Action control costs in task selection: Agents avoid actions with incompatible movement and effect features

When a movement triggers effects with incompatible features, conflict between action and effect features creates costs for action planning and initiation. We investigated whether such action control costs also factor into action choices in terms of the principle of least effort. Participants completed a reaction-time experiment, where they were instructed to perform left and right mouse swipes in response to directional cues presented on the screen. Participants could select between two action options on each trial: Depending on which part of the screen (upper or lower) the action was performed in, the swipe resulted in a visual stimulus moving in the same (compatible) or in the opposite (incompatible) direction as the mouse. Incompatible action-effect mappings did indeed incur action control costs. In accordance with effort avoidance, the proportion of compatible choices was significantly above chance level, suggesting that action selection and initiation costs factor into participants preferences. Interestingly, however, participants' choice tendencies were not predicted by the actual increase in action-initiation costs in the incompatible condition. This indicates that effort-related decisions are not simply based on monitoring performance in the actual task, but they are also influenced by preestablished notions of action-planning costs.

What Is Mental Effort: A Clinical Perspective

Although mental effort is a frequently used term, it is poorly defined and understood. Consequently, its usage is frequently loose and potentially misleading. In neuroscience research, the term is used to mean both the cognitive work that is done to meet task demands and the subjective experience of performing that work. We argue that conflating these two meanings hampers progress in understanding cognitive impairments in neuropsychiatric conditions because cognitive work and the subjective experience of it have distinct underlying mechanisms. We suggest that the most coherent and clinically useful perspective on mental effort is that it is a subjective experience. This makes a clear distinction between cognitive impairments that arise from changes in the cognitive apparatus, as in dementia and brain injury, and those that arise from subjective difficulties in carrying out the cognitive work, as in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and other motivational disorders. We review recent advances in neuroscience research that suggests that the experience of effort has emerged to control task switches so as to minimize costs relative to benefits. We consider how these advances can contribute to our understanding of the experience of increased effort perception in clinical populations. This more specific framing of mental effort will offer a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive impairments in differing clinical groups and will ultimately facilitate better therapeutic interventions.

Some scales require cognitive effort: A systematic review on the role of working memory in scalar implicature derivation

If some inferences require cognitive effort, could that mean, that all of them do? The scalar term "some" has long fascinated academics from various backgrounds, as it can be interpreted either purely semantically, as "some and possibly all", or pragmatically, as "some and not all". The pragmatic reading implies the generation of what is called a scalar implicature. While scientific investigation of such implicatures has given rise to many potential explanations of the "pragmatic enrichment" phenomenon behind them, the debate between the two dominant frameworks-the literal-first and the default accounts-has not convincingly been settled. With the birth of a new interdisciplinary field, appropriately dubbed experimental pragmatics, the last 20 years have led to a substantial amount of new empirical data on scalar implicatures. In this ongoing investigation, the loading and measuring of Working Memory has become an important experimentation tool, as it allows to test the contrasting hypotheses with regard to the cognitive effort of implicature generation, which are made by the two main theoretical accounts. The current systematic review evaluates the relevant literature until March 08, 2022 in an attempt to shed light on the role of Working Memory in implicature derivation. A comprehensive search, and two-step review procedure yielded a sample of 18 studies, containing data of 23 relevant experiments. Findings were bundled in a narrative synthesis and combined through two separate meta-analyses. Our results support the literal-first account, by showing that the derivation of scalar implicatures is a cognitively effortful process that is sensitive to changes in the available Working Memory resources. However, as the reported effects are relatively weak and capricious, we argue that the development of more sophisticated paradigms and eventually, stronger theories within the field, will be crucial in order to both fully understand the current results and set-up fruitful future research.

Dissociable neural after-effects of cognitive and physical effort expenditure during reward evaluation

The reward after-effect of effort expenditure refers to the phenomenon that previous effort investment changes the subjective value of rewards when obtained. However, the neural mechanisms underlying the after-effects of effort exertion are still not fully understood. We investigated the modulation of reward after-effects by effort type (cognitive vs. physical) through the lens of neural dynamics. Thirty-two participants performed a physically or cognitively demanding task during an effort phase and then played a simple gambling game during a subsequent reward phase to earn monetary rewards while their electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. We found that previous effort expenditure decreased electrocortical activity during feedback evaluation. Importantly, this effort effect occurred in a domain-general manner during the early stage (as indexed by the reward positivity) but in a domain-specific manner during the later and more elaborative stage (as indexed by the P3 and delta oscillation) of reward evaluation. Additionally, effort expenditure enhanced P3 sensitivity to feedback valence regardless of effort type. Our findings suggest that cognitive and physical effort, although bearing some surface resemblance to each other, may have dissociable neural influences on the reward after-effects.

The role of defeatist performance beliefs on cognitive effort-cost decision-making in schizophrenia

Impairments in effort-cost decision-making have been consistently observed in people with schizophrenia (SZ) and may be an important mechanism of negative symptoms. However, the processes that give rise to impairments in effort-cost decision-making are unclear, leading to limited progress in identifying the most relevant treatment targets. Drawing from cognitive models of negative symptoms and goal-directed behavior, this study aimed to examine how and under what type of task conditions defeatist performance beliefs contribute to these decision-making processes. Outpatients with SZ (n = 30) and healthy controls (CN; n = 28) completed a cognitive effort allocation task, the Cognitive Effort-Discounting (COGED) task, which assesses participants' willingness to exert cognitive effort for monetary rewards based on parametrically varied working memory demands (completing N-back levels). Results showed that although participants with SZ demonstrated reduced willingness to work for rewards across N-back levels compared to CN participants, they showed less choice modulation across different N-back conditions. However, among SZ participants with greater defeatist performance beliefs, there was a reduced willingness to choose the high effort option at higher N-back levels (N-back levels 3, 4, and 5 versus 2-back). Results suggest that compared to CN, the SZ group's subjective willingness to expend effort largely did not dynamically adjust as cognitive load increased. However, defeatist beliefs may undermine willingness to expend cognitive effort, especially when cognitive task demands are high. These beliefs may be a viable treatment target to improve effort-cost decision-making impairments in people with SZ.

