Behavioral, Modeling, and Electrophysiological Evidence for Supramodality in Human Metacognition

Sensorimotor confidence for tracking eye movements

For successful interactions with the world, we often have to evaluate our own performance. Although eye movements are one of the most frequent actions we perform, we are typically unaware of them. Here, we investigated whether there is any evidence for metacognitive sensitivity for the accuracy of eye movements. Participants tracked a dot cloud as it followed an unpredictable sinusoidal trajectory and then reported if they thought their performance was better or worse than their average tracking performance. Our results show above-chance identification of better tracking behavior across all trials and also for repeated attempts of the same target trajectories. Sensitivity in discriminating performance between better and worse trials was stable across sessions, but judgements within a trial relied more on performance in the final seconds. This behavior matched previous reports when judging the quality of hand movements, although overall metacognitive sensitivity for eye movements was significantly lower.

Intention offloading: Domain-general versus task-specific confidence signals

Intention offloading refers to the use of external reminders to help remember delayed intentions (e.g., setting an alert to help you remember when you need to take your medication). Research has found that metacognitive processes influence offloading such that individual differences in confidence predict individual differences in offloading regardless of objective cognitive ability. The current study investigated the cross-domain organization of this relationship. Participants performed two perceptual discrimination tasks where objective accuracy was equalized using a staircase procedure. In a memory task, two measures of intention offloading were collected, (1) the overall likelihood of setting reminders, and (2) the bias in reminder-setting compared to the optimal strategy. It was found that perceptual confidence was associated with the first measure but not the second. It is shown that this is because individual differences in perceptual confidence capture meaningful differences in objective ability despite the staircase procedure. These findings indicate that intention offloading is influenced by both domain-general and task-specific metacognitive signals. They also show that even when task performance is equalized via staircasing, individual differences in confidence cannot be considered a pure measure of metacognitive bias.

The neural representation of metacognition in preferential decision-making

Humans regularly assess the quality of their judgements, which helps them adjust their behaviours. Metacognition is the ability to accurately evaluate one's own judgements, and it is assessed by comparing objective task performance with subjective confidence report in perceptual decisions. However, for preferential decisions, assessing metacognition in preference-based decisions is difficult because it depends on subjective goals rather than the objective criterion. Here, we develop a new index that integrates choice, reaction time, and confidence report to quantify trial-by-trial metacognitive sensitivity in preference judgements. We found that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right anterior insular were more activated when participants made bad metacognitive evaluations. Our study suggests a crucial role of the dmPFC-insula network in representing online metacognitive sensitivity in preferential decisions.

The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Confidence in visual detection, familiarity and recollection judgments is preserved in schizophrenia spectrum disorder

An effective way to quantify metacognitive performance is to ask participants to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their response during a cognitive task. A recent meta-analysis1 raised the issue that most assessments of metacognitive performance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may be confounded with cognitive deficits, which are known to be present in this population. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the reported metacognitive deficits are metacognitive in nature or rather inherited from cognitive deficits. Arbitrating between these two possibilities requires equating task performance between experimental groups. Here, we aimed to characterize metacognitive performance among individuals with schizophrenia across three tasks (visual detection, familiarity, recollection) using a within-subject design while controlling experimentally for intra-individual task performance and statistically for between-subject task performance. In line with our hypotheses, we found no metacognitive deficit for visual detection and familiarity judgments. While we expected metacognition for recollection to be specifically impaired among individuals with schizophrenia, we found evidence in favor of an absence of a deficit in that domain also. We found no specific metacognitive deficit in schizophrenia spectrum disorder in the visual or memory domain. The clinical relevance of our findings is discussed in light of a hierarchical framework of metacognition.

Modality independent or modality specific? Common computations underlie confidence judgements in visual and auditory decisions

The mechanisms that enable humans to evaluate their confidence across a range of different decisions remain poorly understood. To bridge this gap in understanding, we used computational modelling to investigate the processes that underlie confidence judgements for perceptual decisions and the extent to which these computations are the same in the visual and auditory modalities. Participants completed two versions of a categorisation task with visual or auditory stimuli and made confidence judgements about their category decisions. In each modality, we varied both evidence strength, (i.e., the strength of the evidence for a particular category) and sensory uncertainty (i.e., the intensity of the sensory signal). We evaluated several classes of computational models which formalise the mapping of evidence strength and sensory uncertainty to confidence in different ways: 1) unscaled evidence strength models, 2) scaled evidence strength models, and 3) Bayesian models. Our model comparison results showed that across tasks and modalities, participants take evidence strength and sensory uncertainty into account in a way that is consistent with the scaled evidence strength class. Notably, the Bayesian class provided a relatively poor account of the data across modalities, particularly in the more complex categorisation task. Our findings suggest that a common process is used for evaluating confidence in perceptual decisions across domains, but that the parameter settings governing the process are tuned differently in each modality. Overall, our results highlight the impact of sensory uncertainty on confidence and the unity of metacognitive processing across sensory modalities.

