Using theoretical constraints and the TASI taxonomy to delineate predictably replicable findings

The focus of the present article is not on failures to replicate but on the more optimistically framed and more fruitful question: What stable findings can be reproduced reliably and can be trusted by decision makers, managers, health agents, or politicians? We propagate the working hypothesis that a twofold key to stable and replicable findings lies in the existence of theoretical constraints and, no less important, in researchers' sensitivity to metatheoretical, auxiliary assumptions. We introduce a hierarchy of four levels of theoretical constraints-a priori principles, psychophysical, empirical, and modelling constraints-combined with the TASI taxonomy of theoretical, auxiliary, statistical, and inferential assumptions Trafimow, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 52, 37-48, (2022). Although theoretical constraints clearly facilitate stable and replicable research findings, TASI reminds us of various reasons why even perfectly valid hypotheses need not always be borne out. The presented framework should help researchers to operationalize conditions under which theoretical constraints render empirical findings most predictable.

Susceptibility to online misinformation: A systematic meta-analysis of demographic and psychological factors

Nearly five billion people use and receive news through social media and there is widespread concern about the negative consequences of misinformation on social media (e.g., election interference, vaccine hesitancy). Despite a burgeoning body of research on misinformation, it remains largely unclear who is susceptible to misinformation and why. To address this, we conducted a systematic individual participant data meta-analysis covering 256,337 unique choices made by 11,561 US-based participants across 31 experiments. Our meta-analysis reveals the impact of key demographic and psychological factors on online misinformation veracity judgments. We also disentangle the ability to discern between true and false news (discrimination ability) from response bias, that is, the tendency to label news as either true (true-news bias) or false (false-news bias). Across all studies, participants were well above-chance accurate for both true (68.51%) and false (67.24%) news headlines. We find that older age, higher analytical thinking skills, and identifying as a Democrat are associated with higher discrimination ability. Additionally, older age and higher analytical thinking skills are associated with a false-news bias (caution). In contrast, ideological congruency (alignment of participants' ideology with news), motivated reflection (higher analytical thinking skills being associated with a greater congruency effect), and self-reported familiarity with news are associated with a true-news bias (naïvety). We also find that experiments on MTurk show higher discrimination ability than those on Lucid. Displaying sources alongside news headlines is associated with improved discrimination ability, with Republicans benefiting more from source display. Our results provide critical insights that can help inform the design of targeted interventions.

Accuracy prompts protect professional content moderators from the illusory truth effect

Content moderators review problematic content for technology companies. One concern is that repeated exposure to false claims could cause moderators to come to believe the very claims they are supposed to moderate, via the "illusory truth effect." In a first lab-in-field experiment (N = 199) with a global content moderation company, we found that exposure to false claims while working as moderators increased subsequent belief among (mostly Indian and Philippine) employees by 7.1%. We tested an intervention to mitigate this effect: inducing an accuracy mindset. In both general population samples (N India = 997; N Philippines = 1,184) and a second lab-in-field experiment with professional moderators (N = 239), inducing participants to consider accuracy when first exposed to the claims eliminates the negative effects of exposure on belief in falsehoods. Our results show that the illusory truth effect and the protective power of an accuracy mindset generalize to non-Western populations and professional moderators.

Why Do People Believe in Vaccine Misinformation? The Roles of Perceived Familiarity and Evidence Type

The proliferation of health misinformation poses a significant threat to public health, making it increasingly important to understand why misinformation is accepted. The illusory truth effect, which refers to the increased believability of a message due to repeated exposure, has been widely studied. However, there is limited research on this effect in the context of COVID-19 vaccine misinformation. This paper aims to examine the role of perceived familiarity with COVID-19 vaccine misinformation on various message perceptions, including perceived accuracy, agreement, perceived message effectiveness, and determinants of vaccination, including vaccine attitude and vaccination intention. Furthermore, it explores the impact of misinformation evidence (statistical vs. narrative) on the magnitude of the effects of perceived familiarity. To investigate these factors, a between-subjects experimental study was conducted, employing a 2 (Familiarity: strong vs. weak) × 3 (Evidence type: statistical, narrative, and both evidence) + 1 (Control: a message about drinking water) design. The results revealed that perceived familiarity with COVID-19 vaccine misinformation significantly predicted perceived accuracy, which was found to be negatively correlated with vaccine attitudes and vaccination intentions. Moreover, statistical evidence presented in misinformation was perceived as more persuasive in perceived message effectiveness, compared to narrative and mixed evidence. Interestingly, the effects of perceived familiarity were not contingent on the type of evidence used in COVID-19 vaccine misinformation. These findings emphasize the importance of avoiding the repetition of misinformation, reducing the processing fluency associated with misinformation correction, and educating individuals on how to critically evaluate statistical evidence when encountering (mis)information.

