The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort is Encoded by a Domain-General Valuation Network

Risky effort

Decision-making involves weighing up the outcome likelihood, potential rewards, and effort needed. Previous research has focused on the trade-offs between risk and reward or between effort and reward. Here we bridge this gap and examine how risk in effort levels influences choice. We focus on how two key properties of choice influence risk preferences for effort: changes in magnitude and probability. Two experiments assessed people's risk attitudes for effort, and an additional experiment provided a control condition using monetary gambles. The extent to which people valued effort was related to their pattern of risk preferences. Unlike with monetary outcomes, however, there was substantial heterogeneity in effort-based risk preferences: People who responded to effort as costly exhibited a "flipped" interaction pattern of risk preferences. The direction of the pattern depended on whether people treated effort as a loss of resources. Most, but not all, people treat effort as a loss and are more willing to take risks to avoid potentially high levels of effort.

Exaggerated frontoparietal control over cognitive effort-based decision-making in young women with anorexia nervosa

Effortful tasks are generally experienced as costly, but the value of work varies greatly across individuals and populations. While most mental health conditions are characterized by amotivation and effort avoidance, individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) persistently engage in effortful behaviors that most people find unrewarding (food restriction, excessive exercise). Current models of AN differentially attribute such extreme weight-control behavior to altered reward responding and exaggerated cognitive control. In a novel test of these theoretical accounts, we employed an established cognitive effort discounting paradigm in combination with fMRI in young acutely underweight female patients with AN (n = 48) and age-matched healthy controls (HC; n = 48). Contrary to the hypothesis that individuals with AN would experience cognitive effort (operationalized as N-back task performance) as less costly than HC participants, groups did not differ in the subjective value (SV) of discounted rewards or in SV-related activation of brain regions involved in reward valuation. Rather, all group differences in both behavior (superior N-back performance in AN and associated effort ratings) and fMRI activation (increased SV-related frontoparietal activation during decision-making in AN even for easier choices) were more indicative of increased control. These findings suggest that while effort discounting may be relatively intact in AN, effort investment is high both when performing demanding tasks and during effort-based decision-making; highlighting cognitive overcontrol as an important therapeutic target. Future research should establish whether exaggerated control during effort-based decision-making persists after weight-recovery and explore learning the value of effort in AN with tasks involving disorder-relevant effort demands and rewards.

The neuroscience of active learning and direct instruction

Throughout the educational system, students experiencing active learning pedagogy perform better and fail less than those taught through direct instruction. Can this be ascribed to differences in learning from a neuroscientific perspective? This review examines mechanistic, neuroscientific evidence that might explain differences in cognitive engagement contributing to learning outcomes between these instructional approaches. In classrooms, direct instruction comprehensively describes academic content, while active learning provides structured opportunities for learners to explore, apply, and manipulate content. Synaptic plasticity and its modulation by arousal or novelty are central to all learning and both approaches. As a form of social learning, direct instruction relies upon working memory. The reinforcement learning circuit, associated agency, curiosity, and peer-to-peer social interactions combine to enhance motivation, improve retention, and build higher-order-thinking skills in active learning environments. When working memory becomes overwhelmed, additionally engaging the reinforcement learning circuit improves retention, providing an explanation for the benefits of active learning. This analysis provides a mechanistic examination of how emerging neuroscience principles might inform pedagogical choices at all educational levels.

Investigating an effort avoidance account of attentional strategy choice

People often choose suboptimal attentional control strategies during visual search. This has been at least partially attributed to the avoidance of the cognitive effort associated with the optimal strategy, but aspects of the task triggering such avoidance remain unclear. Here, we attempted to measure effort avoidance of an isolated task component to assess whether this component might drive suboptimal behavior. We adopted a modified version of the Adaptive Choice Visual Search (ACVS), a task designed to measure people's visual search strategies. To perform optimally, participants must make a numerosity judgment-estimating and comparing two color sets-before they can advantageously search through the less numerous of the two. If participants skip the numerosity judgment step, they can still perform accurately, albeit substantially more slowly. To study whether effort associated with performing the optional numerosity judgment could be an obstacle to optimal performance, we created a variant of the demand selection task to quantify the avoidance of numerosity judgment effort. Results revealed a robust avoidance of the numerosity judgment, offering a potential explanation for why individuals choose suboptimal strategies in the ACVS task. Nevertheless, we did not find a significant relationship between individual numerosity judgment avoidance and ACVS optimality, and we discussed potential reasons for this lack of an observed relationship. Altogether, our results showed that the effort avoidance for specific subcomponents of a visual search task can be probed and linked to overall strategy choices.

The Neurobiology of Cognitive Fatigue and Its Influence on Effort-Based Choice

Feelings of cognitive fatigue emerge through repeated mental exertion and are ubiquitous in our daily lives. However, there is a limited understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the influence of cognitive fatigue on decisions to exert. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine brain activity while participants make choices to exert effort for reward, before and after bouts of fatiguing cognitive exertion. We found that when participants became cognitively fatigued, they were more likely to choose to forgo higher levels of reward that required more effort. We describe a mechanism by which signals related to cognitive exertion in dlPFC influence effort value computations, instantiated by the insula, thereby influencing an individual's decisions to exert while fatigued. Our results suggest that cognitive fatigue plays a critical role in decisions to exert effort and provides a mechanistic link through which information about cognitive state shapes effort-based choice.

The effect of Huntington's disease on cognitive and physical motivation

Apathy is one of the most common neuropsychiatric features of Huntington's disease. A hallmark of apathy is diminished goal-directed behaviour, which is characterized by a lower motivation to engage in cognitively or physically effortful actions. However, it remains unclear whether this reduction in goal-directed behaviour is driven primarily by a motivational deficit and/or is secondary to the progressive cognitive and physical deficits that accompany more advanced disease. We addressed this question by testing 17 individuals with manifest Huntington's disease and 22 age-matched controls on an effort-based decision-making paradigm. Participants were first trained on separate cognitively and physically effortful tasks and provided explicit feedback about their performance. Next, they chose on separate trials how much effort they were willing to exert in each domain in return for varying reward. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants were asked to rate their subjective perception of task load. In the cognitive task, the Huntington's disease group were more averse to cognitive effort than controls. Although the Huntington's disease group were more impaired than controls on the task itself, their greater aversion to cognitive effort persisted even after controlling for task performance. This suggests that the lower levels of cognitive motivation in the Huntington's disease group relative to controls was most likely driven by a primary motivational deficit. In contrast, both groups expressed a similar preference for physical effort. Importantly, the similar levels of physical motivation across both groups occurred even though participants with Huntington's disease performed objectively worse than controls on the physical effort task, and were aware of their performance through explicit feedback on each trial. This indicates that the seemingly preserved level of physical motivation in Huntington's disease was driven by a willingness to engage in physically effortful actions despite a reduced capacity to do so. Finally, the Huntington's disease group provided higher ratings of subjective task demand than controls for the cognitive (but not physical) effort task and when assessing the mental (but not the physical) load of each task. Together, these results revealed a dissociation in cognitive and physical motivation deficits between Huntington's disease and controls, which were accompanied by differences in how effort was subjectively perceived by the two groups. This highlights that motivation is the final manifestation of a complex set of mechanisms involved in effort processing, which are separable across different domains of behaviour. These findings have important clinical implications for the day-to-day management of apathy in Huntington's disease.

