Why Heuristics Work

Encountering Bias: Examining Biases and Stereotypes in the Evaluation Process Among Expert Psychologists During Specialization Exams

The study of cognitive biases in job interviews has garnered significant attention due to its far-reaching implications for the economy and society. However, little research has focused on the biases exhibited by expert psychologists serving on psychology specialization examination committees. As such, this study has conducted a comprehensive examination of biases within the specialization exam in Israel. One additional objective of the research is to assess the levels of distress experienced by examinees following the examination. Questionnaires were administered to 418 psychologists participating in the clinical and educational psychology specialization exams. The findings unveiled several noteworthy outcomes. Firstly, several biases were identified, including ethnic stereotypes, biases stemming from cognitive load, and more. Secondly, examinees who presented a cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) case experienced a higher failure rate. Thirdly, a positive association was found between exam failure and personal distress and this effect was stronger for educational examinees compared to clinical examinees. The most intriguing discovery was that all biases, without exception, occurred among clinical psychologists, whereas educational psychologists displayed no biases. This outcome contrasted with initial expectations. Consequently, the present study aims to expand the existing knowledge about psychological biases and stereotypes by elucidate the reasons behind this discrepancy between the two disciplines while considering the advantages and disadvantages associated with a sense of "expertise" in the realm of adult diagnostics.

Does perceptual disfluency affect the illusion of causality?

When a subjective experience of difficulty is associated with a mental task, people tend to engage in systematic and deliberative reasoning, which can reduce the usage of intuitive and effortless thinking that gives rise to cognitive biases. One such bias is the illusion of causality, where people perceive a causal link between two unrelated events. In 2019, Díaz-Lago and Matute found that a superficial perceptual feature of the task could modulate the magnitude of the illusion (i.e., a hard-to-read font led to a decrease in the magnitude of the illusion). The present study explored the generalisability of the idea that perceptual disfluency can lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the illusion. In the first experiment, we tested whether a physical-perceptual manipulation of the stimuli, specifically the contrast between the written text and the background, could modulate the illusion in a contingency learning task. The results of the online experiment (N = 200) showed no effect of contrast on the magnitude of the illusion, despite our manipulation having successfully induced task fluency or disfluency. Building upon this null result, our second experiment (N = 100) focused on manipulating the font type, in an attempt to replicate the results obtained by Díaz-Lago and Matute. In contrast to their findings, we found no discernible effect of font type on the magnitude of the illusion, even though this manipulation also effectively induced variations in task fluency or disfluency. These results underscore the notion that not all categories of (dis)fluency in cognitive processing wield a modulatory influence on cognitive biases, and they call for a re-evaluation and a more precise delineation of the (dis)fluency construct.

Clinical reasoning in real-world practice: a primer for medical trainees and practitioners

Clinical reasoning is a crucial skill and defining characteristic of the medical profession, which relates to intricate cognitive and decision-making processes that are needed to solve real-world clinical problems. However, much of our current competency-based medical education systems have focused on imparting swathes of content knowledge and skills to our medical trainees, without an adequate emphasis on strengthening the cognitive schema and psychological processes that govern actual decision-making in clinical environments. Nonetheless, flawed clinical reasoning has serious repercussions on patient care, as it is associated with diagnostic errors, inappropriate investigations, and incongruent or suboptimal management plans that can result in significant morbidity and even mortality. In this article, we discuss the psychological constructs of clinical reasoning in the form of cognitive 'thought processing' models and real-world contextual or emotional influences on clinical decision-making. In addition, we propose practical strategies, including pedagogical development of a personal cognitive schema, mitigating strategies to combat cognitive bias and flawed reasoning, and emotional regulation and self-care techniques, which can be adopted in medical training to optimize physicians' clinical reasoning in real-world practice that effectively translates learnt knowledge and skill sets into good decisions and outcomes.

The correlation between conspiracy mentality and vaccine intentions is moderated by social events: Evidence from longitudinal data during COVID-19 pandemic in the UK

Social events may provide important cues that influence the sense of reality, including the perception that conspiracy theories are plausible. Using longitudinal panel data collected in the UK from March 2020 to December 2021, this study aims to identify whether social events influenced the strength of the association between conspiracy mentality and vaccine intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consistent with previous research, the conspiracy mentality was a significant predictor of vaccine intentions across three-time points, but also that conspiracy mentality measured in March 2020 predicted that participants were more hesitant to the vaccines in December 2020. The primary finding was that different social events moderated the strength of the correlation between conspiracy mentality and vaccine intentions within similar participants. Conspiracy mentality became more vital to evaluate COVID-19 vaccines in December 2020, when the vaccination program was about to commence.

Vagueness as an implicit-encoding persuasive strategy: an experimental approach

The paper provides novel theoretical and experimental perspectives on the functioning of linguistic vagueness as an implicit persuasive strategy. It presents an operative definition of pragmatically marked vagueness, referring to vague expressions whose interpretation is not retrievable by recipients. The phenomenon is illustrated via numerous examples of its use in predominantly persuasive texts (i.e., advertising and political propaganda) in different languages. The psycholinguistic functioning of vague expressions is then illustrated by the results of a self-paced reading task experiment. Data showing shorter reading times associated with markedly vague expressions as compared to expressions that are either (a) lexically more precise or (b) made precise by the context suggest that the former are interpreted in a shallow way, without searching for and/or retrieving exact referents. These results support the validity of a differentiation between context-supported vs. non-supported vague expressions. Furthermore, validation of using marked vagueness as a persuasive implicit strategy which reduces epistemic vigilance is provided.

