Vividness of Visual Imagery Depends on the Neural Overlap with Perception in Visual Areas

The cerebellum and the Mirror Neuron System: A matter of inhibition? From neurophysiological evidence to neuromodulatory implications. A narrative review

Mirror neurons show activity during both the execution (AE) and observation of actions (AO). The Mirror Neuron System (MNS) could be involved during motor imagery (MI) as well. Extensive research suggests that the cerebellum is interconnected with the MNS and may be critically involved in its activities. We gathered evidence on the cerebellum's role in MNS functions, both theoretically and experimentally. Evidence shows that the cerebellum plays a major role during AO and MI and that its lesions impair MNS functions likely because, by modulating the activity of cortical inhibitory interneurons with mirror properties, the cerebellum may contribute to visuomotor matching, which is fundamental for shaping mirror properties. Indeed, the cerebellum may strengthen sensory-motor patterns that minimise the discrepancy between predicted and actual outcome, both during AE and AO. Furthermore, through its connections with the hippocampus, the cerebellum might be involved in internal simulations of motor programs during MI. Finally, as cerebellar neuromodulation might improve its impact on MNS activity, we explored its potential neurophysiological and neurorehabilitation implications.

Suffering more in imagination than in reality? Mental imagery and fear generalization

Mental imagery may represent a weaker form of perception and, thus, mental images may be more ambiguous than visual percepts. If correct, the acquisition of fear would be less specific for imagined fears in comparison to perceptual fears, perhaps facilitating broader fear generalization. To test this idea, a two-day differential fear conditioning experiment (N = 98) was conducted. On day one, two groups of participants underwent differential fear conditioning such that a specific Gabor patch orientation (CS+) was paired with mild shocks (US) while a second Gabor patch of orthogonal orientation (CS-) was never paired with shock. Critically, one group imagined the Gabor patches and the other group was visually presented the Gabor patches. Next, both groups were presented visual Gabor patches of similar orientations (GCS) to the CS+. On day two, to assess the persistence of imagined fear, participants returned to the lab and were tested on the GCS devoid of shock. For day one, in contrast to our primary hypothesis, both self-report and skin conductance response measures did not show a significant interaction between the GCS and groups. On day two, both measures demonstrated a persistence of imagined fear, without US delivery. Taken together, rather than demonstrating an overgeneralization effect, the results from this study suggest that imagery-based fear conditioning generalizes to a similar extent as perceptually acquired fear conditioning. Further, the persistence of imagery-based fear may have unique extinction qualities in comparison to perceptual-based fear.

Neural mechanisms of psychedelic visual imagery

Visual alterations under classic psychedelics can include rich phenomenological accounts of eyes-closed imagery. Preclinical evidence suggests agonism of the 5-HT2A receptor may reduce synaptic gain to produce psychedelic-induced imagery. However, this has not been investigated in humans. To infer the directed connectivity changes to visual connectivity underlying psychedelic visual imagery in healthy adults, a double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled, cross-over study was performed, and dynamic causal modelling was applied to the resting state eyes-closed functional MRI scans of 24 subjects after administration of 0.2 mg/kg of the serotonergic psychedelic drug, psilocybin (magic mushrooms), or placebo. The effective connectivity model included the early visual area, fusiform gyrus, intraparietal sulcus, and inferior frontal gyrus. We observed a pattern of increased self-inhibition of both early visual and higher visual-association regions under psilocybin that was consistent with preclinical findings. We also observed a pattern of reduced inhibition from visual-association regions to earlier visual areas that indicated top-down connectivity is enhanced during visual imagery. The results were analysed with behavioural measures taken immediately after the scans, suggesting psilocybin-induced decreased sensitivity to neural inputs is associated with the perception of eyes-closed visual imagery. The findings inform our basic and clinical understanding of visual perception. They reveal neural mechanisms that, by affecting balance, may increase the impact of top-down feedback connectivity on perception, which could contribute to the visual imagery seen with eyes-closed during psychedelic experiences.

Representations of imaginary scenes and their properties in cortical alpha activity

Imagining natural scenes enables us to engage with a myriad of simulated environments. How do our brains generate such complex mental images? Recent research suggests that cortical alpha activity carries information about individual objects during visual imagery. However, it remains unclear if more complex imagined contents such as natural scenes are similarly represented in alpha activity. Here, we answer this question by decoding the contents of imagined scenes from rhythmic cortical activity patterns. In an EEG experiment, participants imagined natural scenes based on detailed written descriptions, which conveyed four complementary scene properties: openness, naturalness, clutter level and brightness. By conducting classification analyses on EEG power patterns across neural frequencies, we were able to decode both individual imagined scenes as well as their properties from the alpha band, showing that also the contents of complex visual images are represented in alpha rhythms. A cross-classification analysis between alpha power patterns during the imagery task and during a perception task, in which participants were presented images of the described scenes, showed that scene representations in the alpha band are partly shared between imagery and late stages of perception. This suggests that alpha activity mediates the top-down re-activation of scene-related visual contents during imagery.

Consciousness and sleep

Sleep is a universal, essential biological process. It is also an invaluable window on consciousness. It tells us that consciousness can be lost but also that it can be regained, in all its richness, when we are disconnected from the environment and unable to reflect. By considering the neurophysiological differences between dreaming and dreamless sleep, we can learn about the substrate of consciousness and understand why it vanishes. We also learn that the ongoing state of the substrate of consciousness determines the way each experience feels regardless of how it is triggered-endogenously or exogenously. Dreaming consciousness is also a window on sleep and its functions. Dreams tell us that the sleeping brain is remarkably lively, recombining intrinsic activation patterns from a vast repertoire, freed from the requirements of ongoing behavior and cognitive control.

