Neural signs and mechanisms of consciousness: Is there a potential convergence of theories of consciousness in sight?

The functional role of conscious sensation of movement

This paper proposes a new framework for investigating neural signals sufficient for a conscious sensation of movement and their role in motor control. We focus on signals sufficient for proprioceptive awareness, particularly from muscle spindle activation and from primary motor cortex (M1). Our review of muscle vibration studies reveals that afferent signals alone can induce conscious sensations of movement. Similarly, studies employing peripheral nerve blocks suggest that efferent signals from M1 are sufficient for sensations of movement. On this basis, we show that competing theories of motor control assign different roles to sensation of movement. According to motor command theories, sensation of movement corresponds to an estimation of the current state based on afferent signals, efferent signals, and predictions. In contrast, within active inference architectures, sensations correspond to proprioceptive predictions driven by efferent signals from M1. The focus on sensation of movement provides a way to critically compare and evaluate the two theories. Our analysis offers new insights into the functional roles of movement sensations in motor control and consciousness.

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

Permutation conditional mutual information to quantify TMS-evoked cortical connectivity in disorders of consciousness

Objective.To improve the understanding and diagnostic accuracy of disorders of consciousness (DOC) by quantifying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) evoked electroencephalography connectivity using permutation conditional mutual information (PCMI).Approach.PCMI can characterize the functional connectivity between different brain regions. This study employed PCMI to analyze TMS-evoked cortical connectivity (TEC) in 154 DOC patients and 16 normal controls, focusing on optimizing parameter selection for PCMI (Data length, Order length, Time delay). We compared short-range and long-range PCMI values across different consciousness states-unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and normal (NOR)-and assessed various feature selection and classification techniques to distinguish these states.Main results.(1) PCMI can quantify TEC. We found optimal parameters to be Data length: 500 ms; Order: 3; Time delay: 6 ms. (2) TMS evoked potentials (TEPs) for NOR showed a rich response, while MCS patients showed only a few components, and UWS patients had almost no significant components. The values of PCMI connectivity metrics demonstrated its usefulness for measuring cortical connectivity evoked by TMS. From NOR to MCS to UWS, the number and strength of TEC decreased. Quantitative analysis revealed significant differences in the strength and number of TEC in the entire brain, local regions and inter-regions among different consciousness states. (3) A decision tree with feature selection by mutual information performed the best (balanced accuracy: 87.0% and accuracy: 83.5%). This model could accurately identify NOR (100.0%), but had lower identification accuracy for UWS (86.5%) and MCS (74.1%).Significance.The application of PCMI in measuring TMS-evoked connectivity provides a robust metric that enhances our ability to differentiate between various states of consciousness in DOC patients. This approach not only aids in clinical diagnosis but also contributes to the broader understanding of cortical connectivity and consciousness.

Unconscious and Conscious Gaze-Triggered Attentional Orienting: Distinguishing Innate and Acquired Components of Social Attention in Children and Adults with Autistic Traits and Autism Spectrum Disorders

Typically developing (TD) individuals can readily orient attention according to others' eye-gaze direction, an ability known as social attention, which involves both innate and acquired components. To distinguish between these two components, we used a critical flicker fusion technique to render gaze cues invisible to participants, thereby largely reducing influences from consciously acquired strategies. Results revealed that both visible and invisible gaze cues could trigger attentional orienting in TD adults (aged 20 to 30 years) and children (aged 6 to 12 years). Intriguingly, only the ability to involuntarily respond to invisible gaze cues was negatively correlated with autistic traits among all TD participants. This ability was substantially impaired in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and in children with high autistic traits. No such association or reduction was observed with visible gaze cues. These findings provide compelling evidence for the functional demarcation of conscious and unconscious gaze-triggered attentional orienting that emerges early in life and develops into adulthood, shedding new light on the differentiation of the innate and acquired aspects of social attention. Moreover, they contribute to a comprehensive understanding of social endophenotypes of ASD.

Exploring complex and integrated information during sleep

The Integrated Information Theory is a theoretical framework that aims to elucidate the nature of consciousness by postulating that it emerges from the integration of information within a system, and that the degree of consciousness depends on the extent of information integration within the system. When consciousness is lost, the core complex of consciousness proposed by the Integrated Information Theory disintegrates, and Φ measures, which reflect the level of integrated information, are expected to diminish. This study examined the predictions of the Integrated Information Theory using the global brain network acquired via functional magnetic resonance imaging during various tasks and sleep. We discovered that the complex located within the frontoparietal network remained constant regardless of task content, while the regional distribution of the complex collapsed in the initial stages of sleep. Furthermore, Φ measures decreased as sleep progressed under limited analysis conditions. These findings align with predictions made by the Integrated Information Theory and support its postulates.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Cognitive flexibility moderates the relationship between openness-to-experience and perceptual reversals of Necker cube

