Evaluating intra-action reviews at points of entry: ongoing learning opportunities during the COVID-19 pandemic

BACKGROUND

Long-lasting crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, require proper interim evaluation in order to optimize response. The World Health Organization and the European Center for Disease Control have recently promoted the in(tra)-action review (IAR) method for this purpose. We systematically evaluated the added value of two IARs performed in the Dutch point of entry (PoE) setting.

METHODS

Two online, 4-hour IAR meetings were organized in March 2021, for ports and airports respectively, to reflect on the ongoing COVID-19 response. Topics discussed were selected through a survey among participants. Participants were mainly self-selected by the (air)port public health service. Evaluation of the IAR method consisted of participant evaluation through a questionnaire, and hot and cold debriefs of the organizing team. Evaluation of the impact of the IAR was done through analysis of the meeting results, and a 3-month follow-up of the actions proposed during the meetings.

RESULTS

Thirty-nine professionals joined the IAR meetings. In the participant evaluation (n = 18), 89% agreed or totally agreed the IAR made it possible to identify challenges and problems in the COVID-19 response at PoE. Participants especially appreciated the resulting insight in regional and national partners. Regarding the online setting of the meeting, participants suggested to choose accessible and familiar online tools. After 3 months, all national actions and actions for ports had been executed; some regional actions for airports required further attention. A major result was a new meeting structure for all ports and the participating national authorities in which remaining and newly occurring issues were discussed.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the evaluations, we conclude that the IAR method can be of value during long-term crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic response. Although it is challenging to dedicate time and effort to the organization and attendance of IAR meetings during crisis, the IAR method is feasible in an online setting if appropriate organizing and technical capacity is available. A participatory set-up supports the IAR method as a starting point for continuous exchange and learning during ongoing crises.

Signalling and responding to zoonotic threats using a One Health approach: a decade of the Zoonoses Structure in the Netherlands, 2011 to 2021

In the Netherlands, the avian influenza outbreak in poultry in 2003 and the Q fever outbreak in dairy goats between 2007 and 2010 had severe consequences for public health. These outbreaks led to the establishment of an integrated human-veterinary risk analysis system for zoonoses, the Zoonoses Structure. The aim of the Zoonoses Structure is to signal, assess and control emerging zoonoses that may pose a risk to animal and/or human health in an integrated One Health approach. The Signalling Forum Zoonoses (SO-Z), the first step of the Zoonoses Structure, is a multidisciplinary committee composed of experts from the medical, veterinary, entomology and wildlife domains. The SO-Z shares relevant signals with professionals and has monthly meetings. Over the past 10 years (June 2011 to December 2021), 390 different signals of various zoonotic pathogens in animal reservoirs and humans have been assessed. Here, we describe the Zoonoses Structure with examples from signals and responses for four zoonotic events in the Netherlands (tularaemia, Brucella canis, West Nile virus, and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)). This may serve as an example for other countries on how to collaborate in a One Health approach to signal and control emerging zoonoses.

Estimated incubation period for monkeypox cases confirmed in the Netherlands, May 2022

In May 2022, monkeypox outbreaks have been reported in countries not endemic for monkeypox. We estimated the monkeypox incubation period, using reported exposure and symptom-onset times for 18 cases detected and confirmed in the Netherlands up to 31 May 2022. Mean incubation period was 9.0 [corrected] days (5th-95th percentiles: 4.2-17.3), underpinning the current recommendation to monitor or isolate/quarantine case contacts for 21 days. However, as the incubation period may differ between different transmission routes, further epidemiological investigations are needed.

Experience with in-action reviewing at points of entry

Background

Lessons learned and experiences gained ask for enhancing the response even during a crisis. We present the application of the in-action review (IAR) of Dutch ports and airports, based on methods developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC).