A Picture Corrects a Thousand Words - The Effect of Photos on Veracity Feedback

The truthiness effect (Newman et al., 2012) refers to the belief that any particular stimulus is truthful when it is accompanied by nonprobative information (e.g., a photograph). Accordingly, photo-accompanied statements are more likely to be judged as truthful compared to statements without a photo. In an online experiment (N = 98) with two assessment times, we aimed to replicate this effect and its persistence over time. Furthermore, we were interested in to what extent feedback on the actual veracity of statements would be affected by the presence of a photo. Participants rated the veracity of trivia statements either accompanied by a nonprobative photo or not. Feedback on veracity, with or without a nonprobative photo, was provided after some but not all veracity judgments. The truthiness effect could neither be replicated immediately nor after 48 h. Feedback facilitated discrimination between true and false statements - especially when accompanied by a photo. However, feedback also led to a bias towards responding "true". Our findings suggest using photos in feedback on veracity.

Are you sure? Examining the potential benefits of truth-checking as a learning activity

Learners may be uncertain about whether encountered information is true. Uncertainty may encourage people to critically assess information's accuracy, serving as a kind of desirable difficulty that benefits learning. Uncertainty may also have negative effects, however, leading people to mistrust true information or to later misremember false information as true. In three experiments, participants read history statements. In one condition, all statements were true, and the participants knew it. In the other two conditions, some statements were true, and others were false. Participants were either told the statements' accuracy or they guessed the statements' accuracy prior to feedback, a manipulation we refer to as truth-checking. All participants were then tested on recalling the true information and on recognising true versus false statements. We observed a significant benefit of truth-checking in one of the three experiments, suggesting that truth-checking may have some potential to enhance learning, perhaps by inducing people to encode to-be-learned information more deeply than they would otherwise. Even so, the benefit may come at a cost-truth-checking took significantly longer than study alone, and it led to a greater likelihood of thinking false information was true, suggesting costs of truth-checking may tend to outweigh benefits.

More familiar, more credible? Distinguishing two types of familiarity on the truth effect using the drift-diffusion model

Familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. This illusory truth effect has a tremendous negative impact on misinformation intervention. Previous studies focused on the familiarity from repeated exposure in the laboratory, ignoring preexisting familiarity with real-world misinformation. Over three studies (total N = 337), we investigated the cognitive mechanisms behind the truth biases from these two familiarity sources, and whether fact-checking can curb such biased truth perceptions. Studies 1 and 2 found robust truth effects induced by two sources of familiarity but with different cognitive processes. According to the cognitive process model, repetition-induced familiarity reduced decision prudence. Preexisting familiarity instead enhanced truth-congruent evidence accumulation. Study 3 showed that pre-exposing statements with warning flags eliminated the bias to truth induced by repetition but not that from preexisting familiarity. These repeated statements with warning labels also reduced decision caution. These findings furthered the understanding of how different sources of familiarity affect truth perceptions and undermine the intervention through different cognitive processes.

Illusions of knowledge due to mere repetition

Repeating information increases people's belief that the repeated information is true. This truth effect has been widely researched and is relevant for topics such as fake news and misinformation. Another effect of repetition, which is also relevant to those topics, has not been extensively studied so far: Do people believe they knew something before it was repeated? We used a standard truth effect paradigm in four pre-registered experiments (total N = 773), including a presentation and judgment phase. However, instead of "true"/"false" judgments, participants indicated whether they knew a given trivia statement before participating in the experiment. Across all experiments, participants judged repeated information as "known" more often than novel information. Participants even judged repeated false information to know it to be false. In addition, participants also generated sources of their knowledge. The inability to distinguish recent information from well-established knowledge in memory adds an explanation for the persistence and strength of repetition effects on truth. The truth effect might be so robust because people believe to know the repeatedly presented information as a matter of fact.

The illusory truth effect: A review of how repetition increases belief in misinformation

Repetition increases belief in information, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. In laboratory experiments, the illusory truth effect has often been examined using general trivia statements as stimuli, but repetition also increases belief in misinformation, such as fake news headlines and conspiracy beliefs. Repetition even increases belief in claims that are implausible or that contradict prior knowledge. Repetition also has broader impacts beyond belief, such as increasing sharing intentions of news headlines and decreasing how unethical an act is perceived to be. Although the illusory truth effect is robust, some interventions reduce its magnitude, including instruction to focus on accuracy and awareness of the illusory truth effect. These strategies may be effective for reducing belief in misinformation.

On the role of memory in misinformation corrections: Repeated exposure, correction durability, and source credibility

Misinformation can negatively affect cognition, beliefs, and behavior, and thus contribute to societal disruption. Correcting misinformation can counteract these effects by updating memory and beliefs. In this selective review, we highlight recent perspectives on and evidence for the role of memory in the efficacy of correction methods. Two theoretical accounts propose that repeating misinformation can impair or improve correction efficacy to the extent that familiarity or integrative encoding prevails. We summarize evidence that recollection of corrections can counteract potential interference from misinformation repetitions on memory and belief updating. The efficacy of such updating also declines over time, especially when misinformation sources are not remembered. We call for more research on the role of memory in everyday misinformation corrections to better understand interactions among these processes.

The Online Misinformation Engagement Framework

Research on online misinformation has evolved rapidly, but organizing its results and identifying open research questions is difficult without a systematic approach. We present the Online Misinformation Engagement Framework, which classifies people's engagement with online misinformation into four stages: selecting information sources, choosing what information to consume or ignore, evaluating the accuracy of the information and/or the credibility of the source, and judging whether and how to react to the information (e.g., liking or sharing). We outline entry points for interventions at each stage and pinpoint the two early stages-source and information selection-as relatively neglected processes that should be addressed to further improve people's ability to contend with misinformation.

