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Kim C, Chong SC. Metacognition of perceptual resolution across and around the visual field. Cognition 2024; 253:105938. [PMID: 39232476 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/11/2023] [Revised: 06/21/2024] [Accepted: 08/27/2024] [Indexed: 09/06/2024]
Abstract
Do people have accurate metacognition of non-uniformities in perceptual resolution across (i.e., eccentricity) and around (i.e., polar angle) the visual field? Despite its theoretical and practical importance, this question has not yet been empirically tested. This study investigated metacognition of perceptual resolution by guessing patterns during a degradation (i.e., loss of high spatial frequencies) localization task. Participants localized the degraded face among the nine faces that simultaneously appeared throughout the visual field: fovea (fixation at the center of the screen), parafovea (left, right, above, and below fixation at 4° eccentricity), and periphery (left, right, above, and below fixation at 10° eccentricity). We presumed that if participants had accurate metacognition, in the absence of a degraded face, they would exhibit compensatory guessing patterns based on counterfactual reasoning ("The degraded face must have been presented at locations with lower perceptual resolution, because if it were presented at locations with higher perceptual resolution, I would have easily detected it."), meaning that we would expect more guess responses for locations with lower perceptual resolution. In two experiments, we observed guessing patterns that suggest that people can monitor non-uniformities in perceptual resolution across, but not around, the visual field during tasks, indicating partial in-the-moment metacognition. Additionally, we found that global explicit knowledge of perceptual resolution is not sufficient to guide in-the-moment metacognition during tasks, which suggests a dissociation between local and global metacognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cheongil Kim
- Graduate Program in Cognitive Science, Yonsei University, South Korea
| | - Sang Chul Chong
- Graduate Program in Cognitive Science, Yonsei University, South Korea; Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, South Korea.
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2
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Kirkeby-Hinrup A, Stenseke J, Overgaard MS. Evaluating the explanatory power of the Conscious Turing Machine. Conscious Cogn 2024; 124:103736. [PMID: 39163807 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103736] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2024] [Revised: 08/06/2024] [Accepted: 08/07/2024] [Indexed: 08/22/2024]
Abstract
The recent "Conscious Turing Machine" (CTM) proposal offered by Manuel and Lenore Blum aims to define and explore consciousness, contribute to the solution of the hard problem, and demonstrate the value of theoretical computer science with respect to the study of consciousness. Surprisingly, given the ambitiousness and novelty of the proposal (and the prominence of its creators), CTM has received relatively little attention. We here seek to remedy this by offering an exhaustive evaluation of CTM. Our evaluation considers the explanatory power of CTM in three different domains of interdisciplinary consciousness studies: the philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and computation. Based on our evaluation in each of the target domains, at present, any claim that CTM constitutes progress is premature. Nevertheless, the model has potential, and we highlight several possible avenues of future research which proponents of the model may pursue in its development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
- Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden; Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark.
| | | | - Morten S Overgaard
- Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark
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3
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Filimonov D, Tanskanen S, Revonsuo A, Koivisto M. Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing. Conscious Cogn 2024; 123:103720. [PMID: 38901129 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103720] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2023] [Revised: 06/12/2024] [Accepted: 06/12/2024] [Indexed: 06/22/2024]
Abstract
The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dmitri Filimonov
- Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland; Turku Brain and Mind Centre, University of Turku, Finland.
| | - Sampo Tanskanen
- Faculty of Medicine, University of Turku, Finland; Turku Brain and Mind Centre, University of Turku, Finland
| | - Antti Revonsuo
- Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland; Turku Brain and Mind Centre, University of Turku, Finland; Division of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, Sweden
| | - Mika Koivisto
- Department of Psychology, University of Turku, Finland; Turku Brain and Mind Centre, University of Turku, Finland
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4
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Pruitt J, Knotts JD, Odegaard B. Consistent metacognitive efficiency and variable response biases in peripheral vision. J Vis 2024; 24:4. [PMID: 39110584 PMCID: PMC11314628 DOI: 10.1167/jov.24.8.4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2023] [Accepted: 06/17/2024] [Indexed: 08/11/2024] Open
Abstract
Across the visual periphery, perceptual and metacognitive abilities differ depending on the locus of visual attention, the location of peripheral stimulus presentation, the task design, and many other factors. In this investigation, we aimed to illuminate the relationship between attention and eccentricity in the visual periphery by estimating perceptual sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, and response biases across the visual field. In a 2AFC detection task, participants were asked to determine whether a signal was present or absent at one of eight peripheral locations (±10°, 20°, 30°, and 40°), using either a valid or invalid attentional cue. As expected, results revealed that perceptual sensitivity declined with eccentricity and was modulated by attention, with higher sensitivity on validly cued trials. Furthermore, a significant main effect of eccentricity on response bias emerged, with variable (but relatively unbiased) c'a values from 10° to 30°, and conservative c'a values at 40°. Regarding metacognitive sensitivity, significant main effects of attention and eccentricity were found, with metacognitive sensitivity decreasing with eccentricity, and decreasing in the invalid cue condition. Interestingly, metacognitive efficiency, as measured by the ratio of meta-d'a/d'a, was not modulated by attention or eccentricity. Overall, these findings demonstrate (1) that in some circumstances, observers have surprisingly robust metacognitive insights into how performance changes across the visual field and (2) that the periphery may be subject to variable detection biases that are contingent on the exact location in peripheral space.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joseph Pruitt
- University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
- https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4887-6090
| | | | - Brian Odegaard
- University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
- https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5459-1884
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5
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Kim C, Chong SC. Partial blindness: Visual experience is not rich, but not sparse. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:1558-1569. [PMID: 38151692 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02432-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/29/2023]
Abstract
Is our perceptual experience constrained by an information bottleneck (i.e., the limited capacity for cognitive access), and if so, how? To answer these questions, we investigated observers' perceptual resolution for an individual face when they saw either a single face or multiple faces simultaneously. We characterized perceptual resolution by measuring how accurately observers detected the degradation of a face. In two experiments, we found that the resolution of perception decreased when seeing multiple faces compared to when seeing a single face, which mainly resulted from the neglect of degradation. Importantly, this degradation neglect was based on partial blindness rather than complete blindness to a face, indicating that perceptual experience is limited by an information bottleneck as a form of partial blindness to an individual item. Together, our findings suggest that perceptual experience at a glance might be sparser than retinal resolution or perceptual resolution measured under conditions where the target stimulus is the sole focus of attention; however, it might be richer than a small handful of items.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cheongil Kim
- Graduate Program in Cognitive Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
| | - Sang Chul Chong
- Graduate Program in Cognitive Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea.