Methods

We performed two separate IARs among Dutch airports (5/5) and ports (15/16) respectively. 1) A questionnaire among participants was used to decide upon most urgent matters to discuss during a 4-hour online meeting. 2) a 4-hour, interactive, online meeting was held among local representatives of points of entry, regional public health professionals, safety professionals, the national institute of public health and the ministry of health. Best practices, lessons, barriers and actions on different topics were first prepared in small groups, and discussed and finalized in plenary sessions. Follow-up of actions was performed during the consecutive 6 weeks at the moment of writing. A questionnaire among participants evaluated satisfaction and impact of the IAR among participants.

Results

Main items for the online meetings were the implementation of measures, and regional and supra-regional collaboration. Most urgent actions formulated were a better integration of local needs into national policy making, and enhancing contacts among different points of entry. Implemented actions include the integration of local public health authorities involved at airports into an existing meeting structure at the national level; and an inter-port meeting structure that was developed leading to 3-weekly meetings to discuss upcoming challenges and exchange practices and advice.

Conclusions

This is to our best knowledge the first time that an in-action review has been performed specifically for the point of entry setting. Performing IARs, online with operational partners led to quick wins and a better network during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Public health response to two imported, epidemiologically related cases of Lassa fever in the Netherlands (ex Sierra Leone), November 2019

On 20 November 2019, Lassa fever was diagnosed in a physician repatriated from Sierra Leone to the Netherlands. A second physician with suspected Lassa fever, repatriated a few days later from the same healthcare facility, was confirmed infected with Lassa virus on 21 November. Comprehensive contact monitoring involving high- and low-risk contacts proved to be feasible and follow-up of the contacts did not reveal any case of secondary transmission in the Netherlands.

Towards defining core principles of public health emergency preparedness: scoping review and Delphi consultation among European Union country experts

Background

European Member States, the European Commission and its agencies work together to enhance preparedness and response for serious cross-border threats to health such as Ebola. Yet, common understanding of public health emergency preparedness across EU/EEA countries is challenging, because preparedness is a relatively new field of activity and is inherently fraught with uncertainty. A set of practical, widely accepted and easy to use recommendations for generic preparedness that bundles the activities described in separate guidance documents supports countries in preparing for any possible health threat. The aim of this consensus procedure was to identify and seek consensus from national-level preparedness experts from EU/EEA countries on key recommendations of public health emergency preparedness.

Methods

To identify key recommendations and to prioritize the recommendations we started with a literature consensus procedure, followed by a modified Delphi method for consultation of public health emergency preparedness leaders of EU/EEA countries. This consisted of six consecutive steps: a questionnaire to achieve consensus on a core set of recommendations, a face-to-face consultation, preselection of prioritized recommendations, a questionnaire to achieve consensus on the prioritized set and a face-to-face consensus meeting to further prioritize recommendations.

Results

As a result, EU/EEA experts selected 149 recommendations as core preparedness principles and prioritized 42. The recommendations were grouped in the seven domains: governance (57), capacity building and maintenance (11), surveillance (19), risk-assessment (16), risk- and crisis management (35), post-event evaluation (6) and implementation of lessons learned (5).

Conclusions

This prioritised set of consensus principles can provide a foundation for countries aiming to evaluate and improve their preparedness for public health emergencies. The recommendations are practical, support generic preparedness planning, and can be used by all countries irrespective of their current level of preparedness.

Clinical Management of Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever using Ribavirin and Favipiravir, Belgium, 2020

We report a case of Argentine hemorrhagic fever diagnosed in a woman in Belgium who traveled from a disease-endemic area. Patient management included supportive care and combination therapy with ribavirin and favipiravir. Of 137 potential contacts, including friends, relatives, and healthcare and laboratory workers, none showed development of clinical symptoms of this disease.

Tick-Borne Encephalitis Virus Antibodies in Roe Deer, the Netherlands

To increase knowledge of tick-borne encephalitis virus (TBEV) circulation in the Netherlands, we conducted serosurveillance in roe deer (Capreolus capreolus) during 2017 and compared results with those obtained during 2010. Results corroborate a more widespread occurrence of the virus in 2017. Additional precautionary public health measures have been taken.