It is not clear whether personality is related to basic perceptual processes at the level of automatic bottom-up processes or controlled top-down processes. Two experiments examined how personality influences perceptual dynamics, focusing on how cognitive flexibility moderates the relationship between personality and perceptual reversals of the Necker cube. The participants viewed stimuli either passively or with the intent to either hold or switch the orientation of the Necker cube. The influence of openness was predominantly evident in conditions necessitating intentional control over perceptual reversals. The link between openness and intentional perceptual reversals was always moderated by cognitive flexibility, which was measured in three different ways. No relationship was detected between personality traits and reversals in the passive viewing condition, suggesting that relatively spontaneous adaptation-inhibition processes may not be personality-dependent. Overall, our research sheds light on the nuanced influence of personality traits on perceptual experiences, mediated by cognitive flexibility.

What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review

A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Assessment of impaired consciousness using EEG-based connectivity features and convolutional neural networks

Growing electroencephalogram (EEG) studies have linked the abnormities of functional brain networks with disorders of consciousness (DOC). However, due to network data's high-dimensional and non-Euclidean properties, it is difficult to exploit the brain connectivity information that can effectively detect the consciousness levels of DOC patients via deep learning. To take maximum advantage of network information in assessing impaired consciousness, we utilized the functional connectivity with convolutional neural network (CNN) and employed three rearrangement schemes to improve the evaluation performance of brain networks. In addition, the gradient-weighted class activation mapping (Grad-CAM) was adopted to visualize the classification contributions of connections among different areas. We demonstrated that the classification performance was significantly enhanced by applying network rearrangement techniques compared to those obtained by the original connectivity matrix (with an accuracy of 75.0%). The highest classification accuracy (87.2%) was achieved by rearranging the alpha network based on the anatomical regions. The inter-region connections (i.e., frontal-parietal and frontal-occipital connectivity) played dominant roles in the classification of patients with different consciousness states. The effectiveness of functional connectivity in revealing individual differences in brain activity was further validated by the correlation between behavioral performance and connections among specific regions. These findings suggest that our proposed assessment model could detect the residual consciousness of patients.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework

Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.

Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

The involvement of the human prefrontal cortex in the emergence of visual awareness

Exploring the neural mechanisms of awareness is a fundamental task of cognitive neuroscience. There is an ongoing dispute regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the emergence of awareness, which is partially raised by the confound between report- and awareness-related activity. To address this problem, we designed a visual awareness task that can minimize report-related motor confounding. Our results show that saccadic latency is significantly shorter in the aware trials than in the unaware trials. Local field potential (LFP) data from six patients consistently show early (200-300ms) awareness-related activity in the PFC, including event-related potential and high-gamma activity. Moreover, the awareness state can be reliably decoded by the neural activity in the PFC since the early stage, and the neural pattern is dynamically changed rather than being stable during the representation of awareness. Furthermore, the enhancement of dynamic functional connectivity, through the phase modulation at low frequency, between the PFC and other brain regions in the early stage of the awareness trials may explain the mechanism of conscious access. These results indicate that the PFC is critically involved in the emergence of awareness.

High-Density Exploration of Activity States in a Multi-Area Brain Model

To simulate whole brain dynamics with only a few equations, biophysical, mesoscopic models of local neuron populations can be connected using empirical tractography data. The development of mesoscopic mean-field models of neural populations, in particular, the Adaptive Exponential (AdEx mean-field model), has successfully summarized neuron-scale phenomena leading to the emergence of global brain dynamics associated with conscious (asynchronous and rapid dynamics) and unconscious (synchronized slow-waves, with Up-and-Down state dynamics) brain states, based on biophysical mechanisms operating at cellular scales (e.g. neuromodulatory regulation of spike-frequency adaptation during sleep-wake cycles or anesthetics). Using the Virtual Brain (TVB) environment to connect mean-field AdEx models, we have previously simulated the general properties of brain states, playing on spike-frequency adaptation, but have not yet performed detailed analyses of other parameters possibly also regulating transitions in brain-scale dynamics between different brain states. We performed a dense grid parameter exploration of the TVB-AdEx model, making use of High Performance Computing. We report a remarkable robustness of the effect of adaptation to induce synchronized slow-wave activity. Moreover, the occurrence of slow waves is often paralleled with a closer relation between functional and structural connectivity. We find that hyperpolarization can also generate unconscious-like synchronized Up and Down states, which may be a mechanism underlying the action of anesthetics. We conclude that the TVB-AdEx model reveals large-scale properties identified experimentally in sleep and anesthesia.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia

Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.

