Cognitive control increases honesty in cheaters but cheating in those who are honest

Different neural correlates of deception: Crafting high and low creative scams

Deception is a complex social behavior that manifests in various forms, including scams. To successfully deceive victims, liars have to continually devise novel scams. This ability to create novel scams represents one kind of malevolent creativity, referred to as lying. This study aimed to explore different neural substrates involved in the generation of high and low creative scams. A total of 40 participants were required to design several creative scams, and their cortical activity was recorded by functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The results revealed that the right frontopolar cortex (FPC) was significantly active in scam generation. This region associated with theory of mind may be a key region for creating novel and complex scams. Moreover, creativity-related regions were positively involved in creative scams, while morality-related areas showed negative involvement. This suggests that individuals might attempt to use malevolent creativity while simultaneously minimizing the influence of moral considerations. The right FPC exhibited increased coupling with the right precentral gyrus during the design of high-harmfulness scams, suggesting a diminished control over immoral thoughts in the generation of harmful scams. Additionally, the perception of the victim's emotions (related to right pre-motor cortex) might diminish the quality of highly original scams. Furthermore, an efficient and cohesive neural coupling state appears to be a key factor in generating high-creativity scams. These findings suggest that the right FPC was crucial in scam creation, highlighting a neural basis for balancing malevolent creativity against moral considerations in high-creativity deception.

The Effect of Comparative Direction and Comparative Gap on Self-Deception

Purpose

Self-deception refers to an individual holding inflated beliefs about their abilities, plays a crucial role in human behavior and decision-making. Individuals may inflate their abilities when subject to comparisons with others. This study examined the impact of social comparison on self-deception through the implementation of two behavioral experiments.

Methods

In Experiment 1, we recruited a sample of 152 undergraduate students. Participants were falsely informed that they performed better (downward comparison) and worse (upward comparison) than average on a game. Subsequently, their level of self-deception was assessed by asking them to predict their performance in a future game, with more inflated predictions indicating greater self-deception. In Experiment 2, we gathered 126 undergraduate students to broaden the current study. This experiment examined the combined effects of comparison direction and comparison gap on self-deceptive behavior.

Results

The findings showed that self-deception was more common in circumstances of upward comparison than in downward comparison or no comparison (Experiment 1). Furthermore, Individuals were more inclined to participate in self-deception when encountering a notable performance gap relative to others, particularly in scenarios involving upward social comparison (Experiment 2).

Conclusion

The findings suggested that when confronted with threatening social comparative information, people tended to use self-deception to protect themselves. Members of the large gap group experienced strong feelings of unfairness and negative emotions, which led to self-protective behaviors and a greater likelihood of self-deception.

High consistency of cheating and honesty in early childhood

Three preregistered studies examined whether 5-year-old children cheat consistently or remain honest across multiple math tests. We observed high consistency in both honesty and cheating. All children who cheated on the first test continued cheating on subsequent tests, with shorter cheating latencies over time. In contrast, 77% of initially honest children maintained honesty despite repeated failure to complete the tests successfully. A brief integrity intervention helped initially honest children remain honest but failed to dissuade initially cheating children from cheating. These findings demonstrate that cheating emerges early and persists strongly in young children, underscoring the importance of early prevention efforts. They also suggest that bolstering honesty from the start may be more effective than attempting to remedy cheating after it has occurred. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Our research examines whether 5-year-old children, once they have started cheating, will continue to do so consistently. We also investigate whether 5-year-old children who are initially honest will continue to be honest subsequently. We discovered high consistency in both honesty and cheating among 5-year-old children. Almost all the children who initially cheated continued this behavior, while those who were honest stayed honest. A brief integrity-boosting intervention successfully helped 5-year-old children maintain their honesty. However, the same intervention failed to deter cheaters from cheating again. These findings underscore the importance of implementing integrity intervention as early as possible, potentially before children have had their first experience of cheating.

