Do Religiosity and Spirituality Differ in Their Relationship with Crystallized Intelligence? Evidence from the General Social Survey

Negative associations of religiosity and intelligence are well established in psychological research. However, past studies have shown a substantial heterogeneity in reported effect strengths. Causes that may be able to explain the identified inconsistencies pertain to differing religiosity measurement modalities, participant ages, or possibly cohort effects due to changing societal values in terms of being religious. Moreover, little is known about intelligence associations with the religiosity-related yet distinct construct of spirituality. Here, we provide evidence for religiosity and crystallized intelligence, as well as spirituality and crystallized intelligence associations, in 14 cohorts from 1988 to 2022 (N = 35,093) in the General Social Survey data by means of primary data analyses and meta-analytical approaches. As expected, religiosity was non-trivially negatively associated (r = -0.13, p < .001), but spirituality showed no meaningful association with crystallized intelligence (r = 0.03, p < .001). Our results broadly generalized across age groups, cohorts, and analytical approaches, thus suggesting that religiosity and intelligence may possibly be functionally equivalent to a certain extent whilst spirituality represents a distinct construct that is not functionally equivalent.

The Relationship Between Religiousness/Spirituality and Psychometric Intelligence in the United States

An inverse relationship between religiousness/spirituality (R/S) and psychometric intelligence (IQ) is well-documented in previous literature. However, the studies that have examined group differences on IQ regarding R/S have limited generalizability. The present study contributed to the literature by evaluating IQ among participants identifying as differentially religious/spiritual (i.e., religious only, spiritual only, both religious and spiritual, or neither religious nor spiritual) and among those classified as either Christian/Catholic, Atheist, or Agnostic. Four hundred and thirty-two participants (M age = 37.9; 36% men) participated online via Amazon's Mechanical Turk as part of a larger study and completed a brief measure of IQ, a scale of religiousness and spirituality, and a demographics questionnaire. Correlations between IQ and self-reported religiousness/spirituality were small and negative (Mean r = -0.17), consistent with previous literature. Multivariate analyses of covariance (MANCOVAs) controlling for age, gender, education, and socioeconomic status (operationalized by estimated annual household income) indicated that IQ scores tended to be lowest (p < 0.001) for "religious only" participants (estimated marginal mean [EMM] = 93.0) and highest for "neither religious nor spiritual" participants (EMM = 103.7). Furthermore, IQ scores were significantly lower (ps < 0.001) for Christian/Catholic participants (EMM = 96.7) compared to both Atheist (EMM = 104.9) and Agnostic participants (EMM = 107.5). Discussion of these findings, relationships to previous theoretical and empirical work, limitations of the present study, and directions for future inquiry are provided.

Does social intolerance vary according to cognitive styles, genetic cognitive capacity, or education?

BACKGROUND

Low education, low cognitive abilities, and certain cognitive styles are suggested to predispose to social intolerance and prejudices. Evidence is, however, restricted by comparatively small samples, neglect of confounding variables and genetic factors, and a narrow focus on a single sort of prejudice. We investigated the relationships of education, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, and cognitive styles with social intolerance in adulthood over a 15-year follow-up.

METHODS

We used data from the prospective population-based Young Finns Study (n = 960-1679). Social intolerance was evaluated with the Social Intolerance Scale in 1997, 2001, and 2011; cognitive performance with the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery in 2011; cognitive styles in 1997; and socioeconomic factors in 1980 (childhood) and 2011 (adulthood); and polygenic cognitive potential was calculated based on genome-wide association studies.

RESULTS

We found that nonrational thinking, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, or socioeconomic factors were not related to social intolerance. Regarding cognitive styles, low flexibility (B = -0.759, p < .001), high perseverance (B = 1.245, p < .001), and low persistence (B = -0.329, p < .001) predicted higher social intolerance consistently in the analyses.

DISCUSSION

When developing prejudice-reduction interventions, it should be considered that educational level or cognitive performance may not be crucial for development of social intolerance. Adopting certain cognitive styles may play more important roles in development of social intolerance.

When intelligence hurts and ignorance is bliss: Global pandemic as an evolutionarily novel threat to happiness

Introduction

The savanna theory of happiness posits that it is not only the current consequences of a given situation that affect happiness but also its ancestral consequences, and that the effect of ancestral consequences on happiness is stronger among less intelligent individuals. But what about situations that did not exist in the ancestral environment and thus have no ancestral consequences? Global pandemic is one such situation that has no ancestral analog, and the theory predicts such evolutionarily novel threats to have a negative effect disproportionately on the life satisfaction of more intelligent individuals.

