Blind insight: metacognitive discrimination despite chance task performance

The structure of metacognition in middle childhood: Evidence for a unitary metacognition-for-memory factor

It has been debated whether children's metacognitive monitoring and control processes rely on a general resource or whether metacognitive processes are task specific. Moreover, findings about the extent to which metacognitive processes are related to first-order task performance are mixed. The current study aimed to uncover the relationships among children's monitoring (discrimination between correct and incorrect responses), control (accurate withdrawal of wrong answers), and performance across three memory-based learning tasks: Kanji learning, text comprehension, and secret code learning. All tasks consisted of a study phase, a test phase, monitoring (confidence judgments), and control (maintaining/withdrawing responses). Participants were 325 children (151 second graders [Mage = 8.12 years] and 174 fourth graders [Mage = 10.20 years]). Confirmatory factor analyses showed that a model in which monitoring and control loaded on a joint factor and performance on a separate factor provided the best fit to the data. Fourth graders had better monitoring and control accuracy than second graders. However, the factor structure of metacognition was similar for both age groups, contradictory to the assumption that metacognition generalizes across tasks as children grow older. After accounting for task-specific processes, monitoring and control skills for language-based memory tasks appear to be generalizable in middle childhood. In sum, children's monitoring and control for three separate memory tasks appear to reflect a unitary metacognition-for-memory factor related to, but distinguishable from, performance.

Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality

Perceptual reality monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish internally triggered imagination from externally triggered reality. Such monitoring can take place at perceptual or cognitive levels-for example, in lucid dreaming, perceptual experience feels real but is accompanied by a cognitive insight that it is not real. We recently developed a paradigm to reveal perceptual reality monitoring errors during wakefulness in the general population, showing that imagined signals can be erroneously attributed to perception during a perceptual detection task. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether people have insight into perceptual reality monitoring errors by additionally measuring perceptual confidence. We used hierarchical Bayesian modeling of confidence criteria to characterize metacognitive insight into the effects of imagery on detection. Over two experiments, we found that confidence criteria moved in tandem with the decision criterion shift, indicating a failure of reality monitoring not only at a perceptual but also at a metacognitive level. These results further show that such failures have a perceptual rather than a decisional origin. Interestingly, offline queries at the end of the experiment revealed global, task-level insight, which was uncorrelated with local, trial-level insight as measured with confidence ratings. Taken together, our results demonstrate that confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality during perceptual detection. Future research should further explore the different cognitive dimensions of insight into reality judgments and how they are related.

Differential effects of intrinsic properties of natural scenes and interference mechanisms on recognition processes in long-term visual memory

Humans display remarkable long-term visual memory (LTVM) processes. Even though images may be intrinsically memorable, the fidelity of their visual representations, and consequently the likelihood of successfully retrieving them, hinges on their similarity when concurrently held in LTVM. In this debate, it is still unclear whether intrinsic features of images (perceptual and semantic) may be mediated by mechanisms of interference generated at encoding, or during retrieval, and how these factors impinge on recognition processes. In the current study, participants (32) studied a stream of 120 natural scenes from 8 semantic categories, which varied in frequencies (4, 8, 16 or 32 exemplars per category) to generate different levels of category interference, in preparation for a recognition test. Then they were asked to indicate which of two images, presented side by side (i.e. two-alternative forced-choice), they remembered. The two images belonged to the same semantic category but varied in their perceptual similarity (similar or dissimilar). Participants also expressed their confidence (sure/not sure) about their recognition response, enabling us to tap into their metacognitive efficacy (meta-d'). Additionally, we extracted the activation of perceptual and semantic features in images (i.e. their informational richness) through deep neural network modelling and examined their impact on recognition processes. Corroborating previous literature, we found that category interference and perceptual similarity negatively impact recognition processes, as well as response times and metacognitive efficacy. Moreover, images semantically rich were less likely remembered, an effect that trumped a positive memorability boost coming from perceptual information. Critically, we did not observe any significant interaction between intrinsic features of images and interference generated either at encoding or during retrieval. All in all, our study calls for a more integrative understanding of the representational dynamics during encoding and recognition enabling us to form, maintain and access visual information.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

A single oral dose of citalopram increases interoceptive insight in healthy volunteers

RATIONALE

Interoception is the signalling, perception, and interpretation of internal physiological states. Many mental disorders associated with changes of interoception, including depressive and anxiety disorders, are treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). However, the causative link between SSRIs and interoception is not yet clear.