Timeliness of notification systems for infectious diseases: A systematic literature review

Introduction

Timely notification of infectious diseases is crucial for prompt response by public health services. Adequate notification systems facilitate timely notification. A systematic literature review was performed to assess outcomes of studies on notification timeliness and to determine which aspects of notification systems are associated with timely notification.

Methodology

Articles reviewing timeliness of notifications published between 2000 and 2017 were searched in Pubmed and Scopus. Using a standardized notification chain, timeliness of reporting system for each article was defined as either sufficient (≥ 80% notifications in time), partly sufficient (≥ 50–80%), or insufficient (< 50%) according to the article’s predefined timeframe, a standardized timeframe for all articles, and a disease specific timeframe. Electronic notification systems were compared with conventional methods (postal mail, fax, telephone, email) and mobile phone reporting.

Results

48 articles were identified. In almost one third of the studies with a predefined timeframe (39), timeliness of notification systems was either sufficient or insufficient (11/39, 28% and 12/39, 31% resp.). Applying the standardized timeframe (45 studies) revealed similar outcomes (13/45, 29%, sufficient notification timeframe, vs 15/45, 33%, insufficient). The disease specific timeframe was not met by any study. Systems involving reporting by laboratories most often complied sufficiently with predefined or standardized timeframes. Outcomes were not related to electronic, conventional notification systems or mobile phone reporting. Electronic systems were faster in comparative studies (10/13); this hardly resulted in sufficient timeliness, neither according to predefined nor to standardized timeframes.

Conclusion

A minority of notification systems meets either predefined, standardized or disease specific timeframes. Systems including laboratory reporting are associated with timely notification. Electronic systems reduce reporting delay, but implementation needs considerable effort to comply with notification timeframes. During outbreak threats, patient, doctors and laboratory testing delays need to be reduced to achieve timely detection and notification. Public health authorities should incorporate procedures for this in their preparedness plans.

Environmental surveillance during an outbreak of tularaemia in hares, the Netherlands, 2015

Tularaemia, a disease caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis, is a re-emerging zoonosis in the Netherlands. After sporadic human and hare cases occurred in the period 2011 to 2014, a cluster of F. tularensis-infected hares was recognised in a region in the north of the Netherlands from February to May 2015. No human cases were identified, including after active case finding. Presence of F. tularensis was investigated in potential reservoirs and transmission routes, including common voles, arthropod vectors and surface waters. F. tularensis was not detected in common voles, mosquito larvae or adults, tabanids or ticks. However, the bacterium was detected in water and sediment samples collected in a limited geographical area where infected hares had also been found. These results demonstrate that water monitoring could provide valuable information regarding F. tularensis spread and persistence, and should be used in addition to disease surveillance in wildlife.

Quantifying reporting timeliness to improve outbreak control

The extent to which reporting delays should be reduced to gain substantial improvement in outbreak control is unclear. We developed a model to quantitatively assess reporting timeliness. Using reporting speed data for 6 infectious diseases in the notification system in the Netherlands, we calculated the proportion of infections produced by index and secondary cases until the index case is reported. We assumed interventions that immediately stop transmission. Reporting delays render useful only those interventions that stop transmission from index and secondary cases. We found that current reporting delays are adequate for hepatitis A and B control. However, reporting delays should be reduced by a few days to improve measles and mumps control, by at least 10 days to improve shigellosis control, and by at least 5 weeks to substantially improve pertussis control. Our method provides quantitative insight into the required reporting delay reductions needed to achieve outbreak control and other transmission prevention goals.

