Preserved self-awareness following extensive bilateral brain damage to the insula, anterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortices

The Neural Correlates of Narcissism: Is There a Connection with Desire for Fame and Celebrity Worship?

(1) Objective: Narcissism is characterized by emotional regulation deficits, a lack of empathy for others, and extreme self-focus. Narcissism has also been linked to an increased desire for fame and celebrity worship. Here, the neuroscience underlying narcissism is examined in order to determine what regions and networks of the brain are altered when non-narcissistic individuals are compared to participants with both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism. (2) Methods: The behavioral relationships between grandiose narcissism and desire for fame and vulnerable narcissism and celebrity worship are explored, along with a possible relationship at the neural level between these constructs. In this paper, we review research demonstrating that increased levels of grandiose narcissism are associated with an increase in obsession with fame, while vulnerable narcissism is associated with celebrity worship. (3) Results: Based on current data, the frontal regions underlie narcissism and also likely underlie celebrity worship and desire for fame. This tenuous conclusion is based on a limited number of studies. (4) Conclusions: The brain areas associated with grandiose narcissism may be associated with an intense desire for fame as well, while brain regions associated with vulnerable narcissism may be similar in celebrity worshipers. Future research studies on the brain that are specifically designed to test these relationships at a neurological level are needed.

Alterations of large-scale functional network connectivity in patients with infantile esotropia before and after surgery

BACKGROUND

Growing evidences have indicated neurodevelopmental disorders in infantile esotropia (IE). However, few studies have analyzed the characteristics of large-scale functional networks of IE patients or their postoperative network-level alterations.

METHODS

Here, individuals with IE (n = 32) and healthy subjects (n = 30) accomplished the baseline clinical examinations and resting-state MRI scans. A total of 17 IE patients also underwent corrective surgeries and completed the longitudinal clinical assessments and resting-state MRI scans. Linear mixed effects models were applied for cross-sectional and longitudinal network-level analyses. Correlation analysis was performed to assess the relationship between longitudinal functional connectivity (FC) alterations and baseline clinical variables.

RESULTS

In cross-sectional analyses, network-level FC were apparently aberrant in IE patients compared to controls. In longitudinal analyses, intra- and internetwork connectivity were observed with significant alterations in postoperative IE patients compared to the preoperative counterparts. Longitudinal FC changes are negatively correlated to the age at surgery in IE.

CONCLUSIONS

Obviously, altered network-level FC benefiting from the corrective surgery serves as the neurobiological substrate of the observed improvement of stereovision, visuomotor coordination, and emotional management in postoperative IE patients. Corrective surgery should be performed as early as possible to obtain more benefits for IE in brain function recovery.

Turning Back the Clock: A Retrospective Single-Blind Study on Brain Age Change in Response to Nutraceuticals Supplementation vs. Lifestyle Modifications

BACKGROUND

There is a growing consensus that chronological age (CA) is not an accurate indicator of the aging process and that biological age (BA) instead is a better measure of an individual's risk of age-related outcomes and a more accurate predictor of mortality than actual CA. In this context, BA measures the "true" age, which is an integrated result of an individual's level of damage accumulation across all levels of biological organization, along with preserved resources. The BA is plastic and depends upon epigenetics. Brain state is an important factor contributing to health- and lifespan.

METHODS AND OBJECTIVE

Quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG)-derived brain BA (BBA) is a suitable and promising measure of brain aging. In the present study, we aimed to show that BBA can be decelerated or even reversed in humans (N = 89) by using customized programs of nutraceutical compounds or lifestyle changes (mean duration = 13 months).

RESULTS

We observed that BBA was younger than CA in both groups at the end of the intervention. Furthermore, the BBA of the participants in the nutraceuticals group was 2.83 years younger at the endpoint of the intervention compared with their BBA score at the beginning of the intervention, while the BBA of the participants in the lifestyle group was only 0.02 years younger at the end of the intervention. These results were accompanied by improvements in mental-physical health comorbidities in both groups. The pre-intervention BBA score and the sex of the participants were considered confounding factors and analyzed separately.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the obtained results support the feasibility of the goal of this study and also provide the first robust evidence that halting and reversal of brain aging are possible in humans within a reasonable (practical) timeframe of approximately one year.

Parabrachial-insular stimulation does not wake mice

The parabrachial nucleus (PB) in the upper brainstem receives interoceptive information and sends a massive output projection directly to the cerebral cortex. Its glutamatergic axons primarily target the midinsular cortex, and we have proposed that this PB-insular projection promotes arousal. Here, we test whether stimulating this projection causes wakefulness. We combined optogenetics and video-electroencephalography (vEEG) in mice to test this hypothesis by stimulating PB axons in the insular cortex. Stimulating this projection did not alter the cortical EEG or awaken mice. Also, despite a tendency toward aversion, PB-insular stimulation did not significantly alter real-time place preference (RTPP). These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the direct PB-insular projection is part of the ascending arousal system.NEW & NOTEWORTHY A brainstem region critical for wakefulness overlaps the medial parabrachial nucleus (PB) and has functional and direct axonal connectivity with the insular cortex. In this study, we hypothesized that this direct projection from the PB to the insular cortex promotes arousal. However, photostimulating PB axons in the insular cortex did not alter the cortical EEG or awaken mice. This information constrains the possible circuit connections through which brainstem neurons may sustain arousal.