Cathodal HD-tDCS above the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increases environmentally sustainable decision-making

Environmental sustainability is characterized by a conflict between short-term self-interest and longer-term collective interests. Self-control capacity has been proposed to be a crucial determinant of people's ability to overcome this conflict. Yet, causal evidence is lacking, and previous research is dominated by the use of self-report measures. Here, we modulated self-control capacity by applying inhibitory high-definition transcranial current stimulation (HD-tDCS) above the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) while participants engaged in an environmentally consequential decision-making task. The task includes conflicting and low conflicting trade-offs between short-term personal interests and long-term environmental benefits. Contrary to our preregistered expectation, inhibitory HD-tDCS above the left dlPFC, presumably by reducing self-control capacity, led to more, and not less, pro-environmental behavior in conflicting decisions. We speculate that in our exceptionally environmentally friendly sample, deviating from an environmentally sustainable default required self-control capacity, and that inhibiting the left dlPFC might have reduced participants' ability to do so.

Behavioral dishonesty in multiscenes: Associations with trait honesty and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching

Cross-situational inconsistency is common in the expression of honesty traits; yet, there is insufficient emphasis on behavioral dishonesty across multiple contexts. The current study aimed to investigate behavioral dishonesty in various contexts and reveal the associations between trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns of observing others behave honestly or dishonestly in videos (abbr.: (dis)honesty video-watching). First, the results revealed limitations in using trait honesty to reflect variations in dishonest behaviors and predict behavioral dishonesty. The finding highlights the importance of considering neural patterns in understanding and predicting dishonest behaviors. Second, by comparing the predictive performance of seven types of data across three neural networks, the results showed that functional connectivity in the hypothesis-driven network during (dis)honesty video-watching provided the highest predictive power in predicting multitask behavioral dishonesty. Last, by applying the feature elimination method, the midline self-referential regions (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex), anterior insula, and striatum were identified as the most informative brain regions in predicting behavioral dishonesty. In summary, the study offered insights into individual differences in deception and the intricate connections among trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching.

An Examination of the Motives for Attributing and Interpreting Deception in People with Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment

The aim of the present study was to examine how a person with amnestic mild cognitive impairment perceives the phenomenon of deception. Amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) usually represents the prodromal phase of Alzheimer's disease (AD), with patients showing memory impairment but with normal activities of daily living. It was expected that aMCI patients would face difficulties in the attribution and interpretation of deceptive behavior due to deficits regarding their diagnosis. The main sample of the study consisted of 76 older adults who were patients of a daycare center diagnosed with aMCI. A sample of 55 highly educated young adults was also examined in the same experiment to qualitatively compare their performance with that of aMCI patients. Participants were assigned a scenario where a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) was engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant. The results showed that aMCI patients, even if they understood that something was going wrong, did not invest in interpretations of potential deception and tended to avoid searching for confirmative information related to the hypothetical lie of their partner compared to highly educated young adults. It seems that aMCI patients become somehow "innocent", and this is discussed in terms of cognitive impairment and/or socioemotional selectivity.

The Relationship Between Cognitive Resource Consumption During Gameplay and Postgame Aggressive Behaviors: Between-Subjects Experiment

Background

The question of how video games can shape aggressive behaviors has been a focus for many researchers. Previous research has focused on how violent video game content leads to postgame aggressive behaviors. However, video games not only convey violence or prosocial content to players but also require cognitive effort from individuals. Since human cognitive resources are limited, consuming more cognitive resources in a game leads to less cognitive resources to suppress aggressive impulses. Therefore, the depletion of cognitive resources from playing video games may also lead to changes in postgame aggressive behaviors.

Objective

This study aimed to examine the relationship between cognitive resources consumed in video games and postgame aggressive behaviors.

Methods

A total of 60 participants (age: mean 20.22; range 18-24 y) were randomly assigned to either the high-load group or the low-load group. Participants from both groups played a video game centered around college life. In the low-load group, participants followed the gameplay instructions to complete it. In the high-load group, participants were given an extra digital memory task to complete while playing the game. Participants in both groups played the video game for about 25 minutes. A maze selection task was then conducted to measure the participants' helping and hurting behaviors.