Comparing heuristic valuation processes between health state valuation from child and adult perspectives

OBJECTIVES

Health state valuation assumes that respondents trade off between all aspects of choice tasks and maximize their utility. Yet, respondents may use heuristic valuation processes, i.e., strategies to simplify or avoid the trade-offs that are core to health state valuation. The objective of this study is to explore if heuristic valuation processes are more prevalent for valuation from a 10-year-old child's perspective compared to the use of an adult perspective.

METHODS

We reused existing data in which EQ-5D health states were valued from adult and child perspectives with composite time trade-off (cTTO) and discrete choice experiment (DCE) tasks. Our analyses focused on comparing completion time and responding patterns across both perspectives. We also explored how reflective of a set of heuristic strategies respondents' choices were in both perspectives.

RESULTS

We found no evidence for systematic differences in completion time across perspectives. Generally, we find different responding patterns in child perspectives, e.g., more speeding, dominance violations, and clustering of utilities at 1.0, 0.8, and 0. Very few heuristic strategies provide a coherent explanation for the observed DCE responses.

CONCLUSION

Our results provide some, albeit indirect, evidence for differences in heuristic valuation processes between perspectives, although not across all data sources. Potential effects of heuristic valuation processes, such as transfer of responsibility, may be identified through studying responding patterns in cTTO and DCE responses.

Measuring the importance of influencing factor for COVID-19 vaccination intention in China

Background

Vaccination is considered an effective approach to deter the spread of coronavirus disease (COVID-19). However, vaccine hesitancy is a common issue that makes immunization programs more challenging. To promote vaccination in a targeted and efficient way, this study aims to develop and validate a measurement tool for evaluating the importance of influencing factors related to COVID-19 vaccination intention in China, and to examine the demographic differences.

Methods

In study 1, we developed a Factor Importance Evaluation Questionnaire (FIEQ) based on semi-structured interview results and used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to explore its factor structure. In study 2, we verified the four-factor structure of FIEQ by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We then administered FIEQ to Chinese participants and conducted a student t-test and analysis of variance to examine the differences in the importance evaluation of factors based on gender and educational level.

Results

In study 1, we developed a four-factor construct and retained 20 items after EFA (N = 577), with acceptable reliability (alpha = 0.87) and validity. In study 2, we found that the model fit was good (χ2 = 748.03 (162), p < 0.001, GFI = 0.949, RMSEA = 0.049, SRMR = 0.048, AGFI = 0.934), and reliability was acceptable (alpha = 0.730) (N = 1,496). No gender difference was found in factor importance. However, individuals with different educational levels reported significantly different importance evaluations of three factors, including perceived benefits and social norms (F = 3.786, p = 0.005), perceived influences from reference groups (F = 17.449, p < 0.001), and perceived risks (F = 2.508, p = 0.04).

Conclusion

This study developed and validated FIEQ for measuring the importance of influencing factors related to the COVID-19 vaccination intention in Chinese participants. Moreover, our findings suggest that the educational level may play a role in how individuals evaluate the importance of factors. This study provides insights into the concerns that individuals have regarding vaccination and offers potentially effective and targeted strategies for promoting COVID-19 vaccination.

Disagreement between talent scouts: Implications for improved talent assessment in youth football

Reliable talent identification and selection (TID) processes are prerequisites to accurately select young athletes with the most potential for talent development programmes. Knowledge about the agreement between scouts who play a key role in the initial TID in football is lacking. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to evaluate the agreement within four groups of a total of n = 83 talent scouts during rank assessment of under-11 male youth football players (n = 24, age = 11.0 ± 0.3 years) and to describe scouts' underlying approach to assess talent. Krippendorff's α estimates indicated disagreement of scouts' rankings within all groups of scouts (αA = 0.09, αB = 0.03, αC = 0.05, αD = 0.02). Scouts reported relying mainly on their overall impression when forming their final prediction about a player. Reportings of a consistent, structured approach were less prevalent. Taken together, results indicated that different approaches to TID may be associated with disagreement on selection decisions. In order to overcome disagreement in TID, football organisations are encouraged to establish a more structured process. Future research on the elaboration and benefit of ranking guidelines incorporating decomposed and independently evaluated sub-predictors is recommended to improve the reliability of TID.

Heuristics and biases in medical decision-making under uncertainty: The case of neuropronostication for consciousness disorders

Neuropronostication for consciousness disorders can be very complex and prone to high uncertainty. Despite notable advancements in the development of dedicated scales and physiological markers using innovative paradigms, these technical progressions are often overshadowed by factors intrinsic to the medical environment. Beyond the scarcity of objective data guiding medical decisions, factors like time pressure, fatigue, multitasking, and emotional load can drive clinicians to rely more on heuristic-based clinical reasoning. Such an approach, albeit beneficial under certain circumstances, may lead to systematic error judgments and impair medical decisions, especially in complex and uncertain environments. After a brief review of the main theoretical frameworks, this paper explores the influence of clinicians' cognitive biases on clinical reasoning and decision-making in the challenging context of neuroprognostication for consciousness disorders. The discussion further revolves around developing and implementing various strategies designed to mitigate these biases and their impact, aiming to enhance the quality of care and the patient safety.