Computational mechanisms underlying the dynamics of physical and cognitive fatigue

The willingness to exert effort for reward is essential but comes at the cost of fatigue. Theories suggest fatigue increases after both physical and cognitive exertion, subsequently reducing the motivation to exert effort. Yet a mechanistic understanding of how this happens on a moment-to-moment basis, and whether mechanisms are common to both mental and physical effort, is lacking. In two studies, participants reported momentary (trial-by-trial) ratings of fatigue during an effort-based decision-making task requiring either physical (grip-force) or cognitive (mental arithmetic) effort. Using a novel computational model, we show that fatigue fluctuates from trial-to-trial as a function of exerted effort and predicts subsequent choices. This mechanism was shared across the domains. Selective to the cognitive domain, committing errors also induced momentary increases in feelings of fatigue. These findings provide insight into the computations underlying the influence of effortful exertion on fatigue and motivation, in both physical and cognitive domains.

Preferential Choice to Exert Cognitive Effort in Children with ADHD: a Diffusion Modelling Account

Greater sensitivity to the cost of effortful engagement has long been implicated in the development of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The current study evaluated preferential choice to engage in demanding tasks, and did so in combination with computational methods to interrogate the process of choice. Children aged 8-12 with (n = 49) and without (n = 36) ADHD were administered the cognitive effort discounting paradigm (COG-ED, adapted from Westbrook et al., 2013). Diffusion modelling was subsequently applied to the choice data to allow for a better description of the process of affective decision making. All children showed evidence of effort discounting, but, contrary to theoretical expectations, there was no evidence that children with ADHD judged effortful tasks to be lower in subjective value, or that they maintained a bias towards less effortful tasks. However, children with ADHD developed a much less differentiated mental representation of demand than their non-ADHD counterparts even though familiarity with and exposure to the experience of effort was similar between groups. Thus, despite theoretical arguments to the contrary, and colloquial use of motivational constructs to explain ADHD-related behavior, our findings strongly argue against the presence of greater sensitivity to costs of effort or reduced sensitivity to rewards as an explanatory mechanism. Instead, there appears to be a more global weakness in the metacognitive monitoring of demand, which is a critical precursor for cost-benefit analyses that underlie decisions to engage cognitive control.

Economic Choice and Heart Rate Fractal Scaling Indicate That Cognitive Effort Is Reduced by Depression and Boosted by Sad Mood

BACKGROUND

People with depression typically exhibit diminished cognitive control. Control is subjectively costly, prompting speculation that control deficits reflect reduced cognitive effort. Evidence that people with depression exert less cognitive effort is mixed, however, and motivation may depend on state affect.

METHODS

We used a cognitive effort discounting task to measure propensity to expend cognitive effort and fractal structure in the temporal dynamics of interbeat intervals to assess on-task effort exertion for 49 healthy control subjects, 36 people with current depression, and 67 people with remitted depression.

RESULTS

People with depression discounted more steeply, indicating that they were less willing to exert cognitive effort than people with remitted depression and never-depressed control subjects. Also, steeper discounting predicted worse functioning in daily life. Surprisingly, a sad mood induction selectively boosted motivation among participants with depression, erasing differences between them and control subjects. During task performance, depressed participants with the lowest cognitive motivation showed blunted autonomic reactivity as a function of load.

CONCLUSIONS

Discounting patterns supported the hypothesis that people with current depression would be less willing to exert cognitive effort, and steeper discounting predicted lower global functioning in daily life. Heart rate fractal scaling proved to be a highly sensitive index of cognitive load, and data implied that people with lower motivation for cognitive effort had a diminished physiological capacity to respond to rising cognitive demands. State affect appeared to influence motivation among people with current depression given that they were more willing to exert cognitive effort following a sad mood induction.

Cognitive effort and active inference

This paper aims to integrate some key constructs in the cognitive neuroscience of cognitive control and executive function by formalising the notion of cognitive (or mental) effort in terms of active inference. To do so, we call upon a task used in neuropsychology to assess impulse inhibition-a Stroop task. In this task, participants must suppress the impulse to read a colour word and instead report the colour of the text of the word. The Stroop task is characteristically effortful, and we unpack a theory of mental effort in which, to perform this task accurately, participants must overcome prior beliefs about how they would normally act. However, our interest here is not in overt action, but in covert (mental) action. Mental actions change our beliefs but have no (direct) effect on the outside world-much like deploying covert attention. This account of effort as mental action lets us generate multimodal (choice, reaction time, and electrophysiological) data of the sort we might expect from a human participant engaging in this task. We analyse how parameters determining cognitive effort influence simulated responses and demonstrate that-when provided only with performance data-these parameters can be recovered, provided they are within a certain range.

More than a feeling: physiological measures of affect index the integration of effort costs and rewards during anticipatory effort evaluation

The notion that humans avoid effortful action is one of the oldest and most persistent in psychology. Influential theories of effort propose that effort valuations are made according to a cost-benefit trade-off: we tend to invest mental effort only when the benefits outweigh the costs. While these models provide a useful conceptual framework, the affective components of effort valuation remain poorly understood. Here, we examined whether primitive components of affective response-positive and negative valence, captured via facial electromyography (fEMG)-can be used to better understand valuations of cognitive effort. Using an effortful arithmetic task, we find that fEMG activity in the corrugator supercilii-thought to index negative valence-1) tracks the anticipation and exertion of cognitive effort and 2) is attenuated in the presence of high rewards. Together, these results suggest that activity in the corrugator reflects the integration of effort costs and rewards during effortful decision-making.

Is all mental effort equal? The role of cognitive demand-type on effort avoidance

Humans are often termed "cognitive misers" for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outside the laboratory people often show preferences for low-effort tasks and are willing to forgo financial reward to avoid more demanding alternatives. Mental effort, however, does not seem to be ubiquitously avoided: people play crosswords, board games, and read novels, all as forms of leisure. While such activities undoubtedly require effort, the type of cognitive demands they impose appear markedly different from the tasks typically used in psychological research on mental effort (e.g., N-Back, Stroop Task, vigilance tasks). We investigate the effect disparate demands, such as tasks which require problem solving (e.g., solve the missing number: 1, 3, 7, 15, 31,?) compared to those which require rule-implementation (e.g., N-Back task), have on people's aversion to or preference for increased mental effort. Across four experiments using three different tasks, and a mixture of online and lab-based settings, we find that aversion to effort remains largely stable regardless of the types of cognitive demands a task imposes. The results are discussed in terms of other factors that might induce the pursuit of mental effort over and above the type of cognitive demands imposed by a task.