Auditory inputs modulate intrinsic neuronal timescales during sleep

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated that intrinsic neuronal timescales (INT) undergo modulation by external stimulation during consciousness. It remains unclear if INT keep the ability for significant stimulus-induced modulation during primary unconscious states, such as sleep. This fMRI analysis addresses this question via a dataset that comprises an awake resting-state plus rest and stimulus states during sleep. We analyzed INT measured via temporal autocorrelation supported by median frequency (MF) in the frequency-domain. Our results were replicated using a biophysical model. There were two main findings: (1) INT prolonged while MF decreased from the awake resting-state to the N2 resting-state, and (2) INT shortened while MF increased during the auditory stimulus in sleep. The biophysical model supported these results by demonstrating prolonged INT in slowed neuronal populations that simulate the sleep resting-state compared to an awake state. Conversely, under sine wave input simulating the stimulus state during sleep, the model's regions yielded shortened INT that returned to the awake resting-state level. Our results highlight that INT preserve reactivity to stimuli in states of unconsciousness like sleep, enhancing our understanding of unconscious brain dynamics and their reactivity to stimuli.

Accelerating scientific progress through Bayesian adversarial collaboration

Adversarial collaboration has been championed as the gold standard for resolving scientific disputes but has gained relatively limited traction in neuroscience and allied fields. In this perspective, we argue that adversarial collaborative research has been stymied by an overly restrictive concern with the falsification of scientific theories. We advocate instead for a more expansive view that frames adversarial collaboration in terms of Bayesian belief updating, model comparison, and evidence accumulation. This framework broadens the scope of adversarial collaboration to accommodate a wide range of informative (but not necessarily definitive) studies while affording the requisite formal tools to guide experimental design and data analysis in the adversarial setting. We provide worked examples that demonstrate how these tools can be deployed to score theoretical models in terms of a common metric of evidence, thereby furnishing a means of tracking the amount of empirical support garnered by competing theories over time.

Differential cortical network engagement during states of un/consciousness in humans

What happens in the human brain when we are unconscious? Despite substantial work, we are still unsure which brain regions are involved and how they are impacted when consciousness is disrupted. Using intracranial recordings and direct electrical stimulation, we mapped global, network, and regional involvement during wake vs. arousable unconsciousness (sleep) vs. non-arousable unconsciousness (propofol-induced general anesthesia). Information integration and complex processing we`re reduced, while variability increased in any type of unconscious state. These changes were more pronounced during anesthesia than sleep and involved different cortical engagement. During sleep, changes were mostly uniformly distributed across the brain, whereas during anesthesia, the prefrontal cortex was the most disrupted, suggesting that the lack of arousability during anesthesia results not from just altered overall physiology but from a disconnection between the prefrontal and other brain areas. These findings provide direct evidence for different neural dynamics during loss of consciousness compared with loss of arousability.

The Projective Consciousness Model: Projective Geometry at the Core of Consciousness and the Integration of Perception, Imagination, Motivation, Emotion, Social Cognition and Action

Consciousness has been described as acting as a global workspace that integrates perception, imagination, emotion and action programming for adaptive decision making. The mechanisms of this workspace and their relationships to the phenomenology of consciousness need to be further specified. Much research in this area has focused on the neural correlates of consciousness, but, arguably, computational modeling can better be used toward this aim. According to the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), consciousness is structured as a viewpoint-organized, internal space, relying on 3D projective geometry and governed by the action of the Projective Group as part of a process of active inference. The geometry induces a group-structured subjective perspective on an encoded world model, enabling adaptive perspective taking in agents. Here, we review and discuss the PCM. We emphasize the role of projective mechanisms in perception and the appraisal of affective and epistemic values as tied to the motivation of action, under an optimization process of Free Energy minimization, or more generally stochastic optimal control. We discuss how these mechanisms enable us to model and simulate group-structured drives in the context of social cognition and to understand the mechanisms underpinning empathy, emotion expression and regulation, and approach-avoidance behaviors. We review previous results, drawing on applications in robotics and virtual humans. We briefly discuss future axes of research relating to applications of the model to simulation- and model-based behavioral science, geometrically structured artificial neural networks, the relevance of the approach for explainable AI and human-machine interactions, and the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

Theories of consciousness and psychiatric disorders - A comparative analysis

Disorders of consciousness represent an efficient way to test theories of consciousness' (ToCs) predictions. So far, ToCs have mostly focused on disorders of quantitative awareness such as coma, vegetative state, spatial neglect and hemianopia. Psychiatric disorders, by contrast, have received little attention, leaving their contribution to consciousness research almost unexplored. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the relation between ToCs and psychiatric disorders - that is, the extent to which current ToCs can account for psychiatric symptomatology. First, I review direct and indirect evidence linking each ToC to psychiatry disorders. Next, I differentiate ToCs based on their theoretical and methodological ground, highlighting how they distinctively address neural, cognitive, and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience and, in turn, psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I refer to one specific symptom to directly compare ToCs' explanatory power. Overall, Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) appears to provide a more comprehensive account of psychiatric disorders, suggesting that a novel dimension of consciousness (i.e., form of consciousness) may be needed to address more qualitative alterations in conscious experience.