- Department of Psychology, Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, 03722, Korea.
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6
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Kiefer M, Kammer T. The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions. J Cogn 2024; 7:59. [PMID: 39035071 PMCID: PMC11259121 DOI: 10.5334/joc.381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2024] [Accepted: 06/23/2024] [Indexed: 07/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.
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7
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Cohen MA, Sung S, Alaoui Z. Familiarity Alters the Bandwidth of Perceptual Awareness. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:1546-1556. [PMID: 38527082 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02140] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/27/2024]
Abstract
Results from paradigms like change blindness and inattentional blindness indicate that observers are unaware of numerous aspects of the visual world. However, intuition suggests that perceptual experience is richer than these results indicate. Why does it feel like we see so much when the data suggests we see so little? One possibility stems from the fact that experimental studies always present observers with stimuli that they have never seen before. Meanwhile, when forming intuitions about perceptual experience, observers reflect on their experiences with scenes with which they are highly familiar (e.g., their office). Does prior experience with a scene change the bandwidth of perceptual awareness? Here, we asked if observers were better at noticing alterations to the periphery in familiar scenes compared with unfamiliar scenes. We found that observers noticed changes to the periphery more frequently with familiar stimuli. Signal detection theoretic analyses revealed that when observers are unfamiliar with a stimulus, they are less sensitive at noticing (d') and are more conservative in their response criterion (c). Taken together, these results suggest that prior knowledge expands the bandwidth of perceptual awareness. It should be stressed that these results challenge the widely held idea that prior knowledge fills in perception. Overall, these findings highlight how prior knowledge plays an important role in determining the limits of perceptual experience and is an important factor to consider when attempting to reconcile the tension between empirical observation and personal introspection.
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8
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Ludwig D, Khalidi MA. Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) and the Functions of Consciousness. Cogn Sci 2024; 48:e13453. [PMID: 38742274 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13453] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2023] [Revised: 03/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/29/2024] [Indexed: 05/16/2024]
Abstract
"Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response" (ASMR) refers to a sensory-emotional experience that was first explicitly identified and named within the past two decades in online discussion boards. Since then, there has been mounting psychological and neural evidence of a clustering of properties common to the phenomenon of ASMR, including convergence on the set of stimuli that trigger the experience, the properties of the experience itself, and its downstream effects. Moreover, psychological instruments have begun to be developed and employed in an attempt to measure it. Based on this empirical work, we make the case that despite its nonscientific origins, ASMR is a good candidate for being a real kind in the cognitive sciences. The phenomenon appears to have a robust causal profile and may also have an adaptive evolutionary history. We also argue that a more thorough understanding of the distinctive type of phenomenal experience involved in an ASMR episode can shed light on the functions of consciousness, and ultimately undermine certain "cognitive" theories of consciousness. We conclude that ASMR should be the subject of more extensive scientific investigation, particularly since it may also have the potential for therapeutic applications.
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9
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Negro N. (Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae012. [PMID: 38495333 PMCID: PMC10944285 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Revised: 02/02/2024] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/19/2024] Open
Abstract
The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos' philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the 'distinction between prediction and accommodation'; (ii) the model should represent the 'structural relevance' of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the 'boldness' of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Niccolò Negro
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo 69978, Israel
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10
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Kirkeby-Hinrup A. Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1341430. [PMID: 38558781 PMCID: PMC10979646 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1341430] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.
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11
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Cobos MI, Melcón M, Rodríguez-San Esteban P, Capilla A, Chica AB. The role of brain oscillations in feature integration. Psychophysiology 2024; 61:e14467. [PMID: 37990794 DOI: 10.1111/psyp.14467] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2023] [Revised: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 10/05/2023] [Indexed: 11/23/2023]
Abstract
Our sensory system is able to build a unified perception of the world, which although rich, is limited and inaccurate. Sometimes, features from different objects are erroneously combined. At the neural level, the role of the parietal cortex in feature integration is well-known. However, the brain dynamics underlying correct and incorrect feature integration are less clear. To explore the temporal dynamics of feature integration, we studied the modulation of different frequency bands in trials in which feature integration was correct or incorrect. Participants responded to the color of a shape target, surrounded by distractors. A calibration procedure ensured that accuracy was around 70% in each participant. To explore the role of expectancy in feature integration, we introduced an unexpected feature to the target in the last blocks of trials. Results demonstrated the contribution of several frequency bands to feature integration. Alpha and beta power was reduced for hits compared to illusions. Moreover, gamma power was overall larger during the experiment for participants who were aware of the unexpected target presented during the last blocks of trials (as compared to unaware participants). These results demonstrate that feature integration is a complex process that can go wrong at different stages of information processing and is influenced by top-down expectancies.
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Affiliation(s)
- M I Cobos
- Brain, Mind, and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
| | - M Melcón
- Department of Biological and Health Psychology, Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM), Madrid, Spain
| | - P Rodríguez-San Esteban
- Brain, Mind, and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
| | - A Capilla
- Department of Biological and Health Psychology, Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM), Madrid, Spain
| | - A B Chica
- Brain, Mind, and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada (UGR), Granada, Spain
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12
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Brown SAB. How to get rich from inflation. Conscious Cogn 2024; 117:103624. [PMID: 38150781 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103624] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2023] [Revised: 12/05/2023] [Accepted: 12/08/2023] [Indexed: 12/29/2023]
Abstract
We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as "subjective inflation" allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What's more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally argue for an interpretation on which subjective experience is genuinely rich, but (in peripheral/unattended areas) unreliable as a guide to the external world. The main challenge for this view is that it appears to imply that experience in the periphery is not just unreliable but unstable. However, I argue that this consequence, while initially appearing unintuitive, is in fact plausible.