Human ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for prosocial motivation

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is vital for decision-making. Functional neuroimaging links vmPFC to processing rewards and effort, while parallel work suggests vmPFC involvement in prosocial behaviour. However, the necessity of vmPFC for these functions is unknown. Patients with rare focal vmPFC lesions (n = 25), patients with lesions elsewhere (n = 15) and healthy controls (n = 40) chose between rest and exerting effort to earn rewards for themselves or another person. vmPFC damage decreased prosociality across behavioural and computational measures. vmPFC patients earned less, discounted rewards by effort more, and exerted less force when another person benefited, compared to both control groups. Voxel-based lesion mapping revealed dissociations between vmPFC subregions. While medial damage led to antisocial behaviour, lateral damage increased prosocial behaviour relative to patients with damage elsewhere. vmPFC patients also showed reduced effort sensitivity overall, but reward sensitivity was limited to specific subregions. These results reveal multiple causal contributions of vmPFC to prosocial behaviour, effort and reward.

Disentangling effort from probability of success: Temporal dynamics of frontal midline theta in effort-based reward processing

The ability to weigh a reward against the effort required to acquire it is critical for decision-making. However, extant experimental paradigms oftentimes confound increased effort demand with decreased reward probability, thereby obscuring neural correlates underlying these cognitive processes. To resolve this issue, we designed novel tasks that disentangled probability of success - and therefore reward probability - from effort demand. In Experiment 1, reward magnitude and effort demand were varied while reward probability was kept constant. In Experiment 2, effort demand and reward probability were varied while reward magnitude remained fixed. Electroencephalogram (EEG) data was recorded to explore how frontal midline theta (FMT; an electrophysiological index of mPFC function) and component P3 (an index of incentive salience) respond to effort demand, and reward magnitude and probability. We found no evidence that FMT tracked effort demands or net value during cue evaluation. At feedback, however, FMT power was enhanced for high compared to low effort trials, but not modulated by reward magnitude or probability. Conversely, P3 was sensitive to reward magnitude and probability at both cue and feedback phases and only integrated expended effort costs at feedback, such that P3 amplitudes continued to scale with reward magnitude and probability but were also increased for high compared to low effort reward feedback. These findings suggest that, when likelihood of success is equal, FMT power does not track net value of prospective effort-based rewards. Instead, expended cognitive effort potentiates FMT power and enhances the saliency of rewards at feedback. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: The way the brain weighs rewards against the effort required to achieve them is critical for understanding motivational disorders. Current paradigms confound increased effort demand with decreased reward probability, making it difficult to disentangle neural activity associated with effort costs from those associated with reward likelihood. Here, we explored the temporal dynamics of effort-based reward (via frontal midline theta (FMT) and component P3) while participants underwent a novel paradigm that kept probability of reward constant between mental effort demand conditions. Our findings suggest that the FMT does not track net value and that expended effort enhances, instead of attenuates, the saliency of rewards.

Neurobiological foundations and clinical relevance of effort-based decision-making

Applying effort-based decision-making tasks provides insights into specific variables influencing choice behaviors. The current review summarizes the structural and functional neuroanatomy of effort-based decision-making. Across 39 examined studies, the review highlights the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in forming reward-based predictions, the ventral striatum encoding expected subjective values driven by reward size, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex for monitoring choices to maximize rewards, and specific motor areas preparing for effort expenditure. Neuromodulation techniques, along with shifting environmental and internal states, are promising novel treatment interventions for altering neural alterations underlying decision-making. Our review further articulates the translational promise of this construct into the development, maintenance and treatment of psychiatric conditions, particularly those characterized by reward-, effort- and valuation-related deficits.

Value Estimation versus Effort Mobilization: A General Dissociation between Ventromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex

Deciding on a course of action requires both an accurate estimation of option values and the right amount of effort invested in deliberation to reach sufficient confidence in the final choice. In a previous study, we have provided evidence, across a series of judgment and choice tasks, for a dissociation between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which would represent option values, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which would represent the duration of deliberation. Here, we first replicate this dissociation and extend it to the case of an instrumental learning task, in which 24 human volunteers (13 women) choose between options associated with probabilistic gains and losses. According to fMRI data recorded during decision-making, vmPFC activity reflects the sum of option values generated by a reinforcement learning model and dmPFC activity the deliberation time. To further generalize the role of the dmPFC in mobilizing effort, we then analyze fMRI data recorded in the same participants while they prepare to perform motor and cognitive tasks (squeezing a handgrip or making numerical comparisons) to maximize gains or minimize losses. In both cases, dmPFC activity is associated with the output of an effort regulation model, and not with response time. Taken together, these results strengthen a general theory of behavioral control that implicates the vmPFC in the estimation of option values and the dmPFC in the energization of relevant motor and cognitive processes.

Dissociable neural after-effects of cognitive and physical effort expenditure during reward evaluation

The reward after-effect of effort expenditure refers to the phenomenon that previous effort investment changes the subjective value of rewards when obtained. However, the neural mechanisms underlying the after-effects of effort exertion are still not fully understood. We investigated the modulation of reward after-effects by effort type (cognitive vs. physical) through the lens of neural dynamics. Thirty-two participants performed a physically or cognitively demanding task during an effort phase and then played a simple gambling game during a subsequent reward phase to earn monetary rewards while their electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. We found that previous effort expenditure decreased electrocortical activity during feedback evaluation. Importantly, this effort effect occurred in a domain-general manner during the early stage (as indexed by the reward positivity) but in a domain-specific manner during the later and more elaborative stage (as indexed by the P3 and delta oscillation) of reward evaluation. Additionally, effort expenditure enhanced P3 sensitivity to feedback valence regardless of effort type. Our findings suggest that cognitive and physical effort, although bearing some surface resemblance to each other, may have dissociable neural influences on the reward after-effects.