Sustained, Effortless Weight Loss after Damage to the Left Frontoinsular Cortex: A Case Report

This case report highlights a possible consequence of damage to the left frontoinsular region. A 53-year-old woman with chronic obesity and headaches presented with seizure, leading to the discovery and resection of a large sphenoid wing meningioma. Postoperative brain imaging revealed loss of the left frontoinsular cortex and portions of the underlying white matter, claustrum, and striatum. Throughout her adult life, this patient had tried and failed to lose weight, but after surgery, she no longer desired to eat large meals, and without effort, her body mass index decreased from 38.6 (85th percentile) to 24.9 (25th percentile). Combined with previous research implicating the insular cortex in interoception, appetite, and drug-related urges, her reduced hunger and effortless weight loss after resection of the left frontoinsular cortex suggest that this region of the human brain may play a role in hunger-related urges that contribute to overeating.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

An insula hierarchical network architecture for active interoceptive inference

In the brain, the insular cortex receives a vast amount of interoceptive information, ascending through deep brain structures, from multiple visceral organs. The unique hierarchical and modular architecture of the insula suggests specialization for processing interoceptive afferents. Yet, the biological significance of the insula's neuroanatomical architecture, in relation to deep brain structures, remains obscure. In this opinion piece, we propose the Insula Hierarchical Modular Adaptive Interoception Control (IMAC) model to suggest that insula modules (granular, dysgranular and agranular), forming parallel networks with the prefrontal cortex and striatum, are specialized to form higher order interoceptive representations. These interoceptive representations are recruited in a context-dependent manner to support habitual, model-based and exploratory control of visceral organs and physiological processes. We discuss how insula interoceptive representations may give rise to conscious feelings that best explain lower order deep brain interoceptive representations, and how the insula may serve to defend the body and mind against pathological depression.

I remember therefore I am: Episodic memory retrieval and self-reported trait empathy judgments in young and older adults and individuals with medial temporal lobe excisions

How do we know what sort of people we are? Do we reflect on specific past instances of our own behaviour, or do we just have a general idea? Previous work has emphasized the role of personal semantic memory (general autobiographical knowledge) in how we assess our own personality traits. Using a standardized trait empathy questionnaire, we show in four experiments that episodic autobiographical memory (memory for specific personal events) is associated with people's judgments of their own trait empathy. Specifically, neurologically healthy young adults rated themselves as more empathic on questionnaire items that cued episodic memories of events in which they behaved empathically. This effect, however, was diminished in people who are known to have poor episodic memory: older adults and individuals who have undergone unilateral excision of medial temporal lobe tissue (as treatment for epilepsy). Further, self-report ratings on individual questionnaire items were generally predicted by subjectively rated phenomenological qualities of the memories cued by those items, such as sensory detail, scene coherence, and overall vividness. We argue that episodic and semantic memory play different roles with respect to self-knowledge depending on life experience, the integrity of the medial temporal lobes, and whether one is assessing general abstract traits versus more concrete behaviours that embody these traits. Future research should examine different types of self-knowledge as well as personality traits other than empathy.

Autobiographical memory unknown: Pervasive autobiographical memory loss encompassing personality trait knowledge in an individual with medial temporal lobe amnesia

Autobiographical memory consists of distinct memory types varying from highly abstract to episodic. Self trait knowledge, which is considered one of the more abstract types of autobiographical memory, is thought to rely on regions of the autobiographical memory neural network implicated in schema representation, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and critically, not the medial temporal lobes. The current case study introduces an individual who experienced bilateral posterior cerebral artery strokes resulting in extensive medial temporal lobe damage with sparing of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, in addition to severe retrograde and anterograde episodic and autobiographical fact amnesia, this individual's self trait knowledge was impaired for his current and pre-morbid personality traits. Yet, further assessment revealed that this individual had preserved conceptual knowledge for personality traits, could reliably and accurately rate another person's traits, and could access his own self-concept in a variety of ways. In addition to autobiographical memory loss, he demonstrated impairment on non-personal semantic memory tests, most notably on tests requiring retrieval of unique knowledge. This rare case of amnesia suggests a previously unreported role for the medial temporal lobes in self trait knowledge, which we propose reflects the critical role of this neural region in the storage and retrieval of personal semantics that are experience-near, meaning autobiographical facts grounded in spatiotemporal contexts.

Beyond IQ: The Importance of Metacognition for the Promotion of Global Wellbeing

Global policy makers increasingly adopt subjective wellbeing as a framework within which to measure and address human development challenges, including policies to mitigate consequential societal problems. In this review, we take a systems-level perspective to assemble evidence from studies of wellbeing, of collective intelligence, and of metacognition and argue for a virtuous cycle for health promotion in which the increased collective intelligence of groups: (1) enhances the ability of such groups to address consequential societal problems; (2) promotes the wellbeing of societies and the individual wellbeing of people within groups; and, finally, (3) enables prosocial actions that further promote collective problem-solving and global wellbeing. Notably, evidence demonstrates that effective collaboration and teamwork largely depend on social skills for metacognitive awareness—the capacity to evaluate and control our own mental processes in the service of social problem-solving. Yet, despite their importance, metacognitive skills may not be well-captured by measures of general intelligence. These skills have instead been the focus of decades of research in the psychology of human judgment and decision-making. This literature provides well-validated tests of metacognitive awareness and demonstrates that the capacity to use analysis and deliberation to evaluate intuitive responses is an important source of individual differences in decision-making. Research in network neuroscience further elucidates the topology and dynamics of brain networks that enable metacognitive awareness, providing key targets for intervention. As such, we further discuss emerging scientific interventions to enhance metacognitive skills (e.g., based on mindfulness meditation, and physical activity and aerobic fitness), and how such interventions may catalyze the virtuous cycle to improve collective intelligence, societal problem-solving, and global wellbeing.

