Informational and Normative Influences in Conformity from a Neurocomputational Perspective

Fatigued individuals show increased conformity in virtual meetings

Virtual meetings are widespread in organizations despite being perceived as fatiguing; a phenomenon also known as Zoom fatigue. Research suggests that Zoom fatigue is stronger when the camera is on, potentially influencing individuals to conform to majority opinions during professional online meetings. Two preregistered studies were conducted to explore the relationships between camera use, Zoom fatigue, social presence, and conformity. Study 1 involved 287 participants describing a professional online meeting in terms of the content discussed as well as the study variables. Study 2 involved 64 participants in an experimentally manipulated online meeting (camera on vs. off), focusing on a personnel selection task. We measured how many times participants changed their answers to match the majority and how this was related to Zoom fatigue and self-reported conformity. Results from both studies indicated that camera use was not related to either conformity or Zoom fatigue. Despite not finding the presumed mediation effect, the studies showed a clear link between fatigue and conformity. The results explain the emergence of conformity in online meetings and provide practical information for the design of video conferences.

Bayes Optimal Integration of Social and Endogenous Uncertainty in Numerosity Estimation

One of the most prominent social influences on human decision making is conformity, which is even more prominent when the perceptual information is ambiguous. The Bayes optimal solution to this problem entails weighting the relative reliability of cognitive information and perceptual signals in constructing the percept from self-sourced/endogenous and social sources, respectively. The current study investigated whether humans integrate the statistics (i.e., mean and variance) of endogenous perceptual and social information in a Bayes optimal way while estimating numerosities. Our results demonstrated adjustment of initial estimations toward group means only when group estimations were more reliable (or "certain"), compared to participants' endogenous metric uncertainty. Our results support Bayes optimal social conformity while also pointing to an implicit form of metacognition.

Neurophysiological correlates of interpersonal discrepancy and social adjustment in an interactive decision-making task in dyads

Introduction

The pursuit of convergence and the social behavioral adjustment of conformity are fundamental cooperative behaviors that help people adjust their mental frameworks to reach a common goal. However, while social psychology has extensively studied conformity by its influence context, there is still plenty to investigate about the neural cognitive mechanisms involved in this behavior.

Methods

We proposed a paradigm with two phases, a pre-activation phase to enhance cooperative tendencies and, later, a social decision-making phase in which dyads had to make a perceptual estimation in three consecutive trials and could converge in their decisions without an explicit request or reward to do so. In Study 1, 80 participants were divided in two conditions. In one condition participants did the pre-activation phase alone, while in the other condition the two participants did it with their partners and could interact freely. In Study 2, we registered the electroencephalographical (EEG) activity of 36 participants in the social decision-making phase.

Results

Study 1 showed behavioral evidence of higher spontaneous convergence in participants who interacted in the pre-activation phase. Event related Potentials (ERP) recorded in Study 2 revealed signal differences in response divergence in different time intervals. Time-frequency analysis showed theta, alpha, and beta evidence related to cognitive control, attention, and reward processing associated with social convergence.

Discussion

Current results support the spontaneous convergence of behavior in dyads, with increased behavioral adjustment in those participants who have previously cooperated. In addition, neurophysiological components were associated with discrepancy levels between participants, and supported the validity of the experimental paradigm to study spontaneous social behavioral adaptation in experimental settings.

Adaptive adjustment after conflict with group opinion: evidence from neural electrophysiology

Individuals inherently seek social consensus when making decisions or judgments. Previous studies have consistently indicated that dissenting group opinions are perceived as social conflict that demands attitude adjustment. However, the neurocognitive processes of attitude adjustment are unclear. In this electrophysiological study, participants were recruited to perform a face attractiveness judgment task. After forming their own judgment of a face, participants were informed of a purported group judgment (either consistent or inconsistent with their judgment), and then, critically, the same face was presented again. The neural responses to the second presented faces were measured. The second presented faces evoked a larger late positive potential after conflict with group opinions than those that did not conflict, suggesting that more motivated attention was allocated to stimulus. Moreover, faces elicited greater midfrontal theta (4-7 Hz) power after conflict with group opinions than after consistency with group opinions, suggesting that cognitive control was initiated to support attitude adjustment. Furthermore, the mixed-effects model revealed that single-trial theta power predicted behavioral change in the Conflict condition, but not in the No-Conflict condition. These findings provide novel insights into the neurocognitive processes underlying attitude adjustment, which is crucial to behavioral change during conformity.

Situational social influence leading to non-compliance with conservation rules

It is well established that the decisions that we make can be strongly influenced by the behaviour of others. However, testing how social influence can lead to non-compliance with conservation rules during an individual's decision-making process has received little research attention. We synthesise advances in understanding of conformity and rule-breaking in individuals and in groups, and take a situational approach to studying the social dynamics and ensuing social identity changes that can lead to non-compliant decision-making. We focus on situational social influence contagion that are copresent (i.e., same space and same time) or trace-based (i.e., behavioural traces in the same space). We then suggest approaches for testing how situational social influence can lead to certain behaviours in non-compliance with conservation rules.

Social norms shape visual appearance: Taking a closer look at the link between social norm learning and perceptual decision-making

One of the most fundamental questions in social psychology is whether norms can change individuals' minds by shaping the visual appearance of stimuli. This question was first raised by Muzafer Sherif (1935). Drawing on the extended social reinforcement account (Germar and Mojzisch, 2019), we aimed to provide a rigorous test of the hypothesis that norm learning leads to a persistent perceptual bias and, hence, to a change in the visual appearance of stimuli. From a methodological perspective, we used both a diffusion model approach and the method of adjustment, a well-established technique from psychophysics and vision research. The results of Experiments 1-3 show that norm effects on perceptual decision-making are robustly replicable, and are due to genuine social influence, that is, they cannot be explained by non-social priming, contingency learning effects (Experiments 1 and 2) or anchoring effects (Experiment 3). Most importantly, by using a psychophysical approach, Experiment 4 shows, for the first time, that social norm learning alters individuals' point of subjective equality and, hence, the visual appearance of stimuli.

