The Moral Dyad: A Fundamental Template Unifying Moral Judgment

The effect of reappraisal on the emotional regulation of shame in young adults with ASD and typical peers

Young adults with ASD experience shame in social interactions, and if poorly mishandled, it may interfere with their attempts to participate in their social environment. One strategy to reduce shame is cognitive reappraisal, yet the efficacy of this strategy was not examined in ASD. Here, we investigated the effect of reappraisal in reducing feelings of shame in ASD and the thematic contents used. Young adults with high-functioning ASD and typical participants were shown shame-arousing pictures. They imagined themselves as the primary character in each scenario and rated their feelings of shame. Then, they were trained to reappraise shame-arousing pictures less negatively. Finally, they viewed other shame-arousing photos, reappraised them, stated aloud their new interpretations, and rated their feelings. We found lower shame ratings in participants with ASD than in typical participants. In addition, we found a similar reduction in shame ratings after reappraising these pictures in both groups. Qualitative analysis revealed that participants with ASD used fewer positive narratives and more neutral and unrealistic descriptions than their typical peers. These findings highlight shame-regulation abilities in individuals with ASD while pointing to their unique narratives. We recommend that clinical interventions in ASD emphasize generating positive reappraisals of social situations.

Robots are both anthropomorphized and dehumanized when harmed intentionally

The harm-made mind phenomenon implies that witnessing intentional harm towards agents with ambiguous minds, such as robots, leads to augmented mind perception in these agents. We conducted two replications of previous work on this effect and extended it by testing if robots that detect and simulate emotions elicit a stronger harm-made mind effect than robots that do not. Additionally, we explored if someone is perceived as less prosocial when harming a robot compared to treating it kindly. The harm made mind-effect was replicated: participants attributed a higher capacity to experience pain to the robot when it was harmed, compared to when it was not harmed. We did not find evidence that this effect was influenced by the robot's ability to detect and simulate emotions. There were significant but conflicting direct and indirect effects of harm on the perception of mind in the robot: while harm had a positive indirect effect on mind perception in the robot through the perceived capacity for pain, the direct effect of harm on mind perception was negative. This suggests that robots are both anthropomorphized and dehumanized when harmed intentionally. Additionally, the results showed that someone is perceived as less prosocial when harming a robot compared to treating it kindly.

Unequal by malice, protesters by outrage: Agent perceptions drive moralization of, and collective action against, inequality

Economic inequality does not encounter strong protests even though individuals are generally against it. One potential explanation of this paradox is that individuals do not perceive inequality as caused by intentional agents, which, in line with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018), should prevent its assessment as immoral and consequently dampen moral outrage and collective action. Across three studies, we test and confirm this hypothesis. In Studies 1 (N = 395) and 2 (N = 337), the more participants believed that inequality is human driven and caused by intentional agents, the more they moralized inequality, felt outraged and wanted to engage in collective action. This was confirmed in Study 3 (N = 243) through an experimental design. Thus, our research shows that agent perception is crucial in the moralization of economic inequality and, more broadly, that morality can be a powerful motivator and effectively mobilize people to action.

Nostalgia increases punitiveness by intensifying moral concern

We addressed the relation between nostalgia and moral judgment or behavior. We hypothesized that nostalgia, a social emotion, increases moral concern (H1), nostalgia intensifies punitiveness against moral transgressors (H2), and that the nostalgia-punitiveness link is mediated by moral concern (H3). We conducted three cross-sectional (Studies 1, 2, 4) and one experimental (Study 3) investigations (N = 1145). The investigations, involving distinct operationalizations of the relevant constructs (nostalgia, moral concern, punitiveness) and diverse samples (U.S., Canadian, and European Prolific workers, French business school students, Dutch community members), yielded results consistent with the hypotheses. Nostalgia keeps one's moral compass in check. The findings enrich the emotions and morality literatures.