Results

The independent samples 2-tailed t tests showed that the high-load group had significantly higher hurting scores (mean 3.13, SD 2.47) than the low-load group (mean 1.90, SD 2.12; t58=-2.07, P=.04; Cohen d=-0.535), whereas helping behaviors were not significantly affected (t58=1.52, P=.13; Cohen d=0.393).

Conclusions

As more cognitive resources are consumed in a video game, more hurting behaviors are exhibited after the game. This finding proposes an alternative route by which video games impact aggressive behaviors, adding to previous theories and raising concerns about the popularity of cognitive training games.

Does deception involve more cognitive control than truth-telling? Meta-analyses of N2 and MFN ERP studies

A number of psychological theories propose that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Over the last decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to unravel this question, but the findings are mixed. To address this controversy, two meta-analyses were conducted to quantify the results of existing studies reporting N2 or medial frontal negativity (MFN) associated with deception. In total, 32 papers consisting of 1091 participants were included, which yielded 32 effect sizes for N2 and 7 effect sizes for MFN. We found that deception was associated with a more negative N2 and MFN than truth-telling with medium and large effect sizes (r = .25 and .51, respectively). We also found that the deception paradigm modulated the results (p = .043), but found no evidence for publication bias. Our findings indicate that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Our review also identifies gaps in this literature, including a need for more ERP studies using spontaneous deception.

The single- and dual-brain mechanisms underlying the adviser's confidence expression strategy switching during influence management

Effective influence management during advice-giving requires individuals to express confidence in the advice properly and switch timely between the 'competitive' strategy and the 'defensive' strategy. However, how advisers switch between these two strategies, and whether and why there exist individual differences during this process remain elusive. We used an advice-giving game that manipulated incentive contexts (Incentivized/Non-Incentivized) to induce the adviser's confidence expression strategy switching and measured the brain activities of adviser and advisee concurrently using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Behaviorally, we observed individual differences in strategy switching. Some advisers applied the 'defensive' strategy when incentivized and the 'competitive' strategy when not incentivized, while others applied the 'competitive' strategy when incentivized and the 'defensive' strategy when not incentivized. This effect was mediated by the adviser's perceived stress in each condition and was reflected by the frequencies of advice-taking in the advisees. Neurally, brain activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) supported strategy switching, as well as interpersonal neural synchronization (INS) in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that supported influence management. This two-in-one process, i.e., confidence expression strategy switching and the corresponding influence management, was linked and modulated by the strength of DLPFC-TPJ functional connectivity in the adviser. We further developed a descriptive model that contributed to understanding the adviser's strategy switching during influence management.

The acute effects of stress on dishonesty are moderated by individual differences in moral default

In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.

A straightforward graphical/statistical approach to help substantiate cheating on multiple-choice examinations

Academic dishonesty is prevalent in universities in the form of cheating on examinations, with the problem being much greater in classes that have a large number of students that require close seating arrangements for in-class exams. The scenario described below was experienced during an in-class exam that included the possibility of an Honor Code violation between two students that was observed independently by three different faculty proctors. Herein we detail an objective, statistical approach taken to maintain exam and academic integrity that is compelling and transparent to students and the University Honor Council. Using the established error-similarity analysis for multiple-choice exams, it was determined that the number of identical incorrect answers found on the exams of the two individuals in question was sufficiently greater than the number expected by chance (probability of P < 0.00001). The number of total identical incorrect answers found on the remaining exams (across 65 students, n = 89 comparisons) was plotted as function of the number of total incorrect answers found on these exams (incorrect answers ranged from 1 to 22) and clearly supported that there was an Honor Code violation between the two students in question. The techniques used herein established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a form of cheating had occurred between these students. However, caution must be taken as further investigation is requisite to establish whether the Honor Code violation was unidirectional (one student copying off the other) or bidirectional (collusion between the two students) in nature.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Academic dishonesty is prevalent in universities, especially on examinations with a large number of students in close seating arrangements. Cheating on a multiple-choice exam was suspected by observations from proctors of the examination. Application of error-similarity analysis associated with identical incorrect answers demonstrated that the probability of cheating was confirmed (P < 0.00001) between two examinees. Further comparisons with the remaining exams provided graphic evidence that a violation of the University's Honor Code had occurred.