Learning progress mediates the link between cognitive effort and task engagement

While a substantial body of work has shown that cognitive effort is aversive and costly, a separate line of research on intrinsic motivation suggests that people spontaneously seek challenging tasks. According to one prominent account of intrinsic motivation, the learning progress motivation hypothesis, the preference for difficult tasks reflects the dynamic range that these tasks yield for changes in task performance (Kaplan & Oudeyer, 2007). Here we test this hypothesis, by asking whether greater engagement with intermediately difficult tasks, indexed by subjective ratings and objective pupil measurements, is a function of trial-wise changes in performance. In a novel paradigm, we determined each individual's capacity for task performance and used difficulty levels that are low, intermediately challenging or high for that individual. We demonstrated that challenging tasks resulted in greater liking and engagement scores compared with easy tasks. Pupil size tracked objective task difficulty, where challenging tasks were associated with greater pupil responses than easy tasks. Most importantly, pupil responses were predicted by trial-to-trial changes in average accuracy as well as learning progress (derivative of average accuracy), while greater pupil responses also predicted greater subjective engagement scores. Together, these results substantiate the learning progress motivation hypothesis stating that the link between task engagement and cognitive effort is mediated the dynamic range for changes in task performance.

Measuring cognitive effort without difficulty

An important finding in the cognitive effort literature has been that sensitivity to the costs of effort varies between individuals, suggesting that some people find effort more aversive than others. It has been suggested this may explain individual differences in other aspects of cognition; in particular that greater effort sensitivity may underlie some of the symptoms of conditions such as depression and schizophrenia. In this paper, we highlight a major problem with existing measures of cognitive effort that hampers this line of research, specifically the confounding of effort and difficulty. This means that behaviour thought to reveal effort costs could equally be explained by cognitive capacity, which influences the frequency of success and thereby the chance of obtaining reward. To address this shortcoming, we introduce a new test, the Number Switching Task (NST), specially designed such that difficulty will be unaffected by the effort manipulation and can easily be standardised across participants. In a large, online sample, we show that these criteria are met successfully and reproduce classic effort discounting results with the NST. We also demonstrate the use of Bayesian modelling with this task, producing behavioural parameters which can be associated with other measures, and report a preliminary association with the Need for Cognition scale.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find 'evidence' supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.

Cognitive Effort-Based Decision-Making Across Experimental and Daily Life Indices in Younger and Older Adults

OBJECTIVES

The study investigated whether cognitive effort decision-making measured via a neuroeconomic paradigm that manipulated framing (gain vs. loss outcomes), could predict daily life engagement in mentally demanding activities in both younger and older adults.

METHOD

Younger and older adult participants (N = 310) completed the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm (Cog-ED), under both gain and loss conditions, to provide an experimental index of cognitive effort costs for each participant in each framing condition. A subset of participants (N = 230) also completed a 7-day Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) protocol measuring engagement in mentally demanding daily life activities.

RESULTS

In a large, online sample, we replicated a robust increase in cognitive effort costs among older, relative to younger, adults. Additionally, costs were found to be reduced in the loss relative to gain frame, although these effects were only reliable at high levels of task difficulty and were not moderated by age. Critically, participants who had lower effort costs in the gain frame tended to report engaging in more mentally demanding daily life activities, but the opposite pattern was observed in the loss frame. Further analyses demonstrated the specificity of reward-related cognitive motivation in predicting daily life mentally demanding activities.

DISCUSSION

Together, these results suggest that cognitive effort costs, as measured through behavioral choice patterns in a neuroeconomic decision-making task, can be used to predict and explain engagement in mentally demanding activities during daily life among both older and younger adults.

Examining tradeoffs between cognitive effort and relief among adults with self-injurious behavior

BACKGROUND

People engage in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) to reduce negative affect, but it is not clear why they engage in this harmful type of behavior instead of using healthier strategies. The primary goal of this study was to evaluate whether people choose NSSI to reduce negative affect because they perceive it to be less cognitively costly than other available strategies.

METHOD

In experiment one, 43 adults completed a novel, relief-based effort discounting task designed to index preferences about exerting cognitive effort to achieve relief. In experiment two, 149 adults, 52 % with a history of NSSI, completed our effort discounting task.

RESULTS

Our main results suggest that people will accept less relief from an aversive experience if doing so requires expending less effort, i.e. they demonstrate effort discounting in the context of decisions about relief. We also found and that effort discounting is stronger among those with a history of NSSI, but this association became nonsignificant when simultaneously accounting for other conditions associated with aberrant effort tradeoffs.

LIMITATIONS

The use of a control group without NSSI or other potentially harmful relief-seeking behaviors limits our ability to draw specific conclusions about NSSI. The ecological validity of our task was limited by a modestly effective affect manipulation, and because participants made hypothetical choices.

CONCLUSIONS

This study demonstrates that preferences about exerting cognitive effort may be a barrier to using healthier affect regulation strategies. Further, the preference not to exert cognitive effort, though present in NSSI, is likely not unique to NSSI. Instead, effort discounting may be a transdiagnostic mechanism promoting an array of harmful relief-seeking behaviors.

Explore versus store: Children strategically trade off reliance on exploration versus working memory during a complex task

During complex tasks, we use working memory to actively maintain goal sets and direct attention toward goal-relevant information in the environment. However, working memory is severely limited, and storing information in working memory is cognitively effortful. Previous work by Kibbe and Kowler [2011, Journal of Vision, 11(3), Article 14] showed that adults strategically modulate reliance on working memory during complex, goal-oriented tasks, varying the amount of information they store in working memory depending both on the cognitive demands of the task and on the ease with which task-relevant information can be accessed from the environment. We asked whether children, whose working memory and executive functions are undergoing significant developmental change, also use working memory strategically during complex tasks. Forty-six 8-10-year-old children searched through arrays of hidden objects to find three that belonged to a given category defined over the objects' features. We manipulated the cognitive demands of the task by increasing the complexity of the category. We manipulated the exploration costs of the task by varying the rate at which task-relevant information could be accessed. We measured children's search patterns to gain insights into how the children used working memory during the task. We found that as the cognitive demands of the task increased, children stored less information in working memory, relying more on exploration. When exploration was costlier, children explored less, storing more in working memory. These results suggest that developing children, like adults, make strategic decisions about when to explore versus when to store during a complex, goal-oriented task.

Does mathematics anxiety moderate the effect of problem difficulty on cognitive effort?

A negative relationship between mathematics anxiety (MA) and mathematics performance is well documented. One suggested explanation for this relationship is that MA interferes with the cognitive processes needed when solving mathematics problems. A demand for using more cognitive effort (e.g., when performing harder mathematics problems), can be traced as an increase in pupil dilation during the performance. However, we lack knowledge of how MA affects this relationship between the problem difficulty and cognitive effort. This study investigated, for the first time, if MA moderates the effect of arithmetic (i.e., multiplication) problem difficulty on cognitive effort. Thirty-four university students from Norway completed multiplication tasks, including three difficulty levels of problems, while their cognitive effort was also measured by means of pupil dilation using an eye tracker. Further, the participants reported their MA using a questionnaire, and arithmetic competence, general intelligence, and working memory were measured with paper-pencil tasks. A linear mixed model analysis showed that the difficulty level of the multiplication problems affected the cognitive effort so that the pupil dilated more with harder multiplication problems. However, we did not find a moderating effect of MA on cognitive effort, when controlling for arithmetic competence, general intelligence, and working memory. This suggests that MA does not contribute to cognitive effort when solving multiplication problems.

