Perception and deception: Exploring individual responses to deepfakes across different modalities

This study is one of the first to investigate the relationship between modalities and individuals' tendencies to believe and share different forms of deepfakes (also deep fakes). Using an online survey experiment conducted in the US, participants were randomly assigned to one of three disinformation conditions: video deepfakes, audio deepfakes, and cheap fakes to test the effect of single modality against multimodality and how it affects individuals' perceived claim accuracy and sharing intentions. In addition, the impact of cognitive ability on perceived claim accuracy and sharing intentions between conditions are also examined. The results suggest that individuals are likelier to perceive video deepfakes as more accurate than cheap fakes, but not audio deepfakes. Yet, individuals are more likely to share video deepfakes than cheap and audio deepfakes. We also found that individuals with high cognitive ability are less likely to perceive deepfakes as accurate or share them across formats. The findings emphasize that deepfakes are not monolithic, and associated modalities should be considered when studying user engagement with deepfakes.

Online political engagement, cognitive skills and engagement with misinformation: evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States

Purpose

Informational use of social media facilitates political engagement. Yet, there is also evidence of the perils of frequent political engagement in misinformation propagation. This study aims to examine the association between online political engagement, perceived exposure to misinformation, individuals’ cognitive characteristics and misinformation sharing.

Design/methodology/approach

In this paper, online surveys were conducted in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa (Study 1) and the United States (Study 2).

Findings

Study 1 finds that online political engagement is positively associated with perceived exposure to and sharing of misinformation. Mediation analyses suggest that the relationship between online political engagement and misinformation sharing is mediated by perceived exposure to misinformation. Further, the likelihood of sharing misinformation is found to increase at higher levels of online political engagement, but those with low need for cognition (NFC) are more vulnerable to such sharing. Study 2 explores cognitive ability in place of NFC. The results follow similar patterns as Study 1 – online political engagement is linked to misinformation sharing via higher perceived exposure to misinformation. The authors also find that the tendency to share misinformation increases with frequent exposure to misinformation but those with lower cognitive ability are more prone to such sharing.

Originality/value

In both contexts, the data show that perceived exposure to misinformation mediates the relationship between online political engagement and misinformation sharing and those with low NFC and cognitive ability are more vulnerable. Overall, the findings offer insight into the mechanisms of political engagement and sharing misinformation.

Parents' Political Ideology Predicts How Their Children Punish

From an early age, children are willing to pay a personal cost to punish others for violations that do not affect them directly. Various motivations underlie such "costly punishment": People may punish to enforce cooperative norms (amplifying punishment of in-groups) or to express anger at perpetrators (amplifying punishment of out-groups). Thus, group-related values and attitudes (e.g., how much one values fairness or feels out-group hostility) likely shape the development of group-related punishment. The present experiments (N = 269, ages 3-8 from across the United States) tested whether children's punishment varies according to their parents' political ideology-a possible proxy for the value systems transmitted to children intergenerationally. As hypothesized, parents' self-reported political ideology predicted variation in the punishment behavior of their children. Specifically, parental conservatism was associated with children's punishment of out-group members, and parental liberalism was associated with children's punishment of in-group members. These findings demonstrate how differences in group-related ideologies shape punishment across generations.

Does social intolerance vary according to cognitive styles, genetic cognitive capacity, or education?

BACKGROUND

Low education, low cognitive abilities, and certain cognitive styles are suggested to predispose to social intolerance and prejudices. Evidence is, however, restricted by comparatively small samples, neglect of confounding variables and genetic factors, and a narrow focus on a single sort of prejudice. We investigated the relationships of education, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, and cognitive styles with social intolerance in adulthood over a 15-year follow-up.

METHODS

We used data from the prospective population-based Young Finns Study (n = 960-1679). Social intolerance was evaluated with the Social Intolerance Scale in 1997, 2001, and 2011; cognitive performance with the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery in 2011; cognitive styles in 1997; and socioeconomic factors in 1980 (childhood) and 2011 (adulthood); and polygenic cognitive potential was calculated based on genome-wide association studies.

RESULTS

We found that nonrational thinking, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, or socioeconomic factors were not related to social intolerance. Regarding cognitive styles, low flexibility (B = -0.759, p < .001), high perseverance (B = 1.245, p < .001), and low persistence (B = -0.329, p < .001) predicted higher social intolerance consistently in the analyses.

DISCUSSION

When developing prejudice-reduction interventions, it should be considered that educational level or cognitive performance may not be crucial for development of social intolerance. Adopting certain cognitive styles may play more important roles in development of social intolerance.