Intra- and inter-brain synchrony oscillations underlying social adjustment

Humans naturally synchronize their behavior with other people. However, although it happens almost automatically, adjusting behavior and conformity to others is a complex phenomenon whose neural mechanisms are still yet to be understood entirely. The present experiment aimed to study the oscillatory synchronization mechanisms underlying automatic dyadic convergence in an EEG hyperscanning experiment. Thirty-six people performed a cooperative decision-making task where dyads had to guess the correct position of a point on a line. A reinforcement learning algorithm was used to model different aspects of the participants' behavior and their expectations of their peers. Intra- and inter-connectivity among electrode sites were assessed using inter-site phase clustering in three main frequency bands (theta, alpha, beta) using a two-level Bayesian mixed-effects modeling approach. The results showed two oscillatory synchronization dynamics related to attention and executive functions in alpha and reinforcement learning in theta. In addition, inter-brain synchrony was mainly driven by beta oscillations. This study contributes preliminary evidence on the phase-coherence mechanism underlying inter-personal behavioral adjustment.

Neural Basis of Social Influence of Observing Other's Perception in Dot-Number Estimation

Our perceptions and decisions are often implicitly influenced by observing another's actions. However, it is unclear how observing other people's perceptual decisions without interacting with them can engage the processing of self-other discrepancies and change the observer's decisions. In this study, we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging and a computational model to investigate the neural basis of how unilaterally observing the other's perceptual decisions modulated one's own decisions. The experimental task was to discriminate whether the number of presented dots was higher or lower than a reference number. The participants performed the task solely while unilaterally observing the performance of another "participant," who produced overestimations and underestimations in the same task in separate sessions. Results of the behavioral analysis showed that the participants' decisions were modulated to resemble those of the other. Image analysis based on computational model revealed that the activation in the medial prefrontal cortex was associated with the discrepancy between the inferred participant's and the presented other's decisions. In addition, the number-sensitive region in the superior parietal region showed altered activation patterns after observing the other's overestimations and underestimations. The activity of the superior parietal region was not involved in assessing the observation of other's perceptual decisions, but it was engaged in plain numerosity perception. These results suggest that computational modeling can capture the neuro-behavioral processing of self-other discrepancies in perception followed by the activity modulation in the number-sensitive region in the task of dot-number estimation.

Social value orientation modulates behavioral and neural responses to social influence

Substantial studies have investigated the social influence effect; however, how individuals with different social value orientations (SVOs), prosocials and proselfs, respond to different social influences remains unknown. This study examines the impact of positive and negative social information on the responses of people with different SVOs. A face-attractiveness assessment task was employed to investigate the relationships between influence probability, memory, and event-related potentials of social influence. A significant interactional effect suggested that prosocials and proselfs reacted differently to positive (group rating was more attractive) and negative (group rating was less attractive) social influences. Specifically, proselfs demonstrated significantly higher influence probability, marginally better recall performance, smaller N400, and larger late positive potential on receiving negative influence information than on receiving positive influence information, while prosocials showed no significant differences. Overall, correlations between N400/LPP, influence probability, and recall performance were significant. The above results indicate the modulating role of SVO when responding to social influence. These findings have important implications for understanding how people conform and how prosocial behavior occurs.

Neurocomputational mechanism of real-time distributed learning on social networks

Social networks shape our decisions by constraining what information we learn and from whom. Yet, the mechanisms by which network structures affect individual learning and decision-making remain unclear. Here, by combining a real-time distributed learning task with functional magnetic resonance imaging, computational modeling and social network analysis, we studied how humans learn from observing others' decisions on seven-node networks with varying topological structures. We show that learning on social networks can be approximated by a well-established error-driven process for observational learning, supported by an action prediction error encoded in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Importantly, learning is flexibly weighted toward well-connected neighbors, according to activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, but only insofar as social observations contain secondhand, potentially intertwining, information. These data suggest a neurocomputational mechanism of network-based filtering on the sources of information, which may give rise to biased learning and the spread of misinformation in an interconnected society.

On the social nature of abstraction: cognitive implications of interaction and diversity

The human capacity for abstraction is remarkable. We effortlessly form abstract representations from varied experiences, generalizing and flexibly transferring experiences and knowledge between contexts, which can facilitate reasoning, problem solving and learning across many domains. The cognitive process of abstraction, however, is often portrayed and investigated as an individual process. This paper addresses how cognitive processes of abstraction-together with other aspects of human reasoning and problem solving-are fundamentally shaped and modulated by online social interaction. Starting from a general distinction between convergent thinking, divergent thinking and processes of abstraction, we address how social interaction shapes information processing differently depending on cognitive demands, social coordination and task ecologies. In particular, we suggest that processes of abstraction are facilitated by the interactive sharing and integration of varied individual experiences. To this end, we also discuss how the dynamics of group interactions vary as a function of group composition; that is, in terms of the similarity and diversity between the group members. We conclude by outlining the role of cognitive diversity in interactive processes and consider the importance of group diversity in processes of abstraction. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Brain Systems Underlying Fundamental Motivations of Human Social Conformity

From birth to adulthood, we often align our behaviors, attitudes, and opinions with a majority, a phenomenon known as social conformity. A seminal framework has proposed that conformity behaviors are mainly driven by three fundamental motives: a desire to gain more information to be accurate, to obtain social approval from others, and to maintain a favorable self-concept. Despite extensive interest in neuroimaging investigation of social conformity, the relationship between brain systems and these fundamental motivations has yet to be established. Here, we reviewed brain imaging findings of social conformity with a componential framework, aiming to reveal the neuropsychological substrates underlying different conformity motivations. First, information-seeking engages the evaluation of social information, information integration, and modification of task-related activity, corresponding to brain networks implicated in reward, cognitive control, and tasks at hand. Second, social acceptance involves the anticipation of social acceptance or rejection and mental state attribution, mediated by networks of reward, punishment, and mentalizing. Third, self-enhancement entails the excessive representation of positive self-related information and suppression of negative self-related information, ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup derogation, and elaborated mentalizing processes to the ingroup, supported by brain systems of reward, punishment, and mentalizing. Therefore, recent brain imaging studies have provided important insights into the fundamental motivations of social conformity in terms of component processes and brain mechanisms.