Better living through understanding the insula: Why subregions can make all the difference

Insula function is considered critical for many motivated behaviors, with proposed functions ranging from attention, behavioral control, emotional regulation, goal-directed and aversion-resistant responding. Further, the insula is implicated in many neuropsychiatric conditions including substance abuse. More recently, multiple insula subregions have been distinguished based on anatomy, connectivity, and functional contributions. Generally, posterior insula is thought to encode more somatosensory inputs, which integrate with limbic/emotional information in middle insula, that in turn integrate with cognitive processes in anterior insula. Together, these regions provide rapid interoceptive information about the current or predicted situation, facilitating autonomic recruitment and quick, flexible action. Here, we seek to create a robust foundation from which to understand potential subregion differences, and provide direction for future studies. We address subregion differences across humans and rodents, so that the latter's mechanistic interventions can best mesh with clinical relevance of human conditions. We first consider the insula's suggested roles in humans, then compare subregional studies, and finally describe rodent work. One primary goal is to encourage precision in describing insula subregions, since imprecision (e.g. including both posterior and anterior studies when describing insula work) does a disservice to a larger understanding of insula contributions. Additionally, we note that specific task details can greatly impact recruitment of various subregions, requiring care and nuance in design and interpretation of studies. Nonetheless, the central ethological importance of the insula makes continued research to uncover mechanistic, mood, and behavioral contributions of paramount importance and interest. This article is part of the special Issue on 'Neurocircuitry Modulating Drug and Alcohol Abuse'.

Who Are You? The Study of Personality in Patients With Anterograde Amnesia

Little is known about the role of declarative memory in the ongoing perception of one's personality. Seven individuals who developed a rare and severe type of anterograde amnesia following damage to their medial temporal lobes were identified from our neurological patient registry. We examined the stability of their personality ratings on the Big Five Inventory over five retest periods and assessed the accuracy of their ratings via analyses of self-caregiver agreement. The patients portrayed a stable sense of self over the course of 1 year. However, their self-ratings differed from those provided by the caregivers. Intriguingly, these discrepancies diminished when caregivers retrospectively rated the patients' personalities prior to their brain injury, suggesting that patients' perceptions of themselves were stuck in the past. We interpret our findings to indicate that the ability to form new declarative memories is not required for maintaining a stable sense of self but may be important for updating one's sense of self over time.

The brain functional connectivity in the default mode network is associated with self-efficacy in young adults

Self-efficacy is a subjective belief that depends on self-related past experience, and is a strong predictor for individual future performance. To the aim of promoting one's future performance, it is necessary to gain better knowledge of it's cognitive process and brain mechanism. The present research sought to investigate the functional connectivity basis of self-efficacy by using the resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data of a large sample of young adults (536 participants). Multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between self-efficacy integrated score and brain functional connectivity measures. Gender, age, mean framewise displacement and grey matter volume were used as nuisance covariates. The whole-brain analysis revealed an association between self-efficacy and the functional connectivity of several regions within the default mode network. These regions included the right anterior cingulate cortex, the left posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and bilateral parahippocampal cortex. Our findings suggest that the default mode network plays a crucial role in self-efficacy, and hold the view that episodic memory and self-related processing have influence on self-efficacy.

Five Breakthroughs: A First Approximation of Brain Evolution From Early Bilaterians to Humans

Retracing the evolutionary steps by which human brains evolved can offer insights into the underlying mechanisms of human brain function as well as the phylogenetic origin of various features of human behavior. To this end, this article presents a model for interpreting the physical and behavioral modifications throughout major milestones in human brain evolution. This model introduces the concept of a "breakthrough" as a useful tool for interpreting suites of brain modifications and the various adaptive behaviors these modifications enabled. This offers a unique view into the ordered steps by which human brains evolved and suggests several unique hypotheses on the mechanisms of human brain function.

Alzheimer's and Consciousness: How Much Subjectivity Is Objective?

Does Alzheimer Disease show a decline in cognitive functions that relate to the awareness of external reality? In this paper, we will propose a perspective that patients with increasing symptoms of AD show a change in the awareness of subjective versus objective representative axis of reality thus consequently move to a more internal like perception of reality. This paradigm shift suggests that new insights into the dynamicity of the conscious representation of reality in the AD brain may give us new clues to the very early signs of memory and self-awareness impairment that originates from, in our view the microtubules. Dialog between Adso and William, in Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose, Third Day: Vespers. "But how does it happen," I said with admiration, "that you were able to solve the mystery of the library looking at it from the outside, and you were unable to solve it when you were inside?" "Thus, God knows the world, because He conceived it in His mind, as if it was from the outside, before it was created, and we do not know its rule, because we live inside it, having found it already made."

Taking the body off the mind: Decreased functional connectivity between somatomotor and default-mode networks following Floatation-REST

Floatation‐Reduced Environmental Stimulation Therapy (REST) is a procedure that reduces stimulation of the human nervous system by minimizing sensory signals from visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, thermal, tactile, vestibular, gravitational, and proprioceptive channels, in addition to minimizing musculoskeletal movement and speech. Initial research has found that Floatation‐REST can elicit short‐term reductions in anxiety, depression, and pain, yet little is known about the brain networks impacted by the intervention. This study represents the first functional neuroimaging investigation of Floatation‐REST, and we utilized a data‐driven exploratory analysis to determine whether the intervention leads to altered patterns of resting‐state functional connectivity (rsFC). Healthy participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) before and after 90 min of Floatation‐REST or a control condition that entailed resting supine in a zero‐gravity chair for an equivalent amount of time. Multivariate Distance Matrix Regression (MDMR), a statistically‐stringent whole‐brain searchlight approach, guided subsequent seed‐based connectivity analyses of the resting‐state fMRI data. MDMR identified peak clusters of rsFC change between the pre‐ and post‐float fMRI, revealing significant decreases in rsFC both within and between posterior hubs of the default‐mode network (DMN) and a large swath of cortical tissue encompassing the primary and secondary somatomotor cortices extending into the posterior insula. The control condition, an active form of REST, showed a similar pattern of reduced rsFC. Thus, reduced stimulation of the nervous system appears to be reflected by reduced rsFC within the brain networks most responsible for creating and mapping our sense of self.

