A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society

We propose a framework integrating insights from computational social science, political, and social psychology to explain how extreme polarization can occur in deeply divided societies. Extreme polarization in a society emerges through a dynamic and complex process where societal, group, and individual factors interact. Dissent at different levels of analysis represents the driver of this process, where societal-level ideological dissent divides society into opposing camps, each with contrasting collective narratives. Within these opposing camps, further dissent leads to the formation of splinter factions and radical cells-sub-groups with increasingly extreme views. At the group level, collective narratives underpinning group identity become more extreme as society fragments. At the individual level, this process involves the internalization of an extreme group narrative and norms sanctioning radical behavior. The intense bonding within these groups and the convergence of personal and group identities through identity fusion increase the likelihood of radical group behavior.

The personality of violent Jihadists: Examining violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims

OBJECTIVE

Although violent extremism is often attributed to clinical (dysfunctional) dispositions, it is also possible that violent Jihadists might be clinically "normal" but bear certain personality signatures. This alternative view has yet to be tested.

METHOD

In six studies, employing hard-to-reach Muslim samples, including one study of former Mujahideen, we investigated the relationship between basic personality traits and violent extremism. We further used a known group paradigm to validate the personality signatures of violent extremism, comparing a sample of former Mujahideen with another sample from Afghanistan.

RESULTS

These studies and an internal meta-analysis revealed that Lower Openness to Experience, lower Emotionality, and lower Altruism were associated with more violent intentions to support Muslims. Higher Altruism was associated with higher levels of nonviolent intention to support Muslims. Supporting the validity of the nonviolent intention measure, similar associations were found in Study 3 with overt behavioral support of Muslims (donations). More important, compared to the nonMujahideen, the Mujahideen sample scored lower on average on, for instance, Openness, indicating that these results go beyond self-reported, findings.

CONCLUSION

We demonstrated that personality predicts violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims among four general populations of Muslims living in the West and in Asia (including the Middle East), and a sample of Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

Liberal-conservative asymmetries in anti-democratic tendencies are partly explained by psychological differences in a nationally representative U.S. sample

Based on theory and research in political psychology, we hypothesized that liberal-conservative differences in right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political system justification would contribute to asymmetries in anti-democratic tendencies. These hypotheses were tested in a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1557). Results revealed that conservatives were less supportive of political equality and legal rights and guarantees and more willing to defect from democratic "rules of the game" and vote for anti-democratic candidates, even after adjusting for political extremism. Mediational analyses suggested that conservatives' anti-democratic tendencies were partially attributable to higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Conservatives also scored higher in political system justification, which was associated with support for free speech and mitigated anti-democratic tendencies. Democrats and Republicans who approved January 6, 2021, insurrectionists were more conservative and higher in right-wing authoritarianism than those who did not. Implications for social psychology and society are discussed.

The relationship between political ideology and judgements of bias in distributional outcomes

We examine judgements of bias in distributional outcomes. Such judgements are often based on imbalance in distributional outcomes, namely, the under- or over-representation of a target group relative to some baseline. Using data from 26 studies (N = 14,925), we test how these judgements of bias vary with the target group's characteristics (traditionally dominant or non-dominant) and the observer's political ideology (liberal or conservative). We find that conservatives set a higher threshold for recognizing bias against traditionally non-dominant targets (women, Black people, immigrants), as compared with liberals. Conversely, liberals set a higher threshold for recognizing bias against traditionally dominant targets (men, white people, native-born citizens), as compared with conservatives. However, these relationships between political ideology and judgements of bias diminish when the targets are unknown or ideologically irrelevant. These findings emphasize the context-dependency of bias judgements and underscore the importance of stimulus sampling and appropriate selection of controls.

Ideological asymmetries in online hostility, intimidation, obscenity, and prejudice

To investigate ideological symmetries and asymmetries in the expression of online prejudice, we used machine-learning methods to estimate the prevalence of extreme hostility in a large dataset of Twitter messages harvested in 2016. We analyzed language contained in 730,000 tweets on the following dimensions of bias: (1) threat and intimidation, (2) obscenity and vulgarity, (3) name-calling and humiliation, (4) hatred and/or racial, ethnic, or religious slurs, (5) stereotypical generalizations, and (6) negative prejudice. Results revealed that conservative social media users were significantly more likely than liberals to use language that involved threat, intimidation, name-calling, humiliation, stereotyping, and negative prejudice. Conservatives were also slightly more likely than liberals to use hateful language, but liberals were slightly more likely than conservatives to use obscenities. These findings are broadly consistent with the view that liberal values of equality and democratic tolerance contribute to ideological asymmetries in the expression of online prejudice, and they are inconsistent with the view that liberals and conservatives are equally prejudiced.