Memory retrieval effects as a function of differences in phenomenal experience

Conscious experience and perception are restricted to a single perspective. Although evidence to suggest differences in phenomenal experience can produce observable differences in behavior, it is not well understood how these differences might influence memory. We used fMRI to scan n = 49 participants while they encoded and performed a recognition memory test for faces and words. We calculated a cognitive bias score reflecting individual participants' propensity toward either Visual Imagery or Internal Verbalization based on their responses to the Internal Representations Questionnaire (IRQ). Neither visual imagery nor internal verbalization scores were significantly correlated with memory performance. In the fMRI data, there were typical patterns of activation differences between words and faces during both encoding and retrieval. There was no effect of internal representation bias on fMRI activation during encoding. At retrieval, however, a bias toward visualization was positively correlated with memory-related activation for both words and faces in inferior occipital gyri. Further, there was a crossover interaction in a network of brain regions such that visualization bias was associated with greater activation for words and verbalization bias was associated with greater activation for faces, consistent with increased effort for non-preferred stimulus retrieval. These findings suggest that individual differences in cognitive representations affect neural activation across different types of stimuli, potentially affecting memory retrieval performance.

Uncovering the Role of the Early Visual Cortex in Visual Mental Imagery

The question of whether the early visual cortex (EVC) is involved in visual mental imagery remains a topic of debate. In this paper, I propose that the inconsistency in findings can be explained by the unique challenges associated with investigating EVC activity during imagery. During perception, the EVC processes low-level features, which means that activity is highly sensitive to variation in visual details. If the EVC has the same role during visual mental imagery, any change in the visual details of the mental image would lead to corresponding changes in EVC activity. Within this context, the question should not be whether the EVC is 'active' during imagery but how its activity relates to specific imagery properties. Studies using methods that are sensitive to variation in low-level features reveal that imagery can recruit the EVC in similar ways as perception. However, not all mental images contain a high level of visual details. Therefore, I end by considering a more nuanced view, which states that imagery can recruit the EVC, but that does not mean that it always does so.

Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes

The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.

Differences in the neural correlates of schizophrenia with positive and negative formal thought disorder in patients with schizophrenia in the ENIGMA dataset

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a clinical key factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, the relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume loss in schizophrenia remains to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles by enrolling a large multi-site cohort acquired by the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 schizophrenia patients and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of FTD in schizophrenia and using virtual histology tools on implicated brain regions to investigate the cellular basis. Based on the findings of previous clinical and neuroimaging studies, we decided to separately explore positive, negative and total formal thought disorder. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but positive and negative FTD demonstrated a dissociation: negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD also showed associations with microglial cell types. These results provide an important step towards linking FTD to brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, providing an avenue for a better mechanistic understanding of this syndrome.

Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse

Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.

Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture

Theories of Visual Mental Imagery (VMI) emphasize the processes of retrieval, modification, and recombination of sensory information from long-term memory. Yet, only few studies have focused on the behavioral mechanisms and neural correlates supporting VMI of stimuli from different semantic domains. Therefore, we currently have a limited understanding of how the brain generates and maintains mental representations of colors, faces, shapes - to name a few. Such an undetermined scenario renders unclear the organizational structure of neural circuits supporting VMI, including the role of the early visual cortex. We aimed to fill this gap by reviewing the scientific literature of five semantic domains: visuospatial, face, colors, shapes, and letters imagery. Linking theory to evidence from over 60 different experimental designs, this review highlights three main points. First, there is no consistent activity in the early visual cortex across all VMI domains, contrary to the prediction of the dominant model. Second, there is consistent activity of the frontoparietal networks and the left hemisphere's fusiform gyrus during voluntary VMI irrespective of the semantic domain investigated. We propose that these structures are part of a domain-general VMI sub-network. Third, domain-specific information engages specific regions of the ventral and dorsal cortical visual pathways. These regions partly overlap with those found in visual perception studies (e.g., fusiform face area for faces imagery; lingual gyrus for color imagery). Altogether, the reviewed evidence suggests the existence of domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms of VMI selectively engaged by stimulus-specific properties (e.g., colors or faces). These mechanisms would be supported by an organizational structure mixing vertical and horizontal connections (heterarchy) between sub-networks for specific stimulus domains. Such a heterarchical organization of VMI makes different predictions from current models of VMI as reversed perception. Our conclusions set the stage for future research, which should aim to characterize the spatiotemporal dynamics and interactions among key regions of this architecture giving rise to visual mental images.

Working memory signals in early visual cortex are present in weak and strong imagers

It has been suggested that visual images are memorized across brief periods of time by vividly imagining them as if they were still there. In line with this, the contents of both working memory and visual imagery are known to be encoded already in early visual cortex. If these signals in early visual areas were indeed to reflect a combined imagery and memory code, one would predict them to be weaker for individuals with reduced visual imagery vividness. Here, we systematically investigated this question in two groups of participants. Strong and weak imagers were asked to remember images across brief delay periods. We were able to reliably reconstruct the memorized stimuli from early visual cortex during the delay. Importantly, in contrast to the prediction, the quality of reconstruction was equally accurate for both strong and weak imagers. The decodable information also closely reflected behavioral precision in both groups, suggesting it could contribute to behavioral performance, even in the extreme case of completely aphantasic individuals. Our data thus suggest that working memory signals in early visual cortex can be present even in the (near) absence of phenomenal imagery.

Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Visual Working Memory Reveal Metacognitive Aspects of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery (MI) is the ability to generate visual phenomena in the absence of sensory input. MI is often likened to visual working memory (VWM): the ability to maintain and manipulate visual representations. How MI is recruited during VWM is yet to be established. In a modified orientation change-discrimination task, we examined how behavioral (proportion correct) and neural (contralateral delay activity [CDA]) correlates of precision and capacity map onto subjective ratings of vividness and number of items in MI within a VWM task. During the maintenance period, 17 participants estimated the vividness of their MI or the number of items held in MI while they were instructed to focus on either precision or capacity of their representation and to retain stimuli at varying set sizes (1, 2, and 4). Vividness and number ratings varied over set sizes; however, subjective ratings and behavioral performance correlated only for vividness rating at set size 1. Although CDA responded to set size as was expected, CDA did not reflect subjective reports on high and low vividness and on nondivergent (reported the probed number of items in mind) or divergent (reported number of items diverged from probed) rating trials. Participants were more accurate in low set sizes compared with higher set sizes and in coarse (45°) orientation changes compared with fine (15°) orientation changes. We failed to find evidence for a relationship between the subjective sensory experience of precision and capacity of MI and the precision and capacity of VWM.

