the case when they chose to classify that image previously. Monkeys made more reveal responses when information was insufficient than when it was excessive. These results indicate that monkeys dynamically monitor evolving decision processes and adaptively collect information as necessary to maintain accuracy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hsiao-Wei Tu
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
| | - Alex A Pani
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
| | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
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26
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Assessment of metacognitive monitoring and control in baboons (Papio papio). Anim Cogn 2015; 18:1347-62. [PMID: 26232908 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-015-0907-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2015] [Revised: 06/02/2015] [Accepted: 07/16/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to the ability of an organism to evaluate its states of knowledge (metacognitive monitoring) and engage in appropriate information-seeking behaviors when a lack of knowledge is detected (metacognitive control). This study assessed metacognitive monitoring and control in three Guinea baboons (Papio papio). Monkeys were required to report on a touchscreen the location of two target stimuli that had previously appeared briefly on a grid. They could either respond directly or use a "Repeat" key providing an opportunity to repeat the target stimuli. In Experiment 1, the baboons used the Repeat key more frequently in difficult trials and transferred this use of the key to novel conditions. Two baboons showed higher accuracy when they declined using the key compared to Baseline trials in which the key was not available, suggesting accurate metacognitive monitoring judgments. The same two baboons were consistently faster at reporting the targets' locations after a repetition of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, the baboons had to choose between two Repeat keys, one for each target. Two baboons showed a preference for repeating the presentation of the less visible target, suggesting that they identified what information they lack. Overall, results support the hypothesis of metacognitive monitoring in baboons, and also provide limited evidence for metacognitive control. We propose that tests requiring subjects to choose between several metacognitive responses in computerized tasks provide a suitable new approach for studying targeted information-seeking behaviors in animals.
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Futch SE, Smith JD, Evans TA, Parrish AE. Go when you know: Chimpanzees' confidence movements reflect their responses in a computerized memory task. Cognition 2015; 142:236-46. [PMID: 26057831 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/23/2014] [Revised: 04/14/2015] [Accepted: 05/26/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States.
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, United States
| | - Sara E Futch
- Department of Psychology, Wofford College, United States
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, United States
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, United States
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States
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28
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Basile BM, Schroeder GR, Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. Evaluation of seven hypotheses for metamemory performance in rhesus monkeys. J Exp Psychol Gen 2015; 144:85-102. [PMID: 25365530 PMCID: PMC4308511 DOI: 10.1037/xge0000031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Knowing the extent to which nonhumans and humans share mechanisms for metacognition will advance our understanding of cognitive evolution and will improve selection of model systems for biomedical research. Some nonhuman species avoid difficult cognitive tests, seek information when ignorant, or otherwise behave in ways consistent with metacognition. There is agreement that some nonhuman animals "succeed" in these metacognitive tasks, but little consensus about the cognitive mechanisms underlying performance. In one paradigm, rhesus monkeys visually searched for hidden food when ignorant of the location of the food, but acted immediately when knowledgeable. This result has been interpreted as evidence that monkeys introspectively monitored their memory to adaptively control information seeking. However, convincing alternative hypotheses have been advanced that might also account for the adaptive pattern of visual searching. We evaluated seven hypotheses using a computerized task in which monkeys chose either to take memory tests immediately or to see the answer again before proceeding to the test. We found no evidence to support the hypotheses of behavioral cue association, rote response learning, expectancy violation, response competition, generalized search strategy, or postural mediation. In contrast, we repeatedly found evidence to support the memory monitoring hypothesis. Monkeys chose to see the answer when memory was poor, either from natural variation or experimental manipulation. We found limited evidence that monkeys also monitored the fluency of memory access. Overall, the evidence indicates that rhesus monkeys can use memory strength as a discriminative cue for information seeking, consistent with introspective monitoring of explicit memory.
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Abstract
A growing literature considers whether animals have capacities that are akin to human metacognition (i.e., humans' capacity to monitor their states of uncertainty and knowing). Comparative psychologists have approached this question by testing a dolphin, pigeons, rats, monkeys, and apes using perception, memory, and food-concealment paradigms. As part of this consideration, some associative modelers have attempted to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in low-level, associative terms-an important goal if achievable. The authors summarize the empirical and theoretical situation regarding these associative descriptions. The associative descriptions in the animal-metacognition literature fail to encompass important phenomena. The sharp focus on abstract, mathematical associative models creates serious interpretative problems. The authors compare these failed associative descriptions with an alternative theoretical approach within contemporary comparative psychology. The alternative approach has the potential to strengthen comparative psychology as an empirical science and integrate it more fully within the mainstream of experimental psychology and cognitive science.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
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30
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Abstract
Literature on the mental capacities and cognitive mechanisms of the great apes has been silent about whether they can act autonomously. This paper provides a philosophical theory of autonomy supported by psychological studies of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie chimpanzee behavior to argue that chimpanzees can act autonomously even though their psychological mechanisms differ from those of humans. Chimpanzees satisfy the two basic conditions of autonomy: (1) liberty (the absence of controlling influences) and (2) agency (self-initiated intentional action), each of which is specified here in terms of conditions of understanding, intention, and self-control. In this account, chimpanzees make knowledge-based choices reflecting a richly information-based and socially sophisticated understanding of the world. Finally, two major theories of autonomy (Kantian theory and two-level theory) are rejected as too narrow to adequately address these issues, necessitating the modifications made in the present approach.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tom L Beauchamp
- Department of Philosophy, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, 425 Healy Bldg, Washington, DC, 20057, USA,
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31
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Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 2014; 18:186-93. [PMID: 24582436 PMCID: PMC3989995 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 135] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2013] [Revised: 01/07/2014] [Accepted: 01/22/2014] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
We propose a ‘dual systems’ framework for thinking about metacognition. System 1 metacognition is for ‘intra-personal’ cognitive control. System 2 metacognition is for ‘supra-personal’ cognitive control. The latter allows agents to share metacognitive representations. This sharing creates benefits for the group and facilitates cumulative culture.