How different types of environmentalists are perceived: changing perceptions by the feature

Introduction

Previous research found stereotypes of environmentalists as barriers to public engagement and identification with environmentalism. Yet, there is limited understanding of the distinct attributes of an environmentalist that influence public perceptions and self-identification. In our research, we address this knowledge gap by analyzing reactions to a range of fictional environmentalist profiles.

Methods

We investigated how multiple features of these profiles (e.g., gender, occupation, type of pro-environmentalism) influenced stereotypes (such as competence, friendliness, and trustworthiness), perceived typicality, and participants' self-identification with the described profiles, using a novel conjoint experiment approach with 678 US residents.

Results

We found that profiles described as women, Asians, working as a cleaner or office clerk, and politically moderate or liberal, exhibiting private to moderate environmental behaviors and global environmental concerns, were generally perceived as more typical for environmentalists. Moreover, participants most identified with profiles depicted as women, in a cleaner occupation, and exhibiting private pro-environmental behaviors. Atypical profile descriptions, based on prior research, enhanced participants' impressions only when associated with private pro-environmental behaviors or the cleaner occupation.

Discussion

We introduce new avenues in impression formation research and the use of conjoint analyses in psychological research; moreover, we contribute valuable input to the environmental movement regarding message framing considering the source and content relative to the targeted audience.

Social Psychological Perspectives on Political Polarization: Insights and Implications for Climate Change

Political polarization is a barrier to enacting policy solutions to global issues. Social psychology has a rich history of studying polarization, and there is an important opportunity to define and refine its contributions to the present political realities. We do so in the context of one of the most pressing modern issues: climate change. We synthesize the literature on political polarization and its applications to climate change, and we propose lines of further research and intervention design. We focus on polarization in the United States, examining other countries when literature was available. The polarization literature emphasizes two types of mechanisms of political polarization: (1) individual-level psychological processes related to political ideology and (2) group-level psychological processes related to partisan identification. Interventions that address group-level processes can be more effective than those that address individual-level processes. Accordingly, we emphasize the promise of interventions leveraging superordinate identities, correcting misperceived norms, and having trusted leaders communicate about climate change. Behavioral interventions like these that are grounded in scientific research are one of our most promising tools to achieve the behavioral wedge that we need to address climate change and to make progress on other policy issues.

Toward a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Model of American Political Goals: Recognizing the "Values" and "Vices" Within Both Liberalism and Conservativism

When a person indicates they are "liberal" or "conservative," an important part of what they are communicating is their goals for how they would like society to be structured. However, past theories have described these goals in dramatically different fashions, suggesting that either conservativism or liberalism reflects a divisive or unifying goal. To help overcome this impasse, we systematically compared a broad, representative sample of all possible higher-order goals (drawn a previous lexical investigation of more than 1,000 goals) to the political ideology of American adults (total n = 1,588). The results of five studies suggested that proposals from competing theories are all partially correct. Conservativism simultaneously reflects the unifying "value" of Tradition, as well as the divisive "vice" of Elitism; while Liberalism simultaneously reflects the unifying "value" of Inclusiveness, and the divisive "vice" of Rebellion. These results help to integrate proposals from previous competing theories into a single framework.

Affective Polarization and Political Belief Systems: The Role of Political Identity and the Content and Structure of Political Beliefs

We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.

Cultural threat perceptions predict violent extremism via need for cognitive closure

Understanding the psychological processes that drive violent extremism is a pressing global issue. Across six studies, we demonstrate that perceived cultural threats lead to violent extremism because they increase people's need for cognitive closure (NFC). In general population samples (from Denmark, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, and an international sample) and a sample of former Mujahideen in Afghanistan, single-level and multilevel mediation analyses revealed that NFC mediated the association between perceived cultural threats and violent extremist outcomes. Further, in comparisons between the sample of former Afghan Mujahideen and the general population sample from Afghanistan following the known-group paradigm, the former Mujahideen scored significantly higher on cultural threat, NFC, and violent extremist outcomes. Moreover, the proposed model successfully differentiated former Afghan Mujahideen participants from the general Afghan participants. Next, two preregistered experiments provided causal support for the model. Experimentally manipulating the predictor (cultural threat) in Pakistan led to higher scores on the mediator (NFC) and dependent variables (violent extremist outcomes). Finally, an experiment conducted in France demonstrated the causal effect of the mediator (NFC) on violent extremist outcomes. Two internal meta-analyses using state-of-the-art methods (i.e., meta-analytic structural equation modeling and pooled indirect effects analyses) further demonstrated the robustness of our results across the different extremist outcomes, designs, populations, and settings. Cultural threat perceptions seem to drive violent extremism by eliciting a need for cognitive closure.

