Experimental subjects are not different

Testing a policy intervention in the lab: differences between students and non-students in switching bank accounts

The reliance on student samples has long been a subject of debate in experimental approaches to studying behaviour. We contribute to this discussion by looking at differences in financial behaviour between a student and a non-student sample in three sets of lab experiments conducted in Spain, Germany and Poland (n=857). Participants from both samples switched more often and made better financial decisions after they received a message encouraging them to switch financial service providers. While the size of the effect on switching frequency was comparable between the two samples, the effect on switching quality was significantly stronger on non-students. Further analysis suggests this is due to a better performance of students before the prompt leaving less room for improvement by the reminder. Results suggest that experimental evidence derived from students should be generalized with caution.

Air pollution and anti-social behaviour: Evidence from a randomised lab-in-the-field experiment

We conducted a pre-registered randomised lab-in-the-field online experiment in Beijing, China, to explore the relationship between acute air pollution and anti-social behaviour. Our novel experimental design exploits naturally occurring discontinuities in pollution episodes to mimic an experimental setting in which pollution exposure is exogenously manipulated, thus allowing us to identify a causal relationship. Participants were randomly assigned to be surveyed on either high pollution or low pollution days, thereby exogenously varying the degree of pollution exposure. In addition, a subset of individuals surveyed on the high-pollution days received an additional 'pollution alert' to explore whether providing air pollution warnings influences (protective) behaviour. We used a set of well-established incentivised economic games to obtain clean measures of anti-social behaviour, as well as a range of secondary outcomes which may drive the proposed pollution-behaviour relationship. Our results indicate that exposure to acute air pollution had no statistically significant effect on anti-social behaviour, but significantly reduced both psychological and physiological well-being. However, these effects do not remain statistically significant after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. We find no evidence that pollution affects cognitive ability, present bias, discounting, or risk aversion, four potential pathways which may explain the relationship between pollution and anti-social behaviour. Our study adds to the growing calls for purposefully designed and pre-registered experiments that strengthen experimental (as opposed to correlational or quasi-experimental) identification and thus allow causal insights into the relationship between pollution and anti-social behaviour.

Anti-social behaviour and economic decision-making: Panel experimental evidence in the wake of COVID-19

We systematically examine the acute impact of exposure to a public health crisis on anti-social behaviour and economic decision-making using unique experimental panel data from China, collected just before the outbreak of COVID-19 and immediately after the first wave was overcome. Exploiting plausibly exogenous geographical variation in virus exposure coupled with a dataset of longitudinal experiments, we show that participants who were more intensely exposed to the virus outbreak became more anti-social than those with lower exposure, while other aspects of economic and social preferences remain largely stable. The finding is robust to multiple hypothesis testing and a similar, yet less pronounced pattern emerges when using alternative measures of virus exposure, reflecting societal concern and sentiment, constructed using social media data. The anti-social response is particularly pronounced for individuals who experienced an increase in depression or negative affect, which highlights the important role of psychological health as a potential mechanism through which the virus outbreak affected behaviour.

Holistic thinking and risk-taking perceptions reduce risk-taking intentions: ethical, financial, and health/safety risks across genders and cultures

Holistic thinking involves four subconstructs: causality, contradiction, attention to the whole, and change. This holistic perspective varies across Eastern–Western cultures and genders. We theorize that holistic thinking reduces three domain-specific risk-taking behavioral intentions (ethical, financial, and health/safety) directly and indirectly through enhanced risk-taking attitudes. Our formative theoretical model treats the four subconstructs of holistic thinking as yoked antecedents and frames it in a proximal context of causes and consequences. We simultaneously explore the direct and indirect paths and test our model across cultures, genders, and the combination of the two. For the entire sample (N = 531), holistic thinking negatively relates to risk intentions via enhanced risk perceptions. Across cultures, the indirect paths prevail among Chinese people (n = 284), and both direct and indirect paths triumph for Americans (n = 247). Across genders, the indirect paths exist for females, whereas the negative direct path (risk-raking attitudes → behavioral intentions) succeeds for males. Across cultures and genders, holistic thinking negatively relates to American males’ ethical risks the most but Chinese males’ financial risks the least. Risk-taking perceptions are negatively related to Chinese males’ ethical risks the most, but Chinese people’s (males/females) financial risks the least. Causality and change are vital for all contexts, attention to the whole for all males and Chinese males, and contradiction for Americans and all females. Holistic thinking has limits and is less robust than risk-taking perceptions in reducing risky behavioral intentions. Our practical implications help people make ethical, healthy, and wealthy decisions.

