Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?

Episodic representations can be entertained either as "remembered" or "imagined"-as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a "cognitive gadget"-a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive "feelings of remembering" from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as "I was there" or "I witnessed it myself." We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.

Rethinking the distinction between episodic and semantic memory: Insights from the past, present, and future

On the 50th anniversary of Tulving's introduction of the celebrated distinction between episodic and semantic memory, it seems more than fitting to revisit his proposal in light of recent conceptual and methodological advances in the field. This Special Issue of Memory & Cognition brings together researchers doing cutting-edge work at the intersection between episodic and semantic memory to showcase studies directly probing this psychological distinction, as well as articles that seek to provide conceptual and theoretical accounts to understand their interaction. The 14 articles presented here highlight the need to critically examine the way in which we conceptualize not only the relationship between episodic and semantic memory, but also the interplay between declarative and non-declarative memory, and the myriad implications of such conceptual changes. In many ways, we suggest this Special Issue might serve as a call to action for our field, inspiring future work to challenge pre-existing conceptions and stimulate new directions in this fast-moving field.

Neuroscience of Object Relations in Health and Disorder: A Proposal for an Integrative Model

Recent advances in the neuroscience of episodic memory provide a framework to integrate object relations theory, a psychoanalytic model of mind development, with potential neural mechanisms. Object relations are primordial cognitive-affective units of the mind derived from survival- and safety-level experiences with caretakers during phase-sensitive periods of infancy and toddlerhood. Because these are learning experiences, their neural substrate likely involves memory, here affect-enhanced episodic memory. Inaugural object relations are encoded by the hippocampus-amygdala synaptic plasticity, and systems-consolidated by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Self- and object-mental representations, extracted from these early experiences, are at first dichotomized by contradictory affects evoked by frustrating and rewarding interactions ("partial object relations"). Such affective dichotomization appears to be genetically hardwired the amygdala. Intrinsic propensity of mPFC to form schematic frameworks for episodic memories may pilot non-conscious integration of dichotomized mental representations in neonates and infants. With the emergence of working memory in toddlers, an activated self- and object-representation of a particular valence can be juxtaposed with its memorized opposites creating a balanced cognitive-affective frame (conscious "integration of object relations"). Specific events of object relations are forgotten but nevertheless profoundly influence the mental future of the individual, acting (i) as implicit schema-affect templates that regulate attentional priorities, relevance, and preferential assimilation of new information based on past experience, and (ii) as basic units of experience that are, under normal circumstances, integrated as attractors or "focal points" for interactive self-organization of functional brain networks that underlie the mind. A failure to achieve integrated object relations is predictive of poor adult emotional and social outcomes, including personality disorder. Cognitive, cellular-, and systems-neuroscience of episodic memory appear to support key postulates of object relations theory and help elucidate neural mechanisms of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Derived through the dual prism of psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the gained insights may offer new directions to enhance mental health and improve treatment of multiple forms of psychopathology.

Overview of schizophrenia research and treatment in Pakistan

Mental health is the most neglected health sector in Pakistan, and the majority of citizens have limited or no access to primary and secondary psychiatric services. The incidence of schizophrenia (SCZ) has increased at an alarming rate in Pakistan, relative to that of other psychiatric disorders. While numerous studies have investigated SCZ, few have addressed the issue about the Pakistani population. In the present review, the researchers discuss current data integral to the prevalence, pathophysiology, and molecular genetics of SCZ; treatment approaches to the disease; and patient responses to drugs prescribed for SCZ in Pakistan. Most Pakistani patients exhibit poor responses to antipsychotic drugs. Based on our review, the researchers hypothesize that genetic dissimilarities between Pakistani and Western populations contribute to such poor responses. Consequently, an understanding of such genetic differences and the provision of personalized treatment may simultaneously aid in improving SCZ treatment in Pakistan.

Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales

The ability to decouple from the present environment and explore other times is a central feature of the human mind. Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that the personal past and future is represented at multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that span seconds. Here, I review this evidence and propose a theoretical framework for understanding mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical layers of autobiographical representations. On this view, past and future thoughts rely on two main systems-event simulation and autobiographical knowledge-that allow us to represent experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual knowledge of the content and structure of our life. The neural basis of this cognitive architecture is discussed, emphasizing the possible role of the medial pFC in integrating layers of autobiographical representations in the service of mental time travel.

Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.

Relationships Between Identity, Well-Being, and Willingness to Sacrifice in Personal and Collective Favorite Places: The Mediating Role of Well-Being

In line with research indicating positive associations between well-being and personal and collective people-place bonding, and that collectivistic compared to individualistic commitment may have stronger associations with pro-environmental behavior, we investigated relationships between identity, well-being, and willingness to sacrifice (type of pro-environmental behavior) in personal and collective favorite places. A total of 884 respondents, living in three Swedish municipalities, participated in this study. In line with the hypotheses, we showed congruent positive relationships between place-related: (1) personal identity and personal well-being; (2) collective identity and collective well-being, (3) collective identity and collective willingness to sacrifice; and (4) an incongruent positive association between collective identity and personal willingness to sacrifice. Additionally, a significant role of well-being in mediating the identity → willingness to sacrifice relationship was reported, suggesting that our willingness to pay higher taxes and prices and to accept cuts in standard of living in order to protect our personal and collective favorite places might be accounted for partly by how we feel visiting these places.

Quo vadis 'episodic memory'? - Past, present, and perspective

The term 'episodic memory' was coined by Endel Tulving, who also created a classification in several memory systems. This classification is presented, and it is described which predecessors existed for the partition of memory into systems. The 'episodic memory system' is discussed as being in general equivalent with the 'episodic-autobiographical memory system'. It is seen as an emotionally colorized system. A special paragraph is devoted to the 'perceptual memory system', as this was not included in Tulving's previous schemes of memory systems. More recent sub-categorizations of the 'episodic memory system' are presented and a perspective on the future of the episodic memory system is developed.

Evidence of relational retrieval, even in the absence of the relational eye movement effect (REME)

Eye movements indicate relational memory retrieval by disproportional viewing of a matching stimulus compared to non-matching stimuli after a pair learning study phase (the REME). Experiment 1 showed that the magnitude of the eye movement effect is linked to the subjective confidence level of the responses and we could not find evidence of the REME in incorrect responses, where participants lack conscious recollection. In experiment 2 we used a no-choice task, where participants were instructed to learn the test displays after they have completed a pair learning study phase. The REME only appeared in those participants, who could spontaneously report their relational retrieval (aware group). Meanwhile both aware and unaware participants demonstrated evidence of relational retrieval in a new eye movement measure. Taken together, we demonstrated that the REME is not necessary for retrieval and in both of our experiments the emergence of the REME was associated with conscious access.

Neural hypersensitivity to pleasant touch in women remitted from anorexia nervosa

Interoception, or the sensing and integration of bodily state signals, has been implicated in anorexia nervosa (AN), given that the hallmark symptoms involve food restriction and body image disturbance. Here we focus on brain response to the anticipation and experience of affective interoceptive stimuli. Women remitted from AN (RAN; N = 18) and healthy comparison women (CW; N = 26) underwent a pleasant affective touch paradigm consisting of gentle strokes with a soft brush administered to the forearm or palm during functional neuroimaging. RAN had a lower brain response relative to CW during anticipation of touch, but a greater response when experiencing touch in the right ventral mid-insula. In RAN, this reduced anticipatory response was associated with higher levels of harm avoidance. Exploratory analyses in RAN also suggested that lower response during touch anticipation was associated with greater body dissatisfaction and higher perceived touch intensity ratings. This reduced responsivity to the anticipation of pleasant affective interoceptive stimuli in association with higher harm avoidance, along with an elevated response to the experience of touch, suggests an impaired ability in AN to predict and interpret incoming physiological stimuli. Impaired interoception may thus impact one's sense of self, thereby supporting observations of disturbed body image and avoidance of affective and social stimuli. Therapeutic approaches that help AN to better anticipate and interpret salient affective stimuli or improve tolerance of interoceptive experiences may be an important addition to current interventions.