'Liking' and 'wanting' in eating and food reward: Brain mechanisms and clinical implications

It is becoming clearer how neurobiological mechanisms generate 'liking' and 'wanting' components of food reward. Mesocorticolimbic mechanisms that enhance 'liking' include brain hedonic hotspots, which are specialized subregions that are uniquely able to causally amplify the hedonic impact of palatable tastes. Hedonic hotspots are found in nucleus accumbens medial shell, ventral pallidum, orbitofrontal cortex, insula cortex, and brainstem. In turn, a much larger mesocorticolimbic circuitry generates 'wanting' or incentive motivation to obtain and consume food rewards. Hedonic and motivational circuitry interact together and with hypothalamic homeostatic circuitry, allowing relevant physiological hunger and satiety states to modulate 'liking' and 'wanting' for food rewards. In some conditions such as drug addiction, 'wanting' is known to dramatically detach from 'liking' for the same reward, and this may also occur in over-eating disorders. Via incentive sensitization, 'wanting' selectively becomes higher, especially when triggered by reward cues when encountered in vulnerable states of stress, etc. Emerging evidence suggests that some cases of obesity and binge eating disorders may reflect an incentive-sensitization brain signature of cue hyper-reactivity, causing excessive 'wanting' to eat. Future findings on the neurobiological bases of 'liking' and 'wanting' can continue to improve understanding of both normal food reward and causes of clinical eating disorders.

Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account

"Mineness," also called "subjective presence" or "personalization," is the feeling that experiences belong to a continuing self. This article argues that mineness is produced by processes of interoceptive active inference that model the self as the underlying cause of continuity and coherence in affective experience. A key component of this hierarchical processing system and hub of affective self-modeling is activity in the anterior insula cortex. I defend the account by applying it to the phenomenon of pain asymbolia, a condition in which nociceptive signals (of bodily damage) are not attributed to the self. Thus, pain asymbolia is a form of "depersonalization for pain" as Klein puts it. The pain is experienced as happening to my body but is not experienced as mine. Thus, we can describe it as loss of subjective presence or "mineness" for the experience of pain.

Anterior insular cortex plays a critical role in interoceptive attention

Accumulating evidence indicates that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) mediates interoceptive attention which refers to attention towards physiological signals arising from the body. However, the necessity of the AIC in this process has not been demonstrated. Using a novel task that directs attention toward breathing rhythm, we assessed the involvement of the AIC in interoceptive attention in healthy participants using functional magnetic resonance imaging and examined the necessity of the AIC in interoceptive attention in patients with AIC lesions. Results showed that interoceptive attention was associated with increased AIC activation, as well as enhanced coupling between the AIC and somatosensory areas along with reduced coupling between the AIC and visual sensory areas. In addition, AIC activation was predictive of individual differences in interoceptive accuracy. Importantly, AIC lesion patients showed disrupted interoceptive discrimination accuracy and sensitivity. These results provide compelling evidence that the AIC plays a critical role in interoceptive attention.

Social, self, (situational), and affective processes in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC): Causal, multivariate, and reverse inference evidence

The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has been posited to serve a variety of social, affective, and cognitive functions. These conclusions have largely been driven by forward inference analyses (e.g. GLM fMRI studies and meta-analyses) that indicate where domain-specific tasks tend to produce activity but tell us little about what those regions do. Here, we take a multi-method, multi-domain approach to the functionality of MPFC subdivisions within Brodmann areas 9-11. We consider four methods that each have reverse inference or causal inference value: lesion work, transcranial magnetic stimulation, multivariate pattern analysis, and Neurosynth analyses. The Neurosynth analyses include multi-term reverse inference analyses that compare several domains of interest to one another at once. We examine the evidence supporting structure-function links in five domains: social cognition, self, value, emotional experience, and mental time travel. The evidence is considered for each of three MPFC subdivisions: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), anteromedial prefrontal cortex (AMPFC), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Although there is evidentiary variability across methods, the results suggest that social processes are functionally linked to DMPFC (and somewhat surprisingly in VMPFC), self processes are linked to AMPFC, and affective processes are linked to AMPFC and VMPFC. There is also a relatively non-selective region of VMPFC that may support situational processing, a process key to each domain, but also independent of each.

Pain and consciousness

The aversive experience we call "pain" results from the coordinated activation of multiple brain areas, commonly described as a "pain matrix". This is not a fixed arrangement of structures but rather a fluid system composed of several interacting networks: A 'nociceptive matrix' includes regions receiving input from ascending nociceptive systems, and ensures the bodily characteristics of physical pain. A further set of structures receiving secondary input supports the 'salience' attributes of noxious stimuli, triggers top-down cognitive controls, and -most importantly- ensures the passage from pre-conscious nociception to conscious pain. Expectations and beliefs can still modulate the conscious experience via activity in supramodal regions with widespread cortical projections such as the ventral tegmental area. Intracortical EEG responses in humans show that nociceptive cortical processing is initiated in parallel in sensory, motor and limbic areas; it progresses rapidly to the recruitment of anterior insular and fronto-parietal networks, and finally to the activation of perigenual, posterior cingulate and hippocampal structures. Functional connectivity between sensory and high-level networks increases during the first second post-stimulus, which may be determinant for access to consciousness. A model is described, progressing from unconscious sensori-motor and limbic processing of spinothalamic and spino-parabrachial input, to an immediate sense of awareness supported by coordinated activity in sensorimotor and fronto-parieto-insular networks, and leading to full declarative consciousness through integration with autobiographical memories and self-awareness, involving posterior cingulate and medial temporal areas. This complete sequence is only present during full vigilance states. We contend, however, that even in unconscious subjects, repeated limbic and vegetative activation by painful stimuli via spino-amygdalar pathways can generate implicit memory traces and stimulus-response abnormal sequences, possibly contributing to long-standing anxiety or hyperalgesic syndromes in patients surviving coma.