OBJECTIVES

To ascertain the causal effect of acute changes of serotonin levels on cardiac interoception.

METHODS

Using a within-participant placebo-controlled design, forty-seven healthy human volunteers (31 female, 16 male) were tested on and off a 20 mg oral dose of the commonly prescribed SSRI, citalopram. Participants made judgements on the synchrony between their heartbeat and auditory tones and then expressed confidence in each judgement. We measured three types of interoceptive cognition.

RESULTS

Citalopram increased cardiac interoceptive insight, measured as correspondence of self-reported confidence to the likelihood that interoceptive judgements were actually correct. This effect was driven by enhanced confidence for correct interoceptive judgements and was independent of measured cardiac and reported subjective effects of the drug.

CONCLUSIONS

An acute change of serotonin levels can increase insight into the reliability of inferences made from cardiac interoceptive sensations.

Atypical meta-memory evaluation strategy in schizophrenia patients

Background

Previous research has reported that patients with schizophrenia would regard false memories with higher confidence, and this meta-memory deficit was suggested as a neurocognitive marker of schizophrenia. However, how schizophrenia patients determine their memory decision confidence has received scant consideration. This study, therefore, aimed to characterize the extent to which meta-memory evaluation strategy differs between schizophrenia patients and healthy individuals, and how such difference contributes to the patients' meta-memory performance.

Methods

27 schizophrenia patients and 28 matched healthy controls performed a temporal-order judgement (TOJ) task, in which they judged which movie frame occurred earlier in an encoded video, and then made retrospective confidence rating. Mixed effect regression models were performed to assess the between-group metacognitive evaluation strategy difference and its relationship to clinical symptoms.

Results

Compared to the control group, the patients' confidence ratings were correlated more with the recent confidence history and less with the TOJ-related evidence. The degree of dependence on recent history of confidence was negatively correlated with the severity of positive symptoms. Furthermore, by controlling for the first-order TOJ performance, we observed that the patients discriminated correct memory decisions from the incorrect ones as accurately as the controls.

Conclusion

The present investigation revealed that schizophrenia patients tend to use more heuristics in making meta-memory evaluations, and such atypical strategy is related to their clinical symptoms. This study provides new insights into how schizophrenia patients perform meta-memory processes. Future research could consider examining such metacognitive deficits in light of other cognitive domains in psychosis.

The role of metacognition in recognition of the content of statistical learning

Despite theoretical debate on the extent to which statistical learning is incidental or modulated by explicit instructions and conscious awareness of the content of statistical learning, no study has ever investigated the metacognition of statistical learning. We used an artificial language-learning paradigm and a segmentation task that required splitting a continuous stream of syllables into discrete recurrent constituents. During this task, statistical learning potentially produces knowledge of discrete constituents as well as about statistical regularities that are embodied in familiarization input. We measured metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency (using hierarchical Bayesian modelling to estimate metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency) to probe the role of conscious awareness in recognition of constituents extracted from the familiarization input and recognition of novel constituents embodying the same statistical regularities as these extracted constituents. Novel constituents are conceptualized to represent recognition of statistical structure rather than recognition of items retrieved from memory as whole constituents. We found that participants are equally sensitive to both types of learning products, yet subject them to varying degrees of conscious processing during the postfamiliarization recognition test. The data point to the contribution of conscious awareness to at least some types of statistical learning content.