Primary states of consciousness: A review of historical and contemporary developments

Primary states of consciousness are conceived as phylogenetically older states of consciousness as compared to secondary states governed by sociocultural inhibition. The historical development of the concept in psychiatry and neurobiology is reviewed, along with its relationship to theories of consciousness. We suggest that primary states of consciousness are characterized by a temporary breakdown of self-control accompanied by a merging of action, communication, and emotion (ACE fusion), ordinarily segregated in human adults. We examine the neurobiologic basis of this model, including its relation to the phenomenon of neural dedifferentiation, the loss of modularity during altered states of consciousness, and increased corticostriatal connectivity. By shedding light on the importance of primary states of consciousness, this article provides a novel perspective on the role of consciousness as a mechanism of differentiation and control. We discuss potential differentiators underlying a gradient from primary to secondary state of consciousness, suggesting changes in thalamocortical interactions and arousal function. We also propose a set of testable, neurobiologically plausible working hypotheses to account for their distinct phenomenological and neural signatures.

Fixation-related electrical potentials during a free visual search task reveal the timing of visual awareness

It has been repeatedly claimed that emotional faces readily capture attention, and that they may be processed without awareness. Yet some observations cast doubt on these assertions. Part of the problem may lie in the experimental paradigms employed. Here, we used a free viewing visual search task during electroencephalographic recordings, where participants searched for either fearful or neutral facial expressions among distractor expressions. Fixation-related potentials were computed for fearful and neutral targets and the response compared for stimuli consciously reported or not. We showed that awareness was associated with an electrophysiological negativity starting at around 110 ms, while emotional expressions were distinguished on the N170 and early posterior negativity only when stimuli were consciously reported. These results suggest that during unconstrained visual search, the earliest electrical correlate of awareness may emerge as early as 110 ms, and fixating at an emotional face without reporting it may not produce any unconscious processing.

Probing Intrinsic Neural Timescales in EEG with an Information-Theory Inspired Approach: Permutation Entropy Time Delay Estimation (PE-TD)

Time delays are a signature of many physical systems, including the brain, and considerably shape their dynamics; moreover, they play a key role in consciousness, as postulated by the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). However, they are often not known a priori and need to be estimated from time series. In this study, we propose the use of permutation entropy (PE) to estimate time delays from neural time series as a more robust alternative to the widely used autocorrelation window (ACW). In the first part, we demonstrate the validity of this approach on synthetic neural data, and we show its resistance to regimes of nonstationarity in time series. Mirroring yet another example of comparable behavior between different nonlinear systems, permutation entropy-time delay estimation (PE-TD) is also able to measure intrinsic neural timescales (INTs) (temporal windows of neural activity at rest) from hd-EEG human data; additionally, this replication extends to the abnormal prolongation of INT values in disorders of consciousness (DoCs). Surprisingly, the correlation between ACW-0 and PE-TD decreases in a state-dependent manner when consciousness is lost, hinting at potential different regimes of nonstationarity and nonlinearity in conscious/unconscious states, consistent with many current theoretical frameworks on consciousness. In summary, we demonstrate the validity of PE-TD as a tool to extract relevant time scales from neural data; furthermore, given the divergence between ACW and PE-TD specific to DoC subjects, we hint at its potential use for the characterization of conscious states.

Towards modern post-coma care based on neuroscientific evidence

Background

Understanding the mechanisms underlying human consciousness is pivotal to improve the prognostication and treatment of severely brain-injured patients. Consciousness remains an elusive concept and the identification of its neural correlates is an active subject of research, however recent neuroscientific advances have allowed scientists to better characterize disorders of consciousness. These breakthroughs question the historical nomenclature and our current management of post-comatose patients.

Method

This review examines the contribution of consciousness neurosciences to the current clinical management of severe brain injury. It investigates the major impact of consciousness disorders on healthcare systems, the scientific frameworks employed to identify their neural correlates and how evidence-based data from neuroimaging research have reshaped the landscape of post-coma care in recent years.

Results

Our increased ability to detect behavioral and neurophysiological signatures of consciousness has led to significant changes in taxonomy and clinical practice. We advocate for a multimodal framework for the management of severely brain-injured patients based on precision medicine and evidence-based decisions, integrating epidemiology, health economics and neuroethics.

Conclusions

Major progress in brain imaging and clinical assessment have opened the door to a new era of post-coma care based on standardized neuroscientific evidence. We highlight its implications in clinical applications and call for improved collaborations between researchers and clinicians to better translate findings to the bedside.

