Using provider performance incentives to increase HIV testing and counseling services in Rwanda

Investigate Non-EPI Vaccination Recommendation Practice from a Socio-Ecological Perspective: A Mixed-Methods Study in China

The uptake of non-EPI vaccines, such as influenza and pneumonia vaccines, are very low in China compared to other countries. In China, immunization services are provided by dedicated vaccination service providers (VSPs), and their recommendation is the key to improve vaccine uptake. This study explores VSP recommendation practices for non-EPI vaccines from a socio-ecological perspective. A mixed-methods study, combining a questionnaire survey and key informant interviews, was conducted in Anhui, Shaanxi, and Guangdong provinces. 555 VSPs completed the valid questionnaire, and 49 VSPs participated in in-depth interviews. Among the surveyed VSPs, 51.54% stated that they always or often recommended non-EPI vaccines in work, and the remaining half reported that they sometimes or never recommended non-EPI vaccines. Most VSPs interviewed communicated about non-EPI vaccines with the public in an informed style, not a presumptive one, and provided the public with all the decision-making latitude. The infrequent recommendation of non-EPI vaccines was widely prevalent among Chinese VSPs regardless of their individual characteristics, and was mainly driven by the interpersonal relationship, institutional arrangement, and public policy. Firstly, the VSPs were concerned about conflicts arising from the recommendation of self-paid vaccines and the risk of adverse reactions following vaccination. Secondly, high workloads left them insufficient time to communicate about non-EPI vaccines. Thirdly, there was no performance assessment or financial incentive for VSPs to recommend non-EPI vaccination, and their main responsibility was around EPI vaccination. Therefore, multi-level socio-ecological systems around non-EPI vaccination should be improved to optimize the communication between VSPs and the public, which include a better system of legal redress to resolve potential misunderstandings between the VSPs and the public, more effective workload management through whole-process health information system and strengthening public health workforce, and the introduction of performance assessment and appropriate incentives on non-EPI vaccination.

Monetary Incentives and Early Initiation of Antenatal Care: A Matched-Pair, Parallel Cluster-Randomized Trial in Zambia

Monetary incentives are often used to increase the motivation and output of health service providers. However, the focus has generally been on frontline health service providers. Using a cluster randomized trial, we evaluate the effect of monetary incentives provided to community-based volunteers on early initiation of antenatal care (ANC) visits and deliveries in health facilities in communities in Zambia. Monetary incentives were assigned to community-based volunteers in treatment sites, and payments were made for every woman referred or accompanied in the first trimester of pregnancy during January-June 2020. We find a significant increase of about 32 percent in the number of women completing ANC visits in the first trimester but no effect on service coverage rates. The number of women accompanied by community-based volunteers for ANC in the first trimester increased by 33 percent. The number of deliveries in health facilities also increased by 22 percent. These findings suggest that the use of health facilities during the first trimester of pregnancy can be improved by providing community-based volunteers with monetary incentives and that such incentives can also increase deliveries in health facilities, which are key to improving the survival of women and newborns.

Performance bonuses and the quality of primary health care delivered by family health teams in Brazil: A difference-in-differences analysis

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care.

CONCLUSIONS

Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

What Influences Health Professionals' Recommendations for Non-Scheduled Childhood Vaccinations? A Qualitative Study of Health Professionals' Perspectives in Three Provinces of China

Recommendations by health professionals are important for vaccines that are not included in national schedules. This study explored health professionals’ perspectives on recommending non-scheduled (user-fee) childhood vaccinations in China, identifying key influences on professionals’ interactions with caregivers. We conducted individual semi-structured interviews with 20 health professionals from three provinces in China and analyzed data thematically using deductive and inductive coding. Health professionals from all three provinces were uncomfortable about being perceived to encourage parents to accept vaccines that incurred a fee. They provided information about non-scheduled vaccines but emphasized parental autonomy in decision-making. Rural parents were less aware of unscheduled vaccines and health professionals were more likely to encourage parents living in more affluent areas to consider these vaccines; varicella vaccine was preferred by parents as a way of preventing school absence. Economic incentives for unscheduled vaccines were given to staff at most study sites, although the amount given varied widely. These variations meant that staff receiving lower incentives were not motivated to promote non-scheduled vaccines if their workload was high; on the contrary, those receiving higher incentives were more likely to promote these vaccines. Health professionals need more guidance on how to recommend unscheduled vaccines in an informative, positive and appropriate manner. It is evident that parents’ awareness of these vaccines, and their economic circumstances, influence vaccinators recommendation practice. Economic incentives prompted health professionals to recommend non-scheduled vaccines; however, the application of such staff incentives varied widely in China. To adopt appropriate economic incentives, professional organizations should develop protocols for the use of incentives that account for their influence on recommendation practices. Suitable recommendation policy needs to balance basic salaries with performance-based incentives, consider overall workload, and include monitoring and evaluation of economic incentives.

The Utilisation of Payment Models Across the HIV Continuum of Care: Systematic Review of Evidence

The increasing chronicity and multimorbidities associated with people living with HIV have posed important challenges to health systems across the world. In this context, payment models hold the potential to improve care across a spectrum of clinical conditions. This study aims to systematically review the evidence of HIV performance-based payments models. Literature searches were conducted in March 2020 using multiple databases and manual searches of relevant papers. Papers were limited to any study design that considers the real-world utilisation of performance-based payment models applied to the HIV domain. A total of 23 full-text papers were included. Due to the heterogeneity of study designs, the multiple types of interventions and its implementation across distinct areas of HIV care, direct comparisons between studies were deemed unsuitable. Most evidence focused on healthcare users (83%), seeking to directly affect patients' behaviour based on principles of behavioural economics. Despite the variability between interventions, the implementation of performance-based payment models led to either a neutral or positive impact throughout the HIV care continuum. Moreover, this improvement was likely to be cost-effective or, at least, did not compromise the healthcare system's financial sustainability. However, more research is needed to assess the durability of incentives and its appropriate relative magnitude.

