If I could just stop loving you: anti-love biotechnology and the ethics of a chemical breakup

Refuting Six Misconceptions about Romantic Love

Scientific research on romantic love has been relatively sparse but is becoming more prevalent, as it should. Unfortunately, several misconceptions about romantic love are becoming entrenched in the popular media and/or the scientific community, which hampers progress. Therefore, I refute six misconceptions about romantic love in this article. I explain why (1) romantic love is not necessarily dyadic, social, or interpersonal, (2) love is not an emotion, (3) romantic love does not just have positive effects, (4) romantic love is not uncontrollable, (5) there is no dedicated love brain region, neurotransmitter, or hormone, and (6) pharmacological manipulation of romantic love is not near. To increase progress in our scientific understanding of romantic love, I recommend that we study the intrapersonal aspects of romantic love including the intensity of love, that we focus our research questions and designs using a component process model of romantic love, and that we distinguish hypotheses and suggestions from empirical findings when citing previous work.

Prescription for Love: An Experimental Investigation of Laypeople's Relative Moral Disapproval of Love Drugs

New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople's resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs.

Love and romantic relationship in the domain of medicine

In this paper, I explore the nature of medical interventions like neuromodulation on the complex human experience of love. Love is built upon two fundamental natures, viz: the biological and the psychosocial. As a result of this distinction, scientists, and bioethicists have been exploring the possible ways this complex human experience can be biologically tampered with to produce some supposed higher-order ends like well-being and human flourishing. At the forefront in this quest are Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu whose research works over ten years has focused on the good that could stem from the medicalization of love. I acknowledge the various criticisms that have been made against this stance. However, most of these criticisms have been directed towards the mere side effects and sociocultural disservices that could result from the process of using drugs to influence human romantic relationships and in the end, critiques endorse the medicalization of love on the basis that its benefits outweigh the disadvantages. Consequently, I advance two strands of arguments against "medically-assisted love," the ontological and the socio-ethical arguments. The former presupposes that beyond the possible side effects of medicalizing love there is something inherently mistaken about this effort and there is something intrinsically different about love that distinguishes it from its medically-engineered alternative. In the latter argument, I claim that drug interventions in romantic love contravene the very nature of medicine. Overall, I believe that critiques were still able to endorse medicalizing love despite their objections because they were only looking at one direction, the physical/cultural complications.

The shallow of your smile: the ethics of expressive vocal deep-fakes

Rapid technological advances in artificial intelligence are creating opportunities for real-time algorithmic modulations of a person's facial and vocal expressions, or 'deep-fakes'. These developments raise unprecedented societal and ethical questions which, despite much recent public awareness, are still poorly understood from the point of view of moral psychology. We report here on an experimental ethics study conducted on a sample of N = 303 participants (predominantly young, western and educated), who evaluated the acceptability of vignettes describing potential applications of expressive voice transformation technology. We found that vocal deep-fakes were generally well accepted in the population, notably in a therapeutic context and for emotions judged otherwise difficult to control, and surprisingly, even if the user lies to their interlocutors about using them. Unlike other emerging technologies like autonomous vehicles, there was no evidence of social dilemma in which one would, for example, accept for others what they resent for themselves. The only real obstacle to the massive deployment of vocal deep-fakes appears to be situations where they are applied to a speaker without their knowing, but even the acceptability of such situations was modulated by individual differences in moral values and attitude towards science fiction. This article is part of the theme issue 'Voice modulation: from origin and mechanism to social impact (Part II)'.

Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened Achievement: A New Dilemma

Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements (e.g., Kass, Life, liberty and the defense of dignity: the challenge for bioethics, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2004; Agar, Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Sandel, The case against perfection. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007; Sandel, The case against perfection: what’s wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering?”. In: Holland (ed) Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement. (e.g., Pritchard in Synthese 175:133–151, 2010; Palermos in Synthese 192:2955–2286, 2015; Clark in Synthese 192:3757–3375, 2015). According to such a line, there is—despite initial appearances to the contrary—no genuine tension between using enhancements to attain our goals and achieving these goals in a valuable way provided the relevant enhancement is appropriately integrated into the agent’s cognitive architecture (in some suitably specified way). In this paper, however, we show that the kind of integration recommended by such views will likely come at a high cost. More specifically, we highlight a dilemma for users of pharmacological cognitive enhancement: they can (1) meet the conditions for cognitive integration (and on this basis attain valuable achievements) at the significant risk of dangerous dependency, or (2) remain free of such dependency while foregoing integration and the valuable achievements that such integration enables. After motivating and clarifying the import of this dilemma, we offer recommendations for how future cognitive enhancement research may offer potential routes for navigating past it.

