Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) recognize that their guesses could be wrong and can pass a two-cup disjunctive syllogism task

When chimpanzees search for hidden food, do they realize that their guesses may not be correct? We applied a post-decision wagering paradigm to a simple two-cup search task, varying whether we gave participants visual access to the baiting and then asking after they had chosen one of the cups whether they would prefer a smaller but certain reward instead of their original choice (experiment 1). Results showed that chimpanzees were more likely to accept the smaller reward in occluded than visible conditions. Experiment 2 found the same effect when we blocked visual access but manipulated the number of hiding locations for the food piece, showing that the effect is not owing to representation type. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that when given information about the contents of the unchosen cup, chimpanzees were able to flexibly update their choice behaviour accordingly. These results suggest that language is not a pre-requisite to solving the disjunctive syllogism and provides a valuable contribution to the debate on logical reasoning in non-human animals.

Extrapolating animal consciousness

I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.

The Visual Advantage Effect in Comparing Uni-Modal and Cross-Modal Probabilistic Category Learning

People rely on multiple learning systems to complete weather prediction (WP) tasks with visual cues. However, how people perform in audio and audiovisual modalities remains elusive. The present research investigated how the cue modality influences performance in probabilistic category learning and conscious awareness about the category knowledge acquired. A modified weather prediction task was adopted, in which the cues included two dimensions from visual, auditory, or audiovisual modalities. The results of all three experiments revealed better performances in the visual modality relative to the audio and audiovisual modalities. Moreover, participants primarily acquired unconscious knowledge in the audio and audiovisual modalities, while conscious knowledge was acquired in the visual modality. Interestingly, factors such as the amount of training, the complexity of visual stimuli, and the number of objects to which the two cues belonged influenced the amount of conscious knowledge acquired but did not change the visual advantage effect. These findings suggest that individuals can learn probabilistic cues and category associations across different modalities, but a robust visual advantage persists. Specifically, visual associations can be learned more effectively, and are more likely to become conscious. The possible causes and implications of these effects are discussed.

Concurrent visual sequence learning

Many researchers in the field of implicit statistical learning agree that there does not exist one general implicit learning mechanism, but rather, that implicit learning takes place in highly specialized encapsulated modules. However, the exact representational content of these modules is still under debate. While there is ample evidence for a distinction between modalities (e.g., visual, auditory perception), the representational content of the modules might even be distinguished by features within the same modalities (e.g., location, color, and shape within the visual modality). In implicit sequence learning, there is evidence for the latter hypothesis, as a stimulus-color sequence can be learned concurrently with a stimulus-location sequence. Our aim was to test whether this also holds true for non-spatial features within the visual modality. This has been shown in artificial grammar learning, but not yet in implicit sequence learning. Hence, in Experiment 1, we replicated an artificial grammar learning experiment of Conway and Christiansen (2006) in which participants were supposed to learn color and shape grammars concurrently. In Experiment 2, we investigated concurrent learning of sequences with an implicit sequence learning paradigm: the serial reaction time task. Here, we found evidence for concurrent learning of two sequences, a color and shape sequence. Overall, the findings converge to the assumption that implicit learning might be based on features.

Visuomotor coordination and cognitive capacity in blindsight

Classical literature on blindsight described that some patients with lesions to the primary visual cortex could respond to visual stimuli without subjective awareness. Recent studies addressed more complex arguments on the conscious state of blindsight subjects such as existence of partial awareness, namely "feeling of something happening" in the lesion-affected visual field, termed 'type II blindsight', and high-level performance in complex cognitive tasks in blindsight model monkeys. Endeavors to clarify the visual pathways for blindsight revealed the parallel thalamic routes mediating the visual inputs from the superior colliculus to extrastriate and frontoparietal cortices, which may underlie the flexible visuomotor association and cognitive control in the blindsight subjects. Furthermore, involvement of post-lesion plasticity is suggested for these neural systems to operate.

Metacognitive Awareness and the Hot Hand: When Winning, No Amount of Awareness Will Have Strong Believers Avoid the Heuristic

In some instances, such as in sports, individuals will cheer on the player with the "hot hand". But is the hot hand phenomenon a fallacy? The current research investigated (1) whether the hot hand fallacy (HHF) was related to risky decisions during a gambling scenario, and (2) whether metacognitive awareness might be related to optimal decisions. After measuring for baseline tendencies of using the hot hand heuristic, participants were presented with a series of prior card gambling results that included either winning streaks or losing streaks and asked to choose one of two cards: a good card or a bad card. In addition, we examined whether high metacognitive awareness-as measured by the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses-would be negatively related to the risky decisions induced by the hot hand heuristic. The results showed that our predictions were partially supported. For winning streaks, individuals who had a weak tendency for using the heuristic exhibited fewer risky decisions with higher metacognitive awareness. However, those with a strong baseline tendency for using the hot hand showed no sign of decrease with metacognitive awareness. On the whole, the complex data suggest that further research on the HHF would be helpful for implementing novel ways of avoiding the fallacy, if needed.

Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases

Previous work has sought to understand decision confidence as a prediction of the probability that a decision will be correct, leading to debate over whether these predictions are optimal, and whether they rely on the same decision variable as decisions themselves. This work has generally relied on idealized, low-dimensional models, necessitating strong assumptions about the representations over which confidence is computed. To address this, we used deep neural networks to develop a model of decision confidence that operates directly over high-dimensional, naturalistic stimuli. The model accounts for a number of puzzling dissociations between decisions and confidence, reveals a rational explanation of these dissociations in terms of optimization for the statistics of sensory inputs, and makes the surprising prediction that, despite these dissociations, decisions and confidence depend on a common decision variable.