"That's just like, your opinion, man": the illusory truth effect on opinions

With the expanse of technology, people are constantly exposed to an abundance of information. Of vital importance is to understand how people assess the truthfulness of such information. One indicator of perceived truthfulness seems to be whether it is repeated. That is, people tend to perceive repeated information, regardless of its veracity, as more truthful than new information, also known as the illusory truth effect. In the present study, we examined whether such effect is also observed for opinions and whether the manner in which the information is encoded influenced the illusory truth effect. Across three experiments, participants (n = 552) were presented with a list of true information, misinformation, general opinion, and/or social-political opinion statements. First, participants were either instructed to indicate whether the presented statement was a fact or opinion based on its syntax structure (Exp. 1 & 2) or assign each statement to a topic category (Exp. 3). Subsequently, participants rated the truthfulness of various new and repeated statements. Results showed that repeated information, regardless of the type of information, received higher subjective truth ratings when participants simply encoded them by assigning each statement to a topic. However, when general and social-political opinions were encoded as an opinion, we found no evidence of such effect. Moreover, we found a reversed illusory truth effect for general opinion statements when only considering information that was encoded as an opinion. These findings suggest that how information is encoded plays a crucial role in evaluating truth.

The relevance of syntactic complexity for truth judgments: A registered report

Fluency theories predict higher truth judgments for easily processed statements. We investigated two factors relevant for processing fluency: repetition and syntactic complexity. In three online experiments, we manipulated syntactic complexity by creating simple and complex versions of trivia statements. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect. However, syntactic complexity did not affect truth judgments although complex statements were processed slower than simple statements. This null effect is surprising given that both studies had high statistical power and varied in the relative salience of syntactic complexity. Experiment 3 provides a preregistered test of the discounting explanation by using improved trivia statements of equal length and by manipulating the salience of complexity in a randomized design. As predicted by fluency theories, simple statements were more likely judged as true than complex ones, while this effect was small and not moderated by the salience of complexity.

People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others)

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

The illusory truth effect requires semantic coherence across repetitions

Repeated exposure to information increases its' perceived truth, and this illusory truth effect is often explained by two theoretical frameworks: the fluency account and the referential theory of truth. Whereas the fluency account suggests that prior activation of a single referent within a statement should increase its perceived truth, the referential theory makes no such predictions. The referential theory instead proposes that when a statement is processed, it activates the corresponding memory referents within that statement and strengthens the connection between these referents in the semantic memory network. Because repeated statements will have more coherent corresponding referents than new statements, they are perceived as relatively truer. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on testing the fluency account, with participants exposed to one or two of a statement's referents before evaluating that statement's truth. Experiments 3 and 4 focused on the referential theory by exposing participants to non-critical facts that linked together two of a critical statements' referents before evaluating the truth of the critical statements. We consistently observed a standard illusory truth effect, such that facts that repeated verbatim were rated as truer than new facts. However, perceived truth was not affected by prior exposure to the critical statement's topic (Experiment 1) or by prior exposure to non-critical facts related to the same topic(s) as the critical statement (Experiment 2). There was also no boost in perceived truth following prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked together two of the primary referents of the critical statement but did so in a semantically distinct manner from how those same referents were linked in the critical statement itself (Experiments 3 and 4). However, Experiment 4 demonstrated that perceived truth significantly increased if there was prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked two of the critical statement primary referents in a way that was semantically coherent with how those same referents were linked within the critical statement. Together, these results are consistent with the referential theory, and suggest that semantic consistency across repetitions plays a crucial role in leading to repetition-based illusory truth effects.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

Older Adults' Trust and Distrust in COVID-19 Public Health Information: Qualitative Critical Incident Study

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 infodemic has imposed a disproportionate burden on older adults who face increased challenges in accessing and assessing public health information, but little is known about factors influencing older adults' trust in public health information during COVID-19.

OBJECTIVE

This study aims to identify sources that older adults turn to for trusted COVID-19 public health information and factors that influence their trust. In addition, we explore the relationship between public health information sources and trust factors.

METHODS

Adults aged 65 years or older (N=30; mean age 71.6, SD 5.57; range 65-84 years) were recruited using Prime Panels. Semistructured phone interviews, guided by critical incident technique, were conducted in October and November 2020. Participants were asked about their sources of COVID-19 public health information, the trustworthiness of that information, and factors influencing their trust. Interview data were examined with thematic analysis.

RESULTS

Mass media, known individuals, and the internet were the older adults' main sources for COVID-19 public health information. Although they used social media for entertainment and personal communication, the older adults actively avoided accessing or sharing COVID-19 information on social media. Factors influencing their trust in COVID-19 public health information included confirmation bias, personal research, resigned acceptance, and personal relevance.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings shed light on older adults' use of information sources and their criteria for evaluating the trustworthiness of public health information during a pandemic. They have implications for the future development of effective public health communication, policies, and interventions for older adults during health crises.

