Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in humans

Neural dynamics of deception: insights from fMRI studies of brain states

Deception is a complex behavior that requires greater cognitive effort than truth-telling, with brain states dynamically adapting to external stimuli and cognitive demands. Investigating these brain states provides valuable insights into the brain's temporal and spatial dynamics. In this study, we designed an experiment paradigm to efficiently simulate lying and constructed a temporal network of brain states. We applied the Louvain community clustering algorithm to identify characteristic brain states associated with lie-telling, inverse-telling, and truth-telling. Our analysis revealed six representative brain states with unique spatial characteristics. Notably, two distinct states-termed truth-preferred and lie-preferred-exhibited significant differences in fractional occupancy and average dwelling time. The truth-preferred state showed higher occupancy and dwelling time during truth-telling, while the lie-preferred state demonstrated these characteristics during lie-telling. Using the average z-score BOLD signals of these two states, we applied generalized linear models with elastic net regularization, achieving a classification accuracy of 88.46%, with a sensitivity of 92.31% and a specificity of 84.62% in distinguishing deception from truth-telling. These findings revealed representative brain states for lie-telling, inverse-telling, and truth-telling, highlighting two states specifically associated with truthful and deceptive behaviors. The spatial characteristics and dynamic attributes of these brain states indicate their potential as biomarkers of cognitive engagement in deception.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-025-10222-4.

Honesty threshold affects individuals' resistance to monetary temptations

This study investigated whether honesty is a stable trait or varies depending on situational factors. Using a coin flip guessing paradigm with monetary rewards, 33 participants completed trials with rewards ranging from 0.01 to 3 yuan. Modeling of behavioral data showed individuals have varying "honesty thresholds" where they switch from honest to dishonest behavior. EEG analysis revealed increased P300 amplitude when resisting greater monetary temptation, and individuals with higher honesty thresholds had lower P300 amplitudes for the same rewards. A late positive component indicated greater cognitive conflict when the reward amount neared an individual's honesty threshold. These findings challenge the conception of honesty as a stable trait, instead demonstrating it varies based on contextual factors like reward size. Computational modeling and EEG provide insight into the cognitive processes underlying contextual shifts in honest behavior.

Distinguishing deception from its confounds by improving the validity of fMRI-based neural prediction

Deception is a universal human behavior. Yet longstanding skepticism about the validity of measures used to characterize the biological mechanisms underlying deceptive behavior has relegated such studies to the scientific periphery. Here, we address these fundamental questions by applying machine learning methods and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to signaling games capturing motivated deception in human participants. First, we develop an approach to test for the presence of confounding processes and validate past skepticism by showing that much of the predictive power of neural predictors trained on deception data comes from processes other than deception. Specifically, we demonstrate that discriminant validity is compromised by the predictor's ability to predict behavior in a control task that does not involve deception. Second, we show that the presence of confounding signals need not be fatal and that the validity of the neural predictor can be improved by removing confounding signals while retaining those associated with the task of interest. To this end, we develop a "dual-goal tuning" approach in which, beyond the typical goal of predicting the behavior of interest, the predictor also incorporates a second compulsory goal that enforces chance performance in the control task. Together, these findings provide a firmer scientific foundation for understanding the neural basis of a neglected class of behavior, and they suggest an approach for improving validity of neural predictors.

Cortical oscillations and event-related brain potentials during the preparation and execution of deceptive behavior

Deception often occurs in response to a preceding cue (e.g., a precarious question) alerting us about the need to subsequently lie. Here, we simulate this process by adapting a previously established paradigm of intentionally false responding, now instructing participants about the need for deception (vs. truthful responses) by means of a simple cue occurring before each response-relevant target. We analyzed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) as well as cortical oscillations recorded from the scalp. In an experimental study (N = 44), we show that a cue signaling the need for deception involves increased attentional selection (P2, P3a, P3b). Moreover, in the period following the cue and leading up to the target, ERP and oscillatory signatures of anticipation and preparation (Contingent Negative Variation, alpha suppression) were found to be increased during trials requiring a deceptive as compared to a truthful response. Additionally, we replicated earlier findings that target processing involves enhanced motivated attention toward words requiring a deceptive response (LPC). Moreover, a signature of integration effort and semantic inhibition (N400) was observed to be larger for words to which responses have to be intentionally false as compared to those to which responses must be truthful. Our findings support the view of the involvement of a series of basic cognitive processes (especially attention and cognitive control) when responses are deliberately wrong instead of right. Moreover, preceding cues signaling the subsequent need for lying already elicit attentional and preparatory mechanisms facilitating the cognitive operations necessary for later successful lying.