Confidence in consciousness research

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.

A meta-analysis and critical review of metacognitive accuracy in autism

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to make accurate judgements about our own and others' mental states has been widely researched; however, it is unclear how these two abilities relate to each other. This is important given that there is evidence that autistic individuals can have difficulty with accurately judging others' mental states. Recent evidence suggests that some autistic individuals may also have difficulty accurately judging their own mental states. This may have an impact on various aspects of everyday life but particularly academic success, and therefore it is important that this skill is not overlooked when exploring areas of individual support. The aim of this article is to bring together the research examining autistic individual's ability of making accurate judgements about their own mental states and to establish whether this is an area that warrants further investigation. The results from this article show that autistic individuals may have difficulty making accurate judgements about their own mental states, although this depends on the type of judgement being made. It also highlighted that while autistic children may have difficulties in some areas, these may improve by adulthood. Overall, this article shows that more research is needed to fully understand where specific difficulties lie and how they may be overcome.

The functions of consciousness in visual processing

Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.

Confidence reflects a noisy decision reliability estimate

Decisions vary in difficulty. Humans know this and typically report more confidence in easy than in difficult decisions. However, confidence reports do not perfectly track decision accuracy, but also reflect response biases and difficulty misjudgements. To isolate the quality of confidence reports, we developed a model of the decision-making process underlying choice-confidence data. In this model, confidence reflects a subject's estimate of the reliability of their decision. The quality of this estimate is limited by the subject's uncertainty about the uncertainty of the variable that informs their decision ('meta-uncertainty'). This model provides an accurate account of choice-confidence data across a broad range of perceptual and cognitive tasks, investigated in six previous studies. We find meta-uncertainty varies across subjects, is stable over time, generalizes across some domains and can be manipulated experimentally. The model offers a parsimonious explanation for the computational processes that underlie and constrain the sense of confidence.

I know that I know. But do I know that I do not know?

Metacognition-the ability of individuals to monitor one's own cognitive performance and decisions-is often studied empirically based on the retrospective confidence ratings. In experimental research, participants are asked to report how sure they are in their response, or to report how well their performance in high-level cognitive or low-level perceptual tasks is. These retrospective confidence ratings are used as a measure of monitoring effectiveness: larger difference in confidence ratings assigned to correct and incorrect responses reflects better ability to estimate the likelihood of making an error by an experiment participant, or better metacognitive monitoring ability. We discuss this underlying assumption and provide some methodological consideration that might interfere with interpretation of results, depending on what is being asked to evaluate, how the confidence response is elicited, and the overall proportion of different trial types within one experimental session. We conclude that mixing trials on which decision confidence is assigned when positive evidence needs to be evaluated and the trials on which absence of positive evidence needs to be evaluated should be avoided. These considerations might be important when designing experimental work to explore metacognitive efficiency using retrospective confidence ratings.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

The functional dissociation of posterior parietal regions during multimodal memory formation

The incidental acquisition of multimodal associations is a key memory function for everyday life. While the posterior parietal cortex has been frequently shown to be involved for these memory functions, ventral and dorsal regions revealed differences in their functional recruitment and the precise difference in multimodal memory processing with respect to the associative process has not been differentiated. Using an incidental multimodal learning task, we isolated the associative process during multimodal learning and recollection. The result of the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study demonstrated that during both learning and recollection a clear functional differentiation between ventral and dorsal posterior parietal regions was found and can be related directly to the associative process. The recruitment of a ventral region, the angular gyrus, was specific for learning and recollection of multimodal associations. In contrast, a dorsal region, the superior parietal lobule, could be attributed to memory guided attentional processing. Independent of the memory stage, we assumed a general role for the angular gyrus in the generation of associative representations and updating of fixed association, episodic memory.

Reanalyzing the Maia and McClelland (2004) Empirical Data: How Do Participants Really Behave in the Iowa Gambling Task?

Background

Since 2007, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been a standardized clinical assessment tool for assessing decision behavior in 13 psychiatric/neurological conditions. After the publication of Maia and McClelland's (1) article, there were two responses in 2005 from Bechara et al. and Maia and McClelland, respectively, discussing whether implicit emotion or explicit knowledge influences the development of foresighted decision strategies under uncertain circumstances (e.g., as simulated in the IGT).

Methods and Results

We reanalyze and verify the data obtained by Maia and McClelland (1) in their study "What participants really know in the Iowa Gambling Task" and find that decision-makers were lured into shortsighted decisions by the prospect of immediate gains and losses.

Conclusion

Although the findings of this reanalysis cannot support any arguments concerning the effect of either implicit emotion or explicit knowledge, we find evidence that, based on the gain-loss frequency in the IGT, participants behave myopically. This is consistent with most IGT-related articles (58 out of 86) in Lee et al.'s (2) cross-cultural review. Alternatively, under uncertain circumstances, there is probably no such thing as foresighted decision strategy irrespective of the proposed mechanisms of implicit emotion or explicit knowledge.