Factors influencing fake news rebuttal acceptance during the COVID-19 pandemic and the moderating effect of cognitive ability

Fake news is spreading rapidly on social media and poses a serious threat to the COVID-19 outbreak response. This study thus aims to reveal the factors influencing the acceptance of fake news rebuttals on Sina Weibo. Drawing on the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), we used text mining and the econometrics method to investigate the relationships among the central route (rebuttal's information readability and argument quality), peripheral route (rebuttal's source credibility, including authority and influence), and rebuttal acceptance, as well as the moderating effect of receiver's cognitive ability on these relationships. Our findings suggest that source authority had a negative effect on rebuttal acceptance, while source influence had a positive effect. Second, both information readability and argument quality had positive effects on rebuttal acceptance. In addition, individuals with low cognitive abilities relied more on source credibility and argument quality to accept rebuttals, while individuals with high cognitive abilities relied more on information readability. This study can provide decision support for practitioners to establish more effective fake news rebuttal strategies; it is especially valuable to reduce the negative impact of fake news related to major public health emergencies and safeguard the implementation of anti-epidemic strategies.

Cognitive ability is a powerful predictor of political tolerance

OBJECTIVES

Despite the broad appeal of abstract notions of political tolerance, people vary in the degree to which they support the political rights of groups they dislike. Prior research highlighted the relevance of individual differences in the cognitive domain, claiming the application of general tolerance ideals to specific situations is a cognitively demanding task. Curiously, this work has overwhelmingly focused on differences in cognitive style, largely neglecting differences in cognitive ability, despite compelling conceptual linkages. We remedy this shortcoming.

METHODS

We explore diverse predictors of tolerance using survey data in two large samples from Denmark (N = 805) and the United States (N = 1,603).

RESULTS

Cognitive ability was the single strongest predictor of political tolerance, with larger effects than education, openness to experience, ideology, and threat. The cognitively demanding nature of tolerance judgments was further supported by results showing cognitive ability predicted tolerance best when extending such tolerance was hardest. Additional small-sample panel results demonstrated substantial 4-year stability of political tolerance, informing future work on the origins of political tolerance.

CONCLUSIONS

Our observation of a potent role for cognitive ability in tolerance supports cognitively oriented accounts of tolerance judgments and highlights the need for further exploration of cognitive ability within the political domain.

The cognitive and perceptual correlates of ideological attitudes: a data-driven approach

Although human existence is enveloped by ideologies, remarkably little is understood about the relationships between ideological attitudes and psychological traits. Even less is known about how cognitive dispositions-individual differences in how information is perceived and processed- sculpt individuals' ideological worldviews, proclivities for extremist beliefs and resistance (or receptivity) to evidence. Using an unprecedented number of cognitive tasks (n = 37) and personality surveys (n = 22), along with data-driven analyses including drift-diffusion and Bayesian modelling, we uncovered the specific psychological signatures of political, nationalistic, religious and dogmatic beliefs. Cognitive and personality assessments consistently outperformed demographic predictors in accounting for individual differences in ideological preferences by 4 to 15-fold. Furthermore, data-driven analyses revealed that individuals' ideological attitudes mirrored their cognitive decision-making strategies. Conservatism and nationalism were related to greater caution in perceptual decision-making tasks and to reduced strategic information processing, while dogmatism was associated with slower evidence accumulation and impulsive tendencies. Religiosity was implicated in heightened agreeableness and risk perception. Extreme pro-group attitudes, including violence endorsement against outgroups, were linked to poorer working memory, slower perceptual strategies, and tendencies towards impulsivity and sensation-seeking-reflecting overlaps with the psychological profiles of conservatism and dogmatism. Cognitive and personality signatures were also generated for ideologies such as authoritarianism, system justification, social dominance orientation, patriotism and receptivity to evidence or alternative viewpoints; elucidating their underpinnings and highlighting avenues for future research. Together these findings suggest that ideological worldviews may be reflective of low-level perceptual and cognitive functions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Disliked but Free to Speak: Cognitive Ability Is Related to Supporting Freedom of Speech for Groups Across the Ideological Spectrum

Freedom of speech for all citizens is often considered as a cornerstone of democratic societies. In three studies, we examined the relationship between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech for a variety of social groups across the ideological spectrum ( N 1 varies between 1,373 and 18,719, N 2 = 298, N 3 = 395). Corroborating our theoretical expectations, although cognitive ability was related to more affective prejudice toward relatively conservative groups and less affective prejudice toward relatively liberal groups (Study 2), people with higher levels of cognitive ability were more in favor of freedom of speech for all target groups (Studies 1–3). The relationship between cognitive ability and freedom of speech support was mediated by intellectual humility (preregistered Study 3). These results indicate that cognitive ability contributes to support for the democratic right of freedom of speech for all social–ideological groups.