Detecting lies in investigative interviews through the analysis of response latencies and error rates to unexpected questions

In this study, we propose an approach to detect deception during investigative interviews by integrating response latency and error analysis with the unexpected question technique. Sixty participants were assigned to an honest (n = 30) or deceptive group (n = 30). The deceptive group was instructed to memorize the false biographical details of a fictitious identity. Throughout the interviews, participants were presented with a randomized sequence of control, expected, and unexpected open-ended questions about identity. Responses were audio recorded for detailed examination. Our findings indicate that deceptive participants showed markedly longer latencies and higher error rates when answering expected (requiring deception) and unexpected questions (for which premeditated deception was not possible). Longer response latencies were also observed in participants attempting deception when answering control questions (which necessitated truthful answers). Moreover, a within-subject analysis highlighted that responding to unexpected questions significantly impaired individuals' performance compared to answering control and expected questions. Leveraging machine-learning algorithms, our approach attained a classification accuracy of 98% in distinguishing deceptive and honest participants. Additionally, a classification analysis on single response levels was conducted. Our findings underscore the effectiveness of merging response latency metrics and error rates with unexpected questioning as a robust method for identity deception detection in investigative interviews. We also discuss significant implications for enhancing interview strategies.

Autistic adults' inclination to lie in everyday situations

LAY ABSTRACT

Differences in social communication and understanding others' mental states may mean that autistic adults are less likely to deceive others than non-autistic individuals. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their inclination to lie and which psychological factors are involved in the inclination to lie. We found that autistic and non-autistic groups reported a similar inclination to lie, and the extent to which participants viewed lying as acceptable helped to explain their inclination to deceive others. However, the other underlying psychological factors associated with deception inclination differed between autistic and non-autistic groups. Autistic adults' belief about their ability to lie and also how quickly they could lie helped to explain whether they were more or less inclined to lie. For non-autistic adults, their memory and ability to understand others' mental states helped to explain their lie inclination. We discuss these findings and recommend areas for future research.

An Examination of the Motives for Attributing and Interpreting Deception in People with Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment

The aim of the present study was to examine how a person with amnestic mild cognitive impairment perceives the phenomenon of deception. Amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) usually represents the prodromal phase of Alzheimer's disease (AD), with patients showing memory impairment but with normal activities of daily living. It was expected that aMCI patients would face difficulties in the attribution and interpretation of deceptive behavior due to deficits regarding their diagnosis. The main sample of the study consisted of 76 older adults who were patients of a daycare center diagnosed with aMCI. A sample of 55 highly educated young adults was also examined in the same experiment to qualitatively compare their performance with that of aMCI patients. Participants were assigned a scenario where a hypothetical partner (either a friend or a stranger) was engaged in a task in which the partner could lie to boost their earnings at the expense of the participant. The results showed that aMCI patients, even if they understood that something was going wrong, did not invest in interpretations of potential deception and tended to avoid searching for confirmative information related to the hypothetical lie of their partner compared to highly educated young adults. It seems that aMCI patients become somehow "innocent", and this is discussed in terms of cognitive impairment and/or socioemotional selectivity.

Cognitive load promotes honesty

In three experiments, we examined the cognitive underpinnings of self-serving dishonesty by manipulating cognitive load under different incentive structures. Participants could increase a financial bonus by misreporting outcomes of private die rolls without any risk of detection. At the same time, they had to remember letter strings of varying length. If honesty is the automatic response tendency and dishonesty is cognitively demanding, lying behavior should be less evident under high cognitive load. This hypothesis was supported by the outcome of two out of three experiments. We further manipulated whether all trials or only one random trial determined payoff to modulate reward adaptation over time (Experiment 2) and whether payoff was framed as a financial gain or loss (Experiment 3). The payoff scheme of one random or all trials did not affect lying behavior and, discordant to earlier research, facing losses instead of gains did not increase lying behavior. Finally, cognitive load and incentive frame interacted significantly, but contrary to our assumption gains increased lying under low cognitive load. While the impact of cognitive load on dishonesty appears to be comparably robust, motivational influences seem to be more elusive than commonly assumed in current theorizing.

The role of conflict processing mechanism in deception responses

A considerable number of studies have described the potential neural mechanism of deception, but most deception studies have relied upon deception from experimental supervisor instruction. Experimental control (participants follow instructions to deceive without any risk) means that the deception occurs in a way that does not come close to the real deception. In the current study, a neural imaging experiment on deception closer to the real deception was conducted. Event-related potential (ERP) and event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) techniques were used to explore the neural mechanism of deception. The results showed that deceptive response evoked larger medial-frontal negativity (MFN) and smaller response-locked positivity (RLP) than truthful response. We interpret these findings to indicate that conflict detection and emotional processing are associated with deception. In addition, magnitudes of alpha and beta oscillations after the deceptive response were significantly smaller than those after the truthful response, demonstrating that deception is associated with neural oscillations reflecting conflict adjustment. The results comprehensively characterized the physiological properties of the brain oscillations elicited by a deceptive response and provided a theoretical foundation for detection in practical applications.