The Linkages Between Reimbursement and Prevention: A Mixed-Methods Approach

Background: The benefits of prevention are widely recognized; ranging from avoiding disease onset to substantially reducing disease burden, which is especially relevant considering the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases. However, its delivery has encountered numerous obstacles in healthcare. While healthcare professionals play an important role in stimulating prevention, their behaviors can be influenced by incentives related to reimbursement schemes.

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to obtain a detailed description and explanation of how reimbursement schemes specifically impact primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary prevention.

Methods: Our study takes a mixed-methods approach. Based on a rapid review of the literature, we include and assess 27 studies. Moreover, we conducted semi-structured interviews with eight Dutch healthcare professionals and two representatives of insurance companies, to obtain a deeper understanding of healthcare professionals' behaviors in response to incentives.

Results: Nor fee-for-service (FFS) nor salary can be unambiguously linked to higher or lower provision of preventive services. However, results suggest that FFS's widely reported incentive to increase production might work in favor of preventive services such as immunizations but provide less incentives for chronic disease management. Salary's incentive toward prevention will be (partially) determined by provider-organization's characteristics and reimbursement. Pay-for-performance (P4P) is not always necessarily translated into better health outcomes, effective prevention, or adequate chronic disease management. P4P is considered disruptive by professionals and our results expose how it can lead professionals to resort to (over)medicalization in order to achieve targets. Relatively new forms of reimbursement such as population-based payment may incentivize professionals to adapt the delivery of care to facilitate the delivery of some forms of prevention.

Conclusion: There is not one reimbursement scheme that will stimulate all levels of prevention. Certain types of reimbursement work well for certain types of preventive care services. A volume incentive could be beneficial for prevention activities that are easy to specify. Population-based capitation can help promote preventive activities that require efforts that are not incentivized under other reimbursements, for instance activities that are not easily specified, such as providing education on lifestyle factors related to a patient's (chronic) disease.

Facility standards and the quality of public sector primary care: Evidence from South Africa's "Ideal Clinics" program

Primary healthcare systems are central to achieving universal healthcare coverage. However, in many low- and middle-income country settings, primary care quality is challenged by inadequate facility infrastructure and equipment, limited human resources, and poor provider process. We study the effects of a recent large-scale quality improvement policy in South Africa, the Ideal Clinics Realization and Maintenance Program (ICRMP). The ICRMP introduced a set of standards for facilities and a quality improvement process involving manuals, district-based support, and external assessment. Exploiting differential prioritization of facilities for the ICRMP's quality improvement process, we apply differences-in-differences methods to identify the effects of the program's efforts on standards scores and primary care quality indicators over the first 12 months of implementation. We find large and statistically significant increases in standards scores, but mixed effects on care outcomes-a small magnitude improvement in early antenatal care usage, null effects on childhood immunization and cervical cancer screening, and small negative effect of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) care. While the ICRMP process has led to significant improvements in facilities' satisfaction of the program's standards, we were unable to detect meaningful change in care quality indicators.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).

Is the evidence on the effectiveness of pay for performance schemes in healthcare changing? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis

BACKGROUND

This study investigated if the evidence on the success of the Pay for Performance (P4P) schemes in healthcare is changing as the schemes continue to evolve by updating a previous systematic review.

METHODS

A meta-regression analysis using 116 studies evaluating P4P schemes published between January 2010 to February 2018. The effects of the research design, incentive schemes, use of incentives, and the size of the payment to revenue ratio on the proportion of statically significant effects in each study were examined.

RESULTS

There was evidence of an increase in the range of countries adopting P4P schemes and weak evidence that the proportion of studies with statistically significant effects have increased. Factors hypothesized to influence the success of schemes have not changed. Studies evaluating P4P schemes which made payments for improvement over time, were associated with a lower proportion of statistically significant effects. There was weak evidence of a positive association between the incentives' size and the proportion of statistically significant effects.

CONCLUSION

The evidence on the effectiveness of P4P schemes is evolving slowly, with little evidence that lessons are being learned concerning the design and evaluation of P4P schemes.

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.

Factors That Influence Data Use to Improve Health Service Delivery in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

BACKGROUND

Health service delivery indicators are designed to reveal how well health services meet a community's needs. Effective use of the data can enable targeted improvements in health service delivery. We conducted a systematic review to identify the factors that influence the use of health service delivery indicators to improve delivery of primary health care services in low- and middle-income settings.

METHODS

We reviewed empirical studies published in 2005 or later that provided evidence on the use of health service delivery data at the primary care level in low- and middle-income countries. We searched Scopus, Medline, the Cochrane Library, and citations of included studies. We also searched the gray literature, using a separate strategy. We extracted information on study design, setting, study population, study objective, key findings, and any identified lessons learned.

RESULTS

Twelve studies met the inclusion criteria. This small number of studies suggests there is insufficient evidence to draw reliable conclusions. However, a content analysis identified the following potentially influential factors, which we classified into 3 categories: governance (leadership, participatory monitoring, regular review of data); production of information (presentation of findings, data quality, qualitative data); and health information system resources (electronic health management information systems, organizational structure, training). Contextual factors and performance-based financing were also each found to have a role; however, discussing these as mediating factors may not be practical in terms of promoting data use.