Distributing Blame Among Multiple Entities When Autonomous Technologies Cause Harm

As autonomous technology emerges, new variations in old questions arise. When autonomous technologies cause harm, who is to blame? The current studies compare reactions toward harms caused by human-controlled vehicles (HCVs) or human soldiers (HSs) to identical harms by autonomous vehicles (AVs) or autonomous robot soldiers. Drivers of HCVs, or HSs, were blamed more than mere users of AVs or HSs who outsourced their duties to ARSs. However, as human drivers/soldiers became less involved in (or were unaware of the preprogramming that led to) the harm, blame was redirected toward other entities (i.e., manufacturers and the tech company's executives), showing the opposite pattern as human drivers/soldiers. Results were robust to how blame was measured (i.e., degrees of blame versus apportionment of total blame). Overall, this research furthers the blame literature, raising questions about why, how (much), and to whom blame is assigned when multiple agents are potentially culpable.

Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A State-of-the-art Review

This narrative state-of-the-art review paper describes the progress in the understanding and treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Over the last four decades, the scientific landscape has matured, with many interdisciplinary contributions to understanding its diagnosis, etiology, and epidemiology. Advances in genetics, neurobiology, stress pathophysiology, and brain imaging have made it apparent that chronic PTSD is a systemic disorder with high allostatic load. The current state of PTSD treatment includes a wide variety of pharmacological and psychotherapeutic approaches, of which many are evidence-based. However, the myriad challenges inherent in the disorder, such as individual and systemic barriers to good treatment outcome, comorbidity, emotional dysregulation, suicidality, dissociation, substance use, and trauma-related guilt and shame, often render treatment response suboptimal. These challenges are discussed as drivers for emerging novel treatment approaches, including early interventions in the Golden Hours, pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions, medication augmentation interventions, the use of psychedelics, as well as interventions targeting the brain and nervous system. All of this aims to improve symptom relief and clinical outcomes. Finally, a phase orientation to treatment is recognized as a tool to strategize treatment of the disorder, and position interventions in step with the progression of the pathophysiology. Revisions to guidelines and systems of care will be needed to incorporate innovative treatments as evidence emerges and they become mainstream. This generation is well-positioned to address the devastating and often chronic disabling impact of traumatic stress events through holistic, cutting-edge clinical efforts and interdisciplinary research.

Perceived vulnerability to infectious disease and perceived harmfulness are as predictive of citizen response to COVID-19 as partisanship

Partisans have biased perceptions of objective conditions. At first glance, the COVID-19 pandemic would appear to be an example of this phenomenon. Noting that most citizens have consistently agreed about the pandemic, I argue that we have overlooked pre-political factors that are as influential as partisanship in shaping citizens' responses to the pandemic. I identify one such construct in perceived vulnerability to infectious disease (PVD). In one cross-sectional study and one panel study, I find that the influence of PVD on citizens' perceptions of COVID-19 equals that of partisanship. I also find that PVD can moderate the influence of partisanship on perceptions of harmfulness, nearly erasing the impact of being a Republican on perceiving COVID-19 as a threat. When led by PVD as well as partisanship to accurately perceive harm, citizens, including Republicans, attribute more responsibility to former president Donald Trump for his failed handling of the crisis.

Moral foundations of pro-choice and pro-life women

Opinions on abortion are more polarized than opinions on most other moral issues. Why are some people pro-choice and some pro-life? Religious and political preferences play a role here, but pro-choice and pro-life people may also differ in other aspects. In the current preregistered study (N = 479), we investigated how pro-choice women differ in their moral foundations from pro-life women. When the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) was applied (i.e., when declared moral principles were measured), pro-life women scored higher than pro-choice women in loyalty, authority, and purity. However, when women were asked about moral judgments indirectly via more real-life problems from the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFV), pro-choice women scored higher than pro-life women in emotional and physical care and liberty but lower in loyalty. When we additionally controlled for religious practice and political views, we found no differences between groups in declaring moral foundations (MFQ). However, in the case of real-life moral judgments (MFV), we observed higher care, fairness, and liberty among pro-choice and higher authority and purity among pro-life. Our results show intriguing nuances between women pro-choice and pro-life as we found a different pattern of moral foundations in those groups depending on whether we measured their declared abstract moral principles or moral judgment about real-life situations. We also showed how religious practice and political views might play a role in such differences. We conclude that attitudes to abortion "go beyond" abstract moral principles, and the real-life context matters in moral judgments.