Studying a heterogeneous array of target groups can help us understand prejudice

Prejudice can be expressed towards a wide array of target groups, but it is often operationalized as expressed towards a narrower array of groups. By studying a heterogeneous array of target groups we can draw broader conclusions about prejudice writ large. We describe our research which seeks to understand constructs that consistently predict prejudice across a wide array of groups (consistent predictors), as well as those constructs that only predict prejudice for some types of groups (inconsistent predictors). For inconsistent predictors, we can also identify the perceived characteristics of the target groups (e.g., status, ideology) that are associated with expressed prejudice. Studying a heterogenous array of target groups opens up new questions related to morality, cognitive processing, and perceived discrimination, but also suggests that prejudice, depending on the group, can be a motivating force preserving the status quo or prompting social change.

Who Is Prejudiced, and Toward Whom? The Big Five Traits and Generalized Prejudice

Meta-analyses show that low levels of Openness and Agreeableness correlate with generalized prejudice. However, previous studies narrowly assessed prejudice toward low-status, disadvantaged groups. Using a broad operationalization of generalized prejudice toward a heterogeneous array of targets, we sought to answer two questions: (a) Are some types of people prejudiced against most types of groups? and (b) Are some types of people prejudiced against certain types of groups? Across four samples ( N = 7,543), Openness was very weakly related to broad generalized prejudice, r = −.03, 95% confidence interval (CI) [−.07, −.001], whereas low Agreeableness was reliably associated with broad generalized prejudice, r = −.23, 95% CI [−.31, −.16]. When target characteristics moderated relationships between Big Five traits and prejudice, they implied that perceiver–target dissimilarity on personality traits explains prejudice. Importantly, the relationship between Agreeableness and prejudice remained robust across target groups, suggesting it is the personality trait orienting people toward (dis)liking of others.

Moral reasoning performance determines epistemic peerdom

We offer a friendly criticism of May's fantastic book on moral reasoning: It is overly charitable to the argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge. To highlight the role that reasoning quality plays in moral judgments, we review literature that he did not mention showing that individual differences in intelligence and cognitive reflection explain much of moral disagreement. The burden is on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises from non-rational origins.

Attitudes Toward Presidential Candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American Elections: Cognitive Ability and Support for Trump

Using data from the American National Election Studies, we investigated the relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes toward and actual voting for presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections (i.e., Romney, Obama, Trump, and Clinton). Isolating this relationship from competing relationships, results showed that verbal ability was a significant negative predictor of support and voting for Trump (but not Romney) and a positive predictor of support and voting for Obama and Clinton. By comparing within and across the election years, our analyses revealed the nature of support for Trump, including that support for Trump was better predicted by lower verbal ability than education or income. In general, these results suggest that the 2016 U.S. presidential election had less to do with party affiliation, income, or education and more to do with basic cognitive ability.

Toward an Integrated Cognition Perspective on Ethnic Prejudice

Both ability and motivation aspects of cognition have been shown to relate to ethnic prejudice. In line with recent theorizing, the present study advances an integrated cognition perspective on ethnic prejudice by examining the interplay between cognitive ability (measured with the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test) and cognitive motivation (measured with the Need for Cognitive Closure [NFC] Scale) in a Belgian, heterogeneous adult sample ( N = 315). Path analysis revealed that intelligence and NFC each have unique and independent effects on ethnic prejudice, and that both right-wing authoritarianism and essentialist thinking play a mediating role in these effects. Hence, although cognitive abilities and motivations are to some extent interrelated and operate in similar ways, they uniquely and additively contribute to the explained variance in ethnic prejudice.

Predicting Ideological Prejudice

A major shortcoming of current models of ideological prejudice is that although they can anticipate the direction of the association between participants’ ideology and their prejudice against a range of target groups, they cannot predict the size of this association. I developed and tested models that can make specific size predictions for this association. A quantitative model that used the perceived ideology of the target group as the primary predictor of the ideology-prejudice relationship was developed with a representative sample of Americans (N = 4,940) and tested against models using the perceived status of and choice to belong to the target group as predictors. In four studies (total N = 2,093), ideology-prejudice associations were estimated, and these observed estimates were compared with the models’ predictions. The model that was based only on perceived ideology was the most parsimonious with the smallest errors.