Intertemporal prosocial behavior: a review and research agenda

Research on intertemporal and prosocial decisions has largely developed in separate strands of literature. However, many of the decisions we make occur at the intersection of these two dimensions (intertemporal and prosocial). Trust is an example, where a decision today is made with the expectation that another person will reciprocate (or betray) later. A new literature is emerging to explore the role of time in these types of situations, where time and social considerations are intertwined. In many cases, time introduces (or magnifies) an element of uncertainty about future outcomes and utility that people need to deal with - what will happen, how good will it be, how will it feel. We review this emerging literature on intertemporal prosocial decision-making and discuss how new research can fill existing knowledge gaps.

Victim identifiability, number of victims, and unit asking in charitable giving

This study examines the identifiable victim effect (being more willing to help an identified victim than an unidentified), the singularity effect (i.e., being more willing to help a single identified victim than a group of identified victims), and unit asking (first asking donors for their willingness to donate for one unit and then asking for donations for multiple units) in charitable giving. In five studies (N = 7996), we vary the level of identifiability, singularity, and group size. We find that unit asking is making people more sensitive to the number of people in need. Further, while the level of identifiability influences affective reactions, this effect does not extend to donations and, thus, is not affected by unit asking. We do, however, find an "emotion asking effect" where asking donors to rate their affect before donating increase donation levels (compared to donors asked to rate affect after). Emotion asking was attenuated when combined with unit asking.

Anger and disgust shape judgments of social sanctions across cultures, especially in high individual autonomy societies

When someone violates a social norm, others may think that some sanction would be appropriate. We examine how the experience of emotions like anger and disgust relate to the judged appropriateness of sanctions, in a pre-registered analysis of data from a large-scale study in 56 societies. Across the world, we find that individuals who experience anger and disgust over a norm violation are more likely to endorse confrontation, ostracism and, to a smaller extent, gossip. Moreover, we find that the experience of anger is consistently the strongest predictor of judgments of confrontation, compared to other emotions. Although the link between state-based emotions and judgments may seem universal, its strength varies across countries. Aligned with theoretical predictions, this link is stronger in societies, and among individuals, that place higher value on individual autonomy. Thus, autonomy values may increase the role that emotions play in guiding judgments of social sanctions.

Addressing climate change with behavioral science: A global intervention tournament in 63 countries

Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventions' effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behavior-several interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on people's initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors.

Affective responses drive the impact neglect in sustainable behavior

We need unparalleled human behavioral changes to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, recent studies suggest that people are not good at identifying mitigative behaviors that are effective in reducing carbon emissions. Thus, even when there is an intention to engage in climate action, people are not necessarily making the most effective choices. This suggests that there is an impact of neglecting in evaluative judgments about mitigative behaviors. Here, using an online survey (N = 555), we show that people have a rather poor understanding of the mitigation potential of human behaviors, and both impact judgments and the likelihood of adoption of mitigative behaviors are largely influenced by emotional processes. These findings have potential implications for how to motivate impactful climate action in the future and point toward the importance to fully understand how affect and emotions influence impact judgments and pro-environmental behavior.

Dual-process theory is Barbapapa

The biggest benefit of dual-process theory lies in its role as a benchmark theory that, regardless of its empirical plausibility, serves as a starting point for better and more domain-specific models. In this sense, dual-process theory is the Barbapapa of psychological theory - a blob-shaped creature that can be reshaped and adapted to fit in the context of any human behavior.

A causal link between mental imagery and affect-laden perception of climate change related risks

Previous studies have shed light on the importance of affect in risk perception and the role of mental imagery in generating affect. In the current study, we explore the causal relationship between mental imagery, affect, and risk perception by systematically varying the level of mental imagery in three levels (i.e., enhanced, spontaneous, or prevented). In light of the increasing environmental risk of adverse events caused by climate change, we operationalize risk as participants' perceived risk of climate change. One-thousand-fifty-five participants were recruited online and randomized to one of three levels of mental imagery. As predicted, we found a causal link between the level of mental imagery, affective experience, and perceived risk of climate change, in that enhanced mental imagery caused a larger decrease in positive affective valence and a larger increase in perceived risk of climate change. We argue that mental imagery enhances the negative affect associated with the risk event by creating a perceptual experience that mimics seeing the environmental risk events.

Social and moral psychology of COVID-19 across 69 countries

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.