Mental calculation increases physiological postural tremor, but does not influence physiological goal-directed kinetic tremor

Purpose

During a cognitive effort, an increase in cortical electrical activity, functional alterations in the anterior cingulate cortex, and modifications in cortical inputs to the active motor units have been reported. In light of this, an increase in tremor could be anticipated as result of a mental task. In the present work, we tested this hypothesis.

Methods

In 25 individuals, tremor was measured with a three-axial accelerometer during 300 s of postural and goal-directed tasks performed simultaneously to mental calculation, or during control (same tasks without mental calculation). Hand and finger dexterity were also evaluated. Electromyographic (EMG) recordings from the extensor digitorum communis were collected during the postural task.

Results

Hand and finger dexterity was negatively affected by the mental task (p = .003 and p = .00005 respectively). During mental calculation, muscle tremor increased in the hand postural (+ 29%, p = .00005) but not in the goal-directed task (− 1.5%, p > .05). The amplitude of the main frequency peak also increased exclusively in the hand postural task (p = .028), whilst no shift in the position of the main frequency peak was observed. EMG was not affected.

Conclusion

These results support the position of the contribution of a central component in the origin of physiological hand postural tremor. It is suggested that the different effect of mental calculation on hand postural and goal-directed tasks can be attributed to the different origins and characteristics of hand postural and goal-directed physiological tremor.

Highly Demand Working Memory Intervention Weakens a Reactivated Threat Memory and the Associated Cognitive Biases

Anxiety disorders are the most frequent type of mental disorder. Threat-conditioning memory plays a central role in anxiety disorders, impacting complex cognitive systems by modifying behavioral responses to fearful stimuli and inducing an overestimation of potential threats. Here, we analyzed the reminder-dependent amnesia on physiological responses, unconditioned stimulus (US) expectancy ratings, and measures of cognitive bias towards the threat of a threat-conditioning memory. Subjects received differential threat-conditioning. Twenty-four hours later, after reactivation of the memory of threat-conditioning, one group performed a high demand working memory task (HWM) and a second group a low demand working memory task (LWM). A third group only performed the HWM task. Retention of conditioned threat memory was tested on Day 3 in an extinction session followed by a reinstatement test. Tasks targeting stimulus representation, valuation, and attentional bias towards threat were performed. We show that the reminder-dependent intervention with an HWM weakened memory retention as expressed in skin conductance response (SCR) and faded the representation and valuation towards the threat, but it did not affect US expectancy or attentional bias. Our findings provide evidence for the experimental psychopathology approach opening the possibility to weaken both Threat conditioning memory and the systems associated with the maintenance of anxiety features.

When humor is a matter of heart: effects on emotional state and Interbeat Interval

Previous studies demonstrated that exposure to humor has beneficial effects on psychological well-being. In the present work, we investigated the behavioral and psychophysiological effects of different types of humor on psychological well-being and on the performance during the execution of a stressful cognitive task. To this aim, we examined the behavioral and psychophysiological effects of ToM humorous and Slapstick humorous comic strips before and after executing a stressful cognitive task. We hypothesized that only slapstick humor could reduce the level of anxiety, increase positive affect and improve performance on the cognitive task. Our findings revealed that, at a specific point in time, exposure to ToM Humor and No Humor strips were associated with lower IBI (higher HR, increase in cardiac recruitment) than slapstick humor. This result suggests that humor involving ToM abilities and No Humor strips elicited a greater cognitive engagement level than slapstick humor. Moreover, in an exploratory analysis we found a positive correlation between cardiac deactivation during the exposure to slapstick Humor and individual empathy scores, suggesting that the empathy skills might influence cardiac recruitment and the level of cognitive engagement during the exposure to humorous material.

When do languages use the same word for different meanings? The Goldilocks principle in colexification

Lexical ambiguity is pervasive in language, and often systematic. For instance, the Spanish word dedo can refer to a toe or a finger, that is, these two meanings colexify in Spanish; and they do so as well in over one hundred other languages. Previous work shows that related meanings are more likely to colexify. This is attributed to cognitive pressure towards simplicity in language, as it makes lexicons easier to learn and use. The present study examines the interplay between this pressure and the competing pressure for languages to support accurate information transfer. We hypothesize that colexification follows a Goldilocks principle that balances the two pressures: meanings are more likely to attach to the same word when they are related to an optimal degree-neither too much, nor too little. We find support for this principle in data from over 1200 languages and 1400 meanings. Our results thus suggest that universal forces shape the lexicons of natural languages. More broadly, they contribute to the growing body of evidence suggesting that languages evolve to strike a balance between competing functional and cognitive pressures.

Seizing the opportunity: Lifespan differences in the effects of the opportunity cost of time on cognitive control

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control reflect maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning. However, complementary explanations exist: It could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. Here we test whether the degree of cognitive effort expenditure depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time): if the average reward rate is high, participants should withhold cognitive effort whereas if it is low, they should invest more. In Experiment 1, we examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, by applying a reward rate manipulation in two cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found that young adults and adolescents reflexively withheld effort when the opportunity cost of time was high, whereas older adults and, to a lesser degree children, invested more resources to accumulate reward as quickly as possible. We tentatively interpret these results in terms of age- and task-specific differences in the processing of the opportunity cost of time. We qualify our findings in a second experiment in younger adults in which we address an alternative explanation of our results and show that the observed age differences in effort expenditure may not result from differences in task difficulty. To conclude, we think that our results present an interesting first step at relating opportunity costs to motivational processes across the lifespan. We frame the implications of further work in this area within a recent developmental model of resource-rationality, which points to developmental sweet spots in cognitive control.