CONCLUSION

Scant evidence exists regarding factors that influence the use of health service delivery indicators to improve delivery of primary health care services in low- and middle-income countries. However, the existing evidence highlights some factors that may have a role in improving data use. Further research may benefit from comparing data use factors across different types of program indicators or using our classification as a framework for field experiments.

Performance bonuses in the public sector: Winner-take-all prizes versus proportional payments to reduce child malnutrition in India

We conduct a randomized trial to compare incentives for improved child outcomes among salaried caregivers in Chandigarh, India. A contest whose prize is divided among workers in proportion to measured gains yielded more improvement than a winner-take-all program. In our population of about 2000 children served by 85 workers, using proportional rewards led to weight-for-age malnutrition rates that were 4.3 percentage points lower at 3 months (when rewards were paid) and 5.9 points lower at 6 months (after the contest had ended), with mean weight-for-age z scores that were 0.071 higher at 3 months, and 0.095 higher at 6 months. Proportional bonuses led to larger and more sustained gains because of better performance by lower-ranked workers, whose efforts were not rewarded by a winner-take-all prize. Results are consistent with previous laboratory trials and athletic events, demonstrating the value of proportional rewards to improve development outcomes.

Does performance-based financing curb stock-outs of essential medicines? Results from a randomised controlled trial in Cameroon

OBJECTIVE

In 2011, the government of Cameroon launched its performance-based financing (PBF) scheme. Our study examined the effects of the PBF intervention on the availability of essential medicines (EM).

METHODS

Randomised control trial whereby PBF and three distinct comparison groups were randomised in a total of 205 health facilities across three regions. Baseline data were collected between March and May 2012 and endline data 36 months later. We defined availability of multiple EM groups by assessing stock-outs for at least one day over the 30 days prior to the survey date and estimated changes attributable to PBF using a series of difference-in-difference regression models, adjusted for relevant facility-level covariates. Data were analysed stratified by region and area to assess effect heterogeneity.

RESULTS

Our estimates suggest that PBF intervention had no effect on the stock-outs of antenatal care drugs (P = 0.160), vaccines (P = 0.396), integrated management of childhood illness drugs (P = 0.681) and labour and delivery drugs (P = 0.589). However, the intervention was associated with a significant reduction of 34% in stock-outs of family planning medicines (P = 0.028). We observed effect heterogeneity across regions and areas, with significant decreases in stock-outs of family planning products in North-West region (P = 0.065) and in rural areas (P = 0.043).

CONCLUSIONS

The PBF intervention in Cameroon had limited effects on the reduction of EMs stock-outs. These poor results were likely the consequence of partial implementation failure, ranging from disruption and discontinuation of services to limited facility autonomy in managing decision-making and considerable delay in performance payment.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs.

METHODS

We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched.

RESULTS

We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features.

CONCLUSIONS

We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

Intended and unintended effects: community perspectives on a performance-based financing programme in Malawi

Background

Several performance-based financing (PBF) evaluations have been undertaken in low-income countries, yet few have examined community perspectives of care amid PBF programme implementation. We assessed community members' perspectives of Support for Service Delivery Integration - Performance-Based Incentives ('SSDI-PBI'), a PBF intervention in Malawi, and explored some of the unintended effects that emerged amid implementation.

Methods

We conducted 30 focus group discussions: 17 with community leaders and 13 with mothers within catchment areas of SSDI-PBI implementing facilities. We analysed data using the framework approach.

Results

Community leaders and women had mixed impressions regarding the effect of SSDI-PBI on service delivery in facilities. They highlighted several improvements (including improved dialogue between staff and community, and cleaner, better-equipped facilities with enhanced privacy), but also persisting challenges (including inadequate and overworked staff, overcrowded facilities and long distances to facilities) related to services in SSDI-PBI-implementing facilities. Further, respondents described how four targeted service indicators related to maternal risk factor management, antenatal care (ANC) in the first trimester, skilled birth attendance and couple's HIV testing sparked unintended negative effects as experienced by women and communities. The unintended effects included women returning home for delivery, women feeling uncertain about their pregnancy status, women feeling betrayed or frustrated by the quality of care provided and partnerless women being denied ANC.

Conclusion

PBF programmes such as SSDI-PBI may improve some aspects of service delivery. However, to achieve system improvement, not only should necessary tools (such as medicines, equipment and human resources) be in place, but also programme priorities must be congruent with cultural expectations. Finally, facilities must be better supported to expect and then address increases in client load and heightened expectations in relation to services.

In-kind incentives and health worker performance: Experimental evidence from El Salvador

We experimentally evaluated the effects of in-kind team incentives on health worker performance in El Salvador, with 38 out of 75 community health teams randomly assigned to performance incentives over a 12-month period. All teams received monitoring, performance feedback and recognition for their achievements allowing us to isolate the effect of the incentive. While both treatment and control groups exhibit improvements in performance measures over time, the in-kind incentives generated significant improvements in community outreach, quality of care, timeliness of care, and utilization of maternal and child health services after 12 months. Gains were largest for teams at the bottom and top of the baseline performance distribution. We find no evidence of results being driven by changes in reporting or by shifting away effort from non-contracted outcomes. These results suggest that in-kind team incentives may be a viable alternative to monetary or individual incentives in certain contexts.

The relationship between management practices and the efficiency and quality of voluntary medical male circumcision services in four African countries

Introduction

Given constrained funding for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) programs across Sub-Saharan Africa, delivering services efficiently is paramount. Voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) is a key intervention that can substantially reduce heterosexual transmission—the primary mode of transmission across the continent. There is limited research, however, on what factors may contribute to the efficient and high-quality execution of such programs.