Individual differences in environmental wellbeing and pro-environmental behaviors explained by self-control

Climate change is an increasing problem, with more extreme weather conditions and rising temperatures. To fulfill the temperature goals of the Paris agreement a societal change is needed, a change that requires a shift of lifestyle from all of us. If we want to change our behaviors to more sustainable ones, we need to sacrifice substantial things today to improve a future, which often seems distant and abstract. People with high level of self-control have been shown to have a better ability to visualize future events, which makes self-control an interesting trait to look at in relation to pro-environmental behavior. The aim of this study was to examine how self-control correlates with environmental well-being and environmental behavior. An internet-based survey was sent to a representative Swedish sample (n = 602). The respondents were asked to fill out a newly developed scale measuring their anxiety and security regarding environmental matters (environmental wellbeing), as well as indicate how often they engage in six different pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., turning lights off when leaving the room). Additionally, data on the respondents' gender, age, political orientation, and self-control was collected. Our results suggest a positive correlation between self-control and environmental wellbeing and a weaker, but still positive, correlation between self-control and some pro-environmental behaviors. Additionally, respondents who identified themselves as politically left had lower environmental wellbeing, while men had higher environmental wellbeing, but behaved less environmentally friendly. Thus, our results suggest that political orientation was a better predictor of sound environmental behavior than subjective self-control was.

Structured reflection increases intentions to reduce other people's health risks during COVID-19

People believe they should consider how their behavior might negatively impact other people, Yet their behavior often increases others' health risks. This creates challenges for managing public health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. We examined a procedure wherein people reflect on their personal criteria regarding how their behavior impacts others' health risks. We expected structured reflection to increase people's intentions and decisions to reduce others' health risks. Structured reflection increases attention to others' health risks and the correspondence between people's personal criteria and behavioral intentions. In four experiments during COVID-19, people (N  = 12,995) reported their personal criteria about how much specific attributes, including the impact on others' health risks, should influence their behavior. Compared with control conditions, people who engaged in structured reflection reported greater intentions to reduce business capacity (experiment 1) and avoid large social gatherings (experiments 2 and 3). They also donated more to provide vaccines to refugees (experiment 4). These effects emerged across seven countries that varied in collectivism and COVID-19 case rates (experiments 1 and 2). Structured reflection was distinct from instructions to carefully deliberate (experiment 3). Structured reflection increased the correlation between personal criteria and behavioral intentions (experiments 1 and 3). And structured reflection increased donations more among people who scored lower in cognitive reflection compared with those who scored higher in cognitive reflection (experiment 4). These findings suggest that structured reflection can effectively increase behaviors to reduce public health risks.

Moral spillover in carbon offset judgments

Moral spillover occurs when a morally loaded behavior becomes associated with another source. In the current paper, we addressed whether the moral motive behind causing CO₂ emissions spills over on to how much people think is needed to compensate for the emissions. Reforestation (planting trees) is a common carbon-offset technique. With this in mind, participants estimated the number of trees needed to compensate for the carbon emissions from vehicles that were traveling with various moral motives. Two experiments revealed that people think larger carbon offsets are needed to compensate for the emissions when the emissions are caused by traveling for immoral reasons, in comparison with when caused by traveling for moral reasons. Hence, moral motives influence people’s judgments of carbon-offset requirements even though these motives have no bearing on what is compensated for. Moreover, the effect was insensitive to individual differences in carbon literacy and gender and to the unit (kilograms or tons) in which the CO₂ emissions were expressed to the participants. The findings stress the role of emotion in how people perceive carbon offsetting.

Religious affiliation seldom seems to influence hiring or competence ratings of job applicants: studies conducted in Sweden and in the USA

BACKGROUND

Religion is an important ingroup characteristic for many people. For different reasons, people with different religious affiliations might prefer members of their religious outgroup. Previous studies have investigated perceptions of and behaviour toward religious ingroup and outgroup members in various contexts. The four studies presented here investigated whether competence and likeability ratings differ depending on the target's and participant's religious affiliations in a recruitment context. Two studies were conducted in Sweden, while the other two were conducted in the USA.

METHODS

Participants in 4 studies rated a Christian, Muslim or atheist job applicant and a control applicant on 4 competence and 3 likeability items on 7-point Likert scales. The difference in ratings between the target applicant and control applicant was used to measure perceived competence and likeability of the target applicant. In the two latter studies, one in Sweden and one in the USA, participants also chose to hire either the target or the control applicant.