Consumers with high frequency of 'just about right' in JAR scales may use lower cognitive effort: Evidence from the concurrent 9-point hedonic scale and CATA question

JAR scales are widely used to evaluate the suitability of attributes and guide product optimization. However, the reliability and validity of the results from JAR scales had been widely doubted. In the current research, it was hypothesized that respondents with high just about right (jar) frequency may have more satisficers according to Krosnick's survey satisficing theory, herein they were more likely to employ low cognitive effort in the tests. To search relevant evidence to prove this, a strategy of indirect method was employed that consumer with different jar frequencies may also perform differently in other concurrent tests such as hedonic scaling and CATA questions. A total of 716 consumers were recruited in four studies with four different sets of products involving coffee and chrysanthemum tea. These consumers were then divided into two groups in each study according to their jar frequency to examine the above hypothesis and their performance on the concurrent tests were compared between the two groups. It was found that consumers with high jar frequency tended to use a narrower range of scales on 9-point hedonic scale, and use terms more narrowly and repeatedly in CATA questions. This confirmed the above hypothesis. Meanwhile, the low cognitive effort could noticeably influence responses in other questions. For instance, it led to lower product discrimination based on hedonic scores when samples were similar and altered results of related to terms discrimination and term configurations in CATA questions. Thereby, survey satisficing problem should be taken seriously in both experimental design and statistical analysis in consumer testings.

Neural systems underlying the learning of cognitive effort costs

People balance the benefits of cognitive work against the costs of cognitive effort. Models that incorporate prospective estimates of the costs of cognitive effort into decision making require a mechanism by which these costs are learned. However, it remains an open question what brain systems are important for this learning, particularly when learning is not tied explicitly to a decision about what task to perform. In this fMRI experiment, we parametrically manipulated the level of effort a task requires by increasing task switching frequency across six task contexts. In a scanned learning phase, participants implicitly learned about the task switching frequency in each context. In a subsequent test phase, participants made selections between pairs of these task contexts. We modeled learning within a reinforcement learning framework, and found that effort expectations that derived from task-switching probability and response time (RT) during learning were the best predictors of later choice behavior. Prediction errors (PE) from these two models were associated with FPN during distinct learning epochs. Specifically, PE derived from expected RT was most correlated with the fronto-parietal network early in learning, whereas PE derived from expected task switching frequency was correlated with the fronto-parietal network late in learning. These results suggest that multiple task-related factors are tracked by the brain while performing a task that can drive subsequent estimates of effort costs.

Judgements of effort as a function of post-trial versus post-task elicitation

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such “objective” measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively “objective” measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.

Messages beyond the phone: Processing variable message signs while attending hands-free phone calls

We examined the effects of different types of cognitive distraction coming from a hands-free phone conversation on the processing of information provided by variable message signs (VMS), on driving performance indicators, and on a physiological index of mental effort (heart rate). Participants drove a route in a driving simulator and had to respond to VMS messages under three conditions: no-distraction, visuospatial distraction (attending phone calls with questions inducing visuospatial processing), and conceptual distraction (attending phone calls with questions requiring semantic memory). Results showed more errors responding to VMS messages in the visuospatial distraction condition. In addition, both types of questions increased the intraindividual variability of response distances and the heart rate, as compared to the no-distraction condition. These results provide new evidence that talking on a hands-free phone entails costs in the processing of traffic information (in particular, text messages displayed on VMS) and it increases the driver's cognitive effort. Interestingly, the cognitive distraction had no effect on the driver's control of the vehicle speed or lateral position. Therefore, the effects of potential risk factors can critically vary among the different driving subtasks due to modulatory factors, such as the level of attentional task demands (relatively high in the processing of messages on VMS, but relatively low in controlling the speed and lateral position of the vehicle in quiet traffic conditions). In consequence, the current paper provides new evidence to discuss hands-free phone policies and highlights the importance of designing technological countermeasures to prevent drivers missing critical information displayed on VMS.

Modulatory effects of cognitive exertion on regional functional connectivity of the salience network in women with ME/CFS: A pilot study

BACKGROUND

A common symptom of myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is post-exertional malaise (PEM). Various brain abnormalities have been observed in patients with ME/CFS, especially in insular and limbic areas, but their link with ME/CFS symptoms is still unclear. This pilot study aimed at investigating the association between PEM in ME/CFS and changes in functional connectivity (FC) of two main networks: the salience network (SN) and the default-mode network (DMN).

METHODS

A total of 16 women, 6 with and 10 without ME/CFS, underwent clinical and MRI assessment before and after cognitive exertion. Resting-state FC maps of 7 seeds (3 for the SN and 4 for the DMN) and clinical measures of fatigue, pain and cognition were analysed with repeated-measure models. FC-symptom change associations were also investigated.

RESULTS

Exertion induced increases in fatigue and pain in patients with ME/CFS compared to the control group, while no changes were found in cognitive performance. At baseline, patients showed altered FC between some DMN seeds and frontal areas and stronger FC between all SN seeds and left temporal areas and the medulla. Significantly higher FC increases in patients than in controls were found only between the right insular seed and frontal and subcortical areas; these increases correlated with worsening of symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

Cognitive exertion can induce worsening of ME/CFS-related symptoms. These changes were here associated with strengthening of FC of the right insula with areas involved in reward processing and cognitive control.

Comparing verbal working memory load in auditory and visual modalities using functional near-infrared spectroscopy

The verbal identity n-back task is commonly used to assess verbal working memory (VWM) capacity. Only three studies have compared brain activation during the n-back when using auditory and visual stimuli. The earliest study, a positron emission tomography study of the 3-back, found no differences in VWM-related brain activation between n-back modalities. In contrast, two subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of the 2-back found that auditory VWM was associated with greater left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC) activation than visual VWM, perhaps suggesting that auditory VWM requires more cognitive effort than its visual counterpart. The current study aimed to assess whether DL-PFC activation (i.e., cognitive effort) differs by VWM modality. To do this, 16 younger adults completed an auditory and visual n-back, both at four levels of VWM load. Concurrently, activation of the PFC was measured using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), a silent neuroimaging method. We found that DL-PFC activation increased with VWM load, but it was not affected by VWM modality or the interaction between load and modality. This supports the view that both VWM modalities require similar cognitive effort, and perhaps that previous fMRI results were an artefact of scanner noise. We also found that, across conditions, DL-PFC activation was positively correlated with reaction time. This may further support DL-PFC activation as an index of cognitive effort, and fNIRS as a method to measure it.

More mental rotation time does not imply more mental effort: Pupillary diameters do not change with angular distance

The ability to mentally rotate objects in space is a fundamental cognitive capacity. Previous studies showed that the time to rotate the image of a figure to match another increases progressively with angular disparity. It remains unclear whether this increase in response time with angular disparity could reflect increased processing operations or more cognitive effort instead of a sustained use of a 'rotate' mechanism without a change in workload. We collected response times as well as pupillary responses that index cognitive workload and activity in the brainstem's locus coeruleus, from a sample of 38 young adults performing a chronometric mental rotations task. The results showed the expected increase in response times but no increase in pupil diameters between 60, 120, and 180 degrees of rotation, suggesting no significant changes in arousal levels when rotating figures near and far. This indicates that during mental rotation the load on cognitive resources remains constant irrespective of angular distance.