As without, so within: how the brain's temporo-spatial alignment to the environment shapes consciousness

Consciousness is constituted by a structure that includes contents as foreground and the environment as background. This structural relation between the experiential foreground and background presupposes a relationship between the brain and the environment, often neglected in theories of consciousness. The temporo-spatial theory of consciousness addresses the brain-environment relation by a concept labelled 'temporo-spatial alignment'. Briefly, temporo-spatial alignment refers to the brain's neuronal activity's interaction with and adaption to interoceptive bodily and exteroceptive environmental stimuli, including their symmetry as key for consciousness. Combining theory and empirical data, this article attempts to demonstrate the yet unclear neuro-phenomenal mechanisms of temporo-spatial alignment. First, we suggest three neuronal layers of the brain's temporo-spatial alignment to the environment. These neuronal layers span across a continuum from longer to shorter timescales. (i) The background layer comprises longer and more powerful timescales mediating topographic-dynamic similarities between different subjects' brains. (ii) The intermediate layer includes a mixture of medium-scaled timescales allowing for stochastic matching between environmental inputs and neuronal activity through the brain's intrinsic neuronal timescales and temporal receptive windows. (iii) The foreground layer comprises shorter and less powerful timescales for neuronal entrainment of stimuli temporal onset through neuronal phase shifting and resetting. Second, we elaborate on how the three neuronal layers of temporo-spatial alignment correspond to their respective phenomenal layers of consciousness. (i) The inter-subjectively shared contextual background of consciousness. (ii) An intermediate layer that mediates the relationship between different contents of consciousness. (iii) A foreground layer that includes specific fast-changing contents of consciousness. Overall, temporo-spatial alignment may provide a mechanism whose different neuronal layers modulate corresponding phenomenal layers of consciousness. Temporo-spatial alignment can provide a bridging principle for linking physical-energetic (free energy), dynamic (symmetry), neuronal (three layers of distinct time-space scales) and phenomenal (form featured by background-intermediate-foreground) mechanisms of consciousness.

A systematic approach to brain dynamics: cognitive evolution theory of consciousness

The brain integrates volition, cognition, and consciousness seamlessly over three hierarchical (scale-dependent) levels of neural activity for their emergence: a causal or 'hard' level, a computational (unconscious) or 'soft' level, and a phenomenal (conscious) or 'psyche' level respectively. The cognitive evolution theory (CET) is based on three general prerequisites: physicalism, dynamism, and emergentism, which entail five consequences about the nature of consciousness: discreteness, passivity, uniqueness, integrity, and graduation. CET starts from the assumption that brains should have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, not as prediction machines. This emphasizes the dynamical nature of consciousness in terms of critical dynamics to account for metastability, avalanches, and self-organized criticality of brain processes, then coupling it with volition and cognition in a framework unified over the levels. Consciousness emerges near critical points, and unfolds as a discrete stream of momentary states, each volitionally driven from oldest subcortical arousal systems. The stream is the brain's way of making a difference via predictive (Bayesian) processing. Its objective observables could be complexity measures reflecting levels of consciousness and its dynamical coherency to reveal how much knowledge (information gain) the brain acquires over the stream. CET also proposes a quantitative classification of both disorders of consciousness and mental disorders within that unified framework.

Scale-free dynamics in the core-periphery topography and task alignment decline from conscious to unconscious states

Scale-free physiological processes are ubiquitous in the human organism. Resting-state functional MRI studies observed the loss of scale-free dynamics under anesthesia. In contrast, the modulation of scale-free dynamics during task-related activity remains an open question. We investigate scale-free dynamics in the cerebral cortex's unimodal periphery and transmodal core topography in rest and task states during three conscious levels (awake, sedation, and anesthesia) complemented by computational modelling (Stuart-Landau model). The empirical findings demonstrate that the loss of the brain's intrinsic scale-free dynamics in the core-periphery topography during anesthesia, where pink noise transforms into white noise, disrupts the brain's neuronal alignment with the task's temporal structure. The computational model shows that the stimuli's scale-free dynamics, namely pink noise distinguishes from brown and white noise, also modulate task-related activity. Together, we provide evidence for two mechanisms of consciousness, temporo-spatial nestedness and alignment, suggested by the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC).

Complex of global functional network as the core of consciousness

Finding the neural basis of consciousness is challenging, and the distribution location of the core of consciousness remains inconclusive. Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the posterior part of the brain is the hot zone of consciousness, especially phenological consciousness. The IIT has proposed a "main complex", a set of elements determined such that the information loss in a hierarchical partition approach is the largest among those of any other supersets and subsets, as the core of consciousness in a dynamic system. This approach may be applicable not only to phenomenal but also to access-consciousness. This study estimated the main complex of brain dynamics using functional magnetic resonance imaging in Human Connectome Project (HCP) and sleep datasets. The complex analyses revealed the common networks across various tasks and rest-state in HCP, composed of executive control, salience, and dorsal/ventral attention networks. The set of networks of the main complex was maintained during sleep. However, compared with the wakefulness stage, the amount of information of these networks and the default mode network, was reduced for the hypnagogic stage. The global interconnected structure composed of major functional networks can comprise the core of consciousness.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

Consciousness in a Rotor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.