What is it to remember?

In response to the commentaries, we clarify and defend our characterization of both the nature and function of episodic memory. Regarding the nature of episodic memory, we extend the distinction between event and episodic memory and discuss the relational role of episodic memory. We also address arguments against our characterization of autonoesis and argue that, while self-referential, it needs to be distinguished from an agentive notion of self. Regarding the function of episodic memory, we review arguments about the relation between future mental time travel and memory veridicality; clarify the relation between autonoesis, veridicality, and confidence; and finally discuss the role of episodic memory in diachronic commitments.

Fractionating controlled memory processes and recall of context in recognition memory: a case report

Recollection has been described as both a recognition memory judgment requiring cognitive control and the ability to retrieve contextual information about a prior occurrence. At the core of this article is the question whether or not these two subcomponents of recollection are dissociable in amnesia. In three experiments, we explored the influence of exclusion task instructions on performance in a single case (CJ), with the view to understand the relative contributions of control and source memory to recognition memory decisions. First, contrasting findings were obtained between tasks requiring strategic control or source reports. Second, even though CJ displayed some residual source memory relative to the ability to strategically control this information, his source memory capacity was time-limited. Our findings resonate with the novel proposal that recollection draws heavily upon working memory resources, and provide an example of how amnesic patients might utilize residual working memory capacity to solve episodic memory tasks.

Self-grounding visual, auditory and olfactory autobiographical memories

Given that autobiographical memory provides a cognitive foundation for the self, we investigated the relative importance of visual, auditory and olfactory autobiographical memories for the self. Thirty subjects, with a mean age of 35.4years, participated in a study involving a three×three within-subject design containing nine different types of autobiographical memory cues: pictures, sounds and odors presented with neutral, positive and negative valences. It was shown that visual compared to auditory and olfactory autobiographical memories involved higher cognitive and emotional constituents for the self. Furthermore, there was a trend showing positive autobiographical memories to increase their proportion to both cognitive and emotional components of the self, from olfactory to auditory to visually cued autobiographical memories; but, yielding a reverse trend for negative autobiographical memories. Finally, and independently of modality, positive affective states were shown to be more involved in autobiographical memory than negative ones.

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

Relationships between Personal and Collective Place Identity and Well-Being in Mountain Communities

The aim was to investigate the relationships between landscape-related personal and collective identity and well-being of residents living in a Swedish mountain county (N = 850). It was shown that their most valued mountain activities were viewing and experiencing nature and landscape, outdoor recreation, rest and leisure, and socializing with friends/family. Qualitative analyses showed that the most valued aspects of the sites were landscape and outdoor restoration for personal favorite sites, and tourism and alpine for collective favorite sites. According to quantitative analyses the stronger the attachment/closeness/belonging (emotional component of place identity) residents felt to favorite personal and collective sites the more well-being they perceived when visiting these places. Similarly, the more remembrance, thinking and mental travel (cognitive component of place identity) residents directed to these sites the more well-being they perceived in these places. In both types of sites well-being was more strongly predicted by emotional than cognitive component of place-identity. All this indicates the importance of person-place bonds in beneficial experiences of the outdoors, over and above simply being in outdoor environments.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Assessing a Metacognitive Account of Associative Memory Impairments in Temporal Lobe Epilepsy

Previous research has pointed to a deficit in associative recognition in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). Associative recognition tasks require discrimination between various combinations of words which have and have not been seen previously (such as old-old or old-new pairs). People with TLE tend to respond to rearranged old-old pairs as if they are “intact” old-old pairs, which has been interpreted as a failure to use a recollection strategy to overcome the familiarity of two recombined words into a new pairing. We examined this specific deficit in the context of metacognition, using postdecision confidence judgements at test. We expected that TLE patients would show inappropriate levels of confidence for associative recognition. Although TLE patients reported lower confidence levels in their responses overall, they were sensitive to the difficulty of varying pair types in their judgements and gave significantly higher confidence ratings for their correct answers. We conclude that a strategic deficit is not at play in the associative recognition of people with TLE, insofar as they are able to monitor the status of their memory system. This adds to a growing body of research suggesting that recollection is impaired in TLE, but not metacognition.