Solving the prefrontal conundrum of high-order anxiety: conciliating HOTEC and hypofrontality. A theoretical review

INTRODUCTION

According to the High-order Theory of Emotional Consciousness (HOTEC), every emotional process is a conscious and high-order state of mind carried out by the General Networks of Cognition (GNC), which consists mainly of prefrontal mechanisms. This means that anxiety is also an emotional state of mind carried out by the GNC (positive correlation). However, numerous studies have suggested what is commonly called "hypofrontality" during states of anxiety (negative correlation), which seems to give rise to a theoretical and empirical contraction.

METHODS

I present a theoretical review to address the following issue: how to advocate a HOTEC view of anxiety in the face of a growing paradigm of hypofrontality during states of anxiety?

RESULTS

Here I propose that dmPFC, the dACC, and the anterior insula are GNC areas positively correlated with anxiety, which, along with the prefrontal areas responsible for regulating the activation of survival circuits and driving the attention to adaptive ways to overcome potential threats, form an interconnective model of anticipatory and regulatory mechanisms related to learned threats based on autobiographical memories.

CONCLUSIONS

Through this model, I propose that HOTEC is still a valid way to approach and understand both healthy and unhealthy anxious states of mind.

Measuring the sense of self in brain-damaged patients: A STROBE-compliant article

Recently, researchers have focused on the embodied sense of self (ESS), which consists of the minimal and narrative selves. Although a study demonstrated that the ESS is related to brain dysfunction empirically, the subjective aspects of the ESS, and a systematic approach to it, have not yet been examined in brain-damaged patients. To examine this, we measured the ESS of patients with brain tumors before and after awake craniotomy.A self-reported questionnaire called the Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS) was used to measure the ESS in patients with brain tumors before and after surgery. For comparison, age-matched controls also completed the ESSS.The ESSS scores of the patients with brain tumors before surgery were higher than those of the controls and improved after surgery. Before surgery, patients with left hemispheric lesions had a poorer ESSS than those with right hemispheric lesions. Episodic memory disturbance was highly correlated with malfunction of narrative self and ownership.Brain lesions were associated with anomalous ESSS, associated with hemispheric laterality and cognitive dysfunction.

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

Individual differences in decision making competence revealed by multivariate fMRI

While an extensive literature in decision neuroscience has elucidated the neurobiological foundations of decision making, prior research has focused primarily on group-level effects in a sample population. Due to the presence of inherent differences between individuals' cognitive abilities, it is also important to examine the neural correlates of decision making that explain interindividual variability in cognitive performance. This study therefore investigated how individual differences in decision making competence, as measured by the Adult Decision Making Competence (A-DMC) battery, are related to functional brain connectivity patterns derived from resting-state fMRI data in a sample of 304 healthy participants. We examined connectome-wide associations, identifying regions within frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital cortex that demonstrated significant associations with decision making competence. We then assessed whether the functional interactions between brain regions sensitive to decision making competence and seven intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) were predictive of specific facets of decision making assessed by subtests of the A-DMC battery. Our findings suggest that individual differences in specific facets of decision making competence are mediated by ICNs that support executive, social, and perceptual processes, and motivate an integrative framework for understanding the neural basis of individual differences in decision making competence.

The Persistence of the Self over Time in Mild Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer's Disease

Diachronic unity is the belief that, despite changes, we are the same person across the lifespan. We propose that diachronic unity is supported by the experience of remembering the self over time during episodic recall (i.e., phenomenological continuity). However, we also predict that diachronic unity is also possible when episodic memory is impaired, as long as the ability to construct life narratives from semantic memory (i.e., semantic continuity) is intact. To examine this prediction, we investigated diachronic unity in Alzheimer's Disease (AD) and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), two conditions characterised by disrupted phenomenological continuity. If semantic continuity is also altered in these conditions, there should be an associated deterioration in diachronic unity. Participants with AD, aMCI, and healthy controls (HC) completed a self-persistence interview measuring diachronic unity (beliefs about self-persistence, explanations for stability/change). Semantic continuity was assessed with a life-story interview measuring autobiographical reasoning (self-event connections), and coherence (temporal/thematic/causal) of narratives. Our results highlight a complex relationship between semantic continuity and diachronic unity and revealed a divergence between two aspects of diachronic unity: AD/aMCI groups did not differ from HC in continuity beliefs, but AD explanations for self-persistence were less sophisticated. Semantic continuity was most impaired in AD: their narratives had fewer self-event connections (vs. HCs) and lower temporal/thematic coherence (vs. HC/aMCI), while both AD/aMCI groups had lower causal coherence. Paradoxically AD participants who scored higher on measures of beliefs in the persistence of the core self, provided less sophisticated explanations for their self-persistence and were less able to explore persistence in their life narratives. These findings support the importance of semantic continuity to diachronic unity, but suggest a more nuanced and multifaceted relationship than originally proposed in our model. In AD, diminished life narratives that retain features of cultural life scripts are sufficient for strong subjective beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated explanations about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to weave high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to understand and explain one's diachronic unity, but this produces less surety about self-persistence.