Late ERP correlates of confidence for auditory categorization of complex sounds

Recent research suggests that confidence judgments relate to the quality of early sensory representations and later modality independent processing stages. It is not known whether the nature of this finding might vary based on task and/or stimulus characteristics (e.g., detection vs. categorization). The present study investigated the neural correlates of confidence using electroencephalography (EEG) in an auditory categorization task. This allowed us to examine whether the early event-related potentials (ERPs) related to confidence in detection also apply to a more complex auditory task. Participants listened to frequency-modulated (FM) tonal stimuli going up or down in pitch. The rate of FM tones ranged from slow to fast, making the stimuli harder or easier to categorize. Tone-locked late posterior positivity (LPP) but not N1 or P2 amplitudes were larger for (correct-only) trials rated with high than low confidence. These results replicated for trials presenting stimuli at individually identified threshold levels (rate of change producing ∼71.7% correct performance). This finding suggests that, in this task, neural correlates of confidence do not vary based on difficulty level. We suggest that the LPP is a task general indication of the confidence for an upcoming judgment in a variety of paradigms.

Common computations in automatic cue combination and metacognitive confidence reports

Appropriate perceptual decision making necessitates the accurate estimation and use of sensory uncertainty. Such estimation has been studied in the context of both low-level multisensory cue combination and metacognitive estimation of confidence, but it remains unclear whether the same computations underlie both sets of uncertainty estimation. We created visual stimuli with low vs. high overall motion energy, such that the high-energy stimuli led to higher confidence but lower accuracy in a visual-only task. Importantly, we tested the impact of the low- and high-energy visual stimuli on auditory motion perception in a separate task. Despite being irrelevant to the auditory task, both visual stimuli impacted auditory judgments presumably via automatic low-level mechanisms. Critically, we found that the high-energy visual stimuli influenced the auditory judgments more strongly than the low-energy visual stimuli. This effect was in line with the confidence but contrary to the accuracy differences between the high- and low-energy stimuli in the visual-only task. These effects were captured by a simple computational model that assumes common computational principles underlying both confidence reports and multisensory cue combination. Our results reveal a deep link between automatic sensory processing and metacognitive confidence reports, and suggest that vastly different stages of perceptual decision making rely on common computational principles.

Age-related decreases in global metacognition are independent of local metacognition and task performance

Metacognition refers to a capacity to reflect on and control other cognitive processes, commonly quantified as the extent to which confidence tracks objective performance. There is conflicting evidence about how "local" metacognition (monitoring of individual judgments) and "global" metacognition (estimates of self-performance) change across the lifespan. Additionally, the degree to which metacognition generalises across cognitive domains may itself change with age due to increased experience with one's own abilities. Using a gamified suite of performance-controlled memory and visual perception tasks, we measured local and global metacognition in an age-stratified sample of 304 healthy volunteers (18-83 years; N = 50 in each of 6 age groups). We calculated both local and global metrics of metacognition and quantified how and whether domain-generality changes with age. First-order task performance was stable across the age range. People's global self-performance estimates and local metacognitive bias decreased with age, indicating overall lower confidence in performance. In contrast, local metacognitive efficiency was spared in older age and remained correlated across the two cognitive domains. A stability of local metacognition indicates distinct mechanisms contributing to local and global metacognition. Our study reveals how local and global metacognition change across the lifespan and provide a benchmark against which disease-related changes in metacognition can be compared.

Cross-modal metacognition: Visual and tactile confidence share a common scale

Humans can judge the quality of their perceptual decisions-an ability known as perceptual confidence. Previous work suggested that confidence can be evaluated on an abstract scale that can be sensory modality-independent or even domain-general. However, evidence is still scarce on whether confidence judgments can be directly made across visual and tactile decisions. Here, we investigated in a sample of 56 adults whether visual and tactile confidence share a common scale by measuring visual contrast and vibrotactile discrimination thresholds in a confidence-forced choice paradigm. Confidence judgments were made about the correctness of the perceptual decision between two trials involving either the same or different modalities. To estimate confidence efficiency, we compared discrimination thresholds obtained from all trials to those from trials judged to be relatively more confident. We found evidence for metaperception because higher confidence was associated with better perceptual performance in both modalities. Importantly, participants were able to judge their confidence across modalities without any costs in metaperceptual sensitivity and only minor changes in response times compared to unimodal confidence judgments. In addition, we were able to predict cross-modal confidence well from unimodal judgments. In conclusion, our findings show that perceptual confidence is computed on an abstract scale and that it can assess the quality of our decisions across sensory modalities.

Is visual metacognition associated with autistic traits? A regression analysis shows no link between visual metacognition and Autism-Spectrum Quotient scores

Metacognition -the human ability to recognize correct decisions- is a key cognitive process linked to learning and development. Several recent studies investigated the relationship between metacognition and autism. However, the evidence is still inconsistent. While some studies reported autistic people having lower levels of metacognitive sensitivity, others did not. Leveraging the fact that autistic traits are present in the general population, our study investigated the relationship between visual metacognition and autistic traits in a sample of 360 neurotypical participants. We measured metacognition as the correspondence between confidence and accuracy in a visual two alternative forced choice task. Autistic-traits were assessed through the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) score. A regression analysis revealed no statistically significant association between autistic traits and metacognition or confidence. Furthermore, we found no link between AQ sub-scales and metacognition. We do not find support for the hypothesis that autistic traits are associated with metacognition in the general population.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants performed two tasks probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time, and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

Comparing event-related potentials of retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments during episodic and semantic memory

It is unclear whether metacognitive judgments are made on the basis of domain-generality or domain-specificity. In the current study, we compared both behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) correlates of retrospective (retrospective confidence judgments: RCJs), and prospective (feeling of knowing: FOK) metacognitive judgments during episodic and semantic memory tasks in 82 participants. Behavioral results indicated that FOK judgments reflect a domain-specific process, while RCJ reflect a domain-general process. RCJ and FOK judgments produced similar ERP waveforms within the memory tasks, but with different temporal dynamics; thus supporting the hypothesis that retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments are distinct processes. Our ERP results also suggest that metacognitive judgments are linked to distributed neural substrates, rather than purely frontal lobe functioning. Furthermore, the role of intra-subject and inter-subject differences in metacognitive judgments across and within the memory tasks are highlighted.