The Cognition/Metacognition Trade-Off

Integration to boundary is an optimal decision algorithm that accumulates evidence until the posterior reaches a decision boundary, resulting in the fastest decisions for a target accuracy. Here, we demonstrated that this advantage incurs a cost in metacognitive accuracy (confidence), generating a cognition/metacognition trade-off. Using computational modeling, we found that integration to a fixed boundary results in less variability in evidence integration and thus reduces metacognitive accuracy, compared with a collapsing-boundary or a random-timer strategy. We examined how decision strategy affects metacognitive accuracy in three cross-domain experiments, in which 102 university students completed a free-response session (evidence terminated by the participant's response) and an interrogation session (fixed number of evidence samples controlled by the experimenter). In both sessions, participants observed a sequence of evidence and reported their choice and confidence. As predicted, the interrogation protocol (preventing integration to boundary) enhanced metacognitive accuracy. We also found that in the free-response sessions, participants integrated evidence to a collapsing boundary-a strategy that achieves an efficient compromise between optimizing choice and metacognitive accuracy.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients

Background

Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches.

Main body

We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity.

Conclusions

Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

The interplay between unexpected events and behavior in the development of explicit knowledge in implicit sequence learning

Some studies in implicit learning investigate the mechanisms by which implicitly acquired knowledge (e.g., learning a sequence of responses) becomes consciously aware. It has been suggested that unexpected changes in the own behavior can trigger search processes, of which the outcome then becomes aware. A consistent empirical finding is that participants who develop explicit knowledge show a sudden decrease in reaction times, when responding to sequential events. This so called RT-drop might indicate the point of time when explicit knowledge occurs. We investigated whether an RT-drop is a precursor for the development of explicit knowledge or the consequence of explicit knowledge. To answer this question, we manipulated in a serial reaction time task the timing of long and short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA). For some participants, the different SOAs were presented in blocks of either long or short SOAs, while for others, the SOAs changed randomly. We expected the participants who were given a blocked presentation to express an RT-drop because of the predictable timing. In contrast, randomly changing SOAs should hamper the expression of an RT-drop. We found that more participants in the blocked-SOA condition than in the random-SOA condition showed an RT-drop. Furthermore, the amount of explicit knowledge did not differ between the two conditions. The findings suggest that the RT-drop does not seem to be a presupposition to develop explicit knowledge. Rather, it seems that the RT-drop indicates a behavioral strategy shift as a consequence of explicit knowledge.

Metamemory: Rats know the strength of their memory

Assessing the quality of one's own memories is a core cognitive function, but it has been unclear whether rodents possess this ability. Evidence that they do has come from research using a new behavioural paradigm in which rats make temporal bets guided by memory confidence.

Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge explains perceptual confidence and its deviations from accuracy

In perceptual decisions, subjects infer hidden states of the environment based on noisy sensory information. Here we show that both choice and its associated confidence are explained by a Bayesian framework based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). We test our model on monkeys performing a direction-discrimination task with post-decision wagering, demonstrating that the model explains objective accuracy and predicts subjective confidence. Further, we show that the model replicates well-known discrepancies of confidence and accuracy, including the hard-easy effect, opposing effects of stimulus variability on confidence and accuracy, dependence of confidence ratings on simultaneous or sequential reports of choice and confidence, apparent difference between choice and confidence sensitivity, and seemingly disproportionate influence of choice-congruent evidence on confidence. These effects may not be signatures of sub-optimal inference or discrepant computational processes for choice and confidence. Rather, they arise in Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge of the environment.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

Metacognitive resources for adaptive learning⋆

Biological organisms display remarkably flexible behaviours. This is an area of active investigation, in particular in the fields of artificial intelligence, computational and cognitive neuroscience. While inductive biases and broader cognitive functions are undoubtedly important, the ability to monitor and evaluate one's performance or oneself -- metacognition -- strikes as a powerful resource for efficient learning. Often measured as decision confidence in neuroscience and psychology experiments, metacognition appears to reflect a broad range of abstraction levels and downstream behavioural effects. Within this context, the formal investigation of how metacognition interacts with learning processes is a recent endeavour. Of special interest are the neural and computational underpinnings of confidence and reinforcement learning modules. This review discusses a general hierarchy of confidence functions and their neuro-computational relevance for adaptive behaviours. It then introduces novel ways to study the formation and use of meta-representations and nonconscious mental representations related to learning and confidence, and concludes with a discussion on outstanding questions and wider perspectives.

Neural Mechanism of Blindsight in a Macaque Model

Some patients with damage to the primary visual cortex (V1) exhibit visuomotor ability, despite loss of visual awareness, a phenomenon termed "blindsight". We review a series of studies conducted mainly in our laboratory on macaque monkeys with unilateral V1 lesioning to reveal the neural pathways underlying visuomotor transformation and the cognitive capabilities retained in blindsight. After lesioning, it takes several weeks for the recovery of visually guided saccades toward the lesion-affected visual field. In addition to the lateral geniculate nucleus, the pathway from the superior colliculus to the pulvinar participates in visuomotor processing in blindsight. At the cortical level, bilateral lateral intraparietal regions become critically involved in the saccade control. These results suggest that the visual circuits experience drastic changes while the monkey acquires blindsight. In these animals, analysis based on signal detection theory adapted to behavior in the "Yes-No" task indicates reduced sensitivity to visual targets, suggesting that visual awareness is impaired. Saccades become less accurate, decisions become less deliberate, and some forms of bottom-up attention are impaired. However, a variety of cognitive functions are retained such as saliency detection during free viewing, top-down attention, short-term spatial memory, and associative learning. These observations indicate that blindsight is not a low-level sensory-motor response, but the residual visual inputs can access these cognitive capabilities. Based on these results we suggest that the macaque model of blindsight replicates type II blindsight patients who experience some "feeling" of objects, which guides cognitive capabilities that we naïvely think are not possible without phenomenal consciousness.