The Impact of Information From Mental Health Care Providers on Decisions About State Compensation for Violent Crime Victimization

In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, victims of intentionally committed violent crimes may apply for state compensation if the offender is unknown or unable to pay for the damages of the crime. This state compensation scheme is run by the Dutch Violent Offences Compensation Fund (VOCF). Lawyers who work for this fund need to evaluate applicants´ eligibility for state compensation on the basis of two criteria: (1) the plausibility of the applicant's victimization story and (2) the severity of the injury sustained by the applicant. Whether these criteria are fulfilled is largely left to the discretion of the lawyer who evaluates the application. This discretionary power makes the decision-making process prone to biased outcomes. Inspired by previous research, this study investigated whether information from mental health care providers, such as psychiatrists or clinical psychologists, serves as a potential source of bias. Although this type of information may or should sometimes be used to evaluate an applicant's eligibility for compensation, in most cases it should not affect the outcome of this evaluation because of its potential unreliability. A statistical association between availability of information from mental health care providers and adjudication of state compensation is therefore not to be expected. Analyzing 246 applications submitted to the Dutch VOCF between July 1st 2016 and July 1st 2017, this study tested the empirical validity of this expectation. Results indicated that the availability of information of mental health care providers was associated with adjudication of state compensation. This finding was discussed in view of the literature on heuristic thinking and biased decision making and the study's limitations.

Adolescence as the Context for Understanding Young Mothers' Engagement with Health Promotion: A Phenomenological Exploration

BACKGROUND

The current social construction of young mothers is generally negative, pointing to a lack of engagement with universal services and poor outcomes for their infants and children. However, qualitative studies offer an alternative, more positive construct of young motherhood. Understanding the context of young motherhood can improve the relevance and efficacy of health promotion directed to this group of high-risk mothers.

AIM

To explore the lived experience of young women transitioning to motherhood to better understand their experiences and perspective; and what influences their engagement with health promotion aimed to support safer parenting practices and whether their behaviour changes over time with exposure to parenting health promotion.

METHOD

Longitudinal Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was used with five first-time mothers identified with characteristics known to influence poorer outcomes for infants and children such as low educational achievement and economic disadvantage. Participants aged 16 to 19 years were recruited antenatally. Serial in-depth interviews were conducted at three time points during the ante- and post-natal periods. Interviews were transcribed and data were analysed inductively following the prescribed method of double hermeneutic analysis for IPA.

FINDING

Three themes were identified from the full study: Transition, Information, and Fractured application; the focus of this paper is Transition. Transition revealed that becoming mothers impacted key adolescent developmental tasks; their identity and relationships were significantly affected, both positively and negatively and adolescent brain development influenced behaviour and decision making capability. Adolescence influenced how these young mothers engaged with and interpreted parenting health promotion messages.

CONCLUSIONS

Young mothers in this study operate within the context of adolescence. Adolescence impacts participants' decision making activity and early parenting behaviours which informs the debate on why young mothers may fail to reduce risks for their infants. This insight can contribute to the development of more effective health promotion/educational strategies, and support professionals to better engage with this high-risk group to improve early parenting behaviour and subsequently improve outcomes for their infants and children.

The heuristics-and-biases inventory: An open-source tool to explore individual differences in rationality

Over the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the study of individual differences in how people’s judgments and decisions deviate from normative standards. We conducted a systematic review of heuristics-and-biases tasks for which individual differences and their reliability were measured, which resulted in 41 biases measured over 108 studies, and suggested that reliable measures are still needed for some biases described in the literature. To encourage and facilitate future studies on heuristics and biases, we centralized the task materials in an online resource: The Heuristics-and-Biases Inventory (HBI; https://sites.google.com/view/hbiproject). We discuss how this inventory might help research progress on major issues such as the structure of rationality (single vs. multiple factors) and how biases relate to cognitive ability, personality, and real-world outcomes. We also consider how future research should improve and expand the HBI.

Pushing the Bounds of Bounded Optimality and Rationality

All forms of cognition, whether natural or artificial, are subject to constraints of their computing architecture. This assumption forms the tenet of virtually all general theories of cognition, including those deriving from bounded optimality and bounded rationality. In this letter, we highlight an unresolved puzzle related to this premise: what are these constraints, and why are cognitive architectures subject to cognitive constraints in the first place? First, we lay out some pieces along the puzzle edge, such as computational tradeoffs inherent to neural architectures that give rise to rational bounds of cognition. We then outline critical next steps for characterizing cognitive bounds, proposing that some of these bounds can be subject to modification by cognition and, as such, are part of what is being optimized when cognitive agents decide how to allocate cognitive resources. We conclude that these emerging views may contribute to a more holistic perspective on the nature of cognitive bounds, as well as their alteration subject to cognition.

The Illusion of Pure Reason in Science: A Cautionary Note

Introspection tells people that their behavior is both consciously reasoned and functional (i.e., rational), at least based on the evidence available to them. In contrast, research has found that much human behavior reported to be consciously determined, is strongly influenced by heuristics and the mechanistic principles of associative learning that usually function unconsciously and are sometimes sub-optimal. Scientists are trained to base their conclusions on a rational analysis of evidence, which enhances the scientific validity of their conclusions. But scientific training appears to do little to constrain the role of unconscious heuristics. The present point is that scientists are humans and, as such, they are subject to the influence of heuristics in their scientific conclusions just as laypeople are in their everyday behavior. As an example, the availability heuristic and how it seemingly feeds the repetition-induced truth effect are described. One consequence of this is that failures to replicate frequently cited papers do little to devalue the irreplicable reports. Although unconscious heuristics influence the scientific thinking of researchers, scientists are typically unaware of the role of these heuristics due to their operating below the horizon of introspection. This appears to explain the persistence, in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, of the views by many researchers that 'a prediction error is necessary for learning' and that 'reactivated memories have to be reconsolidated to be retained for future access.'