Mood and implicit confidence independently fluctuate at different time scales

Mood is an important ingredient of decision-making. Human beings are immersed into a sea of ​​emotions where episodes of high mood alternate with episodes of low mood. While changes in mood are well characterized, little is known about how these fluctuations interact with metacognition, and in particular with confidence about our decisions. We evaluated how implicit measurements of confidence are related with mood states of human participants through two online longitudinal experiments involving mood self-reports and visual discrimination decision-making tasks. Implicit confidence was assessed on each session by monitoring the proportion of opt-out trials when an opt-out option was available, as well as the median reaction time on standard correct trials as a secondary proxy of confidence. We first report a strong coupling between mood, stress, food enjoyment, and quality of sleep reported by participants in the same session. Second, we confirmed that the proportion of opt-out responses as well as reaction times in non-opt-out trials provided reliable indices of confidence in each session. We introduce a normative measure of overconfidence based on the pattern of opt-out selection and the signal-detection-theory framework. Finally and crucially, we found that mood, sleep quality, food enjoyment, and stress level are not consistently coupled with these implicit confidence markers, but rather they fluctuate at different time scales: mood-related states display faster fluctuations (over one day or half-a-day) than confidence level (two-and-a-half days). Therefore, our findings suggest that spontaneous fluctuations of mood and confidence in decision making are independent in the healthy adult population.

Sensory Target Detection at Local and Global Timescales Reveals a Hierarchy of Supramodal Dynamics in the Human Cortex

To ensure survival in a dynamic environment, the human neocortex monitors input streams from different sensory organs for important sensory events. Which principles govern whether different senses share common or modality-specific brain networks for sensory target detection? We examined whether complex targets evoke sustained supramodal activity while simple targets rely on modality-specific networks with short-lived supramodal contributions. In a series of hierarchical multisensory target detection studies (n = 77, of either sex) using EEG, we applied a temporal cross-decoding approach to dissociate supramodal and modality-specific cortical dynamics elicited by rule-based global and feature-based local sensory deviations within and between the visual, somatosensory, and auditory modality. Our data show that each sense implements a cortical hierarchy orchestrating supramodal target detection responses, which operate at local and global timescales in successive processing stages. Across different sensory modalities, simple feature-based sensory deviations presented in temporal vicinity to a monotonous input stream triggered a mismatch negativity-like local signal which decayed quickly and early, whereas complex rule-based targets tracked across time evoked a P3b-like global neural response which generalized across a late time window. Converging results from temporal cross-modality decoding analyses across different datasets, we reveal that global neural responses are sustained in a supramodal higher-order network, whereas local neural responses canonically thought to rely on modality-specific regions evolve into short-lived supramodal activity. Together, our findings demonstrate that cortical organization largely follows a gradient in which short-lived modality-specific as well as supramodal processes dominate local responses, whereas higher-order processes encode temporally extended abstract supramodal information fed forward from modality-specific cortices.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Each sense supports a cortical hierarchy of processes tracking deviant sensory events at multiple timescales. Conflicting evidence produced a lively debate around which of these processes are supramodal. Here, we manipulated the temporal complexity of auditory, tactile, and visual targets to determine whether cortical local and global ERP responses to sensory targets share cortical dynamics between the senses. Using temporal cross-decoding, we found that temporally complex targets elicit a supramodal sustained response. Conversely, local responses to temporally confined targets typically considered modality-specific rely on early short-lived supramodal activation. Our finding provides evidence for a supramodal gradient supporting sensory target detection in the cortex, with implications for multiple fields in which these responses are studied (e.g., predictive coding, consciousness, and attention).

Metacognitive Domains Are Not Aligned along a Dimension of Internal-External Information Source

It is still debated whether metacognition, or the ability to monitor our own mental states, relies on processes that are “domain-general” (a single set of processes can account for the monitoring of any mental process) or “domain-specific” (metacognition is accomplished by a collection of multiple monitoring modules, one for each cognitive domain). It has been speculated that two broad categories of metacognitive processes may exist: those that monitor primarily externally generated versus those that monitor primarily internally generated information. To test this proposed division, we measured metacognitive performance (using m-ratio, a signal detection theoretical measure) in four tasks that could be ranked along an internal-external axis of the source of information, namely memory, motor, visuomotor, and visual tasks. We found correlations between m-ratios in visuomotor and motor tasks, but no correlations between m-ratios in visual and visuomotor tasks, or between motor and memory tasks. While we found no correlation in metacognitive ability between visual and memory tasks, and a positive correlation between visuomotor and motor tasks, we found no evidence for a correlation between motor and memory tasks. This pattern of correlations does not support the grouping of domains based on whether the source of information is primarily internal or external. We suggest that other groupings could be more reflective of the nature of metacognition and discuss the need to consider other non-domain task-features when using correlations as a way to test the underlying shared processes between domains.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Psychiatrically relevant signatures of domain-general decision-making and metacognition in the general population

