The anatomy of choice: dopamine and decision-making

Play in Cognitive Development: From Rational Constructivism to Predictive Processing

It is widely believed that play and curiosity are key ingredients as children develop models of the world. There is also an emerging consensus that children are Bayesian learners who combine their structured prior beliefs with estimations of the likelihood of new evidence to infer the most probable model of the world. An influential school of thought within developmental psychology, rational constructivism, combines these two ideas to propose that children learn intuitive theories of how the world works in part by engaging in play activities that allow them to gather new information for testing their theories. There are still, however, at least two pieces missing from rational constructivist theories of development. First, rational constructivism has so far devoted little attention to explaining why children's preferred form of learning, play, feels so fun, enjoyable, and rewarding. Rational constructivism may suggest that children are curious and like to play because reducing uncertainty and learning better theories of the causal workings of the world is enjoyable. What remains unclear, however, is why reducing uncertainty in play is interesting, fun, and joyful, while doing so in other forms of learning can be frustrating or boring. Second, rational constructivism may have overlooked how children, during play, will take control of and manipulate their environment, sometimes in an effort to create ideal niches for surprise-extraction, sometimes for developing strategies for making the world fit with their predictions. These missing elements from rational constructivism can be provided by understanding the contribution of play to development in terms of predictive processing, an influential framework in cognitive neuroscience that models many of the brain's cognitive functions as processes of model-based, probabilistic prediction.

The mechanisms of persisting disability in schizophrenia: imprecise predictive coding via cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical loop dysfunction

Persisting symptoms and disability remain a problem for an appreciable proportion of people with schizophrenia despite treatment with antipsychotic medication. Improving outcomes requires an understanding of the nature and mechanisms of the pathological processes underlying persistence. Classical features of schizophrenia, which include disorganization and impoverishment of mental activity, are well recognised early clinical features that predict poor long-term outcome. Substantial evidence indicates that these features reflect imprecise predictive coding. Predictive coding provides an over-arching framework for understanding efficient function of the nervous system. Imprecise predictive coding also has the potential to precipitate acute psychosis characterised by reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations) at times of stress. On the other hand, substantial evidence indicates that persistent reality distortion itself gives rise to poor occupational and social function in the long term. Furthermore, abuse of psychotomimetic drugs, which exacerbate reality distortion, contributes to poor long-term outcome in schizophrenia. Neural circuits involved in modulating volitional acts are well understood to be implicated in addiction. Plastic changes in these circuits may account for the association between psychotomimetic drug abuse and poor outcomes in schizophrenia. We propose a mechanistic model according to which unbalanced inputs to the corpus striatum disturb the precision of sub-cortical modulation of cortical activity supporting volitional action. This model accounts for the evidence that early classical symptoms predict poor outcome, while in some circumstances, persistent reality distortion also predicts poor outcome. This model has implications for the development of novel treatments that address the risk of persisting symptoms and disabilities in schizophrenia.

Clinically established early Parkinson's disease patients do not show impaired use of priors in conditions of perceptual uncertainty

The ability to use past learned experiences to guide decisions is an important component of adaptive behavior, especially when decision-making is performed under time pressure or when perceptual information is unreliable. Previous studies using visual discrimination tasks have shown that this prior-informed decision-making ability is impaired in Parkinson's disease (PD), but the mechanisms underlying this deficit and the precise impact of dopaminergic denervation within cortico-basal circuits remain unclear. To shed light on this problem, we evaluated prior-informed decision-making under various conditions of perceptual uncertainty in a sample of 13 clinically established early PD patients, and compared behavioral performance with healthy control (HC) subjects matched in age, sex and education. PD patients and HC subjects performed a random dot motion task in which they had to decide the net direction (leftward vs. rightward) of a field of moving dots and communicate their choices through manual button presses. We manipulated prior knowledge by modulating the probability of occurrence of leftward vs. rightward motion stimuli between blocks of trials, and by explicitly giving these probabilities to subjects at the beginning of each block. We further manipulated stimulus discriminability by varying the proportion of dots moving coherently in the signal direction and speed-accuracy instructions. PD patients used choice probabilities to guide perceptual decisions in both speed and accuracy conditions, and their performance did not significantly differ from that of HC subjects. An additional analysis of the data with the diffusion decision model confirmed this conclusion. These results suggest that the impaired use of priors during visual discrimination observed at more advanced stages of PD is independent of dopaminergic denervation, though additional studies with larger sample sizes are needed to more firmly establish this conclusion.

When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago

A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.

Giftedness and atypical sexual differentiation: enhanced perceptual functioning through estrogen deficiency instead of androgen excess

Syndromic autism spectrum conditions (ASC), such as Klinefelter syndrome, also manifest hypogonadism. Compared to the popular Extreme Male Brain theory, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning model explains the connection between ASC, savant traits, and giftedness more seamlessly, and their co-emergence with atypical sexual differentiation. Overexcitability of primary sensory inputs generates a relative enhancement of local to global processing of stimuli, hindering the abstraction of communication signals, in contrast to the extraordinary local information processing skills in some individuals. Weaker inhibitory function through gamma-aminobutyric acid type A (GABAA) receptors and the atypicality of synapse formation lead to this difference, and the formation of unique neural circuits that process external information. Additionally, deficiency in monitoring inner sensory information leads to alexithymia (inability to distinguish one's own emotions), which can be caused by hypoactivity of estrogen and oxytocin in the interoceptive neural circuits, comprising the anterior insular and cingulate gyri. These areas are also part of the Salience Network, which switches between the Central Executive Network for external tasks and the Default Mode Network for self-referential mind wandering. Exploring the possibility that estrogen deficiency since early development interrupts GABA shift, causing sensory processing atypicality, it helps to evaluate the co-occurrence of ASC with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, dyslexia, and schizophrenia based on phenotypic and physiological bases. It also provides clues for understanding the common underpinnings of these neurodevelopmental disorders and gifted populations.

Imagination vs. routines: festive time, weekly time, and the predictive brain

This paper examines the relationship between societal structures shaped by traditions, norms, laws, and customs, and creative expressions in arts and media through the lens of the predictive coding framework in cognitive science. The article proposes that both dimensions of culture can be viewed as adaptations designed to enhance and train the brain's predictive abilities in the social domain. Traditions, norms, laws, and customs foster shared predictions and expectations among individuals, thereby reducing uncertainty in social environments. On the other hand, arts and media expose us to simulated experiences that explore alternative social realities, allowing the predictive machinery of the brain to hone its skills through exposure to a wider array of potentially relevant social circumstances and scenarios. We first review key principles of predictive coding and active inference, and then explore the rationale of cultural traditions and artistic culture in this perspective. Finally, we draw parallels between institutionalized normative habits that stabilize social worlds and creative and imaginative acts that temporarily subvert established conventions to inject variability.