People conform to social norms when gambling with lives or money

Many consider moral decisions to follow an internal "moral compass", resistant to social pressures. Here we examine how social influence shapes moral decisions under risk, and how it operates in different decision contexts. We employed an adapted Asian Disease Paradigm where participants chose between certain losses/gains and probabilistic losses/gains in a series of moral (lives) or financial (money) decisions. We assessed participants' own risk preferences before and after exposing them to social norms that are generally risk-averse or risk-seeking. Our results showed that participants robustly shifted their own choices towards the observed risk preferences. This conformity holds even after a re-testing in three days. Interestingly, in the monetary domain, risk-averse norms have more influence on choices in the loss frame, whereas risk-seeking norms have more influence in the gain frame, presumably because norms that contradict default behavior are most informative. In the moral domain, risk-averse as opposed to risk-seeking norms are more effective in the loss frame but in the gain frame different norms are equally effective. Taken together, our results demonstrate conformity in risk preferences across contexts and highlight unique features of decisions and conformity in moral and monetary domains.

Behavioral and neuro-cognitive bases for emergence of norms and socially shared realities via dynamic interaction

In the digital era, new socially shared realities and norms emerge rapidly, whether they are beneficial or harmful to our societies. Although these are emerging properties from dynamic interaction, most research has centered on static situations where isolated individuals face extant norms. We investigated how perceptual norms emerge endogenously as shared realities through interaction, using behavioral and fMRI experiments coupled with computational modeling. Social interactions fostered convergence of perceptual responses among people, not only overtly but also at the covert psychophysical level that generates overt responses. Reciprocity played a critical role in increasing the stability (reliability) of the psychophysical function within each individual, modulated by neural activity in the mentalizing network during interaction. These results imply that bilateral influence promotes mutual cognitive anchoring of individual views, producing shared generative models at the collective level that enable endogenous agreement on totally new targets-one of the key functions of social norms.

On the realness of people who do not exist: The social processing of artificial faces

Today more than ever, we are asked to evaluate the realness, truthfulness and trustworthiness of our social world. Here, we focus on how people evaluate realistic-looking faces of non-existing people generated by generative adversarial networks (GANs). GANs are increasingly used in marketing, journalism, social media, and political propaganda. In three studies, we investigated if and how participants can distinguish between GAN and REAL faces and the social consequences of their exposure to artificial faces. GAN faces were more likely to be perceived as real than REAL faces, a pattern partly explained by intrinsic stimulus characteristics. Moreover, participants' realness judgments influenced their behavior because they displayed increased social conformity toward faces perceived as real, independently of their actual realness. Lastly, knowledge about the presence of GAN faces eroded social trust. Our findings point to potentially far-reaching consequences for the pervasive use of GAN faces in a culture powered by images at unprecedented levels.

Learning with certainty in childhood

Learners use certainty to guide learning. They maintain existing beliefs when certain, but seek further information when they feel uninformed. Here, we review developmental evidence that this metacognitive strategy does not require reportable processing. Uncertainty prompts nonverbal human infants and nonhuman animals to engage in strategies like seeking help, searching for additional information, or opting out. Certainty directs children's attention and active learning strategies and provides a common metric for comparing and integrating conflicting beliefs across people. We conclude that certainty is a continuous, domain-general signal of belief quality even early in life.

Social learning across adolescence: A Bayesian neurocognitive perspective

Adolescence is a period of social re-orientation in which we are generally more prone to peer influence and the updating of our beliefs based on social information, also called social learning, than in any other stage of our life. However, how do we know when to use social information and whose information to use and how does this ability develop across adolescence? Here, we review the social learning literature from a behavioral, neural and computational viewpoint, focusing on the development of brain systems related to executive functioning, value-based decision-making and social cognition. We put forward a Bayesian reinforcement learning framework that incorporates social learning about value associated with particular behavior and uncertainty in our environment and experiences. We discuss how this framework can inform us about developmental changes in social learning, including how the assessment of uncertainty and the ability to adaptively discriminate between information from different social sources change across adolescence. By combining reward-based decision-making in the domains of both informational and normative influence, this framework explains both negative and positive social peer influence in adolescence.

Social norm learning from non-human agents can induce a persistent perceptual bias: A diffusion model approach

Seminal studies on social influence (Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1935) were based on face-to-face interactions between humans. Nowadays, computer-mediated communication is steadily becoming ubiquitous, and we are increasingly influenced by non-human agents, such as algorithms, robots, and chatbots. The present research aimed to answer two important questions: Can non-human agents exert social influence in a persistent manner and, thus, contribute to the emergence of social norms? And if this is the case, is social influence exerted by non-human agents mediated by the same or by different cognitive mechanisms as social influence exerted by human agents? To answer these questions, we used an online version of an established paradigm in research on social norm learning. To examine the cognitive underpinnings of social influence, we used a diffusion model approach. Our results provide strong evidence for the notion that non-human agents can induce persistent social influence outside an immediate group context and, hence, can contribute to the emergence of social norms. Furthermore, results from our diffusion model analyses support the notion that social influence exerted by non-human agents is mainly mediated by the same cognitive mechanisms as social influence exerted by human agents.