Predicting the subjective intensity of imagined experiences from electrophysiological measures of oscillatory brain activity

Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.

Mental imagery and visual attentional templates: A dissociation

There is a growing interest in the relationship between mental images and attentional templates as both are considered pictorial representations that involve similar neural mechanisms. Here, we investigated the role of mental imagery in the automatic implementation of attentional templates and their effect on involuntary attention. We developed a novel version of the contingent capture paradigm designed to encourage the generation of a new template on each trial and measure contingent spatial capture by a template-matching visual feature (color). Participants were required to search at four different locations for a specific object indicated at the start of each trial. Immediately prior to the search display, color cues were presented surrounding the potential target locations, one of which matched the target color (e.g., red for strawberry). Across three experiments, our task induced a robust contingent capture effect, reflected by faster responses when the target appeared in the location previously occupied by the target-matching cue. Contrary to our predictions, this effect remained consistent regardless of self-reported individual differences in visual mental imagery (Experiment 1, N = 216) or trial-by-trial variation of voluntary imagery vividness (Experiment 2, N = 121). Moreover, contingent capture was observed even among aphantasic participants, who report no imagery (Experiment 3, N = 91). The magnitude of the effect was not reduced in aphantasics compared to a control sample of non-aphantasics, although the two groups reported substantial differences in their search strategy and exhibited differences in overall speed and accuracy. Our results hence establish a dissociation between the generation and implementation of attentional templates for a visual feature (color) and subjectively experienced imagery.

Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

Spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery reveal a reverse cortical hierarchy from cue-induced imagery

Visual imagery allows for the construction of rich internal experience in our mental world. However, it has remained poorly understood how imagery experience derives volitionally as opposed to being cue driven. Here, using electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we systematically investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery by having participants volitionally imagining one of the orientations from a learned pool. We contrast self-generated imagery with cue-induced imagery, where participants imagined line orientations based on associative cues acquired previously. Our results reveal overlapping neural signatures of cue-induced and self-generated imagery. Yet, these neural signatures display substantially differential sensitivities to the two types of imagery: self-generated imagery is supported by an enhanced involvement of the anterior cortex in representing imagery contents. By contrast, cue-induced imagery is supported by enhanced imagery representations in the posterior visual cortex. These results jointly support a reverse cortical hierarchy in generating and maintaining imagery contents in self-generated versus externally cued imagery.

Brain-like Flexible Visual Inference by Harnessing Feedback-Feedforward Alignment

In natural vision, feedback connections support versatile visual inference capabilities such as making sense of the occluded or noisy bottom-up sensory information or mediating pure top-down processes such as imagination. However, the mechanisms by which the feedback pathway learns to give rise to these capabilities flexibly are not clear. We propose that top-down effects emerge through alignment between feedforward and feedback pathways, each optimizing its own objectives. To achieve this co-optimization, we introduce Feedback-Feedforward Alignment (FFA), a learning algorithm that leverages feedback and feedforward pathways as mutual credit assignment computational graphs, enabling alignment. In our study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of FFA in co-optimizing classification and reconstruction tasks on widely used MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Notably, the alignment mechanism in FFA endows feedback connections with emergent visual inference functions, including denoising, resolving occlusions, hallucination, and imagination. Moreover, FFA offers bio-plausibility compared to traditional back-propagation (BP) methods in implementation. By repurposing the computational graph of credit assignment into a goal-driven feedback pathway, FFA alleviates weight transport problems encountered in BP, enhancing the bio-plausibility of the learning algorithm. Our study presents FFA as a promising proof-of-concept for the mechanisms underlying how feedback connections in the visual cortex support flexible visual functions. This work also contributes to the broader field of visual inference underlying perceptual phenomena and has implications for developing more biologically inspired learning algorithms.

Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative Formal Thought Disorder in Individuals with Schizophrenia: An ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group Study

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a key clinical factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume deficiencies in schizophrenia remain to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles based on a large multi-site cohort through the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 individuals with schizophrenia and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of positive, negative and total FTD in schizophrenia and their cellular bases. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks for positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD was also linked to microglial cell types. These findings relate different dimensions of FTD to distinct brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, improve our mechanistic understanding of these key psychotic symptoms.

Neural retrieval processes occur more rapidly for visual mental images that were previously encoded with high-vividness

Visual mental imagery refers to our ability to experience visual images in the absence of sensory stimulation. Studies have shown that visual mental imagery can improve episodic memory. However, we have limited understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying this improvement. Using electroencephalography, we examined the neural processes associated with the retrieval of previously generated visual mental images, focusing on how the vividness at generation can modulate retrieval processes. Participants viewed word stimuli referring to common objects, forming a visual mental image of each word and rating the vividness of the mental image. This was followed by a surprise old/new recognition task. We compared retrieval performance for items rated as high- versus low-vividness at encoding. High-vividness items were retrieved with faster reaction times and higher confidence ratings in the memory judgment. While controlling for confidence, neural measures indicated that high-vividness items produced an earlier decrease in alpha-band activity at retrieval compared with low-vividness items, suggesting an earlier memory reinstatement. Even when low-vividness items were remembered with high confidence, they were not retrieved as quickly as high-vividness items. These results indicate that when highly vivid mental images are encoded, the speed of their retrieval occurs more rapidly, relative to low-vivid items.