RESULTS

Overall, participants in three studies rated control applicants as more likeable than target applicants. In the two US studies, targets were also rated as less competent than control applicants. Christian participants in the two US studies rated the Christian applicant as more likeable than both other targets. In the second US study, atheist participants rated Christians as less likeable than both other targets. In one of the Swedish studies, atheist participants rated the atheist applicant as more likeable than both other targets. The only significant difference in competence ratings between targets was made by Christian Swedes, who rated Muslim applicants as less competent than Christian applicants. The only significant difference in hiring decisions was that Swedish atheist participants hired Christians less often than they hired control applicants.

CONCLUSION

Together, the results suggest that job applicants are sometimes viewed as more likeable if they belong to a religious ingroup rather than a religious outgroup, but that this only rarely translate to significant differences in competence ratings or hiring decisions.

COVID-19 and Politically Motivated Reasoning

Background

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the world witnessed a partisan segregation of beliefs toward the global health crisis and its management. Politically motivated reasoning, the tendency to interpret information in accordance with individual motives to protect valued beliefs rather than objectively considering the facts, could represent a key process involved in the polarization of attitudes. The objective of this study was to explore politically motivated reasoning when participants assess information regarding COVID-19.

Design

We carried out a preregistered online experiment using a diverse sample (N = 1,500) from the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats assessed the same COVID-19–related information about the health effects of lockdowns, social distancing, vaccination, hydroxychloroquine, and wearing face masks.

Results

At odds with our prestated hypothesis, we found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19. Moreover, we found no evidence supporting the idea that numeric ability or cognitive sophistication bolster politically motivated reasoning in the case of COVID-19. Instead, our findings suggest that participants base their assessment on prior beliefs of the matter.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more likely to be driven by lack of reasoning than politically motivated reasoning—a finding that opens potential avenues for combating political polarization about important health care topics.

Highlights

The effect of herd immunity thresholds on willingness to vaccinate

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, media and policymakers openly speculated about the number of immune citizens needed to reach a herd immunity threshold. What are the effects of such numerical goals on the willingness to vaccinate? In a large representative sample (N = 1540) of unvaccinated Swedish citizens, we find that giving a low (60%) compared to a high (90%) threshold has direct effects on beliefs about reaching herd immunity and beliefs about how many others that will get vaccinated. Presenting the high threshold makes people believe that herd immunity is harder to reach (on average about half a step on a seven-point scale), compared to the low threshold. Yet at the same time, people also believe that a higher number of the population will get vaccinated (on average about 3.3% more of the population). Since these beliefs affect willingness to vaccinate in opposite directions, some individuals are encouraged and others discouraged depending on the threshold presented. Specifically, in mediation analysis, the high threshold indirectly increases vaccination willingness through the belief that many others will get vaccinated (B = 0.027, p = 0.003). At the same time, the high threshold also decreases vaccination willingness through the belief that the threshold goal is less attainable (B = -0.053, p < 0.001) compared to the low threshold condition. This has consequences for ongoing COVID-19 vaccination and future vaccination campaigns. One message may not fit all, as different groups can be encouraged or discouraged from vaccination.

Motivated Down-Regulation of Emotion and Compassion Collapse Revisited

Compassion collapse is a phenomenon where feelings and helping behavior decrease as the number of needy increases. But what are the underlying mechanisms for compassion collapse? Previous research has attempted to pit two explanations: Limitations of the feeling system vs. motivated down-regulation of emotion, against each other. In this article, we critically reexamine a previous study comparing these two accounts published in 2011 and present new data that contest motivated down-regulation of emotion as the primary explanation for compassion collapse.

Predicting attitudinal and behavioral responses to COVID-19 pandemic using machine learning

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multinational data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution-individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar results were found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, and collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-neglible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic.

The continuous and changing impact of affect on risky decision-making

Affective experience has an important role in decision-making with recent theories suggesting a modulatory role of affect in ongoing subjective value computations. However, it is unclear how varying expectations and uncertainty dynamically influence affective experience and how dynamic representation of affect modulates risky choices. Using hierarchical Bayesian modeling on data from a risky choice task (N = 101), we find that the temporal integration of recently encountered choice parameters (expected value, uncertainty, and prediction errors) shapes affective experience and impacts subsequent choice behavior. Specifically, self-reported arousal prior to choice was associated with increased loss aversion, risk aversion, and choice consistency. Taken together, these findings provide clear behavioral evidence for continuous affective modulation of subjective value computations during risky decision-making.

National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = -0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.