Developmental trajectories of metacognitive processing and executive function from childhood to older age

The modern understanding of the term metacognition encompasses two levels of processing: a lower level awareness or knowledge of one’s own thoughts and a higher level regulation or control of our thinking. Metacognition, therefore, bears conceptual similarity with executive function: both are concerned with top-down monitoring and control of cognition in the service of ongoing goal-directed behaviour. Previous studies have shown a possible executive function advantage in multilingual speakers but also a possible disadvantage in metacognitive processing. To progress theory on metacognitive processing and the relationship with executive function and linguistic experience across the lifespan, we conducted a study testing 330 healthy individuals in four age groups from 7 to 80 years old. All participants performed a metacognition task and two measures of executive function, which included the Simon task and the Tower of London task. Half the participants were multilingual speakers since birth. We built developmental trajectories of metacognitive and executive function across the lifespan. The best metacognitive efficiency was observed in mid-adulthood, whereas the best executive function processing reached its peak in young adulthood. A steep cognitive decline was observed in older age, while metacognitive efficiency was preserved. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that metacognition and executive function are served by different factors across all ages. Contrary to previous findings in the bilingual literature, a multilinguistic experience conferred neither any significant advantage nor disadvantage in both executive function and metacognitive processing across the lifespan.

Mapping Mind-Brain Development: Towards a Comprehensive Theory

The relations between the developing mind and developing brain are explored. We outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that the mind comprises four systems of processes (domain-specific, attention and working memory, reasoning, and cognizance) developing in four cycles (episodic, realistic, rule-based, and principle-based representations, emerging at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively), with two phases in each. Changes in reasoning relate to processing efficiency in the first phase and working memory in the second phase. Awareness of mental processes is recycled with the changes in each cycle and drives their integration into the representational unit of the next cycle. Brain research shows that each type of processes is served by specialized brain networks. Domain-specific processes are rooted in sensory cortices; working memory processes are mainly rooted in hippocampal, parietal, and prefrontal cortices; abstraction and alignment processes are rooted in parietal, frontal, and prefrontal and medial cortices. Information entering these networks is available to awareness processes. Brain networks change along the four cycles, in precision, connectivity, and brain rhythms. Principles of mind-brain interaction are discussed.

Oxytocin alters the effect of payoff but not base rate in emotion perception

Emotion perception, inferring the emotional state of another person, can be formalized as decision under uncertainty: another person's scowling face may indicate anger or concentration and the optimal inference is contingent on the decision consequences (payoff) and how likely real anger is encountered (base rate). Although emerging evidence suggests that the neuropeptide oxytocin influences human perception of emotional facial expressions, whether such effect relates to the alternated process of payoff or base rate still remains unclear. In addition, little is known about oxytocin's effect on metacognitive process involved in emotion perception. One hundred and twenty-two healthy male adults (sixty-two in Experiment 1 and sixty in Experiment 2, respectively) received 24 international units (IU) of intranasal oxytocin or placebo (between-subjects) in a randomized and double-blind study. We independently and systematically manipulated the payoff and base rate levels in an emotion categorization task and measured participants' response bias via categorization choice and metacognitive sensitivity via confidence report. Compared to the placebo group, oxytocin specifically induced a categorization bias under the payoff, but not base rate manipulation. In contrast, oxytocin had no effect on subjects' confidence rating, indicating that the metacognitive sensitivity can be dissociated from emotion perception. Our results pinpoint the specific role of oxytocin in payoff evaluation, but not target likelihood estimation and provide a potential theoretical framework to bridge oxytocin research in emotion perception, social cognition and value-based decisions.

The Confidence Database

Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for the characterization of a wide range of perceptual, memory, motor and cognitive processes. To enable the continued exploration of these processes, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, participant populations and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analysed using multiple software packages. Each dataset is accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the time of publication, the Confidence Database (which is available at https://osf.io/s46pr/) contained 145 datasets with data from more than 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. Here we show the usefulness of this large collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimations of several foundational confidence-related effects.