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13
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Fazekas P, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M. A construct-first approach to consciousness science. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105480. [PMID: 38008237 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2023] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/28/2023]
Abstract
We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Fazekas
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Høegh-Guldbergs Gade 6B, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, Université Libre De Bruxelles, 50 avenue F.D. Roosevelt CP191, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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14
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Fu Y, Guan C, Tam J, O'Donnell RE, Shen M, Wyble B, Chen H. Attention with or without working memory: mnemonic reselection of attended information. Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:1111-1122. [PMID: 37689583 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2023] [Revised: 08/10/2023] [Accepted: 08/14/2023] [Indexed: 09/11/2023]
Abstract
Attention has been regarded as the 'gatekeeper' controlling what information gets selected into working memory. However, a new perspective has emerged with the discovery of attribute amnesia, a phenomenon revealing that people are frequently unable to report information they have just attended to moments ago. This report failure is thought to stem from a lack of consolidating the attended information into working memory, indicating a dissociation between attention and working memory. Building on these findings, a new concept called memory reselection is proposed to describe a secondary round of selection among the attended information. These discoveries challenge the conventional view of how attention and working memory are related and shed new light onto modeling attention and memory as dissociable processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yingtao Fu
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, China
| | - Chenxiao Guan
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, China
| | - Joyce Tam
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
| | - Ryan E O'Donnell
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
| | - Mowei Shen
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, China.
| | - Brad Wyble
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA.
| | - Hui Chen
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, China.
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15
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Nakamura T, Murakami I. The moment of awareness influences the content of awareness in orientation repulsion. Conscious Cogn 2023; 116:103604. [PMID: 37976782 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103604] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2023] [Revised: 10/02/2023] [Accepted: 11/07/2023] [Indexed: 11/19/2023]
Abstract
Through the neurally evolving process of dynamic contextual modulation of perceptual contents, it remains unclear how the content of awareness is determined. Here we quantified the visual illusion of orientation repulsion, wherein the target appears tilted against the surrounding's orientation, and examined whether its extent changed when the target awareness was quickened by a preceding flanker. Independently of spatial cueing, repulsion was reduced when the flanker preceded the target by 100 ms compared with when they appeared simultaneously. We confirmed that the preceding flanker quickened the awareness of a nearby target relative to distant ones by 40 ms. Furthermore, the preceding flanker that was greater than 7 degrees away from the target still evoked such reduction of repulsion. These findings imply that the content of awareness is determined by the temporal interaction of two distinct processes: one controls the moment of awareness, and the other represents the perceptual content.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tomoya Nakamura
- Department of Psychology, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan; Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 5-3-1 Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0083, Japan.
| | - Ikuya Murakami
- Department of Psychology, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
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16
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Paßler M. The exclusionary approach to consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad022. [PMID: 37810758 PMCID: PMC10553408 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2023] [Revised: 08/25/2023] [Accepted: 09/13/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023] Open
Abstract
The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marlo Paßler
- Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Luisenstraße 56, Berlin 10117, Germany
- RTG 2386 “Extrospection”, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Luisenstraße 56, Berlin 10117, Germany
- Institute of Philosophy, Otto-von-Guericke University, Zschokkestr. 32, Magdeburg, Sachsen-Anhalt 39104, Germany
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17
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Robinson MM, Brady TF. A quantitative model of ensemble perception as summed activation in feature space. Nat Hum Behav 2023; 7:1638-1651. [PMID: 37402880 PMCID: PMC10810262 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-023-01602-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2022] [Accepted: 04/14/2023] [Indexed: 07/06/2023]
Abstract
Ensemble perception is a process by which we summarize complex scenes. Despite the importance of ensemble perception to everyday cognition, there are few computational models that provide a formal account of this process. Here we develop and test a model in which ensemble representations reflect the global sum of activation signals across all individual items. We leverage this set of minimal assumptions to formally connect a model of memory for individual items to ensembles. We compare our ensemble model against a set of alternative models in five experiments. Our approach uses performance on a visual memory task for individual items to generate zero-free-parameter predictions of interindividual and intraindividual differences in performance on an ensemble continuous-report task. Our top-down modelling approach formally unifies models of memory for individual items and ensembles and opens a venue for building and comparing models of distinct memory processes and representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maria M Robinson
- Psychology Department, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA.
| | - Timothy F Brady
- Psychology Department, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA.
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18
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Amir YZ, Assaf Y, Yovel Y, Mudrik L. Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access. Cognition 2023; 238:105529. [PMID: 37393795 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105529] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2023] [Accepted: 06/16/2023] [Indexed: 07/04/2023]
Abstract
Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential - yet controversial - dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult - if not impossible - to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yoni Zion Amir
- Sagol School for Neuroscience, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
| | - Yaniv Assaf
- Sagol School for Neuroscience, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; School of neurobiology, biochemistry and biophysics, Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
| | - Yossi Yovel
- Sagol School for Neuroscience, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; School of Zoology, Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel
| | - Liad Mudrik
- Sagol School for Neuroscience, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
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19
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Cohen MA, Keefe J, Brady TF. Perceptual Awareness Occurs Along a Graded Continuum: No Evidence of All-or-None Failures in Continuous Reproduction Tasks. Psychol Sci 2023; 34:1033-1047. [PMID: 37650455 DOI: 10.1177/09567976231186798] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Does sensory information reach conscious awareness in a discrete, all-or-nothing manner or a gradual, continuous manner? To answer this question, we examined behavioral performance across four different paradigms that manipulate visual awareness: the attentional blink, backward masking, the Sperling iconic memory paradigm, and retro-cuing. We then asked how well we could account for participants' (N = 112 adults) behavior using a signal detection framework that factors in psychophysical scaling to model participants' responses along a single continuum. We found that this model easily accounted for the data from each of these diverse paradigms. Moreover, we reanalyzed the data from prior studies that had posited a discrete view of perceptual awareness and found that our continuous signal detection model outperformed the models that had been used to support an all-or-nothing view of consciousness. This set of data is consistent with the idea that conscious awareness occurs along a graded continuum.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael A Cohen
- Department of Psychology and Program in Neuroscience, Amherst College
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
| | - Jonathan Keefe
- Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego
| | - Timothy F Brady
- Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego
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20