Cognitive control and dishonesty

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Effects of Online Single Pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on Prefrontal and Parietal Cortices in Deceptive Processing: A Preliminary Study

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to test the functional role of parietal and prefrontal cortical regions activated during a playing card Guilty Knowledge Task (GKT). Single-pulse TMS was applied to 15 healthy volunteers at each of three target sites: left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and midline parietal cortex. TMS pulses were applied at each of five latencies (from 0 to 480 ms) after the onset of a card stimulus. TMS applied to the parietal cortex exerted a latency-specific increase in inverse efficiency score and in reaction time when subjects were instructed to lie relative to when asked to respond with the truth, and this effect was specific to when TMS was applied at 240 ms after stimulus onset. No effects of TMS were detected at left or right DLPFC sites. This manipulation with TMS of performance in a deception task appears to support a critical role for the parietal cortex in intentional false responding, particularly in stimulus selection processes needed to execute a deceptive response in the context of a GKT. However, this interpretation is only preliminary, as further experiments are needed to compare performance within and outside of a deceptive context to clarify the effects of deceptive intent.

Brain Regions Activity During a Deceitful Monetary Game: An fMRI Study

: Finding neural correlates underlying deception may have implementations in judicial, security, and financial settings. Telling a successful lie may activate different brain regions associated with risk evaluation, subsequent reward/punishment possibility, decision-making, and theory of mind (ToM). Many other protocols have been developed to study individuals who proceed with deception under instructed laboratory conditions. However, no protocol has practiced lying in a real-life environment. We performed a functional MRI using a 3Tesla machine on 31 healthy individuals to detect the participants who successfully lie in a previously-designed game to earn or lose the monetary reward. The results revealed that lying results in an augmented activity in the right dorsolateral and right dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, the right inferior parietal lobule, bilateral inferior frontal gyri, and right anterior cingulate cortex. The findings would contribute to forensic practices regarding the detection of a deliberate lie. They may also have implications for guilt detection, social cognition, and the societal notions of responsibility.

Detecting spontaneous deception in the brain

Deception detection can be of great value during the juristic investigation. Although the neural signatures of deception have been widely documented, most prior studies were biased by difficulty levels. That is, deceptive behavior typically required more effort, making deception detection possibly effort detection. Furthermore, no study has examined the generalizability across instructed and spontaneous responses and across participants. To explore these issues, we used a dual‐task paradigm, where the difficulty level was balanced between truth‐telling and lying, and the instructed and spontaneous truth‐telling and lying were collected independently. Using Multivoxel pattern analysis, we were able to decode truth‐telling versus lying with a balanced difficulty level. Results showed that the angular gyrus (AG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and postcentral gyrus could differentiate lying from truth‐telling. Critically, linear classifiers trained to distinguish instructed truthful and deceptive responses could correctly differentiate spontaneous truthful and deceptive responses in AG and IFG with above‐chance accuracy. In addition, with a leave‐one‐participant‐out analysis, multivoxel neural patterns from AG could classify if the left‐out participant was lying or not in a trial. These results indicate the commonality of neural responses subserved instructed and spontaneous deceptive behavior as well as the feasibility of cross‐participant deception validation.

Global Functional Connectivity Analysis Indicating Dysconnectivity of the Hate Circuit in Major Depressive Disorder

Background

Abnormalities of functional connectivity (FC) in certain brain regions are closely related to the pathophysiology of major depressive disorder (MDD). Findings are inconsistent with different presuppositions in regions of interest. Our research focused on voxel-wise brain-wide FC changes in patients with MDD in an unbiased manner.

Method

We examined resting-state functional MRI in 23 patients with MDD and 26 healthy controls. Imaging data were analyzed by using global-brain FC (GFC) and used to explore the correlation of abnormal GFC values with clinical variables.

Results

Increased GFC values in the left medial superior frontal gyrus (SFGmed) and decreased GFC values in the right supplementary motor area (SMA) were observed in the patients with MDD compared with the controls. The decreased GFC values in the right SMA had a positive correlation with vitamin D and Hamilton Anxiety Scale (HAM-A) scores.

Conclusion

Abnormal GFC in the hate circuit, particularly increased GFC in the left SFGmed and decreased GFC in the right SMA, appears to be a new sight for comprehending the pathological alterations in MDD.

Does Ego Depletion Elicit Stronger Cues of Deception?

Lying is cognitively demanding and presumably requires self-regulation. According to ego depletion theory, a task that requires self-regulation should therefore impair an individual’s ability to tell a convincing lie in a later task. Consequently, it was hypothesized that a manipulation of ego depletion would enhance behavioral differences between liars and truth-tellers. To manipulate ego depletion, participants worked (vs. did not work) on a task in which they had to suppress dominant responses while copying a text. Subsequently, they talked in a simulated job interview about a job they had previously held (vs. not held). In the sample of 164 participants, there was no evidence to support the hypothesis; the expected Ego Depletion x Veracity interaction was not significant for any of the 15 behavioral cues coded in the videotaped interviews. Although the main effect of ego depletion was significant at the multivariate level for the first of two parts of the interview, none of the univariate main effects reached the significance level corrected for multiple testing. Bayesian analyses rendered moderate to strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Possible implications of the results are discussed, also those related to ego depletion theory.

