Variety in emotional life: within-category typicality of emotional experiences is associated with neural activity in large-scale brain networks

Neural Predictors of Fear Depend on the Situation

The extent to which neural representations of fear experience depend on or generalize across the situational context has remained unclear. We systematically manipulated variation within and across three distinct fear-evocative situations including fear of heights, spiders, and social threats. Participants (n = 21; 10 females and 11 males) viewed ∼20 s clips depicting spiders, heights, or social encounters and rated fear after each video. Searchlight multivoxel pattern analysis was used to identify whether and which brain regions carry information that predicts fear experience and the degree to which the fear-predictive neural codes in these areas depend on or generalize across the situations. The overwhelming majority of brain regions carrying information about fear did so in a situation-dependent manner. These findings suggest that local neural representations of fear experience are unlikely to involve a singular pattern but rather a collection of multiple heterogeneous brain states.

Multimodal, Idiographic Ambulatory Sensing Will Transform our Understanding of Emotion

Emotions are inherently complex - situated inside the brain while being influenced by conditions inside the body and outside in the world - resulting in substantial variation in experience. Most studies, however, are not designed to sufficiently sample this variation. In this paper, we discuss what could be discovered if emotion were systematically studied within persons 'in the wild', using biologically-triggered experience sampling: a multimodal and deeply idiographic approach to ambulatory sensing that links body and mind across contexts and over time. We outline the rationale for this approach, discuss challenges to its implementation and widespread adoption, and set out opportunities for innovation afforded by emerging technologies. Implementing these innovations will enrich method and theory at the frontier of affective science, propelling the contextually situated study of emotion into the future.

The nature and neurobiology of fear and anxiety: State of the science and opportunities for accelerating discovery

Fear and anxiety play a central role in mammalian life, and there is considerable interest in clarifying their nature, identifying their biological underpinnings, and determining their consequences for health and disease. Here we provide a roundtable discussion on the nature and biological bases of fear- and anxiety-related states, traits, and disorders. The discussants include scientists familiar with a wide variety of populations and a broad spectrum of techniques. The goal of the roundtable was to take stock of the state of the science and provide a roadmap to the next generation of fear and anxiety research. Much of the discussion centered on the key challenges facing the field, the most fruitful avenues for future research, and emerging opportunities for accelerating discovery, with implications for scientists, funders, and other stakeholders. Understanding fear and anxiety is a matter of practical importance. Anxiety disorders are a leading burden on public health and existing treatments are far from curative, underscoring the urgency of developing a deeper understanding of the factors governing threat-related emotions.

Coherence and divergence in autonomic-subjective affective space

A central tenet of many theories of emotion is that emotional states are accompanied by distinct patterns of autonomic activity. However, experimental studies of coherence between subjective and autonomic responses during emotional states provide little evidence of coherence. Crucially, previous studies investigating coherence have either adopted univariate approaches or made limited use of multivariate analytic approaches by investigating subjective and autonomic responses separately. The current study addressed this question using a multivariate dimensional approach to build a common autonomic-subjective affective space incorporating subjective responses and three different autonomic signals (heart rate, skin conductance response, and pupil diameter), measured during an emotion-inducing task, in 51 participants. Results showed that autonomic and subjective responses could be adequately described in a two-dimensional affective space. The first dimension included contributions from subjective and autonomic responses, indicating coherence, while contributions to the second dimension were almost exclusively of autonomic covariance. Thus, while there was a degree of coherence between autonomic and subjective emotional responses, there was substantial structure in autonomic responses that did not covary with subjective emotional experience. This study, therefore, contributes new insights into the relationship between subjective and autonomic emotional responses, and provides a framework for future multimodal emotion research, enabling both hypothesis- and data-driven testing.

Improving the study of brain-behavior relationships by revisiting basic assumptions

Neuroimaging research has been at the forefront of concerns regarding the failure of experimental findings to replicate. In the study of brain-behavior relationships, past failures to find replicable and robust effects have been attributed to methodological shortcomings. Methodological rigor is important, but there are other overlooked possibilities: most published studies share three foundational assumptions, often implicitly, that may be faulty. In this paper, we consider the empirical evidence from human brain imaging and the study of non-human animals that calls each foundational assumption into question. We then consider the opportunities for a robust science of brain-behavior relationships that await if scientists ground their research efforts in revised assumptions supported by current empirical evidence.