Modelling visibility judgments using models of decision confidence

How can we explain the regularities in subjective reports of human observers about their subjective visual experience of a stimulus? The present study tests whether a recent model of confidence in perceptual decisions, the weighted evidence and visibility model, can be generalized from confidence to subjective visibility. In a postmasked orientation identification task, observers reported the subjective visibility of the stimulus after each single identification response. Cognitive modelling revealed that the weighted evidence and visibility model provided a superior fit to the data compared with the standard signal detection model, the signal detection model with unsystematic noise superimposed on ratings, the postdecisional accumulation model, the two-channel model, the response-congruent evidence model, the two-dimensional Bayesian model, and the constant noise and decay model. A comparison between subjective visibility and decisional confidence revealed that visibility relied more on the strength of sensory evidence about features of the stimulus irrelevant to the identification judgment and less on evidence for the identification judgment. It is argued that at least two types of evidence are required to account for subjective visibility, one related to the identification judgment, and one related to the strength of stimulation.

Distinct signatures of subjective confidence and objective accuracy in speech prosody

Whether speech prosody truly and naturally reflects a speaker's subjective confidence, rather than other dimensions such as objective accuracy, is unclear. Here, using a new approach combing psychophysics with acoustic analysis and automatic classification of verbal reports, we tease apart the contributions of sensory evidence, accuracy, and subjective confidence to speech prosody. We find that subjective confidence and objective accuracy are distinctly reflected in the loudness, duration and intonation of verbal reports. Strikingly, we show that a speaker's accuracy is encoded in speech prosody beyond their own metacognitive awareness, and that it can be automatically decoded from this information alone with performances up to 60%. These findings demonstrate that confidence and accuracy have separable prosodic signatures that are manifested with different timings, and on different acoustic dimensions. Thus, both subjective mental states of confidence, and objective states related to competence, can be directly inferred from this natural behavior.

Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories

The present study investigated the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in source monitoring with self-report scales engaging either information- or experienced-based knowledge. We expected that the source monitoring abilities may be affected by the origins of meta-knowledge that underlie post-decision wagering (PDW) based on economic categorizations (experience-based scale) and confidence ratings (CR) using a conventional taxonomy of confidence (information-based scale). To examine this hypothesis, healthy participants (N = 50) performed an action memory task, in which simple actions were presented in order to be performed or imagined. In the second phase of the task, participants were required to assess source monitoring by distinguishing whether the presented action was performed or imagined. Then, the participants randomly assigned into the PDW or CR group rated their confidence in responses related to source monitoring performance. It was found that source monitoring ability is resistant to manipulation of the type of knowledge used in the scales. However, measures of metacognition indicated that accuracy of the experienced-based judgments of PDW was higher as compared to the CR scale while source monitoring. These findings suggest the origin of knowledge whose justification rests more on empirical observations generates more accurate knowledge than self-evident direct intuition with respect to discriminations of one’s own memories.

Mindreading and metacognition patterns in patients with borderline personality disorder: experimental study

Current psychopathology attempts to understand personality disorders in relation to deficits in higher cognition such as mindreading and metacognition. Deficits in mindreading are usually related to limitations in or a complete lack of the capacity to understand and attribute mental states to others, while impairments in metacognition concern dysfunctional control and monitoring of one's own processes. The present study investigated dysfunctional higher cognition in the population of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) by analyzing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in a mindreading task [reading the mind in the eyes Test (RMET)] and a subsequent metacognitive task based on self-report scales: a confidence rating scale (CR) versus a post-decision wagering scale (PDW). It turned out that people from the BPD group scored lower in the RMET. However, both groups had the same levels of confidence on the PDW scale when giving incorrect answers in the RMET test. As initially hypothesized, individuals with BPD overestimated their confidence in incorrect answers, regardless of the type of metacognitive scales used. The present findings indicate that BPD individuals show dysfunctional patterns between instances of mindreading and metacognition.

Metacognition in gambling disorder: A systematic review and meta-analysis

INTRODUCTION

In recent literature, abnormalities in the metacognitive domain have been pointed out as psychological variables that may account for a wide range of psychopathologies, including gambling disorder (GD). Considering the growing but scattered nature of the research concerning the relationship between metacognition and GD, a systematic review and meta-analysis of the existing results are required.

METHODS

We performed a systematic search through five scientific databases for research published till December 10, 2019, following PRISMA guidelines. We also searched grey literature. After removing the redundancy, 16.855 records were screened.

RESULTS

Unanimously, authors selected 10 articles based on the inclusion criteria. Four of the selected studies evaluated metacognitive abilities towards cognitive performances, mostly considering metacognitive deficits about decision-making, while metacognitive beliefs were assessed by six of the selected articles. Only one study examined metacognitive functioning regarding GD. The meta-analytic procedure was performed on 10 identified studies based on the criteria adopted, which comprised 1.655 individuals. Results showed that the average effect size linking metacognitive dysfunctions and GD was significant and moderated by the instrument used to measure metacognition.