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Xiao K, Zhang A, Qu J, Deng F, Guo C, Yamauchi T. Hand Motions Reveal Attentional Status and Subliminal Semantic Processing: A Mouse-Tracking Technique. Brain Sci 2023; 13:1267. [PMID: 37759868 PMCID: PMC10526379 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci13091267] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2023] [Revised: 08/22/2023] [Accepted: 08/29/2023] [Indexed: 09/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Theories of embodied cognition suggest that hand motions and cognition are closely interconnected. An emerging technique of tracking how participants move a computer mouse (i.e., the mouse-tracking technique) has shown advantages over the traditional response time measurement to detect implicit cognitive conflicts. Previous research suggests that attention is essential for subliminal processing to take place at a semantic level. However, this assumption is challenged by evidence showing the presence of subliminal semantic processing in the near-absence of attention. The inconsistency of evidence could stem from the insufficient sensitivity in the response time measurement. Therefore, we examined the role of attention in subliminal semantic processing by analyzing participants' hand motions using the mouse-tracking technique. The results suggest that subliminal semantic processing is not only enhanced by attention but also occurs when attention is disrupted, challenging the necessity of facilitated top-down attention for subliminal semantic processing, as claimed by a number of studies. In addition, by manipulating the color of attentional cues, our experiment shows that the cue color per se could influence participants' response patterns. Overall, the current study suggests that attentional status and subliminal semantic processing can be reliably revealed by temporal-spatial features extracted from cursor motion trajectories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kunchen Xiao
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610066, China
| | - Anqi Zhang
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610066, China
| | - Jingke Qu
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610066, China
| | - Feifei Deng
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610066, China
| | - Chenyan Guo
- Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610066, China
| | - Takashi Yamauchi
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4235, USA
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21
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Khrennikov A. Open Systems, Quantum Probability, and Logic for Quantum-like Modeling in Biology, Cognition, and Decision-Making. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:886. [PMID: 37372230 DOI: 10.3390/e25060886] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/20/2023] [Revised: 05/25/2023] [Accepted: 05/29/2023] [Indexed: 06/29/2023]
Abstract
The aim of this review is to highlight the possibility of applying the mathematical formalism and methodology of quantum theory to model behavior of complex biosystems, from genomes and proteins to animals, humans, and ecological and social systems. Such models are known as quantum-like, and they should be distinguished from genuine quantum physical modeling of biological phenomena. One of the distinguishing features of quantum-like models is their applicability to macroscopic biosystems or, to be more precise, to information processing in them. Quantum-like modeling has its basis in quantum information theory, and it can be considered one of the fruits of the quantum information revolution. Since any isolated biosystem is dead, modeling of biological as well as mental processes should be based on the theory of open systems in its most general form-the theory of open quantum systems. In this review, we explain its applications to biology and cognition, especially theory of quantum instruments and the quantum master equation. We mention the possible interpretations of the basic entities of quantum-like models with special interest given to QBism, as it may be the most useful interpretation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrei Khrennikov
- International Center for Mathematical Modeling in Physics and Cognitive Sciences, Linnaeus University, SE-351 95 Växjö, Sweden
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22
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Michel M. Confidence in consciousness research. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023; 14:e1628. [PMID: 36205300 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1628] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2022] [Revised: 09/14/2022] [Accepted: 09/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University, New York, New York, USA
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23
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Rodríguez-San Esteban P, Chica AB, Paz-Alonso PM. Functional characterization of correct and incorrect feature integration. Cereb Cortex 2023; 33:1440-1451. [PMID: 35510933 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhac147] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/09/2021] [Revised: 03/22/2022] [Accepted: 03/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Our sensory system constantly receives information from the environment and our own body. Despite our impression to the contrary, we remain largely unaware of this information and often cannot report it correctly. Although perceptual processing does not require conscious effort on the part of the observer, it is often complex, giving rise to errors such as incorrect integration of features (illusory conjunctions). In the present study, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the neural bases of feature integration in a dual task that produced ~30% illusions. A distributed set of regions demonstrated increased activity for correct compared to incorrect (illusory) feature integration, with increased functional coupling between occipital and parietal regions. In contrast, incorrect feature integration (illusions) was associated with increased occipital (V1-V2) responses at early stages, reduced functional connectivity between right occipital regions and the frontal eye field at later stages, and an overall decrease in coactivation between occipital and parietal regions. These results underscore the role of parietal regions in feature integration and highlight the relevance of functional occipito-frontal interactions in perceptual processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pablo Rodríguez-San Esteban
- Department of Experiment Psychology and Brain, Mind and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), Universidad de Granada, Campus de Cartuja S/N, 18071 Granada, Spain
| | - Ana B Chica
- Department of Experiment Psychology and Brain, Mind and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), Universidad de Granada, Campus de Cartuja S/N, 18071 Granada, Spain
| | - Pedro M Paz-Alonso
- BCBL-Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language, Mikeletegi Pasealekua 69, 20009 Donostia, Gipuzkoa, Spain.,IKERBASQUE-Basque Foundation for Science, 48013 Bilbo, Bizkaia, Spain
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24
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Fesce R. Imagination: The dawn of consciousness: Fighting some misconceptions in the discussion about consciousness. Physiol Behav 2023; 259:114035. [PMID: 36403782 DOI: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2022.114035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2022] [Revised: 10/26/2022] [Accepted: 11/15/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Several theories of consciousness (ToC) have been proposed, but it is hard to integrate them into a consensus theory. Each theory has its merits, in dealing with some aspects of the question, but the terminology is inconsistent, each ToC aims at answering a different question, and there is not even a reasonable agreement about what 'consciousness' is in the first place. Some common implicit assumptions, and the way some critical words - such as 'sensation', 'perception', 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC) - are thought to relate to consciousness, have introduced a series of misconceptions that make it difficult to pinpoint what consciousness consists in and how it arises in the brain. The purpose of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to discern the various steps that lead from the detection of a stimulus to a conscious experience, by redefining terms such as sensation and perception with an adequate operative meaning; secondly, to emphasize the inevitable contribution of emotions and the active role of imagination in this process. The diffuse view, for the layperson but among scientists as well, is that the brain produces an internal 'representation' of the external reality and of oneself. This tends to consign one to a Cartesian perspective, i.e., the idea that some entity must be there to witness and interpret such representation. This approach splits the conscious experience into brain activity, which generates a (possible) content of consciousness (still unconscious), and a vaguely defined entity or process that 'generates' consciousness and injects (or sheds the light of) consciousness onto the content of brain activity. This way, however, we learn nothing about how such consciousness would arise. We propose here that consciousness is the function that generates a subjectively relevant and emotionally coloured internal image of the experience one is living. In this process, endogenous, spontaneous activity (imaginative activity, consisting in recalling and reviving memories, prefiguring consequences, analysing conjectures) produces many vague and ambiguous hints, rich of symbolic links, which compete in giving rise to an implicit, emotionally characterized, and semantically pleiotropic, internal experience. Cognitive elaboration may extract from this a defined and univocal, complete and consistent, explicit experience, that can be verbally reported ('what it is like to...').