Toward a Model of Work-Related Self: A Narrative Review

Occupational work as personal and social identification can be conceptualized as one of the life goals that we strive for and find meaning in. A basic categorization of the phenomenon of work-related identity is suggested, based on psychological theories of identity, memory and relational schema. It distinguishes between organizational, workgroup and professional identity. The two former relate to the concepts of social identity and collective self and the latter to the concepts of personal identity and individual self. These are assumed to form functionally independent cognitive structures, leading to separate motivations and influences on work-related satisfaction. Given this, empirical research on the impact of work-related identity on employee satisfaction, in general terms, is reviewed. The article concludes with some prospective directions for future research by sketching a general model of work-related self. It is hypothesized to evolve by a causal progression from employment across time via emotional and cognitive components.

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. “Memory for the future”: An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1–12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.

Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel

There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.

A Prefrontal-Hippocampal Comparator for Goal-Directed Behavior: The Intentional Self and Episodic Memory

The hypothesis of this article is that the interactions between the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus play a critical role in the modulation of goal-directed self-action and the strengthening of episodic memories. We describe various theories that model a comparator function for the hippocampus, and then elaborate the empirical evidence that supports these theories. One theory which describes a prefrontal-hippocampal comparator for voluntary action is emphasized. Action plans are essential for successful goal-directed behavior, and are elaborated by the prefrontal cortex. When an action plan is initiated, the prefrontal cortex transmits an efference copy (or corollary discharge) to the hippocampus where it is stored as a working memory for the action plan (which includes the expected outcomes of the action plan). The hippocampus then serves as a response intention-response outcome working memory comparator. Hippocampal comparator function is enabled by the hippocampal theta rhythm allowing the hippocampus to compare expected action outcomes to actual action outcomes. If the expected and actual outcomes match, the hippocampus transmits a signal to prefrontal cortex which strengthens or consolidates the action plan. If a mismatch occurs, the hippocampus transmits an error signal to the prefrontal cortex which facilitates a reformulation of the action plan, fostering behavioral flexibility and memory updating. The corollary discharge provides the self-referential component to the episodic memory, affording the personal and subjective experience of what behavior was carried out, when it was carried out, and in what context (where) it occurred. Such a perspective can be applied to episodic memory in humans, and episodic-like memory in non-human animal species.

The nature of the semantic/episodic memory distinction: A missing piece of the “working through” process

The relations between the semantic and episodic-autobiographical memory systems are more complex than described in the target article. We argue that understanding the noetic/autonoetic distinction provides critical insights into the foundation of the delineation between the two memory systems. Clarity with respect to the criteria for classification of these two systems, and the evolving conceptualization of episodic memory, can further neuroscientifically informed therapeutic approaches.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events

An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

Does metarepresentation make human mental time travel unique?

Recent neurological evidence suggests that rats can mentally represent novel spatial trajectories and then are more likely to follow these paths in the future. Consequently, it has been proposed that human and nonhuman mental time travel capacities may differ in degree rather than kind. As of yet, however, there is no evidence for the crucial and qualitatively distinct component of metarepresentation in any nonhuman animal, not even our closest great ape relatives. Metarepresentation allows humans to represent the relationship between current reality and mere representations of reality-including those of the future. Drawing on parallels with dreaming and mind-wandering, I outline the future-oriented benefits associated with uncontextualized (non-metarepresentational) representations of past and novel events, but propose that further, immense benefits flowed from the addition of metarepresentational insight. I critique previous behavioral paradigms used to assess mental time travel in animals and suggest how future-oriented metarepresentation might possibly be demonstrated nonverbally. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:519-531. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1308 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.

Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time

The metaphor that individuals with episodic amnesia due to hippocampal damage are "stuck in time" persists in science, philosophy, and everyday life despite mounting evidence that episodic amnesia can spare many central aspects of temporal consciousness. Here we describe some of this evidence, focusing specifically on KC, one of the most thoroughly documented and severe cases of episodic amnesia on record. KC understands the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future. He expresses typical attitudes toward his past and future, and he is able to make future-regarding decisions. Theories claiming that the hippocampus plays an essential role in temporal consciousness need to be revised in light of these findings.

Sleep benefits in parallel implicit and explicit measures of episodic memory

Research in rats using preferences during exploration as a measure of memory has indicated that sleep is important for the consolidation of episodic-like memory, i.e., memory for an event bound into specific spatio-temporal context. How these findings relate to human episodic memory is unclear. We used spontaneous preferences during visual exploration and verbal recall as, respectively, implicit and explicit measures of memory, to study effects of sleep on episodic memory consolidation in humans. During encoding before 10-h retention intervals that covered nighttime sleep or daytime wakefulness, two groups of young adults were presented with two episodes that were 1-h apart. Each episode entailed a spatial configuration of four different faces in a 3 × 3 grid of locations. After the retention interval, implicit spatio-temporal recall performance was assessed by eye-tracking visual exploration of another configuration of four faces of which two were from the first and second episode, respectively; of the two faces one was presented at the same location as during encoding and the other at another location. Afterward explicit verbal recall was assessed. Measures of implicit and explicit episodic memory retention were positively correlated (r = 0.57, P < 0.01), and were both better after nighttime sleep than daytime wakefulness (P < 0.05). In the sleep group, implicit episodic memory recall was associated with increased fast spindles during nonrapid eye movement (NonREM) sleep (r = 0.62, P < 0.05). Together with concordant observations in rats our results indicate that consolidation of genuinely episodic memory benefits from sleep.

The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person “self-experience,” a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of “awareness” or “knowing consciousness” that permits “time-travel” in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one’s life and its possibilities within the “mind’s eye.”

Subjective experience of episodic memory and metacognition: a neurodevelopmental approach

Episodic retrieval is characterized by the subjective experience of remembering. This experience enables the co-ordination of memory retrieval processes and can be acted on metacognitively. In successful retrieval, the feeling of remembering may be accompanied by recall of important contextual information. On the other hand, when people fail (or struggle) to retrieve information, other feelings, thoughts, and information may come to mind. In this review, we examine the subjective and metacognitive basis of episodic memory function from a neurodevelopmental perspective, looking at recollection paradigms (such as source memory, and the report of recollective experience) and metacognitive paradigms such as the feeling of knowing). We start by considering healthy development, and provide a brief review of the development of episodic memory, with a particular focus on the ability of children to report first-person experiences of remembering. We then consider neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs) such as amnesia acquired in infancy, autism, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, or 22q11.2 deletion syndrome. This review shows that different episodic processes develop at different rates, and that across a broad set of different NDDs there are various types of episodic memory impairment, each with possibly a different character. This literature is in agreement with the idea that episodic memory is a multifaceted process.