Metacognitive Accuracy Improves With the Perceptual Learning of a Low- but Not High-Level Face Property

Experience with visual stimuli can improve their perceptual performance, a phenomenon termed visual perceptual learning (VPL). VPL has been found to improve metacognitive measures, suggesting increased conscious accessibility to the knowledge supporting perceptual decision-making. However, such studies have largely failed to control objective task accuracy, which typically correlates with metacognition. Here, using a staircase method to control this confound, we investigated whether VPL improves the metacognitive accuracy of perceptual decision-making. Across 3 days, subjects were trained to discriminate faces based on their high-level identity or low-level contrast. Holding objective accuracy constant across training days, perceptual thresholds decreased in both tasks, demonstrating VPL in our protocol. However, whilemetacognitive accuracy was not affected by face contrast VPL, it was decreased by face identity VPL. Our findings couldbe parsimoniously explained by a dual-stage signal detection theory-based model involving an initial perceptual decision-making stage and a second confidence judgment stage. Within this model, internal noise reductions for both stages accounts for our face contrast VPL result, while only first stage noise reductions accounts for our face identity VPL result. In summary, we found evidence suggesting that conscious knowledge accessibility was improved by the VPL of face contrast but not face identity.

The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Increased lucid dream frequency in long-term meditators but not following MBSR training

Strong conceptual and theoretical connections have been made between meditation practice, mindfulness and lucid dreaming. However, only a handful of empirical studies have evaluated the relationship between lucid dreaming and meditation, and conclusions remain tempered by methodological limitations. Here we evaluate the relationship between meditation, mindfulness and lucid dream frequency using several complementary methods. First, using a cross-sectional design, we evaluate differences in lucid dream frequency between long-term meditators and meditation naïve individuals. Second, we evaluate the relationship between lucid dream frequency and specific facets of trait mindfulness in both meditators and non-meditators. Third, using a blinded randomized-controlled design, we evaluate the impact of an 8-week mindfulness course on lucid dreaming frequency. Our results show that lucid dreaming is more frequent in long-term meditators compared to meditation naïve individuals. Additionally, lucid dream frequency in meditation-naïve individuals was associated with a capacity to verbalize experience, while lucid dream frequency in long-term meditators was associated with observational and decentering facets of trait mindfulness. However, an 8-week mindfulness course did not increase the frequency of lucid dreams. Together these results support a continuity between increased awareness of waking and sleeping states, provide a novel form of evidence linking meditation training to meta-awareness, and support an association between meditation practice and lucid dreaming, but leave open the specific nature of this connection.

Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play

Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.

Consciousness and confidence

It is natural to see conscious perceptions as typically bringing with them a degree of confidence about what is perceived. So one might also expect such confidence not to occur if a perception is not conscious. This has resulted in the use of confidence as a test or measure of consciousness, one that may be more reliable and fine-grained than the traditional appeal to subjective report as a test for a perception's being conscious. The following describes theoretical difficulties for the use of confidence as a reliable test for consciousness, which show that confidence is less reliable than subjective report. Difficulties are also presented for the use of confidence ratings in assessing degrees of consciousness, which cast doubt on any advantage confidence might have from being more fine-grained than subjective report. And an explanation is proposed for the wide appeal of using confidence to assess subjective awareness, an explanation that also makes clear why confidence is less reliable than subjective report.

Self-evaluation of decision-making: A general Bayesian framework for metacognitive computation

People are often aware of their mistakes, and report levels of confidence in their choices that correlate with objective performance. These metacognitive assessments of decision quality are important for the guidance of behavior, particularly when external feedback is absent or sporadic. However, a computational framework that accounts for both confidence and error detection is lacking. In addition, accounts of dissociations between performance and metacognition have often relied on ad hoc assumptions, precluding a unified account of intact and impaired self-evaluation. Here we present a general Bayesian framework in which self-evaluation is cast as a "second-order" inference on a coupled but distinct decision system, computationally equivalent to inferring the performance of another actor. Second-order computation may ensue whenever there is a separation between internal states supporting decisions and confidence estimates over space and/or time. We contrast second-order computation against simpler first-order models in which the same internal state supports both decisions and confidence estimates. Through simulations we show that second-order computation provides a unified account of different types of self-evaluation often considered in separate literatures, such as confidence and error detection, and generates novel predictions about the contribution of one's own actions to metacognitive judgments. In addition, the model provides insight into why subjects' metacognition may sometimes be better or worse than task performance. We suggest that second-order computation may underpin self-evaluative judgments across a range of domains. (PsycINFO Database Record