Biases in bioethics: a narrative review

Given that biases can distort bioethics work, it has received surprisingly little and fragmented attention compared to in other fields of research. This article provides an overview of potentially relevant biases in bioethics, such as cognitive biases, affective biases, imperatives, and moral biases. Special attention is given to moral biases, which are discussed in terms of (1) Framings, (2) Moral theory bias, (3) Analysis bias, (4) Argumentation bias, and (5) Decision bias. While the overview is not exhaustive and the taxonomy by no means is absolute, it provides initial guidance with respect to assessing the relevance of various biases for specific kinds of bioethics work. One reason why we should identify and address biases in bioethics is that it can help us assess and improve the quality of bioethics work.

Eristic reasoning: Adaptation to extreme uncertainty

Heuristics (shortcut solution rules) can help adaptation to uncertainty by leading to sufficiently accurate decisions with little information. However, heuristics would fail under extreme uncertainty where information is so scarce that any heuristic would be highly misleading for accuracy-seeking. Thus, under very high levels of uncertainty, decision-makers rely on heuristics to no avail. We posit that eristic reasoning (i.e., self-serving inferences for hedonic pursuits), rather than heuristic reasoning, is adaptive when uncertainty is extreme, as eristic reasoning produces instant hedonic gratifications helpful for coping. Eristic reasoning aims at hedonic gains (e.g., relief from the anxiety of uncertainty) that can be pursued by self-serving inferences. As such, eristic reasoning does not require any information about the environment as it instead gets cues introspectively from bodily signals informing what the organism hedonically needs as shaped by individual differences. We explain how decision-makers can benefit from heuristic vs. eristic reasoning under different levels of uncertainty. As a result, by integrating the outputs of formerly published empirical research and our conceptual discussions pertaining to eristic reasoning, we conceptually criticize the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach, which implies that heuristics are the only means of adapting to uncertainty.

Theoretical basis and occurrence of internet fraud victimisation: Based on two systems in decision-making and reasoning

The influencing factors of internet fraud, including demographics, psychology, experience and knowledge of susceptibility, have been widely studied. Research on the psychological mechanism of the victimisation process of internet fraud is relatively scarce but suggests a new research perspective. To summarise and unify the research in this field, this study systematically searched and analysed articles on the psychological decision-making mechanism of online fraud victims. We found that (a) previous researchers consistently believed that the heuristic processing mode was correlated with susceptibility to online fraud and that the systematic processing mode was helpful to detect and identify fraud. From the overall review results, we do not reject this conclusion, but the verification and intrinsic explanation of this relationship need to be further strengthened. (b) Under the heuristic-systematic model (HSM), with the exception of the trait of suspicion, there is no consensus on whether psychological factors (e.g., personality) influence the likelihood of online fraud through the mediating effect of the selection of the two systems. Objective knowledge and experience in specific fields have been found to be able to achieve this path. Information on the influential variables of equipment and habits is emerging, but how they affect network victimisation through the heuristic processing system needs to be further clarified. (c) The measurement of variables is conducted through simulation experiments. There may be a gap between the likelihood of internet fraud victimisation in the simulation experiment and in the real world. (d) The defence strategies under the HSM are intentional explorations, such as content-based cue recognition technology and simulated scene training.

Metacognitive Myopia: A Major Obstacle on the Way to Rationality

The notion of metacognitive myopia refers to a conspicuous weakness of the quality control of memory and reasoning processes. Although people are often remarkably sensitive even to complex samples of information when making evaluative judgments and decisions, their uncritical and naive tendency to take the validity of sampled information for granted constitutes a major obstacle to rational behavior. After illustrating this phenomenon with reference to prominent biases (base-rate neglect, misattribution, perseverance), we decompose metacognitive myopia into two distinct but intertwined functions, monitoring and control. We offer explanations for why effectively monitoring the biases resulting from information sampling in an uncertain world is so difficult and why the control function is severely restricted by the lack of volitional control over mental actions. Because of these and other difficulties, metacognitive myopia constitutes a major obstacle to rational judgment and decision making.

Children and adults rely on different heuristics for estimation of durations

Time is a uniquely human yet culturally ubiquitous concept acquired over childhood and provides an underlying dimension for episodic memory and estimating durations. Because time, unlike distance, lacks a sensory representation, we hypothesized that subjects at different ages attribute different meanings to it when comparing durations; pre-kindergarten children compare the density of events, while adults use the concept of observer-independent absolute time. We asked groups of pre-kindergarteners, school-age children, and adults to compare the durations of an "eventful" and "uneventful" video, both 1-minute long but durations unknown to subjects. In addition, participants were asked to express the durations of both videos non-verbally with simple hand gestures. Statistical analysis has revealed highly polarized temporal biases in each group, where pre-kindergarteners estimated the duration of the eventful video as "longer." In contrast, the school-age group of children and adults claimed the same about the uneventful video. The tendency to represent temporal durations with a horizontal hand gesture was evident among all three groups, with an increasing prevalence with age. These results support the hypothesis that pre-kindergarten-age children use heuristics to estimate time, and they convert from availability to sampling heuristics between pre-kindergarten and school age.

Strategically managing learning during perceptual decision making

Making optimal decisions in the face of noise requires balancing short-term speed and accuracy. But a theory of optimality should account for the fact that short-term speed can influence long-term accuracy through learning. Here, we demonstrate that long-term learning is an important dynamical dimension of the speed-accuracy trade-off. We study learning trajectories in rats and formally characterize these dynamics in a theory expressed as both a recurrent neural network and an analytical extension of the drift-diffusion model that learns over time. The model reveals that choosing suboptimal response times to learn faster sacrifices immediate reward, but can lead to greater total reward. We empirically verify predictions of the theory, including a relationship between stimulus exposure and learning speed, and a modulation of reaction time by future learning prospects. We find that rats' strategies approximately maximize total reward over the full learning epoch, suggesting cognitive control over the learning process.