An active inference perspective for the amygdala complex

The amygdala is a heterogeneous network of subcortical nuclei with central importance in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Various experimental designs in human psychology and animal model research have mapped multiple conceptual frameworks (e.g., valence/salience and decision making) to ever more refined amygdala circuitry. However, these predominantly bottom up-driven accounts often rely on interpretations tailored to a specific phenomenon, thus preventing comprehensive and integrative theories. We argue here that an active inference model of amygdala function could unify these fractionated approaches into an overarching framework for clearer empirical predictions and mechanistic interpretations. This framework embeds top-down predictive models, informed by prior knowledge and belief updating, within a dynamical system distributed across amygdala circuits in which self-regulation is implemented by continuously tracking environmental and homeostatic demands.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Metaphors or mechanism? Predictive coding and a (brief) history of empirical study of the arts

Predictive processing (PP) offers an intriguing approach to perception, cognition, but also to appreciation of the arts. It does this by positing both a theoretical basis-one might say a 'metaphor'-for how we engage and respond, placing emphasis on mismatches rather than fluent overlap between schema and environment. Even more, it holds the promise for translating metaphor into neurobiological bases, suggesting a means for considering mechanisms-from basic perceptions to possibly even our complex, aesthetic experiences. However, while we share the excitement of this promise, the history of empirical or psychological aesthetics is also permeated by metaphors that have progressed our understanding but which also tend to elude translation into concrete, mechanistic operationalization-a challenge that can also be made to PP. We briefly consider this difficulty of convincing implementation of PP via a brief historical outline of some developments in the psychological study of aesthetics and art in order to show how these ideas have often anticipated PP but also how they have remained at the level of rather metaphorical and difficult-to-measure concepts. Although theoretical in scope, we hope that this commentary will spur researchers to reflect on PP with the aim of translating metaphorical explanations into well-defined mechanisms in future empirical study. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

From active affordance to active inference: vertical integration of cognition in the cerebral cortex through dual subcortical control systems

In previous papers, we proposed that the dorsal attention system's top-down control is regulated by the dorsal division of the limbic system, providing a feedforward or impulsive form of control generating expectancies during active inference. In contrast, we proposed that the ventral attention system is regulated by the ventral limbic division, regulating feedback constraints and error-correction for active inference within the neocortical hierarchy. Here, we propose that these forms of cognitive control reflect vertical integration of subcortical arousal control systems that evolved for specific forms of behavior control. The feedforward impetus to action is regulated by phasic arousal, mediated by lemnothalamic projections from the reticular activating system of the lower brainstem, and then elaborated by the hippocampus and dorsal limbic division. In contrast, feedback constraint-based on environmental requirements-is regulated by the tonic activation furnished by collothalamic projections from the midbrain arousal control centers, and then sustained and elaborated by the amygdala, basal ganglia, and ventral limbic division. In an evolutionary-developmental analysis, understanding these differing forms of active affordance-for arousal and motor control within the subcortical vertebrate neuraxis-may help explain the evolution of active inference regulating the cognition of expectancy and error-correction within the mammalian 6-layered neocortex.

Federated inference and belief sharing

This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world-and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs-about what they see-among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme-that attends these optimisation processes-is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language-entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent's beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)-showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems.

Brain evolution and the meaning of catatonia - An update

Back in 2004, in a chapter titled "Brain Evolution and the Meaning of Catatonia", a case was made that the syndrome's core meaning is embedded in millions of years of vertebrate brain evolution. (Fricchione, 2004) In this update, advances over the last almost 20 years, in catatonia theory and research in particular, and pertinent neuropsychiatry in general, will be applied to this question of meaning. The approach will rely heavily on a number of thought leaders, including Nicos Tinbergen, Paul MacLean, John Bowlby, M. Marsel Mesulam, Bruce McEwen and Karl Friston. Their guidance will be supplemented with a selected survey of 21sty century neuropsychiatry, neurophysiology, molecular biology, neuroimaging and neurotherapeutics as applied to the catatonic syndrome. In an attempt to address the question of the meaning of the catatonic syndrome in human life, we will employ two conceptual networks representing the intersubjectivity of the quantitative conceptual network of physical terms and the subjectivity of the qualitative conceptual network of mental and spiritual terms. In the process, a common referent providing extensional identity may emerge (Goodman, 1991). The goal of this exercise is to enhance our attunement with the experience of patients suffering with catatonia. A deeper understanding of catatonia's origins in brain evolution and of the challenges of individual epigenetic development in the setting of environmental events coupled with appreciation of what has been described as the most painful mammalian condition, that of separation, has the potential to foster greater efforts on the part of clinicians to diagnose and treat patients who present with catatonia. In addition, in this ancient and extreme tactic, evolved to provide safety from extreme survival threat, one can speculate what is at the core of human fear and the challenge it presents to all of us. And when the biology, psychology and sociology of catatonia are examined, the nature of solutions to the challenge may emerge.

The utilitarian brain: Moving beyond the Free Energy Principle

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a normative computational framework for iterative reduction of prediction error and uncertainty through perception-intervention cycles that has been presented as a potential unifying theory of all brain functions (Friston, 2006). Any theory hoping to unify the brain sciences must be able to explain the mechanisms of decision-making, an important cognitive faculty, without the addition of independent, irreducible notions. This challenge has been accepted by several proponents of the FEP (Friston, 2010; Gershman, 2019). We evaluate attempts to reduce decision-making to the FEP, using Lucas' (2005) meta-theory of the brain's contextual constraints as a guidepost. We find reductive variants of the FEP for decision-making unable to explain behavior in certain types of diagnostic, predictive, and multi-armed bandit tasks. We trace the shortcomings to the core theory's lack of an adequate notion of subjective preference or "utility", a concept central to decision-making and grounded in the brain's biological reality. We argue that any attempts to fully reduce utility to the FEP would require unrealistic assumptions, making the principle an unlikely candidate for unifying brain science. We suggest that researchers instead attempt to identify contexts in which either informational or independent reward constraints predominate, delimiting the FEP's area of applicability. To encourage this type of research, we propose a two-factor formal framework that can subsume any FEP model and allows experimenters to compare the contributions of informational versus reward constraints to behavior.