Prosociality predicts individual behavior and collective outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic induces a social dilemma: engaging in preventive health behaviors is costly for individuals but generates benefits that also accrue to society at large. The extent to which individuals internalize the social impact of their actions may depend on their prosociality, i.e. the willingness to behave in a way that mostly benefits other people. We conduct a nationally representative online survey in Germany (n = 5843) to investigate the role of prosociality in reducing the spread of COVID-19 during the second coronavirus wave. At the individual level, higher prosociality is strongly positively related to compliance with public health behaviors such as mask wearing and social distancing. A one standard deviation (SD) increase in prosociality is associated with a 0.3 SD increase in compliance (p < 0.01). At the regional (NUTS-2) level, a one SD higher average prosociality is associated with an 11% lower weekly incidence rate (p < 0.01), and a 2%p lower weekly growth rate (p < 0.01) of COVID-19 cases, controlling for a host of demographic and socio-economic factors. This association is driven by higher compliance with public health behaviors in regions with higher prosociality. Our correlational results thus support the common notion that voluntary behavioral change plays a vital role in fighting the pandemic and, more generally, that social preferences may determine collective action outcomes of a society.

Culture and group-functional punishment behaviour

Humans often 'altruistically' punish non-cooperators in one-shot interactions among genetically unrelated individuals. This poses an evolutionary puzzle because altruistic punishment enforces cooperation norms that benefit the whole group but is costly for the punisher. One key explanation is that punishment follows a social-benefits logic: it is eminently normative and group-functional (drawing on cultural group selection theories). In contrast, mismatch-based deterrence theory argues that punishment serves the individual-level function of deterring mistreatment of oneself and one's allies, hinging upon the evolved human coalitional psychology. We conducted multilateral-cooperation experiments with a sample of Spanish Romani people (Gitanos or Calé) and the non-Gitano majority. The Gitanos represent a unique case study because they rely heavily on close kin-based networks and display a strong ethnic identity. We find that Gitano non-cooperators were not punished by co-ethnics in only-Gitano (ethnically) homogeneous groups but were harshly punished by other Gitanos and by non-Gitanos in ethnically mixed groups. Our findings suggest the existence of culture-specific motives for punishment: Gitanos, especially males, appear to use punishment to protect their ethnic identity, whereas non-Gitanos use punishment to protect a norm of universal cooperation. Only theories that consider normative, group-functional forces underlying punishment behaviour can explain our data.

Effects of experimental situation on group cooperation and individual performance: Comparing laboratory and online experiments

With the spread of online behavioral experiments, estimating the effects of experimental situations and sample heterogeneity is increasing in discussions of the generalizability of data. In this study, we examined how the experimental situations (laboratory/online) affected group cooperation and individual performances. The participants were Japanese university students, randomly assigned to laboratory or online experiments. For the group cooperation task, they were asked to perform the public goods game with or without punishment, but no effect of the experimental situation was found both for cooperative and punitive behaviors. For the individual tasks, participants were asked to perform tasks including a creative task and a dull task. We manipulated the presence or absence of an external incentive. As a result, there was no significant difference between the experimental situations with one exception: only in the laboratory situation was the performance of the difficult creative task lower in the presence of an external incentive. Furthermore, we conducted as an additional experiment using the same treatments for a Japanese online-worker sample. This sample was less cooperative in the public goods game than the student sample, both with and without punishment. In addition, the presence of external incentives facilitated performance of the online-worker sample only for the dull task. We discuss the similarities and differences with previous studies that examined the effects of experimental situations and sample heterogeneity, and the implications for remote work in the real world.

Motivating Innovation: Tunnels vs. Funnels

The tentative pursuit of parallel projects in an innovation funnel helps firms improve selection under uncertainty. Yet a risk of premature project termination may make employees more hesitant to innovate. Rewards to innovation, if at risk, become less attractive. My laboratory experiment indeed shows that employees who believe they have low task efficacy and, thus, face a high risk of termination often forego innovation. But funnels also attract: employees with high efficacy beliefs choose innovation more often although they, too, face an additional, albeit smaller, termination risk. Their innovation choices reveal a preference for allocation regimes that are more likely to spot and reward the ultimately most deserving innovators. Such meritocracy increases alongside project-selection accuracy. The uncertainty of innovation, thus, proves a rare context in which employees view a lack of organizational commitment positively. The meritorious self-sorting I document has implications for motivating risk-taking and organizing innovation within firms.

Is formalism the key to resolving the generalizability crisis? An experimental economics perspective

I draw lessons from experimental economics. I argue that the lack of mathematical formalism cannot be usefully thought as the cause of the underappreciation of contextual and generalizability considerations. Instead, this lack is problematic because it hinders a clear relationship between theory and quantitative predictions. I also advocate a pragmatic policy-focused approach as a partial remedy to the generalizability problem.