CONCLUSIONS

The examined line of research is highly heterogeneous owing to the type of operationalization adopted for metacognition. The systematic review also showed a grey area, evidencing the lack of research on metacognitive functions. Results demonstrated by this meta-analysis call for future studies examining the role of metacognitive deficits in GD in order to delineate useful clinical indications.

Priors and payoffs in confidence judgments

Priors and payoffs are known to affect perceptual decision-making, but little is understood about how they influence confidence judgments. For optimal perceptual decision-making, both priors and payoffs should be considered when selecting a response. However, for confidence to reflect the probability of being correct in a perceptual decision, priors should affect confidence but payoffs should not. To experimentally test whether human observers follow this normative behavior for natural confidence judgments, we conducted an orientation-discrimination task with varied priors and payoffs that probed both perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. The placement of discrimination and confidence criteria were examined according to several plausible Signal Detection Theory models. In the normative model, observers use the optimal discrimination criterion (i.e., the criterion that maximizes expected gain) and confidence criteria that shift with the discrimination criterion that maximizes accuracy (i.e., are not affected by payoffs). No observer was consistent with this model, with the majority exhibiting non-normative confidence behavior. One subset of observers ignored both priors and payoffs for confidence, always fixing the confidence criteria around the neutral discrimination criterion. The other group of observers incorrectly incorporated payoffs into their confidence by always shifting their confidence criteria with the same gains-maximizing criterion used for discrimination. Such metacognitive mistakes could have negative consequences outside the laboratory setting, particularly when priors or payoffs are not matched for all the possible decision alternatives.

Metacognition of average face perception

Individuals have the ability to extract summary statistics from multiple items presented simultaneously. However, it is unclear yet whether we have insight into the process of ensemble coding. The aim of this study was to investigate metacognition about average face perception. Participants saw a group of four faces presented for 2 s or 5 s, and then they were asked to judge whether the following test face was present in the previous set (Experiment 1), or whether the test face was the average of the four member faces (Experiment 2). After each response, participants rated their confidence. Replicating previous findings, there was substantial endorsement for the average face derived from the four member faces in Experiment 1, even though it was not present in the set. When judging faces that had been presented in the set, confidence correlated positively with accuracy, providing evidence for metacognitive awareness of previously studied faces. Importantly, there was a negative confidence-accuracy relationship for judging average faces when duration was 2 s, and a near-zero relationship when duration was 5 s. By contrast, when the average face had to be identified explicitly in Experiment 2, performance was above chance level and there was a positive correlation between confidence and accuracy. These results suggest that people have metacognitive awareness about average face perception when averaging is required explicitly, but they lack insight into the averaging process when member identification is required.

Neural and behavioral traces of error awareness

Monitoring for errors and behavioral adjustments after errors are essential for daily life. A question that has not been addressed systematically yet, is whether consciously perceived errors lead to different behavioral adjustments compared to unperceived errors. Our goal was to develop a task that would enable us to study different commonly observed neural correlates of error processing and post-error adjustments in their relation to error awareness and accuracy confidence in a single experiment. We assessed performance in a new number judgement error awareness task in 70 participants. We used multiple, robust, single-trial EEG regressions to investigate the link between neural correlates of error processing (e.g., error-related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe)) and error awareness. We found that only aware errors had a slowing effect on reaction times in consecutive trials, but this slowing was not accompanied by post-error increases in accuracy. On a neural level, error awareness and confidence had a modulating effect on both the ERN and Pe, whereby the Pe was most predictive of participants' error awareness. Additionally, we found partial support for a mediating role of error awareness on the coupling between the ERN and behavioral adjustments in the following trial. Our results corroborate previous findings that show both an ERN/Pe and a post-error behavioral adaptation modulation by error awareness. This suggests that conscious error perception can support meta-control processes balancing the recruitment of proactive and reactive control. Furthermore, this study strengthens the role of the Pe as a robust neural index of error awareness.

The role of metacognition in recognition of the content of statistical learning

Despite theoretical debate on the extent to which statistical learning is incidental or modulated by explicit instructions and conscious awareness of the content of statistical learning, no study has ever investigated the metacognition of statistical learning. We used an artificial language-learning paradigm and a segmentation task that required splitting a continuous stream of syllables into discrete recurrent constituents. During this task, statistical learning potentially produces knowledge of discrete constituents as well as about statistical regularities that are embodied in familiarization input. We measured metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency (using hierarchical Bayesian modelling to estimate metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency) to probe the role of conscious awareness in recognition of constituents extracted from the familiarization input and recognition of novel constituents embodying the same statistical regularities as these extracted constituents. Novel constituents are conceptualized to represent recognition of statistical structure rather than recognition of items retrieved from memory as whole constituents. We found that participants are equally sensitive to both types of learning products, yet subject them to varying degrees of conscious processing during the postfamiliarization recognition test. The data point to the contribution of conscious awareness to at least some types of statistical learning content.