The goal-relevance of affective stimuli is dynamically represented in affective experience

Affect is a continuous and temporally dependent process that represents an individual's ongoing relationship with its environment. However, there is a lack of evidence on how factors defining the dynamic sensory environment modulate changes in momentary affective experience. Here, we show that goal-dependent relevance of stimuli is a key factor shaping momentary affect in a dynamic context. Participants (N = 83) viewed sequentially presented images and reported their momentary affective experience after every fourth stimulus. Relevance was manipulated through an attentional task that rendered each image either task-relevant or task-irrelevant. Computational models were fitted to trial-by-trial affective responses to capture the key dynamic parameters explaining momentary affective experience. The findings from statistical analyses and computational models showed that momentary affective experience was shaped by the temporal integration of the affective impact of recently encountered stimuli, and that task-relevant stimuli, independent of stimulus affect, prompted larger changes in experienced pleasantness compared with task-irrelevant stimuli. These findings clearly show that dynamics of affective experience reflect goal-relevance of stimuli in our surroundings.

Trust in the government increases financial well-being and general well-being during COVID-19

We investigate the antecedents of subjective financial well-being and general well-being during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In an online survey conducted in the midst of COVID-19 pandemic with over 1000 Swedish participants we found that distrust in the government to cope with financial (but not healthcare) challenges of the pandemic was negatively related to the feeling of financial security. In a structural equation model, we also show that trust in government to deal with financial challenges of COVID-19 pandemic has a significant impact on general well-being through the mediating channel of financial well-being. In addition, trust in government to deal with healthcare challenges of COVID-19 pandemic has a significant direct impact on individuals' general well-being. Our findings have important implications for public policy as they highlight the importance of citizens' trust in well-functioning governmental institutions to help cope with not only healthcare, but also financial challenges of an ongoing pandemic.

Investigating the Neural Correlates of the Affect Heuristic Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

This study investigated the neural correlates of the so-called "affect heuristic," which refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals tend to rely on affective states rather than rational deliberation of utility and probabilities during judgments of risk and utility of a given event or scenario. The study sought to explore whether there are shared regional activations during both judgments of relative risk and relative benefit of various scenarios, thus being a potential candidate of the affect heuristic. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we developed a novel risk perception task, based on a preexisting behavioral task assessing the affect heuristic. A whole-brain voxel-wise analysis of a sample of participants (n = 42) during the risk and benefit conditions revealed overlapping clusters in the left insula, left inferior frontal gyrus, and left medial frontal gyrus across conditions. Extraction of parameter estimates of these clusters revealed that activity of these regions during both tasks was inversely correlated with a behavioral measure assessing the inclination to use the affect heuristic. More activity in these areas during risk judgments reflect individuals' ability to disregard momentary affective impulses. The insula may be involved in integrating viscero-somatosensory information and forming a representation of the current emotional state of the body, whereas activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus and medial frontal gyrus indicates that executive processes may be involved in inhibiting the impulse of making judgments in favor of deliberate risk evaluations.

Financial well-being, COVID-19, and the financial better-than-average-effect

At the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak we conducted two surveys in the United Kingdom and Sweden (N=2021) regarding how people assess the near future economic situation within their household, nation, and the world. Together with psychological factors related to information processing we link these prospects to financial well-being. We find that, although generally very pessimistic, a substantial proportion of individuals believes that their households' economy will be doing substantially better than the national and global economy, suggesting a "financial better-than-average" effect. Furthermore, we find that the pessimism regarding future household economic situation and being financially ignorant are associated with decreased financial well-being, while the (inter)national economic situation is not. This study shows how contextual factors and personal aspects shape financial well-being during turbulent and stressful times.

Affective context and its uncertainty drive momentary affective experience

Affect fluctuates in a moment-to-moment fashion, reflecting the continuous relationship between the individual and the environment. Despite substantial research, there remain important open questions regarding how a stream of sensory input is dynamically represented in experienced affect. Here, approaching affect as a temporally dependent process, we show that momentary affect is shaped by a combination of the affective impact of stimuli (i.e., visual images for the current studies) and previously experienced affect. We also found that this temporal dependency is influenced by uncertainty of the affective context. Participants in each trial viewed sequentially presented images and subsequently reported their affective experience, which was modeled based on images' normative affect ratings and participants' previously reported affect. Study 1 showed that self-reported valence and arousal in a given trial is partly shaped by the affective impact of the given images and previously experienced affect. In Study 2, we manipulated context uncertainty by controlling occurrence probabilities for normatively pleasant and unpleasant images in separate blocks. Increasing context uncertainty (i.e., random occurrence of pleasant and unpleasant images) was associated with increased negative affect. In addition, the relative contribution of the most recent image to experienced pleasantness increased with increasing context uncertainty. Taken together, these findings provide clear behavioral evidence that momentary affect is a temporally dependent and continuous process, which reflects the affective impact of recent input variables and the previous internal state, and that this process is sensitive to the affective context and its uncertainty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The Affect Heuristic and Risk Perception - Stability Across Elicitation Methods and Individual Cognitive Abilities