Human behaviours are guided by how confident we feel in our abilities. When confidence does not reflect objective performance, this can impact critical adaptive functions and impair life quality. Distorted decision-making and confidence have been associated with mental health problems. Here, utilising advances in computational and transdiagnostic psychiatry, we sought to map relationships between psychopathology and both decision-making and confidence in the general population across two online studies (N's = 344 and 473, respectively). The results revealed dissociable decision-making and confidence signatures related to distinct symptom dimensions. A dimension characterised by compulsivity and intrusive thoughts was found to be associated with reduced objective accuracy but, paradoxically, increased absolute confidence, whereas a dimension characterized by anxiety and depression was associated with systematically low confidence in the absence of impairments in objective accuracy. These relationships replicated across both studies and distinct cognitive domains (perception and general knowledge), suggesting that they are reliable and domain general. Additionally, whereas Big-5 personality traits also predicted objective task performance, only symptom dimensions related to subjective confidence. Domain-general signatures of decision-making and metacognition characterise distinct psychological dispositions and psychopathology in the general population and implicate confidence as a central component of mental health.

Time-sensitive prefrontal involvement in associating confidence with task performance illustrates metacognitive introspection in monkeys

Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one's own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d' computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.

No evidence of impaired visual and tactile metacognition in adults with tourette disorder

INTRODUCTION

Premonitory urges in Tourette disorder are often linked to altered somatosensory processing, which might include deficits in metacognition. We explored tactile and visual metacognitive ability in people with Tourette disorder and healthy control participants.

METHODS

Patients with Tourrete disorder and healthy control participants completed a tactile and a visual metacognitive task. On each trial, participants did a forced choice discrimination and then rated their confidence in their decision. To quantify metacognitive ability, we used m-ratio - a bias-free measure that allows for comparisons across modalities. Correlations between severity of tics and premonitory urges with tactile metacognitive sensitivity were also performed.

RESULTS

Metacognitive ability in both tactile and visual domains was comparable between adults with Tourette disorder and healthy controls. We also found no evidence for correlations between tactile metacognitive ability and severity of premonitory urges or tic severity.

CONCLUSIONS

Tactile and visual metacognition is not impaired in adults with Tourette disorder. These results question the role of altered tactile metacognition in pathophysiology of tic disorders.

Visual metacognition: Measures, models, and neural correlates

Visual metacognition is the ability to evaluate one's performance on visual perceptual tasks. The field of visual metacognition unites the long tradition of visual psychophysics with the younger field of metacognition research. This article traces the historical roots of the field and reviews progress in the areas of (a) constructing appropriate measures of metacognitive ability, (b) developing computational models, and (c) revealing the neural correlates of visual metacognition. First, I review the most popular measures of metacognitive ability with an emphasis on their psychophysical properties. Second, I examine the empirical targets for modeling, the dominant modeling frameworks and the assumed computations underlying visual metacognition. Third, I explore the progress on understanding the neural correlates of visual metacognition by focusing on anatomical and functional studies, as well as causal manipulations. What emerges is a picture of substantial progress on constructing measures, developing models, and revealing the neural correlates of metacognition, but very little integration between these three areas of inquiry. I then explore the deep, intrinsic links between the three areas of research and argue that continued progress requires the recognition and exploitation of these links. Throughout, I discuss the implications of progress in visual metacognition for other areas of metacognition research, and pinpoint specific advancements that could be adopted by researchers working in other subfields of metacognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Metacognitive Awareness of Difficulty in Action Selection: The Role of the Cingulo-opercular Network

The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes, or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency, we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response), reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by RTs or prime-response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgment of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.

Subject- and task-independent neural correlates and prediction of decision confidence in perceptual decision making

Objective.In many real-world decision tasks, the information available to the decision maker is incomplete. To account for this uncertainty, we associate a degree of confidence to every decision, representing the likelihood of that decision being correct. In this study, we analyse electroencephalography (EEG) data from 68 participants undertaking eight different perceptual decision-making experiments. Our goals are to investigate (1) whether subject- and task-independent neural correlates of decision confidence exist, and (2) to what degree it is possible to build brain computer interfaces that can estimate confidence on a trial-by-trial basis. The experiments cover a wide range of perceptual tasks, which allowed to separate the task-related, decision-making features from the task-independent ones.Approach.Our systems train artificial neural networks to predict the confidence in each decision from EEG data and response times. We compare the decoding performance with three training approaches: (1) single subject, where both training and testing data were acquired from the same person; (2) multi-subject, where all the data pertained to the same task, but the training and testing data came from different users; and (3) multi-task, where the training and testing data came from different tasks and subjects. Finally, we validated our multi-task approach using data from two additional experiments, in which confidence was not reported.Main results.We found significant differences in the EEG data for different confidence levels in both stimulus-locked and response-locked epochs. All our approaches were able to predict the confidence between 15% and 35% better than the corresponding reference baselines.Significance.Our results suggest that confidence in perceptual decision making tasks could be reconstructed from neural signals even when using transfer learning approaches. These confidence estimates are based on the decision-making process rather than just the confidence-reporting process.

Metric error monitoring: Another generalized mechanism for magnitude representations?

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

Confidence in visual motion discrimination is preserved in individuals with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Metacognition is the set of reflexive processes that allows humans to evaluate the accuracy of their mental operations. Metacognitive deficits have been described in people with schizophrenia using mostly narrative assessment, and they have been linked to several key symptoms.

METHODS

We assessed metacognitive performance objectively by asking people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (n = 20) and matched healthy participants (n = 21) to perform a visual discrimination task and report their confidence in their performance. Metacognitive performance was defined as the adequacy between visual discrimination performance and confidence.