Epidemic of mumps among vaccinated persons, The Netherlands, 2009-2012

To analyze the epidemiology of a nationwide mumps epidemic in the Netherlands, we reviewed 1,557 notified mumps cases in persons who had disease onset during September 1, 2009–August 31, 2012. Seasonality peaked in spring and autumn. Most case-patients were males (59%), 18–25 years of age (67.9%), and vaccinated twice with measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (67.7%). Nearly half (46.6%) of cases occurred in university students or in persons with student contacts. Receipt of 2 doses of vaccine reduced the risk for orchitis, the most frequently reported complication (vaccine effectiveness [VE] 74%, 95% CI 57%–85%); complications overall (VE 76%, 95% CI 61%–86%); and hospitalization (VE 82%, 95% CI 53%–93%). Over time, the age distribution of case-patients changed, and proportionally more cases were reported from nonuniversity cities (p<0.001). Changes in age and geographic distribution over time may reflect increased immunity among students resulting from intense exposure to circulating mumps virus.

Speed versus coverage trade off in targeted interventions during an outbreak

Which case-based intervention measures should be applied during an epidemic outbreak depends on how timely they can be applied and how effective they are. During the course of each individual's infection, the earlier control measures are applied on him/her the more effectively further disease spread can be prevented. However, quick implementation can lead to loss of efficacy or coverage, e.g., when individuals are targeted based on rapid but poorly sensitive diagnostic tests in place of slower but accurate PCR tests. To analyse this trade off between speed and coverage we used stochastic models considering how the individual reproduction density is modified by interventions. We took as example the case-based intervention strategy employed in the Netherlands during the beginning of the H1N1 pandemic. Suspected cases were isolated and samples were collected for PCR diagnosis. In case of positive diagnosis, antiviral drugs were provided to contacts as post-exposure prophylaxis. At the time there were also rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) available which provided results within an hour after sample collection compared to a median of 2.7 days for PCR tests, but they were less sensitive. We studied how interventions based on RIDTs with various sensitivities affect the outbreak size and how these compare to PCR diagnosis based interventions. Using an intervention based on a bedside RIDT with 60% detection ratio or a laboratory RIDT with 70% detection ratio is as effective as the most effective PCR-diagnosis based intervention. Relative performances of interventions are not dependent on the basic reproduction number R0 but only on distributions of individual reproduction density and of delay periods. The individual reproduction density combines R0 and infection time distribution, both crucial in determining the impact of case-based interventions during epidemic outbreaks.

The use of tetanus post-exposure prophylaxis guidelines by general practitioners and emergency departments in the Netherlands: a cross-sectional questionnaire study

Background

The Dutch National Immunisation Programme includes six tetanus toxoid (TT) vaccinations and reaches a high rate of vaccination coverage. In the Netherlands, several guidelines related to tetanus post-exposure prophylaxis (T-PEP) are in place. In 2003, the Dutch Health Council (HC) reviewed the use of T-PEP. The aim of this study is to evaluate whether the HC recommendations have been implemented.

Methods

We asked 178 Dutch General Practitioner (GP) offices and 60 Emergency Departments (EDs) to participate in a cross-sectional questionnaire study and requested that participating facilities send in the T-PEP guidelines adopted by their practice. The differences, based on categories mentioned in the HC recommendations, between GPs and EDs and the type of T-PEP guidelines adopted were assessed.

Results

The response rates for the GPs and EDs were 38% (n = 67) and 70% (n = 42), respectively. 98% percent (n = 107) of the participants reported having T-PEP guidelines. Of the guidelines described in the survey responses, 28% (n = 23; EDs 41%, GPs 21%) were consistent with the HC-recommendations, 36% (n = 29; EDs 7%, GPs 52%) adhered to the guidelines of the College of GPs (CGP), which restricts the use of T-PEP to tetanus prone wounds but for these wounds is in line with the recommendations of the HC. The remaining 36% had adopted other guidelines, most of which can lead to over-prescription of T-PEP. Information on T-PEP was lacking in patients with higher risk vaccination histories.

Conclusion

Almost all participants have adopted T-PEP guidelines. Strict adherence to the HC recommendations is low. More than half of GPs have adopted the more restrictive CGP-guideline, which limits T-PEP to tetanus prone wounds.