Science-related populism declining during the COVID-19 pandemic: A panel survey of the Swiss population before and after the Coronavirus outbreak

In many countries, the COVID-19 pandemic led to increased public support for societal institutions including science, a phenomenon described as "rally-round-the-flag" dynamic. However, it is unclear if this dynamic has also reduced public resentment toward science such as science-related populist attitudes, that is, the preference of people's common sense over allegedly elitist scientific knowledge. We test this, relying on individual-level data from panel surveys before and during the pandemic in Switzerland. Results show that science-related populist attitudes decreased after the pandemic started. The decrease was more pronounced among people who had been strong supporters of science-related populism prior to the pandemic, but otherwise spread equally across different sociodemographic and attitudinal segments of the Swiss population. This shows that the Coronavirus outbreak has the potential to undermine persistent (populist) resentments toward science and its epistemology among the general population.

Converging evidence for greater male variability in time, risk, and social preferences

Gender differences in time, risk, and social preferences are important determinants of differential choices of men and women, with broad implications for gender-specific social and economic outcomes. To better understand the shape and form of gender differences in preferences, researchers have traditionally examined the mean differences between the two genders. We present an alternative perspective of greater male variability in preferences. In a meta-analysis of experimental economics studies with more than 50,000 individuals in 97 samples, we find converging evidence for greater male variability in time, risk, and social preferences. In some cases, we find greater male variability in addition to mean differences; in some cases, we only find greater male variability. Our findings suggest that theories of gender differences are incomplete if they fail to consider how the complex interaction of between-gender differences and within-gender variability determines differential choices and outcomes between women and men.

Lab-Sophistication: Does Repeated Participation in Laboratory Experiments Affect Pro-Social Behaviour?

Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioural patterns. In this paper, we focus both on the potential effect of the subjects’ lab-sophistication, and on the role of the knowledge about the level of lab-sophistication of the other participants. Our main findings show that while lab-sophistication per se does not significantly affect pro-social behaviour, for sophisticated subjects the knowledge about the counterpart’s level of (un)sophistication may systematically alter their choices. This result should induce caution among experimenters about whether, in their settings, information about lab-sophistication can be inferred by the participants, due to the characteristics of the recruitment mechanisms, the management of the experimental sessions or to other contextual clues.

NADAL: A Neighbor-Aware Deep Learning Approach for Inferring Interpersonal Trust Using Smartphone Data

Interpersonal trust mediates multiple socio-technical systems and has implications for personal and societal well-being. Consequently, it is crucial to devise novel machine learning methods to infer interpersonal trust automatically using mobile sensor-based behavioral data. Considering that social relationships are often affected by neighboring relationships within the same network, this work proposes using a novel neighbor-aware deep learning architecture (NADAL) to enhance the inference of interpersonal trust scores. Based on analysis of call, SMS, and Bluetooth interaction data from a one-year field study involving 130 participants, we report that: (1) adding information about neighboring relationships improves trust score prediction in both shallow and deep learning approaches; and (2) a custom-designed neighbor-aware deep learning architecture outperforms a baseline feature concatenation based deep learning approach. The results obtained at interpersonal trust prediction are promising and have multiple implications for trust-aware applications in the emerging social internet of things.

Playing nice in the sandbox: On the role of heterogeneity, trust and cooperation in common-pool resources

The increasing heterogeneity of populations affects cooperation in common-pool resources in a time where the depletion of natural resources is a growing problem. This study investigates the effects of economic and sociocultural heterogeneity on trust and cooperation in common-pool resources using a laboratory experiment. The experiment comprises two Investment Games and a Common-Pool Resource Game, with a sample of 344 subjects from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. By measuring the effects of economic and sociocultural heterogeneity separately as well as combined, this study disentangles the effects of specific heterogeneity types on cooperation in common-pool resources; something that has not been done before. Higher levels of trusting behaviour are found to have a positive effect on cooperation on the micro- and macro-level over time. While theory suggests negative effects of both forms of heterogeneity on cooperation through decreased levels of trust, the results show a surprising positive effect of economic heterogeneity on cooperation, but a negative effect if economic and sociocultural heterogeneity are combined. This study concludes that economic inequality can promote cooperation in CPRs, unless this inequality is lined up with sociocultural differences.