Methods

We analyzed a multi-country, multi-stage random sample of 108 health facilities providing VMMC services in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 and 2013. The survey collected information on inputs, outputs, process quality and management practices from facilities providing VMMC services. We analyzed the relationship between management practices, quality (measured through provider vignettes) and efficiency (estimated through data envelopment analysis) using Generalized Linear Models and Mixed-effects Models. Applying multivariate regression models, we assessed the relationship between management indices and efficiency and quality of VMMC services.

Results

Across countries, both efficiency and quality varied widely. After adjusting for type of facility, country and scale, performance-base funding was negatively correlated with efficiency -0.156 (p < 0.05). In our analysis, we did not find any significant relationships between quality and management practices.

Conclusions

No significant relationship was found between process quality and management practices across 108 VMMC facilities. This study is the first to analyze the potential relationships between management and service quality and efficiency among a sample of VMMC health facilities in sub-Saharan Africa and can potentially inform policy-relevant hypotheses to later test through prospective experimental studies.

Conditional economic incentives to improve HIV prevention and treatment in low-income and middle-income countries

New and innovative approaches are needed to improve the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV in low-income and middle-income countries. Several trials use conditional economic incentives (CEIs) to improve HIV outcomes. Most CEI interventions use a traditional economic theory approach, although some interventions incorporate behavioural economics, which combines traditional economics with insights from psychology. Incentive interventions that are appropriately implemented can increase HIV testing rates and voluntary male circumcision, and they can improve other HIV prevention and treatment outcomes in certain settings in the short term. More research is needed to uncover theory-based mechanisms that increase the duration of incentive effects and provide strategies for susceptible individuals, which will help to address common constraints and biases that can influence health-related decisions.

Going beyond incentivizing formal health providers: Evidence from the Rwanda Community Performance-Based Financing program

Pay-for-performance programs are introduced in an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries with the goal of reducing maternal and child mortality and morbidity through increased health service utilization and quality. Although most programs incentivize formal health providers, some constraints to utilization might be better alleviated by incentivizing other actors in the health care system. This paper presents results from a randomized controlled trial set to evaluate the effects of two incentive schemes that were introduced on top of Rwanda's national Performance-Based Financing program at the health facility level. One scheme rewarded community health worker cooperatives for the utilization of five services by their communities. The second scheme provided in-kind transfers to users of three services. The analysis finds no impact of the cooperative performance payments on coverage of the targeted services, behaviors of community health workers, or outcomes at the cooperative level. Although health centers experienced frequent stock outs of the gifts, the demand-side intervention significantly increased timely antenatal care by 9.3 percentage points and timely postnatal care by 8.6 percentage points. This study shows that demand-side incentives can increase service utilization also when provided in addition to a supply-side pay-for-performance scheme.

"Money Helps": People who inject drugs and their perceptions of financial compensation and its ethical implications

This study documents how people who inject drugs (PWID) in rural Puerto Rico perceive payments for participating in HIV epidemiological studies. In-depth interviews were conducted among a subset (n = 40) of active PWID older than 18 years of age who had been previously enrolled in a much larger study (N = 360). Findings suggest that financial compensation was the main motivation for initially enrolling in the parent study. Then, as trust in the researchers developed, participants came to perceive compensation as part of a reciprocal exchange in which they assisted researchers by providing a trustful account of their experiences and researchers reciprocated with financial support.

Efficiency of HIV services in Nigeria: Determinants of unit cost variation of HIV counseling and testing and prevention of mother-to-child transmission interventions

Background

Like most countries with a substantial HIV burden, Nigeria continues to face challenges in reaching coverage targets of HIV services. A fundamental problem is stagnated funding in recent years. Improving efficiency is therefore paramount to effectively scale-up HIV services. In this study, we estimated the facility-level average costs (or unit costs) of HIV Counseling and Testing (HCT) and Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) services and characterized determinants of unit cost variation. We investigated the role of service delivery modalities and the link between facility-level management practices and unit cost variability along both services’ cascades.

Methods

We conducted a cross-sectional, observational, micro-costing study in Nigeria between December 2014 and May 2015 in 141 HCT, and 137 PMTCT facilities, respectively. We retrospectively collected relevant input quantities (personnel, supplies, utilities, capital, and training), input prices, and output data for the year 2013. Staff costs were adjusted using time-motion methods. We estimated the facility-level average cost per service along the HCT and PMTCT service cascades and analyzed their composition and variability. Through linear regressions analysis, we identified aspects of service delivery and management practices associated with unit costs variations.

Results

The weighted average cost per HIV-positive client diagnosed through HCT services was US$130. The weighted average cost per HIV-positive woman on prophylaxis in PMTCT services was US$858. These weighted values are estimates of nationally representative unit costs in Nigeria. For HCT, the facility-level unit costs per client tested and per HIV-positive client diagnosed were US$30 and US$1,364, respectively; and the median unit costs were US$17 and US$245 respectively. For PMTCT, the facility-level unit costs per woman tested, per HIV-positive woman diagnosed, and per HIV-positive woman on prophylaxis were US$46, US$2,932, and US$3,647, respectively, and the median unit costs were US$24, US$1,013 and US$1,448, respectively. Variability in costs across facilities was principally explained by the number of patients, integration of HIV services, task shifting, and the level of care.