Similarity to the self influences memory for social targets

The construct of the self is important in the domain of memory research. Recent work has shown that person memory is influenced by similarity of social targets to the self. The current experiments investigate self-similarity as defined by traits and political ideology to better understand how memory for social targets is organised. Across three experiments, participants formed positive or negative impressions based on each target's picture, a trait-implying behavior (Experiments 1 & 2), and/or political ideology (conservative/liberal label in Experiment 2; political-ideological belief statements in Experiment 3) followed by a memory test. Results showed a self-similarity effect dependent on valence in Experiment 1, but not in Experiments 2 or 3 when participants processed ideological information associated with targets. These results suggest that self-similarity has an effect on memory for social targets, but that ideological information disrupts self-focused processing of others, suggesting that ideological information also has a powerful influence on what people remember about others (i.e. social targets).

Cooperative and conformist behavioural preferences predict the dual dimensions of political ideology

Decades of research suggest that our political differences are best captured by two dimensions of political ideology. The dual evolutionary framework of political ideology predicts that these dimensions should be related to variation in social preferences for cooperation and group conformity. Here, we combine data from a New Zealand survey and a suite of incentivised behavioural tasks (n = 991) to test whether cooperative and conformist preferences covary with a pair of widely used measures of the two dimensions of political ideology-Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)-and related policy views. As predicted, we find that cooperative behaviour is negatively related to SDO and economically conservative policy views, while conformist behaviour in the form of social information use is positively related to RWA and socially conservative policy views. However, we did not find the predicted relationships between punitive and rule following behaviours and RWA or socially conservative views, raising questions about the interpretation of punishment and rule following tasks and the nature of authoritarian conformist preferences. These findings reveal how cooperative and conformist preferences that evolved to help us navigate social challenges in our ancestral past continue to track our political differences even today.

Political ideology and moral dilemmas in public good provision

Individuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favors society at large. Cooperation is often considered the moral choice because it creates equality and fairness among citizens. Accordingly, individuals whose political ideology attaches greater value to equality than to agency and self-reliance should not only cooperate on more rather than less efficient public goods, but also more on public goods from which individuals benefit equally rather than unequally. We examine this possibility by comparing ideologically left-leaning and right-leaning individuals' cooperation on multiple public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality in returns. We find that left-leaning individuals cooperate more than right-leaning ones, but only on public goods that benefit everyone equally, and not more on public goods that generate inequalities. Left-leaning individuals also trust and expect others to cooperate more on equal- versus unequal-returns public goods, while self-identified right-leaning individuals do not differentiate between these. Interestingly, ideology does not predict which public good is deemed more morally appropriate to cooperate on. Results combined specify when and why self-identified leftists can(not) be expected to cooperate more than rightists and reveal how moral decision-making depends on structural elements of the public good provision problems that citizens face.

Social Anhedonia and Intergroup Processes: A Multi-Study Investigation of Known and Novel Group Memberships

Introduction: Group memberships play an important role in promoting psychological well-being and supporting social functioning. However, studies suggest that individuals with social anhedonia, a characteristic defined by limited pleasure from social bonds, may show abnormalities in their desire to cultivate positive feelings, such as belongingness, from social groups. Still, these abnormalities have not been studied in the context of intergroup processes, leaving the relation between social anhedonia and subjective evaluations of group memberships unclear. Methods: Across three studies (Ns = 124-659), we examined associations between social anhedonia and affective and cognitive attitudes about different types of ingroups and outgroups using self-report and behavioral measures. Results: Taken together, results indicate that social anhedonia is associated with less positive and more negative feelings and beliefs about most ingroups and outgroups from everyday life, as well as negatively biased stereotyping of many prominent social groups. At the same time, individuals with either extremely high or low levels of social anhedonia did not report significantly different intergroup attitudes when group memberships were experimentally manipulated in a minimal group setting. Discussion: Overall, these findings suggest that social anhedonia is associated with less positive and more negative subjective evaluations of long-established, real-world ingroups, but not of a newly formed ingroup that requires little motivation or social engagement to maintain group membership. Aberrant feelings and attitudes toward one's ingroups are consistent with the theory that social anhedonia is related to anomalies in the need to belong within social groups from everyday life and could inform psychosocial interventions for related psychopathologies.