Risk-taking and fairness among cocaine-dependent patients in dual diagnoses: Schizophrenia and Anti-Social Personality Disorder

This study reports experimental results from a clinical sample of patients with a cocaine-related disorder and dual diagnosis: Schizophrenia and Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Both types of patients as well as a non-clinical group of students performed two incentivized decision-making tasks. In the first part of the experiment, they performed a lottery-choice task in order to elicit their degree of risk aversion. In the second part, they decided in two modified dictator games aimed at eliciting their aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. It is found that the Anti-Social Personality Disorder group exhibits no significant differences from the non-clinical sample in either task. However, compared with the students' sample, subjects from the group with schizophrenia show more risk aversion and exhibit more aversion towards disadvantageous inequality.

Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges

The conflict between pro-self and pro-social behaviour is at the core of many key problems of our time, as, for example, the reduction of air pollution and the redistribution of scarce resources. For the well-being of our societies, it is thus crucial to find mechanisms to promote pro-social choices over egoistic ones. Particularly important, because cheap and easy to implement, are those mechanisms that can change people’s behaviour without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, the so-called “nudges”. Previous research has found that moral nudges (e.g., making norms salient) can promote pro-social behaviour. However, little is known about whether their effect persists over time and spills across context. This question is key in light of research showing that pro-social actions are often followed by selfish actions, thus suggesting that some moral manipulations may backfire. Here we present a class of simple moral nudges that have a great positive impact on pro-sociality. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 1,400), we use economic games to demonstrate that asking subjects to self-report “what they think is the morally right thing to do” does not only increase pro-sociality in the choice immediately after, but also in subsequent choices, and even when the social context changes. In Study 5, we explore whether moral nudges promote charity donations to humanitarian organisations in a large (N = 1,800) crowdfunding campaign. We find that, in this context, moral nudges increase donations by about 44 percent.

Too cold for warm glow? Christmas-season effects in charitable giving

This paper analyzes seasonal effects and their potential drivers in charitable giving. We conduct two studies to analyze whether donations to the German Red Cross differ between the Christmas season and summer. In study 1 we find that in the pre-Christmas shopping season prosocial subjects almost donate 50% less compared to prosocials in summer. In study 2 we replicate the low donations in the Christmas season. In an extensive questionnaire we control for several causes of this effect. The data suggest that the higher prosocials' self-reported stress level, the lower the donations. The higher their relative savings, the lower the giving. Our questionnaire rules out that "donation fatigue" matters. That is, donations do not depend on the number of charitable campaigns subjects are confronted with and their engagement in these activities during Christmas season outside the lab.

Extraction Behaviour and Income Inequalities Resulting from a Common Pool Resource Exploitation

Using an experimental approach, we investigate income distribution among heterogeneous subjects exploiting a Common Pool Resource (CPR). The CPR experiments are conducted in continuous time and under different treatments, including combinations of communication and monitoring. While many studies have focused on how real-life income inequality affects cooperation and resource use among groups, here we examine the relationship between individuals’ cooperative traits, harvest inequalities, and institutional arrangements. We found that: (1) When combined with monitoring, communication decreases harvest inequality—that is, harvest is more equally distributed among individuals in all treatments; and (2) the cooperative trait of individuals significantly predicts harvest inequality. The relative proportion of non-cooperators and cooperators (i.e., the cooperative dependency ratio) drives the within-session harvest distribution—as the cooperative dependency ration increases, the income distribution becomes increasingly unequal, leading to a downward spiral of resource overexploitation and scarcity. Finally, our results suggest that harvest and income inequalities are contingent to resource abundance, because under this regime, non-cooperators exert the greatest amount effort—thus leading to resource scarcity and income inequalities.

Citizen Social Lab: A digital platform for human behavior experimentation within a citizen science framework

Cooperation is one of the behavioral traits that define human beings, however we are still trying to understand why humans cooperate. Behavioral experiments have been largely conducted to shed light into the mechanisms behind cooperation-and other behavioral traits. However, most of these experiments have been conducted in laboratories with highly controlled experimental protocols but with limitations in terms of subject pool or decisions' context, which limits the reproducibility and the generalization of the results obtained. In an attempt to overcome these limitations, some experimental approaches have moved human behavior experimentation from laboratories to public spaces, where behaviors occur naturally, and have opened the participation to the general public within the citizen science framework. Given the open nature of these environments, it is critical to establish the appropriate data collection protocols to maintain the same data quality that one can obtain in the laboratories. In this article we introduce Citizen Social Lab, a software platform designed to be used in the wild using citizen science practices. The platform allows researchers to collect data in a more realistic context while maintaining the scientific rigor, and it is structured in a modular and scalable way so it can also be easily adapted for online or brick-and-mortar experimental laboratories. Following citizen science guidelines, the platform is designed to motivate a more general population into participation, but also to promote engaging and learning of the scientific research process. We also review the main results of the experiments performed using the platform up to now, and the set of games that each experiment includes. Finally, we evaluate some properties of the platform, such as the heterogeneity of the samples of the experiments, the satisfaction level of participants, or the technical parameters that demonstrate the robustness of the platform and the quality of the data collected.

Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?

Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself under conditions of implicit bias. In doing so, I pair the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, with a laboratory dictator game with sorting. I find that despite its popularity, the IAT does not predict dictator giving and social pressure does not explain acts of giving from biased dictators. These results are indicative of the meaningful difference between having an implicit bias and acting on one. As such, results can be thought of as a bound on the external validity of the IAT.

Which preferences associate with school performance?-Lessons from an exploratory study with university students

Success in life is determined to a large extent by school performance so it is important to understand the effect of the factors that influence it. In this exploratory study, in addition to cognitive abilities, we attempt to link measures of preferences with outcomes of school performance. We measured in an incentivized way risk, time, social and competitive preferences and cognitive abilities of university students to look for associations between these measures and two important academic outcome measures: exam results and GPA. We find consistently that cognitive abilities (proxied by the Cognitive Reflection Test) are very well correlated with school performance. Regarding non-cognitive skills, we report suggestive evidence for many of our measured preferences. We used two alternative measures of time preference: patience and present bias. Present bias explains exam grades better, while patience explains GPA relatively better. Both measures of time preferences have a non-linear relation to school performance. Competitiveness matters, as students, who opt for a more competitive payment scheme in our experimental task have a higher average GPA. We observe also that risk-averse students perform a little better than more risk-tolerant students. That makes sense in case of multiple choice exams, because more risk-tolerant students may want to try to pass the exam less prepared, as the possibility of passing an exam just by chance is not zero. Finally, we have also detected that cooperative preferences-the amount of money offered in a public good game-associates strongly with GPA in a non-linear way. Students who offered around half of their possible amounts had significantly higher GPAs than those, who offered none or all their money.

Risk Preferences and Predictions about Others: No Association with 2D:4D Ratio

Prenatal androgen exposure affects the brain development of the fetus which may facilitate certain behaviors and decision patterns in the later life. The ratio between the lengths of second and the fourth fingers (2D:4D) is a negative biomarker of the ratio between prenatal androgen and estrogen exposure and men typically have lower ratios than women. In line with the typical findings suggesting that women are more risk averse than men, several studies have also shown negative relationships between 2D:4D and risk taking although the evidence is not conclusive. Previous studies have also reported that both men and women believe women are more risk averse than men. In the current study, we re-test the relationship between 2D:4D and risk preferences in a German student sample and also investigate whether the 2D:4D ratio is associated with people's perceptions about others' risk preferences. Following an incentivized risk elicitation task, we asked all participants their predictions about (i) others' responses (without sex specification), (ii) men's responses, and (iii) women's responses; then measured their 2D:4D ratios. In line with the previous findings, female participants in our sample were more risk averse. While both men and women underestimated other participants' (non sex-specific) and women's risky decisions on average, their predictions about men were accurate. We also found evidence for the false consensus effect, as risky choices are positively correlated with predictions about other participants' risky choices. The 2D:4D ratio was not directly associated either with risk preferences or the predictions of other participants' choices. An unexpected finding was that women with mid-range levels of 2D:4D estimated significantly larger sex differences in participants' decisions. This finding needs further testing in future studies.

One-shot exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination in Denmark, Spain and Ghana

Everyday, we are bombarded with periodic, exogenous appeals and instructions on how to behave. How do these appeals and instructions affect subsequent coordination? Using experimental methods, we investigate how a one-time exogenous instruction affects subsequent coordination among individuals in a lab. Participants play a minimum effort game repeated 5 times under fixed matching with a one-time behavioral instruction in either the first or second round. Since coordination behavior may vary across countries, we run experiments in Denmark, Spain and Ghana, and map cross-country rankings in coordination with known national measures of fractualization, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. Our results show that exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination, with earlier interventions yielding better coordination than later interventions. We also find that cross-country rankings in coordination map with published national measures of fractualization, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation.

Numerosity and allocation behavior: Insights using the dictator game

This paper investigates how the numerosity bias influences individuals’ allocation of resources between themselves and others, using the backdrop of the traditional dictator game. Across four studies including both hypothetical and real exchanges of money, we show that the form of the numerical value representing the quantity of the resource (e.g., $20 vs 2000 cents) systematically biases the decision-maker to perceive the quantity s/he is thinking of allocating as being “less than adequate” or “more than adequate”. Essentially, such a biased perception of adequacy with respect to the quantity of the resource consequently influences the decision-maker’s final allocation decision. We attribute this systematic bias to the “numerosity” of the resource. We find that bigger numerical values representing quantity (e.g., 2000 cents) bias decision-makers to over-infer the quantity, thus inducing them to allocate less to the entities they are focusing on.