Discussion

Our findings demonstrate variability in unit costs across facilities. We found evidence consistent with economies of scale and scope, and efficiency gains in facilities implementing task-shifting. Our results could inform program design by suggesting ways to improve resource allocation and efficiently scale-up the HIV response in Nigeria. Some of our findings might also be relevant for other settings.

Performance-Based Financing Empowers Health Workers Delivering Prevention of Vertical Transmission of HIV Services and Decreases Desire to Leave in Mozambique

BACKGROUND

Despite increased access to treatment and reduced incidence, vertical transmission of HIV continues to pose a risk to maternal and child health in sub-Saharan Africa. Performance-based financing (PBF) directed at healthcare providers has shown potential to improve quantity and quality of maternal and child health services. However, the ways in which these PBF initiatives lead to improved service delivery are still under investigation.

METHODS

Therefore, we implemented a longitudinal-controlled proof-of-concept PBF intervention at health facilities and with community-based associations focused on preventing vertical transmission of HIV (PVT) in rural Mozambique. We hypothesized that PBF would increase worker motivation and other aspects of the workplace environment in order to achieve service delivery goals. In this paper, we present two objectives from the PBF intervention with public health facilities (n=6): first, we describe the implementation of the PBF intervention and second, we assess the impact of the PBF on health worker motivation, key factors in the workplace environment, health worker satisfaction, and thoughts of leaving. Implementation (objective 1) was evaluated through quantitative service delivery data and multiple forms of qualitative data (eg, quarterly meetings, participant observation (n=120), exit interviews (n=11)). The impact of PBF on intermediary constructs (objective 2) was evaluated using these qualitative data and quantitative surveys of health workers (n=83) at intervention baseline, midline, and endline.

RESULTS

We found that implementation was challenged by administrative barriers, delayed disbursement of incentives, and poor timing of evaluation relative to incentive disbursement (objective 1). Although we did not find an impact on the motivation constructs measured, PBF increased collegial support and worker empowerment, and, in a time of transitioning implementing partners, decreased against desire to leave (objective 2).

CONCLUSION

Areas for future research include incentivizing meaningful quality- and process-based performance indicators and evaluating how PBF affects the pathway to service delivery, including interactions between motivation and workplace environment factors.

The effect of a performance-based financing program on HIV and maternal/child health services in Mozambique-an impact evaluation

Performance-based financing (PBF) is a mechanism by which health providers are paid on the basis of outputs or results delivered. A PBF program was implemented on the provision of HIV, prevention of mother-to child HIV transmission (PMTCT), and maternal/child health (MCH) services in two provinces of Mozambique. A retrospective case-control study design was used in which PBF provinces were matched with control provinces to evaluate the impact of PBF on 18 indicators. Due to regional heterogeneity, we evaluated the intervention sites (North and South) separately. Beginning January 2011, 11 quarters (33 months or 2.75 years) of data from 134 facilities after matching (84 in the North and 50 in the South) were used. Our econometric framework employed a multi-period, multi-group difference-in-differences model on data that was matched using propensity scoring. The regression design employed a generalized linear mixed model with both fixed and random effects, fitted using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. PBF resulted in positive impacts on MCH, PMTCT and paediatric HIV program outcomes. The majority of the 18 indicators responded to PBF (77% in the North and 66% in the South), with at least half of the indicators demonstrating a statistically significant increase in average output of more than 50% relative to baseline. Excluding pregnant women, the majority of adult HIV treatment indicators did not respond to PBF. On average, it took 18 months (six quarters) of implementation for PBF to take effect, and impact was generally sustained thereafter. Indicators were not sensitive to price, but were inversely correlated to the level of effort associated with marginal output. No negative impacts on incentivized indicators nor spill-over effects on non-incentivized indicators were observed. The PBF program in Mozambique has produced large, sustained increases in the provision of PMTCT, paediatric HIV and MCH services. Our results demonstrate that PBF is an effective strategy for driving down the HIV epidemic and advancing MCH care service delivery as compared with input financing alone.

Punto Seguro: A Randomized Controlled Pilot Using Conditional Economic Incentives to Reduce Sexually Transmitted Infection Risks in Mexico

Randomized controlled pilot evaluated effect of conditional economic incentives (CEIs) on number of sex partners, condom use, and incident sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among male sex workers in Mexico City. Incentives were contingent on testing free of new curable STIs and/or clinic attendance. We assessed outcomes for n = 227 participants at 6 and 12 months (during active phase with incentives), and then at 18 months (with incentives removed). We used intention-to-treat and inverse probability weighting for the analysis. During active phase, CEIs increased clinic visits (10-13 percentage points) and increased condom use (10-15 percentage points) for CEI groups relative to controls. The effect on condom use was not sustained once CEIs were removed. CEIs did not have an effect on number of partners or incident STIs. Conditional incentives for male sex workers can increase linkage to care and retention and reduce some HIV/STI risks such as condomless sex, while incentives are in place.

Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India

This paper tests the effectiveness of performance pay and bonuses among government childcare workers in India. In a controlled study of 160 ICDS centers serving over 4000 children, we randomly assign workers to either fixed bonuses or payments based on the nutritional status of children in their care, and also collect data from a control group receiving only standard salaries. In all three study arms mothers receive nutrition information. We find that performance pay reduces underweight prevalence by about 5 percentage points over 3 months, and height improves by about one centimeter. Impacts on weight continue when incentives are renewed and return to parallel trends thereafter. Fixed bonuses are less expensive but lead to smaller and less precisely estimated effects than performance pay, especially for children near malnutrition thresholds. Both treatments improve worker effort and communication with mothers, who in turn feed a more calorific diet to children at home.