The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This ‘cognitive control’ can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say ‘I’m sure’ or ‘I’m doubtful’? We suggest that ‘system 2 metacognition’ is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.
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Harley HE. Consciousness in dolphins? A review of recent evidence. J Comp Physiol A Neuroethol Sens Neural Behav Physiol 2013; 199:565-82. [DOI: 10.1007/s00359-013-0816-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2012] [Revised: 04/01/2013] [Accepted: 04/02/2013] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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33
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Templer VL, Hampton RR. Cognitive mechanisms of memory for order in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Hippocampus 2013; 23:193-201. [PMID: 23197396 PMCID: PMC3757570 DOI: 10.1002/hipo.22082] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/27/2012] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
One important aspect of episodic memory is the ability to remember the order in which events occurred. Memory for sequences in rats and has been shown to rely on the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (DeVito and Eichenbaum (2011) J Neuro 31:3169-3175; Fortin et al. (2002) Nat Neuro 5:458-462). Rats with hippocampal lesions were impaired in selecting the odor that had appeared earlier in a sequence of five odors but were not impaired in recognition of previously sampled odors (Fortin et al., 2002; Kesner et al. (2002) Behav Neuro 116:286-290). These results suggest that order is not represented by relative familiarity or memory strength. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying memory for order have not been determined. We presented monkeys with lists of five images drawn randomly from a pool of 6,000 images. At test, two images were presented and monkeys were rewarded for selecting the image that had appeared earlier in the studied list. Monkeys learned to discriminate the order of the images, even those that were consecutive in the studied list. In subsequent experiments, we found that discrimination of order was not controlled by list position or relative memory strength. Instead, monkeys used temporal order, a mechanism that appears to encode order of occurrence relative to other events, rather than in absolute time. We found that number of intervening images, rather than passage of time per se, most strongly determined the discriminability of order of occurrence. Better specifying the cognitive mechanisms nonhuman primates use to remember the order of events enhances this animal model of episodic memory, and may further inform our understanding of the functions of the hippocampus.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
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Automated cognitive testing of monkeys in social groups yields results comparable to individual laboratory-based testing. Anim Cogn 2012; 16:445-58. [PMID: 23263675 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-012-0585-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 52] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/08/2012] [Revised: 11/26/2012] [Accepted: 11/30/2012] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive abilities likely evolved in response to specific environmental and social challenges and are therefore expected to be specialized for the life history of each species. Specialized cognitive abilities may be most readily engaged under conditions that approximate the natural environment of the species being studied. While naturalistic environments might therefore have advantages over laboratory settings for cognitive research, it is difficult to conduct certain types of cognitive tests in these settings. We implemented methods for automated cognitive testing of monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in large social groups (Field station) and compared the performance to that of laboratory-housed monkeys (Laboratory). The Field station animals shared access to four touch-screen computers in a large naturalistic social group. Each Field station subject had an RFID chip implanted in each arm for computerized identification and individualized assignment of cognitive tests. The Laboratory group was housed and tested in a typical laboratory setting, with individual access to testing computers in their home cages. Monkeys in both groups voluntarily participated at their own pace for food rewards. We evaluated performance in two visual psychophysics tests, a perceptual classification test, a transitive inference test, and a delayed matching-to-sample memory test. Despite the differences in housing, social environment, age, and sex, monkeys in the two groups performed similarly in all tests. Semi-free ranging monkeys living in complex social environments are therefore viable subjects for cognitive testing designed to take advantage of the unique affordances of naturalistic testing environments.
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35
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Tanaka A, Funahashi S. Macaque monkeys exhibit behavioral signs of metamemory in an oculomotor working memory task. Behav Brain Res 2012; 233:256-70. [DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2012.05.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/23/2012] [Revised: 05/09/2012] [Accepted: 05/10/2012] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
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