The cortical oscillatory patterns associated with varying levels of reward during an effortful vigilance task

We explored how reward and value of effort shapes performance in a sustained vigilance, reaction time (RT) task. It was posited that reward and value would hasten RTs and increase cognitive effort by boosting activation in the sensorimotor cortex and inhibition in the frontal cortex, similar to the horse-race model of motor actions. Participants performed a series of speeded responses while expecting differing monetary rewards (0 pence (p), 1 p, and 10 p) if they responded faster than their median RT. Amplitudes of cortical alpha, beta, and theta oscillations were analysed using the event-related desynchronization method. In experiment 1 (N = 29, with 12 females), reward was consistent within block, while in experiment 2 (N = 17, with 12 females), reward amount was displayed before each trial. Each experiment evaluated the baseline amplitude of cortical oscillations differently. The value of effort was evaluated using a cognitive effort discounting task (COGED). In both experiments, RTs decreased significantly with higher rewards. Reward level sharpened the increased amplitudes of beta oscillations during fast responses in experiment 1. In experiment 2, reward decreased the amplitudes of beta oscillations in the ipsilateral sensorimotor cortex. Individual effort values did not significantly correlate with oscillatory changes in either experiment. Results suggest that reward level and response speed interacted with the task- and baseline-dependent patterns of cortical inhibition in the frontal cortex and with activation in the sensorimotor cortex during the period of motor preparation in a sustained vigilance task. However, neither the shortening of RT with increasing reward nor the value of effort correlated with oscillatory changes. This implies that amplitudes of cortical oscillations may shape upcoming motor responses but do not translate higher-order motivational factors into motor performance.

Free-choice and forced-choice actions: Shared representations and conservation of cognitive effort

We examined two questions regarding the interplay of planned and ongoing actions. First: Do endogenous (free-choice) and exogenous (forced-choice) triggers of action plans activate similar cognitive representations? And, second: Are free-choice decisions biased by future action goals retained in working memory? Participants planned and retained a forced-choice action to one visual event (A) while executing an immediate forced-choice or free-choice action (action B) to a second visual event (B); then the retained action (A) was executed. We found performance costs for action B if the two action plans partly overlapped versus did not overlap (partial repetition costs). This held true even when action B required a free-choice response indicating that forced-choice and free-choice actions are represented similarly. Partial repetition costs for free-choice actions were evident regardless of whether participants did or did not show free-choice response biases. Also, a subset of participants showed a bias to freely choose actions that did not overlap (vs. did overlap) with the action plan retained in memory, which led to improved performance in executing action B and recalling action A. Because cognitive effort is likely required to resolve feature code competition and confusion assumed to underlie partial repetition costs, this free-choice decision bias may serve to conserve cognitive effort and preserve the future action goal retained in working memory.

Distinguishing cognitive effort and working memory load using scale-invariance and alpha suppression in EEG

Despite being intuitive, cognitive effort has proven difficult to define quantitatively. Here, we proposed to study cognitive effort by investigating the degree to which the brain deviates from its default state, where brain activity is scale-invariant. Specifically, we measured such deviations by examining changes in scale-invariance of brain activity as a function of task difficulty and posited suppression of scale-invariance as a proxy for exertion of cognitive effort. While there is some fMRI evidence supporting this proposition, EEG investigations on the matter are scant, despite the EEG signal being more suitable for analysis of scale invariance (i.e., having a much broader frequency range). In the current study we validated the correspondence between scale-invariance (H) of cortical activity recorded by EEG and task load during two working memory (WM) experiments with varying set sizes. Then, we used this neural signature to disentangle cognitive effort from the number of items stored in WM within participants. Our results showed monotonic decreases in H with increased set size, even after set size exceeded WM capacity. This behavior of H contrasted with behavioral performance and an oscillatory indicator of WM load (i.e., alpha-band desynchronization), both of which showed a plateau at difficulty levels surpassing WM capacity. This is the first reported evidence for the suppression of scale-invariance in EEG due to task difficulty, and our work suggests that H suppression may be used to quantify changes in cognitive effort even when working memory load is at maximum capacity.

Anticipated, experienced, and remembered subjective effort and discomfort on sustained attention versus working memory tasks

This study examined individuals' ability to accurately anticipate how cognitively effortful and uncomfortable a task will feel based on a short sample of the task. Participants completed a sustained attention or working memory task. Post-practice, participants rated the effort and discomfort that they anticipated their task would require and engender, respectively. Participants also rated their effort and discomfort during task-administration and the effort and discomfort they recalled feeling after task-administration. Sustained attention task participants anticipated significantly less effort than working memory task participants. Sustained attention task participants felt significantly more effort during the task and remembered feeling more effort than they had anticipated. Working memory task participants felt significantly less effort during the task than they had anticipated. Sustained attention task participants anticipated, experienced, and recalled feeling more discomfort than working memory task participants. Individuals' anticipation of effort required depends on the task and is different from the effort they actually feel during the task and later recall feeling.

The effect of literacy and culture on cognitive effort test performance: An examination of the Test of Memory Malingering in Colombia

Introduction: Cognitive efforts tests, such as the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), are widely used internationally, yet emerging research suggests that performance on the TOMM can be affected by culture and education. This study examined the specificity of the TOMM and performance differences among Colombian adults, contrasting those with varying levels of literacy in order to evaluate the impact of these variables on error rates. It was hypothesized that literacy would be positively correlated with TOMM scores. Method: The sample consisted of 256 participants: the Absolute Illiterate participants had no formal education and no ability to read or write (n = 58), Functional Illiterate participants had no formal education and only basic reading and writing skills (n = 66), Literate participants had up to 12-years of education (n = 66), and Highly Literate participants had some post-secondary education (n = 66). Group differences for Trial 1 (T1) and Trial 2 (T2) were analyzed using ANOVAs and chi-square tests, along with post-hoc comparisons. Results: Mean T2 scores for the four groups were all above the suggested cutoff score of 45: the Highly Literate group had the highest mean score (49.3, range 41 to 50), and the Absolute Illiterate group had the lowest mean score (45.5, range 30 to 50). The Absolute and Functional Illiterate groups performed significantly worse on the TOMM trials than the literate participants. Cognitive performance as measured by indicators of verbal fluency and executive control significantly correlated with TOMM performance. However, when evaluated together in hierarchical logistic regressions, only age and literacy significantly predicted TOMM scores. Conclusions: Although the performance of Colombian adults suggests that the TOMM can be used cross-culturally with literate individuals, Colombian adults with poorer literacy skills performed significantly worse, raising concerns regarding the use of this measure with educationally-diverse samples. Research and clinical implications are discussed.