Graphical abstract

Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04800-0.

People are curious about immoral and morally ambiguous others

Looking to the popularity of superheroes, true crime stories, and anti-heroic characters like Tony Soprano, we investigated whether moral extremity, especially moral badness, piques curiosity. Across five experiments (N = 2429), we examine moral curiosity, testing under what conditions the moral minds of others spark explanation-seeking behavior. In Experiment 1, we find that among the most widely watched Netflix shows in the US over a five-month period, the more immoral the protagonist, the more hours people spent watching. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we find that when given a choice to learn more about morally good, bad, ambiguous, or average others, people preferred to learn more about morally extreme people, both good and bad. Experiment 3 reveals that people are more curious for explanations about (vs. descriptions of) morally bad and ambiguous people compared to morally good ones. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the uniqueness of curiosity for moral ambiguity. We find that people are more drawn to moral rather than aesthetic ambiguity, suggesting that ambiguity, which is cognitively taxing and sometimes avoided, preferentially engenders information seeking in the moral domain. These findings suggest deviations from moral normativity, especially badness, spur curiosity. People are curious about immorality and agents who differ from the norm.

Just wrong? Or just WEIRD? Investigating the prevalence of moral dumbfounding in non-Western samples

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgment. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("It's just wrong") as justification for a judgment. Published evidence for dumbfounding has drawn exclusively on samples of WEIRD backgrounds (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), and it remains unclear to what extent the phenomenon is generalizable to other populations. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of moral dumbfounding have been disputed in recent years. In three studies we apply a standardized moral dumbfounding task, and show evidence for moral dumbfounding in a Chinese sample (Study 1, N = 165), an Indian sample (Study 2, N = 181), and a mixed sample primarily (but not exclusively) from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA region, Study 3, N = 264). These findings are consistent with a categorization theories of moral judgment.

A Meta-Analytical Assessment of the Effect of Deontological Evaluations and Teleological Evaluations on Ethical Judgments/Intentions

Deontological and teleological evaluations are widely utilized in the context of consumer decision-making. Despite their use, the differential effect of these distinct types of evaluations, and the conditions under which they hold, remains an unresolved issue. Thus, we conduct a meta-analysis of 316 effect sizes, from 53 research articles, to evaluate the extent to which deontological and teleological evaluations influence ethical judgments and intentions, and under what circumstances the influence occurs. The effect is explored across three categories of moderators: (1) contextual elements of the ethical issue, (2) stakeholders, and (3) methodological characteristics of primary studies. We find that the overall effect of deontological evaluations on ethical judgments and intentions is stronger than for teleological evaluations; however, the magnitude of the effect is contingent on several moderators. Deontological evaluations are weaker in offline consumer contexts and stronger when there are financial implications of the ethical issue. Conversely, the effect of teleological evaluations is relatively stable across ethical consumer contexts. Teleological evaluations are stronger from a utilitarian perspective than from an egoist one. Furthermore, the effect of deontological evaluations is weaker, but the effect for teleological evaluations is stronger, when the decision-maker has a personal relationship (as compared to an organizational relationship) with the victim of the unethical act. Findings validate the effect of both deontological and teleological evaluations on ethical judgments and intentions and highlight their importance in consumers' ethical decision-making. Implications for developing programs to prevent consumer unethical behavior are discussed.

The effect of faith in intuition on moral judgment: The mediating role of perceived harm

This study aimed to explore the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment and the underlying mechanism among Chinese college students using a questionnaire and experimental method. The results showed that levels of faith in intuition predicted more moral wrongness regarding ambiguous hurtful behaviors than unambiguous ones. Additionally, the perceived harm mediated the effect of individuals' levels of faith in intuition on moral wrongness regarding ambiguous harm behaviors but not regarding unambiguous harm behaviors. The results of this study provide empirical evidence on the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment in Chinese culture and have implications for future studies of moral judgments.