Need for Cognition is associated with a preference for higher task load in effort discounting

When individuals set goals, they consider the subjective value (SV) of the anticipated reward and the required effort, a trade-off that is of great interest to psychological research. One approach to quantify the SVs of levels of difficulty of a cognitive task is the Cognitive Effort Discounting Paradigm by Westbrook and colleagues (2013). However, it fails to acknowledge the highly individual nature of effort, as it assumes a unidirectional, inverse relationship between task load and SVs. Therefore, it cannot map differences in effort perception that arise from traits like Need for Cognition, since individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activities likely do not prefer the easiest level. We replicated the analysis of Westbrook and colleagues with an adapted version, the Cognitive and Affective Discounting (CAD) Paradigm. It quantifies SVs without assuming that the easiest level is preferred, thereby enabling the assessment of SVs for tasks without objective order of task load. Results show that many of the 116 participants preferred a more or the most difficult level. Variance in SVs was best explained by a declining logistic contrast of the [Formula: see text]-back levels and by the accuracy of responses, while reaction time as a predictor was highly volatile depending on the preprocessing pipeline. Participants with higher Need for Cognition scores perceived higher [Formula: see text]-back levels as less effortful and found them less aversive. Effects of Need for Cognition on SVs in lower levels did not reach significance, as group differences only emerged in higher levels. The CAD Paradigm appears to be well suited for assessing and analysing task preferences independent of the supposed objective task difficulty.Protocol registrationThe stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on August 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/CPXTH .

The Willpower Paradox: Possible and Impossible Conceptions of Self-Control

Self-control denotes the ability to override current desires to render behavior consistent with long-term goals. A key assumption is that self-control is required when short-term desires are transiently stronger (more preferred) than long-term goals and people would yield to temptation without exerting self-control. We argue that this widely shared conception of self-control raises a fundamental yet rarely discussed conceptual paradox: How is it possible that a person most strongly desires to perform a behavior (e.g., eat chocolate) and at the same time desires to recruit self-control to prevent themselves from doing it? A detailed analysis reveals that three common assumptions about self-control cannot be true simultaneously. To avoid the paradox, any coherent theory of self-control must abandon either the assumption (a) that recruitment of self-control is an intentional process, or (b) that humans are unitary agents, or (c) that self-control consists in overriding the currently strongest desire. We propose a taxonomy of different kinds of self-control processes that helps organize current theories according to which of these assumptions they abandon. We conclude by outlining unresolved questions and future research perspectives raised by different conceptions of self-control and discuss implications for the question of whether self-control can be considered rational.

Computational mechanisms underlying the dynamics of physical and cognitive fatigue

The willingness to exert effort for reward is essential but comes at the cost of fatigue. Theories suggest fatigue increases after both physical and cognitive exertion, subsequently reducing the motivation to exert effort. Yet a mechanistic understanding of how this happens on a moment-to-moment basis, and whether mechanisms are common to both mental and physical effort, is lacking. In two studies, participants reported momentary (trial-by-trial) ratings of fatigue during an effort-based decision-making task requiring either physical (grip-force) or cognitive (mental arithmetic) effort. Using a novel computational model, we show that fatigue fluctuates from trial-to-trial as a function of exerted effort and predicts subsequent choices. This mechanism was shared across the domains. Selective to the cognitive domain, committing errors also induced momentary increases in feelings of fatigue. These findings provide insight into the computations underlying the influence of effortful exertion on fatigue and motivation, in both physical and cognitive domains.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex represents subjective value across effort-based and risky decision-making

Decisions that require taking effort costs into account are ubiquitous in real life. The neural common currency theory hypothesizes that a particular neural network integrates different costs (e.g., risk) and rewards into a common scale to facilitate value comparison. Although there has been a surge of interest in the computational and neural basis of effort-related value integration, it is still under debate if effort-based decision-making relies on a domain-general valuation network as implicated in the neural common currency theory. Therefore, we comprehensively compared effort-based and risky decision-making using a combination of computational modeling, univariate and multivariate fMRI analyses, and data from two independent studies. We found that effort-based decision-making can be best described by a power discounting model that accounts for both the discounting rate and effort sensitivity. At the neural level, multivariate decoding analyses indicated that the neural patterns of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) represented subjective value across different decision-making tasks including either effort or risk costs, although univariate signals were more diverse. These findings suggest that multivariate dmPFC patterns play a critical role in computing subjective value in a task-independent manner and thus extend the scope of the neural common currency theory.

Brain response in heavy drinkers during cross-commodity alcohol and money discounting with potentially real rewards: A preliminary study

Background

Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is associated with exaggerated preference for immediate rewards, a candidate endophenotype for use disorders. Addiction symptomology is often well-described by the preference for immediate intoxication over other delayed prosocial rewards. We measured brain activation in AUD-implicated regions during a cross-commodity delay discounting (CCD) task with choices for immediate alcohol and delayed money.

Methods

Heavy drinkers (n=24) experienced a brief intravenous alcohol infusion prime, regained sobriety, then chose between 'One Shot' and delayed money in an adjusting delay CCD task (sober and intoxicated); also during fMRI (sober). Participants also performed a behavioral sensation seeking task and completed self-report inventories of other risk factors. We assessed brain activation to choices representing immediate intoxication versus delayed money rewards in a priori regions of interest defined within the framework of Addictions NeuroImaging Assessment.

Results

Activation to CCD choice versus control trials activated paralimbic and ventral frontal cortical regions, including orbital and medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, angular and superior frontal gyri. We detected no differences between immediate or delayed choices. Left medial orbitofrontal cortex activation correlated with alcohol-induced wanting for alcohol; females showed greater activation than males. Behavioral sensation seeking correlated with right nucleus accumbens task engagement.

Conclusions

Alcohol decision-making elicited activation in regions governing reward, introspection, and executive decision-making in heavy drinkers, demonstrating the utility of laboratory tasks designed to better model real-world choice. Our findings suggest that the brain processes subserving immediate and delayed choices are mostly overlapping, even with varied commodities.

Increased cognitive effort costs in healthy aging and preclinical Alzheimer's disease

Life-long engagement in cognitively demanding activities may mitigate against declines in cognitive ability observed in healthy or pathological aging. However, the "mental costs" associated with completing cognitive tasks also increase with age and may be partly attributed to increases in preclinical levels of Alzheimer's disease (AD) pathology, specifically amyloid. We test whether cognitive effort costs increase in a domain-general manner among older adults, and further, whether such age-related increases in cognitive effort costs are associated with working memory (WM) capacity or amyloid burden, a signature pathology of AD. In two experiments, we administered a behavioral measure of cognitive effort costs (cognitive effort discounting) to a sample of older adults recruited from online sources (Experiment 1) or from ongoing longitudinal studies of aging and dementia (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 compared age-related differences in cognitive effort costs across two domains, WM and speech comprehension. Experiment 2 compared cognitive effort costs between a group of participants who were rated positive for amyloid relative to those with no evidence of amyloid. Results showed age-related increases in cognitive effort costs were evident in both domains. Cost estimates were highly correlated between the WM and speech comprehension tasks but did not correlate with WM capacity. In addition, older adults who were amyloid positive had higher cognitive effort costs than those who were amyloid negative. Cognitive effort costs may index a domain-general trait that consistently increases in aging. Differences in cognitive effort costs associated with amyloid burden suggest a potential neurobiological mechanism for age-related differences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The motivational role of the ventral striatum and amygdala in learning from gains and losses