RESULTS

Bayesian analyses revealed equivalent metacognitive performance in the 2 groups, despite a weaker association between confidence and trajectory tracking during task execution among people with schizophrenia. We reproduced these results using an evidence accumulation model, which showed similar decisional processes in the 2 groups.

LIMITATIONS

These results from a relatively small study sample cannot be generalized to other perceptual and nonperceptual tasks. To meet this purpose, ecological tasks are needed. As well, the role of antipsychotic medication and design deserves greater attention in the future.

CONCLUSION

We found similar decisional and metacognitive capabilities between people with schizophrenia and healthy controls in a visual discrimination task.

Perceptual decision confidence is sensitive to forgone physical effort expenditure

Contemporary theoretical accounts of metacognition propose that action-related information is used in the computation of perceptual decision confidence. We investigated whether the amount of expended physical effort, or the 'motoric sunk cost' of a decision, influences perceptual decision confidence judgements in humans. In particular, we examined whether people feel more confident in decisions which required more effort to report. Forty-two participants performed a luminance discrimination task that involved identifying which of two flickering grayscale squares was brightest. Participants reported their choice by squeezing hand-held dynamometers. Across trials, the effort required to report a decision was varied across three levels (low, medium, high). Critically, participants were only aware of the required effort level on each trial once they had initiated their motor response, meaning that the varying effort requirements could not influence their initial decisions. Following each decision, participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that participants were more confident in decisions that required greater effort to report. This suggests that humans are sensitive to motoric sunk costs and supports contemporary models of metacognition in which actions inform the computation of decision confidence.

Confidence in subjective pain is predicted by reaction time during decision making

Self-report is the gold standard for measuring pain. However, decisions about pain can vary substantially within and between individuals. We measured whether self-reported pain is accompanied by metacognition and variations in confidence, similar to perceptual decision-making in other modalities. Eighty healthy volunteers underwent acute thermal pain and provided pain ratings followed by confidence judgments on continuous visual analogue scales. We investigated whether eye fixations and reaction time during pain rating might serve as implicit markers of confidence. Confidence varied across trials and increased confidence was associated with faster pain rating reaction times. The association between confidence and fixations varied across individuals as a function of the reliability of individuals’ association between temperature and pain. Taken together, this work indicates that individuals can provide metacognitive judgments of pain and extends research on confidence in perceptual decision-making to pain.

Performance monitoring for sensorimotor confidence: A visuomotor tracking study

To best interact with the external world, humans are often required to consider the quality of their actions. Sometimes the environment furnishes rewards or punishments to signal action efficacy. However, when such feedback is absent or only partial, we must rely on internally generated signals to evaluate our performance (i.e., metacognition). Yet, very little is known about how humans form such judgements of sensorimotor confidence. Do they monitor their actual performance or do they rely on cues to sensorimotor uncertainty? We investigated sensorimotor metacognition in two visuomotor tracking experiments, where participants followed an unpredictably moving dot cloud with a mouse cursor as it followed a random horizontal trajectory. Their goal was to infer the underlying target generating the dots, track it for several seconds, and then report their confidence in their tracking as better or worse than their average. In Experiment 1, we manipulated task difficulty with two methods: varying the size of the dot cloud and varying the stability of the target's velocity. In Experiment 2, the stimulus statistics were fixed and duration of the stimulus presentation was varied. We found similar levels of metacognitive sensitivity in all experiments, which was evidence against the cue-based strategy. The temporal analysis of metacognitive sensitivity revealed a recency effect, where error later in the trial had a greater influence on the sensorimotor confidence, consistent with a performance-monitoring strategy. From these results, we conclude that humans predominantly monitored their tracking performance, albeit inefficiently, to build a sense of sensorimotor confidence.

Sources of Metacognitive Inefficiency

Confidence judgments are typically less informative about one's accuracy than they could be; a phenomenon we call metacognitive inefficiency. We review the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency and classify them into four categories based on whether the corruption is due to: (i) systematic or nonsystematic influences, and (ii) the input to or the computation of the metacognitive system. Critically, the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency provides an alternative explanation for behavioral findings typically interpreted as evidence for domain-specific (and against domain-general) metacognitive systems. We argue that, contrary to the dominant assumption in the field, metacognitive failures are not monolithic and suggest that understanding the sources of metacognitive inefficiency should be a primary goal of the science of metacognition.

Segregated Co-activation Patterns in the Emergence of Decision Confidence During Visual Perception

Visual metacognition-the introspection and evaluation of one's own visual perceptual processes-is measured through both decision confidence and "metacognitive efficiency." Metacognitive efficiency refers to an individual's ability to accurately judge incorrect and correct decisions through confidence ratings given their task performance. Previous imaging studies in humans and nonhuman primates reported widely distributed brain regions being involved in decision confidence and metacognition. However, the neural correlates of metacognition are remarkably inconsistent across studies concerning spatial outline. Therefore, this study investigates the neural correlates of visual metacognition by examining co-activation across regions that scale with visual decision confidence. We hypothesized that interacting processes of perceptual and metacognitive performance contribute to the arising decision confidence in distributed, but segregable co-activating brain regions. To test this hypothesis, we performed task-fMRI in healthy humans during a visual backward masking task with four-scale, post-decision confidence ratings. We measured blood oxygenation covariation patterns, which served as a physiological proxy for co-activation across brain regions. Decision confidence ratings and an individual's metacognitive efficiency served as behavioral measures for metacognition. We found three distinct co-activation clusters involved in decision confidence: the first included right-centered fronto-temporal-parietal regions, the second included left temporal and parietal regions, and the left basal forebrain (BF), and the third included cerebellar regions. The right fronto-temporal-parietal cluster including the supplementary eye field and the right basal forebrain showed stronger co-activation in subjects with higher metacognitive efficiency. Our results provide novel evidence for co-activation of widely distributed fronto-parieto-temporal regions involved in visual confidence. The supplementary eye field was the only region that activated for both decision confidence and metacognitive efficiency, suggesting the supplementary eye field plays a key role in visual metacognition. Our results link findings in electrophysiology studies and human fMRI studies and provide evidence that confidence estimates arise from the integration of multiple information processing pathways.