Neuro-Behavioral Dynamic Prediction of Interpersonal Cooperation and Aggression

How to quickly predict an individual's behavioral choices is an important issue in the field of human behavior research. Using noninvasive electroencephalography, we aimed to identify neural markers in the prior outcome-evaluation stage and the current option-assessment stage of the chicken game that predict an individual's behavioral choices in the subsequent decision-output stage. Hierarchical linear modeling-based brain-behavior association analyses revealed that midfrontal theta oscillation in the prior outcome-evaluation stage positively predicted subsequent aggressive choices; also, beta oscillation in the current option-assessment stage positively predicted subsequent cooperative choices. These findings provide electrophysiological evidence for the three-stage theory of decision-making and strengthen the feasibility of predicting an individual's behavioral choices using neural oscillations.

Meta-analytic connectivity modelling of deception-related brain regions

Brain-based deception research began only two decades ago and has since included a wide variety of contexts and response modalities for deception paradigms. Investigations of this sort serve to better our neuroscientific and legal knowledge of the ways in which individuals deceive others. To this end, we conducted activation likelihood estimation (ALE) and meta-analytic connectivity modelling (MACM) using BrainMap software to examine 45 task-based fMRI brain activation studies on deception. An activation likelihood estimation comparing activations during deceptive versus honest behavior revealed 7 significant peak activation clusters (bilateral insula, left superior frontal gyrus, bilateral supramarginal gyrus, and bilateral medial frontal gyrus). Meta-analytic connectivity modelling revealed an interconnected network amongst the 7 regions comprising both unidirectional and bidirectional connections. Together with subsequent behavioral and paradigm decoding, these findings implicate the supramarginal gyrus as a key component for the sociocognitive process of deception.

The role of anterior prefrontal cortex (area 10) in face-to-face deception measured with fNIRS

Anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC, Brodmann area 10) activations are often, but not always, found in neuroimaging studies investigating deception, and the precise role of this area remains unclear. To explore the role of the PFC in face-to-face deception, we invited pairs of participants to play a card game involving lying and lie detection while we used functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to record brain activity in the PFC. Participants could win points for successfully lying about the value of their cards or for detecting lies. We contrasted patterns of brain activation when the participants either told the truth or lied, when they were either forced into this or did so voluntarily and when they either succeeded or failed to detect a lie. Activation in the anterior PFC was found in both lie production and detection, unrelated to reward. Analysis of cross-brain activation patterns between participants identified areas of the PFC where the lead player’s brain activity synchronized their partner’s later brain activity. These results suggest that during situations that involve close interpersonal interaction, the anterior PFC supports processing widely involved in deception, possibly relating to the demands of monitoring one’s own and other people’s behaviour.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Evaluating heart rate variability as a predictor of the influence of lying on memory

Previous research suggests self-provided misinformation (lying) impairs memory for the truth, whereby more incorrect details are remembered compared to being truthful. The cognitive control processes evoked by inhibiting retrieval of truthful information may come at the expense of retaining that information in memory. Because lying requires quick adaptability to the situation, heart rate variability (HRV), reflecting cognitive control processes, is a useful metric of these cognitive demands. The present experiment extends previous research (Paige et al., 2019) and had participants complete a questionnaire orally in front of a panel while electrocardiography (ECG) data was collected. Participants were instructed to tell the truth for half of the questions and lie for the other half. For a subset of the questions, participants were instructed to elaborate on their response. After a delay, participants completed the same questionnaire on the computer, responding truthfully to all items. Results revealed that correct memory was lower for items participants previously lied about compared to truthful items. Although prior work suggests increased HRV is associated with increased cognitive control, HRV did not predict memory for truth or lie items. These findings are consistent with past literature showing that lying impairs memory for veridical information compared to truth-telling.

Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes-valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

Cognitive control increases honesty in cheaters but cheating in those who are honest

Every day, we are faced with the conflict between the temptation to cheat for financial gains and maintaining a positive image of ourselves as being a "good person." While it has been proposed that cognitive control is needed to mediate this conflict between reward and our moral self-image, the exact role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty remains elusive. Here we identify this role, by investigating the neural mechanism underlying cheating. We developed a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating on a trial-by-trial basis in the MRI scanner. We found that activity in the nucleus accumbens promotes cheating, particularly for individuals who cheat a lot, while a network consisting of posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex promotes honesty, particularly in individuals who are generally honest. Finally, activity in areas associated with cognitive control (anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. Thus, our results suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default.