The ventral striatum (VS) and amygdala are two structures often implicated as essential structures for learning. The literature addressing the contribution of these areas to learning, however, is not entirely consistent. We propose that these inconsistencies are due to learning environments and the effect they have on motivation. To differentiate aspects of learning from environmental factors that affect motivation, we ran a series of experiments with varying task factors. We compared monkeys (Macaca mulatta) with VS lesions, amygdala lesions, and unoperated controls on reinforcement learning (RL) tasks that involve learning from both gains and losses as well as from deterministic and stochastic schedules of reinforcement. We found that for all three groups, performance varied by experiment. All three groups modulated their behavior in the same directions, to varying degrees, across the three experiments. This behavioral modulation is why we find deficits in some experiments, but not others. The amount of effort animals exhibited differed depending on the learning environment. Our results suggest that the VS is important for the amount of effort animals will give in rich deterministic and relatively leaner stochastic learning enivornments. We also showed that monkeys with amygdala lesions can learn stimulus-based RL in stochastic environments and environments with loss and conditioned reinforcers. These results show that learning environments shape motivation and that the VS is essential for distinct aspects of motivated behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Economic Choice and Heart Rate Fractal Scaling Indicate That Cognitive Effort Is Reduced by Depression and Boosted by Sad Mood

BACKGROUND

People with depression typically exhibit diminished cognitive control. Control is subjectively costly, prompting speculation that control deficits reflect reduced cognitive effort. Evidence that people with depression exert less cognitive effort is mixed, however, and motivation may depend on state affect.

METHODS

We used a cognitive effort discounting task to measure propensity to expend cognitive effort and fractal structure in the temporal dynamics of interbeat intervals to assess on-task effort exertion for 49 healthy control subjects, 36 people with current depression, and 67 people with remitted depression.

RESULTS

People with depression discounted more steeply, indicating that they were less willing to exert cognitive effort than people with remitted depression and never-depressed control subjects. Also, steeper discounting predicted worse functioning in daily life. Surprisingly, a sad mood induction selectively boosted motivation among participants with depression, erasing differences between them and control subjects. During task performance, depressed participants with the lowest cognitive motivation showed blunted autonomic reactivity as a function of load.

CONCLUSIONS

Discounting patterns supported the hypothesis that people with current depression would be less willing to exert cognitive effort, and steeper discounting predicted lower global functioning in daily life. Heart rate fractal scaling proved to be a highly sensitive index of cognitive load, and data implied that people with lower motivation for cognitive effort had a diminished physiological capacity to respond to rising cognitive demands. State affect appeared to influence motivation among people with current depression given that they were more willing to exert cognitive effort following a sad mood induction.

Cognitive Effort-Based Decision-Making Across Experimental and Daily Life Indices in Younger and Older Adults

OBJECTIVES

The study investigated whether cognitive effort decision-making measured via a neuroeconomic paradigm that manipulated framing (gain vs. loss outcomes), could predict daily life engagement in mentally demanding activities in both younger and older adults.

METHOD

Younger and older adult participants (N = 310) completed the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm (Cog-ED), under both gain and loss conditions, to provide an experimental index of cognitive effort costs for each participant in each framing condition. A subset of participants (N = 230) also completed a 7-day Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) protocol measuring engagement in mentally demanding daily life activities.

RESULTS

In a large, online sample, we replicated a robust increase in cognitive effort costs among older, relative to younger, adults. Additionally, costs were found to be reduced in the loss relative to gain frame, although these effects were only reliable at high levels of task difficulty and were not moderated by age. Critically, participants who had lower effort costs in the gain frame tended to report engaging in more mentally demanding daily life activities, but the opposite pattern was observed in the loss frame. Further analyses demonstrated the specificity of reward-related cognitive motivation in predicting daily life mentally demanding activities.

DISCUSSION

Together, these results suggest that cognitive effort costs, as measured through behavioral choice patterns in a neuroeconomic decision-making task, can be used to predict and explain engagement in mentally demanding activities during daily life among both older and younger adults.

Strategically managing learning during perceptual decision making

Making optimal decisions in the face of noise requires balancing short-term speed and accuracy. But a theory of optimality should account for the fact that short-term speed can influence long-term accuracy through learning. Here, we demonstrate that long-term learning is an important dynamical dimension of the speed-accuracy trade-off. We study learning trajectories in rats and formally characterize these dynamics in a theory expressed as both a recurrent neural network and an analytical extension of the drift-diffusion model that learns over time. The model reveals that choosing suboptimal response times to learn faster sacrifices immediate reward, but can lead to greater total reward. We empirically verify predictions of the theory, including a relationship between stimulus exposure and learning speed, and a modulation of reaction time by future learning prospects. We find that rats' strategies approximately maximize total reward over the full learning epoch, suggesting cognitive control over the learning process.

Context-independent scaling of neural responses to task difficulty in the multiple-demand network

The multiple-demand (MD) network is sensitive to many aspects of cognitive demand, showing increased activation with more difficult tasks. However, it is currently unknown whether the MD network is modulated by the context in which task difficulty is experienced. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined MD network responses to low, medium, and high difficulty arithmetic problems within 2 cued contexts, an easy versus a hard set. The results showed that MD activity varied reliably with the absolute difficulty of a problem, independent of the context in which the problem was presented. Similarly, MD activity during task execution was independent of the difficulty of the previous trial. Representational similarity analysis further supported that representational distances in the MD network were consistent with a context-independent code. Finally, we identified several regions outside the MD network that showed context-dependent coding, including the inferior parietal lobule, paracentral lobule, posterior insula, and large areas of the visual cortex. In sum, a cognitive effort is processed by the MD network in a context-independent manner. We suggest that this absolute coding of cognitive demand in the MD network reflects the limited range of task difficulty that can be supported by the cognitive apparatus.

Brain stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex modulates effort-based decision making

Deciding whether to engage in strenuous mental activities requires trading-off the potential benefits against the costs of mental effort, but it is unknown which brain rhythms are causally involved in such cost-benefit calculations. We show that brain stimulation targeting midfrontal theta oscillations increases the engagement in goal-directed mental effort. Participants received transcranial alternating current stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex while deciding whether they are willing to perform a demanding working memory task for monetary rewards. Midfrontal theta tACS increased the willingness to exert mental effort for rewards while leaving working memory performance unchanged. Computational modelling using a hierarchical Bayesian drift diffusion model suggests that theta tACS shifts the starting bias before evidence accumulation towards high reward-high effort options without affecting the velocity of the evidence accumulation process. Our findings suggest that the motivation to engage in goal-directed mental effort can be increased via midfrontal tACS.