Mapping the mental space of emotional concepts through kinematic measures of decision uncertainty

Emotional concepts and their mental representations have been extensively studied. Yet, some ecologically relevant aspects, such as how they are processed in ambiguous contexts (e.g., in relation to other emotional stimuli that share similar characteristics), are incompletely known. We employed a similarity judgement of emotional concepts and manipulated the contextual congruency of the responses along the two main affective dimensions of hedonic valence and physiological activation, respectively. Behavioural and kinematics (mouse-tracking) measures were combined to gather a novel 'similarity index' between emotional concepts, to derive topographical maps of their mental representations. Self-report (interoceptive sensibility, positive-negative affectivity, depression) and physiological measures (heart rate variability, HRV) have been collected to explore their possible association with emotional conceptual representation. Results indicate that emotional concepts typically associated with low arousal profit by contextual congruency, with faster responses and reduced uncertainty when contextual ambiguity decreases. The emotional maps recreate two almost orthogonal axes of valence and arousal, and the similarity measure captures the smooth boundaries between emotions. The emotional map of a subgroup of individuals with low positive affectivity reveals a narrower conceptual distribution, with variations in positive emotions and in individuals with reduced arousal (such as those with reduced HRV). Our work introduces a novel methodology to study emotional conceptual representations, bringing the behavioural dynamics of decision-making processes and choice uncertainty into the affective domain. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Questionnaires based on natural language processing elicit immersive ruminative thinking in ruminators: Evidence from behavioral responses and EEG data

Rumination is closely related to mental disorders and can thus be used as a marker of their presence or a predictor of their development. The presence of masking and fabrication in psychological selection can lead to inaccurate detection of psychological disorders. Human language is considered crucial in eliciting specific conscious activities, and the use of natural language processing (NLP) in the development of questionnaires for psychological tests has the potential to elicit immersive ruminative thinking, leading to changes in neural activity. Electroencephalography (EEG) is commonly used to detect and record neural activity in the human brain and is sensitive to changes in brain activity. In this study, we used NLP to develop a questionnaire to induce ruminative thinking and then recorded the EEG signals in response to the questionnaire. The behavioral results revealed that ruminators exhibited higher arousal rates and longer reaction times, specifically in response to the ruminative items of the questionnaire. The EEG results showed no significant difference between the ruminators and the control group during the resting state; however, a significant alteration in the coherence of the entire brain of the ruminators existed while they were answering the ruminative items. No differences were found in the control participants while answering the two items. These behavioral and EEG results indicate that the questionnaire elicited immersive ruminative thinking, specifically in the ruminators. Therefore, the questionnaire designed using NLP is capable of eliciting ruminative thinking in ruminators, offering a promising approach for the early detection of mental disorders in psychological selection.

The neurobiological basis of affect is consistent with psychological construction theory and shares a common neural basis across emotional categories

Affective experience colours everyday perception and cognition, yet its fundamental and neurobiological basis is poorly understood. The current debate essentially centers around the communalities and specificities across individuals, events, and emotional categories like anger, sadness, and happiness. Using fMRI during the experience of these emotions, we critically compare the two dominant conflicting theories on human affect. Basic emotion theory posits emotions as discrete universal entities generated by dedicated emotion category-specific neural circuits, while psychological construction theory claims emotional events as unique, idiosyncratic, and constructed by psychological primitives like core affect and conceptualization, which underlie each emotional event and operate in a predictive framework. Based on the findings of 8 a priori-defined model-specific prediction tests on the neural response amplitudes and patterns, we conclude that the neurobiological basis of affect is primarily characterized by idiosyncratic mechanisms and a common neural basis shared across emotion categories, consistent with psychological construction theory. The findings provide further insight into the organizational principles of the neural basis of affect and brain function in general. Future studies in clinical populations with affective symptoms may reveal the corresponding underlying neural changes from a psychological construction perspective.

Context reconsidered: Complex signal ensembles, relational meaning, and population thinking in psychological science

This article considers the status and study of "context" in psychological science through the lens of research on emotional expressions. The article begins by updating three well-trod methodological debates on the role of context in emotional expressions to reconsider several fundamental assumptions lurking within the field's dominant methodological tradition: namely, that certain expressive movements have biologically prepared, inherent emotional meanings that issue from singular, universal processes which are independent of but interact with contextual influences. The second part of this article considers the scientific opportunities that await if we set aside this traditional understanding of "context" as a moderator of signals with inherent psychological meaning and instead consider the possibility that psychological events emerge in ecosystems of signal ensembles, such that the psychological meaning of any individual signal is entirely relational. Such a fundamental shift has radical implications not only for the science of emotion but for psychological science more generally. It offers opportunities to improve the validity and trustworthiness of psychological science beyond what can be achieved with improvements to methodological rigor alone. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder

Functional neurological disorder reflects impairments in brain networks leading to distressing motor, sensory and/or cognitive symptoms that demonstrate positive clinical signs on examination incongruent with other conditions. A central issue in historical and contemporary formulations of functional neurological disorder has been the mechanistic and aetiological role of emotions. However, the debate has mostly omitted fundamental questions about the nature of emotions in the first place. In this perspective article, we first outline a set of relevant working principles of the brain (e.g. allostasis, predictive processing, interoception and affect), followed by a focused review of the theory of constructed emotion to introduce a new understanding of what emotions are. Building on this theoretical framework, we formulate how altered emotion category construction can be an integral component of the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder and related functional somatic symptoms. In doing so, we address several themes for the functional neurological disorder field including: (i) how energy regulation and the process of emotion category construction relate to symptom generation, including revisiting alexithymia, 'panic attack without panic', dissociation, insecure attachment and the influential role of life experiences; (ii) re-interpret select neurobiological research findings in functional neurological disorder cohorts through the lens of the theory of constructed emotion to illustrate its potential mechanistic relevance; and (iii) discuss therapeutic implications. While we continue to support that functional neurological disorder is mechanistically and aetiologically heterogenous, consideration of how the theory of constructed emotion relates to the generation and maintenance of functional neurological and functional somatic symptoms offers an integrated viewpoint that cuts across neurology, psychiatry, psychology and cognitive-affective neuroscience.

Unsupervised classification reveals consistency and degeneracy in neural network patterns of emotion

In the present study, we used an unsupervised classification algorithm to reveal both consistency and degeneracy in neural network connectivity during anger and anxiety. Degeneracy refers to the ability of different biological pathways to produce the same outcomes. Previous research is suggestive of degeneracy in emotion, but little research has explicitly examined whether degenerate functional connectivity patterns exist for emotion categories such as anger and anxiety. Twenty-four subjects underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while listening to unpleasant music and self-generating experiences of anger and anxiety. A data-driven model building algorithm with unsupervised classification (subgrouping Group Iterative Multiple Model Estimation) identified patterns of connectivity among 11 intrinsic networks that were associated with anger vs anxiety. As predicted, degenerate functional connectivity patterns existed within these overarching consistent patterns. Degenerate patterns were not attributable to differences in emotional experience or other individual-level factors. These findings are consistent with the constructionist account that emotions emerge from flexible functional neuronal assemblies and that emotion categories such as anger and anxiety each describe populations of highly variable instances.

Dimensions and Clusters of Aesthetic Emotions: A Semantic Profile Analysis

Aesthetic emotions are elicited by different sensory impressions generated by music, visual arts, literature, theater, film, or nature scenes. Recently, the AESTHEMOS scale has been developed to facilitate the empirical assessment of such emotions. In this article we report a semantic profile analysis of aesthetic emotion terms that had been used for the development of this scale, using the GRID approach. This method consists of obtaining ratings of emotion terms on a set of meaning facets (features) which represent five components of the emotion process (appraisal, bodily reactions, action tendencies, expression, and feelings). The aims here were (a) to determine the dimensionality of the GRID features when applied to aesthetic emotions and compare it to published results for emotion terms in general, and (b) to examine the internal organization of the domain of aesthetic emotion terms in order to identify salient clusters of these items based on the similarity of their feature profiles on the GRID. Exploratory Principal Component Analyses suggest a four-dimensional structure of the semantic space consisting of valence, power, arousal, and novelty, converging with earlier GRID studies on large sets of standard emotion terms. Using cluster analyses, 15 clusters of aesthetic emotion terms with similar GRID feature profiles were identified, revealing the internal organization of the aesthetic emotion terms domain and meaningful subgroups of aesthetic emotions. While replication for further languages is required, these findings provide a solid basis for further research and methodological development in the realm of aesthetic emotions.

Multimodal Neuroimaging of Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors in a U.S. Population-Based Sample of School-Age Children

OBJECTIVE

Suicide deaths and suicidal thoughts and behaviors are considered a public health emergency, yet their underpinnings in the brain remain elusive. The authors examined the classification accuracy of individual, environmental, and clinical characteristics, as well as multimodal brain imaging correlates, of suicidal thoughts and behaviors in a U.S. population-based sample of school-age children.

METHODS

Children ages 9-10 years (N=7,994) from a population-based sample from the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development study were assessed for lifetime suicidal thoughts and behaviors. After quality control procedures, structural MRI (N=6,238), resting-state functional MRI (N=4,134), and task-based functional MRI (range, N=4,075-4,608) were examined. Differences with Welch's t test and equivalence tests, with observed effect sizes (Cohen's d) and their 90% confidence intervals <|0.15|, were examined. Classification accuracy was examined with area under precision-recall curves (AUPRCs).

RESULTS

Among the 7,994 unrelated children (females, N=3,757, 47.0%), those with lifetime suicidal thoughts and behaviors based on child (N=684, 8.6%), caregiver (N=654, 8.2%), and concordant (N=198, 2.5%) reports had higher levels of social adversity and psychopathology, among themselves and their caregivers, compared with never-suicidal children (N=6,854, 85.7%). Only one imaging test survived statistical correction: caregiver-reported suicidal thoughts and behaviors were associated with a thinner left bank of the superior temporal sulcus. On the basis of the prespecified bounds of |0.15|, approximately 48% of the group mean differences for child-reported suicidal thoughts and behaviors comparisons and approximately 22% for caregiver-reported suicidal thoughts and behaviors comparisons were considered equivalent. All observed effect sizes were relatively small (d≤|0.30|), and both non-imaging and imaging correlates had low classification accuracy (AUPRC ≤0.10).

CONCLUSIONS

Commonly applied neuroimaging measures did not reveal a discrete brain signature related to suicidal thoughts and behaviors in youths. Improved approaches to the neurobiology of suicide are critically needed.

Investigating the relationship between emotional granularity and cardiorespiratory physiological activity in daily life

Emotional granularity describes the ability to create emotional experiences that are precise and context-specific. Despite growing evidence of a link between emotional granularity and mental health, the physiological correlates of granularity have been under-investigated. This study explored the relationship between granularity and cardiorespiratory physiological activity in everyday life, with particular reference to the role of respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), an estimate of vagal influence on the heart often associated with positive mental and physical health outcomes. Participants completed a physiologically triggered experience-sampling protocol including ambulatory recording of electrocardiogram, impedance cardiogram, movement, and posture. At each prompt, participants generated emotion labels to describe their current experience. In an end-of-day survey, participants elaborated on each prompt by rating the intensity of their experience on a standard set of emotion adjectives. Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals with higher granularity exhibited a larger number of distinct patterns of physiological activity during seated rest, and more situationally precise patterns of activity during emotional events: granularity was positively correlated with the number of clusters of cardiorespiratory physiological activity discovered in seated rest data, as well as with the performance of classifiers trained on event-related changes in physiological activity. Granularity was also positively associated with RSA during seated rest periods, although this relationship did not reach significance in this sample. These findings are consistent with constructionist accounts of emotion that propose concepts as a key mechanism underlying individual differences in emotional experience, physiological regulation, and physical health.

Comparing supervised and unsupervised approaches to emotion categorization in the human brain, body, and subjective experience

Machine learning methods provide powerful tools to map physical measurements to scientific categories. But are such methods suitable for discovering the ground truth about psychological categories? We use the science of emotion as a test case to explore this question. In studies of emotion, researchers use supervised classifiers, guided by emotion labels, to attempt to discover biomarkers in the brain or body for the corresponding emotion categories. This practice relies on the assumption that the labels refer to objective categories that can be discovered. Here, we critically examine this approach across three distinct datasets collected during emotional episodes—measuring the human brain, body, and subjective experience—and compare supervised classification solutions with those from unsupervised clustering in which no labels are assigned to the data. We conclude with a set of recommendations to guide researchers towards meaningful, data-driven discoveries in the science of emotion and beyond.

Bittersweet: The Neuroscience of Ambivalent Affect

Ambivalent affective states, such as bittersweetness, nostalgia, and longing, which are felt as having both positive and negative aspects, are an important component of human experience but have received little attention. The most influential theoretical frameworks in affective neuroscience focus largely on univalenced states. As a result, it is not known whether ambivalent affect corresponds to a simultaneously positive and negative valenced state or whether it results from a rapid vacillation between positive and negative states. Here we hypothesize that ambivalent affect involves both mechanisms, that is, rapid vacillation and simultaneity of positive and negative affect, albeit at different neurobiological levels. Rapidly vacillating univalent emotions could give rise to an ambivalent feeling, a mechanism that depends on brainstem nuclei that facilitate rapid action programs of emotional behavior while inhibiting opposing behaviors. This reciprocal inhibition prevents organisms from simultaneously implementing responses to conflicting emotions but also allows for rapid switching between emotions triggered by counterfactual thinking and rapid reappraisal of situations. We propose that as these transitions occur and respective interoceptive information reaches the insular cortex, further processing of this "emotional moment" would allow separate emotional events to be experienced as one "mixed" and integrated feeling.

Learning situated emotions

From the perspective of constructivist theories, emotion results from learning assemblies of relevant perceptual, cognitive, interoceptive, and motor processes in specific situations. Across emotional experiences over time, learned assemblies of processes accumulate in memory that later underlie emotional experiences in similar situations. A neuroimaging experiment guided participants to experience (and thus learn) situated forms of emotion, and then assessed whether participants tended to experience situated forms of the emotion later. During the initial learning phase, some participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving physical harm, whereas other participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving negative social evaluation. In the subsequent testing phase, both learning groups experienced fear and anger while their neural activity was assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A variety of results indicated that the physical and social learning groups incidentally learned different situated forms of a given emotion. Consistent with constructivist theories, these findings suggest that learning plays a central role in emotion, with emotion adapted to the situations in which it is experienced.

Context-aware experience sampling reveals the scale of variation in affective experience

Emotion research typically searches for consistency and specificity in physiological activity across instances of an emotion category, such as anger or fear, yet studies to date have observed more variation than expected. In the present study, we adopt an alternative approach, searching inductively for structure within variation, both within and across participants. Following a novel, physiologically-triggered experience sampling procedure, participants' self-reports and peripheral physiological activity were recorded when substantial changes in cardiac activity occurred in the absence of movement. Unsupervised clustering analyses revealed variability in the number and nature of patterns of physiological activity that recurred within individuals, as well as in the affect ratings and emotion labels associated with each pattern. There were also broad patterns that recurred across individuals. These findings support a constructionist account of emotion which, drawing on Darwin, proposes that emotion categories are populations of variable instances tied to situation-specific needs.

Emotion Perception in Hadza Hunter-Gatherers

It has long been claimed that certain configurations of facial movements are universally recognized as emotional expressions because they evolved to signal emotional information in situations that posed fitness challenges for our hunting and gathering hominin ancestors. Experiments from the last decade have called this particular evolutionary hypothesis into doubt by studying emotion perception in a wider sample of small-scale societies with discovery-based research methods. We replicate these newer findings in the Hadza of Northern Tanzania; the Hadza are semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers who live in tight-knit social units and collect wild foods for a large portion of their diet, making them a particularly relevant population for testing evolutionary hypotheses about emotion. Across two studies, we found little evidence of universal emotion perception. Rather, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that people infer emotional meaning in facial movements using emotion knowledge embrained by cultural learning.

Developing an Understanding of Emotion Categories: Lessons from Objects

How and when infants and young children begin to develop emotion categories is not yet well understood. Research has largely treated the learning problem as one of identifying perceptual similarities among exemplars (typically posed, stereotyped facial configurations). However, recent meta-analyses and reviews converge to suggest that emotion categories are abstract, involving high-dimensional and situationally variable instances. In this paper we consult research on the development of abstract object categorization to guide hypotheses about how infants might learn abstract emotion categories because the two domains present infants with similar learning challenges. In particular, we consider how a developmental cascades framework offers opportunities to understand how and when young children develop emotion categories.

Context facilitates performance on a classic cross-cultural emotion perception task

The majority of studies designed to assess cross-cultural emotion perception use a choice-from-array task in which participants are presented with brief emotion stories and asked to choose between target and foil cues. This task has been widely criticized, evoking a lively and prolonged debate about whether it inadvertently helps participants to perform better than they otherwise would, resulting in the appearance of universality. In 3 studies, we provide a strong test of the hypothesis that the classic choice-from-array task constitutes a potent source of context that shapes performance. Participants from a remote small-scale (the Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania) and 2 urban industrialized (China and the United States) cultural samples selected target vocalizations that were contrived for 6 non-English, nonuniversal emotion categories at levels significantly above chance. In studies of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, above chance performance is interpreted as evidence of universality. These studies support the hypothesis that choice-from-array tasks encourage evidence for cross-cultural emotion perception. We discuss these findings with reference to the history of cross-cultural emotion perception studies, and suggest several processes that may, together, give rise to the appearance of universal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The Default Mode Network's Role in Discrete Emotion

Emotions are often assumed to manifest in subcortical limbic and brainstem structures. While these areas are clearly important for representing affect (e.g., valence and arousal), we propose that the default mode network (DMN) is additionally important for constructing discrete emotional experiences (of anger, fear, disgust, etc.). Findings from neuroimaging studies, invasive electrical stimulation studies, and lesion studies support this proposal. Importantly, our framework builds on a constructionist theory of emotion to explain how instances involving diverse physiological and behavioral patterns can be conceptualized as belonging to the same emotion category. We argue that this ability requires abstraction (from concrete features to broad mental categories), which the DMN is well positioned to support, and we make novel predictions from our proposed framework.

Emotion words, emotion concepts, and emotional development in children: A constructionist hypothesis

In this article, we integrate two constructionist approaches-the theory of constructed emotion and rational constructivism-to introduce several novel hypotheses for understanding emotional development. We first discuss the hypothesis that emotion categories are abstract and conceptual, whose instances share a goal-based function in a particular context but are highly variable in their affective, physical, and perceptual features. Next, we discuss the possibility that emotional development is the process of developing emotion concepts, and that emotion words may be a critical part of this process. We hypothesize that infants and children learn emotion categories the way they learn other abstract conceptual categories-by observing others use the same emotion word to label highly variable events. Finally, we hypothesize that emotional development can be understood as a concept construction problem: a child becomes capable of experiencing and perceiving emotion only when her brain develops the capacity to assemble ad hoc, situated emotion concepts for the purposes of guiding behavior and giving meaning to sensory inputs. Specifically, we offer a predictive processing account of emotional development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion From Human Facial Movements

It is commonly assumed that a person's emotional state can be readily inferred from his or her facial movements, typically called emotional expressions or facial expressions. This assumption influences legal judgments, policy decisions, national security protocols, and educational practices; guides the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric illness, as well as the development of commercial applications; and pervades everyday social interactions as well as research in other scientific fields such as artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and computer vision. In this article, we survey examples of this widespread assumption, which we refer to as the common view, and we then examine the scientific evidence that tests this view, focusing on the six most popular emotion categories used by consumers of emotion research: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. The available scientific evidence suggests that people do sometimes smile when happy, frown when sad, scowl when angry, and so on, as proposed by the common view, more than what would be expected by chance. Yet how people communicate anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise varies substantially across cultures, situations, and even across people within a single situation. Furthermore, similar configurations of facial movements variably express instances of more than one emotion category. In fact, a given configuration of facial movements, such as a scowl, often communicates something other than an emotional state. Scientists agree that facial movements convey a range of information and are important for social communication, emotional or otherwise. But our review suggests an urgent need for research that examines how people actually move their faces to express emotions and other social information in the variety of contexts that make up everyday life, as well as careful study of the mechanisms by which people perceive instances of emotion in one another. We make specific research recommendations that will yield a more valid picture of how people move their faces to express emotions and how they infer emotional meaning from facial movements in situations of everyday life. This research is crucial to provide consumers of emotion research with the translational information they require.

Historical pitfalls and new directions in the neuroscience of emotion

In this article, we offer a brief history summarizing the last century of neuroscientific study of emotion, highlighting dominant themes that run through various schools of thought. We then summarize the current state of the field, followed by six key points for scientific progress that are inspired by a multi-level constructivist theory of emotion.

Concepts dissolve artificial boundaries in the study of emotion and cognition, uniting body, brain, and mind

Theories of emotion have often maintained artificial boundaries: for instance, that cognition and emotion are separable, and that an emotion concept is separable from the emotional events that comprise its category (e.g. "fear" is distinct from instances of fear). Over the past several years, research has dissolved these artificial boundaries, suggesting instead that conceptual construction is a domain-general process-a process by which the brain makes meaning of the world. The brain constructs emotion concepts, but also cognitions and perceptions, all in the service of guiding action. In this view, concepts are multimodal constructions, dynamically prepared from a set of highly variable instances. This approach obviates old questions (e.g. how does cognition regulate emotion?) but generates new ones (e.g. how does a brain learn emotion concepts?). In this paper, we review this constructionist, predictive coding account of emotion, considering its implications for health and well-being, culture and development.

Words are a context for mental inference

Accumulating evidence indicates that context has an important impact on inferring emotion in facial configurations. In this paper, we report on three studies examining whether words referring to mental states contribute to mental inference in images from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Study 1), Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) in static emoji (Study 2), and in animated emoji (Study 3). Across all three studies, we predicted and found that perceivers were more likely to infer mental states when relevant words were embedded in the experimental context (i.e., in a forced-choice task) versus when those words were absent (i.e., in a free-labeling task). We discuss the implications of these findings for the widespread conclusion that faces or parts of faces "display" emotions or other mental states, as well as for psychology's continued reliance on forced-choice methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The vividness of imagining emotional feelings in positive situations is attenuated in non-clinical dysphoria and predicts the experience of positive emotional feelings

OBJECTIVE

The vividness of imagining emotional feelings in positive situations (EFP) in non-clinically dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals and its relation to dysphoric and positive feelings was examined.

METHOD

Participants were university students in Study 1 (N = 106, 84 women; 18-45 years), in Study 2 (N = 43, 39 women; 20-47 years), in Study 3 (N = 109, 92 women; 18-50 years) who filled out a set of questionnaires assessing depressive symptoms, cognition measures, and then completed an affective imagery task, using a cross-sectional design.

RESULTS

Non-clinically dysphoric participants imagined less vividly EFP than non-dysphoric participants. The vividness of imagining EFP accounted for group differences in positive feelings beyond positive and negative cognition and negative mood.

CONCLUSIONS

In addition to deficits in the general imagery of positive events, the attenuation of vividness of EFP in non-clinical dysphoric individuals warrants attention as a separate pathway by which non-clinically dysphoric individuals develop deficiencies of conscious positive feelings.

Emotion fingerprints or emotion populations? A meta-analytic investigation of autonomic features of emotion categories

The classical view of emotion hypothesizes that certain emotion categories have a specific autonomic nervous system (ANS) "fingerprint" that is distinct from other categories. Substantial ANS variation within a category is presumed to be epiphenomenal. The theory of constructed emotion hypothesizes that an emotion category is a population of context-specific, highly variable instances that need not share an ANS fingerprint. Instead, ANS variation within a category is a meaningful part of the nature of emotion. We present a meta-analysis of 202 studies measuring ANS reactivity during lab-based inductions of emotion in nonclinical samples of adults, using a random effects, multilevel meta-analysis and multivariate pattern classification analysis to test our hypotheses. We found increases in mean effect size for 59.4% of ANS variables across emotion categories, but the pattern of effect sizes did not clearly distinguish 1 emotion category from another. We also observed significant variation within emotion categories; heterogeneity accounted for a moderate to substantial percentage (i.e., I2 ≥ 30%) of variability in 54% of these effect sizes. Experimental moderators epiphenomenal to emotion, such as induction type (e.g., films vs. imagery), did not explain a large portion of the variability. Correction for publication bias reduced estimated effect sizes even further, increasing heterogeneity of effect sizes for certain emotion categories. These findings, when considered in the broader empirical literature, are more consistent with population thinking and other principles from evolutionary biology found within the theory of constructed emotion, and offer insights for developing new hypotheses to understand the nature of emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record

Emotion Perception as Conceptual Synchrony

Psychological research on emotion perception anchors heavily on an object perception analogy. We present static “cues,” such as facial expressions, as objects for perceivers to categorize. Yet in the real world, emotions play out as dynamic multidimensional events. Current theoretical approaches and research methods are limited in their ability to capture this complexity. We draw on insights from a predictive coding account of neural activity and a grounded cognition account of concept representation to conceive of emotion perception as a stream of synchronized conceptualizations between two individuals, which is supported and shaped by language. We articulate how this framework can illuminate the fundamental need to study culture, as well as other sources of conceptual variation, in unpacking conceptual synchrony in emotion. We close by suggesting that the conceptual system provides the necessary flexibility to overcome gaps in emotional synchrony.

Nature of Emotion Categories: Comment on Cowen and Keltner

Cowen and Keltner (2017) published the latest installment in a longstanding debate about whether measures of emotion organize themselves into categories or array themselves more continuously along affective dimensions. We discuss several notable features of the study and suggest future studies should consider asking questions more directly about physical and psychological variation within emotion categories as well as similarities between categories.

The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization

The science of emotion has been using folk psychology categories derived from philosophy to search for the brain basis of emotion. The last two decades of neuroscience research have brought us to the brink of a paradigm shift in understanding the workings of the brain, however, setting the stage to revolutionize our understanding of what emotions are and how they work. In this article, we begin with the structure and function of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of emotions might be. The answer is a brain-based, computational account called the theory of constructed emotion.

Constructing emotion through simulation

Evidence increasingly suggests that simulations implement patterns of prior experience to construct one's current experience, whether that experience is oriented in the past, in the here and now, or in the future. Simulation is the mechanism by which the brain capitalizes on prior learning to efficiently navigate the situation at hand. This review examines the latest developments in theory and empirical research that address simulation during emotional phenomena. Integration of evidence across multiple literatures suggests that simulation accounts provide a unifying framework across many different emotional phenomena and highlights the importance of investigating dynamics, complexity, and variation in emotional experiences moving forward.

Mixed emotions in the predictive brain

Understanding complex or mixed emotions first requires an exploration of the human nervous system underlying emotions, and indeed all experience. We review current research in neuroscience, which describes the brain as a predictive, internal model of the world that flexibly combines features from past experience to construct emotions. We argue that "mixed emotions" result when these features of past experience correspond to multiple emotion categories. Integrating event perception and cognitive linguistic theories, we propose that "mixed emotions" are perceived as an episode of distinct, linked emotional events due to attentional shifts which update the predicted model of experience. These proposed mechanisms have profound implications for the study of emotion; we conclude by suggesting methodological improvements for future research.

Evidence for a Large-Scale Brain System Supporting Allostasis and Interoception in Humans

Large-scale intrinsic brain systems have been identified for exteroceptive senses (e.g., sight, hearing, touch). We introduce an analogous system for representing sensations from within the body, called interoception, and demonstrate its relation to regulating peripheral systems in the body, called allostasis. Employing the recently introduced Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding (EPIC) model, we used tract-tracing studies of macaque monkeys, followed by two intrinsic functional magnetic resonance imaging samples (N = 280 and N = 270) to evaluate the existence of an intrinsic allostatic/interoceptive system in the human brain. Another sample (N = 41) allowed us to evaluate the convergent validity of the hypothesized allostatic/interoceptive system by showing that individuals with stronger connectivity between system hubs performed better on an implicit index of interoceptive ability related to autonomic fluctuations. Implications include insights for the brain's functional architecture, dissolving the artificial boundary between mind and body, and unifying mental and physical illness.