Effects of 10 Hz individualized repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation on patients with disorders of consciousness: a study protocol for an exploratory double-blind crossover randomized sham-controlled trial

BACKGROUND

Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), as a non-invasive brain stimulation technique, has shown potentials for consciousness recovery of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC), as, to a certain extent, it is effective in regulating the excitability of central nervous system. However, it is difficult to achieve satisfactory effect with "one size fits all" rTMS treatment due to different clinical conditions of patients. There is an urgent need to develop individualized strategy to improve the effectiveness of rTMS on patients with DoC.

METHODS

Our protocol is a randomized double-blind sham-controlled crossover trial that includes 30 DoC patients. Each patient will received 20 sessions, in which 10 sessions will be rTMS-active stimulus, and the other 10 sessions will be sham stimulus, separated by no less than 10 days' washout period. The rTMS-active will include 10 Hz rTMS over the individualized-targeted selection area for each patient according to the different insult regions of the brain. Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) will be used as primary outcome at baseline, after the first stage of stimulation, at the end of the washout period, and after the second stage of stimulation. Secondary outcomes will be measured at the same time, including efficiency, relative spectral power, and functional connectivity of high-density electroencephalograph (EEG). Adverse events will be recorded during the study.

DISCUSSION

rTMS has obtained grade A evidence in treating patients with several central nervous system diseases, and there has been some evidence showing partial improvement on level of consciousness in DoC patients. However, the effectiveness of rTMS in DoC is only 30~36%, mostly due to the non-specific target selection. In this protocol, we present a double-blind crossover randomized sham-controlled trial based on the individualized-targeted selection strategy that aims to study the effectiveness of rTMS therapy for DoC, and the result may provide new insights to non-invasive brain stimulation.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

ClinicalTrials.gov : NCT05187000. Registered on January 10, 2022.

Feature-based interaction between masks and target in continuous flash suppression

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has become one of the most popular tools in the study of visual processing in the absence of conscious awareness. Studies use different kinds of masks, like colorful Mondrians or random noise. Even though the use of CFS is widespread, little is known about some of the underlying neuronal mechanisms, such as the interactions between masks and stimuli. We designed a b-CFS experiment with feature-reduced targets and masks in order to investigate possible effects of feature-similarity or -orthogonality between masks and targets. Masks were pink noise patterns filtered with an orientation band pass to generate a strong directionality. Target stimuli were Gabors varying systematically in their orientational alignment with the masks. We found that stimuli whose orientational alignment was more similar to that of the masks are suppressed significantly longer. This feature-similarity (here: orientation) based enhancement of suppression duration can be overcome by feature orthogonality in another feature dimension (here: color). We conclude that mask-target interactions exist in continuous flash suppression, and the human visual system can use orthogonality within a feature dimension or across feature dimensions to facilitate the breaking of the CFS.

Identifying Patients with Cognitive Motor Dissociation Using Resting-state Temporal Stability

Using task-dependent neuroimaging techniques, recent studies discovered a fraction of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) who had no command-following behaviors but showed a clear sign of awareness as healthy controls, which was defined as cognitive motor dissociation (CMD). However, existing task-dependent approaches might fail when CMD patients have cognitive function (e.g., attention, memory) impairments, in which patients with covert awareness cannot perform a specific task accurately and are thus wrongly considered unconscious, which leads to false-negative findings. Recent studies have suggested that sustaining a stable functional organization over time, i.e., high temporal stability, is crucial for supporting consciousness. Thus, temporal stability could be a powerful tool to detect the patient's cognitive functions (e.g., consciousness), while its alteration in the DOC and its capacity for identifying CMD were unclear. The resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) study included 119 participants from three independent research sites. A sliding-window approach was used to investigate global and regional temporal stability, which measured how stable the brain's functional architecture was across time. The temporal stability was compared in the first dataset (36/16 DOC/controls), and then a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier was built to discriminate DOC from controls. Furthermore, the generalizability of the SVM classifier was tested in the second independent dataset (35/21 DOC/controls). Finally, the SVM classifier was applied to the third independent dataset, where patients underwent rs-fMRI and brain-computer interface assessment (4/7 CMD/potential non-CMD), to test its performance in identifying CMD. Our results showed that global and regional temporal stability was impaired in DOC patients, especially in regions of the cingulo-opercular task control network, default-mode network, fronto-parietal task control network, and salience network. Using temporal stability as the feature, the SVM model not only showed good performance in the first dataset (accuracy = 90%), but also good generalizability in the second dataset (accuracy = 84%). Most importantly, the SVM model generalized well in identifying CMD in the third dataset (accuracy = 91%). Our preliminary findings suggested that temporal stability could be a potential tool to assist in diagnosing CMD. Furthermore, the temporal stability investigated in this study also contributed to a deeper understanding of the neural mechanism of consciousness.