The path of dishonesty: identification of mental processes with electrical neuroimaging

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach-the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.

Vigilant Attention, Cerebral Blood Flow and Grey Matter Volume Change after 36 h of Acute Sleep Deprivation in Healthy Male Adults: A Pilot Study

It is commonly believed that alertness and attention decrease after sleep deprivation (SD). However, there are not enough studies on the changes in psychomotor vigilance testing (PVT) during SD and the corresponding changes in brain function and brain structure after SD. Therefore, we recruited 30 healthy adult men to perform a 36 h acute SD experiment, including the measurement of five indicators of PVT every 2 h, and analysis of cerebral blood flow (CBF) and grey matter volume (GMV) changes, before and after SD by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The PVT measurement found that the mean reaction time (RT), fastest 10% RT, minor lapses, and false starts all increased progressively within 20 h of SD, except for major lapses. Subsequently, all indexes showed a significant lengthening or increasing trend, and the peak value was in the range of 24 h-32 h and decreased at 36 h, in which the number of major lapses returned to normal. MRI showed that CBF decreased in the left orbital part of the superior frontal gyrus, the left of the rolandic operculum, the left triangular part, and the right opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus, and CBF increased in the left lingual gyrus and the right superior gyrus after 36 h SD. The left lingual gyrus was negatively correlated with the major lapses, and both the inferior frontal gyrus and the superior frontal gyrus were positively correlated with the false starts. Still, there was no significant change in GMV. Therefore, we believe that 36 h of acute SD causes alterations in brain function and reduces alert attention, whereas short-term acute SD does not cause changes in brain structure.

Self-deception: Distorted metacognitive process in ambiguous contexts

As one of the commonly used folk psychological concepts, self-deception has been intensively discussed yet is short of solid ground from cognitive neuroscience. Self-deception is a biased cognitive process of information to obtain or maintain a false belief that could be both self-enhancing or self-diminishing. Study 1 (N = 152) captured self-deception by adopting a modified numerical discrimination task that provided cheating opportunities, quantifying errors in predicting future performance (via item-response theory model), and measuring the belief of how good they are at solving the task (i.e., self-efficacy belief). By examining whether self-efficacy belief is based upon actual ability (true belief) or prediction errors (false belief), Study 1 showed that self-deception occurred in the effortless (easier access to answer cues) rather than effortful (harder access to answer cues) cheating opportunity conditions, suggesting high ambiguity in attributions facilitates self-deception. Studies 2 and 3 probed the neural source of self-deception, linking self-deception with the metacognitive process. Both studies replicated behavioral results from Study 1. Study 2 (ERP study; N = 55) found that the amplitude of frontal slow wave significantly differed between participants with positive/self-enhancing and negative/self-diminishing self-deceiving tendencies in incorrect predictions while remaining similar in correct predictions. Study 3 (functional magnetic resonance imaging study; N = 33) identified self-deceiving associated activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and showed that effortless cheating context increased cheating behaviors that further facilitated self-deception. Our findings suggest self-deception is a false belief associated with a distorted metacognitive mental process that requires ambiguity in attributions of behaviors.

Honesty as a trait

The purpose of this paper is to review recent research about the possibility that some people are more honest than others and about the causes of them being so. We tackle four big questions about the consistency of honest behavior, the content and breadth of trait honesty, the mechanisms underlying trait honesty, and the measurement of trait honesty. Recent research reveals we are only at the beginning states of answering these questions about honesty. Invigorated research is needed to firmly resolve whether individuals differ in honesty and if so, integrate the determining mechanisms and develop strong measurements.