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.

Injurious Memories from the COVID-19 Frontline: The Impact of Episodic Memories of Self- and Other-Potentially Morally Injurious Events on Romanian Nurses' Burnout, Turnover Intentions and Basic Need Satisfaction

Nurses have been frequently exposed to Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIEs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to resource scarcity, they both perpetrated (self-PMIEs) and passively witnessed (other-PMIEs) moral transgressions toward the patients, severely violating their moral values. Our study investigated the impact of self- and other-PMIEs on work outcomes by exploring nurses' episodic memories of these events and the basic psychological need thwarting associated with them. Using a quasi-experimental design, on a convenience sample of 463 Romanian nurses, we found that PMIEs memories were uniquely associated with burnout and turnover intentions, after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, general basic psychological need satisfaction at work and other phenomenological characteristics. Both self- and other-PMIEs memories were need thwarting, with autonomy and competence mediating their differential impact on burnout, and with relatedness-on turnover intentions. Our findings emphasize the need for organizational moral repair practices, which should include enhancing nurses' feelings of autonomy, relatedness and competence. Psychological counseling and psychotherapy should be provided to nurses to prevent their episodic memories of PMIEs to be (fully) integrated in autobiographical knowledge, because this integration could have severe consequences on their psycho-social function and occupational health, as well as on the organizational climate in healthcare institutions.

Being Watched by God Versus a Third Person: Which Agent Lowers the Perceived Likelihood of Immoral Behaviors?

With three experimental studies using data from young adults living in a highly religious context, namely Turkey (N = 483), the current research examines how being watched by a third person versus God affects the perceived likelihood ratings of harmful versus impure immoral behaviors. We hypothesized that respondents would expect others to more strongly refrain from acting immorally when they believed they were being watched by God compared to a third person, and that this effect would be more pronounced for impure compared to harmful moral transgressions. The God condition was perceived as more effective than the third-person surveillance condition when immoral behaviors were harmful. However, for severe impure transgressions, neither surveillance condition was perceived as effective. We discuss our findings in light of contemporary morality research, outline the role of possible cultural and individual-level boundary conditions, and highlight the scientific and practical contributions of our research to the field.

The Moral Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nurses’ Burnout, Work Satisfaction and Adaptive Work Performance: The Role of Autobiographical Memories of Potentially Morally Injurious Events and Basic Psychological Needs

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in unprecedented exposure to Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIEs) for nurses, in which they were both moral transgressors and moral victims, with deleterious consequences on their psycho-social health and functioning. Our experimental design compared memories of PMIEs with memories of severe moral transgressions (SMTs), in which participants were only moral transgressors. Drawing from Self-Determination Theory and research on moral auto-biographical episodic memories, we assessed a conceptual model describing the impact of recalling a single PMIE or SMT event on nurses’ burnout, work satisfaction and adaptive performance. Our convenience sample comprised 614 Romanian nurses, and data was analyzed with path analysis, general linear modelling, and t-tests. Findings showed that memories of PMIEs, compared to SMTs, were more autonomy thwarting, being associated with more controlled work motivation, less moral learning, higher burnout, less work satisfaction, and adaptive performance. Burnout, moral learning, and work satisfaction were significant mediators of the relationships between PMIE and SMT recall and, respectively, adaptive performance. Our results highlight the urgency for organizational practices of moral repair for nurses after the pandemic, along with interventions meant to increase their autonomy and self-determined work motivation.