Chikungunya outbreak in the Caribbean region, December 2013 to March 2014, and the significance for Europe

On 6 December 2013, two laboratory-confirmed cases of chikungunya without a travel history were reported on the French part of the Caribbean island of Saint Martin, indicating the start of the first documented outbreak of chikungunya in the Americas. Since this report, the virus spread to several Caribbean islands and French Guiana, and between 6 December 2013 and 27 March 2014 more than 17,000 suspected and confirmed cases have been reported. Further spread and establishment of the disease in the Americas is likely, given the high number of people travelling between the affected and non-affected areas and the widespread occurrence of efficient vectors. Also, the likelihood of the introduction of the virus into Europe from the Americas and subsequent transmission should be considered especially in the context of the next mosquito season in Europe. Clinicians should be aware that, besides dengue, chikungunya should be carefully considered among travellers currently returning from the Caribbean region.

Development of a risk assessment tool for contact tracing people after contact with infectious patients while travelling by bus or other public ground transport: a Delphi consensus approach

BACKGROUND

Tracing persons who have been in contact with an infectious patient may be very effective in preventing the spread of communicable diseases. However, criteria to decide when to conduct contact tracing are not well established. We have investigated the available evidence for contact tracing with a focus on public ground transport aiming to give guidance in what situations contact tracing should be considered.

METHODS

Relevant infectious diseases suitable for contact tracing in ground transport and a set of disease-specific epidemiological criteria were defined through literature search and structured multistep expert consultations. We developed continuous scales for each criterion to be rated for its relevance to contact tracing in ground transport. We used the Delphi method with an international expert panel to position the values of criteria on the respective scales.

RESULTS

The study led to the development of the 'Contact Tracing-Risk Assessment Profile' (CT-RAP), a decision-making instrument, taking into account pathogen-specific as well as situation-specific criteria. This report describes the methodology of this instrument and presents two examples of ready-to-use CT-RAP for tuberculosis and for meningococcal disease in public ground transport.

DISCUSSION

The systematic and transparent use of the CT-RAP for tuberculosis and meningococcal disease is likely to facilitate reasonable, efficient and user-friendly decisions with respect to contact tracing. New CT-RAPs for additional pathogens and different settings such as schools and kindergartens are being planned.

Effectiveness and timing of vaccination during school measles outbreak

Implementing a vaccination campaign during an outbreak can effectively reduce the outbreak size.

Another possible food-borne outbreak of hepatitis A in the Netherlands indicated by two closely related molecular sequences, July to October 2011

In November 2011, a cluster of initially five cases of hepatitis A infection with closely related strains was identified in the Netherlands. England reported possibly related cases. Strains with identical sequences had been involved in previous outbreaks linked to semi-dried tomatoes. Investigation of the Dutch cluster suggested a link with ready-to-eat salads including those containing semi-dried tomatoes. Despite trace-back, a source was not identified. Vigilance is needed, and rapid sharing of data may help source-tracing.

Oseltamivir-resistant pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 influenza viruses detected through enhanced surveillance in the Netherlands, 2009-2010

Enhanced surveillance of infections due to the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus, which included monitoring for antiviral resistance, was carried out in the Netherlands from late April 2009 through late May 2010. More than 1100 instances of infection with the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus from 2009 and 2010 [A(H1N1) 2009] distributed across this period were analyzed. Of these, 19 cases of oseltamivir-resistant virus harboring the H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase (NA) were detected. The mean 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) levels for oseltamivir- and zanamivir-susceptible A(H1N1) 2009 viruses were 1.4-fold and 2-fold, respectively, lower than for the seasonal A(H1N1) influenza viruses from 2007/2008; for oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus the IC50 was 2.9-fold lower. Eighteen of the 19 patients with oseltamivir-resistant virus showed prolonged shedding of the virus and developed resistance while on oseltamivir therapy. Sixteen of these 18 patients had an immunodeficiency, of whom 11 had a hematologic disorder. The two other patients had another underlying disease. Six of the patients who had an underlying disease died; of these, five had received cytostatic or immunosuppressive therapy. No indications for onward transmission of resistant viruses were found. This study showed that the main association for the emergence of cases of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was receiving antiviral therapy and having drug-induced immunosuppression or an hematologic disorder. Except for a single case of a resistant virus not linked to oseltamivir therapy, the absence of detection of resistant variants in community specimens and in specimens from contacts of cases with resistant virus suggested that the spread of resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was limited. Containment may have been the cumulative result of impaired NA function, successful isolation of the patients, and prophylactic measures to limit exposure.