Dynamic neural reconfiguration for distinct strategies during competitive social interactions

Information exchange between brain regions is key to understanding information processing for social decision-making, but most analyses ignore its dynamic nature. New insights on this dynamic might help us to uncover the neural correlates of social cognition in the healthy population and also to understand the malfunctioning neural computations underlying dysfunctional social behavior in patients with mental disorders. In this work, we used a multi-round bargaining game to detect switches between distinct bargaining strategies in a cohort of 76 healthy participants. These switches were uncovered by dynamic behavioral modeling using the hidden Markov model. Proposing a novel model of dynamic effective connectivity to estimate the information flow between key brain regions, we found a stronger interaction between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) for the strategic deception compared with the social heuristic strategies. The level of deception was associated with the information flow from the Brodmann area 10 to the rTPJ, and this association was modulated by the rTPJ-to-rDLPFC information flow. These findings suggest that dynamic bargaining strategy is supported by dynamic reconfiguration of the rDLPFC-and-rTPJ interaction during competitive social interactions.

Morality in the flesh: on the link between bodily self-consciousness, moral identity and (dis)honest behaviour

The sense of owning a body (ownership) and controlling its actions (agency) are two main pillars of bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Although studies suggest that BSC signals and morality may be associated, whether such association has a positive or negative direction remains unclear. To investigate this issue, we conducted two pre-registered, online studies, in which a total of 1309 participants completed BSC- and morality-related questionnaires and undertook a task where they could cheat for monetary gain. We found that participants with high sense of ownership displayed high moral identity, which supports the notion that ownership is used to associate the self with positive characteristics. Moreover, high agency was associated with increased moral identity when sense of power is high. Results regarding deception are less clear, and might relate to the impact of COVID-19. Our results concerning moral identity may inspire policies that rely on changes of corporeal awareness to contrast immorality.

Morality in the flesh: on the link between bodily self-consciousness, moral identity and (dis)honest behaviour

The sense of owning a body (ownership) and controlling its actions (agency) are two main pillars of bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Although studies suggest that BSC signals and morality may be associated, whether such association has a positive or negative direction remains unclear. To investigate this issue, we conducted two pre-registered, online studies, in which a total of 1309 participants completed BSC- and morality-related questionnaires and undertook a task where they could cheat for monetary gain. We found that participants with high sense of ownership displayed high moral identity, which supports the notion that ownership is used to associate the self with positive characteristics. Moreover, high agency was associated with increased moral identity when sense of power is high. Results regarding deception are less clear, and might relate to the impact of COVID-19. Our results concerning moral identity may inspire policies that rely on changes of corporeal awareness to contrast immorality.

Morality in the flesh: on the link between bodily self-consciousness, moral identity and (dis)honest behaviour

The sense of owning a body (ownership) and controlling its actions (agency) are two main pillars of bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Although studies suggest that BSC signals and morality may be associated, whether such association has a positive or negative direction remains unclear. To investigate this issue, we conducted two pre-registered, online studies, in which a total of 1309 participants completed BSC- and morality-related questionnaires and undertook a task where they could cheat for monetary gain. We found that participants with high sense of ownership displayed high moral identity, which supports the notion that ownership is used to associate the self with positive characteristics. Moreover, high agency was associated with increased moral identity when sense of power is high. Results regarding deception are less clear, and might relate to the impact of COVID-19. Our results concerning moral identity may inspire policies that rely on changes of corporeal awareness to contrast immorality.

Cognitive control and dishonesty

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Resting-state functional connectivity of social brain regions predicts motivated dishonesty

Motivated dishonesty is a typical social behavior varying from person to person. Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) is capable of identifying unique patterns from functional connectivity (FC) between brain regions. Recent work has built a link between brain networks in resting state to dishonesty in Western participants. To determine and reproduce the relevant neural patterns and build an interpretable model to predict dishonesty, we analyzed two conceptually similar datasets containing rsfMRI data with different dishonesty tasks. Both tasks implemented the information-passing paradigm, in which monetary rewards were employed to induce dishonesty. We applied connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) to build a model among FC within and between four social brain networks (reward, self-referential, moral, and cognitive control). The CPM analysis indicated that FCs of social brain networks are predictive of dishonesty rate, especially FCs within reward network, and between self-referential and cognitive control networks. Our study offers an conceptual replication with integrated model to predict dishonesty with rsfMRI, and the results suggest that frequent motivated dishonest decisions may require the higher engagement of social brain regions.