Knowledge Engineering in Chemistry: From Expert Systems to Agents of Creation

Passing knowledge from human to human is a natural process that has continued since the beginning of humankind. Over the past few decades, we have witnessed that knowledge is no longer passed only between humans but also from humans to machines. The latter form of knowledge transfer represents a cornerstone in artificial intelligence (AI) and lays the foundation for knowledge engineering (KE). In order to pass knowledge to machines, humans need to structure, formalize, and make knowledge machine-readable. Subsequently, humans also need to develop software that emulates their decision-making process. In order to engineer chemical knowledge, chemists are often required to challenge their understanding of chemistry and thinking processes, which may help improve the structure of chemical knowledge.Knowledge engineering in chemistry dates from the development of expert systems that emulated the thinking process of analytical and organic chemists. Since then, many different expert systems employing rather limited knowledge bases have been developed, solving problems in retrosynthesis, analytical chemistry, chemical risk assessment, etc. However, toward the end of the 20th century, the AI winters slowed down the development of expert systems for chemistry. At the same time, the increasing complexity of chemical research, alongside the limitations of the available computing tools, made it difficult for many chemistry expert systems to keep pace.In the past two decades, the semantic web, the popularization of object-oriented programming, and the increase in computational power have revitalized knowledge engineering. Knowledge formalization through ontologies has become commonplace, triggering the subsequent development of knowledge graphs and cognitive software agents. These tools enable the possibility of interoperability, enabling the representation of more complex systems, inference capabilities, and the synthesis of new knowledge.This Account introduces the history, the core principles of KE, and its applications within the broad realm of chemical research and engineering. In this regard, we first discuss how chemical knowledge is formalized and how a chemist's cognition can be emulated with the help of reasoning algorithms. Following this, we discuss various applications of knowledge graph and agent technology used to solve problems in chemistry related to molecular engineering, chemical mechanisms, multiscale modeling, automation of calculations and experiments, and chemist-machine interactions. These developments are discussed in the context of a universal and dynamic knowledge ecosystem, referred to as The World Avatar (TWA).

Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress and perspectives

Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the community for further scrutiny or utilization. For experimental research using magneto- and electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However, GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light. At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies, pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally, GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG research and the resulting responsibility that scientists have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among other things the benefits of peer review and open access at all stages, the need to coordinate larger international projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we find that current GSP tends to favor collective and cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal reasons.

Cognitive bias and attitude distortion of a priority decision

The resource saving bias is a cognitive bias describing how resource savings from improvements of high-productivity units are overestimated compared to improvements of less productive units. Motivational reasoning describes how attitudes, here towards private/public health care, distort decisions based on numerical facts. Participants made a choice between two productivity increase options with the goal of saving doctor resources. The options described productivity increases in low-/high-productivity private/public emergency rooms. Jointly, the biases produced 78% incorrect decisions. The cognitive bias was stronger than the motivational bias. Verbal justifications of the decisions revealed elaborations of the problem beyond the information provided, biased integration of quantitative information, change of goal of decision, and motivational attitude biases. Most (83%) of the incorrect decisions were based on (incorrect) mathematical justifications illustrating the resource saving bias. Participants who had better scores on a cognitive test made poorer decisions. Women who gave qualitative justifications to a greater extent than men made more correct decision. After a first decision, participants were informed about the correct decision with a mathematical explanation. Only 6.3% of the participants corrected their decisions after information illustrating facts resistance. This could be explained by psychological sunk cost and coherence theories. Those who made the wrong choice remembered the facts of the problem better than those who made a correct choice.

Modeling fast-and-frugal heuristics

Heuristics are simple rules that experts and laypeople rely on to make decisions under uncertainty as opposed to situations with calculable risk. The research program on fast-and-frugal heuristics studies formal models of heuristics and is motivated by Herbert Simon's seminal work on bounded rationality and satisficing. In this article, we first introduce the major theoretical principles (e.g., ecological rationality) and research approaches (e.g., competitive testing) that have been adopted in this research program, and then illustrate these principles and approaches with two heuristics: take-the-best and fast-and-frugal trees. We describe conditions under which simple heuristics predict as accurately as or better than more complex models, despite requiring less effort. We close by pointing out several issues that need to be further studied and better understood in the research on fast-and-frugal heuristics.

Do Concepts Creep to the Left and the Right? Evidence for Ideologically Salient Concept Breadth Judgments Across the Political Spectrum

Concept creep explains how established social concepts expand to incorporate new phenomena, with such expansions fundamentally changing conceptual definitions and contributing to a loss of a shared social understanding. However, the existing work has focused on concept creep within a small number of categories that are typically more salient for those on the political left. In this work, we examined whether concept creep is a predominantly leftist phenomenon, or whether the same conceptual expansion is present for typically conservative-salient categories, by exploring judgments of concept breadth for a range of social topics. We found evidence for such symmetry when considering concept breadth for categories such as sexual deviance, terrorism, and personal responsibility—with some nuanced exceptions. We discuss our findings in relation to growing political polarization, intergroup relations, and the study of partisan differences using a variety of politically salient stimuli.

The possibility of an impetus heuristic

Evidence consistent with a belief in impetus is drawn from studies of naïve physics, perception of causality, perception of force, and representational momentum, and the possibility of an impetus heuristic is discussed. An impetus heuristic suggests the motion path of an object that was previously constrained or influenced by an external source (e.g., object, force) appears to exhibit the same constraint or influence even after that constraint or influence is removed. Impetus is not a valid physical principle, but use of an impetus heuristic can in some circumstances provide approximately correct predictions regarding future object motion, and such predictions require less cognitive effort and resources than would predictions based upon objective physical principles. The relationship of an impetus heuristic to naïve impetus theory and to objective physical principles is discussed, and use of an impetus heuristic significantly challenges claims that causality or force can be visually perceived. Alternatives to an impetus heuristic are considered, and potential boundary conditions and falsification of the impetus notion are discussed. Overall, use of an impetus heuristic offers a parsimonious explanation for findings across a wide range of perceptual domains and could potentially be extended to more metaphorical types of motion.