Dopamine dysregulation in Parkinson's disease flattens the pleasurable urge to move to musical rhythms

The pleasurable urge to move to music (PLUMM) activates motor and reward areas of the brain and is thought to be driven by predictive processes. Dopamine in motor and limbic networks is implicated in beat-based timing and music-induced pleasure, suggesting a central role of basal ganglia (BG) dopaminergic systems in PLUMM. This study tested this hypothesis by comparing PLUMM in participants with Parkinson's disease (PD), age-matched controls, and young controls. Participants listened to musical sequences with varying rhythmic and harmonic complexity (low, medium and high), and rated their experienced pleasure and urge to move to the rhythm. In line with previous results, healthy younger participants showed an inverted U-shaped relationship between rhythmic complexity and ratings, with preference for medium complexity rhythms, while age-matched controls showed a similar, but weaker, inverted U-shaped response. Conversely, PD showed a significantly flattened response for both the urge to move and pleasure. Crucially, this flattened response could not be attributed to differences in rhythm discrimination and did not reflect an overall decrease in ratings. For harmonic complexity, PD showed a negative linear pattern for both the urge to move and pleasure while healthy age-matched controls showed the same pattern for pleasure and an inverted U for the urge to move. This contrasts with the pattern observed in young healthy controls in previous studies, suggesting that both healthy aging and PD also influence affective responses to harmonic complexity. Together, these results support the role of dopamine within cortico-striatal circuits in the predictive processes that form the link between the perceptual processing of rhythmic patterns and the affective and motor responses to rhythmic music.

Large-scale effective connectivity analysis reveals the existence of two mutual inhibitory systems in patients with major depression

It is posited that cognitive and affective dysfunction in patients with major depression disorder (MDD) may be caused by dysfunctional signal propagation in the brain. By leveraging dynamic causal modeling, we investigated large-scale directed signal propagation (effective connectivity) among distributed large-scale brain networks with 43 MDD patients and 56 healthy controls. The results revealed the existence of two mutual inhibitory systems: the anterior default mode network, auditory network, sensorimotor network, salience network and visual networks formed an "emotional" brain, while the posterior default mode network, central executive networks, cerebellum and dorsal attention network formed a "rational brain". These two networks exhibited excitatory intra-system connectivity and inhibitory inter-system connectivity. Patients were characterized by potentiated intra-system connections within the "emotional/sensory brain", as well as over-inhibition of the "rational brain" by the "emotional/sensory brain". The hierarchical architecture of the large-scale effective connectivity networks was then analyzed using a PageRank algorithm which revealed a shift of the controlling role of the "rational brain" to the "emotional/sensory brain" in the patients. These findings inform basic organization of distributed large-scale brain networks and furnish a better characterization of the neural mechanisms of depression, which may facilitate effective treatment.

Is predictive coding falsifiable?

Predictive-coding has justifiably become a highly influential theory in Neuroscience. However, the possibility of its unfalsifiability has been raised. We argue that if predictive-coding were unfalsifiable, it would be a problem, but there are patterns of behavioural and neuroimaging data that would stand against predictive-coding. Contra (vanilla) predictive patterns are those in which the more expected stimulus generates the largest evoked-response. However, basic formulations of predictive-coding mandate that an expected stimulus should generate little, if any, prediction error and thus little, if any, evoked-response. It has, though, been argued that contra (vanilla) predictive patterns can be obtained if precision is higher for expected stimuli. Certainly, using precision, one can increase the amplitude of an evoked-response, turning a predictive into a contra (vanilla) predictive pattern. We demonstrate that, while this is true, it does not present an absolute barrier to falsification. This is because increasing precision also reduces latency and increases the frequency of the response. These properties can be used to determine whether precision-weighting in predictive-coding justifiably explains a contra (vanilla) predictive pattern, ensuring that predictive-coding is falsifiable.

Insight and the selection of ideas

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

Longing to act: Bayesian inference as a framework for craving in behavioral addiction

Traditionally, craving is considered a defining feature of drug addiction. Accumulating evidence suggests that craving can also exist in behavioral addictions (e.g., gambling disorder) without drug-induced effects. However, the degree to which mechanisms of craving overlap between classic substance use disorders and behavioral addictions remains unclear. There is, therefore, an urgent need to develop an overarching theory of craving that conceptually integrates findings across behavioral and drug addictions. In this review, we will first synthesize existing theories and empirical findings related to craving in both drug-dependent and -independent addictive disorders. Building on the Bayesian brain hypothesis and previous work on interoceptive inference, we will then propose a computational theory for craving in behavioral addiction, where the target of craving is execution of an action (e.g., gambling) rather than a drug. Specifically, we conceptualize craving in behavioral addiction as a subjective belief about physiological states of the body associated with action completion and is updated based on both a prior belief ("I need to act to feel good") and sensory evidence ("I cannot act"). We conclude by briefly discussing the therapeutic implications of this framework. In summary, this unified Bayesian computational framework for craving generalizes across addictive disorders, provides explanatory power for ostensibly conflicting empirical findings, and generates strong hypotheses for future empirical studies. The disambiguation of the computational components underlying domain-general craving using this framework will lead to a deeper understanding of, and effective treatment targets for, behavioral and drug addictions.

Decisions under uncertainty are more messy than they seem

Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is conceptually so multifaceted as to make critical evaluation difficult. It also omits one course of action: Active engagement with the world. Parsing the developmental and mechanistic processes within CNT would allow for a rigorous research programme to put the account under test. I propose a unifying account based on active inference.

Elevated decision uncertainty and reduced avoidance drives in depression, anxiety and substance use disorders during approach-avoidance conflict: a replication study

BACKGROUND

Decision-making under approach-avoidance conflict (AAC; e.g., sacrificing quality of life to avoid feared outcomes) may be affected in multiple psychiatric disorders. Recently, we used a computational (active inference) model to characterize information processing differences during AAC in individuals with depression, anxiety and/or substance use disorders. Individuals with psychiatric disorders exhibited increased decision uncertainty (DU) and reduced sensitivity to unpleasant stimuli. This preregistered study aimed to determine the replicability of this processing dysfunction.

METHODS

A new sample of participants completed the AAC task. Individual-level computational parameter estimates, reflecting decision uncertainty and sensitivity to unpleasant stimuli ("emotion conflict"; EC), were obtained and compared between groups. Subsequent analyses combining the prior and current samples allowed assessment of narrower disorder categories.

RESULTS

The sample in the present study included 480 participants: 97 healthy controls, 175 individuals with substance use disorders and 208 individuals with depression and/or anxiety disorders. Individuals with substance use disorders showed higher DU and lower EC values than healthy controls. The EC values were lower in females, but not males, with depression and/or anxiety disorders than in healthy controls. However, the previously observed difference in DU between participants with depression and/or anxiety disorders and healthy controls did not replicate. Analyses of specific disorders in the combined samples indicated that effects were common across different substance use disorders and affective disorders.

LIMITATIONS

There were differences, although with small effect size, in age and baseline intellectual functioning between the previous and current sample, which may have affected replication of DU differences in participants with depression and/or anxiety disorders.