The reliance on feelings when judging risks and benefits is one of the most fundamental valuation processes in risk perception. Although previous research suggests that the affect heuristic reliably predicts an inverse correlation between risk and benefit judgments, it has not yet been tested if the affect heuristic is sensitive to elicitation method effects (joint/separate evaluation) and to what extent individual differences in cognitive abilities may mediate the risk–benefit correlation. Across two studies we find that (1) the risk–benefit correlation is stable across different elicitation methods and for different domains (e.g., social domain, sensation-seeking domain, health domain, economic domain) and (2) the strength of the inverse correlation is tied to individual cognitive abilities—primarily cognitive reflection ability.

Moral Foundations Theory and the Psychology of Charitable Giving

Moral foundations theory proposes that intuitions about what is morally right or wrong rest upon a set of universal foundations. Although this theory has generated a recent surge of research, few studies have investigated the real–world moral consequences of the postulated moral intuitions. We show that they are predictably associated with an important type of moral behaviour. Stronger individualizing intuitions (fairness and harm prevention) and weaker binding intuitions (loyalty, authority, and sanctity) were associated with the willingness to comply with a request to volunteer for charity and with the amount of self–reported donations to charity organizations. Among participants who complied with the request, individualizing intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit out–groups, whereas binding intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit the in–group. The associations between moral foundations and self–report measures of allocations in a hypothetical dilemma and concern with helping in–group and out–group victims were similar. Moral foundations predicted charitable giving over and above effects of political ideology, religiosity, and demographics, although variables within these categories also exhibited unique effects on charitable giving and accounted for a portion of the relationship between moral foundations and charitable giving. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology

Opportunity Cost in Monetary Donation Decisions to Non-identified and Identified Victims

Do people consider alternative uses of money (i.e., opportunity cost) when asked to donate to a charitable cause? To answer this question, we examined the effect of providing versus not providing participants with an opportunity cost reminder when they are asked to donate money to causes with identified and non-identified victims. The results of two studies show that when making one-time donation decisions, people become less willing to donate to charity when reminded of opportunity cost, but mainly for non-identified victims. Moreover, framing the opportunity cost reminder as prosocial versus proself did not influence willingness to donate. Overall, our evidence suggests that opportunity cost reminders influence people's donation behavior depending on whether charities identify supported victims or not.

Affective calculus: The construction of affect through information integration over time

Humans receive a constant stream of input that potentially influence their affective experience. Despite intensive research on affect, it is still largely unknown how various sources of information are integrated into the single, unified affective features that accompany consciousness. Here, we aimed to investigate how a stream of evocative input we receive is dynamically represented in self-reported affect. In 4 experiments, participants viewed a number of sequentially presented images and reported their momentary affective experience on valence and arousal scales. The number and duration of images in a trial varied across studies. In Study 4, we also measured participants' physiological responses while they viewed images. We formulated and compared several models with respect to their capacity to predict self-reported affect based on normative image ratings, physiological measurements, and prior affective experience (measured in the previous trial). Our data best supported a model incorporating a temporally sensitive averaging mechanism for affective integration that assigns higher weights to affectively more potent and recently represented stimuli. Crucially, affective averaging of sensory information and prior affect accounted for distinct contributions to currently experienced affect. Taken together, the current study provides evidence that prior affect and integrated affective impact of stimuli partly shape currently experienced affect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

No Effect of Ego Depletion on Risk Taking

We investigated the effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Specifically, we conducted three studies (total n = 1,716) to test the prediction that ego depletion results in decisions that are more strongly in line with prospect theory, i.e., that ego depletion reduces risk taking for gains, increases risk taking for losses, and increases loss aversion. Ego depletion was induced using two of the most common manipulations from previous literature: the letter 'e' task (Studies 1 and 3) and the Stroop task (Study 2). Risk taking was measured using a series of standard, incentivized economic decision-making tasks assessing risk preferences in the gain domain, risk preferences in the loss domain, and loss aversion. None of the studies revealed a significant effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Our findings cast further doubts about the ability of ego-depletion manipulations to affect actual behavior in experimental settings.