Neural Representations in Visual and Parietal Cortex Differentiate between Imagined, Perceived, and Illusory Experiences

Humans constantly receive massive amounts of information, both perceived from the external environment and imagined from the internal world. To function properly, the brain needs to correctly identify the origin of information being processed. Recent work has suggested common neural substrates for perception and imagery. However, it has remained unclear how the brain differentiates between external and internal experiences with shared neural codes. Here we tested this question in human participants (male and female) by systematically investigating the neural processes underlying the generation and maintenance of visual information from voluntary imagery, veridical perception, and illusion. The inclusion of illusion allowed us to differentiate between objective and subjective internality: while illusion has an objectively internal origin and can be viewed as involuntary imagery, it is also subjectively perceived as having an external origin like perception. Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, we observed superior orientation representations in parietal cortex during imagery compared with perception, and conversely in early visual cortex. This imagery dominance gradually developed along a posterior-to-anterior cortical hierarchy from early visual to parietal cortex, emerged in the early epoch of imagery and sustained into the delay epoch, and persisted across varied imagined contents. Moreover, representational strength of illusion was more comparable to imagery in early visual cortex, but more comparable to perception in parietal cortex, suggesting content-specific representations in parietal cortex differentiate between subjectively internal and external experiences, as opposed to early visual cortex. These findings together support a domain-general engagement of parietal cortex in internally generated experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain differentiate between imagined and perceived experiences? Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, the current study revealed enhanced stimulus-specific representations in visual imagery originating from parietal cortex, supporting the subjective experience of imagery. This neural principle was further validated by evidence from visual illusion, wherein illusion resembled perception and imagery at different levels of cortical hierarchy. Our findings provide direct evidence for the critical role of parietal cortex as a domain-general region for content-specific imagery, and offer new insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the differentiation between subjectively internal and external experiences.

Visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky situations

In an fMRI study, we tested the prediction that visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky and more positive situations. We assumed that processing mental images that allow for "trying-out" the future has greater adaptive importance for risky than non-risky situations, because the former can generate severe negative outcomes. We identified several brain regions that were activated when participants produced images of risky situations and these regions overlap with brain areas engaged in visual, speech, and movement imagery. We also found that producing images of risky situations, in contrast to non-risky situations, was associated with increased neural activation in the insular cortex and cerebellum-the regions involved, among other functions, in emotional processing. Finally, we observed an increased BOLD signal in the cingulate gyrus associated with reward-based decision making and monitoring of decision outcomes. In summary, risky situations increased neural activation in brain areas involved in mental imagery, emotional processing, and decision making. These findings imply that the evaluation of everyday risky situations may be driven by emotional responses that result from mental imagery.

Visual Representations: Insights from Neural Decoding

Patterns of brain activity contain meaningful information about the perceived world. Recent decades have welcomed a new era in neural analyses, with computational techniques from machine learning applied to neural data to decode information represented in the brain. In this article, we review how decoding approaches have advanced our understanding of visual representations and discuss efforts to characterize both the complexity and the behavioral relevance of these representations. We outline the current consensus regarding the spatiotemporal structure of visual representations and review recent findings that suggest that visual representations are at once robust to perturbations, yet sensitive to different mental states. Beyond representations of the physical world, recent decoding work has shone a light on how the brain instantiates internally generated states, for example, during imagery and prediction. Going forward, decoding has remarkable potential to assess the functional relevance of visual representations for human behavior, reveal how representations change across development and during aging, and uncover their presentation in various mental disorders.

Construction of Meta-Thinking Educational Program Based on Mental-Brain Simulation (MTMBS) and Evaluating its Effectiveness on Executive Functions, Emotion Regulation, and Impulsivity in Children With ADHD: A Resting-State Functional MRI Study

OBJECTIVE

The aim of present research was to make a Meta-Thinking educational program based on mental-brain simulation and to evaluate its effectiveness on executive functions, emotion regulation and impulsivity in children with ADHD.

METHODS

The research method was Embedded Design: Embedded Experimental Model. The research sample included 32 children with ADHD who were randomly assigned to two experimental and control groups. The intervention was implemented for eight sessions of 1.5 hr for the experimental group, and fMRI images were taken from them, while the control group didn't receive any treatment. Finally, using semi-structured interviews, coherent information was collected from the parents of the experimental group about the changes made. Data were analyzed with SPSS-24, MAXQDA, fMRIprep, and FSL software.

RESULTS

The Meta-Thinking Educational Program had effect on performance of ADHD children and suppressed brain regions related to DMN.

CONCLUSION

The Implementation of this educational program plays a vital role in improving psychological problems of children with ADHD.

Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts

Mental imagery is a process by which thoughts become experienced with sensory characteristics. Yet, it is not clear why mental images appear diminished compared to veridical images, nor how mental images are phenomenologically distinct from hallucinations, another type of non-veridical sensory experience. Current evidence suggests that imagination and veridical perception share neural resources. If so, we argue that considering how neural representations of externally generated stimuli (i.e. sensory input) and internally generated stimuli (i.e. thoughts) might interfere with one another can sufficiently differentiate between veridical, imaginary, and hallucinatory perception. We here use a simple computational model of a serially connected, hierarchical network with bidirectional information flow to emulate the primate visual system. We show that modelling even first approximations of neural competition can more coherently explain imagery phenomenology than non-competitive models. Our simulations predict that, without competing sensory input, imagined stimuli should ubiquitously dominate hierarchical representations. However, with competition, imagination should dominate high-level representations but largely fail to outcompete sensory inputs at lower processing levels. To interpret our findings, we assume that low-level stimulus information (e.g. in early visual cortices) contributes most to the sensory aspects of perceptual experience, while high-level stimulus information (e.g. towards temporal regions) contributes most to its abstract aspects. Our findings therefore suggest that ongoing bottom-up inputs during waking life may prevent imagination from overriding veridical sensory experience. In contrast, internally generated stimuli may be hallucinated when sensory input is dampened or eradicated. Our approach can explain individual differences in imagery, along with aspects of daydreaming, hallucinations, and non-visual mental imagery.

Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative Formal Thought Disorder in Individuals with Schizophrenia: An ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group Study

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a key clinical factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume deficiencies in schizophrenia remain to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles based on a large multi-site cohort through the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 individuals with schizophrenia and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of positive, negative and total FTD in schizophrenia and their cellular bases. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks for positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD was also linked to microglial cell types. These findings relate different dimensions of FTD to distinct brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, improve our mechanistic understanding of these key psychotic symptoms.

Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination

Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagery overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. One possibility is that the intention to imagine is used to identify and discount self-generated signals during imagery. Alternatively, because internally generated signals are generally weaker, sensory strength is used to index reality. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here, we combined one-trial-per-participant psychophysics with computational modelling and neuroimaging to show that imagined and perceived signals are in fact intermixed, with judgments of reality being determined by whether this intermixed signal is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. A consequence of this account is that when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality.

The influence of imagery vividness and internally-directed attention on the neural mechanisms underlying the encoding of visual mental images into episodic memory

Attention can be directed externally toward sensory information or internally toward self-generated information. Using electroencephalography (EEG), we investigated the attentional processes underlying the formation and encoding of self-generated mental images into episodic memory. Participants viewed flickering words referring to common objects and were tasked with forming visual mental images of the objects and rating their vividness. Subsequent memory for the presented object words was assessed using an old-new recognition task. Internally-directed attention during image generation was indexed as a reduction in steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs), oscillatory EEG responses at the frequency of a flickering stimulus. The results yielded 3 main findings. First, SSVEP power driven by the flickering word stimuli decreased as subjects directed attention internally to form the corresponding mental image. Second, SSVEP power returned to pre-imagery baseline more slowly for low- than high-vividness later remembered items, suggesting that longer internally-directed attention is required to generate subsequently remembered low-vividness images. Finally, the event-related-potential difference due to memory was more sustained for subsequently remembered low- versus high-vividness items, suggesting that additional conceptual processing may have been needed to remember the low-vividness visual images. Taken together, the results clarify the neural mechanisms supporting the encoding of self-generated information.

What do you have in mind? ERP markers of visual and auditory imagery

This study aimed to investigate the psychophysiological markers of imagery processes through EEG/ERP recordings. Visual and auditory stimuli representing 10 different semantic categories were shown to 30 healthy participants. After a given interval and prompted by a light signal, participants were asked to activate a mental image corresponding to the semantic category for recording synchronized electrical potentials. Unprecedented electrophysiological markers of imagination were recorded in the absence of sensory stimulation. The following peaks were identified at specific scalp sites and latencies, during imagination of infants (centroparietal positivity, CPP, and late CPP), human faces (anterior negativity, AN), animals (anterior positivity, AP), music (P300-like), speech (N400-like), affective vocalizations (P2-like) and sensory (visual vs auditory) modality (PN300). Overall, perception and imagery conditions shared some common electro/cortical markers, but during imagery the category-dependent modulation of ERPs was long latency and more anterior, with respect to the perceptual condition. These ERP markers might be precious tools for BCI systems (pattern recognition, classification, or A.I. algorithms) applied to patients affected by consciousness disorders (e.g., in a vegetative or comatose state) or locked-in-patients (e.g., spinal or SLA patients).

Read and Imagine: Visual Imagery Experience Evoked by First versus Second Language

This research examined visual imagery evoked during reading in relation to language. Following the previous reports that bilinguals experience less vivid imagery in their second language (L2) than first language (L1), we studied how visual imagery is affected by the language in use, characteristics of text, and readers' individual differences. In L1 and L2, 382 bilinguals read object texts describing pictorial properties of objects such as color and shape, spatial texts describing spatial properties such as spatial relations and locations, and excerpts from novels. They rated imagery vividness after each segment and the whole text, and rated the specific imagery characteristics (e.g., color, spatial relations). Regardless of the types of text or the timing of rating, the vividness of imagery was higher in L1 than in L2. However, English proficiency also predicted vividness in L2. Further, vividness in the object and spatial trials were predicted by the individual's object and spatial imagery skills. The effect of language on imagery depends on the text nature and difficulty, when and how vividness is measured, and individual differences.

Functional connectivity fingerprints of the frontal eye field and inferior frontal junction suggest spatial versus nonspatial processing in the prefrontal cortex

Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the frontal eye field (FEF) and inferior frontal junction (IFJ) govern the encoding of spatial and nonspatial (such as feature- or object-based) representations, respectively, both during visual attention and working memory tasks. However, it is still unclear whether such contrasting functional segregation is also reflected in their underlying functional connectivity patterns. Here, we hypothesized that FEF has predominant functional coupling with spatiotopically organized regions in the dorsal ('where') visual stream whereas IFJ has predominant functional connectivity with the ventral ('what') visual stream. We applied seed-based functional connectivity analyses to temporally high-resolving resting-state magnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings. We parcellated the brain according to the multimodal Glasser atlas and tested, for various frequency bands, whether the spontaneous activity of each parcel in the ventral and dorsal visual pathway has predominant functional connectivity with FEF or IFJ. The results show that FEF has a robust power correlation with the dorsal visual pathway in beta and gamma bands. In contrast, anterior IFJ (IFJa) has a strong power coupling with the ventral visual stream in delta, beta and gamma oscillations. Moreover, while FEF is phase-coupled with the superior parietal lobe in the beta band, IFJa is phase-coupled with the middle and inferior temporal cortex in delta and gamma oscillations. We argue that these intrinsic connectivity fingerprints are congruent with each brain region's function. Therefore, we conclude that FEF and IFJ have dissociable connectivity patterns that fit their respective functional roles in spatial versus nonspatial top-down attention and working memory control.