Disrupted relationship between intrinsic neural timescales and alpha peak frequency during unconscious states - A high-density EEG study

Our brain processes the different timescales of our environment's temporal input stochastics. Is such a temporal input processing mechanism key for consciousness? To address this research question, we calculated measures of input processing on shorter (alpha peak frequency, APF) and longer (autocorrelation window, ACW) timescales on resting-state high-density EEG (256 channels) recordings and compared them across different consciousness levels (awake/conscious, ketamine and sevoflurane anaesthesia, unresponsive wakefulness, minimally conscious state). We replicate and extend previous findings of: (i) significantly longer ACW values, consistently over all states of unconsciousness, as measured with ACW-0 (an unprecedented longer version of the well-know ACW-50); (ii) significantly slower APF values, as measured with frequency sliding, in all four unconscious states. Most importantly, we report a highly significant correlation of ACW-0 and APF in the conscious state, while their relationship is disrupted in the unconscious states. In sum, we demonstrate the relevance of the brain's capacity for input processing on shorter (APF) and longer (ACW) timescales - including their relationship - for consciousness. Albeit indirectly, e.g., through the analysis of electrophysiological activity at rest, this supports the mechanism of temporo-spatial alignment to the environment's temporal input stochastics, through relating different neural timescales, as one key predisposing factor of consciousness.

Beyond noise to function: reframing the global brain activity and its dynamic topography

How global and local activity interact with each other is a common question in complex systems like climate and economy. Analogously, the brain too displays 'global' activity that interacts with local-regional activity and modulates behavior. The brain's global activity, investigated as global signal in fMRI, so far, has mainly been conceived as non-neuronal noise. We here review the findings from healthy and clinical populations to demonstrate the neural basis and functions of global signal to brain and behavior. We show that global signal (i) is closely coupled with physiological signals and modulates the arousal level; and (ii) organizes an elaborated dynamic topography and coordinates the different forms of cognition. We also postulate a Dual-Layer Model including both background and surface layers. Together, the latest evidence strongly suggests the need to go beyond the view of global signal as noise by embracing a dual-layer model with background and surface layer.

Breathing is coupled with voluntary initiation of mental imagery

Previous research has suggested that bodily signals from internal organs are associated with diverse cortical and subcortical processes involved in sensory-motor functions, beyond homeostatic reflexes. For instance, a recent study demonstrated that the preparation and execution of voluntary actions, as well as its underlying neural activity, are coupled with the breathing cycle. In the current study, we investigated whether such breathing-action coupling is limited to voluntary motor action or whether it is also present for mental actions not involving any overt bodily movement. To answer this question, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and respiratory signals while participants were conducting a voluntary action paradigm including self-initiated motor execution (ME), motor imagery (MI), and visual imagery (VI) tasks. We observed that the voluntary initiation of ME, MI, and VI are similarly coupled with the respiration phase. In addition, EEG analysis revealed the existence of readiness potential (RP) waveforms in all three tasks (i.e., ME, MI, VI), as well as a coupling between the RP amplitude and the respiratory phase. Our findings show that the voluntary initiation of both imagined and overt action is coupled with respiration, and further suggest that the breathing system is involved in preparatory processes of voluntary action by contributing to the temporal decision of when to initiate the action plan, regardless of whether this culminates in overt movements.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

The complexity of the stream of consciousness

Typical consciousness can be defined as an individual-specific stream of experiences. Modern consciousness research on dynamic functional connectivity uses clustering techniques to create common bases on which to compare different individuals. We propose an alternative approach by combining modern theories of consciousness and insights arising from phenomenology and dynamical systems theory. This approach enables a representation of an individual's connectivity dynamics in an intrinsically-defined, individual-specific landscape. Given the wealth of evidence relating functional connectivity to experiential states, we assume this landscape is a proxy measure of an individual's stream of consciousness. By investigating the properties of this landscape in individuals in different states of consciousness, we show that consciousness is associated with short term transitions that are less predictable, quicker, but, on average, more constant. We also show that temporally-specific connectivity states are less easily describable by network patterns that are distant in time, suggesting a richer space of possible states. We show that the cortex, cerebellum and subcortex all display consciousness-relevant dynamics and discuss the implication of our results in forming a point of contact between dynamical systems interpretations and phenomenology.

Non-Separability of Physical Systems as a Foundation of Consciousness

A hypothesis is presented that non-separability of degrees of freedom is the fundamental property underlying consciousness in physical systems. The amount of consciousness in a system is determined by the extent of non-separability and the number of degrees of freedom involved. Non-interacting and feedforward systems have zero consciousness, whereas most systems of interacting particles appear to have low non-separability and consciousness. By contrast, brain circuits exhibit high complexity and weak but tightly coordinated interactions, which appear to support high non-separability and therefore high amount of consciousness. The hypothesis applies to both classical and quantum cases, and we highlight the formalism employing the Wigner function (which in the classical limit becomes the Liouville density function) as a potentially fruitful framework for characterizing non-separability and, thus, the amount of consciousness in a system. The hypothesis appears to be consistent with both the Integrated Information Theory and the Orchestrated Objective Reduction Theory and may help reconcile the two. It offers a natural explanation for the physical properties underlying the amount of consciousness and points to methods of estimating the amount of non-separability as promising ways of characterizing the amount of consciousness.

Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability

Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the “local” states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.

Beyond the veil of duality-topographic reorganization model of meditation

Meditation can exert a profound impact on our mental life, with proficient practitioners often reporting an experience free of boundaries between a separate self and the environment, suggesting an explicit experience of "nondual awareness." What are the neural correlates of such experiences and how do they relate to the idea of nondual awareness itself? In order to unravel the effects that meditation has on the brain's spatial topography, we review functional magnetic resonance imaging brain findings from studies specific to an array of meditation types and meditator experience levels. We also review findings from studies that directly probe the interaction between meditation and the experience of the self. The main results are (i) decreased posterior default mode network (DMN) activity, (ii) increased central executive network (CEN) activity, (iii) decreased connectivity within posterior DMN as well as between posterior and anterior DMN, (iv) increased connectivity within the anterior DMN and CEN, and (v) significantly impacted connectivity between the DMN and CEN (likely a nonlinear phenomenon). Together, these suggest a profound organizational shift of the brain's spatial topography in advanced meditators-we therefore propose a topographic reorganization model of meditation (TRoM). One core component of the TRoM is that the topographic reorganization of DMN and CEN is related to a decrease in the mental-self-processing along with a synchronization with the more nondual layers of self-processing, notably interoceptive and exteroceptive-self-processing. This reorganization of the functionality of both brain and self-processing can result in the explicit experience of nondual awareness. In conclusion, this review provides insight into the profound neural effects of advanced meditation and proposes a result-driven unifying model (TRoM) aimed at identifying the inextricably tied objective (neural) and subjective (experiential) effects of meditation.

Highly connected and highly variable: A Core brain network during resting state supports Propofol-induced unconsciousness

Despite that leading theories of consciousness make diverging predictions for where and how neural activity gives rise to subjective experience, they all seem to partially agree that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) require globally integrated brain activity across a network of functionally specialized modules. However, it is not clear yet whether such functional configurations would be able to identify the NCC. We scanned resting-state fMRI data from 21 subjects during wakefulness, propofol-induced sedation, and anesthesia. Graph-theoretical analyses were conducted on awake fMRI data to search for the NCC candidates as brain regions that exhibit both high rich-clubness and high modular variability, which were found to locate in prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices. Another independent data set of 10 highly-sampled subjects was used to validate the NCC distribution at the individual level. Brain module-based dynamic analysis revealed two discrete reoccurring brain states, one of which was dominated by the NCC candidates (state 1), while the other state was predominately composed of primary sensory/motor regions (state 2). Moreover, state 1 appeared to be temporally more stable than state 2, suggesting that the identified NCC members could sustain conscious content as metastable network representations. Finally, we showed that the identified NCC was modulated in terms of functional connectedness and modular variability in response to the loss of consciousness induced by propofol anesthesia. This work offers a framework to search for neural correlates of consciousness by charting the brain network topology and provides new insights into understanding the roles of different regions in underpinning human consciousness.

Are we really unconscious in “unconscious” states? Common assumptions revisited

In the field of consciousness science, there is a tradition to categorize certain states such as slow-wave non-REM sleep and deep general anesthesia as “unconscious”. While this categorization seems reasonable at first glance, careful investigations have revealed that it is not so simple. Given that (1) behavioral signs of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, (2) subjective reports of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, and, (3) states presumed to be unconscious are not always devoid of reported experience, there are reasons to reexamine our traditional assumptions about “states of unconsciousness”. While these issues are not novel, and may be partly semantic, they have implications both for scientific progress and clinical practice. We suggest that focusing on approaches that provide a more pragmatic and nuanced characterization of different experimental conditions may promote clarity in the field going forward, and help us build stronger foundations for future studies.

From Brain-Body Function to Conscious Interactions

In this review, we discuss empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience. First, we motivate the discussion through evidence regarding the dynamic brain. Second, we review different brain-body couplings associated with conscious experience and its potential role in driving brain dynamics. Third, we introduce the machinery of multilayer networks to account for several types of interactions in brain-body systems. Then, a multilayer structure consists of two main generalizations: a formal semantic to study biological systems, and an integrative account for several signatures and models of consciousness. Finally, under this framework, we define composition of layers to account for entangled features of brain-body systems related to conscious experience. As such, a multilayer mathematical framework is highly integrative and thus may be more complete than other models. In this short review, we discuss a variety of empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.