Why Men (Don't) Buy Sex: Purity Moralization and Perceived Harm as Constraints on Prostitution Offending

This study explores the moralization of purity and perceptions of harm as constraints on sex buying among men. Purchasing sex has long been considered an offense against public morality. While personal morality provides a powerful constraint on offending, and people may vary in the extent to which they experience moral intuitions about bodily and spiritual purity, research has so far neglected the role of purity moralization in understanding sex buying behavior. We hypothesize specifically that moral intuitions about purity constrain sex buying by leading people to perceive it as inherently wrong and by eliciting perceptions that sex buying is harmful to prostitutes. We test these hypotheses in a nationally representative survey of U.S. men (N = 2,525). Results indicate that purity moralization is associated with reduced sex buying, and that this relationship is mediated fully by perceptions of sex buying as harming prostitutes.

The puzzle of wrongless harms: Some potential concerns for dyadic morality and related accounts

There is wide-ranging consensus that harm or perceptions of harm play a significant role in judgments of moral wrongdoing. On one prominent view, the pattern that makes up the "essence" (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012) of acts of moral wrongdoing is "harm caused by an agent" (Schein, Goranson, & Gray, 2015, p. 983). According to Gray, Schein, and colleagues, events matching this pattern-a thinking/intentional agent inflicting some manner of harm (i.e., emotional/physical pain) upon a suffering patient-will be perceived as immoral. With this proposal in mind, we argue two basic points: (1) the current specification of the dyadic template would need to be further refined or "fortified" to withstand some obvious counter-examples; (2) this "fortified" formulation is still unfit to address the underlying concern: for any general pattern that is supposed to link perceptions of harm and wrongdoing, there are a number of cases (the "wrongless harms" of the title) that match the pattern quite well but are not viewed as immoral. We show this in four studies and one supplementary study. In our original study, we find, across six vignettes, that people may judge a behavior to be intended, self-serving, as well as foreseeably harmful and yet not judge it immoral. In our subsequent studies, we replicate these results with further checks and controls. With these findings in mind, we argue that moral cognition is far too complex and capricious to be reduced to a template.

Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC)

Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.

Virtuous victims

How do people perceive the moral character of victims? We find, across a range of transgressions, that people frequently see victims of wrongdoing as more moral than nonvictims who have behaved identically. Across 17 experiments (total n = 9676), we document this Virtuous Victim effect and explore the mechanisms underlying it. We also find support for the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, which proposes that people see victims as moral because this perception serves to motivate punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims, and people frequently face incentives to enact or encourage these “justice-restorative” actions. Our results validate predictions of this hypothesis and suggest that the Virtuous Victim effect does not merely reflect (i) that victims look good in contrast to perpetrators, (ii) that people are generally inclined to positively evaluate those who have suffered, or (iii) that people hold a genuine belief that victims tend to be people who behave morally.

Social perception in moral judgments of interpersonal transgressions

Moral judgments about interpersonal transgressions are shaped by attributions about the actor's mental state (intent), responsibility, and harmful consequences. Curiously, most research has investigated these judgments from a third-party perspective, often overlooking perceptions of the individuals directly involved in the transgression. We address this by reviewing research on how victims and transgressors involved in interpersonal transgressions form judgments about the transgressor's intent, responsibility, and how much harm was caused, and the ways in which victims' and transgressors' judgments diverge from one another. Our review indicates that both cognitive biases and motivation-based differences give rise to asymmetries. We argue that future research could investigate not only social perceptions but also meta-perceptions and that a better understanding of the content and causes of divergent interpersonal perceptions in this domain will lead to a more complete understanding of how to resolve conflicts.

The sex premium in religiously motivated moral judgment

Recent theorizing suggests that religious people's moral convictions are quite strategic (albeit unconsciously so), designed to make their worlds more amenable to their favored approaches to solving life's basic challenges. In a meta-analysis of 5 experiments and a preregistered replication, we find that religious identity places a sex premium on moral judgments, causing people to judge violations of conventional sexual morality as particularly objectionable. The sex premium is especially strong among highly religious people, and applies to both legal and illegal acts. Religion's influence on moral reasoning emphasizes conventional sexual norms, and may reflect the strategic projects to which religion has been applied throughout history. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Humanness Is Not Always Positive: Automatic Associations between Incivilities and Human Symbols