The influence of memory for impressions based on behaviours and beliefs on approach/avoidance decisions

Recent work has shown that memory for various types of information associated with social targets (impressions based on behaviours and political ideology) influences decisions to approach or avoid those same targets. The current study was intended to better understand the extent that memory for other types of details associated with targets (beliefs and behaviours) affects subsequent approach/avoidance decisions. In this investigation, participants formed impressions of social targets represented by a picture and a sentence (a belief in Experiment 1; either a belief or behaviour in Experiment 2). Later, memory for the impressions and sentences associated with each target was tested. Finally, participants decided whether they would want to approach or avoid each target. Results demonstrated that accurate memory strongly influenced approach/avoidance decisions for targets associated with different types of information (beliefs; behaviours), although there was no difference in the effect of memory between beliefs and behaviours. Overall, results suggest an important role of memory in decisions to approach or avoid others.

Democrats and independents stigmatize people with COVID-19 greater compared to Republicans

Messaging about COVID-19 was different across the political spectrum, which influenced differences in attitudes surrounding COVID-19. This study examined the political affiliation/ideology on COVID-19 stigma (blame, deservingness of help, negative emotionality) and two mediators of this relationship: conspiracy beliefs and anxiety about COVID-19. Participants answered questions about their political affiliation and ideology, attitudes toward people who have contracted COVID-19; and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and anxiety. Democrats and Independents indirectly stigmatized people with COVID-19 via increased COVID-19 anxiety and fewer COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs relative to Republicans. Politicization can strongly impact stigma, and messaging could be harnessed as a stigma reduction tool.

Disclosing political partisanship polarizes first impressions of faces

Americans’ increasing levels of ideological polarization contribute to pervasive intergroup tensions based on political partisanship. Cues to partisanship may affect even the most basic aspects of perception. First impressions of faces constitute a widely-studied basic aspect of person perception relating to intergroup tensions. To understand the relation between face impressions and political polarization, two experiments were designed to test whether disclosing political partisanship affected face impressions based on perceivers’ political ideology. Disclosed partisanship more strongly affected people’s face impressions than actual, undisclosed, categories (Experiment 1). In a replication and extension, disclosed shared and opposing partisanship also engendered, respectively, positive and negative changes in face impressions (Experiment 2). Partisan disclosure effects on face impressions were paralleled by the extent of people’s partisan threat perceptions (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings suggest that partisan biases appear in basic aspects of person perception and may emerge concomitant with perceived partisan threat.

The Hateful People: Populist Attitudes Predict Interpersonal and Intergroup Hate

Do populist attitudes predict a growth in feelings of hate? Or does experiencing hate predict a growth in populist attitudes? Previous research has not yet examined the relation between populist attitudes and hate over time. We conducted a two-wave study with a Dutch adult sample in the Netherlands, to examine the time-extended associations between populism and hate, thereby focusing on other individuals ( N = 943) or groups ( N = 851) as targets of hate. For interpersonal and intergroup hate, results uncovered an association between populist attitudes and hate, such that, earlier populist attitudes predict later feelings of hate, while the reverse associations were virtually absent. The findings provide new evidence that a populist worldview might fuel feelings of hate over time, rather than the reverse, highlighting the intense and strong negative feelings that the populist worldview can inspire among people. Further implications are discussed.

Does social intolerance vary according to cognitive styles, genetic cognitive capacity, or education?

BACKGROUND

Low education, low cognitive abilities, and certain cognitive styles are suggested to predispose to social intolerance and prejudices. Evidence is, however, restricted by comparatively small samples, neglect of confounding variables and genetic factors, and a narrow focus on a single sort of prejudice. We investigated the relationships of education, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, and cognitive styles with social intolerance in adulthood over a 15-year follow-up.