Developmental trajectories of associative memory from childhood to adulthood: a behavioral and neuroimaging study

Episodic memory refers to the capacity to bind multimodal memories to constitute a unique personal event. Most developmental studies on episodic memory focused on one specific component, i.e., the core factual information. The present study examines the relevance of a novel episodic paradigm to assess its developmental trajectories in a more comprehensive way according to the type of association (item-feature, item-location, and item-sequence associations) with measures of both objective and subjective recollection. We conducted a behavioral study aimed at testing the effects of age in a large sample of 160 children, adolescents, and young adults (6-23 years old). We confronted the behavioral data to the neural correlates in a subgroup of 30 children using voxel-based morphometry. Behavioral data outlined differential developmental trajectories according to the type of association, with a continuous increase of factual associative memory efficiency until 10 years, a linear increase of performance in spatial associative memory that pursues until early adulthood and an abrupt increase in temporal associative memory efficiency between 9 and 10. Regarding recollection, measures showed a more pronounced enhancement from 9 to 10 years. Hence, behavioral data highlight a peculiar period in late childhood (8-10 years old) crucial for the developmental time course of episodic memory. Regarding structural data, we found that the improvement of associative memory efficiency was related to a decrease in gray matter volume in a large cerebral network including the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (and superior and anterior temporal regions), and the hippocampus bilaterally. These data suggest that multimodal integration would probably be related to the maturation of temporal regions and modulated by a fronto-parietal network. Besides, our findings emphasize the relevance of the present paradigm to assess episodic memory especially in the clinical setting.

Episodic memory: a comparative approach

Historically, episodic memory has been described as autonoetic, personally relevant, complex, context-rich, and allowing mental time travel. In contrast, semantic memory, which is theorized to be free of context and personal relevance, is noetic and consists of general knowledge of facts about the world. The field of comparative psychology has adopted this distinction in order to study episodic memory in non-human animals. Our aim in this article is not only to reflect on the concept of episodic memory and the experimental approaches used in comparative psychology to study this phenomenon, but also to provide a critical analysis of these paradigms. We conclude the article by providing new avenues for future research.

Memory and self-neuroscientific landscapes

Relations between memory and the self are framed from a number of perspectives-developmental aspects, forms of memory, interrelations between memory and the brain, and interactions between the environment and memory. The self is seen as dividable into more rudimentary and more advanced aspects. Special emphasis is laid on memory systems and within them on episodic autobiographical memory which is seen as a pure human form of memory that is dependent on a proper ontogenetic development and shaped by the social environment, including culture. Self and episodic autobiographical memory are seen as interlocked in their development and later manifestation. Aside from content-based aspects of memory, time-based aspects are seen along two lines-the division between short-term and long-term memory and anterograde-future-oriented-and retrograde-past-oriented memory. The state dependency of episodic autobiographical is stressed and implications of it-for example, with respect to the occurrence of false memories and forensic aspects-are outlined. For the brain level, structural networks for encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval are discussed both by referring to patient data and to data obtained in normal participants with functional brain imaging methods. It is elaborated why descriptions from patients with functional or dissociative amnesia are particularly apt to demonstrate the facets in which memory, self, and personal temporality are interwoven.

Perspectives on episodic-like and episodic memory

Episodic memory refers to the conscious recollection of a personal experience that contains information on what has happened and also where and when it happened. Recollection from episodic memory also implies a kind of first-person subjectivity that has been termed autonoetic consciousness. Episodic memory is extremely sensitive to cerebral aging and neurodegenerative diseases. In Alzheimer’s disease deficits in episodic memory function are among the first cognitive symptoms observed. Furthermore, impaired episodic memory function is also observed in a variety of other neuropsychiatric diseases including dissociative disorders, schizophrenia, and Parkinson disease. Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to induce and measure episodic memories in the laboratory and it is even more difficult to measure it in clinical populations. Presently, the tests used to assess episodic memory function do not comply with even down-sized definitions of episodic-like memory as a memory for what happened, where, and when. They also require sophisticated verbal competences and are difficult to apply to patient populations. In this review, we will summarize the progress made in defining behavioral criteria of episodic-like memory in animals (and humans) as well as the perspectives in developing novel tests of human episodic memory which can also account for phenomenological aspects of episodic memory such as autonoetic awareness. We will also define basic behavioral, procedural, and phenomenological criteria which might be helpful for the development of a valid and reliable clinical test of human episodic memory.