Specification of implementation interventions to address the cascade of HIV care and treatment in resource-limited settings: a systematic review

Background

The global response to HIV has started over 18 million persons on life-saving antiretroviral therapy (ART)—the vast majority in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC)—yet substantial gaps remain: up to 40% of persons living with HIV (PLHIV) know their status, while another 30% of those who enter care are inadequately retained after starting treatment. Identifying strategies to enhance use of treatment is urgently needed, but the conceptualization and specification of implementation interventions is not always complete. We sought to assess the completeness of intervention reporting in research to advance uptake of treatment for HIV globally.

Methods

We carried out a systematic review to identify interventions targeting the adult HIV care cascade in LMIC dating from 1990 to 2017. We identified components of each intervention as “intervention types” to decompose interventions into common components. We grouped “intervention types” into a smaller number of more general “implementation approaches” to aid summarization.

We assessed the reporting of six intervention characteristics adapted from the implementation science literature: the actor, action, action dose, action temporality, action target, and behavioral target in each study.

Findings

In 157 unique studies, we identified 34 intervention “types,” which were empirically grouped into six generally understandable “approaches.” Overall, 42% of interventions defined the actor, 64% reported the action, 41% specified the intervention “dose,” 43% reported action temporality, 61% defined the action target, and 69% reported a target behavior. Average completeness of reporting varied across approaches from a low of 50% to a high of 72%. Dimensions that involved conceptualization of the practices themselves (e.g., actor, dose, temporality) were in general less well specified than consequences (e.g., action target and behavioral target).

Implications

The conceptualization and Reporting of implementation interventions to advance treatment for HIV in LMIC is not always complete. Dissemination of standards for reporting intervention characteristics can potentially promote transparency, reproducibility, and scientific accumulation in the area of implementation science to address HIV in low- and middle-income countries.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s13012-017-0630-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Is it all about the money? A qualitative exploration of the effects of performance-based financial incentives on Zimbabwe's voluntary male medical circumcision program

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Zimbabwe's voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) program adopted performance-based financing (PBF) to speed progress towards ambitious VMMC targets. The $25 USD PBF intended to encourage low-paid healthcare workers to remain in the public sector and to strengthen the public healthcare system. The majority of the incentive supports healthcare workers (HCWs) who perform VMMC alongside other routine services; a small portion supports province, district, and facility levels.

METHODS

This qualitative study assessed the effect of the PBF on HCW motivation, satisfaction, and professional relationships. The study objectives were to: 1) Gain understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of PBF at the HCW level; 2) Gain understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of PBF at the site level; and 3) Inform scale up, modification, or discontinuation of PBF for the national VMMC program. Sixteen focus groups were conducted: eight with HCWs who received PBF for VMMC and eight with HCWs in the same clinics who did not work in VMMC and, therefore, did not receive PBF. Fourteen key informant interviews ascertained administrator opinion.

RESULTS

Findings suggest that PBF appreciably increased motivation among VMMC teams and helped improve facilities where VMMC services are provided. However, PBF appears to contribute to antagonism at the workplace, creating divisiveness that may reach beyond VMMC. PBF may also cause distortion in the healthcare system: HCWs prioritized incentivized VMMC services over other routine duties. To reduce workplace tension and improve the VMMC program, participants suggested increasing HCW training in VMMC to expand PBF beneficiaries and strengthening integration of VMMC services into routine care.

CONCLUSION

In the low-resource, short-staffed context of Zimbabwe, PBF enabled rapid VMMC scale up and achievement of ambitious targets; however, side effects make PBF less advantageous and sustainable than envisioned. Careful consideration is warranted in choosing whether, and how, to implement PBF to prioritize a public health program.

Performance-based financing for improving HIV/AIDS service delivery: a systematic review

Background

Although domestic HIV/AIDS financing is increasing, international HIV/AIDS financing has plateaued. Providing incentives for the health system (i.e. performance-based financing [PBF]) may help countries achieve more with available resources. We systematically reviewed effects of PBF on HIV/AIDS service delivery to inform WHO guidelines.

Methods

PubMed, WHO Index Medicus, conference databases, and clinical trial registries were searched in April 2015 for randomised trials, comparative contemporaneous studies, or time-series studies. Studies evaluating PBF in people with HIV were included when they reported service quality, access, or cost. Meta-analyses were not possible due to limited data. This study is registered with PROSPERO, number CRD42015023207.

Results

Four studies, published from 2009 to 2015 and including 173,262 people, met the eligibility criteria. All studies were from Sub-Saharan Africa. PBF did not improve individual testing coverage (relative risk [RR], 1.00, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.89 to 1.13), improved couples testing coverage (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.20), and improved pregnant women testing coverage (RR 1.29, 95% CI 1.28-1.30). PBF improved coverage of antiretrovirals in pregnant women (RR 1.55, 95% CI 1.50 to 1.59), infants (RR 1.92, 95% CI 1.84 to 2.01), and adults (RR 1.74, 1.64 to 1.85). PBF reduced attrition (RR 0.84, 95% CI 0.74 to 0.96) and treatment failure (odds ratio 0.55, 95% CI 0.32 to 0.97). Potential harms were not reported.