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Affiliation(s)
- Riccardo Fesce
- Department of Biomedical Sciences - Humanitas University Medical School.
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25
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Linton P. Minimal theory of 3D vision: new approach to visual scale and visual shape. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20210455. [PMID: 36511406 PMCID: PMC9745885 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0455] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Since Kepler and Descartes in the early-1600s, vision science has been committed to a triangulation model of stereo vision. But in the early-1800s, we realized that disparities are responsible for stereo vision. And we have spent the past 200 years trying to shoe-horn disparities back into the triangulation account. The first part of this article argues that this is a mistake, and that stereo vision is a solution to a different problem: the eradication of rivalry between the two retinal images, rather than the triangulation of objects in space. This leads to a 'minimal theory of 3D vision', where 3D vision is no longer tied to estimating the scale, shape, and direction of objects in the world. The second part of this article then asks whether the other aspects of 3D vision, which go beyond stereo vision, really operate at the same level of visual experience as stereo vision? I argue they do not. Whilst we want a theory of real-world 3D vision, the literature risks giving us a theory of picture perception instead. And I argue for a two-stage theory, where our purely internal 'minimal' 3D percept (from stereo vision) is linked to the world through cognition. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul Linton
- Presidential Scholars in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science and Society, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA,Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA,Visual Inference Lab, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA
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26
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Ludwig D. The functions of consciousness in visual processing. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niac018. [PMID: 36628118 PMCID: PMC9825248 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2022] [Revised: 10/24/2022] [Accepted: 12/06/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Ludwig
- Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
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27
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Chiarella SG, Simione L, D'Angiò M, Raffone A, Di Pace E. The mechanisms of selective attention in phenomenal consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2023; 107:103446. [PMID: 36508897 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103446] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2022] [Revised: 10/15/2022] [Accepted: 11/18/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
In three experiments we investigated the effects of selective attention in iconic memory and fragile-visual short-term memory (VSTM), which have been related to phenomenal consciousness. We used a novel retro-cue paradigm with different delays (early vs late) and object priorities (high vs equal vs low), to investigate (a) attentional costs and benefits and the role of (b) bottom-up factors and (c) fragile-VSTM in feature-based attentional selection. Experiment 1 showed that attentional costs modulate visual maintenance at longer delays, while Experiment 2 showed that by reducing the time exposure of the memory array from 250 ms to 100 ms, as a bottom-up factor, participants were not able to select the objects based on their priorities. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that a pattern mask presented before the transfer in visual working memory, attenuates the overall performance while preserving the priority effect. The implications for phenomenal consciousness before conscious access are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Salvatore G Chiarella
- Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Psychology, Rome, Italy; Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC), National Research Council (CNR), Rome, Italy.
| | - Luca Simione
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC), National Research Council (CNR), Rome, Italy
| | - Monia D'Angiò
- Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Psychology, Rome, Italy
| | - Antonino Raffone
- Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Psychology, Rome, Italy; ECONA, Interuniversity Center, Rome, Italy; School of Buddhist Studies, Philosophy, and Comparative Religions, Nalanda University, Rajgir, India
| | - Enrico Di Pace
- Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Psychology, Rome, Italy
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28
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Pang DKF, Elntib S. Further evidence and theoretical framework for a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS). Conscious Cogn 2023; 107:103452. [PMID: 36508898 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103452] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2022] [Revised: 11/28/2022] [Accepted: 11/28/2022] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
We recently provided evidence that strongly masked stimuli are not erased or overwritten but are briefly stored in a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS), where information can accumulate through repetition and become consciously accessible. SSBS supports a direct prediction made by the global workspace theory of consciousness (GWT) and has implications on discussions about conscious overflow and the problem of the criterion. Here we show that the presentation sequence and the time from the target presentation to evaluation does not significantly impact perception. We suggest that selected information from this subliminal sensory buffer store is transferred into a type of supraliminal short-term memory that keeps stable representations for longer durations with full conscious access. We argue that the level of conscious access of memory storage has a greater impact on subsequent reportability than initial phenomenology and needs to be included more prominently in discussions on perception and consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Damian K F Pang
- School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Department of Psychological Sciences, Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
| | - Stamatis Elntib
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; School of Psychology and Counselling, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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29
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Hawkins B, Evans D, Preston A, Westmoreland K, Mims CE, Lolo K, Rosario N, Odegaard B. Color diversity judgments in peripheral vision: Evidence against "cost-free" representations. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0279686. [PMID: 36584092 PMCID: PMC9803108 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0279686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2022] [Accepted: 12/12/2022] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Is visual perception "rich" or "sparse?" One finding supporting the "rich" hypothesis shows that a specific visual summary representation, color diversity, is represented "cost-free" outside focally-attended regions in dual-task paradigms [1]. Here, we investigated whether this "cost-free" phenomenon for color diversity perception extends to peripheral vision. After replicating previous findings and verifying that color diversity is represented "cost-free" in central vision, we performed two experiments: in our first experiment, we extended the paradigm to peripheral vision and found that in minimally-attended regions of space, color diversity perception was impaired. In a second and final experiment, we added confidence judgments to our task, and found that participants maintained high levels of metacognitive awareness of impaired performance in minimally-attended visual areas in the periphery. These findings provide evidence that color perception may be partially attention-dependent in peripheral vision, and challenge previous views on both sides of the rich vs. sparse debate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brylee Hawkins
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Dee Evans
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Anya Preston
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Kendra Westmoreland
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Callie E. Mims
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, United States of America
| | - Kiara Lolo
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Nicholas Rosario
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | - Brian Odegaard
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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30
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Budson AE, Richman KA, Kensinger EA. Consciousness as a Memory System. Cogn Behav Neurol 2022; 35:263-297. [PMID: 36178498 PMCID: PMC9708083 DOI: 10.1097/wnn.0000000000000319] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2022] [Accepted: 05/03/2022] [Indexed: 01/31/2023]