Transmission of novel influenza A(H1N1) in households with post-exposure antiviral prophylaxis

Background

Despite impressive advances in our understanding of the biology of novel influenza A(H1N1) virus, little is as yet known about its transmission efficiency in close contact places such as households, schools, and workplaces. These are widely believed to be key in supporting propagating spread, and it is therefore of importance to assess the transmission levels of the virus in such settings.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We estimate the transmissibility of novel influenza A(H1N1) in 47 households in the Netherlands using stochastic epidemic models. All households contained a laboratory confirmed index case, and antiviral drugs (oseltamivir) were given to both the index case and other households members within 24 hours after detection of the index case. Among the 109 household contacts there were 9 secondary infections in 7 households. The overall estimated secondary attack rate is low (0.075, 95%CI: 0.037–0.13). There is statistical evidence indicating that older persons are less susceptible to infection than younger persons (relative susceptibility of older persons: 0.11, 95%CI: 0.024–0.43. Notably, the secondary attack rate from an older to a younger person is 0.35 (95%CI: 0.14–0.61) when using an age classification of ≤12 versus >12 years, and 0.28 (95%CI: 0.12–0.50) when using an age classification of ≤18 versus >18 years.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results indicate that the overall household transmission levels of novel influenza A(H1N1) in antiviral-treated households were low in the early stage of the epidemic. The relatively high rate of adult-to-child transmission indicates that control measures focused on this transmission route will be most effective in minimizing the total number of infections.

Update: a food-borne outbreak of hepatitis A in the Netherlands related to semi-dried tomatoes in oil, January-February 2010

Between 31 December 2009 and 10 February 2010, 13 patients were infected by an identical hepatitis A virus strain not previously detected in the Netherlands. They had not been abroad and were widely distributed over the Netherlands. A case-control study including 12 cases and 44 controls identified semi-dried tomatoes in oil as the source of the outbreak (odds ratio: 20.0; 95% confidence interval: 1.5-274). The virus was not detected in any of 81 tested food samples. International trace-back is still ongoing.

Update: A food-borne outbreak of hepatitis A in the Netherlands related to semi-dried tomatoes in oil, January-February 2010

Between 31 December 2009 and 10 February 2010, 13 patients were infected by an identical hepatitis A virus strain not previously detected in the Netherlands. They had not been abroad and were widely distributed over the Netherlands. A case-control study including 12 cases and 44 controls identified semi-dried tomatoes in oil as the source of the outbreak (odds ratio: 20.0; 95% confidence interval: 1.5-274). The virus was not detected in any of 81 tested food samples. International trace-back is still ongoing.

Ongoing mumps outbreak in a student population with high vaccination coverage, Netherlands, 2010

Since December 2009, mumps incidence has increased in the Netherlands. As of 20 April 2010, 172 cases have been notified on the basis of laboratory confirmation or linkage to a laboratory-confirmed case. Of these, 112 were students, the majority of whom had been vaccinated (81%). Although outbreaks in vaccinated populations have been described before, risk factors for exposure and susceptibility, and dose-dependent vaccine effectiveness in a student population of this nature are relatively unknown.