Evidence for a two-step model of social group influence

Social group influence plays an important role in societally relevant phenomena such as rioting and mass panic. One way through which groups influence individuals is by directing their gaze. Evidence that gaze following increases with group size has typically been explained in terms of strategic processes. Here, we tested the role of reflexive processes. In an ecologically valid virtual reality task, we found that participants were more likely to follow the group’s gaze when more people looked, even though they knew the group provided no relevant information. Interestingly, participants also sometimes changed their mind after starting to follow the gaze of the group, indicating that automatic imitation can be overruled by strategic processes. This suggests that social group influence is best explained by a two-step model in which bottom-up imitative processes first elicit a reflexive tendency to imitate, before top-down strategic processes determine whether to execute or inhibit this reflex.

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Groups influence human behavior in two stages

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First, groups elicit a reflexive tendency to imitate

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Second, strategic processes decide to execute or inhibit this reflex

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Social group conformity may be more automatic than previously thought

Cost-benefit considerations have limited effect on the decision to exert cognitive effort in real-world computer-programming tasks

Recent research shows that people usually try to avoid exerting cognitive effort yet they are willing to exert effort to gain rewards. This cost-benefit framework provides predictions for behaviour outside the laboratory. Nevertheless, the extent to which such considerations affect real-life decisions is not clear. Here we experimentally examined computer-programmers' decisions to write code in a reusable manner, using functions, which demands an initial investment of cognitive effort or to clone and tweak code, a strategy whose cost increases with repetitions. Only a small portion of our participants demonstrated sensitivity to the benefits and costs of programming strategies. When asked to solve the tasks, participants tended to avoid using functions, demonstrating biased effort estimation. By contrast, when asked how they planned to solve the tasks, participants tended to demonstrate an opposite trend, overestimating effort, in line with an injunctive norm involving the overuse of functions. In the context of real-world problems, the effect of cost-benefit considerations may therefore be limited by task-irrelevant factors. Our interdisciplinary approach may be useful in providing novel theoretical insights and in promoting cognitive-effort investments outside the laboratory.

Social Prevalence Is Rationally Integrated in Belief Updating

People rely on social information to inform their beliefs. We ask whether and to what degree the perceived prevalence of a belief influences belief adoption. We present the results of two experiments that show how increases in a person’s estimated prevalence of a belief led to increased endorsement of said belief. Belief endorsement rose when impressions of the belief’s prevalence were increased and when initial beliefs were uncertain, as predicted by a Bayesian cue integration framework. Thus, people weigh social information rationally. An implication of these results is that social engagement metrics that prompt inflated prevalence estimates in users risk increasing the believability and adoption of viral misinformation posts.

Distinct neurocomputational mechanisms support informational and socially normative conformity

A change of mind in response to social influence could be driven by informational conformity to increase accuracy, or by normative conformity to comply with social norms such as reciprocity. Disentangling the behavioural, cognitive, and neurobiological underpinnings of informational and normative conformity have proven elusive. Here, participants underwent fMRI while performing a perceptual task that involved both advice-taking and advice-giving to human and computer partners. The concurrent inclusion of 2 different social roles and 2 different social partners revealed distinct behavioural and neural markers for informational and normative conformity. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) BOLD response tracked informational conformity towards both human and computer but tracked normative conformity only when interacting with humans. A network of brain areas (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ)) that tracked normative conformity increased their functional coupling with the dACC when interacting with humans. These findings enable differentiating the neural mechanisms by which different types of conformity shape social changes of mind.

Different drives of herding: An exploratory study of motivations underlying social conformity

We often align our behaviors, attitudes, and opinions in line with a majority of others, a phenomenon known as "social conformity." A seminal framework has proposed that conformity behaviors are mainly driven by three fundamental motives: a desire to gain more information to be accurate, to obtain social approval from others, and to maintain a favorable self-concept. However, previous studies usually have interpreted conformity behaviors as driven by one motive or another, largely ignoring the fact that human behaviors could be concurrently induced by multiple and even conflicting motivations. Adopting a typical conformity paradigm widely used in previous studies, we explored distinct and concurrent motives underlying the same conformity behavior, combining personality and individual differences with more nuanced analyses of observed conformity behaviors. Our findings provide novel evidence to show that three motivations exist within a single conformity behavior, suggesting that multiple motivations drive the conformity concurrently. These findings provide a potential solution for the extensive debate about what drives human social conformity and help to better understand the conformity behavior in daily life.

The Subjective Value of Product Popularity: A Neural Account of How Product Popularity Influences Choice Using a Social and a Quality Focus

Research on social influences often distinguishes between social and quality incentives to ascribe meaning to the value that popularity conveys. This study examines the neural correlates of those incentives through which popularity influences preferences. This research reports an functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment and a behavioral task in which respondents evaluated popular products with three focus perspectives; unspecified focus, focus on social aspects, and focus on quality. The results show that value derived with a social focus reflects inferences of approval and reward value, and positively affects preferences. Value derived with a quality (versus normal) focus reflects inferences of quality and negatively affects preferences. This study provides evidence of two distinct inferential routes on both a neurological level, represented by different regions in the brain, and a behavioral level. These results provide the first evidence that a single popularity cue can in different ways influence the value derived from product popularity.