Odor imagery but not perception drives risk for food cue reactivity and increased adiposity

Mental imagery has been proposed to play a critical role in the amplification of cravings. Here we tested whether olfactory imagery drives food cue reactivity strength to promote adiposity in 45 healthy individuals. We measured odor perception, odor imagery ability, and food cue reactivity using self-report, perceptual testing, and neuroimaging. Adiposity was assessed at baseline and one year later. Brain responses to real and imagined odors were analyzed with univariate and multivariate decoding methods to identify pattern-based olfactory codes. We found that the accuracy of decoding imagined, but not real, odor quality correlated with a perceptual measure of odor imagery ability and with greater adiposity changes. This latter relationship was mediated by cue-potentiated craving and intake. Collectively, these findings establish odor imagery ability as a risk factor for weight gain and more specifically as a mechanism by which exposure to food cues promotes craving and overeating.

Fear in the mind's eye: the neural correlates of differential fear acquisition to imagined conditioned stimuli

Mental imagery is involved in both the expression and treatment of fear-related disorders such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the neural correlates associated with the acquisition and generalization of differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli are relatively unknown. In this study, healthy human participants (n = 27) acquired differential fear conditioning to imagined conditioned stimuli paired with a physical unconditioned stimulus (i.e. mild shock), as measured via self-reported fear, the skin conductance response and significant right anterior insula (aIn) activation. Multivoxel pattern analysis cross-classification also demonstrated that the pattern of activity in the right aIn during imagery acquisition was quantifiably similar to the pattern produced by standard visual acquisition. Additionally, mental imagery was associated with significant differential fear generalization. Fear conditioning acquired to imagined stimuli generalized to viewing those same stimuli as measured with self-reported fear and right aIn activity, and likewise fear conditioning to visual stimuli was associated with significant generalized differential self-reported fear and right aIn activity when imagining those stimuli. Together, the study provides a novel understanding of the neural mechanisms associated with the acquisition of differential fear conditioning to imagined stimuli and that of the relationship between imagery and emotion more generally.

Comparative effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction on bodily awareness

Bodily awareness is informed by both sensory data and prior knowledge. Although misleading sensory signals have been repeatedly shown to affect bodily awareness, only scant attention has been given to the influence of cognitive variables. Hypnotic suggestion has recently been shown to impact visuospatial and sensorimotor representations of body-part size although the mechanisms subserving this effect are yet to be identified. Mental imagery might play a causal or facilitative role in this effect, as it has been shown to influence body awareness in previous studies. Nonetheless, current views ascribe only an epiphenomenal role to imagery in the implementation of hypnotic suggestions. This study compared the effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction for influencing the visuospatial and sensorimotor aspects of body-size representation. Both experimental manipulations produced significant increases (elongation) in both representations compared to baseline, although the effects were larger in the hypnotic suggestion condition. The effects of both manipulations were highly correlated across participants, suggesting overlapping mechanisms. Self-reports suggested that the use of voluntary imagery did not significantly contribute to the efficacy of either manipulation. Rather, top-down effects on body representations seem to be partly driven by response expectancies, spontaneous imagery, and hypnotic suggestibility in both conditions. These results are in line with current theories of suggestion and raise fundamental questions regarding the mechanisms driving the influence of cognition on body representations.

Seeing the future: Connectome strength and network efficiency in visual network predict individual ability of episodic future thinking

Episodic future thinking (EFT) refers to the critical ability that enables people to construct and pre-experience the vivid mental imagery about future events, which impacts on the decision-making for individuals and group. Although EFT is generally believed to have a visual nature by theorists, little neuroscience evidence has been provided to verify this assumption. Here, by employing the approach of connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) and graph-theoretical analysis, we analyzed resting-state functional brain image from 191 participants to predict their variability of EFT ability (leave-one-out cross-validation), and validated the results by applying different parcellation schemas and feature selection thresholds. At the connectome strength level, CPM-based analysis revealed that EFT ability could be predicted by the connectome strength of visual network. Besides, at the network level, graph-theoretical analysis showed that EFT ability could be predicted by the network efficiency of visual network. Moreover, these findings were replicated using different parcellation schemas and feature selection thresholds. These results robustly and collectively supported that the visual network might be one of the neural substrates underlying EFT ability from a comprehensive perspective of resting-state functional connectivity strength and the neural network. This study provides indications on how the function of visual network supports EFT ability, and enhances our understanding of the EFT ability from a neural basis perspective.

Common and distinct neural representations of imagined and perceived speech

Humans excel at constructing mental representations of speech streams in the absence of external auditory input: the internal experience of speech imagery. Elucidating the neural processes underlying speech imagery is critical to understanding this higher-order brain function in humans. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated the shared and distinct neural correlates of imagined and perceived speech by asking participants to listen to poems articulated by a male voice (perception condition) and to imagine hearing poems spoken by that same voice (imagery condition). We found that compared to baseline, speech imagery and perception activated overlapping brain regions, including the bilateral superior temporal gyri and supplementary motor areas. The left inferior frontal gyrus was more strongly activated by speech imagery than by speech perception, suggesting functional specialization for generating speech imagery. Although more research with a larger sample size and a direct behavioral indicator is needed to clarify the neural systems underlying the construction of complex speech imagery, this study provides valuable insights into the neural mechanisms of the closely associated but functionally distinct processes of speech imagery and perception.

Motor imagery and engagement favour spatial reasoning

Based on the assumption that spatial reasoning relies on the construction of mental models of the states of affairs described in the premises, and on evidence that sensory-motor imagery can enhance cognitive abilities, we hypothesised that imagining moving the objects mentioned in the premises to the specific spatial locations should favour spatial reasoning. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction: when participants imagined moving the objects mentioned in the premises (dynamic-engagement condition), they drew accurate inferences faster compared with participants who merely read the premises (static-non-engagement condition). Experiment 2 was in part a replication of Experiment 1 but included two additional experimental conditions to control for possible effects of self-engagement in reasoning: in one condition, participants imagined that someone else was moving the objects (dynamic-non-engagement condition), and in the other condition, participants imagined that they were observing the objects (static-engagement condition). The results revealed an interaction between motor imagery and engagement in decreasing response times to spatial problems. We discuss the practical implications of the current results.