Cognitive effort avoidance in veterans with suicide attempt histories

Suicide attempts (SA) are increasing in the United States, especially in veterans. Discovering individual cognitive features of the subset of suicide ideators who attempt suicide is critical. Cognitive theories attribute SA to facile schema-based negative interpretations of environmental events. Over-general autobiographical memory and facile solutions in problem solving tasks in SA survivors suggest that aversion to expending cognitive effort may be a neurobehavioral marker of SA risk. In veterans receiving care for mood disorder, we compared cognitive effort discounting and evidence-gathering in a beads task between veterans with (SAHx+; n = 26) versus without (SAHx-; n = 22) a history of SA. Groups did not differ in depressed mood or in a proxy metric of premorbid intelligence. Compared to SAHx- participants, SAHx+ participants self-reported significantly more severe cognitive problems in most domains, and also eschewed choice to earn higher monetary reward if earning it required a slightly increased working memory (WM) demand relative to an easy WM task. There was no group difference, however, in extent of evidence-gathering before declaring a conclusion in a beads task. These preliminary data suggest that aversion to expenditure of cognitive effort, potentially as a component of cognitive difficulties, may be a marker for SA risk.

Distinct neural representations for prosocial and self-benefiting effort

Prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others-are central to individual and societal well-being. Although the mechanisms underlying the financial and moral costs of prosocial behaviors are increasingly understood, this work has often ignored a key influence on behavior: effort. Many prosocial acts are effortful, and people are averse to the costs of exerting them. However, how the brain encodes effort costs when actions benefit others is unknown. During fMRI, participants completed a decision-making task where they chose in each trial whether to "work" and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) or "rest" (no effort) for rewards (2-10 credits). Crucially, on separate trials, they made these decisions either to benefit another person or themselves. We used a combination of multivariate representational similarity analysis and model-based univariate analysis to reveal how the costs of prosocial and self-benefiting efforts are processed. Strikingly, we identified a unique neural signature of effort in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) for prosocial acts, both when choosing to help others and when exerting force to benefit them. This pattern was absent for self-benefiting behaviors. Moreover, stronger, specific representations of prosocial effort in the ACCg were linked to higher levels of empathy and higher subsequent exerted force to benefit others. In contrast, the ventral tegmental area and ventral insula represented value preferentially when choosing for oneself and not for prosocial acts. These findings advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms of prosocial behavior, highlighting the critical role that effort has in the brain circuits that guide helping others.

Cognitive effort for self, strangers, and charities

Effort is aversive and often avoided, even when earning benefits for oneself. Yet, people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work shows people avoid physical effort for strangers relative to themselves, but invest more physical effort for charity. Here, we find that people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is a personally meaningful charity. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants (N = 51; 150 choices) were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity than themselves. In Study 2, participants (N = 47; 225 choices) were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred cognitive exertion that benefited themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike prior physical effort findings, cognitive effort discounted the subjective value of rewards linearly. Exploratory machine learning analyses suggest that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf, opening up new avenues for future research.

Value, Confidence, Deliberation: A Functional Partition of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Demonstrated across Rating and Choice Tasks

Deciding about courses of action involves minimizing costs and maximizing benefits. Decision neuroscience studies have implicated both the ventral and dorsal medial PFC (vmPFC and dmPFC) in signaling goal value and action cost, but the precise functional role of these regions is still a matter of debate. Here, we suggest a more general functional partition that applies not only to decisions but also to judgments about goal value (expected reward) and action cost (expected effort). In this conceptual framework, cognitive representations related to options (reward value and effort cost) are dissociated from metacognitive representations (confidence and deliberation) related to solving the task (providing a judgment or making a choice). We used an original approach aimed at identifying consistencies across several preference tasks, from likeability ratings to binary decisions involving both attribute integration and option comparison. fMRI results in human male and female participants confirmed the vmPFC as a generic valuation system, its activity increasing with reward value and decreasing with effort cost. In contrast, more dorsal regions were not concerned with the valuation of options but with metacognitive variables, confidence being reflected in mPFC activity and deliberation time in dmPFC activity. Thus, there was a dissociation between the effort attached to choice options (represented in the vmPFC) and the effort invested in deliberation (represented in the dmPFC), the latter being expressed in pupil dilation. More generally, assessing commonalities across preference tasks might help in reaching a unified view of the neural mechanisms underlying the cost/benefit tradeoffs that drive human behavior.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Decision neuroscience studies have implicated the medial PFC in forming the cognitive representations that drive human choice behavior. However, different studies using different tasks have suggested somewhat inconsistent links between precise computational variables and specific brain regions. Here, we use fMRI to demonstrate a robust functional partition of the medial PFC that generalizes across tasks involving an estimation of goal value and/or action cost to provide a judgment or make a choice. This general functional partition makes a critical dissociation between neural representations of decisional factors (the expected costs and benefits attached to a given option) and metacognitive estimates (confidence in the judgment or choice, and effort invested in the deliberation process).

Everything Comes at a Price: Considerations in Modeling Effort-Based Choice

When observing human behavior, one of the key factors determining choice is effort. It is often assumed that people prefer an easier course of action when the alternative yields the same benefits. However, recent research demonstrates that this is not always the case: effort is not always costly and can also add value. A promising avenue to study effort-based choice is to utilize formal decision models that enable quantitative modeling. In this paper, we aim to present an overview of the current approaches to modeling effort-based choice and discuss some considerations that stem from theoretical and practical issues (present and previous) in studies on the role of effort, focusing on the connections and discrepancies between formal models and the findings from the body of empirical research. Considering that effort can, in some circumstances, act as a cost and as a benefit, reconciling these discrepancies is a practical and theoretical challenge that can ultimately lead to better predictions and increased model validity. Our review identifies and discusses these discrepancies providing direction for future empirical research.

The Neurobiology of Pathological Fatigue: New Models, New Questions

The last decade has seen the emergence of new theoretical frameworks to explain pathological fatigue, a much neglected, yet highly significant symptom across a wide range of diseases. While the new models of fatigue provide new hypotheses to test, they also raise a number of questions. The primary purpose of this essay is to examine the predictions of three recently proposed models of fatigue, the overlap and differences between them, and the evidence from diseases that may lend support to the models of fatigue. I also present expansions for the sensory attenuation model of fatigue. Further questions examined here are the following: What are the neural substrates of fatigue? How can sensory attenuation, which underpins agency also explain fatigue? Are fatigue and agency related?