METHODS

We used data from the prospective population-based Young Finns Study (n = 960-1679). Social intolerance was evaluated with the Social Intolerance Scale in 1997, 2001, and 2011; cognitive performance with the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery in 2011; cognitive styles in 1997; and socioeconomic factors in 1980 (childhood) and 2011 (adulthood); and polygenic cognitive potential was calculated based on genome-wide association studies.

RESULTS

We found that nonrational thinking, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, or socioeconomic factors were not related to social intolerance. Regarding cognitive styles, low flexibility (B = -0.759, p < .001), high perseverance (B = 1.245, p < .001), and low persistence (B = -0.329, p < .001) predicted higher social intolerance consistently in the analyses.

DISCUSSION

When developing prejudice-reduction interventions, it should be considered that educational level or cognitive performance may not be crucial for development of social intolerance. Adopting certain cognitive styles may play more important roles in development of social intolerance.

Interventions to reduce partisan animosity

Rising partisan animosity is associated with a reduction in support for democracy and an increase in support for political violence. Here we provide a multi-level review of interventions designed to reduce partisan animosity, which we define as negative thoughts, feelings and behaviours towards a political outgroup. We introduce the TRI framework to capture three levels of intervention-thoughts (correcting misconceptions and highlighting commonalities), relationships (building dialogue skills and fostering positive contact) and institutions (changing public discourse and transforming political structures)-and connect these levels by highlighting the importance of motivation and mobilization. Our review encompasses both interventions conducted as part of academic research projects and real-world interventions led by practitioners in non-profit organizations. We also explore the challenges of durability and scalability, examine self-fulfilling polarization and interventions that backfire, and discuss future directions for reducing partisan animosity.

Political ideology and pandemic lifestyles: the indirect effects of empathy, authoritarianism, and threat

Background

In this paper, we integrate theory and research from sociology, psychology, and political science to develop and test a mediation model that helps to explain why political conservatism is often associated with pandemic behaviors and lifestyles that are inconsistent with public health recommendations for COVID-19.

Methods

Using national data from the 2021 Crime, Health, and Politics Survey (n = 1743), we formally test the indirect effects of political conservatism (an index of Republican party identification, conservative political orientation, right-wing news media consumption, and 2020 Trump vote) on pandemic lifestyles (an index of social distancing, hand sanitizing, mask usage, and vaccination) through the mechanisms of empathy (concern about the welfare of others), authoritarian beliefs (authoritarian aggressiveness and acquiescence to authority), and pandemic threat perceptions (threats to self and to the broader society).

Result

Our results confirm that political conservatism is associated with riskier pandemic lifestyles. We also find that this association is partially mediated by lower levels of empathy, higher levels of authoritarian beliefs, and lower levels of perceived pandemic threat.

Conclusions

Understanding why political conservatism is associated with riskier pandemic lifestyles may eventually lead us to ways of identifying and overcoming widespread cultural barriers to critical pandemic responses.

Distinguishing Active and Passive Outgroup Tolerance: Understanding Its Prevalence and the Role of Moral Concern

Tolerance, the acceptance of disapproved conduct of others, is considered an indispensable feature of diverse societies. Yet tolerance can be expressed in one of two distinct ways, which is not reflected in the literature. In one way, tolerance is passive and involves suppressing the inclination to interfere with the disapproved conduct of others. In the other way, tolerance is active and involves endorsing the ability of others to engage in a disapproved practice. Using two nationally representative samples of Dutch majority members and eight scenarios involving real-world debates about the accommodation of Muslim minority practices, we find that while a significant minority of people engage in passive tolerance toward disapproved outgroup practices, very few people are willing to engage in active tolerance by proactively supporting disapproved practices. Furthermore, we also find that people who have stronger moral concerns about particular minority practices are less willing to engage in either active or passive tolerance. These results emerged both in contexts where Muslim minority practices had a direct impact on one's personal life as well as those that impacted on society as a whole. Collectively, these results illustrate two different forms of tolerance and the influence of moral concern in tolerance.

A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

College Students’ Political Attitudes Affect Negative Stereotypes about Social Groups

This study examined the relations between political attitudes and negative stereotypes in undergraduates by employing 4 measures of stereotypes: modern sexism, modern racism, feelings about 20 social groups, and ratings of the intelligence of these social groups. It was hypothesized that conservatives and Republicans alike would show more evidence of negative stereotypes than liberals and Democrats, especially for disadvantaged social groups. The study revealed that, indeed, Republicans showed stronger evidence of negative stereotypes but that Democrats also harbor some biases. Importantly, the social groups for whom Democrats and Republicans show negative stereotypes differed greatly. Republicans had considerably more negative stereotypes against racial and religious minorities, and particularly against individuals who do not identify with the cis-gender, heterosexual norm. Thus, the targets of Republicans’ stereotypes were groups that have traditionally been subjected to discrimination. Democrats, on the other hand, held stronger negative stereotypes against groups that are more politically powerful, such as Caucasians and Christians.