The games economists play: Why economics students behave more selfishly than other students

Do economics students behave more selfishly than other students? Experiments involving monetary allocations suggest so. This article investigates the underlying motives for the economic students' more selfish behavior by separating three potential explanatory mechanisms: economics students are less concerned with fairness when making allocation decisions; have a different notion of what is fair in allocations; or are more skeptical about other people's allocations, which in turn makes them less willing to comply with a shared fairness norm. The three mechanisms were tested by inviting students from various disciplines to participate in a relatively novel experimental game and asking all participants to give reasons for their choices. Compared with students of other disciplines, economics students were about equally likely to mention fairness in their comments; had a similar notion of what was fair in the situation; however, they expected lower offers, made lower offers, and were less willing to enforce compliance with a fair allocation at a cost to themselves. The economics students' lower expectations mediated their allocation decisions, suggesting that economics students behaved more selfishly because they expected others not to comply with the shared fairness norm.

Spot on for liars! How public scrutiny influences ethical behavior

We examine whether people are more honest in public than in private. In a laboratory experiment, we have subjects roll dice and report outcomes either in public or in private. Higher reports yield more money and lies cannot be detected. We also elicit subjects’ ethical mindsets and their expectations about others’ reports. We find that outcome-minded subjects lie less in public to conform with their expectations about others’ reports. Ironically, these expectations are false. Rule-minded subjects, in turn, do not respond to public scrutiny. These findings challenge the common faith in public scrutiny to promote ethical behavior. While public scrutiny eventually increases honesty, this effect is contingent on people’s mindsets and expectations.

The dynamics of behavior in modified dictator games

We investigate the dynamics of individual pro-social behavior over time. The dynamics are tested by running the same experiment with the same subjects at several points in time. To exclude learning and reputation building, we employ non-strategic decision tasks and a sequential prisoners-dilemma as a control treatment. In the first wave, pro-social concerns explain a high share of individual decisions. Pro-social decisions decrease over time, however. In the final wave, most decisions can be accounted for by assuming pure selfishness. Stable behavior in the sense that subjects stick to their decisions over time is observed predominantly for purely selfish subjects. We offer two explanation for our results: diminishing experimenter demand effects and moral self-licensing.

Are Individuals Luck Egalitarians? - An Experiment on the Influence of Brute and Option Luck on Social Preferences

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities should be deemed fair as long as they follow from individuals’ deliberate and fully informed choices (i.e., option luck) while inequalities should be deemed unfair if they follow from choices over which the individual has no control (i.e., brute luck). This study investigates if individuals’ fairness preferences correspond with the luck egalitarian fairness position. More specifically, in a laboratory experiment we test how individuals choose to redistribute gains and losses that stem from option luck compared to brute luck. A two-stage experimental design with real incentives was employed. We show that individuals (n = 226) change their action associated with re-allocation depending on the underlying conception of luck. Subjects in the brute luck treatment equalized outcomes to larger extent (p = 0.0069). Thus, subjects redistributed a larger amount to unlucky losers and a smaller amount to lucky winners compared to equivalent choices made in the option luck treatment. The effect is less pronounced when conducting the experiment with third-party dictators, indicating that there is some self-serving bias at play. We conclude that people have fairness preference not just for outcomes, but also for how those outcomes are reached. Our findings are potentially important for understanding the role citizens assign individual responsibility for life outcomes, i.e., health and wealth.

Heart rate variability indicates emotional value during pro-social economic laboratory decisions with large external validity

The present study investigates the external validity of emotional value measured in economic laboratory experiments by using a physiological indicator of stress, heart rate variability (HRV). While there is ample evidence supporting the external validity of economic experiments, there is little evidence comparing the magnitude of internal levels of emotional stress during decision making with external stress. The current study addresses this gap by comparing the magnitudes of decision stress experienced in the laboratory with the stress from outside the laboratory. To quantify a large change in HRV, measures observed in the laboratory during decision-making are compared to the difference between HRV during a university exam and other mental activity for the same individuals in and outside of the laboratory. The results outside the laboratory inform about the relevance of laboratory findings in terms of their relative magnitude. Results show that psychologically induced HRV changes observed in the laboratory, particularly in connection with social preferences, correspond to large effects outside. This underscores the external validity of laboratory findings and shows the magnitude of emotional value connected to pro-social economic decisions in the laboratory.

Humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games

Socially relevant situations that involve strategic interactions are widespread among animals and humans alike. To study these situations, theoretical and experimental research has adopted a game theoretical perspective, generating valuable insights about human behavior. However, most of the results reported so far have been obtained from a population perspective and considered one specific conflicting situation at a time. This makes it difficult to extract conclusions about the consistency of individuals' behavior when facing different situations and to define a comprehensive classification of the strategies underlying the observed behaviors. We present the results of a lab-in-the-field experiment in which subjects face four different dyadic games, with the aim of establishing general behavioral rules dictating individuals' actions. By analyzing our data with an unsupervised clustering algorithm, we find that all the subjects conform, with a large degree of consistency, to a limited number of behavioral phenotypes (envious, optimist, pessimist, and trustful), with only a small fraction of undefined subjects. We also discuss the possible connections to existing interpretations based on a priori theoretical approaches. Our findings provide a relevant contribution to the experimental and theoretical efforts toward the identification of basic behavioral phenotypes in a wider set of contexts without aprioristic assumptions regarding the rules or strategies behind actions. From this perspective, our work contributes to a fact-based approach to the study of human behavior in strategic situations, which could be applied to simulating societies, policy-making scenario building, and even a variety of business applications.

Tend to Compare and Tend to Be Fair: The Relationship between Social Comparison Sensitivity and Justice Sensitivity

Social comparison is a prerequisite for processing fairness, although the two types of cognition may be associated with different emotions. Whereas social comparison may induce envy, the perception of unfairness may elicit anger. Yet, it remains unclear whether people who tend to have a strong sense of fairness also tend to compare themselves more with others. Here, Study 1 used a modified ultimatum game (UG) and a social comparison game (SCG) to examine the relationship between justice sensitivity and social comparison sensitivity in 51 young adults. Study 2 examined self-reported social comparison and justice sensitivity in 142 young adults. Both studies showed a positive correlation between social comparison sensitivity and justice sensitivity. We reason that social comparison and justice sensitivity have an important positive correlation in human decision-making. The rejection of self-disadvantageous inequality offers may be due to the social comparison effect, which suggests that the tendency to compare oneself with others may contribute to having a strong sense of justice. Our findings suggest that the predictions of game theory may vary depending on the social culture context and incorporating notions of fairness and social comparison tendency may be essential to better predict the actual behavior of players in social interactive situations.

Heterogeneous Motives in the Trust Game: A Tale of Two Roles

Trustful and trustworthy behaviors have important externalities for the society. But what exactly drives people to behave in a trustful and trustworthy manner? Building on research suggesting that individuals’ social preferences might be a common factor informing both behaviors, we study the impact of a set of different motives on individuals’ choices in a dual-role Trust Game (TG). We employ data from a large-scale representative experiment (N = 774), where all subjects played both roles of a binary TG with real monetary incentives. Subjects’ social motives were inferred using their decisions in a Dictator Game and a dual-role Ultimatum Game. Next to self-interest and strategic motives we consider preferences for altruism, spitefulness, egalitarianism, and efficiency. We demonstrate that there exists considerable heterogeneity in motives in the TG. Most importantly, among individuals who choose to trust as trustors, social motives can differ dramatically as there is a non-negligible proportion of them who seem to act out of (strategic) self-interest whereas others are driven more by efficiency considerations. Subjects’ elicited trustworthiness, however, can be used to infer such motivations: while the former are not trustworthy as trustees, the latter are. We discuss that research on trust can benefit from adding the second player’s choice in TG designs.

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.

The cognitive basis of social behavior: cognitive reflection overrides antisocial but not always prosocial motives

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person's payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e., those who rely more heavily on intuition), on the other hand, are more likely to be associated with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. We also identify a negative link between reflection and choices characterized by “strong” altruism, but this result holds only in Study 2. Moreover, we provide evidence that the relationship between social preferences and CRT scores is not driven by general intelligence. We discuss how our results can reconcile some previous conflicting findings on the cognitive basis of social behavior.

Short- and long-run goals in ultimatum bargaining: impatience predicts spite-based behavior

The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In this game, two players have to agree on how to split a sum of money. The proposer makes an offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If the responder rejects, neither player gets anything. The prevailing view is that, beyond self-interest, the desire to equalize both players’ payoffs (i.e., fairness) is the crucial motivation in the UG. Based on this view, previous research suggests that fairness is a short-run oriented motive that conflicts with the long-run goal of self-interest. However, competitive spite, which reflects an antisocial (not norm-based) desire to minimize others’ payoffs, can also account for the behavior observed in the UG, and has been linked to short-run, present-oriented aspirations as well. In this paper, we explore the relationship between individuals’ intertemporal preferences and their behavior in a citywide dual-role UG experiment (N = 713). We find that impatience (short-run orientation) predicts the rejection of low, “unfair” offers as responder and the proposal of low, “unfair” offers as proposer, which is consistent with spitefulness but inconsistent with fairness motivations. This behavior systematically reduces the payoffs of those who interact with impatient individuals. Thus, impatient individuals appear to be keen to minimize their partners’ share of the pie, even at the risk of destroying it. These findings indicate that competitively reducing other’s payoffs, rather than fairness (or self-interest), is the short-run goal in ultimatum bargaining.