Behavioural and neural responses of crabs show evidence for selective attention in predator avoidance

Selective attention, the ability to focus on a specific stimulus and suppress distractions, plays a fundamental role for animals in many contexts, such as mating, feeding, and predation. Within natural environments, animals are often confronted with multiple stimuli of potential importance. Such a situation significantly complicates the decision-making process and imposes conflicting information on neural systems. In the context of predation, selectively attending to one of multiple threats is one possible solution. However, how animals make such escape decisions is rarely studied. A previous field study on the fiddler crab, Gelasimus dampieri, provided evidence of selective attention in the context of escape decisions. To identify the underlying mechanisms that guide their escape decisions, we measured the crabs' behavioural and neural responses to either a single, or two simultaneously approaching looming stimuli. The two stimuli were either identical or differed in contrast to represent different levels of threat certainty. Although our behavioural data provides some evidence that crabs perceive signals from both stimuli, we show that both the crabs and their looming-sensitive neurons almost exclusively respond to only one of two simultaneous threats. The crabs' body orientation played an important role in their decision about which stimulus to run away from. When faced with two stimuli of differing contrasts, both neurons and crabs were much more likely to respond to the stimulus with the higher contrast. Our data provides evidence that the crabs' looming-sensitive neurons play an important part in the mechanism that drives their selective attention in the context of predation. Our results support previous suggestions that the crabs' escape direction is calculated downstream of their looming-sensitive neurons by means of a population vector of the looming sensitive neuronal ensemble.

Start-Ups as Adaptable Stable Systems Based on Synchronous Business Models

Business models have been a popular topic in research and practice for more than twenty years. During this time, frameworks for formulating business models have been developed, such as the business model canvas. Moreover, different business model frameworks have been proposed for different sectors. Yet, these frameworks have the fundamental shortcoming of not addressing directly and persistently the primary objective of start-ups: to survive in changing environments. The aim of the action research reported in this paper is to overcome that fundamental shortcoming. This is an important topic because the majority of start-ups do not survive. In this paper, first principles for survival in changing environments are related to business models. In particular, action research to reframe start-ups as adaptable stable systems based on synchronous business models is reported. The paper provides three principal contributions. The contribution to business model theory building is to relate survival first principles revealed through natural science research to business models. Reference to first principles highlight that survival depends on maintaining both external adaptability and internal stability through synchronization with changing environments. The second contribution is to business model practice through describing a simple business modeling method that is based on the scientific first principles. The third contribution is to provide an example that bridges the rigor–relevance gap between scientific research and business practice.

Spelling Errors in Brief Computer-Mediated Texts Implicitly Lead to Linearly Additive Penalties in Trustworthiness

Background

Spelling errors in documents lead to reduced trustworthiness, but the mechanism for weighing the psychological assessment (i.e., integrative versus dichotomous) has not been elucidated. We instructed participants to rate content of texts, revealing that their implicit trustworthiness judgments show marginal differences specifically caused by spelling errors.

Methods

An online experiment with 100 English-speaking participants were asked to rate 27 short text excerpts (∼100 words) about multiple sclerosis in the format of unmoderated health forum posts. In a counterbalanced design, some excerpts had no typographic errors, some had two errors, and some had five errors. Each participant rated nine paragraphs with a counterbalanced mixture of zero, two or five errors. A linear mixed effects model (LME) was assessed with error number as a fixed effect and participants as a random effect.

Results

Using an unnumbered scale with anchors of "completely untrustworthy" (left) and "completely trustworthy" (right) recorded as 0 to 100, two spelling errors resulted in a penalty to trustworthiness of 5.91 ± 1.70 (robust standard error) compared to the reference excerpts with zero errors, while the penalty for five errors was 13.5 ± 2.47; all three conditions were significantly different from each other (P < 0.001).

Conclusion

Participants who rated information about multiple sclerosis in a context mimicking an online health forum implicitly assigned typographic errors nearly linearly additive trustworthiness penalties. This contravenes any dichotomous heuristic or local ceiling effect on trustworthiness penalties for these numbers of typographic errors. It supports an integrative model for psychological judgments of trustworthiness.

Rational use of cognitive resources in human planning

Making good decisions requires thinking ahead, but the huge number of actions and outcomes one could consider makes exhaustive planning infeasible for computationally constrained agents, such as humans. How people are nevertheless able to solve novel problems when their actions have long-reaching consequences is thus a long-standing question in cognitive science. To address this question, we propose a model of resource-constrained planning that allows us to derive optimal planning strategies. We find that previously proposed heuristics such as best-first search are near optimal under some circumstances but not others. In a mouse-tracking paradigm, we show that people adapt their planning strategies accordingly, planning in a manner that is broadly consistent with the optimal model but not with any single heuristic model. We also find systematic deviations from the optimal model that might result from additional cognitive constraints that are yet to be uncovered.

A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†

In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as "intuitive statisticians" while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as "probing organisms." We first highlight how ecological rationality's focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from the misapplication of concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature-the city size task-to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology-in contrast to ecological rationality's focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments "teem" with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a "cue-to-clue" transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively "grown." We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as the presentation of cues and objects rather than their representation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments-as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature-but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with-but modify-Herbert Simon's popular "scissors" metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.