Channels to consciousness: a possible role of gap junctions in consciousness

The neurophysiological basis of consciousness is still unknown and one of the most challenging questions in the field of neuroscience and related disciplines. We propose that consciousness is characterized by the maintenance of mental representations of internal and external stimuli for the execution of cognitive operations. Consciousness cannot exist without working memory, and it is likely that consciousness and working memory share the same neural substrates. Here, we present a novel psychological and neurophysiological framework that explains the role of consciousness for cognition, adaptive behavior, and everyday life. A hypothetical architecture of consciousness is presented that is organized as a system of operation and storage units named platforms that are controlled by a consciousness center (central executive/online platform). Platforms maintain mental representations or contents, are entrusted with different executive functions, and operate at different levels of consciousness. The model includes conscious-mode central executive/online and mental time travel platforms and semiconscious steady-state and preconscious standby platforms. Mental representations or contents are represented by neural circuits and their support cells (astrocytes, oligodendrocytes, etc.) and become conscious when neural circuits reverberate, that is, fire sequentially and continuously with relative synchronicity. Reverberatory activity in neural circuits may be initiated and maintained by pacemaker cells/neural circuit pulsars, enhanced electronic coupling via gap junctions, and unapposed hemichannel opening. The central executive/online platform controls which mental representations or contents should become conscious by recruiting pacemaker cells/neural network pulsars, the opening of hemichannels, and promoting enhanced neural circuit coupling via gap junctions.

A brain network supporting social influences in human decision-making

Humans learn from their own trial-and-error experience and observing others. However, it remains unknown how brain circuits compute expected values when direct learning and social learning coexist in uncertain environments. Using a multiplayer reward learning paradigm with 185 participants (39 being scanned) in real time, we observed that individuals succumbed to the group when confronted with dissenting information but observing confirming information increased their confidence. Leveraging computational modeling and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we tracked direct valuation through experience and vicarious valuation through observation and their dissociable, but interacting neural representations in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, respectively. Their functional coupling with the right temporoparietal junction representing instantaneous social information instantiated a hitherto uncharacterized social prediction error, rather than a reward prediction error, in the putamen. These findings suggest that an integrated network involving the brain's reward hub and social hub supports social influence in human decision-making.

Visual experience forms a multidimensional pattern that is not reducible to a single measure: Evidence from metacontrast masking

A metacontrast masking paradigm was employed to provide evidence for the richness and diversity of our visual experience. Square- and diamond-shaped targets were followed by square- and diamond-shaped masks at varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), resulting in shape-congruent and shape-incongruent trials. In Experiment 1, participants reported in each trial how they perceived target and mask. After extended training, seven different aspects of the target could be distinguished as specific percepts in this metacontrast masking paradigm. These percepts encompass aspects including the temporal distance between both stimuli, the perceived contrast of the target, and motion percepts resulting from the interplay between the target and mask. Participants spontaneously reported each of these percepts, and the frequency of reports varied systematically with SOA and the congruency between target and mask. In Experiment 2, we trained a new group of participants to distinguish each of these target percepts. Again, the frequency of reports of the specific percepts varied with SOA and congruency, just as in Experiment 1. In a last session, we measured objective discrimination performance yielding the typical individually different masking functions across SOAs. An examination of the relation between the frequencies of reports of subjective percepts and objective discrimination performance revealed multiple dissociations between these measures. Results suggest a multidimensional pattern of subjective experiences under metacontrast, which is reflected in dissociated subjective and objective measures of visual awareness. As a consequence, awareness cannot be assessed exhaustively by a single measure, thus challenging the use of simple one-dimensional subjective or objective measures in visual masking.

Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses

Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct 'sensory' contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.

Conscious perception of flickering stimuli in binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression is not affected by tACS-induced SSR modulation

The content of conscious perception is known to correlate with steady-state responses (SSRs), yet their causal relationship remains unclear. Can we manipulate conscious perception by directly interfering with SSRs through transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS)? Here, we directly addressed this question in three experiments involving binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression (CFS). Specifically, while participants (N = 24) viewed either binocular rivalry or tried to detect stimuli masked by CFS, we applied sham or real tACS across parieto-occipital cortex at either the same or a different frequency and phase as an SSR eliciting flicker stimulus. We found that tACS did not differentially affect conscious perception in the forms of predominance, CFS detection accuracy, reaction time, or metacognitive sensitivity, confirmed by Bayesian statistics. We conclude that tACS application at frequencies of stimulus-induced SSRs does not have perceptual effects and that SSRs may be epiphenomenal to conscious perception.

Confidence reports in decision-making with multiple alternatives violate the Bayesian confidence hypothesis

Decision confidence reflects our ability to evaluate the quality of decisions and guides subsequent behavior. Experiments on confidence reports have almost exclusively focused on two-alternative decision-making. In this realm, the leading theory is that confidence reflects the probability that a decision is correct (the posterior probability of the chosen option). There is, however, another possibility, namely that people are less confident if the best two options are closer to each other in posterior probability, regardless of how probable they are in absolute terms. This possibility has not previously been considered because in two-alternative decisions, it reduces to the leading theory. Here, we test this alternative theory in a three-alternative visual categorization task. We found that confidence reports are best explained by the difference between the posterior probabilities of the best and the next-best options, rather than by the posterior probability of the chosen (best) option alone, or by the overall uncertainty (entropy) of the posterior distribution. Our results upend the leading notion of decision confidence and instead suggest that confidence reflects the observer’s subjective probability that they made the best possible decision.

Conventional theory suggests that people’s confidence about a decision reflects their subjective probability that the decision was correct. By studying decisions with multiple alternatives, the authors show that confidence reports instead reflect the difference in probabilities between the chosen and the next-best alternative.