Explore or reset? Pupil diameter transiently increases in self-chosen switches between cognitive labor and leisure in either direction

When people invest effort in cognitive work, they often keep an eye open for rewarding alternative activities. Previous research suggests that the norepinephrine (NE) system regulates such trade-offs between exploitation of the current task and exploration of alternative possibilities. We examined the possibility that the NE system is involved in another trade-off, i.e., the trade-off between cognitive labor and leisure. We conducted two pre-registered studies (total N = 62) in which participants freely chose to perform either a paid 2-back task (labor) versus a non-paid task (leisure), while we tracked their pupil diameter—which is an indicator of the state of the NE system. In both studies, consistent with prior work, we found (a) increases in pupil baseline and (b) decreases in pupil dilation when participants switched from labor to leisure. Unexpectedly, we found the same pattern when participants switched from leisure back to labor. Both increases in pupil baseline and decreases in pupil dilation were short-lived. Collectively, these results are more consistent with a role of norepinephrine in reorienting attention and task switching, as suggested by network reset theory, than with a role in motivation, as suggested by adaptive gain theory.

Focused attention predicts visual working memory performance in 13-month-old infants: A pupillometric study

Attention turns looking, into seeing. Yet, little developmental research has examined the interface of attention and visual working memory (VWM), where what is seen is maintained for use in ongoing visual tasks. Using the task-evoked pupil response - a sensitive, real-time, involuntary measure of focused attention that has been shown to correlate with VWM performance in adults and older children - we examined the relationship between focused attention and VWM in 13-month-olds. We used a Delayed Match Retrieval paradigm, to test infants' VWM for object-location bindings - what went where - while recording anticipatory gaze responses and pupil dilation. We found that infants with greater focused attention during memory encoding showed significantly better memory performance. As well, trials that ended in a correct response had significantly greater pupil response during memory encoding than incorrect trials. Taken together, this shows that pupillometry can be used as a measure of focused attention in infants, and a means to identify those individuals, or moments, where cognitive effort is maximized.

Context-dependent modulation of cognitive control involves different temporal profiles of fronto-parietal activity

To efficiently deal with quickly changing task demands, we often need to organize our behaviour on different time scales. For example, to ignore irrelevant and select relevant information, cognitive control might be applied in reactive (short time scale) or proactive (long time scale) mode. These two control modes play a pivotal role in cognitive-neuroscientific theorizing but the temporal dissociation of the underlying neural mechanisms is not well established empirically. In this fMRI study, a cognitive control task was administered in contexts with mainly congruent (MC) and mainly incongruent (MI) trials to induce reactive and proactive control, respectively. Based on behavioural profiles, we expected cognitive control in the MC context to be characterized by transient activity (measured on-trial) in task-relevant areas. In the MI context, cognitive control was expected to be reflected in sustained activity (measured in the intertrial interval) in similar or different areas. Results show that in the MC context, on-trial transient activity (incongruent - congruent trials) was increased in fronto-parietal areas, compared to the MI context. These areas included dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS). In the MI context, sustained activity in similar fronto-parietal areas during the intertrial interval was increased, compared to the MC context. These results illuminate how context-dependent reactive and proactive control subtend the same brain areas but operate on different time scales.

Cue awareness in avoiding effortful control

Based on a recent metacognitive account, cognitive effort is the result of an inferential evaluation made over explicitly available cues. Following from this account, we present here a pre-registered experiment that tested the specific hypothesis that explicit awareness of cues that are aligned with cognitive demand is a prerequisite in avoiding effortful lines of action. We attempted to modulate levels of effort avoidance behavior by introducing an incentive (between-subjects) to monitor two lines of action that, unbeknownst to individuals, varied in the probability of a task switch. Importantly, previous research has demonstrated that the difference in these probabilities is relatively opaque to individuals. We did not find strong evidence for our incentive manipulation having an effect on demand avoidance as indexed by individuals' choices in a block of the task where avoiding effort was instructed. However, we do find that being aware of the task-switching cue appears to increase the likelihood of demand avoidance. We consider these results within the context of the metacognition of cognitive effort.

Can sustained attention adapt to prior cognitive effort? An evidence from experimental study

According to the limited resources paradigm, prior cognitive effort should result in a temporary depletion of available cognitive resources (Kahneman, 1973). Some recent evidence however has proved an opposite effect of increment in the availability of cognitive resources as a function of prior cognitive effort. In the current study the follow-up effect of cognitive effort on sustained attention was examined. Eighty-nine participants took part in the experiment. The cognitive load was manipulated between subjects using three versions of the DIVA Task (intensive warming-up condition, moderate warming-up condition and the control one). Following the experimental manipulation, the availability of cognitive resources during vigilance task was checked. Some significant effects of experimental manipulation were observed. First, in the context of overall task performance, subjects from the intensive warming-up condition obtained lower total errors rate than subjects from the control one. Some moderate effect of cognitive warming-up on time-on-task performance was also observed, although it was isolated to false alarms rate. Those results, tentatively suggesting the occurrence of the cognitive warming-up effect in vigilance performance, are then discussed. PSYCINFO CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES AND CODES: 2300 Human Experimental Psychology: 2346 Attention.

An information-theoretic perspective on the costs of cognition

In statistics and machine learning, model accuracy is traded off with complexity, which can be viewed as the amount of information extracted from the data. Here, we discuss how cognitive costs can be expressed in terms of similar information costs, i.e. as a function of the amount of information required to update a person's prior knowledge (or internal model) to effectively solve a task. We then examine the theoretical consequences that ensue from this assumption. This framework naturally explains why some tasks - for example, unfamiliar or dual tasks - are costly and permits to quantify these costs using information-theoretic measures. Finally, we discuss brain implementation of this principle and show that subjective cognitive costs can originate either from local or global capacity limitations on information processing or from increased rate of metabolic alterations. These views shed light on the potential adaptive value of cost-avoidance mechanisms.