Preserved metacognitive ability despite unilateral or bilateral anterior prefrontal resection

Brodmann area 10 (BA10) is thought to be at the summit of the prefrontal cortex's hierarchical organization. It is widely accepted that metacognitive abilities depend on the structural and functional properties of BA10. Our objective was to assess whether metacognition can be maintained after low-grade glioma surgery with BA10 resection. Three groups of participants were recruited: (i) patients having undergone resection of the right prefrontal cortex, including BA10 (n = 9); (ii) patients having undergone resection of the right prefrontal cortex but not BA10 (n = 10); and (iii) healthy controls (n = 38). Importantly, we also included a patient (referred to as "PR") with resection of BA10 in the two hemispheres. The patients with resection of right BA10 had metacognitive performances that were indistinguishable from those of brain-damaged control patients and healthy controls. Crucially, PR's metacognitive ability was not only maintained but was even in the upper quartile of normal performances. Our findings demonstrate that the brain can redistribute and remap metacognition in response to injury. We thus provide experimental evidence against the conventional hypothesis whereby cognitive functions are directly and lastingly linked to particular cortical structures. The latter hypothesis seems to be particularly false for the highest levels of human cognition and for BA10.

The Insula and Taste Learning

The sense of taste is a key component of the sensory machinery, enabling the evaluation of both the safety as well as forming associations regarding the nutritional value of ingestible substances. Indicative of the salience of the modality, taste conditioning can be achieved in rodents upon a single pairing of a tastant with a chemical stimulus inducing malaise. This robust associative learning paradigm has been heavily linked with activity within the insular cortex (IC), among other regions, such as the amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. A number of studies have demonstrated taste memory formation to be dependent on protein synthesis at the IC and to correlate with the induction of signaling cascades involved in synaptic plasticity. Taste learning has been shown to require the differential involvement of dopaminergic GABAergic, glutamatergic, muscarinic neurotransmission across an extended taste learning circuit. The subsequent activation of downstream protein kinases (ERK, CaMKII), transcription factors (CREB, Elk-1) and immediate early genes (c-fos, Arc), has been implicated in the regulation of the different phases of taste learning. This review discusses the relevant neurotransmission, molecular signaling pathways and genetic markers involved in novel and aversive taste learning, with a particular focus on the IC. Imaging and other studies in humans have implicated the IC in the pathophysiology of a number of cognitive disorders. We conclude that the IC participates in circuit-wide computations that modulate the interception and encoding of sensory information, as well as the formation of subjective internal representations that control the expression of motivated behaviors.

Opioid and orexin hedonic hotspots in rat orbitofrontal cortex and insula

Hedonic hotspots are brain sites where particular neurochemical stimulations causally amplify the hedonic impact of sensory rewards, such as "liking" for sweetness. Here, we report the mapping of two hedonic hotspots in cortex, where mu opioid or orexin stimulations enhance the hedonic impact of sucrose taste. One hedonic hotspot was found in anterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and another was found in posterior insula. A suppressive hedonic coldspot was also found in the form of an intervening strip stretching from the posterior OFC through the anterior and middle insula, bracketed by the two cortical hotspots. Opioid/orexin stimulations in either cortical hotspot activated Fos throughout a distributed "hedonic circuit" involving cortical and subcortical structures. Conversely, cortical coldspot stimulation activated circuitry for "hedonic suppression." Finally, food intake was increased by stimulations at several prefrontal cortical sites, indicating that the anatomical substrates in cortex for enhancing the motivation to eat are discriminable from those for hedonic impact.

Neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience in the fMRI era: A recapitulation of localizationist and connectionist views

OBJECTIVE

We highlight the past 25 years of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology, focusing on the impact to the field of the introduction in 1992 of functional MRI (fMRI).

METHOD

We reviewed the past 25 years of literature in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology, focusing on the relation and interplay of fMRI studies and studies utilizing the "lesion method" in human participants with focal brain damage.

RESULTS

Our review highlights the state of localist/connectionist research debates in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology circa 1992, and details how the introduction of fMRI into the field at that time catalyzed a new wave of efforts to map complex human behavior to specific brain regions. This, in turn, eventually evolved into many studies that focused on networks and connections between brain areas, culminating in recent years with large-scale investigations such as the Human Connectome Project.

CONCLUSIONS

We argue that throughout the past 25 years, neuropsychology-and more precisely, the "lesion method" in humans-has continued to play a critical role in arbitrating conclusions and theories derived from inferred patterns of local brain activity or wide-spread connectivity from functional imaging approaches. We conclude by highlighting the future for neuropsychology in the context of an increasingly complex methodological armamentarium. (PsycINFO Database Record

A mathematical model of embodied consciousness

We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial field of consciousness (FoC) is structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory and frames them by selecting points of view and perspectives according to preferences. The choice of projective frames governs how expectations are transformed by consciousness. Violations of expectation are encoded as free energy. Free energy minimization drives perspective taking, and controls the switch between perception, imagination and action. In the PCM, consciousness functions as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can account for a variety of psychological phenomena: the characteristic spatial phenomenology of subjective experience, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination and action, the role of affective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the dynamics of bistable figures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to function, showing the computational advantages of consciousness. It suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious to conscious reflect the action of projective transformations and suggests specific neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing artificial systems, and formal principles for psychology.

Subjectivity of the Anomalous Sense of Self Is Represented in Gray Matter Volume in the Brain

The self includes complicated and heterogeneous functions. Researchers have divided the self into three distinct functions called “agency,” “ownership,” and “narrative self”. These correspond to psychiatric symptoms, behavioral characteristics and neural responses, but their relationship with brain structure is unclear. This study examined the relationship between the subjectivity of self-related malfunctions and brain structure in terms of gray matter (GM) volume in 96 healthy people. They completed a recently developed self-reported questionnaire called the Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS) that measures self-related malfunctions. The ESSS has three subscales reflecting the three distinct functions of the self. We also determined the participants’ brain structures using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and voxel-based morphometry (VBM). Multiple regression analysis revealed a significant negative correlation between ownership malfunction and the insular cortex GM volume. A relationship with brain structure could thus only be confirmed for the ESSS “ownership” subscale. This finding suggests that distinct brain structures feel ownership and that the ESSS could partly screen for distinct brain structures.