CONCLUSION

The now robust evidence base for these clinical group differences motivates specific questions that should be addressed in future research: can DU and EC become behavioural treatment targets, and can we identify neural substrates of DU and EC that could be used to measure severity of dysfunction or as neuromodulatory treatment targets?

"Ten euros now" temporal discounting in Huntington disease

BACKGROUND

When making decisions, one often faces a trade-off between immediate and long-term rewards. In these situations, people may prefer immediate over later rewards, even if immediate rewards are smaller than later ones; a phenomenon known as temporal discounting. In this study, we, for the first time, assessed temporal discounting in three populations: participants with manifest Huntington disease (HD), participants with premanifest HD, and control participants.

METHODS

Using the temporal discounting task, we invited participants to choose between small immediate amount of money vs. delayed, but larger amount of money (e.g., "Which do you prefer: you get 10 euros right now or 50 euros in a month?"). We also measured inhibition in order to test if it impacts discounting performance.

RESULTS

Analysis demonstrated higher temporal discounting (i.e., a preference for the immediate rewards) in participants with manifest HD compared to those with premanifest HD or control participants, but no significant differences were observed in participants with premanifest HD and control participants. Analysis also demonstrated significant correlations between temporal discounting and scores on an inhibition test in participants with manifest HD, but not in those with premanifest HD or in control participants.

DISCUSSION

We suggest that, when making decisions, patients with manifest HD may have difficulties with suppressing the temptation of smaller, but immediate, rewards.

To copy or not to copy? That is the question! From chimpanzees to the foundation of human technological culture

A prerequisite for copying innovative behaviour faithfully is the capacity of observers' brains, regarded as 'hierarchically mechanistic minds', to overcome cognitive 'surprisal' (see 2.), by maximising the evidence for their internal models, through active inference. Unlike modern humans, chimpanzees and other great apes show considerable limitations in their ability, or 'Zone of Bounded Surprisal', to overcome cognitive surprisal induced by innovative or unorthodox behaviour that rarely, therefore, is copied precisely or accurately. Most can copy adequately what is within their phenotypically habitual behavioural repertoire, in which technology plays scant part. Widespread intra- and intergenerational social transmission of complex technological innovations is not a hall-mark of great-ape taxa. 3 Ma, precursors of the genus Homo made stone artefacts, and stone-flaking likely was habitual before 2 Ma. After that time, early Homo erectus has left traces of technological innovations, though faithful copying of these and their intra- and intergenerational social transmission were rare before 1 Ma. This likely owed to a cerebral infrastructure of interconnected neuronal systems more limited than ours. Brains were smaller in size than ours, and cerebral neuronal systems ceased to develop when early Homo erectus attained full adult maturity by the mid-teen years, whereas its development continues until our mid-twenties nowadays. Pleistocene Homo underwent remarkable evolutionary adaptation of neurobiological propensities, and cerebral aspects are discussed that, it is proposed here, plausibly, were fundamental for faithful copying, which underpinned social transmission of technologies, cumulative learning, and culture. Here, observers' responses to an innovation are more important for ensuring its transmission than is an innovator's production of it, because, by themselves, the minimal cognitive prerequisites that are needed for encoding and assimilating innovations are insufficient for practical outcomes to accumulate and spread intra- and intergenerationally.

Computational psychiatry: from synapses to sentience

This review considers computational psychiatry from a particular viewpoint: namely, a commitment to explaining psychopathology in terms of pathophysiology. It rests on the notion of a generative model as underwriting (i) sentient processing in the brain, and (ii) the scientific process in psychiatry. The story starts with a view of the brain-from cognitive and computational neuroscience-as an organ of inference and prediction. This offers a formal description of neuronal message passing, distributed processing and belief propagation in neuronal networks; and how certain kinds of dysconnection lead to aberrant belief updating and false inference. The dysconnections in question can be read as a pernicious synaptopathy that fits comfortably with formal notions of how we-or our brains-encode uncertainty or its complement, precision. It then considers how the ensuing process theories are tested empirically, with an emphasis on the computational modelling of neuronal circuits and synaptic gain control that mediates attentional set, active inference, learning and planning. The opportunities afforded by this sort of modelling are considered in light of in silico experiments; namely, computational neuropsychology, computational phenotyping and the promises of a computational nosology for psychiatry. The resulting survey of computational approaches is not scholarly or exhaustive. Rather, its aim is to review a theoretical narrative that is emerging across subdisciplines within psychiatry and empirical scales of investigation. These range from epilepsy research to neurodegenerative disorders; from post-traumatic stress disorder to the management of chronic pain, from schizophrenia to functional medical symptoms.

Associations between Frailty and Ambient Temperature in Winter: Findings from a Population-Based Study

Frailty is an accumulation of deficits characterized by reduced resistance to stressors and increased vulnerability to adverse outcomes. However, there is little known about the effect of ambient temperature in winter on frailty among older adults, a population segment with the highest frailty prevalence. Thus, the objective of this study is to investigate the associations between frailty and ambient temperature in winter among older adults. This study was based on the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) of older adults aged ≥65 years from the 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014 waves. The 39-item accumulation of frailty index (FI) was used to assess the frailty status of the participants. The FI was categorized into three groups as follows: robust (FI ≤ 0.10), prefrail (FI > 0.10 to <0.25), and frail (FI ≥ 0.25). Generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) were conducted to explore the associations between frailty and ambient temperature in winter. A generalized estimating equation (GEE) modification was applied in the sensitivity analysis. A total of 9421 participants were included with a mean age of 82.81 (SD: 11.32) years. Compared with respondents living in the highest quartile (≥7.5 °C) of average temperature in January, those in the lowest quartile (<−1.9 °C) had higher odds of prefrailty (OR = 1.35, 95% CI 1.17−1.57) and frailty (OR = 1.61, 95%CI 1.32−1.95). The associations were stronger among the low-education groups, agricultural workers before retirement, and non-current exercisers. Additionally, results from the GEE model reported consistent findings. Lower levels of ambient temperature in winter were associated with higher likelihoods of prefrailty and frailty. The findings on vulnerability characteristics could help improve public health practices to tailor cold temperature health education and warning information.

Depersonalization disorder as a systematic downregulation of interoceptive signals

Depersonalisation disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition characterised by a feeling of detachment from one's own body and surrounding, and it is understood as emerging from the downregulation of interoceptive afferents. However, the precise mechanisms that drive this 'interoceptive silencing' are yet to be clarified. Here we present a computational and neurobiologically plausible model of DPD within the active inference framework. Specifically, we describe DPD as arising from disrupted interoceptive processing at higher levels of the cortical hierarchy where the interoceptive and exteroceptive streams are integrated. We simulated the behaviour of an agent subjected to a situation of high interoceptive activation despite the absence of a perceivable threat in the external environment. The simulation showed how a similar condition, if perceived as inescapable, would result in a downregulation of interoceptive signals, whilst leaving the exteroceptive ones unaffected. Such interoceptive silencing would force the agent to over-rely on exteroceptive information and would ultimately lead to the DPD phenomenology. Finally, our simulation shows that repeated exposure to similar situations over time will lead the agent to increasingly disengage from bodily responses even in the face of a less triggering situation, explaining how a single episode of depersonalization can lead to chronic DPD.