Covariations between pupil diameter and supplementary eye field activity suggest a role in cognitive effort implementation

In both human and nonhuman primates (NHP), the medial prefrontal region, defined as the supplementary eye field (SEF), can indirectly influence behavior selection through modulation of the primary selection process in the oculomotor structures. To perform this oculomotor control, SEF integrates multiple cognitive signals such as attention, memory, reward, and error. As changes in pupil responses can assess these cognitive efforts, a better understanding of the precise dynamics by which pupil diameter and medial prefrontal cortex activity interact requires thorough investigations before, during, and after changes in pupil diameter. We tested whether SEF activity is related to pupil dynamics during a mixed pro/antisaccade oculomotor task in 2 macaque monkeys. We used functional ultrasound (fUS) imaging to examine temporal changes in brain activity at the 0.1-s time scale and 0.1-mm spatial resolution concerning behavioral performance and pupil dynamics. By combining the pupil signals and real-time imaging of NHP during cognitive tasks, we were able to infer localized cerebral blood volume (CBV) responses within a restricted part of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, referred to as the SEF, an area in which antisaccade preparation activity is also recorded. Inversely, SEF neurovascular activity measured by fUS imaging was found to be a robust predictor of specific variations in pupil diameter over short and long-time scales. Furthermore, we directly manipulated pupil diameter and CBV in the SEF using reward modulations. These results bring a novel understanding of the physiological links between pupil and SEF, but it also raises questions about the role of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), as CBV variations in the ACC seems to be negligible compared to CBV variations in the SEF.

Ultrafast functional imaging reveals short- and long-term covariations between pupil diameter and activity in the Supplementary Eye Field (SEF) of awake behaving non-human primates, yielding a novel understanding of the physiological links between the pupil and SEF.

Did It Change Your Mind? Neural Substrates of Purchase Intention Change and Product Information

Price and customer ratings are perhaps the two most important pieces of information consumers rely on when shopping online. This study aimed to elucidate the neural mechanism by which the introduction of these two types of information influences the purchase intention of potential consumers for hedonic products. Participants performed a lip-care product shopping task during functional magnetic resonance imaging, in which they re-disclosed purchase intentions referring to the information of price or rating provided about the products that they had previously disclosed their purchase intentions without any information. Data from 38 young female participants were analyzed to identify the underlying neural regions associated with the intention change and product information. The bilateral frontopolar cortex, bilateral dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and left insula activated higher for the unchanged than changed intention condition. The right dACC and bilateral insula also activated more toward the price than the rating condition, whereas the medial prefrontal cortex and bilateral temporoparietal junction responded in the opposite direction. These results seem to reflect the shift to exploratory decision-making strategies and increased salience in maintaining purchase intentions despite referring to provided information and to highlight the involvement of social cognition-related regions in reference to customer ratings rather than price.

Domain-general cognitive motivation: Evidence from economic decision-making - Final Registered Report

Stable individual differences in cognitive motivation (i.e., the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities) have been documented with self-report measures, yet convergent support for a trait-level construct is still lacking. In the present study, we used an innovative decision-making paradigm (COG-ED) to quantify the costs of cognitive effort, a metric of cognitive motivation, across two distinct cognitive domains: working memory (an N-back task) and speech comprehension (understanding spoken sentences in background noise). We hypothesized that cognitive motivation operates similarly within individuals, regardless of domain. Specifically, in 104 adults aged 18-40 years, we tested whether individual differences in effort costs are stable across domains, even after controlling for other potential sources of shared individual variation. Conversely, we evaluated whether the costs of cognitive effort across domains may be better explained in terms of other relevant cognitive and personality-related constructs, such as working memory capacity or reward sensitivity. We confirmed a reliable association among effort costs in both domains, even when these other sources of individual variation, as well as task load, are statistically controlled. Taken together, these results add support for trait-level variation in cognitive motivation impacting effort-based decision making across multiple domains.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Cognitive Effort Exertion Enhances Electrophysiological Responses to Rewarding Outcomes

Recent work has highlighted neural mechanisms underlying cognitive effort-related discounting of anticipated rewards. However, findings on whether effort exertion alters the subjective value of obtained rewards are inconsistent. Here, we provide a more nuanced account of how cognitive effort affects subsequent reward processing in a novel task designed to assess effort-induced modulations of the Reward Positivity, an event-related potential indexing reward-related neural activity. We found that neural responses to both gains and losses were significantly elevated in trials requiring more versus less cognitive effort. Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that these effects were mirrored in gain-related delta, but not in loss-related theta band activity, suggesting that people ascribed more value to high-effort outcomes. In addition, we also explored whether individual differences in behavioral effort discounting rates and reward sensitivity in the absence of effort may affect the relationship between effort exertion and subsequent reward processing. Together, our findings provide evidence that cognitive effort exertion can increase the subjective value of subsequent outcomes and that this effect may primarily rely on modulations of delta band activity.

Neural Substrates of the Drift-Diffusion Model in Brain Disorders

Many studies on the drift-diffusion model (DDM) explain decision-making based on a unified analysis of both accuracy and response times. This review provides an in-depth account of the recent advances in DDM research which ground different DDM parameters on several brain areas, including the cortex and basal ganglia. Furthermore, we discuss the changes in DDM parameters due to structural and functional impairments in several clinical disorders, including Parkinson's disease, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and schizophrenia. This review thus uses DDM to provide a theoretical understanding of different brain disorders.

Altered motivation of effortful decision-making for self and others in subthreshold depression

BACKGROUND

Amotivation is a typical feature in major depressive disorders and refers to individuals exhibiting reduced willingness to exert effort for rewards. However, the motivation pattern when deciding whether to exert effort for self versus others in people with depression remains unclear.

METHODS

We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study and employed an adapted Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task in subthreshold depressive (SD) participants (n = 33) and healthy controls (HC) (n = 32). This required participants to choose between a fixed low-effort/low-reward and a variable high-effort/high-reward option, and then immediately exert effort to obtain corresponding rewards for themselves or for unfamiliar people.

RESULTS

Compared with the HC group, the SD group showed blunted activity in the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula (AI), and right putamen-left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex functional connectivity when choosing to exert effort for themselves. Additionally, the SD group exhibited increased willingness and greater activation in the bilateral AI when choosing to exert effort for others. Furthermore, these brain activations and functional connectivity were positively related to self-reported motivation.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings show altered motivation during effort-based decision-making in individuals with the mild depressive state, particularly with higher motivation for others. Thus, this suggests that motivational behaviors and prefrontal-striatal circuitry are altered in individuals with SD, which can be utilized to discover treatment targets and develop strategies to address mental illness caused by motivation disorders.

Culture-related differences in the neural processing of probability during mixed lottery value-based decision-making

This study evaluated how differences in economic risk-taking in Westerners and East Asians reflect cultural differences in the analytic or holistic processing of probabilistic outcomes during value-based decisions. Twenty-seven Americans (US) and 51 Taiwanese (TW) young adults completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) Lottery Choice Task (LCT) experiment. Participants accepted or rejected stakes with varying probabilities of winning or losing different magnitudes of points. TW participants accepted more stakes when win probabilities were > 0.50, whereas US participants reduced their acceptance rates of winning stakes more discriminately as win probabilities decreased. Both groups rejected losing stakes (win probabilities < 0.50) with similar frequency. Critically, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) responses correspondingly showed greater discrimination between win probability conditions in US than TW groups. Our findings highlight a neurocognitive mechanism in the VMPFC for how cultural differences in distinguishing between probabilistic reward outcomes shape neural computations of risk and prospects.

The cue-reactivity paradigm: An ensemble of networks driving attention and cognition when viewing drug and natural reward-related stimuli

The cue-reactivity paradigm is a widely adopted neuroimaging probe engendering brain activity linked with attentional, affective, and reward processes following presentation of appetitive stimuli. Given the multiple mental operations invoked, we sought to decompose cue-related brain activity into constituent components employing emergent meta-analytic techniques when considering drug and natural reward-related cues. We conducted coordinate-based meta-analyses delineating common and distinct brain activity convergence across cue-reactivity studies (N = 196 articles) involving drug (n = 133) or natural (n = 63) visual stimuli. Across all studies, convergence was observed in limbic, cingulate, insula, and fronto-parieto-occipital regions. Drug-distinct convergence was observed in posterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal, and temporo-parietal regions, whereas distinct-natural convergence was observed in thalamic, insular, orbitofrontal, and occipital regions. We characterized connectivity profiles of identified regions by leveraging task-independent and task-dependent MRI datasets, grouped these profiles into subnetworks, and linked each with putative mental operations. Outcomes suggest multifaceted brain activity during cue-reactivity can be decomposed into elemental processes and indicate that while drugs of abuse usurp the brain's natural-reward-processing system, some regions appear distinct to drug cue-reactivity.

The neural basis of effort valuation: A meta-analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging studies

Choosing how much effort to expend is critical for everyday decisions. While several neuroimaging studies have examined effort-based decision-making, results have been highly heterogeneous, leaving unclear which brain regions process effort-related costs and integrate them with rewards. We conducted two meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging data to examine consistent neural correlates of effort demands (23 studies, 15 maps, 549 participants) and net value (15 studies, 11 maps, 428 participants). The pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) scaled positively with pure effort demand, whereas the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) showed the opposite effect. Moreover, regions that have been previously implicated in value integration in other cost domains, such as the vmPFC and ventral striatum, were consistently involved in signaling net value. The opposite response patterns of the pre-SMA and vmPFC imply that they are differentially involved in the representation of effort costs and value integration. These findings provide conclusive evidence that the vmPFC is a central node for net value computation and reveal potential brain targets to treat motivation-related disorders.

Relationship of ventral striatum activation during effort discounting to clinical amotivation severity in schizophrenia

Motivational deficits play a central role in disability due to negative symptoms of schizophrenia (SZ), but limited pathophysiological understanding impedes critically needed therapeutic development. We applied an fMRI Effort Discounting Task (EDT) that quantifies motivation using a neuroeconomic decision-making approach, capturing the degree to which effort requirements produce reductions in the subjective value (SV) of monetary reward. An analyzed sample of 21 individuals with SZ and 23 group-matched controls performed the EDT during fMRI. We hypothesized that ventral striatum (VS) as well as extended brain motivation circuitry would encode SV, integrating reward and effort costs. We also hypothesized that VS hypoactivation during EDT decisions would demonstrate a dimensional relationship with clinical amotivation severity, reflecting greater suppression by effort costs. As hypothesized, VS as well as a broader cortico-limbic network were activated during the EDT and this activation correlated positively with SV. In SZ, activation to task decisions was reduced selectively in VS. Greater VS reductions correlated with more severe clinical amotivation in SZ and across all participants. However, these diagnosis and amotivation effects could not be explained by the response to parametric variation in reward, effort, or model-based SV. Our findings demonstrate that VS hypofunction in schizophrenia is manifested during effort-based decisions and reflects dimensional motivation impairment. Dysfunction of VS impacting effort-based decision-making can provide a target for biomarker development to guide novel efforts to assess and treat disabling amotivation.

Investigating mindfulness influences on cognitive function: On the promise and potential of converging research strategies

Research investigating the effects and underlying mechanisms of mindfulness on cognitive functioning has accelerated exponentially over the past two decades. Despite the rapid growth of the literature and its influential role in garnering public interest in mindfulness, inconsistent methods in defining and measuring mindfulness have yielded variable findings, which contribute to the overall dearth of clear generalizable conclusions. The focus of this article is to address the lack of cohesion in the collective methodologies used in this domain by providing a new perspective grounded in classic cognitive and experimental psychology principles. We leverage the concept of converging operations to demonstrate how seemingly disparate research strategies can be integrated towards a more unified and systematic approach. An organizing taxonomic framework is described to provide useful structure in how mindfulness can be operationalized, measured, and investigated. We illustrate the rationale and core organizing principles of the framework through a selective review of studies on mindfulness and cognitive control. We then demonstrate the utility of the approach by showing how it can be applied to synthesize extant methodologies and guide the development of future research. Specific suggestions and examples pertaining to experimental design and statistical analysis are provided.

Effort Mobilization and Healthy Aging

Healthy aging is in part dependent upon people's willingness and ability to mobilize the effort necessary to support behaviors that promote health and well-being. People may have the best information relating to health along with the best intentions to stay healthy (e.g., health-related goals), but positive outcomes will ultimately be dependent upon them actually investing the necessary effort toward using this information to achieve their goals. In addition, the influences on effort mobilization may vary as a function of physical, psychological, and social changes experienced by the individual across the life span. Building on the overall theme of this special issue, we explore the relationships between motivation, effort mobilization, and healthy aging. We begin by characterizing the relationship between motivation and effort, and identify the factors that influence effort mobilization. We then consider the factors associated specifically with aging that may influence effort mobilization (e.g., changes in cardiovascular and neural mechanisms) and, ultimately, the health and well-being of older adults. Finally, distinguishing between those influential factors that are modifiable versus intractable, we identify ways to structure situations and beliefs to optimize mobilization in support of healthy aging.

Neural and computational mechanisms of momentary fatigue and persistence in effort-based choice

From a gym workout, to deciding whether to persevere at work, many activities require us to persist in deciding that rewards are ‘worth the effort’ even as we become fatigued. However, studies examining effort-based decisions typically assume that the willingness to work is static. Here, we use computational modelling on two effort-based tasks, one behavioural and one during fMRI. We show that two hidden states of fatigue fluctuate on a moment-to-moment basis on different timescales but both reduce the willingness to exert effort for reward. The value of one state increases after effort but is ‘recoverable’ by rests, whereas a second ‘unrecoverable’ state gradually increases with work. The BOLD response in separate medial and lateral frontal sub-regions covaried with these states when making effort-based decisions, while a distinct fronto-striatal system integrated fatigue with value. These results provide a computational framework for understanding the brain mechanisms of persistence and momentary fatigue.

The willingness to exert effort into demanding tasks often declines over time through fatigue. Here the authors provide a computational account of the moment-to-moment dynamics of fatigue and its impact on effort-based choices, and reveal the neural mechanisms that underlie such computations.

Neural systems underlying the learning of cognitive effort costs

People balance the benefits of cognitive work against the costs of cognitive effort. Models that incorporate prospective estimates of the costs of cognitive effort into decision making require a mechanism by which these costs are learned. However, it remains an open question what brain systems are important for this learning, particularly when learning is not tied explicitly to a decision about what task to perform. In this fMRI experiment, we parametrically manipulated the level of effort a task requires by increasing task switching frequency across six task contexts. In a scanned learning phase, participants implicitly learned about the task switching frequency in each context. In a subsequent test phase, participants made selections between pairs of these task contexts. We modeled learning within a reinforcement learning framework, and found that effort expectations that derived from task-switching probability and response time (RT) during learning were the best predictors of later choice behavior. Prediction errors (PE) from these two models were associated with FPN during distinct learning epochs. Specifically, PE derived from expected RT was most correlated with the fronto-parietal network early in learning, whereas PE derived from expected task switching frequency was correlated with the fronto-parietal network late in learning. These results suggest that multiple task-related factors are tracked by the brain while performing a task that can drive subsequent estimates of effort costs.

Measuring the Subjective Cost of Listening Effort Using a Discounting Task

Purpose Objective measures of listening effort have been gaining prominence, as they provide metrics to quantify the difficulty of understanding speech under a variety of circumstances. A key challenge has been to develop paradigms that enable the complementary measurement of subjective listening effort in a quantitatively precise manner. In this study, we introduce a novel decision-making paradigm to examine age-related and individual differences in subjective effort during listening. Method Older and younger adults were presented with spoken sentences mixed with speech-shaped noise at multiple signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). On each trial, subjects were offered the choice between completing an easier listening trial (presented at +20 dB SNR) for a smaller monetary reward and completing a harder listening trial (presented at either +4, 0, -4, -8, or -12 dB SNR) for a greater monetary reward. By varying the amount of the reward offered for the easier option, the subjective value of performing effortful listening trials at each SNR could be assessed. Results Older adults discounted the value of effortful listening to a greater degree than young adults, opting to accept less money in order to avoid more difficult SNRs. Additionally, older adults with poorer hearing and smaller working memory capacities were more likely to choose easier trials; however, in younger adults, no relationship with hearing or working memory was found. Self-reported measures of economic status did not affect these relationships. Conclusions These findings suggest that subjective listening effort depends on factors including, but not necessarily limited to, hearing and working memory. Additionally, this study demonstrates that economic decision-making paradigms can be a useful approach for assessing subjective listening effort and may prove beneficial in future research.

The effort-doors task: Examining the temporal dynamics of effort-based reward processing using ERPs

Aberrant reward processing is a cardinal feature of various forms of psychopathology. However, recent research indicates that aberrant reward processing may manifest at temporally distinct substages and involve interdependent subcomponents of reward processing. To improve our understanding of both the temporal dynamics and distinct subcomponents of reward processing, we added an effort manipulation to the "doors" reward-task paradigm, to derive behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) measures of effort-based reward processing. Behavioral measures consisting of reaction time, response rate, and response rate change were used to index effort expenditure, and ERP measures were used to index attention allocated toward effort-completion cues, anticipation of reward, valuation of reward, and attention toward monetary feedback. Reduced response rate and slowing of response were evident during the high effort versus the low effort condition. ERP findings indicated increased attention to signals of high- compared to low-effort completion cues-as well as reduced anticipation of rewards, and reduced attention toward feedback information following high effort expenditure. Participants showing the most response-rate slowing evidenced the greatest reward devaluation following high versus low effort. Findings demonstrate that the addition of an effort expenditure manipulation to the doors reward paradigm produced reliable ERP and behavioral measures of effort-based reward processing, providing opportunities for future researchers to utilize the effort-doors task to parse the temporal dynamics of both anticipatory and consummatory reward processing components.

Influence of ovarian hormones on value-based decision-making systems: Contribution to sexual dimorphisms in mental disorders

Women and men exhibit differences in behavior when making value-based decisions. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain these findings, stressing differences in functional lateralization of the brain, functional activation, neurotransmitter involvement and more recently, sex hormones. While a significant interaction of neurotransmitter systems and sex hormones has been shown for both sexes, decision-making in women might be particularly affected by variations of ovarian hormones. In this review we have gathered information from animal and human studies on how ovarian hormones affect decision-making processes in females by interacting with neurotransmitter systems at functionally relevant brain locations and thus modify the computation of decision aspects. We also review previous findings on impaired decision-making in animals and clinical populations with substance use disorder and depression, emphasizing how little we know about the role of ovarian hormones in aberrant decision-making.

Effort-Related Decision-Making in ADHD

ADHD is defined by behavioral symptoms that are not well characterized in relation to ADHD’s neurobiological mechanisms. This approach has limited our ability to define ADHD nosology and predict outcomes because it does not systematically examine facets of the disorder such as the inability to maintain cognitively effortful activities, as promoted in the NIMH RDoC approach. Existing data indicate ADHD is associated with differences in reward valuation and processing, but we do not know whether ADHD is also associated with higher levels of aversion to exerting cognitive effort and/or altered reward x effort interactions. Our ongoing study addresses this knowledge gap by examining individuals’ preferences between rewards associated with minimal effort and reward alternatives with a higher payoff but higher effort costs (“effort discounting”); thereby permitting us to characterize differences in biases and tradeoffs during effort-related decision-making in ADHD. The study takes advantage of a well-defined sample of ADHD-diagnosed and healthy control individuals to address three aims. First, we determine whether ADHD is associated with steeper discounting of larger, more effortful rewards. Second, we examine the subjective perception of effort in youth diagnosed with ADHD and healthy controls using tasks requiring varying levels of cognitive effort. Third, we explore relationships amongst indices of effort discounting, theoretically-related traits (e.g., grit, distress tolerance), biomarkers of effort-related decision-making (eye movements and pupil size), and various cognitive measures. Successful completion of the aims will permit us to better characterize ADHD-healthy control differences and lay a foundation for more computational approaches to ADHD diagnostic criteria.