Measuring extremist archetypes: Scale development and validation

Previous work has often disregarded the psychological heterogeneity of violent extremists. This research aimed to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the psychological diversity of violent extremists. Based on qualitative work, we developed and validated the Extremist Archetypes Scale, identifying five distinct archetype dimensions: "adventurer," "fellow traveler," "leader," "drifter" and "misfit." Study 1 identified five dimensions among White majority members (N = 307), four of which were related to extremist violent intentions and which dissociated in terms of sociopolitical ideologies and intergroup attitudes. Preregistered Study 2 (N = 308) confirmed the scale's five-factor solution in another sample of White majority members, replicated relationships with violent intentions, and demonstrated the dimensions' distinct personality correlates. As in Study 1, the archetype dimensions had positive associations with extremist violent intentions and tapped onto different psychological profiles in terms of major personality traits. Study 3 (N = 317) replicated these results in a sample of Muslim minority members. Measurement equivalence was established across gender, age, political orientation, and ethnicity (majority and minority).

A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking

The psychological study of ideology has traditionally emphasized the content of ideological beliefs, guided by questions about what people believe, such as why people believe in omniscient gods or fascist worldviews. This theoretical focus has led to siloed subdisciplines separately dealing with political, religious, moral, and prejudiced attitudes. The fractionation has fostered a neglect of the cognitive structure of ideological worldviews and associated questions about why ideologies-in all their forms-are so compelling to the human mind. Here I argue that it is essential to consider the nature of ideological cognition across a multitude of ideologies. I offer a multidimensional, empirically tractable framework of ideological thinking, suggesting it can be conceptualized as a style of thinking that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and resistance to evidence-based belief-updating and favorably oriented toward an in-group and antagonistic to out-groups. The article identifies the subcomponents of ideological thinking and highlights that ideological thinking constitutes a meaningful psychological phenomenon that merits direct scholarly investigation and analysis. By emphasizing conceptual precision, methodological directions, and interdisciplinary integration across the political and cognitive sciences, the article illustrates the potential of this framework as a catalyst for developing a rigorous domain-general psychology of ideology.

Assessing the efficacy of a participant-vetting procedure to improve data-quality on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk

In recent years, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) has become a pivotal source for participant recruitment in many social-science fields. In the last several years, however, concerns about data quality have arisen. In response, CloudResearch developed an intensive pre-screening procedure to vet the full participant pool available on MTurk and exclude those providing low-quality data. To assess its efficacy, we compared three MTurk samples that completed identical measures: Sample 1 was collected prior to the pre-screening’s implementation. Sample 2 was collected shortly following its implementation, and Sample 3 was collected nearly a full-year after its implementation. Results indicated that the reliability and validity of scales improved with the implementation of this prescreening procedure, and that this was especially apparent with more recent versions. Thus, this prescreening procedure appears to be a valuable tool to help ensure the collection of high-quality data on MTurk.

Understanding Evaluations of Kamala Harris in 2020: Political Ideology Qualifies Perceived Communality Effects when Communal Cues are Present

Women of color (vs. White women) are underrepresented in the United States government. Identifying factors that affect evaluations of these women is important to understand their underrepresentation. Deviating from communal expectations contributes to backlash against women. Being perceived as prioritizing communality thus appears key for women to receive support. Little work, however, has examined this relation in actual politicians and how perceiver political ideology may affect it. We examined how gendered trait inferences and political ideology affected evaluations of Kamala Harris, the first woman of color elected to the executive branch, before the 2020 election. People perceived Harris as more agentic than communal (Studies 1–2). Communal trait inferences and having a more liberal political ideology each positively related to evaluations of Harris. More liberal relative to more conservative perceivers had weaker positive communality effects when evaluating her expected success (Studies 1–2) and when a description conveyed Harris’s communality (vs. agency; Study 2). These findings highlight communality effects on evaluations of Harris and suggest a context under which she was likely more supported by co-partisans. Moreover, these studies identify potential sources of bias toward female candidates of color, illustrating a need for gendered trait inferences to be thoroughly considered in campaign strategies. Additional online materials for this article are available on PWQ’s website at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/03616843221104383 .