Structure learning enhances concept formation in synthetic Active Inference agents

Humans display astonishing skill in learning about the environment in which they operate. They assimilate a rich set of affordances and interrelations among different elements in particular contexts, and form flexible abstractions (i.e., concepts) that can be generalised and leveraged with ease. To capture these abilities, we present a deep hierarchical Active Inference model of goal-directed behaviour, and the accompanying belief update schemes implied by maximising model evidence. Using simulations, we elucidate the potential mechanisms that underlie and influence concept learning in a spatial foraging task. We show that the representations formed–as a result of foraging–reflect environmental structure in a way that is enhanced and nuanced by Bayesian model reduction, a special case of structure learning that typifies learning in the absence of new evidence. Synthetic agents learn associations and form concepts about environmental context and configuration as a result of inferential, parametric learning, and structure learning processes–three processes that can produce a diversity of beliefs and belief structures. Furthermore, the ensuing representations reflect symmetries for environments with identical configurations.

A New Look at Young Children's Referential Informativeness

In this article, I review experimental evidence for the dependence of 2- to 5-year-olds' linguistic referential informativeness on cues to common ground (CG) and propose a process model. Cues to CG provide evidence for CG, that is, for the shared knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of interlocutors. The presence of cues to CG (e.g., unimpeded listener line of regard or prior mention) is shown to be associated with less informative reference (e.g., pronouns). In contrast, the absence of cues to CG (e.g., impeded listener line of regard or new mention) is shown to be associated with more informative reference (e.g., nouns). Informativeness is sensitive to linguistic before nonlinguistic cues to CG (i.e., 2.0 vs. 2.5 years old, respectively). Reference is cast as a process of active inference, a formulation of Bayesian belief-guided control in biological systems. Child speakers are hierarchical generative models that, characteristically, expect sensory evidence for the evolved, prior Bayesian belief that interlocutor mental states are aligned (i.e., that CG exists). Referential control emerges as an embodied tool to gather evidence for this prior belief. Bottom-up cues to CG elicited by action drive updates to beliefs about CG. In turn, beliefs about CG guide efficient referential control.

Neuroprotection in late life attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: A review of pharmacotherapy and phenotype across the lifespan

For decades, psychostimulants have been the gold standard pharmaceutical treatment for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In the United States, an astounding 9% of all boys and 4% of girls will be prescribed stimulant drugs at some point during their childhood. Recent meta-analyses have revealed that individuals with ADHD have reduced brain volume loss later in life (>60 y.o.) compared to the normal aging brain, which suggests that either ADHD or its treatment may be neuroprotective. Crucially, these neuroprotective effects were significant in brain regions (e.g., hippocampus, amygdala) where severe volume loss is linked to cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease. Historically, the ADHD diagnosis and its pharmacotherapy came about nearly simultaneously, making it difficult to evaluate their effects in isolation. Certain evidence suggests that psychostimulants may normalize structural brain changes typically observed in the ADHD brain. If ADHD itself is neuroprotective, perhaps exercising the brain, then psychostimulants may not be recommended across the lifespan. Alternatively, if stimulant drugs are neuroprotective, then this class of medications may warrant further investigation for their therapeutic effects. Here, we take a bottom-up holistic approach to review the psychopharmacology of ADHD in the context of recent models of attention. We suggest that future studies are greatly needed to better appreciate the interactions amongst an ADHD diagnosis, stimulant treatment across the lifespan, and structure-function alterations in the aging brain.

Analysis of individual differences in neurofeedback training illuminates successful self-regulation of the dopaminergic midbrain

The dopaminergic midbrain is associated with reinforcement learning, motivation and decision-making – functions often disturbed in neuropsychiatric disorders. Previous research has shown that dopaminergic midbrain activity can be endogenously modulated via neurofeedback. However, the robustness of endogenous modulation, a requirement for clinical translation, is unclear. Here, we examine whether the activation of particular brain regions associates with successful regulation transfer when feedback is no longer available. Moreover, to elucidate mechanisms underlying effective self-regulation, we study the relation of successful transfer with learning (temporal difference coding) outside the midbrain during neurofeedback training and with individual reward sensitivity in a monetary incentive delay (MID) task. Fifty-nine participants underwent neurofeedback training either in standard (Study 1 N = 15, Study 2 N = 28) or control feedback group (Study 1, N = 16). We find that successful self-regulation is associated with prefrontal reward sensitivity in the MID task (N = 25), with a decreasing relation between prefrontal activity and midbrain learning signals during neurofeedback training and with increased activity within cognitive control areas during transfer. The association between midbrain self-regulation and prefrontal temporal difference and reward sensitivity suggests that reinforcement learning contributes to successful self-regulation. Our findings provide insights in the control of midbrain activity and may facilitate individually tailoring neurofeedback training.

Analysis of real-time fMRI data from 59 participants undergoing neurofeedback training suggests that reinforcement learning contributes to successful self-regulation in the dopaminergic midbrain.

The sweet spot between predictability and surprise: musical groove in brain, body, and social interactions

Groove—defined as the pleasurable urge to move to a rhythm—depends on a fine-tuned interplay between predictability arising from repetitive rhythmic patterns, and surprise arising from rhythmic deviations, for example in the form of syncopation. The perfect balance between predictability and surprise is commonly found in rhythmic patterns with a moderate level of rhythmic complexity and represents the sweet spot of the groove experience. In contrast, rhythms with low or high complexity are usually associated with a weaker experience of groove because they are too boring to be engaging or too complex to be interpreted, respectively. Consequently, the relationship between rhythmic complexity and groove experience can be described by an inverted U-shaped function. We interpret this inverted U shape in light of the theory of predictive processing and provide perspectives on how rhythmic complexity and groove can help us to understand the underlying neural mechanisms linking temporal predictions, movement, and reward. A better understanding of these mechanisms can guide future approaches to improve treatments for patients with motor impairments, such as Parkinson’s disease, and to investigate prosocial aspects of interpersonal interactions that feature music, such as dancing. Finally, we present some open questions and ideas for future research.