A possible foodborne outbreak of hepatitis A in the Netherlands, January-February 2010

As of 1 March 2010, a total of 11 primary cases with onset of symptoms between 31 December 2009 and 10 February 2010, have been identified with identical hepatitis A genotype IB strains in the Netherlands. A relation with Australian and French foodborne outbreaks occurring in 2009 and 2010 is suspected. Ten of the 11 primary cases indicated that they had consumed one or more products containing semi-dried tomatoes during their incubation period.

A possible foodborne outbreak of hepatitis A in the Netherlands, January-February 2010

As of 1 March 2010, a total of 11 primary cases with onset of symptoms between 31 December 2009 and 10 February 2010, have been identified with identical hepatitis A genotype IB strains in the Netherlands. A relation with Australian and French foodborne outbreaks occurring in 2009 and 2010 is suspected. Ten of the 11 primary cases indicated that they had consumed one or more products containing semi-dried tomatoes during their incubation period.

Import of norovirus infections in the Netherlands and Ireland following pilgrimages to Lourdes, 2008--preliminary report

Between mid-September and 19 October 2008, nine clusters of norovirus infection involving around 90 primary cases and over a hundred secondary cases were identified in patients from the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and France, linked to pilgrimage to Lourdes, France.

Import of norovirus infections in the Netherlands and Ireland following pilgrimages to Lourdes, 2008 – preliminary report

Between mid-September and 19 October 2008, nine clusters of norovirus infection involving around 90 primary cases and over a hundred secondary cases were identified in patients from the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and France, linked to pilgrimage to Lourdes, France.

Local cluster of psittacosis after bird show in the Netherlands, November 2007

On 14 November 2007, a general practitioner in the Nijmegen region of the Netherlands called the Municipal Health Service (MHS). He reported three patients complaining of high fever, vomiting, diarrhoea, and headache, all of whom had visited a bird show in the rural town of Weurt (village of Beuningen).

Monitoring the potential introduction of the Swedish Chlamydia trachomatis variant (swCT) in the Netherlands

This report describes the actions of public health experts in cooperation with specialists in sexually transmitted diseases (STD), epidemiologists and (molecular) microbiologists to investigate the possible introduction of the swCT variant in the Netherlands: 1. Investigating trends in CT epidemiology Result: STD surveillance and laboratory surveillance did not show any evidence of the introduction of the swCT variant in Holland. 2. Retesting samples by TaqMan PCR Result: Roche CT-negative samples suspected to be CT-positive on the basis of the clinical picture were retested by swCT TaqMan but did not harbour the swCT variant 3. Screening sample pools for the presence of the swCT variant Result: Four different sample pools covering a wide geographical range were tested by specific swCT Taqman assay, but the swCT variant was not detected in any of them. In conclusion, to date the swCT variant has not been found in the Netherlands. However, ongoing monitoring is needed until Roche and Abbott have adapted their CT nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) to detect the new variant.

High and persistent excretion of hepatitis A virus in immunocompetent patients

The duration and level of virus excretion in blood and faeces of patients with hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection were studied in relation to levels of alanine aminotransferase (ALT), disease severity and HAV genotype. Clinical data, blood and faeces were collected from 27 patients with acute hepatitis A (median age: 33 years) for a maximum of 26 weeks. Single blood donations from 55 other patients with acute HAV (median age: 32 years) were also used. Virus loads were quantified by competitive nested RT-PCR. HAV was excreted in faeces for a median period of 81 days after disease onset, with 50% of patients still excreting high levels at Day 36 (2 x 10(6) - 2 x 10(8) copies/ml faeces suspension). Viraemia was detected, but not quantifiable, for a median period of 42 days. In the first 10 days of illness, higher ALT levels were correlated with higher viraemia levels. Comparison of patients infected with genotype 1a with those infected with type 1b did not differ significantly in terms of the duration of HAV excretion or jaundice. In conclusion, faecal excretion of HAV is at a high titre in the first month, perhaps making patients infectious for a longer period than assumed currently. Blood banks should be aware that viraemia may be present for more than 1 month, and genotype did not affect the duration of virus excretion or jaundice.