Methods

We analyzed prospectively longitudinal data from population samples from the National Child Development Study (Study 1) and the British Cohort Study (Study 2).

Results

Consistent with the theoretical prediction, while more intelligent individuals were generally more satisfied with their lives than less intelligent individuals were throughout adulthood (albeit not because they were more intelligent but because they earned more money, were more likely to be married, and healthier), more intelligent individuals were less satisfied with their lives during the COVID‐19 global pandemic because they were more intelligent.

Conclusion

Higher intelligence may have a downside in the modern world, by allowing life satisfaction to be more vulnerable from being better able to comprehend the severity of problems that did not exist in the ancestral world.

Meta-analyzing intelligence and religiosity associations: Evidence from the multiverse

Over the past century, a remarkable body of research about the relationship of intelligence and religiosity has accumulated. So far, the majority of studies that investigated this relationship showed a negative correlation, indicating lower cognitive abilities of individuals reporting stronger religious beliefs. Although the effect direction has been observed to be largely consistent across studies, the reported effect strength varied substantially across studies. Several potentially moderating variables such as different intelligence and religiosity assessment methods, educational status of samples, and participant sex have been proposed as likely candidates for explaining systematic differences in effect strengths. However, the effects of these moderators are to date unclear. Consequently, we focused in investigating effects of these moderating variables on the intelligence and religiosity link in an update of prior meta-analytical investigations in n = 89 (k = 105; N = 201,457) studies. Random-effects analyses showed a small but robust negative association between intelligence and religiosity r = -.14 (p < .001; 95% CI [-.17, -.12]). Effects were stronger for (i) psychometric intelligence tests than for proxy measures such as grade point averages and (ii) general population and college samples than pre-college samples. Moreover, we provide evidence from combinatorial, multiverse, and specification curve analyses that further corroborates the robustness of the investigated association. Out of 192 reasonable specifications all 135 (70.4%) significant summary effects were negative. In all, our results show small but robust negative associations between religiosity and intelligence that are differentiated in strength but generalize in terms of direction over moderating variables.

The clashing nature of rebelliousness: Nontraditional attitudes and counter-normative behaviors show divergent associations with intelligence

OBJECTIVE

Prior literature indicates that nontraditional attitudes are linked to higher intelligence. However, such attitudes in adolescence often accompany counter-normative, delinquent-type behaviors, which are themselves negatively linked with intelligence. This points to the possibility of suppression in the relationship between intelligence and nontraditional attitudes.

METHOD

We analyzed a large community sample of 17 year olds (N = 3330) with data on intelligence, nontraditional attitudes, and a diverse collection of self- and teacher-reported counter-normative behaviors. Developmental questions for these relationships were examined through cross-sectional comparisons between the adolescents and their parents as well as longitudinal analysis of the adolescent sample across emerging adulthood.

RESULTS

Youth who endorsed nontraditional attitudes had lower school grades, earlier age at first sex, heavier substance use, and were perceived as more oppositional by their teachers. Each of these problem behaviors was inversely related to intelligence. Accordingly, the positive correlation between nontraditional attitudes and intelligence was much weaker in adolescents as compared to their middle-aged parents. Longitudinal analyses revealed that the association between nontraditional attitudes and intelligence strengthens in early adulthood.

CONCLUSIONS

Associations between intelligence and sociopolitical attitudes can be obscured even by seemingly distal psychological characteristics.

Bartlett-corrected tests for varying precision beta regressions with application to environmental biometrics

Beta regressions are commonly used with responses that assume values in the standard unit interval, such as rates, proportions and concentration indices. Hypothesis testing inferences on the model parameters are typically performed using the likelihood ratio test. It delivers accurate inferences when the sample size is large, but can otherwise lead to unreliable conclusions. It is thus important to develop alternative tests with superior finite sample behavior. We derive the Bartlett correction to the likelihood ratio test under the more general formulation of the beta regression model, i.e. under varying precision. The model contains two submodels, one for the mean response and a separate one for the precision parameter. Our interest lies in performing testing inferences on the parameters that index both submodels. We use three Bartlett-corrected likelihood ratio test statistics that are expected to yield superior performance when the sample size is small. We present Monte Carlo simulation evidence on the finite sample behavior of the Bartlett-corrected tests relative to the standard likelihood ratio test and to two improved tests that are based on an alternative approach. The numerical evidence shows that one of the Bartlett-corrected typically delivers accurate inferences even when the sample is quite small. An empirical application related to behavioral biometrics is presented and discussed.