‘Munchausen's syndrome by proxy’ or a ‘miscarriage of justice’? An initial application of functional neuroimaging to the question of guilt versus innocence

‘Munchausen's syndrome by proxy’ characteristically describes women alleged to have fabricated or induced illnesses in children under their care, purportedly to attract attention. Where conclusive evidence exists the condition's aetiology remains speculative, where such evidence is lacking diagnosis hinges upon denial of wrong-doing (conduct also compatible with innocence). How might investigators obtain objective evidence of guilt or innocence? Here, we examine the case of a woman convicted of poisoning a child. She served a prison sentence but continues to profess her innocence. Using a modified fMRI protocol (previously published in 2001) we scanned the subject while she affirmed her account of events and that of her accusers. We hypothesized that she would exhibit longer response times in association with greater activation of ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices when endorsing those statements she believed to be false (i.e., when she ‘lied’). The subject was scanned 4 times at 3 Tesla. Results revealed significantly longer response times and relatively greater activation of ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices when she endorsed her accusers' version of events. Hence, while we have not ‘proven’ that this subject is innocent, we demonstrate that her behavioural and functional anatomical parameters behave as if she were.

Interview based connectivity analysis of EEG in order to detect deception

Deception is mentioned as an expression or action which hides the truth and deception detection as a concept to uncover the truth. In this research, a connectivity analysis of Electro Encephalography study is presented regarding cognitive processes of an instructed liar/truth-teller about identity during an interview. In this survey, connectivity analysis is applied because it can provide unique information about brain activity patterns of lying and interaction among brain regions. The novelty of this paper lies in applying an open-ended questions interview protocol during EEG recording. We recruited 40 healthy participants to record EEG signal during the interview. For each subject, whole-brain functional and effective connectivity networks such as coherence, generalized partial direct coherence and directed directed transfer function, are constructed for the lie-telling and truth-telling conditions. The classification results demonstrate that lying could be differentiated from truth-telling with an accuracy of 86.25% with the leave-one-person-out method. Results show functional and effective connectivity patterns of lying for the average of all frequency bands are different in regions from that of truth-telling. The current study may shed new light on neural patterns of deception from connectivity analysis view point.

Intuitive Honesty Versus Dishonesty: Meta-Analytic Evidence

Is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars (k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying (k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie, log odds ratio = 0.38, p = .0004, and people to lie more, Hedges's g = 0.26, p < .0001. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty (p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition's role in honesty. We discuss limitations such as the relatively unbalanced distribution of studies using concrete versus abstract victims and the overall large interstudy heterogeneity.

Influence of age on the effects of lying on memory

False memories are elicited from exposure to misleading information. It is possible that self-provided misinformation, or lying, has similar effects. We hypothesized that lying impairs memory for younger adults, as increased cognitive control, necessary to inhibit a truthful response, comes at the expense of retaining veridical information in memory. Because older adults show deficits in cognitive control, we hypothesized their memory is unaffected by lying. In the present study, participants made truthful and deceptive responses on a computer while EEG data were recorded. We investigated medial frontal negativity (MFN), an ERP component associated with deception and cognitive control, which may be differentially generated across age groups due to differences in cognitive control. Unexpectedly, results revealed that older adults showed reduced accurate memory for items to which they previously lied compared to younger adults. There were no age differences in correct memory for truth items. We did not find the expected MFN effect, however results revealed long-lasting negative slow waves (NSW) to lie items across age in the pre-response period and following the response cue, suggesting the role of working memory processes in deception. These findings demonstrate that lying is another source of misinformation and influences memory differently across the lifespan.

Sophisticated Deception in Junior Middle School Students: An ERP Study

Sophisticated deception refers to the deception of others based on inferences of their mental states (e.g., answering honestly when inferring that the other will not believe their answer). Studying the brain mechanism of sophisticated deception in junior middle school students can provide physiological evidence for deception detection and deceptive ability measurement. Sixteen junior middle school students were asked to engage in different trial types (i.e., instructed truth/lie and chosen truth/lie), during which we recorded their response times (RT) along with electroencephalographic data to calculate event-related potentials (ERPs). We observed significant differences in amplitude [N2, P3, N450, and medial frontal negativity (MFN)] between chosen reactions (sophisticated deception and simple deception) and instructed reactions (instructed truth and instructed lie) in both the stimulus presentation and feedback stages. In the former, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were significantly and positively correlated with the N2 amplitude over the central brain area during sophisticated deception. In the latter, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were negatively correlated with the MFN amplitude over the left frontal and left frontocentral regions. Overall, deception intention, rather than simply making counterfactual statements, appears to underlie the increased demand for cognitive control in deceivers. This can be attributed to deceivers' need to strongly consider their opponent's mental state-the better the deceivers' deceptive ability, the more they will make conjectures about the mental state of their opponent with sophisticated deception and monitor conflict; the less conflict they experience while answering honestly with the intention to deceive, the more conflict may arise when the results of their deception are inconsistent with these conjectures.

How good are we at detecting deception? A review of current techniques and theories

The task of discerning truth from untruth has long interested psychologists; however, methods for doing so accurately remain elusive. In this article, we provide an overview and evaluation of methods of detecting deception used in the laboratory and the field. We identify and discuss three broad approaches to detecting deception: measurement of non-verbal behaviour, verbal interview methods, and statement evaluation by humans and computers. Part of the problem in devising good methods for detecting deception is the absence of a sound understanding of deception in human lives. We thus consider three theories of deception – leakage, reality monitoring, and truth-default – and conclude that although promising, they do not yet provide an adequate foundation. We review 10 extant methods of detecting deception in the second part of the article, focusing at greatest length on the most widely used method in South Africa, the polygraph test of deception. Our conclusion is that non-verbal methods that work by inducing anxiety in interviewees are fundamentally flawed, and that we ought to move away from such methods. Alternate methods of detecting deception, including statement analysis, are considered, but ultimately our view is that there are currently no methods sufficiently accurate for practitioners to rely on. We suspect that a precondition for developing such measures is a coherent and validated theory.

The Neurostructure of Morality and the Hubris of Memory Manipulation

Neurotechnologies that promise to dampen (via pharmacologicals), disassociate (via electro-convulsive therapy), erase (via deep brain stimulation), and replace (via false memory creation) unsavory episodic memories are no longer the subject of science fiction. They have already arrived, and their funding suggests that they will not disappear anytime soon. In light of their emergence, this essay examines the neurostructure of normative morality to clarify that memory manipulation, which promises to take away that which is bad in human experience, also removes that which enables human beings to be good. Concepts such as free will, moral responsibility, and the neurobiological basis of moral reasoning are explored to underscore the fundamental hubris inherent to the memory manipulation enterprise.

Testing the applied potential of the Sheffield Lie Test

The Sheffield Lie Test (SLT) has been frequently used in laboratory research investigating basic mechanisms of deception. Its applied potential as a lie detection tool has been contested. The current two experiments used a reaction time SLT and investigated whether it can discriminate between participants who committed a mock crime and participants who performed an everyday activity. Results of the first experiment revealed that guilty participants (n = 32) took longer and committed more errors when having to deceptively deny the mock crime and deceptively confirm having performed the everyday activity in contrast to truthfully admitting the mock crime and denying the everyday activity. Innocent participants (n = 29) showed the reversed pattern. Individual Cohen's d's and the area under the ROC curve revealed a high above chance discrimination between both groups. In a second experiment, we repeated this procedure, yet participants were now given a more elaborate explanation of the alibi activity that all should pretend to have done. Although results still revealed the expected pattern in innocent participants (n = 48), the effect was not significant any more for the guilty participants (n = 46). Accordingly, classification accuracies also dropped. These two experiments demonstrate the applied potential of the SLT, yet at the same time its severe limitations. Potential solutions and suggestions for future research will be discussed.

I lie, why don't you: Neural mechanisms of individual differences in self-serving lying

People tend to lie in varying degrees. To advance our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms of this heterogeneity, we investigated individual differences in self-serving lying. We performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in 37 participants and introduced a color-reporting game where lying about the color would in general lead to higher monetary payoffs but would also be punished if get caught. At the behavioral level, individuals lied to different extents. Besides, individuals who are more dishonest showed shorter lying response time, whereas no significant correlation was found between truth-telling response time and the degree of dishonesty. At the neural level, the left caudate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) were key regions reflecting individual differences in making dishonest decisions. The dishonesty associated activity in these regions decreased with increased dishonesty. Subsequent generalized psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that individual differences in self-serving lying were associated with the functional connectivity among the caudate, vmPFC, IFG, and dlPFC. More importantly, regardless of the decision types, the neural patterns of the left caudate and vmPFC during the decision-making phase could be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty. The present study demonstrated that lying decisions differ substantially from person to person in the functional connectivity and neural activation patterns which can be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty.

Effect of negative motivation on the behavioral and autonomic correlates of deception

In forensic contexts, lying is often motivated by the will to avoid negative consequences (e.g., an arrest). Previous research investigating the effect of motivation on deception has, however, nearly exclusively focused on the effect of positive motivation (e.g., via financial rewards). In the current study, we aimed to replicate previous studies on the behavioral and autonomic correlates of deception and to investigate the influence of negative motivation on those correlates. Participants committed a mock theft and underwent a questioning procedure in which they had to truthfully and deceptively answer questions about the committed mock crime and a control crime. Half of the participants completed the procedure without any specific motivation, whereas the other half of the participants was told that lies detected by a computer algorithm would result in an unpleasant electric stimulation. Results revealed longer reaction times, larger skin conductance responses, and a relative heart rate slowing for lying compared to truth telling. The latter two effects were larger in the motivation compared to the control condition. Results are in line with the motivation impairment hypothesis and effects of positive motivation on the autonomic correlates of information concealment. The observation that a higher motivation increased rather than decreased deception effects is promising for forensic contexts. The possible explanation that these effects could be related to fear conditioning should stimulate future research on the stability of differences between lying and truth telling in people who experienced no or only seldom punishment for deception in their learning history.