Among the Two Kinds of Metacognitive Evaluation, Only One Is Predictive of Illusory Object Perception

The relationship between expectation-induced hallucination proneness and self-confidence in performance was studied in a visual perception task. Participants were prompted either to recognize briefly shown faces as male or female or to rate the subjective vividness of a square surrounding the face. Importantly, in a few critical trials, the square was absent. Upon completion, participants rated their performance in the face recognition task; they were also asked whether they were sure that their estimation was correct. Out of 35 participants, 33 "hallucinated" on at least one trial, rating the square as visible when it was actually absent. Negative correlation between hallucination proneness and self-confidence in performance (metacognitive rating) was found: The more hallucinations a participant experienced, the less confident he/she was in his/her performance in the face recognition task. Most subjects underestimated their performance; higher ratings were also more accurate. Thus, higher hallucination proneness was associated with more inaccurate ratings of one's own perception. However, confidence in self-ratings as measured by the second follow-up question was unrelated to both, hallucination proneness and self-confidence in performance, supporting the view that there is no unitary mechanism of metacognitive evaluations and extending this view to the domain of visual hallucinatory perception.

Is there a G factor for metacognition? Correlations in retrospective metacognitive sensitivity across tasks

Is metacognition a general resource shared across domains? Previous research has documented consistent biases in judgments across tasks. In contrast, there is debate regarding the domain generality or the domain specificity of the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers (metacognitive sensitivity) because most previous work has documented nonsignificant correlations across domains. However, such null findings may be due to low statistical power and differences in task structure or performance, thereby masking a latent domain generality in metacognition. We examined across-domain correlations in confidence level and sensitivity in a large sample (N = 181). Participants performed 4 2-alternative forced-choice tasks (episodic memory, semantic memory, executive function, and visual perception) with trial-by-trial confidence judgments. We found significant correlations in average confidence level across tasks. By applying a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate cross-task covariance, we found five out 6 cross-task correlations in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d') were significant, even for pairs of tasks in which first-order performance was not correlated. This suggests that at least some components of metacognitive efficiency in retrospective confidence are domain general. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Hydrocortisone decreases metacognitive efficiency independent of perceived stress

It is well established that acute stress produces negative effects on high level cognitive functions. However, these effects could be due to the physiological components of the stress response (among which cortisol secretion is prominent), to its psychological concomitants (the thoughts generated by the stressor) or to any combination of those. Our study shows for the first time that the typical cortisol response to stress is sufficient to impair metacognition, that is the ability to monitor one's own performance in a task. In a pharmacological protocol, we administered either 20 mg hydrocortisone or placebo to 46 male participants, and measured their subjective perception of stress, their performance in a perceptual task, and their metacognitive ability. We found that hydrocortisone selectively impaired metacognitive ability, without affecting task performance or creating a subjective state of stress. In other words, the single physiological response of stress produces a net effect on metacognition. These results inform our basic understanding of the physiological bases of metacognition. They are also relevant for applied or clinical research about situations involving stress, anxiety, depression, or simply cortisol use.

Confounding in Studies on Metacognition: A Preliminary Causal Analysis Framework

By definition, metacognitive processes may monitor or regulate various stages of first-order processing. By combining causal analysis with hypotheses expressed by other authors we derive the theoretical and methodological consequences of this special relation between metacognition and the underlying processes. In particular, we prove that because multiple processing stages may be monitored or regulated and because metacognition may form latent feedback loops, (1) without strong additional causal assumptions, typical measures of metacognitive monitoring or regulation are confounded; (2) without strong additional causal assumptions, typical methods of controlling for first-order task performance (i.e., calibration, staircase, including first-order task performance in a regression analysis, or analyzing correct and incorrect trials separately) not only do not deconfound measures of metacognition but may even introduce bias; (3) that the first two problems cannot be solved by using simple models of decision-making derived from Signal Detection Theory. We conclude the paper by advocating robust methods of discovering properties of latent mechanisms.

Atypical spatial frequency dependence of visual metacognition among schizophrenia patients

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Visual metacognition of controls was dependent on spatial frequency.

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Visual metacognition of schizophrenia patients was independent of spatial frequency.

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Patients and controls differently rely on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

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Sensory inputs may reach metacognitive circuits in an atypical manner among patients.