Why Do Intelligent People Care More About the Environment?

The present study investigates and provides support for the Savanna-IQ interaction hypothesis regarding pro-environmental values. Study 1 showed that the highest attained education level is a significant predictor of pro-environmental concern, while Study 2 showed that the trait of openness to experience plays a unique role in predicting biospheric values, but not other values, lending support for the Savanna-IQ interaction hypothesis. Acting to preserve the natural environment is an evolutionarily novel challenge, and therefore, is more actively addressed by individuals who more readily adopt novel ideas and seek out new ways of behaving.

Economics and Epicycles

I aver that standard economics as a model of human behavior is as incorrect in 2017 (after Thaler) as geocentrism was as a model of celestial behavior in 1617 (after Galileo). Behavioral economic studies that have exposed the paradoxes and anomalies in standard economics are akin to epicycles on geocentrism. Just as no amount of epicycles could salvage geocentrism as a model of celestial behavior because it was fundamentally incorrect, no amount of behavioral economic adjustments could salvage standard economics as a model of human behavior because it is fundamentally incorrect. Many of the cognitive biases exhibited by humans are shared by other species, so not only are human actors Humans (as opposed to Econs), but nonhuman animals as phylogenetically distant from humans as ants and locusts are also Humans. Evolutionary biology as a model of human behavior can explain many of the hitherto unexplained cognitive biases and provide a unifying model of human behavior currently lacking in behavioral economics.

The Negative Intelligence-Religiosity Relation: New and Confirming Evidence

Zuckerman et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of 63 studies that showed a negative intelligence-religiosity relation (IRR). As more studies have become available and because some of Zuckerman et al.'s (2013) conclusions have been challenged, we conducted a new meta-analysis with an updated data set of 83 studies. Confirming previous conclusions, the new analysis showed that the correlation between intelligence and religious beliefs in college and noncollege samples ranged from -.20 to -.23. There was no support for mediation of the IRR by education but there was support for partial mediation by analytic cognitive style. Thus, one possible interpretation for the IRR is that intelligent people are more likely to use analytic style (i.e., approach problems more rationally). An alternative (and less interesting) reason for the mediation is that tests of both intelligence and analytic style assess cognitive ability. Additional empirical and theoretical work is needed to resolve this issue.

Attitudes Toward Presidential Candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American Elections: Cognitive Ability and Support for Trump

Using data from the American National Election Studies, we investigated the relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes toward and actual voting for presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections (i.e., Romney, Obama, Trump, and Clinton). Isolating this relationship from competing relationships, results showed that verbal ability was a significant negative predictor of support and voting for Trump (but not Romney) and a positive predictor of support and voting for Obama and Clinton. By comparing within and across the election years, our analyses revealed the nature of support for Trump, including that support for Trump was better predicted by lower verbal ability than education or income. In general, these results suggest that the 2016 U.S. presidential election had less to do with party affiliation, income, or education and more to do with basic cognitive ability.

Belief in God: Why People Believe, and Why They Don’t

Belief in a god or gods is a central feature in the lives of billions of people and a topic of perennial interest within psychology. However, research over the past half decade has achieved a new level of understanding regarding both the ultimate and proximate causes of belief in God. Ultimate causes—the evolutionary influences on a trait—shed light on the adaptive value of belief in God and the reasons why a tendency toward this belief exists in humans. Proximate causes—the immediate influences on the expression of a trait—explain variation and changes in belief. We review this research and discuss remaining barriers to a fuller understanding of belief in God.

Is vegetarianism healthy for children?

According to the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics' influential position statement on vegetarianism, meat and seafood can be replaced with milk, soy/legumes, and eggs without any negative effects in children. The United States Department of Agriculture endorses a similar view. The present paper argues that the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics ignores or gives short shrift to direct and indirect evidence that vegetarianism may be associated with serious risks for brain and body development in fetuses and children. Regular supplementation with iron, zinc, and B12 will not mitigate all of these risks. Consequently, we cannot say decisively that vegetarianism or veganism is safe for children.