Item-method directed forgetting and perceived truth of news headlines

Research on item-method directed forgetting (IMDF) suggests that memories can be voluntarily forgotten. IMDF is however usually examined with relatively simple study materials, such as single words or pictures. In the present study, we examined voluntary forgetting of news headlines from (presumably) untrustworthy sources. Experiment 1 found intact IMDF when to-be-forgotten headlines were characterised as untrustworthy and to-be-remembered headlines were characterised as trustworthy. Experiment 2 separated remember/forget cues and trustworthiness prompts. Forget cues alone had a large effect on memory, but only a small reducing effect on perceived truth. In contrast, trustworthiness prompts alone had essentially no effect on memory, but a large effect on perceived truth. Finally, Experiment 3 fully crossed forget/remember cues and trustworthiness prompts, revealing that forget cues can reduce memory irrespective of whether headlines are characterised as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Moreover, forget cues may bias source attributions, which can explain their small reducing effect on perceived truth. Overall, this work suggests that news headlines can be voluntarily forgotten. At least when people are motivated to forget information from untrustworthy sources, such forgetting may be helpful for curtailing the spread of false information.

Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence - plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge.

Navigating the COVID-19 infodemic: the influence of metacognitive efficiency on health behaviours and policy attitudes

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an infodemic of misinformation and increasing polarization around public health measures, such as social distancing and national lockdowns. In this study, I examined metacognitive efficiency-the extent to which the subjective feeling of knowing predicts the objective accuracy of knowledge-as a tool to understand and measure the assimilation of misleading misinformation in a balanced sample of Great Britain's population (N = 1689), surveyed at the end of the third national lockdown. Using a signal-detection theory approach to quantify metacognitive efficiency, I found that at the population level, metacognitive efficiency for COVID-19 knowledge was impaired compared with general knowledge, indicating a worse alignment between confidence levels and the actual ability to discern true and false statements. Crucially, individual differences in metacognitive efficiency related to COVID-19 knowledge predicted health-protective behaviours, vaccination intentions and attitudes towards public health measures, even after accounting for the level of knowledge itself and demographic covariates, such as education, income and political alignment. These results reveal the significant impact of misinformation on public beliefs and suggest that fostering confidence in accurate knowledge should be a key target for science communication efforts aimed at promoting compliance with public health and social measures.

Impact of Social Reference Cues on Misinformation Sharing on Social Media: Series of Experimental Studies

BACKGROUND

Health-related misinformation on social media is a key challenge to effective and timely public health responses. Existing mitigation measures include flagging misinformation or providing links to correct information, but they have not yet targeted social processes. Current approaches focus on increasing scrutiny, providing corrections to misinformation (debunking), or alerting users prospectively about future misinformation (prebunking and inoculation). Here, we provide a test of a complementary strategy that focuses on the social processes inherent in social media use, in particular, social reinforcement, social identity, and injunctive norms.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to examine whether providing balanced social reference cues (ie, cues that provide information on users sharing and, more importantly, not sharing specific content) in addition to flagging COVID-19-related misinformation leads to reductions in sharing behavior and improvement in overall sharing quality.

METHODS

A total of 3 field experiments were conducted on Twitter's native social media feed (via a newly developed browser extension). Participants' feed was augmented to include misleading and control information, resulting in 4 groups: no-information control, Twitter's own misinformation warning (misinformation flag), social cue only, and combined misinformation flag and social cue. We tracked the content shared or liked by participants. Participants were provided with social information by referencing either their personal network on Twitter or all Twitter users.

RESULTS

A total of 1424 Twitter users participated in 3 studies (n=824, n=322, and n=278). Across all 3 studies, we found that social cues that reference users' personal network combined with a misinformation flag reduced the sharing of misleading but not control information and improved overall sharing quality. We show that this improvement could be driven by a change in injunctive social norms (study 2) but not social identity (study 3).

CONCLUSIONS

Social reference cues combined with misinformation flags can significantly and meaningfully reduce the amount of COVID-19-related misinformation shared and improve overall sharing quality. They are a feasible and scalable way to effectively curb the sharing of COVID-19-related misinformation on social media.

Buffering against exposure to mental health misinformation in online communities on Facebook: the interplay of depression literacy and expert moderation

BACKGROUND

The proliferation of health misinformation on social media is a growing public health concern. Online communities for mental health (OCMHs) are also considered an outlet for exposure to misinformation. This study explored the impact of the self-reported volume of exposure to mental health misinformation in misinformation agreement and the moderating effects of depression literacy and type of OCMHs participation (expert vs. peer-led).

METHODS

Participants (n = 403) were recruited in Italian-speaking OCMHs on Facebook. We conducted regression analyses using PROCESS macro (moderated moderation, Model 3). Measures included: the Depression Literacy Questionnaire (Griffiths et al., 2004), the self-reported misinformation exposure in the OCMHs (3 items), and misinformation agreement with the exposure items (3 items). Whether participants were members of expert or peer-led OCMHs was also investigated.