Conclusions

Although the limited data suggests PBF positively affected HIV service access and quality, critical health system and governance knowledge gaps remain. More research is needed to inform national policymaking.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12913-016-1962-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Financial Incentives to Encourage Value-Based Health Care

This article reviews the literature on the use of financial incentives to improve the provision of value-based health care. Eighty studies of 44 schemes from 10 countries were reviewed. The proportion of positive and statistically significant outcomes was close to .5. Stronger study designs were associated with a lower proportion of positive effects. There were no differences between studies conducted in the United States compared with other countries; between schemes that targeted hospitals or primary care; or between schemes combining pay for performance with rewards for reducing costs, relative to pay for performance schemes alone. Paying for performance improvement is less likely to be effective. Allowing payments to be used for specific purposes, such as quality improvement, had a higher likelihood of a positive effect, compared with using funding for physician income. Finally, the size of incentive payments relative to revenue was not associated with the proportion of positive outcomes.

Performance-based incentives may be appropriate to address challenges to delivery of prevention of vertical transmission of HIV services in rural Mozambique: a qualitative investigation

BACKGROUND

Performance-based incentives (PBIs) have garnered global attention as a promising strategy to improve healthcare delivery to vulnerable populations. However, literature gaps in the context in which an intervention is implemented and how the PBIs were developed exist. Therefore, we (1) characterized the barriers and promoters to prevention of vertical transmission of HIV (PVT) service delivery in rural Mozambique, where the vertical transmission rate is 12 %, and (2) assessed the appropriateness for a PBI's intervention and application to PVT.

METHODS

We conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with nurses, volunteers, community health workers, and traditional birth attendants about the barriers and promoters they experienced delivering PVT services. We then explored emergent themes in subsequent focus group discussions (n = 7, total participants N = 92) and elicited participant perspectives on PBIs. The ecological motivation-opportunity-ability framework guided our iterative data collection and thematic analysis processes.

RESULTS

The interviews revealed that while all health worker cadres were motivated intrinsically and by social recognition, they were dissatisfied with low and late remuneration. Facility-based staff were challenged by factors across the rest of the ecological levels, primarily in the opportunity domain, including the following: poor referral and record systems (work mandate), high workload, stock-outs, poor infrastructure (facility environment), and delays in obtaining patient results and donor payment discrepancies (administrative). Community-based cadres' opportunity challenges included lack of supplies, distance (work environment), lack of incorporation into the health system (administration), and ability challenges of incorrect knowledge (health worker). PBIs based on social recognition and that enable action on intrinsic motivation through training, supervision, and collaboration were thought to have the most potential for targeting improvements in record and referral systems and better integrating community-based health workers into the health system. Concerns about the implementation of incentives included neglect of non-incentivized tasks and distorted motivation among colleagues.

CONCLUSIONS

We found that highly motivated health workers encountered severe opportunity challenges in their PVT mandate. PBIs have the potential to address key barriers that facility- and community-based health workers encounter when delivering PVT services, specifically by building upon existing intrinsic motivation and leveraging highly valued social recognition. We recommend a controlled intervention to monitor incentives' effects on worker motivation and non-incentivized tasks to generate insights about the feasibility of PBIs to improve the delivery of PVT services.

Health system changes under pay-for-performance: the effects of Rwanda's national programme on facility inputs

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes have been introduced in numerous developing countries with the goal of increasing the provision and quality of health services through financial incentives. Despite the popularity of P4P, there is limited evidence on how providers achieve performance gains and how P4P affects health system quality by changing structural inputs. We explore these two questions in the context of Rwanda's 2006 national P4P programme by examining the programme's impact on structural quality measures drawn from international and national guidelines. Given the programme's previously documented success at increasing institutional delivery rates, we focus on a set of delivery-specific and more general structural inputs. Using the programme's quasi-randomized roll-out, we apply multivariate regression analysis to short-run facility data from the 2007 Service Provision Assessment. We find positive programme effects on the presence of maternity-related staff, the presence of covered waiting areas and a management indicator and a negative programme effect on delivery statistics monitoring. We find no effects on a set of other delivery-specific physical resources, delivery-specific human resources, delivery-specific operations, general physical resources and general human resources. Using mediation analysis, we find that the positive input differences explain a small and insignificant fraction of P4P's impact on institutional delivery rates. The results suggest that P4P increases provider availability and facility operations but is only weakly linked with short-run structural health system improvements overall.

Targeting elimination of mother-to-child HIV transmission efforts using geospatial analysis of mother-to-child HIV transmission in Zimbabwe

BACKGROUND

We assessed Zimbabwe's progress toward elimination of mother-to-child HIV transmission (MTCT) under Option A.

METHODS

We analyzed 2012 and 2014 cross-sectional serosurvey data from mother-infant pairs residing in the same 157 health facility catchment areas randomly sampled from five provinces. Eligible women were at least 16 years and mothers/caregivers of infants born 9-18 months prior. We aggregated individual-level questionnaire and HIV serostatus within catchment areas or district to estimate MTCT and the number of HIV-infected infants; these data were mapped using facility global positioning system coordinates.

RESULTS

A weighted population of 8800 and 10 404 mother-infant pairs was included from 2012 and 2014, respectively. In 2014, MTCT among HIV-exposed infants was 6.7% (95% confidence interval: 5.2, 8.6), not significantly different from 2012 (8.8%, 95% confidence interval: 6.9, 11.1, P = 0.13). From 2012 to 2014, self-reported antiretroviral therapy or prophylaxis among HIV-infected women increased from 59 to 65% (P = 0.05), as did self-reported infant antiretroviral prophylaxis (63 vs. 67%, P = 0.08). In 2014, 65 (41%), 55 (35%), and 37 (24%) catchment areas had the same, lower, and higher MTCT rate as in 2012, respectively. MTCT in 2014 varied by catchment areas (median = 0%, mean = 4.9%, interquartile range = 0-10%) as did the estimated number of HIV-infected infants (median = 0, mean = 1.1, interquartile range = 0-1.0). Also in 2014, 106 (68%) catchment areas had MTCT = 0%. Geovisualization revealed clustering of catchment areas where both MTCT and the estimated number of HIV-infected infants were relatively high.