Characterization of the Core Determinants of Social Influence From a Computational and Cognitive Perspective

Most human decisions are made among social others, and in what social context the choices are made is known to influence individuals' decisions. Social influence has been noted as an important factor that may nudge individuals to take more risks (e.g., initiation of substance use), but ironically also help individuals to take safer actions (e.g., successful abstinence). Such bi-directional impacts of social influence hint at the complexity of social information processing. Here, we first review the recent computational approaches that shed light on neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying social influence following basic computations involved in decision-making: valuation, action selection, and learning. We next review the studies on social influence from various fields including neuroeconomics, developmental psychology, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, and highlight three dimensions of determinants-who are the recipients, how the social contexts are presented, and to what domains and processes of decisions the influence is applied-that modulate the extent to which individuals are influenced by others. Throughout the review, we also introduce the brain regions that were suggested as neural instantiations of social influence from a large body of functional neuroimaging studies. Finally, we outline the remaining questions to be addressed in the translational application of computational and cognitive theories of social influence to psychopathology and health.

Confidence Modulates the Conformity Behavior of the Investors and Neural Responses of Social Influence in Crowdfunding

The decision about whether to invest can be affected by the choices or opinions of others known as a form of social influence. People make decisions with fluctuating confidence, which plays an important role in the decision process. However, it remains a fair amount of confusion regarding the effect of confidence on the social influence as well as the underlying neural mechanism. The current study applied a willingness-to-invest task with the event-related potentials method to examine the behavioral and neural manifestations of social influence and its interaction with confidence in the context of crowdfunding investment. The behavioral results demonstrate that the conformity tendency of the people increased when their willingness-to-invest deviated far from the group. Besides, when the people felt less confident about their initial judgment, they were more likely to follow the herd. In conjunction with the behavioral findings, the neural results of the social information processing indicate different susceptibilities to small and big conflicts between the own willingness of the people and the group, with small conflict evoked less negative feedback-related negativity (FRN) and more positive late positive potential (LPP). Moreover, confidence only modulated the later neural processing by eliciting larger LPP in the low confidence, implying more reliance on social information. These results corroborate previous findings regarding the conformity effect and its neural mechanism in investment decision and meanwhile extend the existing works of literature through providing behavioral and neural evidence to the effect of confidence on the social influence in the crowdfunding marketplace.

Trusting and learning from others: immediate and long-term effects of learning from observation and advice

Social learning underpins our species's extraordinary success. Learning through observation has been investigated in several species, but learning from advice-where information is intentionally broadcast-is less understood. We used a pre-registered, online experiment (n = 1492) combined with computational modelling to examine learning through observation and advice. Participants were more likely to immediately follow advice than to copy an observed choice, but this was dependent upon trust in the adviser: highly paranoid participants were less likely to follow advice in the short term. Reinforcement learning modelling revealed two distinct patterns regarding the long-term effects of social information: some individuals relied fully on social information, whereas others reverted to trial-and-error learning. This variation may affect the prevalence and fidelity of socially transmitted information. Our results highlight the privileged status of advice relative to observation and how the assimilation of intentionally broadcast information is affected by trust in others.

How conformity can lead to polarised social behaviour

Learning social behaviour of others strongly influences one’s own social attitudes. We compare several distinct explanations of this phenomenon, testing their predictions using computational modelling across four experimental conditions. In the experiment, participants chose repeatedly whether to pay for increasing (prosocial) or decreasing (antisocial) the earnings of an unknown other. Halfway through the task, participants predicted the choices of an extremely prosocial or antisocial agent (either a computer, a single participant, or a group of participants). Our analyses indicate that participants polarise their social attitude mainly due to normative expectations. Specifically, most participants conform to presumed demands by the authority (vertical influence), or because they learn that the observed human agents follow the norm very closely (horizontal influence).

What drives people to extreme acts of generosity? What causes behaviour that is unduly spiteful? This study explored how our social decisions polarise. Participants chose whether to spend money to increase or decrease the earnings of an unknown person. Halfway through this task, they observed another agent playing. The agent took participants’ choices to the extremes: if for instance the participant was moderately generous, it spent considerable sums to help the other. Participants conformed regardless of whether the agent was a computer algorithm, a person, or a group of people. We tested several competing explanations of why this happened with the help of cognitive modelling. Our analyses identify two factors behind polarisation: willingness to comply with the experimenter expectations (social desirability), and concern about appropriate behaviour (norm conformity). Our approach provided insight into how social choices are influenced by others, and could be applied in the study of conformity in other types of decisions.

Ecological Values Theory: Beyond Conformity, Goal-Seeking, and Rule-Following in Action and Interaction

Values have long been considered important for psychology but are frequently characterized as beliefs, goals, rules, or norms. Ecological values theory locates them, not in people or in objects, but in ecosystem relationships and the demands those relationships place on fields of action within the system. To test the worth of this approach, we consider skilled coordination tasks in social psychology (e.g., negotiating disagreements, synchrony and asynchrony in interactions, and selectivity in social learning) and perception-action (e.g., driving vehicles and carrying a child). Evidence suggests that a diverse array of values (e.g., truth, social solidarity, justice, flexibility, safety, and comfort) work in a cooperative tension to guide actions. Values emerge as critical constraints on action that differ from goals, rules, and natural laws, and yet provide the larger context in which they can function effectively. Prospects and challenges for understanding values and their role in action, including theoretical and methodological issues, are considered.

Collective rule-breaking

Rules form an important part of our everyday lives. Here we explore the role of social influence in rule-breaking. In particular, we identify some of the cognitive mechanisms underlying rule-breaking and propose approaches for how they can be scaled up to the level of groups or crowds to better understand the emergence of collective rule-breaking. Social contagion plays an important role in such processes and different dynamics such as linear or rapid nonlinear spreading can have important consequences for interventions in rule-breaking. A closer integration of cognitive psychology, microsociology and mathematical modelling will be key to a deeper understanding of collective rule-breaking to turn this field of research into a predictive science.