RESULTS

The final model explained the 12% variance in the agreement. There was a positive and significant relationship between misinformation exposure and misinformation agreement (β = 0.3221, p < .001), a significant two-way interaction between misinformation exposure and depression literacy (β = - 0.2179, p = .0014 ), and between self-reported misinformation exposure and type of OCMH (β = - 0.2322, p = .0254), such that at higher levels of depression literacy and in case of participation to expert-led OCMHs, the relationship misinformation exposure-misinformation agreement was weaker. Finally, a three-way interaction was found (β = 0.2497, p = .0144) that showed that depression literacy moderated the positive relationship between misinformation exposure and misinformation agreement such that the more misinformation participants were exposed to, the more they agreed with it unless they had higher levels of depression literacy; this, however, occurred only if they participated in peer-led groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Results provide evidence that the more members reported being exposed to mental health misinformation, the more they tended to agree with it, however this was only visible when participants had lower depression literacy and were participating in peer-led OCMHs. Results of this study suggest that both internal factors (i.e., high depression literacy) and external factors (the type of online community individuals were participating in) can buffer the negative effects of misinformation exposure. It also suggests that increasing depression literacy and expert community moderation could curb the negative consequences of misinformation exposure related to mental health. Results will guide interventions to mitigate the effects of misinformation in OCMHs, including encouraging health professionals in their administration and implementing health education programs.

Combatting rumors around the French election: the memorability and effectiveness of fact-checking articles

Across four studies, we examined the how design decisions influenced the effectiveness of fact-checking articles created by CrossCheck France during the 2017 French election. We measured both memory for the article and belief in the false rumor. We saw no difference in fact check efficacy based on the type of headline (question vs negation) or the number of newsroom logos present around the article (one, four, or seven). In addition, informative design features such as an icon identifying the type of misinformation were ignored by readers. Participants failed to remember many of the details from the article, but retrieval practice was beneficial in reducing forgetting over a 1-week delay. In both US and French samples, reading the fact check decreased belief in the false information, even 1 week later. However, the articles were much more effective in the US sample, who lacked relevant prior knowledge and political beliefs. Overall, fact-checking articles can be effective at reducing belief in false information, but readers tend to forget the details and ignore peripheral information.

Exploring the impact of social media exposure patterns on people’s belief in fake news during COVID-19: A cross-gender study

During COVID-19, fake news on social media seriously threatened public health. As a solution to this problem, this study examined how social media exposure patterns affect people being deeply harmed by fake news. Based on cognitive dissonance theory, this study investigated the effect of intentional and incidental exposure on belief in fake news through the mediating role of confirmation bias. The results show that intentional exposure positively influences confirmation bias and belief in fake news. Incidental exposure is the opposite. Our results also show that intentional exposure and confirmation bias negatively influence incidental exposure. Furthermore, these relationships remain unchanged by gender. This study provides theoretical and empirical contributions to reducing people’s belief in fake news.

Polarization or Mainstreaming? How COVID-19 News Exposure Affects Perceived Seriousness of the Pandemic and the Susceptibility to COVID-19 Misinformation?

Two surveys investigated whether the exposure to COVID-19 news widens (polarization) or narrows (mainstreaming) the partisan gap in perceived seriousness of the pandemic, and how the perception affects individuals' susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation that either exaggerates or downplays its health risks. Overall exposure to COVID-19 news homogenized the partisans' otherwise divergent risk perceptions, but the partisan divide was wider among those selectively approaching like-minded news outlets. Perceived seriousness of COVID-19 subsequently altered participants' susceptibility to either fear-arousing or fear-suppressing COVID-19 misinformation in a belief-confirming manner. It is discussed how news media shape the public's reality perception amid the global crisis.

The evasive truth: do mere exposures at the subliminal and supraliminal levels drive the illusory truth effect?

The subjective truth of a statement is boosted by mere exposure to itself or a part of itself. This phenomenon is referred to as the illusory truth effect. We examined whether subliminal pre-exposure to the statement topic would increase its subjective truth. In the exposure phase, participants observed the topic, which was presented supraliminally or subliminally. After the exposure phase, they rated the subjective truth of the statement. If unconscious processing contributed to the illusory truth effect, subliminal exposure to the topic would increase the subjective truth of the statement. On the other hand, if the illusory truth effect required conscious and controlled processing, increases in the subjective truth of a statement would be induced only by supraliminal exposure to the topic. The results showed that the illusory truth effect was not found in either supraliminal or subliminal groups. Our findings provide no reliable evidence that pre-exposure to the statement topic saliently promotes its subjective truth.

Lack of source memory as a potential marker of early assimilation of novel items into current knowledge

In daily life, humans process a plethora of new information that can be either consistent (familiar) or inconsistent (novel) with prior knowledge. Over time, both types of information can integrate into our accumulated knowledge base via distinct pathways. However, the mnemonic processes supporting the integration of information that is inconsistent with prior knowledge remain under-characterized. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the initial assimilation of novel items into the semantic network. Participants saw three repetitions of adjective-noun word pairs that were either consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge. Twenty-four hours later, they were presented with the same stimuli again while undergoing fMRI scans. Outside the scanner, participants completed a surprise recognition test. We found that when the episodic context associated with initially inconsistent items was irretrievable, the neural signature of these items was indistinguishable from that of consistent items. In contrast, initially inconsistent items with accessible episodic contexts showed neural signatures that differed from those associated with consistent items. We suggest that, at least one day post encoding, items inconsistent with prior knowledge can show early assimilation into the semantic network only when their episodic contexts become inaccessible during retrieval, thus evoking a sense of familiarity.