Toward an Integrated Cognition Perspective on Ethnic Prejudice

Both ability and motivation aspects of cognition have been shown to relate to ethnic prejudice. In line with recent theorizing, the present study advances an integrated cognition perspective on ethnic prejudice by examining the interplay between cognitive ability (measured with the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test) and cognitive motivation (measured with the Need for Cognitive Closure [NFC] Scale) in a Belgian, heterogeneous adult sample ( N = 315). Path analysis revealed that intelligence and NFC each have unique and independent effects on ethnic prejudice, and that both right-wing authoritarianism and essentialist thinking play a mediating role in these effects. Hence, although cognitive abilities and motivations are to some extent interrelated and operate in similar ways, they uniquely and additively contribute to the explained variance in ethnic prejudice.

Climate change policies: The role of democracy and social cognitive capital

The impact of democracy on governments' choice of environmental policies has attracted significant academic attention in recent years. However, less attention has been devoted to the role of the social cognitive capital of the national population. Does society's cognitive capital matter in governmental choice regarding environmental policies, if at all? This study addresses this question through a large-N analysis of 94 countries accounting for the role of both political regimes and social capital in governmental choice of climate change policies. We find that higher social cognitive capital within a democratic state radically increases that state's commitment to adopt environmental policies. More specifically, a 1-point increase in the democracy index is associated with nearly 5 points increase in the adoption of the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI). In a similar vein, a 10 points increase in social cognitive capital is associated with a nearly 16 points increase in CLIMI. The findings presented in this study aim to contribute to the ongoing debate on the impact of democracy and the cognitive capital of society on international environmentalism. The findings will also be interesting for scholars working on the impact of political institutional factors and the role of society in environmental policy choices made at the international level.

WHY DO SOCIETIES WITH HIGHER AVERAGE COGNITIVE ABILITY HAVE LOWER INCOME INEQUALITY? THE ROLE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES

Past studies suggest that, across nations, the average cognitive ability of a population is negatively associated with income inequality; societies with higher average cognitive ability tend to have lower levels of income inequality. However, it is not clear why. This paper proposes that social transfers from the wealthy to the poor may be a major mechanism by which some societies achieve lower income inequality than others, because more intelligent individuals may be more likely to have a preference for such transfers. Publicly available societal-level data were analysed in a series of multiple regression models. The empirical results in this study replicate the earlier finding that societies with higher cognitive ability have lower levels of income inequality, but the association is entirely mediated by social transfers. Social transfers therefore appear to be the primary mechanism by which societies with higher levels of cognitive ability achieve lower income inequality.

The process of deforestation in weak democracies and the role of Intelligence

This article examines the interconnection between national intelligence, political institutions, and the mismanagement of public resources (deforestations). The paper examines the reasons for deforestation and investigates the factors accountable for it. The analysis builds on authors-compiled cross-national dataset on 185 countries over the time period of twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. We find that, first, nation's intelligence reduces significantly the level of deforestation in a state. Moreover, the nations' IQ seems to play an offsetting role in the natural resource conservation (forest management) in the countries with weak democratic institutions. The analysis also discovered the presence of the U-shaped relationship between democracy and deforestation. Intelligence sheds more light on this interconnection and explains the results. Our results are robust to various sample selection strategies and model specifications. The main implication from our study is that intelligence not only shapes formal rules and informal regulations such as social trust, norms and traditions but also it has the ability to reverse the paradoxical process known as "resource curse." The study contributes to better understanding of reasons of deforestation and shed light on the debated impact of political regime on forest management.

A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch

When the environment in which an organism lives deviates in some essential way from that to which it is adapted, this is described as "evolutionary mismatch," or "evolutionary novelty." The notion of mismatch plays an important role, explicitly or implicitly, in evolution-informed cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, and medicine. The evolutionary novelty of our contemporary environment is thought to have significant implications for our health and well-being. However, scientists have generally been working without a clear definition of mismatch. This paper defines mismatch as deviations in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their ability, to produce their selected effects (i.e., to perform their proper functions in Neander's sense). The machinery developed by Millikan in connection with her account of proper function, and with her related teleosemantic account of representation, is used to identify four major types, and several subtypes, of evolutionary mismatch. While the taxonomy offered here does not in itself resolve any scientific debates, the hope is that it can be used to better formulate empirical hypotheses concerning the effects of mismatch. To illustrate, it is used to show that the controversial hypothesis that general intelligence evolved as an adaptation to handle evolutionary novelty can, contra some critics, be formulated in a conceptually coherent way.

Diverse crowds using diverse methods improves the scientific dialectic

In science, diversity is vital to the development of new knowledge. We agree with Duarte et al. that we need more political diversity in social psychology, but contend that we need more religious diversity and methodological diversity as well. If some diversity is good, more is better (especially in science).