Uncivil behavior involves an attack on social norms related to the protection of public property and respect for community life. However, at the same time, the low-frequency and relatively low-intensity damage caused by most of these behaviors could lead to incivilities being considered a typically human action. The purpose of this set of studies is to examine the automatic associations that people establish between humanness and both civic and uncivil behaviors. Across three studies, uncivil behaviors were more strongly associated with human pictures than animal pictures (study 1) and with human-related words than animal-related words (study 2). We replicated study 2 with uncivil behaviors that do not prime graphically human beings (study 3). Overall, our results showed that uncivil behaviors and civic behaviors were clearly associated with human concepts. Our findings have direct implications for the conceptualization of humanness and its denial.

The extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD): Development and applications of a crowd-sourced approach to extracting moral intuitions from text

Moral intuitions are a central motivator in human behavior. Recent work highlights the importance of moral intuitions for understanding a wide range of issues ranging from online radicalization to vaccine hesitancy. Extracting and analyzing moral content in messages, narratives, and other forms of public discourse is a critical step toward understanding how the psychological influence of moral judgments unfolds at a global scale. Extant approaches for extracting moral content are limited in their ability to capture the intuitive nature of moral sensibilities, constraining their usefulness for understanding and predicting human moral behavior. Here we introduce the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD), a dictionary-based tool for extracting moral content from textual corpora. The eMFD, unlike previous methods, is constructed from text annotations generated by a large sample of human coders. We demonstrate that the eMFD outperforms existing approaches in a variety of domains. We anticipate that the eMFD will contribute to advance the study of moral intuitions and their influence on social, psychological, and communicative processes.

The P300 and MFN as indicators of concealed knowledge in situations with negative and positive moral valence

Many studies on concealed knowledge involve mock-thefts. The present study compares ERPs of participants concealing knowledge of a morally negative behavior (mock-theft) with ERPs of participants concealing knowledge of a morally positive behavior. Some participants (n= 33) stole a candy box out of an office, whereas others (n= 28) put the candy box into an office as a present. During a concealed information test, participants concealed knowledge of the candy box and a key they had seen in the office (probe stimuli) and honestly indicated not knowing similar irrelevant stimuli. P300s were enlarged for probe, compared to irrelevant stimuli in both conditions, revealing that probe stimuli were more salient than irrelevant stimuli regardless of their moral valence. Likewise, medial frontal negativities were enlarged for probe versus irrelevant stimuli in both conditions, indicating response conflicts when answering deceptively to probe items in both situations.

Good Robots, Bad Robots: Morally Valenced Behavior Effects on Perceived Mind, Morality, and Trust

Both robots and humans can behave in ways that engender positive and negative evaluations of their behaviors and associated responsibility. However, extant scholarship on the link between agent evaluations and valenced behavior has generally treated moral behavior as a monolithic phenomenon and largely focused on moral deviations. In contrast, contemporary moral psychology increasingly considers moral judgments to unfold in relation to a number of moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, liberty) subject to both upholding and deviation. The present investigation seeks to discover whether social judgments of humans and robots emerge differently as a function of moral foundation-specific behaviors. This work is conducted in two studies: (1) an online survey in which agents deliver observed/mediated responses to moral dilemmas and (2) a smaller laboratory-based replication with agents delivering interactive/live responses. In each study, participants evaluate the goodness of and blame for six foundation-specific behaviors, and evaluate the agent for perceived mind, morality, and trust. Across these studies, results suggest that (a) moral judgments of behavior may be agent-agnostic, (b) all moral foundations may contribute to social evaluations of agents, and (c) physical presence and agent class contribute to the assignment of responsibility for behaviors. Findings are interpreted to suggest that bad behaviors denote bad actors, broadly, but machines bear a greater burden to behave morally, regardless of their credit- or blame-worthiness in a situation.