Evolution of honesty in higher-order social networks

Sender-receiver games are simple models of information transmission that provide a formalism to study the evolution of honest signaling and deception between a sender and a receiver. In many practical scenarios, lies often affect groups of receivers, which inevitably entangles the payoffs of individuals to the payoffs of other agents in their group, and this makes the formalism of pairwise sender-receiver games inapt for where it might be useful the most. We therefore introduce group interactions among receivers and study how their interconnectedness in higher-order social networks affects the evolution of lying. We observe a number of counterintuitive results that are rooted in the complexity of the underlying evolutionary dynamics, which has thus far remained hidden in the realm of pairwise interactions. We find conditions for honesty to persist even when there is a temptation to lie, and we observe the prevalence of moral strategy profiles even when lies favor the receiver at a cost to the sender. We confirm the robustness of our results by further performing simulations on hypergraphs created from real-world data using the SocioPatterns database. Altogether, our results provide persuasive evidence that moral behavior may evolve on higher-order social networks, at least as long as individuals interact in groups that are small compared to the size of the network.

Individual differences in (dis)honesty are represented in the brain's functional connectivity at rest

Measurement of the determinants of socially undesirable behaviors, such as dishonesty, are complicated and obscured by social desirability biases. To circumvent these biases, we used connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) on resting state functional connectivity patterns in combination with a novel task which inconspicuously measures voluntary cheating to gain access to the neurocognitive determinants of (dis)honesty. Specifically, we investigated whether task-independent neural patterns within the brain at rest could be used to predict a propensity for (dis)honest behavior. Our analyses revealed that functional connectivity, especially between brain networks linked to self-referential thinking (vmPFC, temporal poles, and PCC) and reward processing (caudate nucleus), reliably correlates, in an independent sample, with participants' propensity to cheat. Participants who cheated the most also scored highest on several self-report measures of impulsivity which underscores the generalizability of our results. Notably, when comparing neural and self-report measures, the neural measures were found to be more important in predicting cheating propensity.

Neural mechanisms of deliberate dishonesty: Dissociating deliberation from other control processes during dishonest behaviors

Numerous studies have sought proof of whether people are genuinely honest by testing whether cognitive control mechanisms are recruited during honest and dishonest behaviors. The underlying assumption is: Deliberate behaviors require cognitive control to inhibit intuitive responses. However, cognitive control during honest and dishonest behaviors can be required for other reasons than deliberation. Across 58 neuroimaging studies (1,211 subjects), we investigated different forms of honest and dishonest behaviors and demonstrated that many brain regions previously implicated in dishonesty may reflect more general cognitive mechanisms. We argue that the motivational/volitional dimension is central to deliberation and provide evidence that motivated dishonest behaviors recruit the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex. This work questions the view that cognitive control is a hallmark of dishonesty.

Cognitive Control Promotes Either Honesty or Dishonesty, Depending on One's Moral Default

Cognitive control is crucially involved in making (dis)honest decisions. However, the precise nature of this role has been hotly debated. Is honesty an intuitive response, or is will power needed to override an intuitive inclination to cheat? A reconciliation of these conflicting views proposes that cognitive control enables dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it allows those who are generally honest to cheat. Thus, cognitive control does not promote (dis)honesty per se; it depends on one's moral default. In the present study, we tested this proposal using electroencephalograms in humans (males and females) in combination with an independent localizer (Stroop task) to mitigate the problem of reverse inference. Our analysis revealed that the neural signature evoked by cognitive control demands in the Stroop task can be used to estimate (dis)honest choices in an independent cheating task, providing converging evidence that cognitive control can indeed help honest participants to cheat, whereas it facilitates honesty for cheaters.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Dishonesty causes enormous economic losses. To target dishonesty with interventions, a rigorous understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms is required. A recent study found that cognitive control enables honest participants to cheat, whereas it helps cheaters to be honest. However, it is evident that a single study does not suffice as support for a novel hypothesis. Therefore, we tested the replicability of this finding using a different modality (EEG instead of fMRI) together with an independent localizer task to avoid reverse inference. We find that the same neural signature evoked by cognitive control demands in the localizer task can be used to estimate (dis)honesty in an independent cheating task, establishing converging evidence that the effect of cognitive control indeed depends on a person's moral default.