Variation in the μ-Opioid Receptor Gene (OPRM1) Does Not Moderate Social-Rejection Sensitivity in Humans

Given previous findings from animal studies and small-scale studies in humans, variation in the μ-opioid receptor gene ( OPRM1) has been proposed as a strong biological candidate for moderating sensitivity to social rejection. Using a substantially larger sample ( N = 490) than previous studies, a prospective genotyping strategy, and preregistered analysis plans, we tested the hypotheses that OPRM1 variation measured by the functional A118G polymorphism (rs1799971) moderates (a) dispositional sensitivity to rejection and feelings of distress following social exclusion and (b) decision making involving social cognition. In three experimental tasks commonly used to assess altruism, reciprocity, and trust in humans, we found no evidence in favor of the hypotheses; nine main tests were preregistered, and all of them yielded small and statistically insignificant estimates. In secondary analyses, we used Bayesian inference and estimation to quantify support for our findings. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that the link between OPRM1 A118G variation and social-rejection sensitivity is weaker than previously thought.

Disentangling Mathematics from Executive Functions by Investigating Unique Functional Connectivity Patterns Predictive of Mathematics Ability

What are the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms that give rise to mathematical competence? This study investigated the relationship between tests of mathematical ability completed outside the scanner and resting-state functional connectivity (FC) of cytoarchitectonically defined subdivisions of the parietal cortex in adults. These parietal areas are also involved in executive functions (EFs). Therefore, it remains unclear whether there are unique networks for mathematical processing. We investigate the neural networks for mathematical cognition and three measures of EF using resting-state fMRI data collected from 51 healthy adults. Using 10 ROIs in seed to whole-brain voxel-wise analyses, the results showed that arithmetical ability was correlated with FC between the right anterior intraparietal sulcus (hIP1) and the left supramarginal gyrus and between the right posterior intraparietal sulcus (hIP3) and the left middle frontal gyrus and the right premotor cortex. The connection between the posterior portion of the left angular gyrus and the left inferior frontal gyrus was also correlated with mathematical ability. Covariates of EF eliminated connectivity patterns with nodes in inferior frontal gyrus, angular gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus, suggesting neural overlap. Controlling for EF, we found unique connections correlated with mathematical ability between the right hIP1 and the left supramarginal gyrus and between hIP3 bilaterally to premotor cortex bilaterally. This is partly in line with the “mapping hypothesis” of numerical cognition in which the right intraparietal sulcus subserves nonsymbolic number processing and connects to the left parietal cortex, responsible for calculation procedures. We show that FC within this circuitry is a significant predictor of math ability in adulthood.

The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology

This research systematically mapped the relationship between political ideology and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit-that is, obscure sentences constructed to impress others rather than convey truth. Among Swedish adults (N = 985), bullshit receptivity was (a) robustly positively associated with socially conservative (vs. liberal) self-placement, resistance to change, and particularly binding moral intuitions (loyalty, authority, purity); (b) associated with centrism on preference for equality and even leftism (when controlling for other aspects of ideology) on economic ideology self-placement; and (c) lowest among right-of-center social liberal voters and highest among left-wing green voters. Most of the results held up when we controlled for the perceived profundity of genuine aphorisms, cognitive reflection, numeracy, information processing bias, gender, age, education, religiosity, and spirituality. The results are supportive of theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in cognitive orientation, while also pointing to the existence of bullshit receptivity among both right- and left-wingers.

How does mathematics anxiety impair mathematical abilities? Investigating the link between math anxiety, working memory, and number processing

In contemporary society, it is essential to have adequate mathematical skills. Being numerate has been linked to positive life outcomes and well-being in adults. It is also acknowledged that math anxiety (MA) hampers mathematical skills increasingly with age. Still, the mechanisms by which MA affect performance remain debated. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), we contrast the different ways in which MA has been suggested to interfere with math abilities. Our models indicate that MA may affect math performance through three pathways: (1) indirectly through working memory ability, giving support for the 'affective drop' hypothesis of MA's role in mathematical performance, (2) indirectly through symbolic number processing, corroborating the notion of domain-specific mechanisms pertaining to number, and (3) a direct effect of MA on math performance. Importantly, the pathways vary in terms of their relative strength depending on what type of mathematical problems are being solved. These findings shed light on the mechanisms by which MA may interfere with mathematical performance.