Abstract
We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew E. Budson
- Center for Translational Cognitive Neuroscience, Veterans Affairs Boston Healthcare System, Boston, Massachusetts
- Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts
| | - Kenneth A. Richman
- Center for Health Humanities, Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences, Boston, Massachusetts
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31
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Cheng T, Lin Y, Tseng P. Taking Conceptual Issues Really Seriously: One Next Step for the Cognitive Science of Consciousness. Cogn Sci 2022; 46:e13213. [PMID: 36399054 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2022] [Revised: 10/06/2022] [Accepted: 10/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
In this letter we focus on the cognitive science of consciousness. The general message is that, while this interdisciplinary area has made much progress in recent years, there is a tendency of downplaying conceptual issues, and therefore underestimating the difficulties of various problems. We briefly focus on a few prominent examples only, due to the space limit, but the general message should be clear: this recent tendency can be problematic for the progress of the consciousness branch of cognitive sciences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tony Cheng
- Department of Philosophy, Research Center for Mind, Brain and Learning, National Chengchi University
| | - Yi Lin
- Department of Brain and Cognition, KU Leuven
| | - Philip Tseng
- Graduate Institute of Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Taipei Medical University
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32
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Wilkinson BD. Understanding experiential awareness in humanistic‐phenomenological counseling. THE JOURNAL OF HUMANISTIC COUNSELING 2022. [DOI: 10.1002/johc.12196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Brett D. Wilkinson
- School of Education, Purdue University Fort Wayne Fort Wayne Indiana USA
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33
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Koculak M, Wierzchoń M. How much consciousness is there in complexity? Front Psychol 2022; 13:983315. [PMID: 36204731 PMCID: PMC9530911 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.983315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2022] [Accepted: 08/29/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The notion of complexity currently receives significant attention in neuroscience, mainly through the popularity of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). It has proven successful in research centred on discriminating states of consciousness, while little theoretical and experimental effort was directed toward studying the content. In this paper, we argue that exploring the relationship between complexity and conscious content is necessary to understand the importance of information-theoretic measures for consciousness research properly. We outline how content could be experimentally operationalised and how rudimental testable hypotheses can be formulated without requiring IIT formalisms. This approach would not only allow for a better understanding of aspects of consciousness captured by complexity but could also facilitate comparison efforts for theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marcin Koculak
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
- Centre for Brain Research, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
- Centre for Brain Research, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
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Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Ludwig D. The functional contributions of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2022; 104:103383. [PMID: 35963081 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103383] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2021] [Revised: 07/17/2022] [Accepted: 07/23/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism's information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness (FCCs), in the sense that conscious experience facilitates different functional capacities in different psychological domains. In this paper, I first develop a general methodological framework for isolating the psychological functions that are associated with conscious experience. I then use this to show that the leading accounts-Global Workspace Theories, Higher Order Thought Theory and Information Integration Theory-all fail to acknowledge this functional pluralism, which limits their applicability as theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Ludwig
- York University, (1) 636 Euclid Ave., Toronto, Ontario M6G 2T5, Canada.
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Samaha J, Denison R. The positive evidence bias in perceptual confidence is unlikely post-decisional. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac010. [PMID: 35903409 PMCID: PMC9316228 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/14/2022] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 06/27/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
Confidence in a perceptual decision is a subjective estimate of the accuracy of one’s choice. As such, confidence is thought to be an important computation for a variety of cognitive and perceptual processes, and it features heavily in theorizing about conscious access to perceptual states. Recent experiments have revealed a “positive evidence bias” (PEB) in the computations underlying confidence reports. A PEB occurs when confidence, unlike objective choice, overweights the evidence for the correct (or chosen) option, relative to evidence against the correct (or chosen) option. Accordingly, in a perceptual task, appropriate stimulus conditions can be arranged that produce selective changes in confidence reports but no changes in accuracy. Although the PEB is generally assumed to reflect the observer’s perceptual and/or decision processes, post-decisional accounts have not been ruled out. We therefore asked whether the PEB persisted under novel conditions that addressed two possible post-decisional accounts: (i) post-decision evidence accumulation that contributes to a confidence report solicited after the perceptual choice and (ii) a memory bias that emerges in the delay between the stimulus offset and the confidence report. We found that even when the stimulus remained on the screen until observers responded, and when observers reported their choice and confidence simultaneously, the PEB still emerged. Signal detection-based modeling showed that the PEB was not associated with changes to metacognitive efficiency, but rather to confidence criteria. The data show that memory biases cannot explain the PEB and provide evidence against a post-decision evidence accumulation account, bolstering the idea that the PEB is perceptual or decisional in nature.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jason Samaha
- Department of Psychology, University of California, 1156 High St, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA
| | - Rachel Denison
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, 64 Cummington Mall, Boston, MA 02215, USA
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Yildirim FZ, Sayim B. High confidence and low accuracy in redundancy masking. Conscious Cogn 2022; 102:103349. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2021] [Revised: 02/19/2022] [Accepted: 04/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
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Lahav N, Neemeh ZA. A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness. Front Psychol 2022; 12:704270. [PMID: 35801192 PMCID: PMC9255957 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2021] [Accepted: 12/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon. Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect. There is an “explanatory gap” between our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects, referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation. Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness. Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties. We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer. We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer. Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic. In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective). These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct, just as in the case of an observer that claims to be at rest while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity. Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged, as they both describe the same underlying reality. Based on relativistic phenomena in physics we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness, we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nir Lahav
- Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
- *Correspondence: Nir Lahav,
| | - Zachariah A. Neemeh
- Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United States
- Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United States
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Qianchen L, Gallagher RM, Tsuchiya N. How much can we differentiate at a brief glance: revealing the truer limit in conscious contents through the massive report paradigm (MRP). ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022; 9:210394. [PMID: 35619998 PMCID: PMC9128849 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.210394] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2021] [Accepted: 04/27/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
Upon a brief glance, how well can we differentiate what we see from what we do not? Previous studies answered this question as 'poorly'. This is in stark contrast with our everyday experience. Here, we consider the possibility that previous restriction in stimulus variability and response alternatives reduced what participants could express from what they consciously experienced. We introduce a novel massive report paradigm that probes the ability to differentiate what we see from what we do not. In each trial, participants viewed a natural scene image and judged whether a small image patch was a part of the original image. To examine the limit of discriminability, we also included subtler changes in the image as modification of objects. Neither the images nor patches were repeated per participant. Our results showed that participants were highly accurate (accuracy greater than 80%) in differentiating patches from the viewed images from patches that are not present. Additionally, the differentiation between original and modified objects was influenced by object sizes and/or the congruence between objects and the scene gists. Our massive report paradigm opens a door to quantitatively measure the limit of immense informativeness of a moment of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Liang Qianchen
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
| | - Regan M. Gallagher
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
| | - Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), Osaka, Japan
- Advanced Telecommunications Research Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan
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Cleeremans A, Tallon-Baudry C. Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac007. [PMID: 35479522 PMCID: PMC9036654 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2021] [Revised: 02/04/2022] [Accepted: 03/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
‘Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us?’ In other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to many of which subjective experience is a mere epiphenomenon that affords no functional advantage, we propose that subject-level experience—‘What it feels like’—is endowed with intrinsic value, and it is precisely the value agents associate with their experiences that explains why they do certain things and avoid others. Because experiences have value and guide behaviour, consciousness has a function. Under this hypothesis of ‘phenomenal worthiness’, we argue that it is only in virtue of the fact that conscious agents ‘experience’ things and ‘care’ about those experiences that they are ‘motivated’ to act in certain ways and that they ‘prefer’ some states of affairs vs. others. Overviewing how the concept of value has been approached in decision-making, emotion research and consciousness research, we argue that phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic value and conclude that if this is indeed the case, then it must have a function. Phenomenal experience might act as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows conscious mental states with intrinsic value but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centred space—a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is ‘unified’. The phenomenal worthiness hypothesis, in turn, makes the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness more tractable, since it can then be reduced to a problem about function.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Cleeremans
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neuroscience, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Catherine Tallon-Baudry
- Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience Laboratory, Inserm, École Normale Supérieure—PSL University, Paris, France
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Charalampaki A, Ninija Karabanov A, Ritterband-Rosenbaum A, Bo Nielsen J, Roman Siebner H, Schram Christensen M. Sense of agency as synecdoche: Multiple neurobiological mechanisms may underlie the phenomenon summarized as sense of agency. Conscious Cogn 2022; 101:103307. [PMID: 35447600 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103307] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2020] [Revised: 01/13/2022] [Accepted: 02/23/2022] [Indexed: 12/28/2022]
Abstract
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies on the sense of agency (SoA) have yielded heterogeneous findings identifying regional brain activity during tasks that probed SoA. In this review, we argue that the reason behind this between-study heterogeneity is a "synecdochic" way the field conceptualizes and studies SoA. Typically, a single feature is experimentally manipulated and then this is interpreted as covering all aspects of SoA. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the fMRI studies of SoA and attempt to provide meaningful categories whereby the heterogeneous findings may be classified. This classification is based on a separation of the experimental paradigms (Feedback Manipulations of ongoing movements, Action-Effect, and Sensory Attenuation) and type of report employed (implicit, explicit reports of graded or dichotic nature, and whether these concern self-other distinctions or sense of control). We only find that Feedback Manipulation and Action-Effect share common activation in supplementary motor area, insula and cerebellum in positive SoA and inferior frontal gyrus in the negative SoA, but observe large networks related to SoA only in Feedback Manipulation studies. To illustrate the advantages of this approach, we discuss the findings from an fMRI study which we conducted, within this framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angeliki Charalampaki
- Department of Neuroscience, Christensen Lab, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Centre for Functional and Diagnostic Imaging and Research Copenhagen University Hospital Amager and Hvidovre, Hvidovre, Denmark.
| | - Anke Ninija Karabanov
- Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Centre for Functional and Diagnostic Imaging and Research Copenhagen University Hospital Amager and Hvidovre, Hvidovre, Denmark; Department of Nutrition, Exercise and Sports, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Anina Ritterband-Rosenbaum
- Department of Neuroscience, Christensen Lab, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; The Elsass Foundation, Charlottenlund, Denmark
| | - Jens Bo Nielsen
- Department of Neuroscience, Christensen Lab, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; The Elsass Foundation, Charlottenlund, Denmark
| | - Hartwig Roman Siebner
- Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, Centre for Functional and Diagnostic Imaging and Research Copenhagen University Hospital Amager and Hvidovre, Hvidovre, Denmark; Department of Neurology, Copenhagen University Hospital, Bispebjerg and Frederiksberg, Copenhagen, Denmark; Institute for Clinical Medicine, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Levinson M, Baillet S. Perceptual filling-in dispels the veridicality problem of conscious perception research. Conscious Cogn 2022; 100:103316. [PMID: 35358869 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103316] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2021] [Revised: 01/13/2022] [Accepted: 03/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Conscious perceptual experiences are expected to correlate with content-specific brain activity. A veridicality problem arises when attempting to disentangle unconscious and conscious brain processes if conscious perceptual contents accurately match the physical nature of the stimulus. We argue that perceptual filling-in, a phenomenon whereby visual information inaccurately spreads across visual space, is a promising approach to circumvent the veridicality problem. Filling-in generates non-veridical although unambiguous percepts dissociated from stimulus input. In particular, the radial uniformity illusion induces a filling-in experience between a central disk and the surrounding periphery. We discuss how this illusion facilitates both the detection of neurophysiological responses and subjective phenomenological monitoring. We report behavioral effects from a large-sample (n = 200) psychophysics study and examine key stimulus parameters that drive the conscious filling-in experience. We propose that these data underpin future hypothesis-driven studies of filling-in to further delineate the neural mechanisms of conscious perception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Max Levinson
- McConnell Brain Imaging Centre, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada.