HMeta-d: hierarchical Bayesian estimation of metacognitive efficiency from confidence ratings

Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect on and monitor one's cognitive processes, such as perception, memory and decision-making. Metacognition is often assessed in the lab by whether an observer's confidence ratings are predictive of objective success, but simple correlations between performance and confidence are susceptible to undesirable influences such as response biases. Recently, an alternative approach to measuring metacognition has been developed (Maniscalco and Lau 2012) that characterizes metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d') by assuming a generative model of confidence within the framework of signal detection theory. However, current estimation routines require an abundance of confidence rating data to recover robust parameters, and only provide point estimates of meta-d'. In contrast, hierarchical Bayesian estimation methods provide opportunities to enhance statistical power, incorporate uncertainty in group-level parameter estimates and avoid edge-correction confounds. Here I introduce such a method for estimating metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d') from confidence ratings and demonstrate its application for assessing group differences. A tutorial is provided on both the meta-d' model and the preparation of behavioural data for model fitting. Through numerical simulations I show that a hierarchical approach outperforms alternative fitting methods in situations where limited data are available, such as when quantifying metacognition in patient populations. In addition, the model may be flexibly expanded to estimate parameters encoding other influences on metacognitive efficiency. MATLAB software and documentation for implementing hierarchical meta-d' estimation (HMeta-d) can be downloaded at https://github.com/smfleming/HMeta-d.

Should metacognition be measured by logistic regression?

Are logistic regression slopes suitable to quantify metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the efficiency with which subjective reports differentiate between correct and incorrect task responses? We analytically show that logistic regression slopes are independent from rating criteria in one specific model of metacognition, which assumes (i) that rating decisions are based on sensory evidence generated independently of the sensory evidence used for primary task responses and (ii) that the distributions of evidence are logistic. Given a hierarchical model of metacognition, logistic regression slopes depend on rating criteria. According to all considered models, regression slopes depend on the primary task criterion. A reanalysis of previous data revealed that massive numbers of trials are required to distinguish between hierarchical and independent models with tolerable accuracy. It is argued that researchers who wish to use logistic regression as measure of metacognitive sensitivity need to control the primary task criterion and rating criteria.

Learning and Recognition of a Non-conscious Sequence of Events in Human Primary Visual Cortex

Human primary visual cortex (V1) has long been associated with learning simple low-level visual discriminations [1] and is classically considered outside of neural systems that support high-level cognitive behavior in contexts that differ from the original conditions of learning, such as recognition memory [2, 3]. Here, we used a novel fMRI-based dichoptic masking protocol—designed to induce activity in V1, without modulation from visual awareness—to test whether human V1 is implicated in human observers rapidly learning and then later (15–20 min) recognizing a non-conscious and complex (second-order) visuospatial sequence. Learning was associated with a change in V1 activity, as part of a temporo-occipital and basal ganglia network, which is at variance with the cortico-cerebellar network identified in prior studies of “implicit” sequence learning that involved motor responses and visible stimuli (e.g., [4]). Recognition memory was associated with V1 activity, as part of a temporo-occipital network involving the hippocampus, under conditions that were not imputable to mechanisms associated with conscious retrieval. Notably, the V1 responses during learning and recognition separately predicted non-conscious recognition memory, and functional coupling between V1 and the hippocampus was enhanced for old retrieval cues. The results provide a basis for novel hypotheses about the signals that can drive recognition memory, because these data (1) identify human V1 with a memory network that can code complex associative serial visuospatial information and support later non-conscious recognition memory-guided behavior (cf. [5]) and (2) align with mouse models of experience-dependent V1 plasticity in learning and memory [6].