Registered Replication Report on Srull and Wyer (1979)

Srull and Wyer (1979) demonstrated that exposing participants to more hostility-related stimuli caused them subsequently to interpret ambiguous behaviors as more hostile. In their Experiment 1, participants descrambled sets of words to form sentences. In one condition, 80% of the descrambled sentences described hostile behaviors, and in another condition, 20% described hostile behaviors. Following the descrambling task, all participants read a vignette about a man named Donald who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner and then rated him on a set of personality traits. Next, participants rated the hostility of various ambiguously hostile behaviors (all ratings on scales from 0 to 10). Participants who descrambled mostly hostile sentences rated Donald and the ambiguous behaviors as approximately 3 scale points more hostile than did those who descrambled mostly neutral sentences. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 26 independent replications ( N = 7,373 in the total sample; k = 22 labs and N = 5,610 in the primary analyses) of Srull and Wyer’s Experiment 1, each of which followed a preregistered and vetted protocol. A random-effects meta-analysis showed that the protagonist was seen as 0.08 scale points more hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% confidence interval, CI = [0.004, 0.16]). The ambiguously hostile behaviors were seen as 0.08 points less hostile when participants were primed with 80% hostile sentences than when they were primed with 20% hostile sentences (95% CI = [−0.18, 0.01]). Although the confidence interval for one outcome excluded zero and the observed effect was in the predicted direction, these results suggest that the currently used methods do not produce an assimilative priming effect that is practically and routinely detectable.

Registered Replication Report on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008)

The self-concept maintenance theory holds that many people will cheat in order to maximize self-profit, but only to the extent that they can do so while maintaining a positive self-concept. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008, Experiment 1) gave participants an opportunity and incentive to cheat on a problem-solving task. Prior to that task, participants either recalled the Ten Commandments (a moral reminder) or recalled 10 books they had read in high school (a neutral task). Results were consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory. When given the opportunity to cheat, participants given the moral-reminder priming task reported solving 1.45 fewer matrices than did those given a neutral prime (Cohen’s d = 0.48); moral reminders reduced cheating. Mazar et al.’s article is among the most cited in deception research, but their Experiment 1 has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the aggregated result of 25 direct replications (total N = 5,786), all of which followed the same preregistered protocol. In the primary meta-analysis (19 replications, total n = 4,674), participants who were given an opportunity to cheat reported solving 0.11 more matrices if they were given a moral reminder than if they were given a neutral reminder (95% confidence interval = [−0.09, 0.31]). This small effect was numerically in the opposite direction of the effect observed in the original study (Cohen’s d = −0.04).

Bullshit-sensitivity predicts prosocial behavior

Bullshit-sensitivity is the ability to distinguish pseudo-profound bullshit sentences (e.g. "Your movement transforms universal observations") from genuinely profound sentences (e.g. "The person who never made a mistake never tried something new"). Although bullshit-sensitivity has been linked to other individual difference measures, it has not yet been shown to predict any actual behavior. We therefore conducted a survey study with over a thousand participants from a general sample of the Swedish population and assessed participants' bullshit-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven bullshit sentences) and profoundness-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven genuinely profound sentences), and used these variables to predict two types of prosocial behavior (self-reported donations and a decision to volunteer for charity). Despite bullshit-receptivity and profoundness-receptivity being positively correlated with each other, logistic regression analyses showed that profoundness-receptivity had a positive association whereas bullshit-receptivity had a negative association with both types of prosocial behavior. These relations held up for the most part when controlling for potentially intermediating factors such as cognitive ability, time spent completing the survey, sex, age, level of education, and religiosity. The results suggest that people who are better at distinguishing the pseudo-profound from the actually profound are more prosocial.

Examining the Triple Code Model in numerical cognition: An fMRI study

The Triple Code Model (TCM) of numerical cognition argues for the existence of three representational codes for number: Arabic digits, verbal number words, and analog nonsymbolic magnitude representations, each subserved by functionally dissociated neural substrates. Despite the popularity of the TCM, no study to date has explored all three numerical codes within one fMRI paradigm. We administered three tasks, associated with each of the aforementioned numerical codes, in order to explore the neural correlates of numerosity processing in a sample of adults (N = 46). Independent task-control contrast analyses revealed task-dependent activity in partial support of the model, but also highlight the inherent complexity of a distributed and overlapping fronto-parietal network involved in all numerical codes. The results indicate that the TCM correctly predicts the existence of some functionally dissociated neural substrates, but requires an update that accounts for interactions with attentional processes. Parametric contrasts corresponding to differences in task difficulty revealed specific neural correlates of the distance effect, where closely spaced numbers become more difficult to discriminate than numbers spaced further apart. A conjunction analysis illustrated overlapping neural correlates across all tasks, in line with recent proposals for a fronto-parietal network of number processing. We additionally provide tentative results suggesting the involvement of format-independent numerosity-sensitive retinotopic maps in the early visual stream, extending previous findings of nonsymbolic stimulus selectivity. We discuss the functional roles of the components associated with the model, as well as the purported fronto-parietal network, and offer arguments in favor of revising the TCM.