The Role of Valence Matching in the Truth-by-Repetition Effect

People judge repeated information as truer than new information, a “truth-by-repetition” effect. Because repetition increases processing fluency, which is assumed to elicit positive affect, participants may match their positive experience associated with repeated information with a positive (“true”) rather than negative (“false”) response. We tested this valence-matching hypothesis in a preregistered experiment by manipulating the affective congruency of the response format. Specifically, in the congruent condition, participants had to select a positive (negative) picture to respond “true” (“false”). In the incongruent condition, we reversed these associations. In line with the valence matching hypothesis, the truth-by-repetition effect was larger in the congruent than incongruent condition. However, the effect was small, and Bayesian analyses were inconclusive. In addition, the truth-by-repetition effect was significant in both response format conditions. The results suggest a possible contribution of a valence matching process to the truth-by-repetition effect, but one that does not challenge extant models.

The Effect of Repetition on the Perceived Truth of Tobacco-Related Health Misinformation Among U.S. Adults

As concerns about the effects of health misinformation rise, understanding why misbeliefs are accepted is increasingly important. People believe repeated statements more than novel statements, an effect known as truth by repetition, however this has not been examined in the context of tobacco information. Misbeliefs about tobacco are rampant and novel facts about tobacco are viewed as less believable. This paper examines how repetition of true and false tobacco statements affects truth perceptions. We recruited an online sample of 1,436 U.S. adults in May 2021. In an exposure phase, each participant rated their interest in 30 randomly selected statements about tobacco products and general knowledge trivia, half of them true and half false. The study had a two (tobacco product) by two (familiarity of statement claim) between-subjects design and a two (statement truth) by two (statement repetition) within-subjects design. During the testing phase participants rated the truthfulness of 24 repeated statements and 24 unseen statements. Repetition of true and false tobacco statements increased their subjective truth (diff=.20, p < .001), and the effect was larger for false claims compared to true claims. This underscores the importance of strategies to inoculate people against misinformation and calls for interventions that can stop the repetition of newly generated false claims.

Time pressure reduces misinformation discrimination ability but does not alter response bias

Many parts of our social lives are speeding up, a process known as social acceleration. How social acceleration impacts people's ability to judge the veracity of online news, and ultimately the spread of misinformation, is largely unknown. We examined the effects of accelerated online dynamics, operationalised as time pressure, on online misinformation evaluation. Participants judged the veracity of true and false news headlines with or without time pressure. We used signal detection theory to disentangle the effects of time pressure on discrimination ability and response bias, as well as on four key determinants of misinformation susceptibility: analytical thinking, ideological congruency, motivated reflection, and familiarity. Time pressure reduced participants' ability to accurately distinguish true from false news (discrimination ability) but did not alter their tendency to classify an item as true or false (response bias). Key drivers of misinformation susceptibility, such as ideological congruency and familiarity, remained influential under time pressure. Our results highlight the dangers of social acceleration online: People are less able to accurately judge the veracity of news online, while prominent drivers of misinformation susceptibility remain present. Interventions aimed at increasing deliberation may thus be fruitful avenues to combat online misinformation.

Recalling fake news during real news corrections can impair or enhance memory updating: the role of recollection-based retrieval

Fake news can impair memory leading to societal controversies such as COVID-19 vaccine efficacy. The pernicious influence of fake news is clear when ineffective corrections leave memories outdated. A key theoretical issue is whether people should recall fake news while reading corrections with contradictory details. The familiarity backfire view proposes that recalling fake news increases its familiarity, leading to interference. However, the integrative encoding view proposes that recalling fake news promotes co-activation and binding of contradictory details, leading to facilitation. Two experiments examined if one theory better accounts for memory updating after participants recalled actual fake news details when reading headlines that corrected misinformation. In Phase 1, participants read real and fake news headlines of unclear veracity taken from various internet sources. In Phase 2, participants read real news headlines that reaffirmed real news and corrected fake news from Phase 1. When they detected that Phase 2 real news corrected fake news, they attempted to recall Phase 1 fake news. In Phase 3, participants first recalled real news details. When they remembered that those details were corrections from Phase 2, they attempted to recall fake news from Phase 1. Recalling fake news when noticing corrections in Phase 2 led to better memory for real news in Phase 3 when fake news was recalled again and worse memory for real news in Phase 3 when fake news was not recalled again. Both views explain part of the memory differences associated with recalling fake news during corrections, but only when considering whether people recollected that fake news had been corrected.

Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review

RATIONALE

Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories can have severe consequences; it is therefore crucial to understand this phenomenon, in its similarities with general conspiracy belief, but also in how it is context-dependent.

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this systematic review is to provide a comprehensive overview of the available research on COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and to synthesise this research to make it widely accessible.

METHODS

We present a synthesis of COVID-19 conspiracy belief research from 85 international articles, identified and appraised through a systematic review, in line with contemporary protocols and guidelines for systematic reviews.