Functional connectivity between the caudate and medial prefrontal cortex reflects individual honesty variations in adults and children

Deception emerges in early childhood and prevails in adults. Activation patterns in previous adults' task-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), though sensitive to state honesty on a specific decision, are less reliable reflecting trait honesty. Besides of state honesty, most previous neuroimaging studies about dishonesty suffer the generalization problem due to the major focus on adults with children unexplored. To investigate honesty associated functional brain networks variations, 98 healthy adults (Age: 18-28 y.o.; 49 males and 49 females) were invited to participate in a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rfMRI) study (Study 1). We investigated how functional connections between the caudate and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) change among adults who differ in self-reported trait honesty. Results showed that adults with higher trait honesty have increased functional connectivity from the caudate to the mPFC, which is identified as an honesty-related hub region in global brain connectivity analysis and connects more tightly to a wide range of brain regions including the amygdala. Study 2 compared functional connectivity between children with high vs. low lying frequencies (Age: 6-16 y.o.; 61 males and 39 females) based on a publicly accessible database of rfMRI. Consistent with findings in adults, increased functional connectivity from the caudate to the mPFC was found in less frequently lying children. Despite different honesty indicators of self-reported honesty trait in adults and parent-reported lying patterns in children, consistent findings have been noted in the two samples with regards to functional connectivity variations between reward-related and self-related brain regions. These findings suggest functional connectivity alterations between the caudate and the mPFC contribute to honesty variations in both adults and children.

Human moral decision-making through the lens of Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by the loss of dopaminergic neurons in the basal ganglia (BG) and thalamocortical circuitry. While defective motor control has long been considered the defining symptom of PD, mounting evidence indicates that the BG are fundamentally important for a multitude of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes in addition to motor function. Here, we review alterations in moral decision-making in people with PD, specifically in the context of deceptive behavior. We report that PD patients exhibit two opposite behavioral patterns: hyper- and hypo-honesty. The hyper-honest subgroup engages in deception less often than matched controls, even when lying is associated with a monetary payoff. This behavioral pattern seems to be linked to dopaminergic hypo-activity, implying enhanced harm avoidance, risk aversion, non-impulsivity, and reduced reward sensitivity. On the contrary, the hypo-honest subgroup-often characterized by the additional diagnosis of impulse control disorders (ICDs) and dopamine dysregulation syndrome (DDS)-deceives more often than both PD patients without ICDs/DDS and controls. This behavioral pattern appears to be associated with dopaminergic hyperactivity, which underpins enhanced novelty-seeking, risk-proneness, impulsivity, and reward sensitivity. We posit that these two complementary behavioral patterns might be related to dysfunction of the dopaminergic reward system, leading to reduced or enhanced motivation to deceive. Only a few studies have directly investigated moral decision-making in PD and other neurodegenerative disorders affecting the BG, and further research on the causal role of subcortical structures in shaping moral behavior is needed.

Motivated Interpretations of Deceptive Information

We examine whether people seek information that might help them make sense of others' dishonest behavior. Participants were told that a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) had engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant's earnings. Participants were less likely to search for information that can justify potential dishonest behavior conducted by a friend than by a stranger (Experiment 1). When participants knew for certain that their partners had lied to them, they were less likely to assume that that the lie was justified when told that the partner was a friend rather than a stranger (Experiment 2). The results imply that people are more likely to search for information that may reduce the severity of possible dishonest behavior when a stranger, rather than a friend, is responsible for the behavior.

Different Neural Mechanisms Underlie Non-habitual Honesty and Non-habitual Cheating

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.