More Thumbs Than Rules: Is Rationality an Exaptation?

The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism-and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm-that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality-embodied rationality-based on the reuse of the perception-action system, where many neural processes involved in the control of the sensory-motor system, salient in ancestral environments have been later co-opted to create-by tinkering-high-level reasoning processes, employed in civilized niches.

Use of Parsing Heuristics in the Comprehension of Passive Sentences: Evidence from Dyslexia and Individual Differences

This study examined the comprehension of passive sentences in order to investigate whether individuals with dyslexia rely on parsing heuristics in language comprehension to a greater extent than non-dyslexic readers. One hundred adults (50 dyslexics and 50 controls) read active and passive sentences, and we also manipulated semantic plausibility. Eye movements were monitored, while participants read each sentence, and afterwards, participants answered a comprehension question. We also assessed verbal intelligence and working memory in all participants. Results showed dyslexia status interacted with sentence structure and plausibility, such that participants with dyslexia showed significantly more comprehension errors with passive and implausible sentence. With respect to verbal intelligence and working memory, we found that individuals with lower verbal intelligence were overall more likely to make comprehension errors, and individuals with lower working memory showed particular difficulties with passive and implausible sentences. For reading times, we found that individuals with dyslexia were overall slower readers. These findings suggest that (1) individuals with dyslexia do rely on heuristics to a greater extent than do non-dyslexic individuals, and (2) individual differences variables (e.g., verbal intelligence and working memory) are also related to the use of parsing heuristics. For the latter, lower ability individuals tended to be more consistent with heuristic processing (i.e., good-enough representations).

Preferences for Prevention: People Assume Expensive Problems Have Expensive Solutions

People support inefficient spending on preventing disasters, and these preferences are translated into inefficient policies as elected officials try to appeal to their constituents. Here, we find preferences for prevention spending are biased by the "cost conflation" mechanism, where people assume expensive problems have expensive solutions. In this article, we present a formal model of collective action, and illustrate how cost conflation causes people to deviate from the equilibria. We test for these hypothesized deviations using an incentivized experiment. The experimental subjects engage in cost conflation-they believe the costs of disaster prevention are positively related to the costs of disaster damages, even when explicitly told otherwise. As a result, they fail to prevent smaller disasters and pay too much to prevent large disasters when cheap solutions exist. Furthermore, we provide evidence that overemphasizing disaster damages undermines successful disaster prevention because people view these disasters as too big to solve.

A Model of Scientific Data Reasoning

Data reasoning is an essential component of scientific reasoning, as a component of evidence evaluation. In this paper, we outline a model of scientific data reasoning that describes how data sensemaking underlies data reasoning. Data sensemaking, a relatively automatic process rooted in perceptual mechanisms that summarize large quantities of information in the environment, begins early in development, and is refined with experience, knowledge, and improved strategy use. Summarizing data highlights set properties such as central tendency and variability, and these properties are used to draw inferences from data. However, both data sensemaking and data reasoning are subject to cognitive biases or heuristics that can lead to flawed conclusions. The tools of scientific reasoning, including external representations, scientific hypothesis testing, and drawing probabilistic conclusions, can help reduce the likelihood of such flaws and help improve data reasoning. Although data sensemaking and data reasoning are not supplanted by scientific data reasoning, scientific reasoning skills can be leveraged to improve learning about science and reasoning with data.

Private land conservation decision-making: An integrative social science model

Owners and managers of private lands make decisions that have implications well beyond the boundaries of their land, influencing species conservation, water quality, wildfire risk, and other environmental outcomes with important societal and ecological consequences. Understanding how these decisions are made is key for informing interventions to support better outcomes. However, explanations of the drivers of decision making are often siloed in social science disciplines that differ in focus, theory, methodology, and terminology, hindering holistic understanding. To address these challenges, we propose a conceptual model of private land conservation decision-making that integrates theoretical perspectives from three dominant disciplines: economics, sociology, and psychology. The model highlights how heterogeneity in behavior across decision-makers is driven by interactions between the decision context, attributes of potential conservation behaviors, and attributes of the decision-maker. These differences in both individual attributes and context shape decision-makers' constraints and the potential and perceived consequences of a behavior. The model also captures how perceived consequences are evaluated and weighted through a decision-making process that may range from systematic to heuristic, ultimately resulting in selection of a behavior. Outcomes of private land behaviors across the landscape feed back to alter the socio-environmental conditions that shape future decisions. The conceptual model is designed to facilitate better communication, collaboration, and integration across disciplines and points to methodological innovations that can expand understanding of private land decision-making. The model also can be used to illuminate how behavior change interventions (e.g., policies, regulations, technical assistance) could be designed to target different drivers to encourage environmentally and socially beneficial behaviors on private lands.

Intuitive global sourcing – a study of supplier selection decisions by apparel SMEs

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to create knowledge on the intuitive global sourcing process applied by small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) managers.

Design/methodology/approach

This study reports on qualitative inquiries with experienced sourcing managers from 10 SMEs in the textile industry. The study follows a three-step semi-structured interviewing process, allowing us to gradually unveil the detailed nature of the intuitive supplier selection process.

Findings

Nine of the 10 SMEs rely on a highly intuitive supplier selections process, where one supplier at a time is gradually taken into the exchange while testing the supplier’s behavior. The process consists of an early heuristics sub-process, which gradually switches over to a more advanced intuiting behavioral pattern-matching process.

Practical implications

Most OM/SCM research has treated global sourcing and supplier selection as a highly rational, analytical and deliberate optimization problem. This study uncovers a completely different, and frequently successful, intuitive process, which could inspire managers in companies of all sizes, faced with high uncertainty about global supplier selection decisions.