People See Political Opponents as More Stupid Than Evil

Affective polarization is a rising threat to political discourse and democracy. Public figures have expressed that "conservatives think liberals are stupid, and liberals think conservatives are evil." However, four studies (N = 1,660)-including a representative sample-reveal evidence that both sides view political opponents as more unintelligent than immoral. Perceiving the other side as "more stupid than evil" occurs both in general judgments (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and regarding specific issues (Study 2). Study 4 also examines "meta-perceptions" of how Democrats and Republicans disparage one another, revealing that people correctly perceive that both Democrats and Republicans see each other as more unintelligent than immoral, although they exaggerate the extent of this negativity. These studies clarify the way everyday partisans view each other, an important step in designing effective interventions to reduce political animosity.

Perceived Muslim population growth triggers divergent perceptions and reactions from Republicans and Democrats

The Muslim population is rapidly growing worldwide. Five experiments show that Republicans and Democrats respond to this demographic change with divergent reactions in three domains: perception of threats, celebratory reactions, and emotional responses. In terms of threat perceptions, Republicans tend to perceive Muslim population growth as a threat to Christians and the U.S. society in terms of American culture, legal norms, and peace. Furthermore, Republicans are less likely to have celebratory reactions to Muslim population growth (a theoretically novel reaction). They experience less hope and pride, along with more anxiety and anger. The divergent responses from partisans are partially explained by their ideological orientation and media exposure, but they are not explained by any racial mechanisms or the partisans’ religious identity. Together, these studies reveal that political leaning can be an antecedent to reactions to the demographic change in many complex ways beyond the dominant group’s concern for their status.

Protest movements involving limited violence can sometimes be effective: Evidence from the 2020 BlackLivesMatter protests

SignificanceThe effects of recent protests for racial equality, particularly when they included violence, are currently of public and academic interest. To better understand these effects, we combine a dataset of all 2020 BlackLivesMatter protests with survey data containing measures of prejudice and support for police reform. Protests were not associated with reductions in prejudice, but were associated with increases in support for police reform. Specifically, a mix of nonviolent and violent protests was associated with an increase in police-reform support among conservatives living in liberal areas. This study highlights the importance of considering multiple measures of protest effectiveness and suggests that mass protest (including when it mixes nonviolence and violence) can be effective at advancing the movement's goals.

Tolerating the intolerant: Does realistic threat lead to increased tolerance of right-wing extremists?

Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one’s group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.

Political coherence and certainty as drivers of interpersonal liking over and above similarity

Affective polarization and political segregation have become a serious threat to democratic societies. One standard explanation for these phenomena is that people like and prefer interacting with similar others. However, similarity may not be the only driver of interpersonal liking in the political domain, and other factors, yet to be uncovered, could play an important role. Here, we hypothesized that beyond the effect of similarity, people show greater preference for individuals with politically coherent and confident opinions. To test this idea, we performed two behavioral studies consisting of one-shot face-to-face pairwise interactions. We found that people with ambiguous or ambivalent views were nonreciprocally attracted to confident and coherent ingroups. A third experimental study confirmed that politically coherent and confident profiles are rated as more attractive than targets with ambiguous or ambivalent opinions. Overall, these findings unfold the key drivers of the affability between people who discuss politics.

Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

Ignorance of History and Political Differences in Perception of Racism in the United States

According to the Marley hypothesis, White Americans are more ignorant of historical racism than Black Americans, which explains their greater tendency to deny racism in the present. We extended the Marley hypothesis by testing whether it explains political differences in perception of racism among White Americans in the United States. Two preregistered studies measured participants’ knowledge of historical racism as well as their perception of present racism in individual cases and in society ( N = 463). White Republicans had less knowledge of historical racism and perceived less individual and systemic racism than White Democrats. Consistent with the Marley hypothesis, political differences in perception of individual racism were significantly mediated by knowledge of historical racism. These findings suggest that ignorance of historical racism may partly explain why White Republicans perceive less racism than White Democrats, and therefore extend the Marley hypothesis to the political realm.

Development and validity of the Value-based Stigma Inventory (VASI): a value-sensitive questionnaire for the assessment of mental health stigma

BACKGROUND

It has been hypothesized that mental illness stigma differs according to what matters most to people, and that this results in value-based differences in stigma within societies. However, there is a lack of stigma measures that account for a broad range of values, including modern and liberal values.