Registered Replication Report: Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998)

Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence ("professor") subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence ("soccer hooligans"). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%-3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and -0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N = 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N = 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the "professor" category and those primed with the "hooligan" category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.

The (Null) Effect of Affective Touch on Betrayal Aversion, Altruism, and Risk Taking

Pleasant touch is thought to increase the release of oxytocin. Oxytocin, in turn, has been extensively studied with regards to its effects on trust and prosocial behavior, but results remain inconsistent. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of touch on economic decision making. Participants (n = 120) were stroked on their left arm using a soft brush (touch condition) or not at all (control condition; varied within subjects), while they performed a series of decision tasks assessing betrayal aversion (the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task), altruism (donating money to a charitable organization), and risk taking (the Balloon Analog Risk Task). We found no significant effect of touch on any of the outcome measures, neither within nor between subjects. Furthermore, effects were not moderated by gender or attachment. However, attachment avoidance had a significant effect on altruism in that those who were high in avoidance donated less money. Our findings contribute to the understanding of affective touch—and, by extension, oxytocin—in social behavior, and decision making by showing that touch does not directly influence performance in tasks involving risk and prosocial decisions. Specifically, our work casts further doubt on the validity of oxytocin research in humans.

Exposure to arousal-inducing sounds facilitates visual search

Exposure to affective stimuli could enhance perception and facilitate attention via increasing alertness, vigilance, and by decreasing attentional thresholds. However, evidence on the impact of affective sounds on perception and attention is scant. Here, a novel aspect of affective facilitation of attention is studied: whether arousal induced by task-irrelevant auditory stimuli could modulate attention in a visual search. In two experiments, participants performed a visual search task with and without auditory-cues that preceded the search. Participants were faster in locating high-salient targets compared to low-salient targets. Critically, search times and search slopes decreased with increasing auditory-induced arousal while searching for low-salient targets. Taken together, these findings suggest that arousal induced by sounds can facilitate attention in a subsequent visual search. This novel finding provides support for the alerting function of the auditory system by showing an auditory-phasic alerting effect in visual attention. The results also indicate that stimulus arousal modulates the alerting effect. Attention and perception are our everyday tools to navigate our surrounding world and the current findings showing that affective sounds could influence visual attention provide evidence that we make use of affective information during perceptual processing.

Are Individuals Luck Egalitarians? - An Experiment on the Influence of Brute and Option Luck on Social Preferences

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities should be deemed fair as long as they follow from individuals’ deliberate and fully informed choices (i.e., option luck) while inequalities should be deemed unfair if they follow from choices over which the individual has no control (i.e., brute luck). This study investigates if individuals’ fairness preferences correspond with the luck egalitarian fairness position. More specifically, in a laboratory experiment we test how individuals choose to redistribute gains and losses that stem from option luck compared to brute luck. A two-stage experimental design with real incentives was employed. We show that individuals (n = 226) change their action associated with re-allocation depending on the underlying conception of luck. Subjects in the brute luck treatment equalized outcomes to larger extent (p = 0.0069). Thus, subjects redistributed a larger amount to unlucky losers and a smaller amount to lucky winners compared to equivalent choices made in the option luck treatment. The effect is less pronounced when conducting the experiment with third-party dictators, indicating that there is some self-serving bias at play. We conclude that people have fairness preference not just for outcomes, but also for how those outcomes are reached. Our findings are potentially important for understanding the role citizens assign individual responsibility for life outcomes, i.e., health and wealth.

Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of -0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

The effect of fast and slow decisions on risk taking

We experimentally compare fast and slow decisions in a series of experiments on financial risk taking in three countries involving over 1700 subjects. To manipulate fast and slow decisions, subjects were randomly allocated to responding within 7 seconds (time pressure) or waiting for at least 7 or 20 seconds (time delay) before responding. To control for different effects of time pressure and time delay on measurement noise, we estimate separate parameters for noise and risk preferences within a random utility framework. We find that time pressure increases risk aversion for gains and risk taking for losses compared to time delay, implying that time pressure increases the reflection effect of Prospect Theory. The results for gains are weaker and less robust than the results for losses. We find no significant difference between time pressure and time delay for loss aversion (tested in only one of the experiments). Time delay also leads to less measurement noise than time pressure and unconstrained decisions, and appears to be an effective way of decreasing noise in experiments.