Direct and indirect punishment of norm violations in daily life

Across societies, humans punish norm violations. To date, research on the antecedents and consequences of punishment has largely relied upon agent-based modeling and laboratory experiments. Here, we report a longitudinal study documenting punishment responses to norm violations in daily life (k = 1507; N = 257) and test pre-registered hypotheses about the antecedents of direct punishment (i.e., confrontation) and indirect punishment (i.e., gossip and social exclusion). We find that people use confrontation versus gossip in a context-sensitive manner. Confrontation is more likely when punishers have been personally victimized, have more power, and value offenders more. Gossip is more likely when norm violations are severe and when punishers have less power, value offenders less, and experience disgust. Findings reveal a complex punishment psychology that weighs the benefits of adjusting others' behavior against the risks of retaliation.

Measurement invariance of the moral vitalism scale across 28 cultural groups

Moral vitalism refers to a tendency to view good and evil as actual forces that can influence people and events. The Moral Vitalism Scale had been designed to assess moral vitalism in a brief survey form. Previous studies established the reliability and validity of the scale in US-American and Australian samples. In this study, the cross-cultural comparability of the scale was tested across 28 different cultural groups worldwide through measurement invariance tests. A series of exact invariance tests marginally supported partial metric invariance, however, an approximate invariance approach provided evidence of partial scalar invariance for a 5-item measure. The established level of measurement invariance allows for comparisons of latent means across cultures. We conclude that the brief measure of moral vitalism is invariant across 28 cultures and can be used to estimate levels of moral vitalism with the same precision across very different cultural settings.

Outcome-Based Evaluations of Social Interaction Valence in a Contingent Response Context

Previous studies have indicated that social evaluations rely heavily on the outcome of an actor's behavior toward a recipient. These studies focused on interactions in which two agents are connected by an external goal (i.e., object-mediated social interaction) and revealed that the intent behind an action has a privileged role in evaluating the valence of a social interaction. The current study investigated whether the intent behind an action influences evaluation of contingent social interactions wherein one agent responds to another without referring to a specific target. To clarify this, we operationalized intent as harmful or harmless when one agent hit another (i.e., recipient), and manipulated the action's outcome by determining to what extent it changed the recipient's state (i.e., falling down or moving slightly). Results showed that in contingent interactions with both direct launching (i.e., the actor directly caused the change) and extended launching (i.e., the actor caused the change through a mediated block), when the action significantly affected the recipient, the agents were evaluated as having a more negative social interaction than when the influence was small; this effect was independent of the intent behind the action. Such findings demonstrated that evaluations of contingent social interactions are primarily influenced by an actor's causal role in the outcome, not the intent behind an action. This null effect of intent when evaluating social interaction contrasts with findings on object-mediated social interaction, which is consistent with human social evaluations relying on two dissociable systems: causal and intentional components.

Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value-assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well-namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research.

Asymmetric memory for harming versus being harmed

Most people have been both the victim and the perpetrator of a moral transgression at some point in their lives; this article asks whether one set of moral experiences is easier to remember than the other, and why. In Study 1, we documented this basic asymmetry, finding that individuals recalled more instances in which they were the victim of a moral transgression than instances in which they were the perpetrator. In Study 2, we found that this asymmetry in memory arises because experiences of being the victim are perceived more negatively than experiences of being the perpetrator. In Studies 3 and 4, we demonstrated the critical role of intent in this asymmetry, finding that victim memories emphasize perpetrator intent to a greater degree than do perpetrator memories (Study 3), and that the memory asymmetry disappeared when individuals recalled unintentional moral violations (Study 4). Finally, in Study 5, we ruled out a potential alternative mechanism for these effects-that of self-protective motivation on the part of perpetrators. We found that the threat associated with the moral violation moderated victim (but not perpetrator) memories, a finding that is inconsistent with a motivational account for perpetrator memories. This research demonstrates that perceived agency shapes emotional experience and autobiographical memory and speaks to the importance of studying morality as it occurs in everyday contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A latent profile analysis of moral injury appraisals in refugees