The hidden cost of coaching: intentional training of shot adequacy discrimination in basketball hampers utilization of informative incidental cues

The goal was to identify the advantages and disadvantages of using intentional guidance to teach to discriminate between good and bad circumstances to shoot in basketball. A simulated shot-adequacy learning task was developed, in which participants were asked to decide, in each trial, whether the player in possession of the ball should shoot or not. After each decision, they received feedback on their response (determined by five cues: Opposition, Rebound, Balance, Alternative, and Distance). 65 naïve participants (M age = 18.6 yr., SD = 1.3) were divided into two groups. The Incidental group received no guiding instructions. The Intentional group was instructed to utilize four of the five cues. The Distance cue was kept incidental for both groups. Participants effectively incorporated the cues into their decisions. Guidance had a markedly different effect across cues. The Intentional group utilized Distance less efficiently than the Incidental group, i.e., intentional instructions on the other four cues nearly blocked the utilization of Distance.

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.

Fairness norms and theory of mind in an ultimatum game: judgments, offers, and decisions in school-aged children

The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8-10 years, the present study shows that children's beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal no influence of theory of mind on children's decision-making behavior.

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.

Religious pro-sociality? Experimental evidence from a sample of 766 Spaniards

This study explores the relationship between several personal religion-related variables and social behaviour, using three paradigmatic economic games: the dictator (DG), ultimatum (UG), and trust (TG) games. A large carefully designed sample of the urban adult population in Granada (Spain) is employed (N = 766). From participants' decisions in these games we obtain measures of altruism, bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality, trust, and positive reciprocity. Three dimensions of religiosity are examined: (i) religious denomination; (ii) intensity of religiosity, measured by active participation at church services; and (iii) conversion out into a different denomination than the one raised in. The major results are: (i) individuals with "no religion" made decisions closer to rational selfish behaviour in the DG and the UG compared to those who affiliate with a "standard" religious denomination; (ii) among Catholics, intensity of religiosity is the key variable that affects social behaviour insofar as religiously-active individuals are generally more pro-social than non-active ones; and (iii) the religion raised in seems to have no effect on pro-sociality, beyond the effect of the current measures of religiosity. Importantly, behaviour in the TG is not predicted by any of the religion-related variables we analyse. While the results partially support the notion of religious pro-sociality, on the other hand, they also highlight the importance of closely examining the multidimensional nature of both religiosity and pro-social behaviour.

Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments

In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest “equal distribution” scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.

Can exposure to prenatal sex hormones (2D:4D) predict cognitive reflection?

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a test introduced by Frederick (2005). The task is designed to measure the tendency to override an intuitive response that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. The consistent sex differences in CRT performance may suggest a role for prenatal sex hormones. A now widely studied putative marker for relative prenatal testosterone is the second-to-fourth digit ratio (2D:4D). This paper tests to what extent 2D:4D, as a proxy for the prenatal ratio of testosterone/estrogens, can predict CRT scores in a sample of 623 students. After controlling for sex, we observe that a lower 2D:4D (reflecting a relative higher exposure to testosterone) is significantly associated with a higher number of correct answers. The result holds for both hands' 2D:4Ds. In addition, the effect appears to be stronger for females than for males. We also control for patience and math proficiency, which are significantly related to performance in the CRT. But the effect of 2D:4D on performance in CRT is not reduced with these controls, implying that these variables are not mediating the relationship between digit ratio and CRT.

A comparative analysis of spatial Prisoner's Dilemma experiments: conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance

We have carried out a comparative analysis of data collected in three experiments on Prisoner's Dilemmas on lattices available in the literature. We focus on the different ways in which the behavior of human subjects can be interpreted, in order to empirically narrow down the possibilities for behavioral rules. Among the proposed update dynamics, we find that the experiments do not provide significant evidence for non-innovative game dynamics such as imitate-the-best or pairwise comparison rules, whereas moody conditional cooperation is supported by the data from all three experiments. This conclusion questions the applicability of many theoretical models that have been proposed to understand human behavior in spatial Prisoner's Dilemmas. A rule compatible with all our experiments, moody conditional cooperation, suggests that there is no detectable influence of interaction networks on the emergence of cooperation in behavioral experiments.