Are Smart People Less Racist? Verbal Ability, Anti-Black Prejudice, and the Principle-Policy Paradox

It is commonly hypothesized that higher cognitive abilities promote racial tolerance and a greater commitment to racial equality, but an alternative theoretical framework contends that higher cognitive abilities merely enable members of a dominant racial group to articulate a more refined legitimizing ideology for racial inequality. According to this perspective, ideological refinement occurs in response to shifting patterns of racial conflict and is characterized by rejection of overt prejudice, superficial support for racial equality in principle, and opposition to policies that challenge the dominant group's status. This study estimates the impact of verbal ability on a comprehensive set of racial attitudes, including anti-black prejudice, views about black-white equality in principle, and racial policy support. It also investigates cohort differences in the effects of verbal ability on these attitudes. Results suggest that high-ability whites are less likely than low-ability whites to report prejudicial attitudes and more likely to support racial equality in principle. Despite these liberalizing effects, high-ability whites are no more likely to support a variety of remedial policies for racial inequality. Results also suggest that the ostensibly liberalizing effects of verbal ability on anti-black prejudice and views about racial equality in principle emerged slowly over time, consistent with ideological refinement theory.

Genes, Culture and Conservatism-A Psychometric-Genetic Approach

The Wilson−Patterson conservatism scale was psychometrically evaluated using homogeneity analysis and item response theory models. Results showed that this scale actually measures two different aspects in people: on the one hand people vary in their agreement with either conservative or liberal catch-phrases and on the other hand people vary in their use of the “?” response category of the scale. A 9-item subscale was constructed, consisting of items that seemed to measure liberalism, and this subscale was subsequently used in a biometric analysis including genotype–environment interaction, correcting for non-homogeneous measurement error. Biometric results showed significant genetic and shared environmental influences, and significant genotype–environment interaction effects, suggesting that individuals with a genetic predisposition for conservatism show more non-shared variance but less shared variance than individuals with a genetic predisposition for liberalism.

The Association of Cognitive Ability with Right–Wing Ideological Attitudes and Prejudice: A Meta–Analytic Review

The cognitive functioning of individuals with stronger endorsement of right–wing and prejudiced attitudes has elicited much scholarly interest. Whereas many studies investigated cognitive styles, less attention has been directed towards cognitive ability. Studies investigating the latter topic generally reveal lower cognitive ability to be associated with stronger endorsement of right–wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice. However, this relationship has remained widely unrecognized in literature. The present meta–analyses revealed an average effect size of r = −. 20 [95% confidence interval (95% CI) [−0.23, −0.17]; based on 67 studies, N = 84 017] for the relationship between cognitive ability and right–wing ideological attitudes and an average effect size of r = −.19 (95% CI [−0.23, −0.16]; based on 23 studies, N = 27 011) for the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice. Effect sizes did not vary significantly across different cognitive abilities and sample characteristics. The effect strongly depended on the measure used for ideological attitudes and prejudice, with the strongest effect sizes for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. We conclude that cognitive ability is an important factor in the genesis of ideological attitudes and prejudice and thus should become more central in theorizing and model building. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology

Intelligence and childlessness

Demographers debate why people have children in advanced industrial societies where children are net economic costs. From an evolutionary perspective, however, the important question is why some individuals choose not to have children. Recent theoretical developments in evolutionary psychology suggest that more intelligent individuals may be more likely to prefer to remain childless than less intelligent individuals. Analyses of the National Child Development Study show that more intelligent men and women express preference to remain childless early in their reproductive careers, but only more intelligent women (not more intelligent men) are more likely to remain childless by the end of their reproductive careers. Controlling for education and earnings does not at all attenuate the association between childhood general intelligence and lifetime childlessness among women. One-standard-deviation increase in childhood general intelligence (15 IQ points) decreases women's odds of parenthood by 21-25%. Because women have a greater impact on the average intelligence of future generations, the dysgenic fertility among women is predicted to lead to a decline in the average intelligence of the population in advanced industrial nations.

Is it impolite to discuss cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives?

Hibbing and colleagues argue convincingly that liberals and conservatives differ in reactivity to (negative) stimuli. Yet their analysis sidesteps evidence that cognitive ability differs as a function of ideology. Cognitive abilities, like cognitive preferences (e.g., structure needs), shape whether stimuli are psychologically threatening (prompting avoidance) or offer opportunity (prompting approach). Incorporation of these findings is critical despite any socially “delicate” implications.