| | - Sylvain Baillet
- McConnell Brain Imaging Centre, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
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43
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Cobos MI, Chica AB. EXPRESS: Attention does not always help: the role of expectancy, divided, and spatial attention on illusory conjunctions. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2022; 75:2087-2104. [PMID: 35274574 DOI: 10.1177/17470218221089625] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Humans have the subjective impression of a rich perceptual experience, but this perception is riddled with errors that might be produced by top-down expectancies or failures in feature integration. The role of attention in feature integration is still unclear. Some studies support the importance of attention in feature integration (Paul & Schyns, 2003), whereas others suggest that feature integration does not require attention (Humphreys, 2016). Understanding attention as a heterogeneous system, in this study we explored the role of divided (as opposed to focused - Experiment 1) attention, and endogenous-exogenous spatial orienting (Experiments 2 and 3) in feature integration. We also explored the role of feature expectancy, by presenting stimulus features that were completely unexpected to the participants. Results demonstrated that both endogenous and exogenous orienting improved feature integration while divided attention did not. Moreover, a strong and consistent feature expectancy effect was observed, demonstrating perceptual completion when an unexpected perceptual feature was presented in the scene. These results support the feature confirmation account (Humphreys, 2016), which proposes that attention is important for top-down matching of stable representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- María I Cobos
- Brain, Mind, and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC) and Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Spain 16741
| | - Ana B Chica
- Brain, Mind, and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC) and Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Spain 16741
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Bellet J, Gay M, Dwarakanath A, Jarraya B, van Kerkoerle T, Dehaene S, Panagiotaropoulos TI. Decoding rapidly presented visual stimuli from prefrontal ensembles without report nor post-perceptual processing. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac005. [PMID: 35223085 PMCID: PMC8868130 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/19/2021] [Revised: 12/09/2021] [Accepted: 01/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
The role of the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception is debated. The global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness predicts that PFC neurons should contain a detailed code of the current conscious contents. Previous research showed that PFC is indeed activated in paradigms of conscious visual perception, including no-report paradigms where no voluntary behavioral report of the percept is given, thus avoiding a conflation of signals related to visual consciousness with signals related to the report. Still, it has been argued that prefrontal modulation could reflect post-perceptual processes that may be present even in the absence of report, such as thinking about the perceived stimulus, therefore reflecting a consequence rather than a direct correlate of conscious experience. Here, we investigate these issues by recording neuronal ensemble activity from the macaque ventrolateral PFC during briefly presented visual stimuli, either in isolated trials in which stimuli were clearly perceived or in sequences of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) in which perception and post-perceptual processing were challenged. We report that the identity of each stimulus could be decoded from PFC population activity even in the RSVP condition. The first visual signals could be detected at 60 ms after stimulus onset and information was maximal at 150 ms. However, in the RSVP condition, 200 ms after the onset of a stimulus, the decoding accuracy quickly dropped to chance level and the next stimulus started to be decodable. Interestingly, decoding in the ventrolateral PFC was stronger compared to posterior parietal cortex for both isolated and RSVP stimuli. These results indicate that neuronal populations in the macaque PFC reliably encode visual stimuli even under conditions that have been shown to challenge conscious perception and/or substantially reduce the probability of post-perceptual processing in humans. We discuss whether the observed activation reflects conscious access, phenomenal consciousness, or merely a preconscious bottom-up wave.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joachim Bellet
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Marion Gay
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Abhilash Dwarakanath
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Bechir Jarraya
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Timo van Kerkoerle
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
| | - Theofanis I Panagiotaropoulos
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin, Gif-Sur-Yvette 91191, France
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Abstract
There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forward? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy, theory-neutral and theory-light. Theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches face serious problems, motivating a middle path: the theory-light approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal commitment about the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognition that is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the hypothesis that phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus. This "facilitation hypothesis" can productively guide inquiry into invertebrate consciousness. What is needed? At this stage, not more theory, and not more undirected data gathering. What is needed is a systematic search for consciousness-linked cognitive abilities, their relationships to each other, and their sensitivity to masking.
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Derrien D, Garric C, Sergent C, Chokron S. The nature of blindsight: implications for current theories of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niab043. [PMID: 35237447 PMCID: PMC8884361 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab043] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2021] [Revised: 11/08/2021] [Accepted: 01/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diane Derrien
- Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, UMR 8002, CNRS & Université de Paris, Paris 75006, France
- Institut de Neuropsychologie, Neurovision, NeuroCognition, Fondation Ophtalmologique Rothschild, Paris 75019, France
| | - Clémentine Garric
- Inserm, CHU Lille, U1172—LilNCog (JPARC)—Lille Neuroscience & Cognition, University of Lille, Lille 59000, France
| | - Claire Sergent
- Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, UMR 8002, CNRS & Université de Paris, Paris 75006, France
| | - Sylvie Chokron
- Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, UMR 8002, CNRS & Université de Paris, Paris 75006, France
- Institut de Neuropsychologie, Neurovision, NeuroCognition, Fondation Ophtalmologique Rothschild, Paris 75019, France
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Hutchinson BT, Bandara KH, McGovern HT, Talipski LA. Insights on overflow from failure to report tasks. Behav Brain Res 2022; 417:113610. [PMID: 34600961 DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2021.113610] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2021] [Revised: 09/18/2021] [Accepted: 09/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Theories of consciousness diverge on the functional requirement that a conscious state need be reportable. Some maintain that the perceptual system's capacity for consciousness exceeds that of its capacity for access. Others contend that what is accessed is all there is to consciousness. Here, we suggest a compelling case for access-free consciousness cannot be made reliant on experimental evidence where access is necessarily invoked. However, a bona fide empirical separation of consciousness and report could counter the claim that reportability, and hence access, is all there is to consciousness. We first overview recent neurophysiological findings from no-report tasks, before examining a series of studies in which participants were unable to report features of clearly visible items. These new data present a challenge for a hard "access-only" view of consciousness, as they appear to demonstrate that properties of our visual experience can remain unreportable. In so doing, we highlight the utility and underappreciated value of so-called failure to report tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Kavindu H Bandara
- Research School of Psychology, Australian National University, Australia
| | | | - Louisa A Talipski
- Research School of Psychology, Australian National University, Australia
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48
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Revach D, Salti M. Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2021; 96:103229. [PMID: 34749156 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Revised: 10/23/2021] [Accepted: 10/23/2021] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Revach
- Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.
| | - Moti Salti
- Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
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49
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Sklar AY, Kardosh R, Hassin RR. From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab026. [PMID: 34676105 PMCID: PMC8524171 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2021] [Revised: 06/23/2021] [Accepted: 10/11/2021] [Indexed: 01/22/2023] Open
Abstract
The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asael Y Sklar
- Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University Edmond J. Safra Campus, Jerusalem 9190401, Israel
| | - Rasha Kardosh
- Psychology Department, The Hebrew University Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
| | - Ran R Hassin
- James Marshall Chair of Psychology, Psychology Department & The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
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50
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Ellia F, Hendren J, Grasso M, Kozma C, Mindt G, P. Lang J, M. Haun A, Albantakis L, Boly M, Tononi G. Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab032. [PMID: 34667639 PMCID: PMC8519344 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2021] [Revised: 07/22/2021] [Accepted: 08/23/2021] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Ellia
- Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Via Zamboni, 38, 40126 Bologna, Italy
| | - Jeremiah Hendren
- Graduate School Language & Literature, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Csaba Kozma
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Garrett Mindt
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Jonathan P. Lang
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Andrew M. Haun
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Larissa Albantakis
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
- Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53705, USA
| | - Giulio Tononi
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, USA
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