Background: Refugees often exhibit reactions to traumatic events that may be conceptualized as moral injury (i.e. the impact of events that violate important moral values). There have been two types of moral injury appraisals found in refugees: transgressions by others and transgressions by oneself. Objective: To examine whether these types of moral injury appraisals co-occur or whether one form is usually predominant. Additionally, to investigate what types of events (trauma, living difficulties) and outcomes (PTSD, depression, anger, suicidality) were associated with each moral injury appraisal profile. Method: Participants included 221 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Australia. Data was collected online, and via pen and paper. A latent profile analysis was used to identify profiles of moral injury appraisals. Results: Results indicated a three-profile solution: Moral Injury-Other (MI-O; 37.8%), Moral Injury Other + Self (MI-OS; 35.2%), and no moral injury (No-MI; 26.9%). MI-O and MI-OS were predicted by both trauma experience and living difficulties. MI-O and MI-OS were also associated with greater psychopathology across all outcome variables compared to No-MI. MI-OS was also associated with greater anger and depression, compared to the MI-O profile. Conclusions: The association between the moral injury appraisal profiles and traumatic events, living difficulties and psychopathology, will have important clinical implications.

Avatars in Pain: Visible Harm Enhances Mind Perception in Humans and Robots

Previous research has shown that when people read vignettes about the infliction of harm upon an entity appearing to have no more than a liminal mind, their attributions of mind to that entity increased. Currently, we investigated if the presence of a facial wound enhanced the perception of mental capacities (experience and agency) in response to images of robotic and human-like avatars, compared with unharmed avatars. The results revealed that harmed versions of both robotic and human-like avatars were imbued with mind to a higher degree, irrespective of the baseline level of mind attributed to their unharmed counterparts. Perceptions of capacity for pain mediated attributions of experience, while both pain and empathy mediated attributions of abilities linked to agency. The findings suggest that harm, even when it appears to have been inflicted unintentionally, may augment mind perception for robotic as well as for nearly human entities, at least as long as it is perceived to elicit pain.

Inflammatory Comments Elicit Less Outrage When Made in Anonymous Online Contexts

Digital communities often face difficulties in limiting inflammatory social exchanges. The present studies test one potential obstacle to combating malicious comments online: that characteristics of specific online environments dull emotional reactions to inflammatory speech. Across four studies, results suggest that online contexts, particularly those lacking social information such as names and profile pictures, attenuate negative reactions to malicious behavior relative to face-to-face contexts. Shifting expectations and perceptions of harm may partly account for varying outrage across face-to-face and digital environments.

Moral fatigue: The effects of cognitive fatigue on moral reasoning

We report two experiments that show a moral fatigue effect: participants who are fatigued after they have carried out a tiring cognitive task make different moral judgements compared to participants who are not fatigued. Fatigued participants tend to judge that a moral violation is less permissible even though it would have a beneficial effect, such as killing one person to save the lives of five others. The moral fatigue effect occurs when people make a judgement that focuses on the harmful action, killing one person, but not when they make a judgement that focuses on the beneficial outcome, saving the lives of others, as shown in Experiment 1 ( n = 196). It also occurs for judgements about morally good actions, such as jumping onto railway tracks to save a person who has fallen there, as shown in Experiment 2 ( n = 187). The results have implications for alternative explanations of moral reasoning.

The Cognition of Severe Moral Failure: A Novel Approach to the Perception of Evil

I describe the perception of evil as a categorization judgment, based on a prototype, with extensive feedback loops and top-down influences. Based on the attachment approach to moral judgment (Govrin, 2014, 2018), I suggest that the perception of evil consists of four salient features: Extreme asymmetry between victim and perpetrator; a specific perceived attitude of the perpetrator toward the victim's vulnerability; the observer's inability to understand the perpetrator's perspective; and insuperable differences between the observer and perpetrator's judgment following the incident which shake the observer no less than the event itself. I then show that the perception of evil involves a cognitive bias: The observer is almost always mistaken in his attributions of a certain state of mind to the perpetrator. The philosophical and evolutionary significance of this bias is discussed as well as suggestions for future testing of the prototype model of evil.