A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness

According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace.

A human brain network derived from coma-causing brainstem lesions

OBJECTIVE

To characterize a brainstem location specific to coma-causing lesions, and its functional connectivity network.

METHODS

We compared 12 coma-causing brainstem lesions to 24 control brainstem lesions using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping in a case-control design to identify a site significantly associated with coma. We next used resting-state functional connectivity from a healthy cohort to identify a network of regions functionally connected to this brainstem site. We further investigated the cortical regions of this network by comparing their spatial topography to that of known networks and by evaluating their functional connectivity in patients with disorders of consciousness.

RESULTS

A small region in the rostral dorsolateral pontine tegmentum was significantly associated with coma-causing lesions. In healthy adults, this brainstem site was functionally connected to the ventral anterior insula (AI) and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC). These cortical areas aligned poorly with previously defined resting-state networks, better matching the distribution of von Economo neurons. Finally, connectivity between the AI and pACC was disrupted in patients with disorders of consciousness, and to a greater degree than other brain networks.

CONCLUSIONS

Injury to a small region in the pontine tegmentum is significantly associated with coma. This brainstem site is functionally connected to 2 cortical regions, the AI and pACC, which become disconnected in disorders of consciousness. This network of brain regions may have a role in the maintenance of human consciousness.

Self-specific processing in the meditating brain: a MEG neurophenomenology study

Self-specific processes (SSPs) specify the self as an embodied subject and agent, implementing a functional self/nonself distinction in perception, cognition, and action. Despite recent interest, it is still undetermined whether SSPs are all-or-nothing or graded phenomena; whether they can be identified in neuroimaging data; and whether they can be altered through attentional training. These issues are approached through a neurophenomenological exploration of the sense-of-boundaries (SB), the fundamental experience of being an 'I' (self) separated from the 'world' (nonself). The SB experience was explored in collaboration with a uniquely qualified meditation practitioner, who volitionally produced, while being scanned by magnetoencephalogram (MEG), three mental states characterized by a graded SB experience. The results were then partly validated in an independent group of 10 long-term meditators. Implicated neural mechanisms include right-lateralized beta oscillations in the temporo-parietal junction, a region known to mediate the experiential unity of self and body; and in the medial parietal cortex, a central node of the self's representational system. The graded nature as well as the trainable flexibility and neural plasticity of SSPs may hold clinical implications for populations with a disturbed SB.

Magnitude Processing in the Brain: An fMRI Study of Time, Space, and Numerosity as a Shared Cortical System

Continuous dimensions, such as time, space, and numerosity, have been suggested to be subserved by common neurocognitive mechanisms. Neuroimaging studies that have investigated either one or two dimensions simultaneously have consistently identified neural correlates in the parietal cortex of the brain. However, studies investigating the degree of neural overlap across several dimensions are inconclusive, and it remains an open question whether a potential overlap can be conceptualized as a neurocognitive magnitude processing system. The current functional magnetic resonance imaging study investigated the potential neurocognitive overlap across three dimensions. A sample of adults (N = 24) performed three different magnitude processing tasks: a temporal discrimination task, a number discrimination task, and a line length discrimination task. A conjunction analysis revealed several overlapping neural substrates across multiple magnitude dimensions, and we argue that these cortical nodes comprise a distributed magnitude processing system. Key components of this predominantly right-lateralized system include the intraparietal sulcus, insula, premotor cortex/SMA, and inferior frontal gyrus. Together with previous research highlighting intraparietal sulcus, our results suggest that the insula also is a core component of the magnitude processing system. We discuss the functional role of each of these components in the magnitude processing system and suggest that further research of this system may provide insight into the etiology of neurodevelopmental disorders where cognitive deficits in magnitude processing are manifest.

Impaired personal trait knowledge, but spared other-person trait knowledge, in an individual with bilateral damage to the medial prefrontal cortex

Functional neuroimaging has revealed that in healthy adults retrieval of personal trait knowledge is associated with increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Separately, neuropsychology has shown that the self-referential nature of memory can be disrupted in individuals with mPFC lesions. However, it remains unclear whether damage to the mPFC impairs retrieval of personal trait knowledge. Therefore, in this neuropsychological case study we investigated the integrity of personal trait knowledge in J.S., an individual who sustained bilateral damage to the mPFC as a result of an anterior communicating artery aneurysm. We measured both accuracy and consistency of J.S.'s personal trait knowledge as well as his trait knowledge of another, frequently seen person, and compared his performance to a group of healthy adults. Findings revealed that J.S. had severely impaired accuracy and consistency of his personal trait knowledge relative to control participants. In contrast, J.S.'s accuracy and consistency of other-person trait knowledge was intact in comparison to control participants. Moreover, J.S. showed a normal positivity bias in his trait ratings. These results, albeit based on a single case, implicate the mPFC as critical for retrieval of personal trait knowledge. Findings also cast doubt on the likelihood that the mPFC, in particular the ventral mPFC, is necessary for storage and retrieval of trait knowledge of other people. Therefore, this case study adds to a growing body of evidence that mPFC damage can disrupt the link between self and memory.