RESULTS

We identify a number of potential antecedents of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (individual differences, personality traits, demographic variables, attitudes, thinking styles and biases, group identity, trust in authorities, and social media use), their consequences (protective behaviours, self-centred and misguided behaviours such as hoarding and pseudoscientific health practices, vaccination intentions, psychological wellbeing, and other negative social consequences such as discrimination and violence), and the effect sizes of their relations with the conspiracy beliefs.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that understanding both the potential antecedents and consequences of conspiracy beliefs and how they are context-dependent is highly important to tackle them, whether in the COVID-19 pandemic or future threats, such as that of climate change.

Susceptibility to misinformation is consistent across question framings and response modes and better explained by myside bias and partisanship than analytical thinking

Misinformation presents a significant societal problem. To measure individuals’ susceptibility to misinformation and study its predictors, researchers have used a broad variety of ad-hoc item sets, scales, question framings, and response modes. Because of this variety, it remains unknown whether results from different studies can be compared (e.g., in meta-analyses). In this preregistered study (US sample; N = 2,622), we compare five commonly used question framings (eliciting perceived headline accuracy, manipulativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, and whether a headline is real or fake) and three response modes (binary, 6-point and 7-point scales), using the psychometrically validated Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). We test 1) whether different question framings and response modes yield similar responses for the same item set, 2) whether people’s confidence in their primary judgments is affected by question framings and response modes, and 3) which key psychological factors (myside bias, political partisanship, cognitive reflection, and numeracy skills) best predict misinformation susceptibility across assessment methods. Different response modes and question framings yield similar (but not identical) responses for both primary ratings and confidence judgments. We also find a similar nomological net across conditions, suggesting cross-study comparability. Finally, myside bias and political conservatism were strongly positively correlated with misinformation susceptibility, whereas numeracy skills and especially cognitive reflection were less important (although we note potential ceiling effects for numeracy). We thus find more support for an “integrative” account than a “classical reasoning” account of misinformation belief.

Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements

A single exposure to statements is typically enough to increase their perceived truth. This Truth-by-Repetition (TBR) effect has long been assumed to occur only with statements whose truth value is unknown to participants. Contrary to this hypothesis, recent research has found that statements contradicting participants' prior knowledge (as established from a first sample of participants) show a TBR effect following their repetition (in a second, independent sample of participants). As for now, however, attempts at finding a TBR effect for blatantly false (i.e., highly implausible) statements have failed. Here, we reasoned that highly implausible statements such as Elephants run faster than cheetahs may show repetition effects, provided a sensitive truth measure is used and statements are repeated more than just once. In a preregistered experiment, participants judged on a 100-point scale the truth of highly implausible statements that were either new to them or had been presented five times before judgment. We observed an effect of repetition: repeated statements were judged more true than new ones, although all judgments were judged below the scale midpoint. Exploratory analyses additionally show that about half the participants showed no or even a reversed effect of repetition. The results provide the first empirical evidence that repetition can increase perceived truth even for highly implausible statements, although not equally so for all participants and not to the point of making the statements look true.

A Signal Detection Approach to Understanding the Identification of Fake News

Researchers across many disciplines seek to understand how misinformation spreads with a view toward limiting its impact. One important question in this research is how people determine whether a given piece of news is real or fake. In the current article, we discuss the value of signal detection theory (SDT) in disentangling two distinct aspects in the identification of fake news: (a) ability to accurately distinguish between real news and fake news and (b) response biases to judge news as real or fake regardless of news veracity. The value of SDT for understanding the determinants of fake-news beliefs is illustrated with reanalyses of existing data sets, providing more nuanced insights into how partisan bias, cognitive reflection, and prior exposure influence the identification of fake news. Implications of SDT for the use of source-related information in the identification of fake news, interventions to improve people's skills in detecting fake news, and the debunking of misinformation are discussed.

Monetary incentives do not reduce the repetition-induced truth effect

People rate and judge repeated information more true than novel information. This truth-by-repetition effect is of relevance for explaining belief in fake news, conspiracy theories, or misinformation effects. To ascertain whether increased motivation could reduce this effect, we tested the influence of monetary incentives on participants’ truth judgments. We used a standard truth paradigm, consisting of a presentation and judgment phase with factually true and false information, and incentivized every truth judgment. Monetary incentives may influence truth judgments in two ways. First, participants may rely more on relevant knowledge, leading to better discrimination between true and false statements. Second, participants may rely less on repetition, leading to a lower bias to respond “true.” We tested these predictions in a preregistered and high-powered experiment. However, incentives did not influence the percentage of “true” judgments or correct responses in general, despite participants’ longer response times in the incentivized conditions and evidence for knowledge about the statements. Our findings show that even monetary consequences do not protect against the truth-by-repetition effect, further substantiating its robustness and relevance and highlighting its potential hazardous effects when used in purposeful misinformation.

Linguistic drivers of misinformation diffusion on social media during the COVID-19 pandemic

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, unprecedent amounts of fake news and hoax spread on social media. In particular, conspiracy theories argued on the effect of specific new technologies like 5G and misinformation tarnished the reputation of brands like Huawei. Language plays a crucial role in understanding the motivational determinants of social media users in sharing misinformation, as people extract meaning from information based on their discursive resources and their skillset. In this paper, we analyze textual and non-textual cues from a panel of 4923 tweets containing the hashtags #5G and #Huawei during the first week of May 2020, when several countries were still adopting lockdown measures, to determine whether or not a tweet is retweeted and, if so, how much it is retweeted. Overall, through traditional logistic regression and machine learning, we found different effects of the textual and non-textual cues on the retweeting of a tweet and on its ability to accumulate retweets. In particular, the presence of misinformation plays an interesting role in spreading the tweet on the network. More importantly, the relative influence of the cues suggests that Twitter users actually read a tweet but not necessarily they understand or critically evaluate it before deciding to share it on the social media platform.