Telling a truth to deceive: Examining executive control and reward-related processes underlying interpersonal deception

Does deception necessarily involve false statements that are incompatible with the truth? In some cases, people choose truthful statements in order to mislead others. This type of deception has been investigated less. The current study employed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neurocognitive processes when both truthful and false statements were used to deceive others. We focused our ERP analysis on two stages: a decision making stage during which participants decided whether to tell a false or a truthful statement, and an outcome evaluation stage during which participants evaluated whether their deception had succeeded or not. Results showed that in the decision making stage, intentions to deceive elicited larger N200s and smaller P300s than an honest control condition. During the outcome evaluation stage, success/failure feedback in the deception condition elicited larger Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P300 than feedback after honest responses. Importantly, whether participants chose to tell false or true statements, did not further modulate executive control or reward-related processes. Taken together, these results suggest that during interpersonal deception, having deceptive intentions engages executive control and reward-related processes regardless of the veracity of statements.

Memory-Based Deception Detection: Extending the Cognitive Signature of Lying From Instructed to Self-Initiated Cheating

From a cognitive perspective, lying can be regarded as a complex cognitive process requiring the interplay of several executive functions. Meta‐analytic research on 114 studies encompassing 3,307 participants (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben‐Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017) suggests that computerized paradigms can reliably assess the cognitive burden of lying, with large reaction time differences between lying and truth telling. These studies, however, lack a key ingredient of real‐life deception, namely self‐initiated behavior. Research participants have typically been instructed to commit a mock crime and conceal critical information, whereas in real life, people freely choose whether or not to engage in antisocial behavior. In this study, participants (n = 433) engaged in a trivia quiz and were provided with a monetary incentive for high accuracy performance. Participants were randomly allocated to either a condition where they were instructed to cheat on the quiz (mimicking the typical laboratory set‐up) or to a condition in which they were provided with the opportunity to cheat, yet without explicit instructions to do so. Assessments of their response times in a subsequent Concealed Information Test (CIT) revealed that both instructed cheaters (n = 107) and self‐initiated cheaters (n = 142) showed the expected RT‐slowing for concealed information. The data indicate that the cognitive signature of lying is not restricted to explicitly instructed cheating, but it can also be observed for self‐initiated cheating. These findings are highly encouraging from an ecological validity perspective.

Geven, Ben‐Shakhar, Kindt and Verschuere point out that research on deception detection usually employs instructed cheating. They experimentally demonstrate that participants show slower reaction times for concealed information than for other information, regardless of whether they are explicitly instructed to cheat or whether they can freely choose to cheat or not. Finding this ‘cognitive signature of lying’ with self‐initiated cheating too is argued by the authors to strengthen the external validity of deception detection research. [75]

Distinct Patterns of Cognitive Conflict Dynamics in Promise Keepers and Promise Breakers

On a daily basis, we see how different people can be in keeping or breaking a given promise. However, we know very little about the cognitive conflict dynamics that underlie the decision to keep or break a promise and whether this is shaped by inter-individual variability. In order to fill this gap, we applied an ecologically valid promise decision task with real monetary consequences for all involved interaction partners and used mouse tracking to identify the dynamic, on-line cognitive processes that underlie the decision to keep or break a promise. Our findings revealed that on average, the process of breaking a promise is associated with largely curved mouse trajectories, while the process of keeping a promise was not, indicating that breaking a promise is associated with a larger conflict. Interestingly, however, this conflict pattern was strongly shaped by individual differences. Individuals who always kept their promises did not show any signs of conflict (i.e., straight mouse trajectories), indicating that they were not tempted by the monetary benefits associated with breaking the promise. In contrast, individuals who did not always keep their promise exhibited a large conflict (i.e., curved mouse trajectories), irrespective of whether they broke or kept their promise. A possible interpretation of these findings is that these individuals were always tempted by the unchosen decision option – the desire to act in a fair manner when breaking the promise and the monetary benefits when keeping the promise. This study provides the first piece of evidence that there are substantial inter-individual differences in cognitive conflict dynamics that underlie the decision to keep or break promises and that mouse tracking is able to illuminate important insights into individual differences in complex human’s decision processes.

Alcohol facilitates detection of concealed identity information

The Concealed Information Test (CIT) is a well-validated means to detect whether someone possesses certain (e.g., crime-relevant) information. The current study investigated whether alcohol intoxication during CIT administration influences reaction time (RT) CIT-effects. Two opposing predictions can be made. First, by decreasing attention to critical information, alcohol intoxication could diminish CIT-effects. Second, by hampering the inhibition of truthful responses, alcohol intoxication could increase CIT-effects. A correlational field design was employed. Participants (n = 42) were recruited and tested at a bar, where alcohol consumption was voluntary and incidental. Participants completed a CIT, in which they were instructed to hide knowledge of their true identity. BAC was estimated via breath alcohol ratio. Results revealed that higher BAC levels were correlated with higher CIT-effects. Our results demonstrate that robust CIT effects can be obtained even when testing conditions differ from typical laboratory settings and strengthen the idea that response inhibition contributes to the RT-CIT effect.