The hierarchical sensitivity to social misalignment during decision-making under uncertainty

Social misalignment occurs when a person’s attitudes and opinions deviate from those of others. We investigated how individuals react to social misalignment in risky (outcome probabilities are known) or ambiguous (outcome probabilities are unknown) decision contexts. During each trial, participants played a forced-choice gamble, and they observed the decisions of four other players after they made a tentative decision, followed by an opportunity to keep or change their initial decision. Behavioral and event-related potential data were collected. Behaviorally, the stronger the participants’ initial preference, the less likely they were to switch their decisions, whereas the more their decisions were misaligned with the majority, the more likely they were to switch. Electrophysiological results showed a hierarchical processing pattern of social misalignment. Misalignment was first detected binarily (i.e. match/mismatch) at an early stage, as indexed by the N1 component. During the second stage, participants became sensitive to low levels of misalignment, which were indexed by the feedback-related negativity. The degree of social misalignment was processed in greater detail, as indexed by the P3 component. Moreover, such hierarchical neural sensitivity is generalizable across different decision contexts (i.e. risky and ambiguous). These findings demonstrate a fine-grained neural sensitivity to social misalignment during decision-making under uncertainty.

The role of the mPFC in the social influence of majority and expert opinion

Individual attitudes and preferences are easily affected by social information. In a world where information sharing and dissemination are extremely convenient, social influence has played a greater role than in any previous era. Previous studies have suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) participates in mediating the tendency towards social conformity. However, the specific role of this brain area is still unknown, and it is not clear whether various types of external information influences share a mechanism. In this research, we aimed to use transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to further explore the role of the mPFC in human conformity behaviour. In our experiment, the subjects received the majority opinion/expert opinion, and conformity behaviour was measured by the subject's tendency to follow this information after receiving the social information. Our research found that when social information conveys the majority opinion, cathodal stimulation of the mPFC significantly enhances the subject's consistency tendency. When social information conveys an expert opinion, stimulation of the mPFC has no significant effect on the conformity tendency of subjects. The results suggest that the mPFC plays an inhibitory role in regulating the social conformity tendency and that the activated neural circuits may vary with source when dealing with social influences.

Preference uncertainty accounts for developmental effects on susceptibility to peer influence in adolescence

Adolescents are prone to social influence from peers, with implications for development, both adaptive and maladaptive. Here, using a computer-based paradigm, we replicate a cross-sectional effect of more susceptibility to peer influence in a large dataset of adolescents 14 to 24 years old. Crucially, we extend this finding by adopting a longitudinal perspective, showing that a within-person susceptibility to social influence decreases over a 1.5 year follow-up time period. Exploiting this longitudinal design, we show that susceptibility to social influences at baseline predicts an improvement in peer relations over the follow-up period. Using a Bayesian computational model, we demonstrate that in younger adolescents a greater tendency to adopt others’ preferences arises out of a higher uncertainty about their own preferences in the paradigmatic case of delay discounting (a phenomenon called ‘preference uncertainty’). This preference uncertainty decreases over time and, in turn, leads to a reduced susceptibility of one’s own behaviour to an influence from others. Neuro-developmentally, we show that a measure of myelination within medial prefrontal cortex, estimated at baseline, predicts a developmental decrease in preference uncertainty at follow-up. Thus, using computational and neural evidence, we reveal adaptive mechanisms underpinning susceptibility to social influence during adolescence.

People often change their preferences to conform with others. Using a longitudinal design, the authors show that such conformity decreases over the course of adolescence and that this reduction in conformity is accompanied by a decreasing degree of uncertainty about what to like.

Majority and popularity effects on norm formation in adolescence

Personal norms consist of individuals' attitudes about the appropriateness of behaviour. These norms guide adolescents' behaviour in countless domains that are fundamental for their social functioning and well-being. Peers are known to have a marked influence on adolescent risk-taking and prosocial behaviour, but little is known about how peers shape personal norms underlying those behaviours. Here we show that adolescents' personal norms are decisively moulded by the norms of the majority and popular peers in their social network. Our experiment indicates that observing peer norms substantially impacts adolescents' normative evaluation of risk-taking and prosocial behaviours. The majority norm had a stronger impact than the norm of a single popular peer, and norm adjustments were largest when adolescents observed strong disapproval of risk-taking or strong approval of prosocial behaviour. Our study suggests that learning about peer norms likely promotes adolescents to hold views and values supporting socially desirable behaviour.

Neural correlates of recursive thinking during interpersonal strategic interactions

To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people's beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people's beliefs about simple world facts is the first-order attribution while going further to reason people's beliefs about the minds of others is the second-order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high-order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential-move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal-subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high-order reasoning as compared with low-order reasoning. At the decision stage, high-order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high-order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high-order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision-making.

A Minority of One against a Majority of Robots

Studies have shown that people conform their answers to match those of group members even when they believe the group’s answer to be wrong [2]. In this experiment, we test whether people conform to groups of robots and whether the robots cause informational conformity (believing the group to be correct), normative conformity (feeling peer pressure), or both. We conducted an experiment in which participants (N = 63) played a subjective game with three robots. We measured humans’ conformity to robots by how many times participants changed their preliminary answers to match the group of robots’ in their final answer. Participants in conditions that were given more information about the robots’ answers conformed significantly more than those who were given less, indicating that informational conformity is present. Participants in conditions where they were aware they were a minority in their answers conformed more than those who were unaware they were a minority. Additionally, they also report feeling more pressure to change their answers from the robots, and the amount of pressure they reported was correlated to the frequency they conformed, indicating normative conformity. Therefore, we conclude that robots can cause both informational and normative conformity in people.