The neurobiological basis of affect is consistent with psychological construction theory and shares a common neural basis across emotional categories

Affective experience colours everyday perception and cognition, yet its fundamental and neurobiological basis is poorly understood. The current debate essentially centers around the communalities and specificities across individuals, events, and emotional categories like anger, sadness, and happiness. Using fMRI during the experience of these emotions, we critically compare the two dominant conflicting theories on human affect. Basic emotion theory posits emotions as discrete universal entities generated by dedicated emotion category-specific neural circuits, while psychological construction theory claims emotional events as unique, idiosyncratic, and constructed by psychological primitives like core affect and conceptualization, which underlie each emotional event and operate in a predictive framework. Based on the findings of 8 a priori-defined model-specific prediction tests on the neural response amplitudes and patterns, we conclude that the neurobiological basis of affect is primarily characterized by idiosyncratic mechanisms and a common neural basis shared across emotion categories, consistent with psychological construction theory. The findings provide further insight into the organizational principles of the neural basis of affect and brain function in general. Future studies in clinical populations with affective symptoms may reveal the corresponding underlying neural changes from a psychological construction perspective.

Prevalence of visual snow and relation to attentional absorption

Visual snow is a condition of unclear prevalence characterized by tiny flickering dots throughout the entire visual field. It appears to result from visual cortex hyperactivity and possibly correlates with propensity to be engrossed in sensory and imaginary experiences (absorption). The prevalence and correlates of visual snow, and emotional reactions to it, were explored in the general Portuguese population with three studies with online surveys. In Study 1, 564 participants were shown an animated graphic simulation of visual snow and asked to rate how frequently they have similar percepts on a scale anchored by 0% and 100% of their waking time. They also reported their degree of distress and fascination resulting from visual snow. Absorption was measured with the Modified Tellegen Absorption Scale. 44% of respondents reported they see visual snow at least 10% of the time, and 20% reported seeing it between 80% and 100% of the time. Similar to findings in clinical samples, the frequency of visual snow correlated with tinnitus frequency and entoptic phenomena, but not with ophthalmologic problems. It was confirmed that visual snow is related to absorption. Although distress caused by visual snow was generally absent or minimal in our samples, a substantial minority (28%) reported moderate to high levels of distress. High fascination with visual snow was reported by 9%. In Studies 2 and 3, visual snow was measured by means of verbal descriptions without graphic simulation (“visual field full of tiny dots of light” and “world seen with many dots of light”, respectively). The results were similar to those in Study 1, but seeing visual snow 80%-100% of the time was less frequent (6.5% in Study 2 and 3.6% in Study 3). Visual snow has been insufficiently investigated. More research is needed to uncover underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and psychological and behavioral correlates.

Patterns of episodic content and specificity predicting subjective memory vividness

The ability to remember and internally represent events is often accompanied by a subjective sense of "vividness". Vividness measures are frequently used to evaluate the experience of remembering and imagining events, yet little research has considered the objective attributes of event memories that underlie this subjective judgment, and individual differences in this mapping. Here, we tested how the content and specificity of event memories support subjectively vivid recollection. Over three experiments, participants encoded events containing a theme word and three distinct elements - a person, a place, and an object. In a memory test, memory for event elements was assessed at two levels of specificity - semantic gist (names) and perceptual details (lure discrimination). We found a strong correspondence between memory vividness and memory for gist information that did not vary by which elements were contained in memory. There was a smaller, additive benefit of remembering specific perceptual details on vividness, which, in one study, was driven by memory for place details. Moreover, we found individual differences in the relationship between memory vividness and objective memory attributes primarily along the specificity dimension, such that one cluster of participants used perceptual detail to inform memory vividness whereas another cluster was more driven by gist information. Therefore, while gist memory appears to drive vividness on average, there were idiosyncrasies in this pattern across participants. When assessing subjective ratings of memory and imagination, research should consider how these ratings map onto objective memory attributes in the context of their study design and population.

Decreased associative processing and memory confidence in aphantasia

Visual imagery and mental reconstruction of scenes are considered core components of episodic memory retrieval. Individuals with absent visual imagery (aphantasia) score lower on tests of autobiographical memory, suggesting that aphantasia may be associated with differences in episodic and associative processing. In this online study, we tested aphantasic participants and controls on associative recognition and memory confidence for three types of associations encoded incidentally: associations between visual-visual and audio-visual stimulus pairs, associations between an object and its location on the screen, and intraitem associations. Aphantasic participants had a lower rate of high-confidence hits in all associative memory tests compared with controls. Performance on auditory-visual associations was correlated with individual differences in a measure of object imagery in the aphantasic group but not in controls. No overall group difference in memory performance was found, indicating that visual imagery selectively contributes to memory confidence. Analysis of the encoding task revealed that aphantasics made fewer associative links between the stimuli, suggesting a role for visual imagery in associative processing of visual and auditory input. These data enhance our understanding of visual imagery contributions to associative memory and further characterize the cognitive profile of aphantasia.

Experimental evidence for involvement of monocular channels in mental rotation

According to the prevailing view, cognitive processes of mental rotation are carried out by visuospatial perceptual circuits located primarily in high cortical areas. Here, we examined the functional involvement of (mostly subcortical) monocular channels in mental rotation tasks. Images of two rotated objects (0°, 50°, 100°, or 150°; identical or mirrored) were presented either to one eye (monocular) or segregated between the eyes (interocular). The results indicated a causal role for low monocular visual channels in mental rotation: Response times for identical ("same") objects at high angular disparities (100°, 150°) were shorter when both objects were presented to a single eye than when each object was presented to a different eye. We suggest that mental rotation processes rely on cortico-subcortical loops that support visuospatial perception. More generally, the findings highlight the potential contribution of lower-level mechanisms to what are typically considered to be high-level cognitive functions, such as mental representation.