Cognitive Neural Mechanism of Backward Inhibition and Deinhibition: A Review

Task switching is one of the typical paradigms to study cognitive control. When switching back to a recently inhibited task (e.g., “A” in an ABA sequence), the performance is often worse compared to a task without N-2 task repetitions (e.g., CBA). This difference is called the backward inhibitory effect (BI effect), which reflects the process of overcoming residual inhibition from a recently performed task (i.e., deinhibition). The neural mechanism of backward inhibition and deinhibition has received a lot of attention in the past decade. Multiple brain regions, including the frontal lobe, parietal, basal ganglia, and cerebellum, are activated during deinhibition. The event-related potentials (ERP) studies have shown that deinhibition process is reflected in the P1/N1 and P3 components, which might be related to early attention control, context updating, and response selection, respectively. Future research can use a variety of new paradigms to separate the neural mechanisms of BI and deinhibition.

An insula hierarchical network architecture for active interoceptive inference

In the brain, the insular cortex receives a vast amount of interoceptive information, ascending through deep brain structures, from multiple visceral organs. The unique hierarchical and modular architecture of the insula suggests specialization for processing interoceptive afferents. Yet, the biological significance of the insula's neuroanatomical architecture, in relation to deep brain structures, remains obscure. In this opinion piece, we propose the Insula Hierarchical Modular Adaptive Interoception Control (IMAC) model to suggest that insula modules (granular, dysgranular and agranular), forming parallel networks with the prefrontal cortex and striatum, are specialized to form higher order interoceptive representations. These interoceptive representations are recruited in a context-dependent manner to support habitual, model-based and exploratory control of visceral organs and physiological processes. We discuss how insula interoceptive representations may give rise to conscious feelings that best explain lower order deep brain interoceptive representations, and how the insula may serve to defend the body and mind against pathological depression.

Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls

Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause-effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e., generative) models of the world optimized by standard cognitive functions (e.g., perception, action, learning). This paper presents an active inference formulation that views cognitive niche construction as a cognitive function aimed at optimizing organisms' generative models. We call that process of optimization extended active inference.

How Stress Can Change Our Deepest Preferences: Stress Habituation Explained Using the Free Energy Principle

People who habituate to stress show a repetition-induced response attenuation—neuroendocrine, cardiovascular, neuroenergetic, and emotional—when exposed to a threatening environment. But the exact dynamics underlying stress habituation remain obscure. The free energy principle offers a unifying account of self-organising systems such as the human brain. In this paper, we elaborate on how stress habituation can be explained and modelled using the free energy principle. We introduce habituation priors that encode the agent’s tendency for stress habituation and incorporate them in the agent’s decision-making process. Using differently shaped goal priors—that encode the agent’s goal preferences—we illustrate, in two examples, the optimising (and thus habituating) behaviour of agents. We show that habituation minimises free energy by reducing the precision (inverse variance) of goal preferences. Reducing the precision of goal priors means that the agent accepts adverse (previously unconscionable) states (e.g., lower social status and poverty). Acceptance or tolerance of adverse outcomes may explain why habituation causes people to exhibit an attenuation of the stress response. Given that stress habituation occurs in brain regions where goal priors are encoded, i.e., in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and that these priors are encoded as sufficient statistics of probability distributions, our approach seems plausible from an anatomical-functional and neuro-statistical point of view. The ensuing formal and generalisable account—based on the free energy principle—further motivate our novel treatment of stress habituation. Our analysis suggests that stress habituation has far-reaching consequences, protecting against the harmful effects of toxic stress, but on the other hand making the acceptability of precarious living conditions and the development of the obese type 2 diabetes mellitus phenotype more likely.

Noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy in Parkinson's disease through the precision of expected outcomes

Apathy is a debilitating feature of many neuropsychiatric diseases, that is typically described as a reduction of goal-directed behaviour. Despite its prevalence and prognostic importance, the mechanisms underlying apathy remain controversial. Degeneration of the locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system is known to contribute to motivational deficits, including apathy. In healthy people, noradrenaline has been implicated in signalling the uncertainty of expectations about the environment. We proposed that noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy by modulating the relative weighting of prior beliefs about action outcomes. We tested this hypothesis in the clinical context of Parkinson’s disease, given its associations with apathy and noradrenergic dysfunction. Participants with mild-to-moderate Parkinson’s disease (N = 17) completed a randomised double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study with 40 mg of the noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine. Prior weighting was inferred from psychophysical analysis of performance in an effort-based visuomotor task, and was confirmed as negatively correlated with apathy. Locus coeruleus integrity was assessed in vivo using magnetisation transfer imaging at ultra-high field 7T. The effect of atomoxetine depended on locus coeruleus integrity: participants with a more degenerate locus coeruleus showed a greater increase in prior weighting on atomoxetine versus placebo. The results indicate a contribution of the noradrenergic system to apathy and potential benefit from noradrenergic treatment of people with Parkinson’s disease, subject to stratification according to locus coeruleus integrity. More broadly, these results reconcile emerging predictive processing accounts of the role of noradrenaline in goal-directed behaviour with the clinical symptom of apathy and its potential pharmacological treatment.

Apathy is a common and harmful consequence of many neuropsychiatric diseases. Its underlying causes are not fully understood, which prevents the development of new treatments. We approach the problem in a new way, modelling human behaviour in terms of the continuously updated interaction between sensory information and brain-based predictions or ‘priors’ about the consequences of our actions. We have previously shown that apathy is related to a loss of precision of these ‘priors’. We proposed that the precision is controlled by noradrenaline (like adrenaline, but made in the brain). We tested whether the noradrenaline-enhancing drug called atomoxetine can restore the priors’ precision in apathetic people. We enrolled participants with Parkinson’s disease, which is associated with both apathy and noradrenaline loss. We used ultra-high field MRI to measure individual differences in the integrity of specialist region called the locus coeruleus–the brain’s source of noradrenaline. We found that the effect of treatment with atomoxetine on prior precision depended on locus coeruleus integrity: Participants with a degenerated locus coeruleus had a more positive change in prior precision. Our results highlight how individual differences in neuroanatomy can predict the potential benefit of noradrenaline treatments in people suffering from apathy.

Altered Pain Processing Associated with Administration of Dopamine Agonist and Antagonist in Healthy Volunteers

Striatal dopamine dysfunction is associated with the altered top-down modulation of pain processing. The dopamine D2-like receptor family is a potential substrate for such effects due to its primary expression in the striatum, but evidence for this is currently lacking. Here, we investigated the effect of pharmacologically manipulating striatal dopamine D2 receptor activity on the anticipation and perception of acute pain stimuli in humans. Participants received visual cues that induced either certain or uncertain anticipation of two pain intensity levels delivered via a CO₂ laser. Rating of the pain intensity and unpleasantness was recorded. Brain activity was recorded with EEG and analysed via source localisation to investigate neural activity during the anticipation and receipt of pain. Participants completed the experiment under three conditions, control (Sodium Chloride), D2 receptor agonist (Cabergoline), and D2 receptor antagonist (Amisulpride), in a repeated-measures, triple-crossover, double-blind study. The antagonist reduced an individuals’ ability to distinguish between low and high pain following uncertain anticipation. The EEG source localisation showed that the agonist and antagonist reduced neural activations in specific brain regions associated with the sensory integration of salient stimuli during the anticipation and receipt of pain. During anticipation, the agonist reduced activity in the right mid-temporal region and the right angular gyrus, whilst the antagonist reduced activity within the right postcentral, right mid-temporal, and right inferior parietal regions. In comparison to control, the antagonist reduced activity within the insula during the receipt of pain, a key structure involved in the integration of the sensory and affective aspects of pain. Pain sensitivity and unpleasantness were not changed by D2R modulation. Our results support the notion that D2 receptor neurotransmission has a role in the top-down modulation of pain.