Although altered early stages of visual processing have been reported among schizophrenia patients, how such atypical visual processing may affect higher-level cognition remains largely unknown. Here we tested the hypothesis that metacognitive performance may be atypically modulated by spatial frequency (SF) of visual stimuli among individuals with schizophrenia, given their altered magnocellular function. To study the effect of SF on metacognitive performance, we asked patients and controls to perform a visual detection task on gratings with different SFs and report confidence, and analyzed the data using the signal detection theoretic measure meta-d′. Control subjects showed better metacognitive performance after yes- (stimulus presence) than after no- (stimulus absence) responses (‘yes-response advantage’) for high SF (HSF) stimuli but not for low SF (LSF) stimuli. The patients, to the contrary, showed a ‘yes-response advantage’ not only for HSF but also for LSF stimuli, indicating atypical SF dependency of metacognition. An fMRI experiment using the same task revealed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), known to be crucial for metacognition, shows activity mirroring the behavioral results: decoding accuracy of perceptual confidence in DLPFC was significantly higher for HSF than for LSF stimuli in controls, whereas this decoding accuracy was independent of SF in patients. Additionally, the functional connectivity of DLPFC with parietal and visual areas was modulated by SF and response type (yes/no) in a different manner between controls and patients. While individuals without schizophrenia may flexibly adapt metacognitive computations across SF ranges, patients may employ a different mechanism that is independent of SF. Because visual stimuli of low SF have been linked to predictive top-down processing, this may reflect atypical functioning in these processes in schizophrenia.

Response-Related Signals Increase Confidence But Not Metacognitive Performance

Confidence judgments are a central tool in metacognition research. In a typical task, participants first perform perceptual (first-order) decisions and then rate their confidence in these decisions. The relationship between confidence and first-order accuracy is taken as a measure of metacognitive performance. Confidence is often assumed to stem from decision-monitoring processes alone, but processes that co-occur with the first-order decision may also play a role in confidence formation.

Confidence judgments are a central tool in metacognition research. In a typical task, participants first perform perceptual (first-order) decisions and then rate their confidence in these decisions. The relationship between confidence and first-order accuracy is taken as a measure of metacognitive performance. Confidence is often assumed to stem from decision-monitoring processes alone, but processes that co-occur with the first-order decision may also play a role in confidence formation. In fact, some recent studies have revealed that directly manipulating motor regions in the brain, or the time of first-order decisions relative to second-order decisions, affects confidence judgments. This finding suggests that confidence could be informed by a readout of reaction times in addition to decision-monitoring processes. To test this possibility, we assessed the contribution of response-related signals to confidence and, in particular, to metacognitive performance (i.e., a measure of the adequacy of these confidence judgments). In human volunteers, we measured the effect of making an overt (vs covert) decision, as well as the effect of pairing an action to the stimulus about which the first-order decision is made. Against our expectations, we found no differences in overall confidence or metacognitive performance when first-order responses were covert as opposed to overt. Further, actions paired to visual stimuli presented led to higher confidence ratings, but did not affect metacognitive performance. These results suggest that confidence ratings do not always incorporate motor information.

Disentangling the origins of confidence in speeded perceptual judgments through multimodal imaging

The human capacity to compute the likelihood that a decision is correct-known as metacognition-has proven difficult to study in isolation as it usually cooccurs with decision making. Here, we isolated postdecisional from decisional contributions to metacognition by analyzing neural correlates of confidence with multimodal imaging. Healthy volunteers reported their confidence in the accuracy of decisions they made or decisions they observed. We found better metacognitive performance for committed vs. observed decisions, indicating that committing to a decision may improve confidence. Relying on concurrent electroencephalography and hemodynamic recordings, we found a common correlate of confidence following committed and observed decisions in the inferior frontal gyrus and a dissociation in the anterior prefrontal cortex and anterior insula. We discuss these results in light of decisional and postdecisional accounts of confidence and propose a computational model of confidence in which metacognitive performance naturally improves when evidence accumulation is constrained upon committing a decision.

Similar history biases for distinct prospective decisions of self-performance

Metacognition can be deployed retrospectively -to reflect on the correctness of our behavior- or prospectively -to make predictions of success in one's future behavior or make decisions about strategies to solve future problems. We investigated the factors that determine prospective decision making. Human participants performed a visual discrimination task followed by ratings of visibility and response confidence. Prior to each trial, participants made prospective judgments. In Experiment 1, they rated their belief of future success. In Experiment 2, they rated their decision to adopt a focused attention state. Prospective beliefs of success were associated with no performance changes while prospective decisions to engage attention were followed by better self-evaluation of the correctness of behavioral responses. Using standard machine learning classifiers we found that the current prospective decision could be predicted from information concerning task-correctness, stimulus visibility and response confidence from previous trials. In both Experiments, awareness and confidence were more diagnostic of the prospective decision than task correctness. Notably, classifiers trained with prospective beliefs of success in Experiment 1 predicted decisions to engage in Experiment 2 and vice-versa. These results indicate that the formation of these seemingly different prospective decisions share a common, dynamic representational structure.

Biological Stress Reactivity and Introspective Sensitivity: An Exploratory Study

Reaction to stressful events has an impact on several cognitive processes. High levels of stress can be detrimental to working memory, attention and decision-making. Here, we investigated whether individuals’ reactivity to stress is related to their introspective sensitivity (i.e., how well individuals monitor their own cognitive processes). To this aim, 27 participants (16 women, mean 20 years old) were exposed to a psychosocial stress protocol (trier social stress test, TSST), where individuals were asked to simulate a job interview and perform arithmetic calculations in front of a panel of experts. The salivary cortisol concentration, which is considered a hormonal index of stress reactivity, was collected during the TSST through the enzyme immunoassay DRG cortisol ELISA kit. Based on literature recommendations, we classified participants as responders and non-responders to the TSST. In a second session, through a visual search paradigm, we evaluated the introspective sensitivity of the participants. We evaluated how these individuals (i) monitor their own performance (through a confidence estimation), (ii) monitor their own attentional shifts (through a subjective number of scanned items estimation, SNSI), and (iii) monitor their own response times (through an introspective response time estimation, iRT). We found that individuals with lower biological reactivity to stress are more accurate in estimating their SNSI (p = 0.033) and iRT (p = 0.002), and in evaluating their own performance (p = 0.038) through their confidence. We argue that the effect of stress on introspection is not limited to a particular type of introspective evaluation, but rather consists of a general alteration of the introspective mechanism.