Visual experience forms a multidimensional pattern that is not reducible to a single measure: Evidence from metacontrast masking

A metacontrast masking paradigm was employed to provide evidence for the richness and diversity of our visual experience. Square- and diamond-shaped targets were followed by square- and diamond-shaped masks at varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), resulting in shape-congruent and shape-incongruent trials. In Experiment 1, participants reported in each trial how they perceived target and mask. After extended training, seven different aspects of the target could be distinguished as specific percepts in this metacontrast masking paradigm. These percepts encompass aspects including the temporal distance between both stimuli, the perceived contrast of the target, and motion percepts resulting from the interplay between the target and mask. Participants spontaneously reported each of these percepts, and the frequency of reports varied systematically with SOA and the congruency between target and mask. In Experiment 2, we trained a new group of participants to distinguish each of these target percepts. Again, the frequency of reports of the specific percepts varied with SOA and congruency, just as in Experiment 1. In a last session, we measured objective discrimination performance yielding the typical individually different masking functions across SOAs. An examination of the relation between the frequencies of reports of subjective percepts and objective discrimination performance revealed multiple dissociations between these measures. Results suggest a multidimensional pattern of subjective experiences under metacontrast, which is reflected in dissociated subjective and objective measures of visual awareness. As a consequence, awareness cannot be assessed exhaustively by a single measure, thus challenging the use of simple one-dimensional subjective or objective measures in visual masking.

Implicit perceptual learning of visual-auditory modality sequences

We examined perceptual modality sequence learning by presenting number words either visually (V) or auditorily (A). Manual responses were assigned to number identity, which was random, but the stimulus modalities followed a predictable 6-element sequence (e.g., VVAAVA). In two experiments, we assessed sequence-specific learning as the performance difference between the predictable sequence and a random transfer sequence. We expected learning benefits, but for visual trials we did not find any clear predictability benefits, and, surprisingly, for auditory trials we even found a general processing disadvantage (i.e., a predictability cost) for auditory trials (Experiment 1) or a cost-benefit pattern (Experiment 2, with equated shift rates in predictable and random sequences), with costs for auditory repetition trials and benefits for shifting to auditory processing. Hence, overall there was a general learning "cost" (Experiment 1) or a null net benefit of predictability for performance (Experiment 2). Together, the findings reveal a modality-specific sensitivity towards variations in shift frequency and modality predictability only for auditory trials, but there was no overall benefit of modality-specific sequence learning.

Monetary Incentives Increase Metacognitive Confidence in Source Memory Performance in Patients With Schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Contemporary psychiatric research focuses its attention on the patient's dysfunction of metacognition in relation to the basic cognitive processes of mental activity. The current study investigated dysfunctional metacognition in relation to self-monitoring of memory in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Dysfunctions in metacognition were examined by focusing on two types of metacognitive measures: post-decision wagering (PDW) scale and confidence ratings (CR) scale (CR).

OBJECTIVES

The research employed an action-memory task that required patients with schizophrenia (N = 39) and healthy controls (N = 50) to evaluate their metacognition by categorizing self-monitoring actions (imagined vs. performed actions) either with PDW or CR. It was hypothesized that metacognition in self-monitoring activity in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia is improved by imaginary monetary incentives.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

To test this hypothesis, participants were asked to memorize actions either performed or imagined during the first phase of the experiment. The second phase was to identify previous actions as performed, imagined or new, and then to express confidence using two measures of metacognition (CR or PDW scales) that were randomly allocated to participants.

RESULTS

Our study showed reduced performance in the action memory task for patients with schizophrenia, although there were no group differences in confidence measures when assessing self-monitoring actions. In particular, irrespective of the diagnosis, no differences in confidence measures for correct responses were found in the case of the PDW and CR scales. We also observed that metacognitive judgements were more accurate for incorrect responses when both groups used monetary incentives to reveal their metacognition.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that monetary incentives improve accuracy of metacognition among both patients and healthy controls. This accuracy-enhancing effect of monetary incentives on metacognition was possibly a result of motivational processes, including aversion to loss. The paper discusses the potential application of PDW in therapeutic metacognitive training for patients with schizophrenia.

Working memory can compare two visual items without accessing visual consciousness

Recent studies argued that unconscious visual information could access the working memory, however, it is still unclear whether the central executive could be activated unconsciously. We investigated, using a delayed match-to-sample task, whether the central executive is an unconscious process. In the experiment of the present study, participants were asked to compare the locations of two given visual targets. Both targets (or one of the two targets, depending on the experimental condition) were masked by a visual masking paradigm. The results showed an above-chance-level performance even in the condition that participants compared two unconscious targets. However, when the trials with the non-visual conscious experience of the target were removed from the analysis, the performance was no longer significantly different from chance level. Our results suggest that the central executive could be activated unconsciously by some level of stimulus signal, that is still below the threshold for a subjective report.

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth is: Examining Metacognition in ASD Using Post-decision Wagering

It has been argued that metacognition and mindreading rely on the same cognitive processes (Carruthers in The opacity of mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). It is widely accepted that mindreading is diminished among individuals diagnosed with autism (Brunsdon and Happé in Autism 18(1):17–30, 2014), however, little is known about metacognition. This study examined metacognition in relation to mindreading and autism using post-decision wagering. Results from a student sample showed negative associations between autism traits and metacognitive accuracy, and metacognitive reaction times and mindreading. These findings were replicated in a general population sample, providing evidence of a reliable association between metacognition, mindreading and autism traits. However, adults diagnosed with autism showed equivalent levels of metacognitive accuracy to age- and IQ-matched comparison participants, albeit only with an overall increase in meta-level processing time.