Towards a Unifying Account of Dopamine’s Role in Cost-Benefit Decision Making

Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in cost-benefit decision making, but so far there is no consensus on the precise role of dopamine in decision making. Here, we review the literature on dopaminergic manipulations of cost-benefit decision making in humans and evaluate how well different theoretical accounts explain the existing body of evidence. Reduced D₂ stimulation tends to increase the willingness to bear delay and risk costs (i.e., wait for later rewards, take riskier options), while increased D₁ and D₂ receptor stimulation increases willingness to bear effort costs. We argue that the empirical findings can best be explained by combining the strengths of two theoretical accounts: in cost-benefit decision making, dopamine may play a dual role both in promoting the pursuit of psychologically close options (e.g., sooner and safer rewards) and in computing which costs are acceptable for a reward at stake. Moreover, we identify several limiting factors in the study designs of previous investigations that prevented a fuller understanding of dopamine's role in value-based choice. Together, the proposed theoretical framework and the methodological suggestions for future studies may bring us closer to a unifying account of dopamine in healthy and impaired cost-benefit decision making.

Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Synchrony

Recognizing and aligning individuals' unique adaptive beliefs or "priors" through cooperative communication is critical to establishing a therapeutic relationship and alliance. Using active inference, we present an empirical integrative account of the biobehavioral mechanisms that underwrite therapeutic relationships. A significant mode of establishing cooperative alliances-and potential synchrony relationships-is through ostensive cues generated by repetitive coupling during dynamic touch. Established models speak to the unique role of affectionate touch in developing communication, interpersonal interactions, and a wide variety of therapeutic benefits for patients of all ages; both neurophysiologically and behaviorally. The purpose of this article is to argue for the importance of therapeutic touch in establishing a therapeutic alliance and, ultimately, synchrony between practitioner and patient. We briefly overview the importance and role of therapeutic alliance in prosocial and clinical interactions. We then discuss how cooperative communication and mental state alignment-in intentional communication-are accomplished using active inference. We argue that alignment through active inference facilitates synchrony and communication. The ensuing account is extended to include the role of (C-) tactile afferents in realizing the beneficial effect of therapeutic synchrony. We conclude by proposing a method for synchronizing the effects of touch using the concept of active inference.

Synthetic Spatial Foraging With Active Inference in a Geocaching Task

Humans are highly proficient in learning about the environments in which they operate. They form flexible spatial representations of their surroundings that can be leveraged with ease during spatial foraging and navigation. To capture these abilities, we present a deep Active Inference model of goal-directed behavior, and the accompanying belief updating. Active Inference rests upon optimizing Bayesian beliefs to maximize model evidence or marginal likelihood. Bayesian beliefs are probability distributions over the causes of observable outcomes. These causes include an agent's actions, which enables one to treat planning as inference. We use simulations of a geocaching task to elucidate the belief updating-that underwrites spatial foraging-and the associated behavioral and neurophysiological responses. In a geocaching task, the aim is to find hidden objects in the environment using spatial coordinates. Here, synthetic agents learn about the environment via inference and learning (e.g., learning about the likelihoods of outcomes given latent states) to reach a target location, and then forage locally to discover the hidden object that offers clues for the next location.

The Predictive Dynamics of Happiness and Well-Being

We offer an account of mental health and well-being using the predictive processing framework (PPF). According to this framework, the difference between mental health and psychopathology can be located in the goodness of the predictive model as a regulator of action. What is crucial for avoiding the rigid patterns of thinking, feeling and acting associated with psychopathology is the regulation of action based on the valence of affective states. In PPF, valence is modelled as error dynamics—the change in prediction errors over time . Our aim in this paper is to show how error dynamics can account for both momentary happiness and longer term well-being. What will emerge is a new neurocomputational framework for making sense of human flourishing.

Understanding, Explanation, and Active Inference

While machine learning techniques have been transformative in solving a range of problems, an important challenge is to understand why they arrive at the decisions they output. Some have argued that this necessitates augmenting machine intelligence with understanding such that, when queried, a machine is able to explain its behaviour (i.e., explainable AI). In this article, we address the issue of machine understanding from the perspective of active inference. This paradigm enables decision making based upon a model of how data are generated. The generative model contains those variables required to explain sensory data, and its inversion may be seen as an attempt to explain the causes of these data. Here we are interested in explanations of one's own actions. This implies a deep generative model that includes a model of the world, used to infer policies, and a higher-level model that attempts to predict which policies will be selected based upon a space of hypothetical (i.e., counterfactual) explanations-and which can subsequently be used to provide (retrospective) explanations about the policies pursued. We illustrate the construct validity of this notion of understanding in relation to human understanding by highlighting the similarities in computational architecture and the consequences of its dysfunction.

Toward the unity of pathological and exertional fatigue: A predictive processing model

Fatigue is a common experience in both health and disease. Yet, pathological (i.e., prolonged or chronic) and transient (i.e., exertional) fatigue symptoms are traditionally considered distinct, compounding a separation between interested research fields within the study of fatigue. Within the clinical neurosciences, nascent frameworks position pathological fatigue as a product of inference derived through hierarchical predictive processing. The metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis (Stephan et al., 2016) states that pathological fatigue emerges from the metacognitive mechanism in which the detection of persistent mismatches between prior interoceptive predictions and ascending sensory evidence (i.e., prediction error) signals low evidence for internal generative models, which undermine an agent’s feeling of mastery over the body and is thus experienced phenomenologically as fatigue. Although acute, transient subjective symptoms of exertional fatigue have also been associated with increasing interoceptive prediction error, the dynamic computations that underlie its development have not been clearly defined. Here, drawing on the metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis, we extend this account to offer an explicit description of the development of fatigue during extended periods of (physical) exertion. Accordingly, it is proposed that a loss of certainty or confidence in control predictions in response to persistent detection of prediction error features as a common foundation for the conscious experience of both pathological and nonpathological fatigue.