CONCLUSION

Although MTCT is declining in Zimbabwe, geospatial analysis indicates facility-level variability. Catchment areas with high MTCT rates and a high burden of HIV-infected infants should be the highest priority for service intensification.

The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Scheme on Prescription Quality in Rural China

In this prospective study, conducted in China where providers have traditionally been paid fee-for-service, and where drug spending is high and irrational drug prescribing common, township health centers in two counties were assigned to two groups: in one fee-for-service was replaced by a capitated global budget (CGB); in the other by a mix of CGB and pay-for-performance. In the latter, 20% of the CGB was withheld each quarter, with the amount returned depending on points deducted for failure to meet performance targets. Outcomes studied included indicators of rational drug prescribing and prescription cost. Impacts were assessed using differences-in-differences, because political interference led to non-random assignment across the two groups. The combination of capitated global budget and pay-for-performance reduced irrational prescribing substantially relative to capitated global budget but only in the county that started above the penalty targets. Endline rates were still appreciable, however, and no effects were found in either county on out-of-pocket spending. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Fear of an HIV positive test result: an exploration of the low uptake of couples HIV counselling and testing (CHCT) in a rural setting in Mukono district, Uganda

BACKGROUND

Couples HIV counselling and testing (CHCT) is a key preventive strategy used to reduce the spread of HIV. In Uganda, HIV prevalence among married or cohabiting couples is 5.6%, compared to 2.2% among those never married. CHCT can help ease disclosure of HIV positive status, which in turn may help increase opportunities to obtain social supports and reduce new infections. The purpose of this study was aimed at exploring the possible reasons for the low uptake of CHCT in Mukono district, a rural in setting in Uganda.

METHODS

The study was conducted in two sub-counties in a rural district (Mukono district) using a descriptive qualitative research design. Specifically, we conducted four focus group discussions and 10 key informant interviews. We also interviewed 53 individuals in couple relationships. Data were collected mainly in the local language Luganda and English, all data were transcribed into English and coded for emergent themes. Ethical clearance for this study was obtained from the Mengo Hospital Research Review Board and from the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology.

RESULTS

Fear of a positive HIV test result emerged strongly as the most significant barrier to CHCT. To a lesser extent, perceptions and knowledge of CHCT, mistrust in marriages and culture were also noted by participants as important barriers to the uptake of CHCT among couples. Participants offered suggestions on ways to overcome these barriers, including peer couple counselling, offering incentives to couples that test together and door-to-door CHCT testing.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to improve the uptake of CHCT, it is crucial to involve both females and males in the planning and implementation of CHCT, as well as to address the misconceptions about CHCT and to prioritise CHCT within health care systems management.

Quasi-experiments to establish causal effects of HIV care and treatment and to improve the cascade of care

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Randomized, population-representative trials of clinical interventions are rare. Quasi-experiments have been used successfully to generate causal evidence on the cascade of HIV care in a broad range of real-world settings.

RECENT FINDINGS

Quasi-experiments exploit exogenous, or quasi-random, variation occurring naturally in the world or because of an administrative rule or policy change to estimate causal effects. Well designed quasi-experiments have greater internal validity than typical observational research designs. At the same time, quasi-experiments may also have potential for greater external validity than experiments and can be implemented when randomized clinical trials are infeasible or unethical. Quasi-experimental studies have established the causal effects of HIV testing and initiation of antiretroviral therapy on health, economic outcomes and sexual behaviors, as well as indirect effects on other community members. Recent quasi-experiments have evaluated specific interventions to improve patient performance in the cascade of care, providing causal evidence to optimize clinical management of HIV.

SUMMARY

Quasi-experiments have generated important data on the real-world impacts of HIV testing and treatment and on interventions to improve the cascade of care. With the growth in large-scale clinical and administrative data, quasi-experiments enable rigorous evaluation of policies implemented in real-world settings.

When incentives work too well: locally implemented pay for performance (P4P) and adverse sanctions towards home birth in Tanzania - a qualitative study

BACKGROUND

Despite limited evidence of its effectiveness, performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress in reaching Millennium Development Goal 5: improved maternal health. This paper offers insights into two of the aspects that are lacking in the current literature on P4P, namely what strategies health workers employ to reach set targets, and how the intervention plays out when implemented by local government as part of a national programme that does not receive donor funding.

METHODS

A total of 28 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 25 individuals were conducted in Mvomero district over a period of 15 months in 2010 and 2011, both before and after P4P payments. Seven facilities, including six dispensaries and one health centre, were covered. Informants included 17 nurses, three clinical officers, two medical attendants, one lab technician and two district health administrators.

RESULTS

Health workers reported a number of strategies to increase the number of deliveries at their facility, including health education and cooperation with traditional health providers. The staff at all facilities also reported that they had told the women that they would be sanctioned if they gave birth at home, such as being fined or denied clinical cards and/or vaccinations for their babies. There is a great uncertainty in relation to the potential health impacts of the behavioural changes that have come with P4P, as the reported strategies may increase the numbers, but not necessarily the quality. Contrary to the design of the P4P programme, payments were not based on performance. We argue that this was due in part to a lack of resources within the District Administration, and in part as a result of egalitarian fairness principles.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggest that particular attention should be paid to adverse effects when using external rewards for improved health outcomes, and secondly, that P4P may take on a different form when implemented by local implementers without the assistance of professional P4P specialists.