Expanding the Romantic Circle

Our romantic lives are influenced, to a large extent, by our perceptions of physical attractiveness - and the societal beauty standards that shape them. But what if we could free our desires from this fixation on looks? Science fiction writer Ted Chiang has explored this possibility in a fascinating short story - and scientific developments might, in the future, move it beyond the realm of fiction. In this paper, I lay out the prudential case for using "attraction-expanding technology," and then consider it from a moral point of view. Using the technology would, in one respect, be morally good: it would benefit those whom prevailing beauty standards marginalize. But attraction-expanding technology also raises a moral concern - one that can be cast in non-harm-based and harm-based terms. I argue that the non-harm-based objection should be rejected, because it is incompatible with a moral principle central to queer rights. And the harm-based objection, I argue, is outweighed by the benefits of attraction-expanding technology, and undermined by the prerogative you have over your personal romantic choices. I conclude by considering whether, from the perspective of society, the development of attraction-expanding technology would be desirable.

Love is a physiological motivation (like hunger, thirst, sleep or sex)

The multitude of terms associated with love has given rise to a false perception of love. In this paper, only maternal and romantic love are considered. Love is usually regarded as a feeling, motivation, addiction, passion, and, above all, an emotion. This confusion has consequences in the lives of human beings, leading not only to divorces, suicides, femicides but possibly also to a number of mental illnesses and suffering. Therefore, it is crucial to first clarify what is meant by emotion, motivation and love. This work aims to finally place love within the category of physiological motivations, such as hunger, thirst, sleep, or sex, on the basis that love is also essential for human survival, especially in childhood. Love is presented from an evolutionary perspective. Some other similarities between love and other physiological motivations are pointed out, such as its importance for appropriate human development, both its ontogeny and its permanence, and the long-lasting consequences of abuse and neglect. There are summarized reasons that account for this, such as the fact that physiological motivations are essential for survival and that love is an essential motivation for the survival of human offspring. Other reasons are that minimum changes in the quantity and quality of love alters development, that there can be a variety of neurophysiological and behavioural states within a motivation, and that motivations (also love) appear and change throughout development. Also, motivations and love sometimes may lead to an addictive behaviour. Finally, it is recognized that once physiological motivations (and love) appear, they become permanent. In a third section, some potential social, cultural, clinical and scientific consequences of the proposed consideration of love as a motivation are discussed. Accordingly, love's recognition as a motivation in the clinical field would imply a better understanding of its disorders and its inclusion in classifications manuals such as The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), or in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Considering love as a motivation rather than an emotion could also impact the results of scientific research (an example is included). A comprehensive understanding of these questions could potentially allow for a new therapeutic approach in the treatment of mental illness, while offering an all-inclusive evolutionary explanation of cultural phenomena such as the origin and diffusion of both language and art. Love should be understood as a physiological motivation, like hunger, sleep or sex, and not as an emotion as it is commonly considered.

Psychedelic Moral Enhancement

The moral enhancement (or bioenhancement) debate seems stuck in a dilemma. On the one hand, the more radical proposals, while certainly novel and interesting, seem unlikely to be feasible in practice, or if technically feasible then most likely imprudent. But on the other hand, the more sensible proposals – sensible in the sense of being both practically achievable and more plausibly ethically justifiable – can be rather hard to distinguish from both traditional forms of moral enhancement, such as non-drug-mediated social or moral education, and non-moral forms of bioenhancement, such as smart-drug style cognitive enhancement. In this essay, I argue that bioethicists have paid insufficient attention to an alternative form of moral bioenhancement – or at least a likely candidate – that falls somewhere between these two extremes, namely the (appropriately qualified) use of certain psychedelic drugs.