METHODS

For the development of the Value-based Stigma Inventory (VASI) a preliminary item-pool of 68 VASI-items was assembled by mental health and stigma experts. For psychometric evaluation, we tested the VASI in an online sample of the general population (n = 4983).

RESULTS

Based on item-characteristics as well as explorative and confirmatory factor analyses, a final version of the VASI was developed, comprising 15 items and 5 subscales. The VASI shows good psychometric properties (item difficulty = 0.34 to 0.67; mean inter-item correlation r = 0.326; Cronbach's α = 0.879). Medium to high correlations with established stigma scales (SDS, SSMI), medium associations with instruments assessing personal values (PVQ, KSA-3) and small to no associations with a social desirability scale (KSE-G) attest to good convergent and discriminatory validity of the new instrument. Normative values for the VASI subscales are presented.

CONCLUSIONS

The developed VASI can be used to assess public stigma of mental illness including personal stigma-relevant value orientations.

Pushing Back Against the Microaggression Pushback in Academic Psychology: Reflections on a Concept-Creep Paradox

Echoing the 1960s, the 2020s opened with racial tensions boiling. The Black Lives Matter movement is energized, issuing pleas to listen to Black voices regarding day-to-day discrimination and expressing frustrations over the slow progress of social justice. However, psychological scientists have published only several opinion pieces on racial microaggressions, primarily objections, and strikingly little empirical data. Here I document three trends in psychology that coincide with the academic pushback against microaggressions: concept-creep concerns, especially those regarding expanded notions of harm; the expansion of right-leaning values in moral judgments (moral foundations theory); and an emphasis on prejudice symmetry, with the political left deemed equivalently biased against right-leaning targets (e.g., the rich, police) as the right is against left-leaning targets (e.g., Black people, women, LGBT+ people). Psychological scientists have ignored power dynamics and have strayed from their mission to understand and combat prejudice against disadvantaged populations, rendering researchers distracted and ill-equipped to tackle the microaggression concept. An apparent creep paradox, with calls to both reduce (e.g., harm) and expand (e.g., liberal prejudices, conservative moral foundations) concepts, poses a serious challenge to research on prejudice. I discuss the need for psychology to better capture Black experiences and to "tell it like it is" or risk becoming an irrelevant discipline of study.

Moral Judgments of COVID-19 Social Distancing Violations: The Roles of Perceived Harm and Impurity

Can perceptions of impurity uniquely explain moral judgment? Or is moral judgment reducible to perceptions of harm? Whereas some perspectives posit that purity violations may drive moral judgment distinctly from harm violations, other perspectives contend that perceived harm is an essential precursor of moral condemnation. We tested these competing hypotheses through five preregistered experiments (total N = 2,944) investigating U.S. adults' perceptions of social distancing violations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Perceived harm was more strongly related to moral judgment than was perceived impurity. Nevertheless, over and above perceived harm, perceived impurity reliably explained unique variance in moral judgment. Effects of perceived harm and impurity were significant among both liberal and conservative participants but were larger among liberals. Results suggest that appraisals of both harm and impurity provide valuable insights into moral cognition. We discuss implications of these findings for dyadic morality, moral foundations, act versus character judgments, and political ideology.

Moving Morality Beyond the In-Group: Liberals and Conservatives Show Differences on Group-Framed Moral Foundations and These Differences Mediate the Relationships to Perceived Bias and Threat

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., 'ingroups' and 'outgroups' in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects.

A Replication of Stern, West, and Schmitt (2014) Indicates Less False Consensus Among Liberals Than Conservatives, But No False Uniqueness

Abstract. Stern, West, and Schmitt (2014) reported that liberals display truly false uniqueness in contrast to moderates and conservatives who display truly false consensus. We conducted a close, preregistered replication of Stern et al.’s (2014) research with a large sample ( N = 1,005). Liberals, moderates, and conservatives demonstrated the truly false consensus effect by overestimating ingroup consensus. False consensus was strongest among conservatives, followed by moderates, and weakest among liberals. However, liberals did score higher than moderates and conservatives on the need for uniqueness scale, which partially accounted for the difference in false consensus between liberals and conservatives. Overall, our data align with Stern et al.’s (2014) in demonstrating left-right ideological differences in the overestimation of ingroup consensus but fall short of illustrating a liberal illusion of uniqueness.