The Application of Artificial Intelligence to Automate Sensory Assessments Combining Pretrained Transformers with Word Embedding Based on the Online Sensory Marketing Index

We present how artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies create new opportunities to capture and assess sensory marketing elements. Based on the Online Sensory Marketing Index (OSMI), a sensory assessment framework designed to evaluate e-commerce websites manually, the goal is to offer an alternative procedure to assess sensory elements such as text and images automatically. This approach aims to provide marketing managers with valuable insights and potential for sensory marketing improvements. To accomplish the task, we initially reviewed 469 related peer-reviewed scientific publications. In this process, manual reading is complemented by a validated AI methodology. We identify relevant topics and check if they exhibit a comprehensible distribution over the last years. We recognize and discuss similar approaches from machine learning and the big data environment. We apply state-of-the-art methods from the natural language processing domain for the principal analysis, such as word embedding techniques GloVe and Word2Vec, and leverage transformers such as BERT. To validate the performance of our newly developed AI approach, we compare results with manually collected parameters from previous studies and observe similar findings in both procedures. Our results reveal a functional and scalable AI approach for determining the OSMI for industries, companies, or even individual (sub-) websites. In addition, the new AI selection and assessment procedures are extremely fast, with only a small loss in performance compared to a manual evaluation. It resembles an efficient way to evaluate sensory marketing efforts.

Priming and reversals of the perceived ambiguous orientation of a structure-from-motion shape and relation to personality traits

We demonstrate contributions of top-down and bottom-up influences in perception as explored by priming and counts of perceived reversals and mixed percepts, as probed by an ambiguously slanted structure-from-motion (SFM) test-cylinder. We included three different disambiguated primes: a SFM cylinder, a still image of a cylinder, and an imagined cylinder. In Experiment 1 where the prime and test sequentially occupied the same location, we also administered questionnaires with the Big-5 trait openness and vividness of visual imagery to probe possible relations to top-down driven priming. Since influences of gaze or position in the prime conditions in Experiment 1 could not be ruled out completely, Experiment 2 was conducted where the test cylinder appeared at a randomly chosen position after the prime. In Experiment 2 we also measured the number of perceptual reversals and mixed percepts during prolonged viewing of our ambiguous SFM-cylinder, and administered questionnaires to measure all Big-5 traits, autism, spatial and object imagery, and rational or experiential cognitive styles, associated with bottom-up and top-down processes. The results revealed contributions of position-invariant and cue-invariant priming. In addition, residual contributions of low-level priming was found when the prime and test were both defined by SFM, and were presented at the same location, and the correlation between the SFM priming and the other two priming conditions were weaker than between the pictorial and imagery priming. As previously found with ambiguous binocular rivalry stimuli, we found positive correlations between mixed percepts and the Big-5 dimension openness to experience, and between reversals, mixed percepts and neuroticism. Surprisingly, no correlations between the scores from the vividness of imagery questionnaires and influence from any of the primes were obtained. An intriguing finding was the significant differences between the positive correlation from the experiential cognitive style scores, and the negative correlation between rational style and the cue invariant priming. Among other results, negative correlations between agreeableness and all priming conditions were obtained. These results not only support the notion of multiple processes involved in the perception of ambiguous SFM, but also link these processes in perception to specific personality traits.

Imagery-related eye movements in 3D space depend on individual differences in visual object imagery

During recall of visual information people tend to move their eyes even though there is nothing to see. Previous studies indicated that such eye movements are related to the spatial location of previously seen items on 2D screens, but they also showed that eye movement behavior varies significantly across individuals. The reason for these differences remains unclear. In the present study we used immersive virtual reality to investigate how individual tendencies to process and represent visual information contribute to eye fixation patterns in visual imagery of previously inspected objects in three-dimensional (3D) space. We show that participants also look back to relevant locations when they are free to move in 3D space. Furthermore, we found that looking back to relevant locations depends on individual differences in visual object imagery abilities. We suggest that object visualizers rely less on spatial information because they tend to process and represent the visual information in terms of color and shape rather than in terms of spatial layout. This finding indicates that eye movements during imagery are subject to individual strategies, and the immersive setting in 3D space made individual differences more likely to unfold.

Decoding of Motor Imagery Involving Whole-body Coordination

The present study investigated whether different types of motor imageries can be classified based on the location of the activation peaks or the multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and compared the difference between visual motor imagery (VI) and kinesthetic motor imagery (KI). During fMRI scanning sessions, 25 participants imagined four movements included in the Motor Imagery Questionnaire-Revised (MIQ-R): knee lift, jump, arm movement, and waist bend. These four imagined movements were then classified based on the peak location or the patterns of fMRI signal values. We divided the participants into two groups based on whether they found it easier to generate VI (VI group, n = 10) or KI (KI group, n = 15). Our results show that the imagined movements can be classified using both the location of the activation peak and the spatial activation patterns within the sensorimotor cortex, and MVPA performs better than the activation peak classification. Furthermore, our result reveals that the KI group achieved a higher MVPA decoding accuracy within the left primary somatosensory cortex than the VI group, suggesting that the modality of motor imagery differently affects the classification performance in distinct brain regions.

Cortical activity involved in perception and imagery of visual stimuli in a subject with aphantasia. An EEG case report

Aphantasia has been described as the inability to voluntarily evoke mental images using the "mind's eye." We studied a congenital aphantasic subject using neuropsychological testsand 64 channel EEG recordings, in order to studycortical activity involved in perception and imagery evaluating event-related potentials(N170, P200, N250). The subject is in the normal range of the neuropsychological tests performed, except for specific imagery tests. The EEG results show that when he evokes the same mental image, he starts the evoking process from left temporal instead of frontal areas, he does not activate occipital visual nor left anterior parietal areas.