Ethnopharmacology of Love

Background: Elixirs conferring eternal youth or inducing amatory and erotic attraction have been searched for without success. Lovesickness is a widespread affliction resulting from unrequited love and/or the impossibility for physical and emotional union. The symptoms are reflections of altered dopamine, serotonin, noradrenaline, testosterone and cortisol levels and range from frenzy and intrusive thinking to despair and depression, sharing traits with the neurochemistry of addiction and compulsive behavior disorder. Although it can seriously impact the quality of life, lovesickness is currently not considered in official disease classification systems. Consequently, no official therapeutic guidelines exist, leaving subjects to seek the cure on their own. Methods: We review literature of the past 2000 years dealing with the concept, diagnosis and the healing of lovesickness and contextualize it with neurochemical, ethnomedical, and ethnographic data. Since neurobiological and pharmacological connections between the love drive and the sex drive exist, we review also the literature about herbal an- and aphrodisiacs, focusing on their excitatory or calmative potential. Results: An overall consensus regarding socio-behavioral regimes exists for dealing with lovesickness from historical through contemporary literature. The herbal drugs used for treating lovesickness or inducing love passion do not possess the alleged properties. The pharmacological effects of aphrodisiacs are heterogeneous, including dopaminergic and adrenergic activities, but there is no evidence for any serotonergic effects. The libido-regulating properties of anaphrodisiacs seem to be associated with sedative and toxic effects or decreasing testosterone levels. CB2 receptors expressed on dopaminergic neurons of the ventral tegmental area, part of the brain's reward circuit, implicated with addiction, orgasm and strong emotions such as love, might constitute a new therapeutic target. Conclusion: The common food additive and CB2 agonist β-caryophyllene might have the potential to attenuate dopaminergic firing, quenching the reward and thus motivation associated with romantic love. From Greek mythology to modern history, cultural expressions and implications of love, sex and procreation is and was organized along hierarchical lines that put men on top. The neuronal predispositions and activities associated with falling in love will probably forever remain nature's and Eros' secret.

The Quantified Relationship

The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis of the Quantified Relationship (QR). We identify eight core objections to the QR and subject them to critical scrutiny. We argue that although critics raise legitimate concerns, there are ways in which tracking technologies can be used to support and facilitate good relationships. We thus adopt a stance of cautious openness toward this technology and advocate the development of a research agenda for the positive use of QR technologies.

Addicted to love: What is love addiction and when should it be treated?

Recent research suggests that romantic love can be literally addictive. Although the exact nature of the relationship between love and addiction has been described in inconsistent terms throughout the literature, we offer a framework that distinguishes between a narrow view and a broad view of love addiction. The narrow view counts only the most extreme, harmful forms of love or love-related behaviors as being potentially addictive in nature. The broad view, by contrast, counts even basic social attachment as being on a spectrum of addictive motivations, underwritten by similar neurochemical processes as more conventional addictions. We argue that on either understanding of love-as-addiction, treatment decisions should hinge on considerations of harm and well-being rather than on definitions of disease. Implications for the ethical use of anti-love biotechnology are considered.

Should Surgery for Hypospadias Be Performed Before An Age of Consent?

Hypospadias is a relatively common genital condition in which the urethral opening forms on the underside of the penis, as opposed to at the tip of the glans. Patients with hypospadias are typically referred for surgery during infancy or early childhood. Recent evidence, however, indicates that many individuals with hypospadias do not experience the functional or psychosocial difficulties commonly attributed to the condition, and that surgical intervention for hypospadias carries substantial risk of adverse outcomes. In this article, we review published outcomes data and conduct an in-depth analysis of the typical rationales for hypospadias surgery, taking into consideration both the potential benefits and harms of the procedure, as well as the existence of nonsurgical alternatives. We argue, first, that most childhood surgeries for hypospadias are performed for anticipated future problems concerning function and cosmesis, rather than extant physical and/or psychosocial problems that are adversely affecting the child's well-being. Second, we contend that the surgery can be safely performed after an age of consent without increasing the absolute risk of surgical complications to an ethically meaningful degree. We conclude, therefore, that surgery for hypospadias should be performed only if requested by the affected individual, under conditions of informed consent.

The Medicalization of Love

In 2015, we published an article entitled "The Medicalization of Love," in which we argued that both good and bad consequences could be expected to follow from love's medicalization, depending on how the process unfolded. A flurry of commentaries followed; here we offer some preliminary thoughts in reply to the more substantial of the criticisms that were raised. We focus in particular on the nature of love itself as well as the role it plays (or should play) in our lives; we also touch on a number of practical issues concerning the likely effects of any plausible "real-life" love drugs and conclude with a call for careful regulation.

Lessons From Reparative Therapy Applied to Post-Abortion Grief Counseling

There is evidence from the legislative, judicial, and counseling sectors that the sun is setting on therapies designed to change sexual orientation. Despite this evidence, there is also evidence that similar pseudoscientific interventions continue to be used in at least one other area-post-abortion counseling. The key factor shared by both interventions is their dependence on unvalidated explanations of behavior. In the case of changing the expression of sexual orientation, the harm at the personal and communal levels is clear. In the case of post-abortion counseling, the harm is hypothesized, and the reasons why a communal response is lacking in the post-abortion community are described. Steps clinicians can take to alleviate the probable harm caused by the use of unvalidated/unvalidatable interventions, with a particular emphasis on identifying and expunging culturally derived and oppressive interventions currently used, are delineated as clinical and social justice activities to reduce human suffering.