Memory and Markov Blankets

In theoretical biology, we are often interested in random dynamical systems-like the brain-that appear to model their environments. This can be formalized by appealing to the existence of a (possibly non-equilibrium) steady state, whose density preserves a conditional independence between a biological entity and its surroundings. From this perspective, the conditioning set, or Markov blanket, induces a form of vicarious synchrony between creature and world-as if one were modelling the other. However, this results in an apparent paradox. If all conditional dependencies between a system and its surroundings depend upon the blanket, how do we account for the mnemonic capacity of living systems? It might appear that any shared dependence upon past blanket states violates the independence condition, as the variables on either side of the blanket now share information not available from the current blanket state. This paper aims to resolve this paradox, and to demonstrate that conditional independence does not preclude memory. Our argument rests upon drawing a distinction between the dependencies implied by a steady state density, and the density dynamics of the system conditioned upon its configuration at a previous time. The interesting question then becomes: What determines the length of time required for a stochastic system to 'forget' its initial conditions? We explore this question for an example system, whose steady state density possesses a Markov blanket, through simple numerical analyses. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance for memory in cognitive systems like us.

The computational neurology of movement under active inference

We propose a computational neurology of movement based on the convergence of theoretical neurobiology and clinical neurology. A significant development in the former is the idea that we can frame brain function as a process of (active) inference, in which the nervous system makes predictions about its sensory data. These predictions depend upon an implicit predictive (generative) model used by the brain. This means neural dynamics can be framed as generating actions to ensure sensations are consistent with these predictions-and adjusting predictions when they are not. We illustrate the significance of this formulation for clinical neurology by simulating a clinical examination of the motor system using an upper limb coordination task. Specifically, we show how tendon reflexes emerge naturally under the right kind of generative model. Through simulated perturbations, pertaining to prior probabilities of this model's variables, we illustrate the emergence of hyperreflexia and pendular reflexes, reminiscent of neurological lesions in the corticospinal tract and cerebellum. We then turn to the computational lesions causing hypokinesia and deficits of coordination. This in silico lesion-deficit analysis provides an opportunity to revisit classic neurological dichotomies (e.g. pyramidal versus extrapyramidal systems) from the perspective of modern approaches to theoretical neurobiology-and our understanding of the neurocomputational architecture of movement control based on first principles.

Active Inferants: An Active Inference Framework for Ant Colony Behavior

In this paper, we introduce an active inference model of ant colony foraging behavior, and implement the model in a series of in silico experiments. Active inference is a multiscale approach to behavioral modeling that is being applied across settings in theoretical biology and ethology. The ant colony is a classic case system in the function of distributed systems in terms of stigmergic decision-making and information sharing. Here we specify and simulate a Markov decision process (MDP) model for ant colony foraging. We investigate a well-known paradigm from laboratory ant colony behavioral experiments, the alternating T-maze paradigm, to illustrate the ability of the model to recover basic colony phenomena such as trail formation after food location discovery. We conclude by outlining how the active inference ant colony foraging behavioral model can be extended and situated within a nested multiscale framework and systems approaches to biology more generally.

The Radically Embodied Conscious Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Free Energy to Free Will and Back Again

Drawing from both enactivist and cognitivist perspectives on mind, I propose that explaining teleological phenomena may require reappraising both "Cartesian theaters" and mental homunculi in terms of embodied self-models (ESMs), understood as body maps with agentic properties, functioning as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. Quasi-homuncular ESMs are suggested to constitute a major organizing principle for neural architectures due to their initial and ongoing significance for solutions to inference problems in cognitive (and affective) development. Embodied experiences provide foundational lessons in learning curriculums in which agents explore increasingly challenging problem spaces, so answering an unresolved question in Bayesian cognitive science: what are biologically plausible mechanisms for equipping learners with sufficiently powerful inductive biases to adequately constrain inference spaces? Drawing on models from neurophysiology, psychology, and developmental robotics, I describe how embodiment provides fundamental sources of empirical priors (as reliably learnable posterior expectations). If ESMs play this kind of foundational role in cognitive development, then bidirectional linkages will be found between all sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies, so infusing all senses with somatic-motoric properties, thereby structuring all perception by relevant affordances, so solving frame problems for embodied agents. Drawing upon the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, I describe a particular mechanism for intentional action selection via consciously imagined (and explicitly represented) goal realization, where contrasts between desired and present states influence ongoing policy selection via predictive coding mechanisms and backward-chained imaginings (as self-realizing predictions). This embodied developmental legacy suggests a mechanism by which imaginings can be intentionally shaped by (internalized) partially-expressed motor acts, so providing means of agentic control for attention, working memory, imagination, and behavior. I further describe the nature(s) of mental causation and self-control, and also provide an account of readiness potentials in Libet paradigms wherein conscious intentions shape causal streams leading to enaction. Finally, I provide neurophenomenological handlings of prototypical qualia including pleasure, pain, and desire in terms of self-annihilating free energy gradients via quasi-synesthetic interoceptive active inference. In brief, this manuscript is intended to illustrate how radically embodied minds may create foundations for intelligence (as capacity for learning and inference), consciousness (as somatically-grounded self-world modeling), and will (as deployment of predictive models for enacting valued goals).

Out-of-step: brain-heart desynchronization in anxiety disorders

Imaging studies in anxiety disorders (AD) show abnormal functional connectivity primarily in the salience network (SN), somatomotor network (SMN), and default mode network (DMN). However, it is not clear how precisely these network changes occur including their relation to psychopathological symptoms. Here, we show that the functional networks affected in AD overlap with cortical regions that receive visceral inputs (the so-called central/visceral autonomic network). Focusing on cardiac afferents, we suggest that network changes in AD may be due to reduced phase synchronization between ongoing neural and cardiac activity. This neuro-cardiac desynchronization occurs due to the abnormal phase resetting of neural activity at the onset of each heartbeat, as measured by a lower intertrial coherence and heartbeat-evoked potential. Biochemically, cardiac afferents reach subcortical serotonergic raphe nuclei and noradrenergic locus coeruleus (among others) which, in turn, are known to reciprocally modulate the DMN and SMN/SN on the cortical level. Consistent with the network changes in AD, decreases in serotonergic and noradrenergic activity are known to increase connectivity in both SMN and SN while, at the same time, they decrease DMN connectivity. SMN and SN increases, in turn, lead to increased emotional arousal/anxiety and bodily awareness whereas decreased DMN connectivity leads to an unstable sense-of-self in AD. Finally, we integrate our proposal with interoceptive predictive processing models suggesting neuro-cardiac desynchronization as a mechanism for "noisy" bottom-up information leading to a persistently uncertain bodily state in top-down models. In sum, integrating theories on active interference and hyperarousal, we propose a precise neuro-cardiac and biochemically -driven mechanisms for key psychopathological symptoms of AD.