Originality/value

Intuition has recently been adopted in the global sourcing literature. However, this study is the first to offer detailed insights into a predominantly intuitive global sourcing process, specifically as it is managed by SMEs.

Is intuition allied with jumping to conclusions in decision-making? An intensive longitudinal study in patients with delusions and in non-clinical individuals

Research suggests that a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, excessive intuition, and reduced analysis in information processing may favor suboptimal decision-making, both in non-clinical and mentally disordered individuals. The temporal relationship between processing modes and JTC bias, however, remains unexplored. Therefore, using an experience sampling methodology (ESM) approach, this study examines the temporal associations between intuitive/analytical information processing, JTC bias, and delusions in non-clinical individuals and patients with schizophrenia. Specifically, we examine whether a high use of intuitive and/or a low use of analytical processing predicts subsequent JTC bias and paranoid conviction. In a smartphone-based ESM study, participants will be prompted four times per day over three consecutive days to answer questionnaires designed to measure JTC bias, paranoid conviction, and preceding everyday-life intuition/analysis. Our hierarchical data will be analyzed using multilevel modelling for hypothesis testing. Results will further elucidate the role of aberrant human reasoning, particularly intuition, in (non-)clinical delusions and delusion-like experiences, and also inform general information processing models.

What Bias Management Can Learn From Change Management? Utilizing Change Framework to Review and Explore Bias Strategies

This paper conducted a preliminary study of reviewing and exploring bias strategies using a framework of a different discipline: change management. The hypothesis here is: If the major problem of implicit bias strategies is that they do not translate into actual changes in behaviors, then it could be helpful to learn from studies that have contributed to successful change interventions such as reward management, social neuroscience, health behavioral change, and cognitive behavioral therapy. The result of this integrated approach is: (1) current bias strategies can be improved and new ones can be developed with insight from adjunct study fields in change management; (2) it could be more sustainable to invest in a holistic and proactive bias strategy approach that targets the social environment, eliminating the very condition under which biases arise; and (3) while implicit biases are automatic, future studies should invest more on strategies that empower people as "change agents" who can act proactively to regulate the very environment that gives rise to their biased thoughts and behaviors.

Envisioning Complex Futures: Collective Narratives and Reasoning in Deliberations over Gene Editing in the Wild

The development of technologies for gene editing in the wild has the potential to generate tremendous benefit, but also raises important concerns. Using some form of public deliberation to inform decisions about the use of these technologies is appealing, but public deliberation about them will tend to fall back on various forms of heuristics to account for limited personal experience with these technologies. Deliberations are likely to involve narrative reasoning-or reasoning embedded within stories. These are used to help people discuss risks, processes, and fears that are otherwise difficult to convey. In this article, we identify three forms of collective narrative that are particularly relevant to debates about modifying genes in the wild. Our purpose is not to privilege any particular narrative, but to encourage people involved in deliberations to make these narratives transparent. Doing so can help guard against the way some narratives-referred to here as "crafted narratives"-may be manipulated by powerful elites and concentrated economic interests for their own strategic ends.

Unfolding the simple heuristics of smart solution development

Purpose

The present study intends to foster understanding of how a traditional manufacturer can utilize the “simple rules” approach of managerial heuristics to facilitate its smart solution development (SSD) process.

Design/methodology/approach

The study uses an in-depth single case research strategy and 25 senior manager interviews to understand the application of simple rules in smart solution development.

Findings

The findings reveal process, boundary, preference, schedule, and stop rules as the dominant managerial heuristics in the case and identify how the manufacturer applies these rules during the innovation process phases of ideation, incubation, transformation, and industrialization for attaining project outcomes.

Research limitations/implications

The study contributes to the new service development (NSD) literature by shedding light on simple rules and how managers may apply them to facilitate SSD. The main limitations stem from applying the qualitative case study approach and the interpretative nature of the study, which produces novel insights but prevents direct generalization to other empirical cases.

Practical implications

The resulting framework provides guidelines for managers on how to establish formal and clear simple rules that enable industrial solution providers to approach decision-making in smart solution development in a more agile manner.

Originality/value

The study comprises one of the first attempts to investigate managerial heuristics in the context of SSD and puts forward a plea for further NSD research applying psychological conceptualizations to enrich the simple rules perspective.

The attachments of 'autonomous' vehicles

The ideal of the self-driving car replaces an error-prone human with an infallible, artificially intelligent driver. This narrative of autonomy promises liberation from the downsides of automobility, even if that means taking control away from autonomous, free-moving individuals. We look behind this narrative to understand the attachments that so-called 'autonomous' vehicles (AVs) are likely to have to the world. Drawing on 50 interviews with AV developers, researchers and other stakeholders, we explore the social and technological attachments that stakeholders see inside the vehicle, on the road and with the wider world. These range from software and hardware to the behaviours of other road users and the material, social and economic infrastructure that supports driving and self-driving. We describe how innovators understand, engage with or seek to escape from these attachments in three categories: 'brute force', which sees attachments as problems to be solved with more data, 'solve the world one place at a time', which sees attachments as limits on the technology's reach and 'reduce the complexity of the space', which sees attachments as solutions to the problems encountered by technology developers. Understanding attachments provides a powerful way to anticipate various possible constitutions for the technology.

Vigor and aspiration levels in neuroeconomics

In this contribution, we criticize the demanding assumption of vigor that economic agents are maximizers. We discuss the link between vigor and subjective value through the alternative notion of aspiration levels, arguing that vigor can help articulate the ecological balance - central in bounded and ecological rationality - between minimum expected reward (aspiration level) and the efforts made for its attainment.