Normality, therapy, and enhancement

According to human enhancement advocates, it is morally permissible (and sometimes obligatory) to use biomedical means to modulate or select certain biological traits in order to increase people's welfare, even when there is no pathology to be treated or prevented. Some authors have recently proposed to extend the use of biomedical means to modulate lust, attraction, and attachment. I focus on some conceptual implications of this proposal, particularly with regard to bioconservatives' understanding of the notions of therapy and enhancement I first explain what makes the proposal of medicalizing love interesting and unique, compared to the other forms of bioenhancement usually advocated. I then discuss how the medicalization of love bears on the more general debate on human enhancement, particularly with regard to the key notion of "normality" that is commonly used to define the therapy-enhancement distinction. This analysis suggests that the medicalization of love, in virtue of its peculiarity, requires bioconservatives to reconsider their way of understanding and applying the notions of "therapy" and "enhancement." More in particular, I show that, because a non-arbitrary and value-free notion of "therapy" cannot be applied to the case of love, bioconservatives have the burden of either providing some new criterion that could be used for drawing a line between permissible and impermissible medicalization, or demonstrating that under no circumstances-including the cases in which love is already acknowledged to require medical intervention-can love fall within the domain of medicine.

Addressing polarisation in science

Ploug and Holm argue that polarisation in scientific communities can generate conflicts of interest for individual researchers. Their proposed solution to this problem is that authors should self-report whether they are polarised on conflict of interest disclosure forms. I argue that this is unlikely to work. This is because any author with the self-awareness and integrity to identify herself as polarised would be unlikely to conduct polarised research to begin with. Instead, I suggest that it is the role of (associate-level) editors of journals to detect and report on polarisation. One consequence of this view is that they need to be sufficiently familiar with the field of research they are evaluating to know whether polarisation is at stake.

The medicalization of love

Pharmaceuticals or other emerging technologies could be used to enhance (or diminish) feelings of lust, attraction, and attachment in adult romantic partnerships. Although such interventions could conceivably be used to promote individual (and couple) well-being, their widespread development and/or adoption might lead to the 'medicalization' of human love and heartache--for some, a source of a serious concern. In this essay, we argue that the medicalization of love need not necessarily be problematic, on balance, but could plausibly be expected to have either good or bad consequences depending upon how it unfolds. By anticipating some of the specific ways in which these technologies could yield unwanted outcomes, bioethicists and others can help to direct the course of love's medicalization--should it happen to occur--more toward the 'good' side than the 'bad.'

Are gay and lesbian people fading into the history of bioethics?

In many ways, we live in propitious times for gay and lesbian people. In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down Colorado law prohibiting any kind of protected status based on sexual orientation. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that states may not criminalize sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same sex in private, so long as no money changes hands. In 2010, the Congress repealed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that excluded openly gay men and lesbians from military service. In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down key elements of the Defense of Marriage Act that prohibited any federal recognition of same-sex marriage. Most states do not allow same-sex marriage, but more and more states are joining the fold. Likewise, most U.S. states do not forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation, but the number that does is increasing. Arguably, no other social minority has made as much legal progress in so short a time. Despite these advances, the story of gay and lesbian people and the law is not yet finished, and the meaning of homosexuality for bioethics is still being written too. Concerns about gay and lesbian people remain important to bioethics in key domains, especially in seeing to the conferral of optimal health care benefits and in sorting through the priorities and social effects of research. Progress in these domains still involves lifting certain burdens of medical and social misjudgments about same-sex attraction.

When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics

The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual's overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as enhancement” and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.

Brave New Love: The Threat of High-Tech "Conversion" Therapy and the Bio-Oppression of Sexual Minorities

Our understanding of the neurochemical bases of human love and attachment, as well as of the genetic, epigenetic, hormonal, and experiential factors that conspire to shape an individual's sexual orientation, is increasing exponentially. This research raises the vexing possibility that we may one day be equipped to modify such variables directly, allowing for the creation of “high-tech” conversion therapies or other suspect interventions. In this article, we discuss the ethics surrounding such a possibility, and call for the development of legal and procedural safeguards for protecting vulnerable children from the application of such technology. We also consider the more difficult case of voluntary, adult “conversion” and argue that in rare cases, such attempts might be permissible under strict conditions.