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Sequence learning and recognition memory can operate without visual awareness

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V1, hippocampus, and basal ganglia support learning of a non-conscious sequence

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Old/new status of non-conscious recognition probes modulates V1-hippocampal coupling

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V1 activity predicts non-conscious recognition memory performance

But I Was So Sure! Metacognitive Judgments Are Less Accurate Given Prospectively than Retrospectively

Prospective and retrospective metacognitive judgments have been studied extensively in the field of memory; however, their accuracy has not been systematically compared. Such a comparison is important for studying how metacognitive judgments are formed. Here, we present the results of an experiment aiming to investigate the relation between performance in an anagram task and the accuracy of prospective and retrospective confidence judgments. Participants worked on anagrams and were then asked to respond whether a presented word was the solution. They also rated their confidence, either before or after the response and either before or after seeing the suggested solution. The results showed that although response accuracy always correlated with confidence, this relationship was weaker when metacognitive judgements were given before the response. We discuss the theoretical and methodological implications of this finding for studies on metacognition and consciousness.

Implicit memory for words heard during sleep

When we fall asleep, our awareness of the surrounding world fades. Yet, the sleeping brain is far from being dormant and recent research unraveled the preservation of complex sensory processing during sleep. In wakefulness, such processes usually lead to the formation of long-term memory traces, being it implicit or explicit. We examined here the consequences upon awakening of the processing of sensory information at a high level of representation during sleep. Participants were instructed to classify auditory stimuli as words or pseudo-words, through left and right hand responses, while transitioning toward sleep. An analysis of the electroencephalographic (EEG) signal revealed the preservation of lateralized motor activations in response to sounds, suggesting that stimuli were correctly categorized during sleep. Upon awakening, participants did not explicitly remember words processed during sleep and failed to distinguish them from new words (old/new recognition test). However, both behavioral and EEG data indicate the presence of an implicit memory trace for words presented during sleep. In addition, the underlying neural signature of such implicit memories markedly differed from the explicit memories formed during wakefulness, in line with dual-process accounts arguing for two independent systems for explicit and implicit memory. Thus, our results reveal that implicit learning mechanisms can be triggered during sleep and provide a novel approach to explore the neural implementation of memory without awareness.

The signal processing architecture underlying subjective reports of sensory awareness

What is the relationship between perceptual information processing and subjective perceptual experience? Empirical dissociations between stimulus identification performance and subjective reports of stimulus visibility are crucial for shedding light on this question. We replicated a finding that metacontrast masking can produce such a dissociation (Lau and Passingham, 2006), and report a novel finding that this paradigm can also dissociate stimulus identification performance from the efficacy with which visibility ratings predict task performance. We explored various hypotheses about the relationship between perceptual task performance and visibility rating by implementing them in computational models and using formal model comparison techniques to assess which ones best captured the unusual patterns in the data. The models fell into three broad categories: Single Channel models, which hold that task performance and visibility ratings are based on the same underlying source of information; Dual Channel models, which hold that there are two independent processing streams that differentially contribute to task performance and visibility rating; and Hierarchical models, which hold that a late processing stage generates visibility ratings by evaluating the quality of early perceptual processing. Taking into account the quality of data fitting and model complexity, we found that Hierarchical models perform best at capturing the observed behavioral dissociations. Because current theories of visual awareness map well onto these different model structures, a formal comparison between them is a powerful approach for arbitrating between the different theories.

Human observers have optimal introspective access to perceptual processes even for visually masked stimuli

Many believe that humans can 'perceive unconsciously' - that for weak stimuli, briefly presented and masked, above-chance discrimination is possible without awareness. Interestingly, an online survey reveals that most experts in the field recognize the lack of convincing evidence for this phenomenon, and yet they persist in this belief. Using a recently developed bias-free experimental procedure for measuring subjective introspection (confidence), we found no evidence for unconscious perception; participants' behavior matched that of a Bayesian ideal observer, even though the stimuli were visually masked. This surprising finding suggests that the thresholds for subjective awareness and objective discrimination are effectively the same: if objective task performance is above chance, there is likely conscious experience. These findings shed new light on decades-old methodological issues regarding what it takes to consider a neurobiological or behavioral effect to be 'unconscious,' and provide a platform for rigorously investigating unconscious perception in future studies.