Poison Parasite Counter: Turning Duplicitous Mass Communications Into Self-Negating Memory-Retrieval Cues

Disinformation in politics, advertising, and mass communications has proliferated in recent years. Few counterargumentation strategies have proven effective at undermining a deceptive message over time. This article introduces the Poison Parasite Counter (PPC), a cognitive-science-based strategy for durably countering deceptive communications. The PPC involves inserting a strong (poisonous) counter-message, just once, into a close replica of a deceptive rival's original communication. In parasitic fashion, the original communication then "hosts" the counter-message, which is recalled on each reexposure to the original communication. The strategy harnesses associative memory to turn the original communication into a retrieval cue for a negating counter-message. Seven experiments (N = 3,679 adults) show that the PPC lastingly undermines a duplicitous rival's original communication, influencing judgments of communicator honesty and favorability as well as real political donations.

Judging fast and slow: The truth effect does not increase under time-pressure conditions

Due to the information overload in today’s digital age, people may sometimes feel pressured to process and judge information especially fast. In three experiments, we examined whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect — the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as “true” than novel statements. Based on the Heuristic-Systematic Model, a dual-process model in the field of persuasion research, we expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably heuristic cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and systematic process that determines truth judgments. However, contrary to our expectation, time pressure did not moderate the truth effect. Importantly, this was the case for difficult statements, for which most people lack prior knowledge, as well as for easy statements, for which most people hold relevant knowledge. Overall, the findings clearly speak against the conception of fast, fluency-based truth judgments versus slow, knowledge-based truth judgments. In contrast, the results are compatible with a referential theory of the truth effect that does not distinguish between different types of truth judgments. Instead, it assumes that truth judgments rely on the coherence of localized networks in people’s semantic memory, formed by both repetition and prior knowledge.

The effects of repeating false and misleading information on belief

False and misleading information is readily accessible in people's environments, oftentimes reaching people repeatedly. This repeated exposure can significantly affect people's beliefs about the world, as has been noted by scholars in political science, communication, and cognitive, developmental, and social psychology. In particular, repetition increases belief in false information, even when the misinformation contradicts prior knowledge. We review work across these disciplines, identifying factors that may heighten, diminish, or have no impact on these adverse effects of repetition on belief. Specifically, we organize our discussion around variations in what information is repeated, to whom the information is repeated, how people interact with this repetition, and how people's beliefs are measured. A key cross-disciplinary theme is that the most influential factor is how carefully or critically people process the false information. However, several open questions remain when comparing findings across different fields and approaches. We conclude by noting a need for more interdisciplinary work to help resolve these questions, as well as a need for more work in naturalistic settings so that we can better understand and combat the effects of repeated circulation of false and misleading information in society. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.

The Trajectory of Truth: A Longitudinal Study of the Illusory Truth Effect

Repeated statements are rated as subjectively truer than comparable new statements, even though repetition alone provides no new, probative information (the illusory truth effect). Contrary to some theoretical predictions, the illusory truth effect seems to be similar in magnitude for repetitions occurring after minutes or weeks. This Registered Report describes a longitudinal investigation of the illusory truth effect (n = 608, n = 567 analysed) in which we systematically manipulated intersession interval (immediately, one day, one week, and one month) in order to test whether the illusory truth effect is immune to time. Both our hypotheses were supported: We observed an illusory truth effect at all four intervals (overall effect: χ 2(1) = 169.91; M repeated = 4.52, M new = 4.14; H1), with the effect diminishing as delay increased (H2). False information repeated over short timescales might have a greater effect on truth judgements than repetitions over longer timescales. Researchers should consider the implications of the choice of intersession interval when designing future illusory truth effect research.

The effects of repetition frequency on the illusory truth effect

Repeated information is often perceived as more truthful than new information. This finding is known as the illusory truth effect, and it is typically thought to occur because repetition increases processing fluency. Because fluency and truth are frequently correlated in the real world, people learn to use processing fluency as a marker for truthfulness. Although the illusory truth effect is a robust phenomenon, almost all studies examining it have used three or fewer repetitions. To address this limitation, we conducted two experiments using a larger number of repetitions. In Experiment 1, we showed participants trivia statements up to 9 times and in Experiment 2 statements were shown up to 27 times. Later, participants rated the truthfulness of the previously seen statements and of new statements. In both experiments, we found that perceived truthfulness increased as the number of repetitions increased. However, these truth rating increases were logarithmic in shape. The largest increase in perceived truth came from encountering a statement for the second time, and beyond this were incrementally smaller increases in perceived truth for each additional repetition. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of the illusory truth effect and have applications for advertising, politics, and the propagation of "fake news."

The Psychology of Fake News

We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are 'better' at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) when evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms.