Bidirectional Human-Swine Transmission of Seasonal Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Pig Herd, France, 2018

Reverse zoonotic transmission of human seasonal influenza to a pig herd in Sweden

In January 2023, a Swedish piglet-producing farm with 2800 sows in production (SIP) was diagnosed with IAV (Influenza A virus) and the isolates were shown to cluster with the human seasonal influenza (2022/2023). In December 2022, employees with flu like symptoms tended to the pigs and a few weeks later, respiratory signs appeared in different age groups; sows in farrowing units were anorectic and pyrectic. Lung and nasal swabs were tested positive for IAV and other respiratory infectious agents. Blanket vaccination against H1N1pdm09 of sows and gilts was initiated but discontinued for sows after 2 treatments. Biosecurity measures aiming to reduce the spread of virus were implemented. However, the compliance to follow the protocol was moderate.Combining immunity and strict sanitary measures is crucial to control virus circulation. As the farmer discontinued sow vaccination and just partly increased biosecurity, this may have contributed to ongoing virus circulation and clinical signs in pigs, even 5 months post-diagnosis. Although H1N1pdm09 already had been found in the herd in 2017, there were no clinical signs or diagnostic results indicating continuous circulation of this or other IAV strains afterwards. However, this cannot be entirely excluded. Swine IAVs pose a risk of reintroduction into the human population, highlighting the importance of vaccination of farm workers against seasonal influenza.

The reverse zoonotic potential of SARS-CoV-2

There has been considerable emphasis recently on the zoonotic origins of emerging infectious diseases in humans, including the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic; however, reverse zoonoses (infections transmitted from humans to other animals) have received less attention despite their potential importance. The effects can be devastating for the infected species and can also result in transmission of the pathogen back to human populations or other animals either in the original form or as a variant. Humans have transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to other animals, and the virus is able to circulate and evolve in those species. As global travel resumes, the potential of SARS-CoV-2 as a reverse zoonosis threatens humans and endangered species. Nonhuman primates are of particular concern given their susceptibility to human respiratory infections. Enforcing safety measures for all people working in and visiting wildlife areas, especially those with nonhuman primates, and increasing access to safety measures for people living near protected areas that are home to nonhuman primates will help mitigate reverse zoonotic transmission.

Risk assessment of influenza transmission between workers and pigs on US indoor hog growing units

On pig farms ample opportunity exists for pig-to-human and human-to-pig (cross-species) influenza transmission. The purpose of this study was to assess the risks of cross-species influenza transmission within an indoor pig grower unit in the United States and to prioritize data gaps. Using the World Organization for Animal Health risk assessment framework we evaluated influenza transmission across two risk pathways: 1. What is the likelihood that based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one hog becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with swine (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 1a] and that at least one worker becomes infected as a result [step 1b] and that the worker develops symptoms [step 1c]? And 2. What is the likelihood that, based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one worker becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with people (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 2a] and that at least one pig becomes infected as a result [step 2b] and that the pig(s) develop(s) symptoms [step 2c]? Semi-quantitative probability and uncertainty assessments were based on literature review including passive and active influenza surveillance data. We assumed a typical pig-grower farm has capacity for 4,000 pigs, two workers, and minimal influenza control measures. Probability and uncertainty categories were assessed for each risk step and the combined risk pathway. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway one was estimated to be Very Low for H1N1 and H1N2 with an overall High level of uncertainty. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway two was estimated to be Extremely Low for H1N1 and H3N2 with a High degree of uncertainty. Scenario analyses in which influenza control measures were assumed to be implemented separately (implementing vaccinating sows, mass vaccinating incoming pigs or improved personal protective equipment adherence) showed no reduction in the combined risk category. When implementing three influenza control methods altogether, the combined risk could be reduced to Extremely Low for risk pathway one and remained Extremely Low for risk pathway two. This work highlights that multiple influenza control methods are needed to reduce the risks of inter-species influenza transmission on swine farms.

Reverse Zoonotic Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Monkeypox Virus: A Comprehensive Review

Reverse zoonosis reveals the process of transmission of a pathogen through the human-animal interface and the spillback of the zoonotic pathogen. In this article, we methodically demonstrate various aspects of reverse zoonosis, with a comprehensive discussion of SARS-CoV-2 and MPXV reverse zoonosis. First, different components of reverse zoonosis, such as humans, different pathogens, and numerous animals (poultry, livestock, pets, wild animals, and zoo animals), have been demonstrated. Second, it explains the present status of reverse zoonosis with different pathogens during previous occurrences of various outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics. Here, we present 25 examples from literature. Third, using several examples, we comprehensively illustrate the present status of the reverse zoonosis of SARS-CoV-2 and MPXV. Here, we have provided 17 examples of SARS-CoV-2 reverse zoonosis and two examples of MPXV reverse zoonosis. Fourth, we have described two significant aspects of reverse zoonosis: understanding the fundamental aspects of spillback and awareness. These two aspects are required to prevent reverse zoonosis from the current infection with two significant viruses. Finally, the One Health approach was discussed vividly, where we urge scientists from different areas to work collaboratively to solve the issue of reverse zoonosis.

Potential zoonotic spillover at the human-animal interface: A mini-review

Wildlife markets and wet wildlife markets, a type of human-animal interface, are commonly trading centers for wild-caught and captive-exotic animals as well as their products. These markets provide an ideal environment for spillovers of zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). These conditions may raise serious concerns, particularly in relation to wildlife species that frequently interact with humans and domestic animals. EIDs pose a significant risk to humans, ecosystems, and public health, as demonstrated by the current COVID-19 pandemic, and other previous outbreaks, including the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. Even though it seems appears impossible to eliminate EIDs, we may still be able to minimalize the risks and take several measures to prevent new EIDs originated from animals. The aim of this study was to review several types of human-animal interfaces with a high risk of zoonotic spillover, infectious agents, and animal hosts or reservoirs. Identifying those factors will support the development of interventions and effective disease control in human-animal interface settings.

Zoonosis and zooanthroponosis of emerging respiratory viruses

Lung infections in Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) are triggered by a variety of respiratory viruses. All human pandemics have been caused by the members of two major virus families, namely Orthomyxoviridae (influenza A viruses (IAVs); subtypes H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2) and Coronaviridae (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, SARS-CoV-2). These viruses acquired some adaptive changes in a known intermediate host including domestic birds (IAVs) or unknown intermediate host (SARS-CoV-2) following transmission from their natural reservoirs (e.g. migratory birds or bats, respectively). Verily, these acquired adaptive substitutions facilitated crossing species barriers by these viruses to infect humans in a phenomenon that is known as zoonosis. Besides, these adaptive substitutions aided the variant strain to transmit horizontally to other contact non-human animal species including pets and wild animals (zooanthroponosis). Herein we discuss the main zoonotic and reverse-zoonosis events that occurred during the last two pandemics of influenza A/H1N1 and SARS-CoV-2. We also highlight the impact of interspecies transmission of these pandemic viruses on virus evolution and possible prophylactic and therapeutic interventions. Based on information available and presented in this review article, it is important to close monitoring viral zoonosis and viral reverse zoonosis of pandemic strains within a One-Health and One-World approach to mitigate their unforeseen risks, such as virus evolution and resistance to limited prophylactic and therapeutic interventions.

Seroprevalence of Viral Enzootic Diseases in Swine Backyard Farms in Serbia

Contrary to pig farming in developed Western countries, in a large part of the world, pigs are still traditionally kept in small backyard farms, usually for family needs. Their main characteristics are low biosecurity, swill feeding, natural breeding and uncontrolled trade. Given the high number of backyard farms in Serbia and the risk they are thought to pose to intensive pig farming, the main aim of this study was to evaluate the prevalence of major viral diseases of swine among traditionally kept pigs in small holdings with low biosecurity. For this investigation, 222 serum samples from 69 backyard holdings were randomly selected and tested for antibodies to Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome virus (PRRSV), Aujeszky's disease virus (ADV), Porcine Parvovirus (PPV) and Swine influenza Virus (SIV) by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). The herd-level seroprevalence of PRRS, Aujeszky's disease and PPV was 2.9%, 27.5% and 37.7%, respectively. Swine influenza seroconversion was not confirmed in any of the tested holdings. Despite widely distributed PPV and AD in backyard farms in Serbia, almost 50% of them are still negative for all the tested diseases. The backyard farms must be monitored, and owners must be educated as their role in eradication programs and obtaining country-free status may be crucial.

From Snoot to Tail: A Brief Review of Influenza Virus Infection and Immunity in Pigs

Pigs play an important role in influenza A virus (IAV) epidemiology because they support replication of human, avian, and swine origin viruses and act as an IAV reservoir for pigs and other species, including humans. Moreover, novel IAVs with human pandemic potential may be generated in pigs. To minimize the threat of IAVs to human and swine health, it is crucial to understand host defense mechanisms that restrict viral replication and pathology in pigs. In this article, we review IAV strains circulating in the North American swine population, as well as porcine innate and acquired immune responses to IAV, including recent advances achieved through immunological tools developed specifically for swine. Furthermore, we highlight unique aspects of the porcine pulmonary immune system, which warrant consideration when developing vaccines and therapeutics to limit IAV in swine or when using pigs to model human IAV infections.

Existing Evidence for Influenza B Virus Adaptations to Drive Replication in Humans as the Primary Host

Influenza B virus (IBV) is one of the two major types of influenza viruses that circulate each year. Unlike influenza A viruses, IBV does not harbor pandemic potential due to its lack of historical circulation in non-human hosts. Many studies and reviews have highlighted important factors for host determination of influenza A viruses. However, much less is known about the factors driving IBV replication in humans. We hypothesize that similar factors influence the host restriction of IBV. Here, we compile and review the current understanding of host factors crucial for the various stages of the IBV viral replication cycle. While we discovered the research in this area of IBV is limited, we review known host factors that may indicate possible host restriction of IBV to humans. These factors include the IBV hemagglutinin (HA) protein, host nuclear factors, and viral immune evasion proteins. Our review frames the current understanding of IBV adaptations to replication in humans. However, this review is limited by the amount of research previously completed on IBV host determinants and would benefit from additional future research in this area.

Phylogenomic analysis supports Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission between humans and elephants

Introduction

Tuberculosis is an infectious disease caused by a group of acid-fast bacilli known as Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex (MTC), which has a major impact on humans. Transmission of MTC across the human-animal interface has been demonstrated by several studies. However, the reverse zoonotic transmission from humans to animals (zooanthroponosis) has often been neglected.

Methods

In this study, we used Nanopore MinION and Illumina MiSeq approaches to sequence the whole genome of M. tuberculosis strains isolated from two deceased Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) and one human in Chitwan, Nepal. The evolutionary relationships and drug resistance capacity of these strains were assessed using the whole genome data generated by the stand-alone tool Tb-Profiler. Phylogenomic trees were also constructed using a non-synonymous SNP alignment of 2,596 bp, including 94 whole genome sequences representative of the previously described M. tuberculosis lineages from elephants worldwide (lineages 1 and 4) and from humans in Nepal (lineages 1, 2 and 3).

Results and Discussion

The new genomes achieved an average coverage of 99.6%, with an average depth of 55.67x. These M. tuberculosis strains belong to lineage 1 (elephant DG), lineage 2 (elephant PK) and lineage 4 (human), and none of them were found to have drug-resistant variants. The elephant-derived isolates were evolutionarily closely related to human-derived isolates previously described in Nepal, both in lineages 1 and 2, providing additional support for zooanthroponosis or bidirectional transmission between humans and elephants. The human-derived isolate clustered together with other published human isolates from Argentina, Russia and the United Kingdom in the lineage 4 clade. This complex multi-pathogen, multi-host system is challenging and highlights the need for a One Health approach to tuberculosis prevention and control at human-animal interface, particularly in regions where human tuberculosis is highly endemic.

Farm management practices associated with influenza A virus contamination of people working in Midwestern United States swine farms

Indirect transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) contributes to virus spread in pigs. To identify farm management activities with the ability to contaminate farmworkers' hands and clothing that then could be a source of virus spread to other pigs, we conducted a within-farm, prospective IAV surveillance study. Hands and clothes from farmworkers performing the activities of piglet processing, vaccination, or weaning were sampled before and after the activities were performed. Samples were tested by IAV rRT-PCR and virus viability was assessed by cell culture. A multivariate generalized linear model was used to detect associations of the activities with IAV contamination. Of the samples collected for IAV rRT-PCR testing, there were 16% (12/76) collected immediately after processing, 96% (45/48) collected after vaccination, and 94% (29/31) collected after weaning that tested positive. Samples collected immediately after vaccination and weaning, i.e., activities that took place during the peri-weaning period when pigs were about 3 weeks of age, had almost 6 times higher risk of IAV detection and had more samples IAV positive (p-value < 0.0001) than samples collected after processing, i.e., an activity that took place in the first few days of life. Both, hands and clothes had similar contamination rates (46% and 55% respectively, p-value = 0.42) and viable virus was isolated from both. Our results indicate that activities that involve the handling of infected piglets close to weaning age represent a significant risk for IAV dissemination due to the high level of IAV contamination found in farmworkers' hands and coveralls involved in the activities. Biosecurity protocols that include hand sanitation and changing clothing after performing activities with a high-risk of influenza contamination should be recommended to farmworkers to control and limit the mechanical spread of IAV between pigs.

An Orf-Virus (ORFV)-Based Vector Expressing a Consensus H1 Hemagglutinin Provides Protection against Diverse Swine Influenza Viruses

Influenza A viruses (IAV-S) belonging to the H1 subtype are endemic in swine worldwide. Antigenic drift and antigenic shift lead to a substantial antigenic diversity in circulating IAV-S strains. As a result, the most commonly used vaccines based on whole inactivated viruses (WIVs) provide low protection against divergent H1 strains due to the mismatch between the vaccine virus strain and the circulating one. Here, a consensus coding sequence of the full-length of HA from H1 subtype was generated in silico after alignment of the sequences from IAV-S isolates obtained from public databases and was delivered to pigs using the Orf virus (ORFV) vector platform. The immunogenicity and protective efficacy of the resulting ORFVΔ121conH1 recombinant virus were evaluated against divergent IAV-S strains in piglets. Virus shedding after intranasal/intratracheal challenge with two IAV-S strains was assessed by real-time RT-PCR and virus titration. Viral genome copies and infectious virus load were reduced in nasal secretions of immunized animals. Flow cytometry analysis showed that the frequency of T helper/memory cells, as well as cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs), were significantly higher in the peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) of the vaccinated groups compared to unvaccinated animals when they were challenged with a pandemic strain of IAV H1N1 (CA/09). Interestingly, the percentage of T cells was higher in the bronchoalveolar lavage of vaccinated animals in relation to unvaccinated animals in the groups challenged with a H1N1 from the gamma clade (OH/07). In summary, delivery of the consensus HA from the H1 IAV-S subtype by the parapoxvirus ORFV vector decreased shedding of infectious virus and viral load of IAV-S in nasal secretions and induced cellular protective immunity against divergent influenza viruses in swine.

Evaluation of early single dose vaccination on swine influenza A virus transmission in piglets: From experimental data to mechanistic modelling

Swine influenza A virus (swIAV) is a major pathogen affecting pigs with a huge economic impact and potentially zoonotic. Epidemiological studies in endemically infected farms permitted to identify critical factors favoring on-farm persistence, among which maternally-derived antibodies (MDAs). Vaccination is commonly practiced in breeding herds and might be used for immunization of growing pigs at weaning. Althoughinterference between MDAs and vaccination was reported in young piglets, its impact on swIAV transmission was not yet quantified. To this aim, this study reports on a transmission experiment in piglets with or without MDAs, vaccinated with a single dose injection at four weeks of age, and challenged 17 days post-vaccination. To transpose small-scale experiments to real-life situation, estimated parameters were used in a simulation tool to assess their influence at the herd level. Based on a thorough follow-up of the infection chain during the experiment, the transmission of the swIAV challenge strain was highly dependent on the MDA status of the pigs when vaccinated. MDA-positive vaccinated animals showed a direct transmission rate 3.6-fold higher than the one obtained in vaccinated animals without MDAs, estimated to 1.2. Vaccination nevertheless reduced significantly the contribution of airborne transmission when compared with previous estimates obtained in unvaccinated animals. The integration of parameter estimates in a large-scale simulation model, representing a typical farrow-to-finish pig herd, evidenced an extended persistence of viral spread when vaccination of sows and single dose vaccination of piglets was hypothesized. When extinction was quasi-systematic at year 5 post-introduction in the absence of sow vaccination but with single dose early vaccination of piglets, the extinction probability fell down to 33% when batch-to-batch vaccination was implemented both in breeding herd and weaned piglets. These results shed light on a potential adverse effect of single dose vaccination in MDA-positive piglets, which might lead to longer persistence of the SwIAV at the herd level.

Cold-passaged isolates and bat-swine influenza a chimeric viruses as modified live-attenuated vaccines against influenza a viruses in pigs

Swine influenza A virus (swIAV) infections in pig populations cause considerable morbidity and economic losses. Frequent reverse zoonotic incursions of human IAV boost reassortment opportunities with authentic porcine and avian-like IAV in swine herds potentially enhancing zoonotic and even pre-pandemic potential. Vaccination using adjuvanted inactivated full virus vaccines is frequently used in attempting control of swIAV infections. Accelerated antigenic drift of swIAV in large swine holdings and interference of maternal antibodies with vaccine in piglets can compromise these efforts. Potentially more efficacious modified live-attenuated vaccines (MLVs) bear the risk of reversion of MLV to virulence. Here we evaluated new MLV candidates based on cold-passaged swIAV or on reassortment-incompetent bat-IAV-swIAV chimeric viruses. Serial cold-passaging of various swIAV subtypes did not yield unambiguously temperature-sensitive mutants although safety studies in mice and pigs suggested some degree of attenuation. Chimeric bat-swIAV expressing the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of an avian-like H1N1, in contrast, proved to be safe in mice and pigs, and a single nasal inoculation induced protective immunity against homologous challenge in pigs. Reassortant-incompetent chimeric bat-swIAV vaccines could aid in reducing the amount of swIAV circulating in pig populations, thereby increasing animal welfare, limiting economic losses and lowering the risk of zoonotic swIAV transmission.

Possible bidirectional human-swine and subsequent human-human transmission of influenza virus A(H1N1)/2009 in Japan

In 2019, sows at a swine farm in Japan showed influenza-like illness (ILI) shortly after contact with an employee that exhibited ILI. Subsequently, a veterinarian became sick shortly after examining the sows and was diagnosed with influenza A virus (IAV) infection. Then, her family also contracted the infection. Subsequently, Pandemic A(H1N1)2009 viruses were isolated from all samples obtained from the sows, veterinarian and her family. Whole-genome analysis of the isolates confirmed that the viruses belonged to the same lineage (6B.1A) and the genome sequences obtained from all of the isolates were almost identical to each other. Furthermore, an epidemiological survey revealed no contact between veterinarians or their families and influenza patients prior to the onset of illness. These results strongly indicated a case of bidirectional infection between humans and sows. At the same time, we found a few unique mutations in the IAV genomes corresponding to the host species. The mutations that occurred in the virus after it was transferred from the farm worker to the sows were not observed in the humans infected from the sows, probably as a result of the mutations reverting to the original nucleotides. These results demonstrate that the bidirectional transmission of IAV is a potential risk for the next pandemic outbreak due to the emergence of new mutant strains.

Simulating the Commercial Implementation of Gene-Editing for Influenza A Virus Resistance in Pigs: An Economic and Genetic Analysis

The development of swine Influenza A Virus resistance along with genetic technologies could complement current control measures to help to improve animal welfare standards and the economic efficiency of pig production. We have created a simulation model to assess the genetic and economic implications of various gene-editing methods that could be implemented in a commercial, multi-tiered swine breeding system. Our results demonstrate the length of the gene-editing program was negatively associated with genetic progress in commercial pigs and that the time required to reach fixation of resistance alleles was reduced if the efficiency of gene-editing is greater. The simulations included the resistance conferred in a digenic model, the inclusion of genetic mosaicism in progeny, and the effects of selection accuracy. In all scenarios, the level of mosaicism had a greater effect on the time required to reach resistance allele fixation and the genetic progress of the herd than gene-editing efficiency and zygote survival. The economic analysis highlights that selection accuracy will not affect the duration of gene-editing and the investment required compared to the effects of gene-editing-associated mosaicism and the swine Influenza A Virus control strategy on farms. These modelling results provide novel insights into the economic and genetic implications of targeting two genes in a commercial pig gene-editing program and the effects of selection accuracy and mosaicism.

Zoonotic Threat of G4 Genotype Eurasian Avian-Like Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Viruses, China, 2020

We investigated genetic and biologic characteristics of 2 Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza viruses from pigs in China that belong to the predominant G4 genotype. One swine isolate exhibited strikingly great homology to contemporaneous human Eurasian avian-like H1N1 isolates, preferential binding to the human-type receptor, and vigorous replication in mice without adaptation.

Are pigs overestimated as a source of zoonotic influenza viruses?

Background

Swine influenza caused by influenza A viruses (IAV) directly affects respiratory health and indirectly impairs reproduction rates in pigs causing production losses. In Europe, and elsewhere, production systems have intensified featuring fewer holdings but, in turn, increased breeding herd and litter sizes. This seems to foster swine IAV (swIAV) infections with respect to the entrenchment within and spread between holdings. Disease management of swine influenza is difficult and relies on biosecurity and vaccination measures. Recently discovered and widely proliferating forms of self-sustaining modes of swIAV infections in large swine holdings challenge these preventive concepts by generating vaccine-escape mutants in rolling circles of infection.

Main body

The most recent human IAV pandemic of 2009 rooted at least partly in IAV of porcine origin highlighting the zoonotic potential of swIAV. Pigs constitute a mixing vessel of IAV from different species including avian and human hosts. However, other host species such as turkey and quail but also humans themselves may also act in this way; thus, pigs are not essentially required for the generation of IAV reassortants with a multispecies origin. Since 1918, all human pandemic influenza viruses except the H2N2 virus of 1958 have been transmitted in a reverse zoonotic mode from human into swine populations. Swine populations act as long-term reservoirs of these viruses. Human-derived IAV constitute a major driver of swIAV epidemiology in pigs. Swine-to-human IAV transmissions occurred rarely and mainly sporadically as compared to avian-to-human spill-over events of avian IAV. Yet, new swIAV variants that harbor zoonotic components continue to be detected. This increases the risk that such components might eventually reassort into viruses with pandemic potential.

Conclusions

Domestic pig populations should not be globally stigmatized as the only or most important reservoir of potentially zoonotic IAV. The likely emergence from swine of the most recent human IAV pandemic in 2009, however, emphasized the principal risks of swine populations in which IAV circulate unimpededly. Implementation of regular and close-meshed IAV surveillance of domestic swine populations to follow the dynamics of swIAV evolution is clearly demanded. Improved algorithms for directly inferring zoonotic potential from whole IAV genome sequences as well as improved vaccines are still being sought.

Evidence of influenza A infection and risk of transmission between pigs and farmworkers

Interspecies transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) between pigs and people represents a threat to both animal and public health. To better understand the risks of influenza transmission at the human–animal interface, we evaluated 1) the rate of IAV detection in swine farmworkers before and after work during two human influenza seasons, 2) assessed risk factors associated with IAV detection in farmworkers and 3) characterized the genetic sequences of IAV detected in both workers and pigs. Of 58 workers providing nasal passage samples during 8‐week periods during the 2017/18 and 2018/19 influenza seasons, 33 (57%) tested positive by rRT‐PCR at least once. Sixteen (27%) workers tested positive before work and 24 (41%) after work. At the sample level, 58 of 1,785 nasal swabs (3.2%) tested rRT‐PCR positive, of which 20 of 898 (2.2%) were collected prior to work and 38 of 887 (4.3%) after work. Although farmworkers were more likely to test positive at the end of the working day (OR = 1.98, 95% CI 1.14–3.41), there were no influenza‐like illness (ILI) symptoms, or other risk indicators, associated with IAV detection before or after reporting to work. Direct whole‐genome sequencing from samples obtained from worker nasal passages indicated evidence of infection of a worker with pandemic 2009 H1N1 of human‐origin IAV (H1‐pdm 1A 3.3.2) when reporting to work, and exposure of several workers to a swine‐origin IAV (H1‐alpha 1A 1.1) circulating in the pigs on the farm where they were employed. Our study provides evidence of 1) risk of IAV transmission between pigs and people, 2) pandemic H1N1 IAV infected workers reporting to work and 3) workers exposed to swine harbouring swine‐origin IAV in their nasal passages temporarily. Overall, our results emphasize the need to implement surveillance and transmission preventive protocols at the pig/human interface.

Human infection with a reassortant swine-origin influenza A(H1N2)v virus in Taiwan, 2021

Background

Influenza A virus infections occur in different species, causing mild-to-severe symptoms that lead to a heavy disease burden. H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 are major subtypes of swine influenza A viruses in pigs and occasionally infect humans.

Methods

A case infected by novel influenza virus was found through laboratory surveillance system for influenza viruses. Clinical specimens were tested by virus culture and/or real-time RT–PCR. The virus was identified and characterized by gene sequencing and phylogenetic analysis.

Results

In 2021, for the first time in Taiwan, an influenza A(H1N2)v virus was isolated from a 5-year old girl who was suffering from fever, runny nose and cough. The isolated virus was designated A/Taiwan/1/2021(H1N2)v. Full-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analyses revealed that A/Taiwan/1/2021(H1N2)v is a novel reassortant virus containing hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene segments derived from swine influenza A(H1N2) viruses that may have been circulating in Taiwan for decades, and the other 6 internal genes (PB2, PB2, PA, NP, M and NS) are from human A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses.

Conclusion

Notably, the HA and NA genes of A/Taiwan/1/2021(H1N2)v separately belong to specific clades that are unique for Taiwanese swine and were proposed to be introduced from humans in different time periods. Bidirectional transmission between humans and swine contributes to influenza virus diversity and poses the next pandemic threat.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12985-022-01794-2.

Review of genome sequencing technologies in molecular characterization of influenza A viruses in swine

The rapidly evolving antigenic diversity of influenza A virus (IAV) genomes in swine makes it imperative to detect emerging novel strains and track their circulation. We analyzed in our review the sequencing technologies used for subtyping and characterizing swine IAV genomes. Google Scholar, PubMed, and International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC) database searches identified 216 studies that have utilized Sanger, second-, and third-generation sequencing techniques to subtype and characterize swine IAV genomes up to 31 March 2021. Sanger dideoxy sequencing was by far the most widely used sequencing technique for generating either full-length (43.0%) or partial (31.0%) IAV genomes in swine globally; however, in the last decade, other sequencing platforms such as Illumina have emerged as serious competitors for the generation of whole-genome sequences of swine IAVs. Although partial HA and NA gene sequences were sufficient to determine swine IAV subtypes, whole-genome sequences were critical for determining reassortments and identifying unusual or less frequently occurring IAV subtypes. The combination of Sanger and second-generation sequencing technologies also greatly improved swine IAV characterization. In addition, the rapidly evolving third-generation sequencing platform, MinION, appears promising for on-site, real-time sequencing of complete swine IAV genomes. With a higher raw read accuracy, the use of the MinION could enhance the scalability of swine IAV testing in the field and strengthen the swine IAV disease outbreak response.

Selected Livestock-Associated Zoonoses as a Growing Challenge for Public Health

The aim of this paper is to review the most significant livestock-associated zoonoses. Human and animal health are intimately connected. This idea has been known for more than a century but now it has gained special importance because of the increasing threat from zoonoses. Zoonosis is defined as any infection naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans. As the frequency and prevalence of zoonotic diseases increase worldwide, they become a real threat to public health. In addition, many of the newly discovered diseases have a zoonotic origin. Due to globalization and urbanization, some of these diseases have already spread all over the world, caused by the international flow of goods, people, and animals. However, special attention should be paid to farm animals since, apart from the direct contact, humans consume their products, such as meat, eggs, and milk. Therefore, zoonoses such as salmonellosis, campylobacteriosis, tuberculosis, swine and avian influenza, Q fever, brucellosis, STEC infections, and listeriosis are crucial for both veterinary and human medicine. Consequently, in the suspicion of any zoonoses outbreak, the medical and veterinary services should closely cooperate to protect the public health.

Pathogenicity of novel reassortant Eurasian avian-like H1N1 influenza virus in pigs

Reassortant Eurasian avian-like (EA) H1N1 virus, possessing 2009 pandemic (pdm/09) and triple-reassortant (TR)-derived internal genes, namely G4 genotype, has replaced the G1 genotype EA H1N1 virus (all the genes were of EA origin) and become predominant in swine populations in China. Understanding the pathogenicity of G4 viruses in pigs is of great importance for disease control. Here, we conducted comprehensive analyses of replication and pathogenicity of G4 and G1 EA H1N1 viruses in pigs. G4 virus exhibited enhanced replication, increased duration of virus shedding, and caused more severe respiratory lesions in pigs compared with G1 virus. G4 virus, with viral ribonucleoprotein (vRNP) complex genes of pdm/09 origin, exhibited higher levels of nuclear accumulation and higher polymerase activity, which is essential for improved replication of G4 virus. These findings indicate that G4 virus poses a great threat to both swine industry and public health, and control measures should be urgently implemented.

Animal board invited review: Risks of zoonotic disease emergence at the interface of wildlife and livestock systems

The ongoing coronavirus disease 19s pandemic has yet again demonstrated the importance of the human-animal interface in the emergence of zoonotic diseases, and in particular the role of wildlife and livestock species as potential hosts and virus reservoirs. As most diseases emerge out of the human-animal interface, a better understanding of the specific drivers and mechanisms involved is crucial to prepare for future disease outbreaks. Interactions between wildlife and livestock systems contribute to the emergence of zoonotic diseases, especially in the face of globalization, habitat fragmentation and destruction and climate change. As several groups of viruses and bacteria are more likely to emerge, we focus on pathogenic viruses of the Bunyavirales, Coronaviridae, Flaviviridae, Orthomyxoviridae, and Paramyxoviridae, as well as bacterial species including Mycobacterium sp., Brucella sp., Bacillus anthracis and Coxiella burnetii. Noteworthy, it was difficult to predict the drivers of disease emergence in the past, even for well-known pathogens. Thus, an improved surveillance in hotspot areas and the availability of fast, effective, and adaptable control measures would definitely contribute to preparedness. We here propose strategies to mitigate the risk of emergence and/or re-emergence of prioritized pathogens to prevent future epidemics.

The pig as a medical model for acquired respiratory diseases and dysfunctions: An immunological perspective

By definition no model is perfect, and this also holds for biology and health sciences. In medicine, murine models are, and will be indispensable for long, thanks to their reasonable cost and huge choice of transgenic strains and molecular tools. On the other side, non-human primates remain the best animal models although their use is limited because of financial and obvious ethical reasons. In the field of respiratory diseases, specific clinical models such as sheep and cotton rat for bronchiolitis, or ferret and Syrian hamster for influenza and Covid-19, have been successfully developed, however, in these species, the toolbox for biological analysis remains scarce. In this view the porcine medical model is appearing as the third, intermediate, choice, between murine and primate. Herein we would like to present the pros and cons of pig as a model for acquired respiratory conditions, through an immunological point of view. Indeed, important progresses have been made in pig immunology during the last decade that allowed the precise description of immune molecules and cell phenotypes and functions. These progresses might allow the use of pig as clinical model of human respiratory diseases but also as a species of interest to perform basic research explorations.

Current and prospective control strategies of influenza A virus in swine

BACKGROUND

Influenza A Viruses (IAV) are endemic pathogens of significant concern in humans and multiple keystone livestock species. Widespread morbidity in swine herds negatively impacts animal welfare standards and economic performance whilst human IAV pandemics have emerged from pigs on multiple occasions. To combat the rising prevalence of swine IAV there must be effective control strategies available.

MAIN BODY

The most basic form of IAV control on swine farms is through good animal husbandry practices and high animal welfare standards. To control inter-herd transmission, biosecurity considerations such as quarantining of pigs and implementing robust health and safety systems for workers help to reduce the likelihood of swine IAV becoming endemic. Closely complementing the physical on-farm practices are IAV surveillance programs. Epidemiological data is critical in understanding regional distribution and variation to assist in determining an appropriate response to outbreaks and understanding the nature of historical swine IAV epidemics and zoonoses. Medical intervention in pigs is restricted to vaccination, a measure fraught with the intrinsic difficulties of mounting an immune response against a highly mutable virus. It is the best available tool for controlling IAV in swine but is far from being a perfect solution due to its unreliable efficacy and association with an enhanced respiratory disease. Because IAV generally has low mortality rates there is a reticence in the uptake of vaccination. Novel genetic technologies could be a complementary strategy for IAV control in pigs that confers broad-acting resistance. Transgenic pigs with IAV resistance are useful as models, however the complexity of these reaching the consumer market limits them to research models. More promising are gene-editing approaches to prevent viral exploitation of host proteins and modern vaccine technologies that surpass those currently available.

CONCLUSION

Using the suite of IAV control measures that are available for pigs effectively we can improve the economic productivity of pig farming whilst improving on-farm animal welfare standards and avoid facing the extensive social and financial costs of a pandemic. Fighting 'Flu in pigs will help mitigate the very real threat of a human pandemic emerging, increase security of the global food system and lead to healthier pigs.

Detection and Characterization of Swine Origin Influenza A(H1N1) Pandemic 2009 Viruses in Humans following Zoonotic Transmission

Human-to-swine transmission of seasonal influenza viruses has led to sustained human-like influenza viruses circulating in the U.S. swine population. While some reverse zoonotic-origin viruses adapt and become enzootic in swine, nascent reverse zoonoses may result in virus detections that are difficult to classify as "swine-origin" or "human-origin" due to the genetic similarity of circulating viruses. This is the case for human-origin influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 2009 (pdm09) viruses detected in pigs following numerous reverse zoonosis events since the 2009 pandemic. We report the identification of two human infections with A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses originating from swine hosts and classify them as "swine-origin" variant influenza viruses based on phylogenetic analysis and sequence comparison methods. Phylogenetic analyses of viral genomes from two cases revealed these viruses were reassortants containing A(H1N1)pdm09 hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes with genetic combinations derived from the triple reassortant internal gene cassette. Follow-up investigations determined that one individual had direct exposure to swine in the week preceding illness onset, while another did not report swine exposure. The swine-origin A(H1N1) variant cases were resolved by full genome sequence comparison of the variant viruses to swine influenza genomes. However, if reassortment does not result in the acquisition of swine-associated genes and swine virus genomic sequences are not available from the exposure source, future cases may not be discernible. We have developed a pipeline that performs maximum likelihood analyses, a k-mer-based set difference algorithm, and random forest algorithms to identify swine-associated sequences in the hemagglutinin gene to differentiate between human-origin and swine-origin A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses.IMPORTANCE Influenza virus infects a wide range of hosts, resulting in illnesses that vary from asymptomatic cases to severe pneumonia and death. Viral transfer can occur between human and nonhuman hosts, resulting in human and nonhuman origin viruses circulating in novel hosts. In this work, we have identified the first case of a swine-origin influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus resulting in a human infection. This shows that these viruses not only circulate in swine hosts, but are continuing to evolve and distinguish themselves from previously circulating human-origin influenza viruses. The development of techniques for distinguishing human-origin and swine-origin viruses are necessary for the continued surveillance of influenza viruses. We show that unique genetic signatures can differentiate circulating swine-associated strains from circulating human-associated strains of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and these signatures can be used to enhance surveillance of swine-origin influenza.

Reverse Zoonosis of COVID-19: Lessons From the 2009 Influenza Pandemic

Over the past decade, pandemics caused by pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in 2009 and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in 2019 have emerged. Both are high-impact respiratory pathogens originating from animals. Their wide distribution in the human population subsequently results in an increased risk of human-to-animal transmission: reverse zoonosis. Although there have only been rare reports of reverse zoonosis events associated with the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic from SARS-CoV-2 so far, comparison with the pH1N1 influenza pandemic can provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of such events for public and animal health. The results of our review suggest that similar factors contribute to successful crossing of the host species barriers in both pandemics. Specific risk factors include sufficient interaction between infected humans and recipient animals, suitability of the animal host factors for productive virus infection, and suitability of the animal host population for viral persistence. Of particular concern is virus spread to susceptible animal species, in which group housing and contact network structure could potentially result in an alternative virus reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can take place. Virus exposure in high-density populations could allow sustained transmission in susceptible animal species. Identification of the risk factors and serological surveillance in SARS-CoV-2-susceptible animal species that are group-housed should help reduce the threat from reverse zoonosis of COVID-19.

A Century of Swine Influenza: Is It Really Just about the Pigs?

Influenza viruses (IV) are one of the major threats to human and animal health worldwide due to the variety of species they affect. Pigs play an important role in IV ecology as the "mixing vessel," since they can be infected by swine, avian and human IV, allowing the appearance of new subtypes. Human viruses originated in swine are known as IV of swine origin or swine influenza virus (SwIV) variants. In this study, we identified knowledge tendencies of SwIV and assessed potential bias in the literature caused by these variants. We identified the most mentioned SwIV variants and manually reviewed the literature to determine the number of publications applying the whole influenza nomenclature, a partial nomenclature, only the subtype or mixed terminology, along with the proportion of articles in which the GenBank ID number was available. We observed that the 2009 H1N1 human pandemic created an important bias in SwIV research driven by an increase in human publications on the IV of swine origin. H1N1 is the most studied subtype for swine and humans, followed by H3N2. We found differences between the nomenclatures applied, where partial classifications were slightly more common. Finally, from all the publications, only 25% stated the GenBank ID of the sequence studied. This review represents the most complete exploration of trends in SwIV knowledge to date and will serve as a guidance for future search strategies in SwIV research.

Swine influenza virus: Current status and challenge

Since swine influenza virus was first isolated in 1930, it has become endemic in pigs worldwide. Although large amount of swine influenza vaccines has been used in swine industry, swine influenza still cannot be efficiently controlled and has been an important economic disease for swine industry. The high diversity and varied distribution of different subtypes and genotypes of swine influenza viruses circulating in pigs globally is a major challenge to produce broadly effective vaccines and control disease. Importantly, swine influenza virus is able to cross species barrier to infect humans and even caused influenza pandemic in 2009. Herein, current status and challenge of swine influenza viruses is reviewed and discussed.

A Systematic Review Analyzing the Prevalence and Circulation of Influenza Viruses in Swine Population Worldwide

The global anxiety and a significant threat to public health due to the current COVID-19 pandemic reiterate the need for active surveillance for the zoonotic virus diseases of pandemic potential. Influenza virus due to its wide host range and zoonotic potential poses such a significant threat to public health. Swine serve as a “mixing vessel” for influenza virus reassortment and evolution which as a result may facilitate the emergence of new strains or subtypes of zoonotic potential. In this context, the currently available scientific data hold a high significance to unravel influenza virus epidemiology and evolution. With this objective, the current systematic review summarizes the original research articles and case reports of all the four types of influenza viruses reported in swine populations worldwide. A total of 281 articles were found eligible through screening of PubMed and Google Scholar databases and hence were included in this systematic review. The highest number of research articles (n = 107) were reported from Asia, followed by Americas (n = 97), Europe (n = 55), Africa (n = 18), and Australia (n = 4). The H1N1, H1N2, H3N2, and A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were the most common influenza A virus subtypes reported in swine in most countries across the globe, however, few strains of influenza B, C, and D viruses were also reported in certain countries. Multiple reports of the avian influenza virus strains documented in the last two decades in swine in China, the United States, Canada, South Korea, Nigeria, and Egypt provided the evidence of interspecies transmission of influenza viruses from birds to swine. Inter-species transmission of equine influenza virus H3N8 from horse to swine in China expanded the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses. Additionally, numerous reports of the double and triple-reassortant strains which emerged due to reassortments among avian, human, and swine strains within swine further increased the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses. These findings are alarming hence active surveillance should be in place to prevent future influenza pandemics.

Virus persistence in pig herds led to successive reassortment events between swine and human influenza A viruses, resulting in the emergence of a novel triple-reassortant swine influenza virus

This report describes the detection of a triple reassortant swine influenza A virus of H1_avN2 subtype. It evolved from an avian-like swine H1_avN1 that first acquired the N2 segment from a seasonal H3N2, then the M segment from a 2009 pandemic H1N1, in two reassortments estimated to have occurred 10 years apart. This study illustrates how recurrent influenza infections increase the co-infection risk and facilitate evolutionary jumps by successive gene exchanges. It recalls the importance of appropriate biosecurity measures inside holdings to limit virus persistence and interspecies transmissions, which both contribute to the emergence of new potentially zoonotic viruses.