Self-Knowledge Dim-Out: Stress Impairs Metacognitive Accuracy

Modulation of frontal lobes activity is believed to be an important pathway trough which the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis stress response impacts cognitive and emotional functioning. Here, we investigate the effects of stress on metacognition, which is the ability to monitor and control one's own cognition. As the frontal lobes have been shown to play a critical role in metacognition, we predicted that under activation of the HPA axis, participants should be less accurate in the assessment of their own performances in a perceptual decision task, irrespective of the effect of stress on the first order perceptual decision itself. To test this prediction, we constituted three groups of high, medium and low stress responders based on cortisol concentration in saliva in response to a standardized psycho-social stress challenge (the Trier Social Stress Test). We then assessed the accuracy of participants' confidence judgments in a visual discrimination task. As predicted, we found that high biological reactivity to stress correlates with lower sensitivity in metacognition. In sum, participants under stress know less when they know and when they do not know.

Manipulation of working memory contents selectively impairs metacognitive sensitivity in a concurrent visual discrimination task

What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying perceptual metacognition? Prior research indicates that prefrontal cortex (PFC) contributes to metacognitive performance, suggesting that metacognitive judgments are supported by high-level cognitive operations. We explored this hypothesis by investigating metacognitive performance for a visual discrimination task in the context of a concurrent working memory (WM) task. We found that, overall, high WM load caused a nonspecific decrease in visual discrimination performance as well as metacognitive performance. However, active manipulation of WM contents caused a selective decrease in metacognitive performance without impairing visual discrimination performance. These behavioral findings are consistent with previous neuroscience findings that high-level PFC is engaged by and necessary for (i) visual metacognition, and (ii) active manipulation of WM contents, but not mere maintenance. The selective interference of WM manipulation on metacognition suggests that these seemingly disparate cognitive functions in fact recruit common cognitive mechanisms. The common cognitive underpinning of these tasks may consist in (i) higher-order re-representation of lower-level sensory information, and/or (ii) application of decision rules in order to transform representations in PFC into definite cognitive/motor responses.

How is working memory content consciously experienced? The 'conscious copy' model of WM introspection

We address the issue of how visual information stored in working memory (WM) is introspected. In other words, how do we become aware of WM content in order to consciously examine or manipulate it? Influential models of WM have suggested that WM representations are either conscious by definition, or directly accessible for conscious inspection. We propose that WM introspection does not operate on the actual memory trace but rather requires a new representation to be created for the conscious domain. This conscious representation exists in addition and in parallel to the actual memory representation. The existence of such a separate representation is revealed by and reflected in the qualitatively different functional characteristics between the actual memory trace and its conscious experience, and their distinct interactions within external visual input. Our model differs from state-based models in that WM introspection does not involve a change in the state of WM content, but rather involves the creation of a new, second representation existing in parallel to the original memory trace.

There are things that we know that we know, and there are things that we do not know we do not know: Confidence in decision-making

Metacognition, the ability to think about our own thoughts, is a fundamental component of our mental life and is involved in memory, learning, planning and decision-making. Here we focus on one aspect of metacognition, namely confidence in perceptual decisions. We review the literature in psychophysics, neuropsychology and neuroscience. Although still a very new field, several recent studies suggest there are specific brain circuits devoted to monitoring and reporting confidence, whereas others suggest that confidence information is encoded within decision-making circuits. We provide suggestions, based on interdisciplinary research, to disentangle these disparate results.

Confidence measurement in the light of signal detection theory

We compare three alternative methods for eliciting retrospective confidence in the context of a simple perceptual task: the Simple Confidence Rating (a direct report on a numerical scale), the Quadratic Scoring Rule (a post-wagering procedure), and the Matching Probability (MP; a generalization of the no-loss gambling method). We systematically compare the results obtained with these three rules to the theoretical confidence levels that can be inferred from performance in the perceptual task using Signal Detection Theory (SDT). We find that the MP provides better results in that respect. We conclude that MP is particularly well suited for studies of confidence that use SDT as a theoretical framework.