The Confidence Database

Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for the characterization of a wide range of perceptual, memory, motor and cognitive processes. To enable the continued exploration of these processes, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, participant populations and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analysed using multiple software packages. Each dataset is accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the time of publication, the Confidence Database (which is available at https://osf.io/s46pr/) contained 145 datasets with data from more than 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. Here we show the usefulness of this large collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimations of several foundational confidence-related effects.

Belief formation - A driving force for brain evolution

The topic of belief has been neglected in the natural sciences for a long period of time. Recent neuroscience research in non-human primates and humans, however, has shown that beliefs are the neuropsychic product of fundamental brain processes that attribute affective meaning to concrete objects and events, enabling individual goal setting, decision making and maneuvering in the environment. With regard to the involved neural processes they can be categorized as empirical, relational, and conceptual beliefs. Empirical beliefs are about objects and relational beliefs are about events as in tool use and in interactions between subjects that develop below the level of awareness and are up-dated dynamically. Conceptual beliefs are more complex being based on narratives and participation in ritual acts. As neural processes are known to require computational space in the brain, the formation of inceasingly complex beliefs demands extra neural resources. Here, we argue that the evolution of human beliefs is related to the phylogenetic enlargement of the brain including the parietal and medial frontal cortex in humans.

Sensorimotor conflicts alter metacognitive and action monitoring

While sensorimotor signals are known to modulate perception, little is known about their influence on higher-level cognitive processes. Here, we applied sensorimotor conflicts while participants performed a perceptual task followed by confidence judgments. Results showed that sensorimotor conflicts altered metacognitive monitoring by decreasing metacognitive performance. In a second experiment, we replicated this finding and extended our results by showing that sensorimotor conflicts also altered action monitoring, as measured implicitly through intentional binding. In a third experiment, we replicated the same effects on intentional binding with sensorimotor conflicts related to the hand rather than to the trunk. However, effects of hand sensorimotor conflicts on metacognitive monitoring were not significant. Taken together, our results suggest that metacognitive and action monitoring may involve endogenous, embodied processes involving sensorimotor signals which are informative regarding the state of the decider.

Metacognitive Failure as a Feature of Those Holding Radical Beliefs

Widening polarization about political, religious, and scientific issues threatens open societies, leading to entrenchment of beliefs, reduced mutual understanding, and a pervasive negativity surrounding the very idea of consensus [1, 2]. Such radicalization has been linked to systematic differences in the certainty with which people adhere to particular beliefs [3, 4, 5, 6]. However, the drivers of unjustified certainty in radicals are rarely considered from the perspective of models of metacognition, and it remains unknown whether radicals show alterations in confidence bias (a tendency to publicly espouse higher confidence), metacognitive sensitivity (insight into the correctness of one’s beliefs), or both [7]. Within two independent general population samples (n = 381 and n = 417), here we show that individuals holding radical beliefs (as measured by questionnaires about political attitudes) display a specific impairment in metacognitive sensitivity about low-level perceptual discrimination judgments. Specifically, more radical participants displayed less insight into the correctness of their choices and reduced updating of their confidence when presented with post-decision evidence. Our use of a simple perceptual decision task enables us to rule out effects of previous knowledge, task performance, and motivational factors underpinning differences in metacognition. Instead, our findings highlight a generic resistance to recognizing and revising incorrect beliefs as a potential driver of radicalization.

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Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect on our cognitive processes

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We investigated metacognitive features of radicalism in a low-level perceptual task

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Radical participants showed less insight into the accuracy of their decisions

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Radicals showed smaller confidence shifts in response to disconfirmatory evidence

Abnormalities of confidence in psychiatry: an overview and future perspectives

Our behavior is constantly accompanied by a sense of confidence and its' precision is critical for adequate adaptation and survival. Importantly, abnormal confidence judgments that do not reflect reality may play a crucial role in pathological decision-making typically seen in psychiatric disorders. In this review, we propose abnormalities of confidence as a new model of interpreting psychiatric symptoms. We hypothesize a dysfunction of confidence at the root of psychiatric symptoms either expressed subclinically in the general population or clinically in the patient population. Our review reveals a robust association between confidence abnormalities and psychiatric symptomatology. Confidence abnormalities are present in subclinical/prodromal phases of psychiatric disorders, show a positive relationship with symptom severity, and appear to normalize after recovery. In the reviewed literature, the strongest evidence was found for a decline in confidence in (sub)clinical OCD, and for a decrease in confidence discrimination in (sub)clinical schizophrenia. We found suggestive evidence for increased/decreased confidence in addiction and depression/anxiety, respectively. Confidence abnormalities may help to understand underlying psychopathological substrates across disorders, and should thus be considered transdiagnostically. This review provides clear evidence for confidence abnormalities in different psychiatric disorders, identifies current knowledge gaps and supplies suggestions for future avenues. As such, it may guide future translational research into the underlying processes governing these abnormalities, as well as future interventions to restore them.