Emotional Experience and Awareness of Self: Functional MRI Studies of Depersonalization Disorder

This paper presents functional MRI work on emotional processing in depersonalization disorder (DPD). This relatively neglected disorder is hallmarked by a disturbing change in the quality of first-person experience, almost invariably encompassing a diminished sense of self and an alteration in emotional experience such that the sufferer feels less emotionally reactive, with emotions experienced as decreased or “damped down,” so that emotional life seems to lack spontaneity and subjective validity. Here we explored responses to emotive visual stimuli to examine the functional neuroanatomy of emotional processing in DPD before and after pharmacological treatment. We also employed concurrent skin conductance measurement as an index of autonomic arousal. In common with previous studies we demonstrated that in DPD, there is attenuated psychophysiological response to emotional material, reflected in altered patterns of (i) regional brain response, (ii) autonomic responses. By scanning participants before and after treatment we were able to build on previous findings by examining the changes in functional MRI response in patients whose symptoms had improved at time 2. The attenuation of emotional experience was associated with reduced activity of the insula, whereas clinical improvement in DPD symptoms was associated with increased insula activity. The insula is known to be implicated in interoceptive awareness and the generation of feeling states. In addition an area of right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex emerged as particularly implicated in what may be “top-down” inhibition of emotional responses. The relevance of these findings to the wider study of emotion, self-related processes, and interoception is discussed.

Self, cortical midline structures and the resting state: Implications for Alzheimer's disease

Different aspects of the self have been reported to be affected in many neurological or psychiatric diseases such as Alzheimer's disease (AD), including mainly higher-level cognitive self-unawareness. This higher sense of self-awareness is most likely related to and dependent on episodic memory, due to the proper integration of ourselves in time, with a permanent conservation of ourselves (i.e., sense of continuity across time). Reviewing studies in this field, our objective is thus to raise possible explanations, especially with the help of neuroimaging studies, for where such self-awareness deficits originate in AD patients. We describe not only episodic (and autobiographical memory) impairment in patients, but also the important role of cortical midline structures, the Default Mode Network, and the resting state (intrinsic brain activity) for the processing of self-related information.

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal's perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian.

Mapping neuroplastic potential in brain-damaged patients

It is increasingly acknowledged that the brain is highly plastic. However, the anatomic factors governing the potential for neuroplasticity have hardly been investigated. To bridge this knowledge gap, we generated a probabilistic atlas of functional plasticity derived from both anatomic magnetic resonance imaging results and intraoperative mapping data on 231 patients having undergone surgery for diffuse, low-grade glioma. The atlas includes detailed level of confidence information and is supplemented with a series of comprehensive, connectivity-based cluster analyses. Our results show that cortical plasticity is generally high in the cortex (except in primary unimodal areas and in a small set of neural hubs) and rather low in connective tracts (especially associative and projection tracts). The atlas sheds new light on the topological organization of critical neural systems and may also be useful in predicting the likelihood of recovery (as a function of lesion topology) in various neuropathological conditions-a crucial factor in improving the care of brain-damaged patients.

Acquired alexithymia following damage to the anterior insula

Alexithymia is a subclinical condition characterized by impaired awareness of one's emotional states, which has profound effects on mental health and social interaction. Despite the clinical significance of this condition, the neurocognitive impairment(s) that lead to alexithymia remain unclear. Recent theoretical models suggest that impaired anterior insula (AI) functioning might be involved in alexithymia, but conclusive evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. We measured alexithymia levels in a large sample of brain-injured patients (N=129) and non-brain-injured control participants (N=33), to determine whether alexithymia can be acquired after pronounced damage to the AI. Alexithymia levels were first analysed as a function of group, with patients separated into four groups based on AI damage: patients with >15% damage to AI, patients with <15% damage to AI, patients with no damage to AI, and healthy controls. An ANOVA revealed that alexithymia levels varied across groups (p=0.009), with >15% AI damage causing higher alexithymia relative to all other groups (all p<0.01). Next, a multiple linear regression model was fit with the degree of damage to AI, the degree of damage to a related region (the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC), and the degree of damage to the whole brain as predictor variables, and alexithymia as the dependent variable. Critically, increased AI damage predicted increased alexithymia after controlling for the other two regressors (ACC damage; total lesion volume). Collectively, our results suggest that pronounced AI damage causes increased levels of alexithymia, providing critical evidence that this region supports emotional awareness.

Connecting Self-Awareness and Error-Awareness in Patients with Traumatic Brain Injury

Impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain injury (TBI) is often seen in stark contrast to the observations of significant-others, who are acutely aware of the difficulties experienced by patients. Our objective was to investigate the relationship between metacognitive knowledge in daily life and emergent awareness of errors during laboratory tasks, since the breakdown of error detection mechanisms may impose limitations on the recovery of metacognitive knowledge after TBI. We also examined the extent to which these measures of awareness can predict dysexecutive behaviors. A sample of TBI patients (n=62) and their significant-others, provided reports of daily functioning post injury. In addition, patients underwent a neuropsychological assessment and were instructed to signal their errors during go/no-go tests. Interrelationships between metacognitive and emergent levels of awareness were examined, after controlling for the influence of secondary cognitive variables. Significant-other ratings correlated with errors made by the patients on neuropsychological tests but not with their premorbid function. Patients who under-reported daily life difficulties or over-reported their competency, compared to significant-other reports, were less likely to show awareness of laboratory errors. Emergent awareness was also identified as the sole predictor of performance on the modified six-element test, an ecologically valid test of multitasking. The online breakdown of error awareness after brain injury is related to difficulties with metacognitive awareness as reported in daily life, and is also predictive of dysexecutive behaviors. These findings are discussed in the context of multidimensional and neural models of awareness and error monitoring.

Consciousness: individuated information in action

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness - the main aim of this article -into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.

Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.