Are errors detected before they occur? Early error sensations revealed by metacognitive judgments on the timing of error awareness

Errors in choice tasks are not only detected fast and reliably, participants often report that they knew that an error occurred already before a response was produced. These early error sensations stand in contrast with evidence suggesting that the earliest neural correlates of error awareness emerge around 300 ms after erroneous responses. The present study aimed to investigate whether anecdotal evidence for early error sensations can be corroborated in a controlled study in which participants provide metacognitive judgments on the subjective timing of error awareness. In Experiment 1, participants had to report whether they became aware of their errors before or after the response. In Experiment 2, wemeasured confidence in these metacognitive judgments. Our data show that participants report early error sensations with high confidence in the majority of error trials across paradigms and experiments. These results provide first evidence for early error sensations, informing theories of error awareness.

Analyzing Abstraction and Hierarchical Decision-Making in Absolute Identification by Information-Theoretic Bounded Rationality

In the face of limited computational resources, bounded rational decision theory predicts that information-processing should be concentrated on actions that make a significant contribution in terms of the utility achieved. Accordingly, information-processing can be simplified by choosing stereotypic actions that lead to satisfactory performance over a range of different inputs rather than choosing a specific action for each input. Such a set of similar inputs with similar action responses would then correspond to an abstraction that can be harnessed with possibly negligible loss in utility, but with potentially considerable savings in information-processing effort. Here we test this prediction in an identification task, where human subjects were asked to estimate the roundness of ellipses varying from a straight line to a perfect circle. Crucially, when reporting their estimates, subjects could choose between three different levels of precision corresponding to three levels of abstraction in a decision-making hierarchy. To induce changes in level selection, we manipulated the information-processing resources available at the perceptual and action stages by varying the difficulty of identifying the stimulus and by enforcing different response times in the action stage. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that subjects adapt their abstraction level depending on the available resources. We compare subjects' behavior to the maximum efficiency predicated by the bounded rational decision-making model and investigate possible sources of inefficiency.

Metacognition in Psychology

How has the concept of metacognition been used within basic and applied psychological research? We begin our answer by presenting a broad definition of metacognition, a historical overview of its development and its presence in research databases. To assess which function and facets are most frequently addressed within each of the sub-disciplines, we present results from separate literature searches. We then review how metacognition has been defined and empirically explored within selected sub-disciplines in terms of typical research questions, conceptual definitions, how the concept has been measured, and examples of interesting findings and implications. We identify similarities, inconsistencies, and disagreements across fields and point out areas for future research. Our overall conclusion is that it is useful to consider metacognition as a broad umbrella concept across different domains and across basic and applied research. Nonetheless, we recommend that researchers be more specific and explicit about their approach and assumptions whenever using metacognition in their research.

Does the influence of near-threshold primes depend on the type of task?

Most studies investigating the influence of primes on the processing of subsequent targets involve a main task in which responses are made to the targets, and a task that tests prime awareness. If the participant is not aware of the prime location/identity but an influence of the prime is observed in the main task, researchers conclude that this influence can be ascribed to unconscious processing of the prime. This implies the assumption that the prime's influence is independent of task instructions: a prime consciously perceived in the prime task is consciously perceived in the main task. In the metacontrast-masking study, we compared motor- and attention-related electroencephalographic (EEG) components in three tasks with the same stimuli but different instructions and showed that early posterior contralateral negativities (PCNs) and lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) were smaller when primes were task-relevant than when targets were task-relevant. This suggests that early components may depend on task instruction and are not purely prime-related.

Explicit and implicit monitoring in neurodegeneration and stroke

Monitoring is a complex multidimensional neurocognitive phenomenon. Patients with fronto-insular stroke (FIS), behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) show a lack of self-awareness, insight, and self-monitoring, which translate into anosognosia and daily behavioural impairments. Notably, they also present damage in key monitoring areas. While neuroscientific research on this domain has accrued in recent years, no previous study has compared monitoring performance across these brain diseases and none has applied a multiple lesion model approach combined with neuroimaging analysis. Here, we evaluated explicit and implicit monitoring in patients with focal stoke (FIS) and two types of dementia (bvFTD and AD) presenting damage in key monitoring areas. Participants performed a visual perception task and provided two types of report: confidence (explicit judgment of trust about their performance) and wagering (implicit reports which consisted in betting on their accuracy in the perceptual task). Then, damaged areas were analyzed via structural MRI to identify associations with potential behavioral deficits. In AD, inadequate confidence judgments were accompanied by poor wagering performance, demonstrating explicit and implicit monitoring impairments. By contrast, disorders of implicit monitoring in FIS and bvFTD patients occurred in the context of accurate confidence reports, suggesting a reduced ability to turn self-knowledge into appropriate wagering conducts. MRI analysis showed that ventromedial compromise was related to overconfidence, whereas fronto-temporo-insular damage was associated with excessive wagering. Therefore, joint assessment of explicit and implicit monitoring could favor a better differentiation of neurological profiles (frontal damage vs AD) and eventually contribute to delineating clinical interventions.