Functional connectivity dynamics during film viewing reveal common networks for different emotional experiences

Recent theoretical and empirical work has highlighted the role of domain-general, large-scale brain networks in generating emotional experiences. These networks are hypothesized to process aspects of emotional experiences that are not unique to a specific emotional category (e.g., "sadness," "happiness"), but rather that generalize across categories. In this article, we examined the dynamic interactions (i.e., changing cohesiveness) between specific domain-general networks across time while participants experienced various instances of sadness, fear, and anger. We used a novel method for probing the network connectivity dynamics between two salience networks and three amygdala-based networks. We hypothesized, and found, that the functional connectivity between these networks covaried with the intensity of different emotional experiences. Stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the medial amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across six different instances of the three emotion categories examined. Also, stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the ventrolateral amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across five out of the six different instances. Our findings demonstrate that a variety of emotional experiences are associated with dynamic interactions of domain-general neural systems.

Novel response patterns during repeated presentation of affective and neutral stimuli

Repeated stimulus presentations are commonly used in social and affective neuroimaging tasks, but much remains to be known about how the brain processes such repetitions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found three groups of brain regions with distinct response patterns during repeated presentations of natural scene images. One group consisted of several limbic, paralimbic, frontoparietal and medial prefrontal areas and showed a habituation-like response across pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral image categories. A second group of occipital and adjacent posterior cortical regions showed a pattern of diminishing responses with repeated presentations of affective images but not for neutral images, and also plateaued to activation levels above baseline for all image categories. A third group involved bilateral frontopolar areas and the precuneus and exhibited a novel, non-monotonic response pattern. Activity was low on the first presentation, peaked upon the second presentation (first repetition) and subsequently diminished. These findings indicate that the transition from novel to increasingly familiar, and also arousing to less arousing, involves a broad array of neural mechanisms alluding to both passive learning and active inference strategies.

Establishing the situated features associated with perceived stress

We propose that the domain general process of categorization contributes to the perception of stress. When a situation contains features associated with stressful experiences, it is categorized as stressful. From the perspective of situated cognition, the features used to categorize experiences as stressful are the features typically true of stressful situations. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to evaluate the perceived stress of 572 imagined situations, and to also evaluate each situation for how much it possessed 19 features potentially associated with stressful situations and their processing (e.g., self-threat, familiarity, visual imagery, outcome certainty). Following variable reduction through factor analysis, a core set of 8 features associated with stressful situations-expectation violation, self-threat, coping efficacy, bodily experience, arousal, negative valence, positive valence, and perseveration-all loaded on a single Core Stress Features factor. In a multilevel model, this factor and an Imagery factor explained 88% of the variance in judgments of perceived stress, with significant random effects reflecting differences in how individual participants categorized stress. These results support the hypothesis that people categorize situations as stressful to the extent that typical features of stressful situations are present. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to establish a comprehensive set of features that predicts perceived stress.

Involvement of Sensory Regions in Affective Experience: A Meta-Analysis

A growing body of work suggests that sensory processes may also contribute to affective experience. In this study, we performed a meta-analysis of affective experiences driven through visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory stimulus modalities including study contrasts that compared affective stimuli to matched neutral control stimuli. We found, first, that limbic and paralimbic regions, including the amygdala, anterior insula, pre-supplementary motor area, and portions of orbitofrontal cortex were consistently engaged across two or more modalities. Second, early sensory input regions in occipital, temporal, piriform, mid-insular, and primary sensory cortex were frequently engaged during affective experiences driven by visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory inputs. A classification analysis demonstrated that the pattern of neural activity across a contrast map diagnosed the stimulus modality driving the affective experience. These findings suggest that affective experiences are constructed from activity that is distributed across limbic and paralimbic brain regions and also activity in sensory cortical regions.

The neural representation of typical and atypical experiences of negative images: comparing fear, disgust and morbid fascination

Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of 'morbid fascination' which is an urge to approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful; participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated differential activity within regions in the 'neural reference space for discrete emotion' depending on the type of feedback. We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimentally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state.

The Brain Basis of Positive and Negative Affect: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis of the Human Neuroimaging Literature

The ability to experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings or to represent objects as "positive" or "negative" is known as representing hedonic "valence." Although scientists overwhelmingly agree that valence is a basic psychological phenomenon, debate continues about how to best conceptualize it scientifically. We used a meta-analysis of 397 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography studies (containing 914 experimental contrasts and 6827 participants) to test 3 competing hypotheses about the brain basis of valence: the bipolarity hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by a brain system that monotonically increases and/or decreases along the valence dimension, the bivalent hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by independent brain systems, and the affective workspace hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by a flexible set of valence-general regions. We found little evidence for the bipolar or bivalent hypotheses. Findings instead supported the hypothesis that, at the level of brain activity measurable by fMRI, valence is flexibly implemented across instances by a set of valence-general limbic and paralimbic brain regions.

A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many “whole number” accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality–emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality–emotion links.