I know better! Emerging metacognition allows adolescents to ignore false advice

Adolescents aspire for independence. Successful independence means knowing when to rely on one's own knowledge and when to listen to others. A critical prerequisite thus is a well‐developed metacognitive ability to accurately assess the quality of one's own knowledge. Little is known about whether the strive to become an independent decision maker in adolescence is underpinned by the necessary metacognitive skills. Here, we demonstrate that metacognition matures from childhood to adolescence (N = 107) and that this process coincides with greater independent decision‐making. We show that adolescents, in contrast to children, take on others’ advice less often, but only when the advice is misleading. Finally, we demonstrate that adolescents’ reduced reliance on others’ advice is explained by their increased metacognitive skills, suggesting that a developing ability to introspect may support independent decision‐making in adolescence.

MEG signatures of long-term effects of agreement and disagreement with the majority

People often change their beliefs by succumbing to an opinion of others. Such changes are often referred to as effects of social influence. While some previous studies have focused on the reinforcement learning mechanisms of social influence or on its internalization, others have reported evidence of changes in sensory processing evoked by social influence of peer groups. In this study, we used magnetoencephalographic (MEG) source imaging to further investigate the long-term effects of agreement and disagreement with the peer group. The study was composed of two sessions. During the first session, participants rated the trustworthiness of faces and subsequently learned group rating of each face. In the first session, a neural marker of an immediate mismatch between individual and group opinions was found in the posterior cingulate cortex, an area involved in conflict-monitoring and reinforcement learning. To identify the neural correlates of the long-lasting effect of the group opinion, we analysed MEG activity while participants rated faces during the second session. We found MEG traces of past disagreement or agreement with the peers at the parietal cortices 230 ms after the face onset. The neural activity of the superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, and precuneus was significantly stronger when the participant’s rating had previously differed from the ratings of the peers. The early MEG correlates of disagreement with the majority were followed by activity in the orbitofrontal cortex 320 ms after the face onset. Altogether, the results reveal the temporal dynamics of the neural mechanism of long-term effects of disagreement with the peer group: early signatures of modified face processing were followed by later markers of long-term social influence on the valuation process at the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

How higher goals are constructed and collapse under stress: A hierarchical Bayesian control systems perspective

In this paper, we show that organisms can be modeled as hierarchical Bayesian control systems with small world and information bottleneck (bow-tie) network structure. Such systems combine hierarchical perception with hierarchical goal setting and hierarchical action control. We argue that hierarchical Bayesian control systems produce deep hierarchies of goal states, from which it follows that organisms must have some form of 'highest goals'. For all organisms, these involve internal (self) models, external (social) models and overarching (normative) models. We show that goal hierarchies tend to decompose in a top-down manner under severe and prolonged levels of stress. This produces behavior that favors short-term and self-referential goals over long term, social and/or normative goals. The collapse of goal hierarchies is universally accompanied by an increase in entropy (disorder) in control systems that can serve as an early warning sign for tipping points (disease or death of the organism). In humans, learning goal hierarchies corresponds to personality development (maturation). The failure of goal hierarchies to mature properly corresponds to personality deficits. A top-down collapse of such hierarchies under stress is identified as a common factor in all forms of episodic mental disorders (psychopathology). The paper concludes by discussing ways of testing these hypotheses empirically.

Conformidade em Memória de Reconhecimento: Revisão Breve e Potenciais Direções de Pesquisa

Resumo Conformidade de memória é o fenômeno em que relatos de memória de uma pessoa são modificados após exposição aos relatos de outra pessoa. Estudos sobre conformidade de memória são importantes tanto no âmbito puro quanto aplicado, especialmente quando os estímulos são carregados emocionalmente. No entanto, estudos de conformidade de memória com estímulos emocionais ainda são escassos. Além disso, os poucos estudos sobre o tema apresentam resultados contraditórios. Nesta revisão, apresentamos um breve resumo de pesquisas sobre conformidade de memória em tarefas de reconhecimento e avaliamos o papel moderador da emocionalidade na conformidade. Sugerimos como possível direção de pesquisas futuras a avaliação de duas variáveis, intervalo de retenção e distintividade dos estímulos, que podem ser cruciais para elucidar as inconsistências empíricas.

Strategies for integrating disparate social information

Social information use is widespread in the animal kingdom, helping individuals rapidly acquire useful knowledge and adjust to novel circumstances. In humans, the highly interconnected world provides ample opportunities to benefit from social information but also requires navigating complex social environments with people holding disparate or conflicting views. It is, however, still largely unclear how people integrate information from multiple social sources that (dis)agree with them, and among each other. We address this issue in three steps. First, we present a judgement task in which participants could adjust their judgements after observing the judgements of three peers. We experimentally varied the distribution of this social information, systematically manipulating its variance (extent of agreement among peers) and its skewness (peer judgements clustering either near or far from the participant's judgement). As expected, higher variance among peers reduced their impact on behaviour. Importantly, observing a single peer confirming a participant's own judgement markedly decreased the influence of other-more distant-peers. Second, we develop a framework for modelling the cognitive processes underlying the integration of disparate social information, combining Bayesian updating with simple heuristics. Our model accurately accounts for observed adjustment strategies and reveals that people particularly heed social information that confirms personal judgements. Moreover, the model exposes strong inter-individual differences in strategy use. Third, using simulations, we explore the possible implications of the observed strategies for belief updating. These simulations show how confirmation-based weighting can hamper the influence of disparate social information, exacerbate filter bubble effects and deepen group polarization. Overall, our results clarify what aspects of the social environment are, and are not, conducive to changing people's minds.

Modulating the Activity of vmPFC Regulates Informational Social Conformity: A tDCS Study

Social conformity has been evaluated in many different contexts, ranging from an emotional contagion in psychology, to speculative episodes in economics, to mass protests concerning politics. Previous neuroscience studies suggest that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) participates in social conformity, especially when it comes to the value integration process, but the specific mechanism of vmPFC is still unclear. In this study, we aimed to identify a direct link between the vmPFC and conformity tendencies by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Conformity tendencies are measured by the probability that participants change their decisions when they observe the majority responses. In our experiment, subjects could make two decisions in each trial, once without social information and once with social information, which allowed us to directly observe the conformity tendency of subjects in different conditions. We found that cathodal stimulation of the vmPFC significantly increased conformity tendency and decreased response time when the initial decision of participants differs from the majority opinion. Based on the experimental results, our study suggests that the vmPFC mainly inhibits and regulates the informational conformity behavior. These findings complement investigations of the neural mechanism of conformity and the role of the vmPFC in the neural circuit behind conformity behavior.

Neural Processing of Narratives: From Individual Processing to Viral Propagation

Narratives, in the form of, e.g., written stories, mouth-to-mouth accounts, audiobooks, fiction movies, and media-feeds, powerfully shape the perception of reality and widely influence human decision-making. In this review, we describe findings from recent neuroimaging studies unraveling how narratives influence the human brain, thus shaping perception, cognition, emotions, and decision-making. It appears that narrative sense-making relies on default-mode network (DMN) structures of the brain, especially precuneus. Activity in precuneus further seems to differ for fictitious vs. real narratives. Notably, high inter-subject correlation (ISC) of brain activity during narrative processing seems to predict the efficacy of a narrative. Factors that enhance the ISC of brain activity during narratives include higher levels of attention, emotional arousal, and negative emotional valence. Higher levels of attentional suspense seem to co-vary with activity in the temporoparietal junction, emotional arousal with activity in dorsal attention network, and negative emotional valence with activity in DMN. Lingering after-effects of emotional narratives have been further described in DMN, amygdala, and sensory cortical areas. Finally, inter-individual differences in personality, and cultural-background related analytical and holistic thinking styles, shape ISC of brain activity during narrative perception. Together, these findings offer promising leads for future studies elucidating the effects of narratives on the human brain, and how such effects might predict the efficacy of narratives in modulating decision-making.

Social training reconfigures prediction errors to shape Self-Other boundaries

Selectively attributing beliefs to specific agents is core to reasoning about other people and imagining oneself in different states. Evidence suggests humans might achieve this by simulating each other’s computations in agent-specific neural circuits, but it is not known how circuits become agent-specific. Here we investigate whether agent-specificity adapts to social context. We train subjects on social learning tasks, manipulating the frequency with which self and other see the same information. Training alters the agent-specificity of prediction error (PE) circuits for at least 24 h, modulating the extent to which another agent’s PE is experienced as one’s own and influencing perspective-taking in an independent task. Ventromedial prefrontal myelin density, indexed by magnetisation transfer, correlates with the strength of this adaptation. We describe a frontotemporal learning network, which exploits relationships between different agents’ computations. Our findings suggest that Self-Other boundaries are learnable variables, shaped by the statistical structure of social experience.

The human brain can simulate other people’s mental processes with Self-specific and Other-specific neural circuits, but it is not known how these circuits emerge. Here, the authors show that these circuits adapt to social experience, to determine whether a computation is attributed to Self or Other.

TTOM in action: Refining the variational approach to cognition and culture

The target article "Thinking Through Other Minds" (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic - building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive - showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators' critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias.

Mentalizing during social InterAction: A four component model

Mentalizing, conventionally defined as the process in which we infer the inner thoughts and intentions of others, is a fundamental component of human social cognition. Yet its role, and the nuanced layers involved, in real world social interaction are rarely discussed. To account for this lack of theory, we propose the interactive mentalizing theory (IMT) -to emphasize the role of metacognition in different mentalizing components. We discuss the connection between mentalizing, metacognition, and social interaction in the context of four elements of mentalizing: (i) Metacognition-inference of our own thought processes and social cognitions and which is central to all other components of mentalizing including: (ii) first-order mentalizing-inferring the thoughts and intentions of an agent's mind; (iii) personal second-order mentalizing-inference of other's mentalizing of one's own mind; (iv) Collective mentalizing: which takes at least two forms (a) vicarious mentalizing: adopting another's mentalizing of an agent (i.e., what we think others think of an agent) and (b) co-mentalizing: mentalizing about an agent in conjunction with others' mentalizing of that agent (i.e., conforming to others beliefs about another agent's internal states). The weights of these four elements is determined by metacognitive insight and confidence in one's own or another's mentalizing ability, yielding a dynamic interaction between these circuits. To advance our knowledge on mentalizing during live social interaction, we identify how these subprocesses can be organized by different target agents and facilitated by combining computational modeling and interactive brain approaches.

The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure

What is social pressure, and how could it be adaptive to conform to others' expectations? Existing accounts highlight the importance of reputation and social sanctions. Yet, conformist behavior is multiply determined: sometimes, a person desires social regard, but at other times she feels obligated to behave a certain way, regardless of any reputational benefit-i.e. she feels a sense of should. We develop a formal model of this sense of should, beginning from a minimal set of biological premises: that the brain is predictive, that prediction error has a metabolic cost, and that metabolic costs are prospectively avoided. It follows that unpredictable environments impose metabolic costs, and in social environments these costs can be reduced by conforming to others' expectations. We elaborate on a sense of should's benefits and subjective experience, its likely developmental trajectory, and its relation to embodied mental inference. From this individualistic metabolic strategy, the emergent dynamics unify social phenomenon ranging from status quo biases, to communication and motivated cognition. We offer new solutions to long-studied problems (e.g. altruistic behavior), and show how compliance with arbitrary social practices is compelled without explicit sanctions. Social pressure may provide a foundation in individuals on which societies can be built.