This Is How To Be a Rule Breaker

Violating rules comes with cognitive conflict for the rule-breaker. Here, we probed for means to reduce the behavioral effects of this conflict by studying the combined impact of recency and frequency of rule violations. We found that violating a rule facilitated the initiation of a subsequent rule violation, while notable costs relative to rule-based responding remained in measures of response execution. Such costs during response execution vanished, however, when frequency and recency of rule violation worked in concert. That is, it is possible to overcome the costs of rule violation when (a) having violated this particular rule frequently and (b) having violated this particular rule very recently. Moreover, we demonstrated that recent rule violations reduce the costs of cognitive conflict in an unrelated interference task (Simon task). Based on these findings, we present a revised model of the cognitive processes underlying deliberate rule violations.

Lie Detection Using fNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates Infrequent but not Frequent Liars

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to test whether monitoring inhibition-related brain regions is a feasible method for detecting both infrequent liars and frequent liars. Thirty-two participants were divided into two groups: the deceptive group (liars) and the non-deceptive group (ND group, innocents). All the participants were required to undergo a simulated interrogation by a computer. The participants from the deceptive group were instructed to tell a mix of lies and truths and those of the ND group were instructed always to tell the truth. Based on the number of deceptions, the participants of the deceptive group were further divided into a infrequently deceptive group (IFD group, infrequent liars) and a frequently deceptive group (FD group, frequent liars). The infrequent liars exhibited greater neural activities than the frequent liars and the innocents in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) when performing the deception detection tasks. While performing deception detection tasks, infrequent liars showed significantly greater neural activation in the left MFG than the baseline, but frequent liars and innocents did not exhibit this pattern of neural activation in any area of inhibition-related brain regions. The results of individual analysis showed an acceptable accuracy of detecting infrequent liars, but an unacceptable accuracy of detecting frequent liars. These results suggest that using fNIRS monitoring of inhibition-related brain regions is feasible for detecting infrequent liars, for whom deception may be more effortful and therefore more physiologically marked, but not frequent liars.

The guilty brain: the utility of neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies in forensic field

Several studies have aimed to address the natural inability of humankind to detect deception and accurately discriminate lying from truth in the legal context. To date, it has been well established that telling a lie is a complex mental activity. During deception, many functions of higher cognition are involved: the decision to lie, withholding the truth, fabricating the lie, monitoring whether the receiver believes the lie, and, if necessary, adjusting the fabricated story and maintaining a consistent lie. In the previous 15 years, increasing interest in the neuroscience of deception has resulted in new possibilities to investigate and interfere with the ability to lie directly from the brain. Cognitive psychology, as well as neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies, are increasing the possibility that neuroscience will be useful for lie detection. This paper discusses the scientific validity of the literature on neuroimaging and neurostimulation regarding lie detection to understand whether scientific findings in this field have a role in the forensic setting. We considered how lie detection technology may contribute to addressing the detection of deception in the courtroom and discussed the conditions and limits in which these techniques reliably distinguish whether an individual is lying.

Effects of task-irrelevant emotional information on deception

Deception has been reported to be influenced by task-relevant emotional information from an external stimulus. However, it remains unclear how task-irrelevant emotional information would influence deception. In the present study, facial expressions of different valence and emotion intensity were presented to participants, where they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to the preceding cues. We observed the influence of facial expression intensity upon individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving (mean difference of individuals' truthful and deceptive response times). Larger cost was observed for high intensity faces compared to low intensity faces. These results provided insights on how automatic attraction of attention evoked by task-irrelevant emotional information in facial expressions influenced individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving.

Delta plots do not reveal response inhibition in lying

The role of response inhibition in lying is debated. By using the delta-plot method applied to the Sheffield Lie Test, Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De Schryver, and Verschuere (2015) provided evidence supporting the role of inhibition in lying. In the study of Debey et al., inhibitory skill was measured in terms of the size of the lie effect. However, to provide convincing evidence that delta plots highlight the role of response inhibition in lying, inhibitory ability must be evaluated independently from the size of the lie effect. After replicating original findings, this article shows that a delta plot analysis does not differentiate individuals with different inhibitory abilities, when inhibitory skill is measured by means of the Stop Signal Task, instead of the size of the lie effect. This suggests that researchers should be cautious when making conclusions about cognitive mechanisms based on the sole analysis of delta plots.

Associations between psychopathic traits and brain activity during instructed false responding

Lying is one of the characteristic features of psychopathy, and has been recognized in clinical and diagnostic descriptions of the disorder, yet individuals with psychopathic traits have been found to have reduced neural activity in many of the brain regions that are important for lying. In this study, we examine brain activity in sixteen individuals with varying degrees of psychopathic traits during a task in which they are instructed to falsify information or tell the truth about autobiographical and non-autobiographical facts, some of which was related to criminal behavior. We found that psychopathic traits were primarily associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate, various regions of the prefrontal cortex, insula, angular gyrus, and the inferior parietal lobe when participants falsified information of any type. Associations tended to be stronger when participants falsified information about criminal behaviors. Although this study was conducted in a small sample of individuals and the task used has limited ecological validity, these findings support a growing body of literature suggesting that in some contexts, individuals with higher levels of psychopathic traits may demonstrate heightened levels of brain activity.