Motivation dynamically increases noise resistance by internal feedback during movement

Motivation improves performance, pushing us beyond our normal limits. One general explanation for this is that the effects of neural noise can be reduced, at a cost. If this were possible, reward would promote investment in resisting noise. But how could the effects of noise be attenuated, and why should this be costly? Negative feedback may be employed to compensate for disturbances in a neural representation. Such feedback would increase the robustness of neural representations to internal signal fluctuations, producing a stable attractor. We propose that encoding this negative feedback in neural signals would incur additional costs proportional to the strength of the feedback signal. We use eye movements to test the hypothesis that motivation by reward improves precision by increasing the strength of internal negative feedback. We find that reward simultaneously increases the amplitude, velocity and endpoint precision of saccades, indicating true improvement in oculomotor performance. Analysis of trajectories demonstrates that variation in the eye position during the course of saccades is predictive of the variation of endpoints, but this relation is reduced by reward. This indicates that motivation permits more aggressive correction of errors during the saccade, so that they no longer affect the endpoint. We suggest that such increases in internal negative feedback allow attractor stability, albeit at a cost, and therefore may explain how motivation improves cognitive as well as motor precision.

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Motivation can increase speed and reduce behavioural variability.

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This requires stabilising neural representations so they are robust to noise.

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Stable representations or attractors in neural systems may come at the cost of stronger negative feedback.

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Examination of trajectory correlations demonstrates that reward increases negative feedback.

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We propose that the cost of stabilising signals explain why effort is expensive.

Brain Stimulation Over the Frontopolar Cortex Enhances Motivation to Exert Effort for Reward

BACKGROUND

Loss of motivation is a characteristic feature of several psychiatric and neurological disorders. However, the neural mechanisms underlying human motivation are far from being understood. Here, we investigate the role that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) plays in motivating cognitive and physical effort exertion by computing subjective effort equivalents.

METHODS

We manipulated neural processing with transcranial direct current stimulation targeting the FPC while 141 healthy participants decided whether or not to engage in cognitive or physical effort to obtain rewards.

RESULTS

We found that brain stimulation targeting the FPC increased the amount of both types of effort participants were willing to exert for rewards.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings provide important insights into the neural mechanisms involved in motivating effortful behavior. Moreover, they suggest that considering the motivation-related activity of the FPC could facilitate the development of treatments for the loss of motivation commonly seen in psychiatric and other neurological disorders.

Neural systems of cognitive demand avoidance

Cognitive effort is typically aversive, evident in people's tendency to avoid cognitively demanding tasks. The 'cost of control' hypothesis suggests that engagement of cognitive control systems of the brain makes a task costly and the currency of that cost is a reduction in anticipated rewards. However, prior studies have relied on binary hard versus easy task subtractions to manipulate cognitive effort and so have not tested this hypothesis in "dose-response" fashion. In a sample of 50 participants, we parametrically manipulated the level of effort during fMRI scanning by systematically increasing cognitive control demands during a demand-selection paradigm over six levels. As expected, frontoparietal control network (FPN) activity increased, and reward network activity decreased, as control demands increased across tasks. However, avoidance behavior was not attributable to the change in FPN activity, lending only partial support to the cost of control hypothesis. By contrast, we unexpectedly observed that the de-activation of a task-negative brain network corresponding to the Default Mode Network (DMN) across levels of the cognitive control manipulation predicted the change in avoidance. In summary, we find partial support for the cost of control hypothesis, while highlighting the role of task-negative brain networks in modulating effort avoidance behavior.

Reward circuitry activation reflects social preferences in the face of cognitive effort

Research at the intersection of social neuroscience and cognitive effort is an interesting new area for exploration. There is great potential to broaden our understanding of how social context and cognitive effort processes, currently addressed in disparate literatures, interact with one another. In this paper, we briefly review the literature on cognitive effort, focusing on effort-linked valuation and the gap in the literature regarding cognitive effort in the social domain. Next, we present a study designed to explore valuation processes linked to cognitive effort within the social context of an inequality manipulation. More specifically, we created monetary inequality among the participant (SELF, endowed with $50) and two confederates: one also endowed with $50 (OTHER HIGH) and another with only $5 (OTHER LOW). We then scanned participants using fMRI as they attempted to earn bonus payments for themselves and others through a cognitively effortful feedback-based learning task. Positive feedback produced significantly greater activation than negative feedback in key valuation regions, the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), both when participants were performing the task on their own behalf and when earning rewards for others. While reward-related activity in the VS was exaggerated for SELF compared to OTHER HIGH for both positive and negative feedback, activity in the vmPFC did not distinguish between recipients in the group-level results. Furthermore, participants naturally fell into two groups: those most engaged when playing for themselves and those who reported engagement for others. While Self-Engaged participants showed differences between the SELF and both OTHER conditions in the VS and vmPFC, Other-Engaged participants only showed an attenuated response to negative feedback for OTHER HIGH compared to SELF in the VS and no differences between recipient conditions in the vmPFC. Together, this work shows the importance of individual differences and the fragility of advantageous inequality aversion in the face of cognitive effort, highlighting the need to study cognitive effort in the social domain.

The opportunity cost of time modulates cognitive effort

A spate of recent work demonstrates that humans seek to avoid the expenditure of cognitive effort, much like physical effort or economic resources. Less is clear, however, about the circumstances dictating how and when people decide to expend cognitive effort. Here we adopt a popular theory of opportunity costs and response vigor and to elucidate this question. This account, grounded in Reinforcement Learning, formalizes a trade-off between two costs: the harder work assumed necessary to emit faster actions and the opportunity cost inherent in acting more slowly (i.e., the delay that results to the next reward and subsequent rewards). Recent work reveals that the opportunity cost of time-operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time, theorized to be signaled by tonic dopamine levels, modulates the speed with which a person responds in a simple discrimination tasks. We extend this framework to cognitive effort in a diverse range of cognitive tasks, for which 1) the amount of cognitive effort demanded from the task varies from trial to trial and 2) the putative expenditure of cognitive effort holds measureable consequences in terms of accuracy and response time. In the domains of cognitive control, perceptual decision-making, and task-switching, we found that subjects tuned their level of effort exertion in accordance with the experienced average reward rate: when the opportunity cost of time was high, subjects made more errors and responded more quickly, which we interpret as a withdrawal of cognitive effort. That is, expenditure of cognitive effort appeared to be modulated by the opportunity cost of time. Further, and consistent with our account, the strength of this modulation was predicted by individual differences in efficacy of cognitive control. Taken together, our results elucidate the circumstances dictating how and when people expend cognitive effort.

Cognitive capacity limitations and Need for Cognition differentially predict reward-induced cognitive effort expenditure

While psychological, economic, and neuroscientific accounts of behavior broadly maintain that people minimize expenditure of cognitive effort, empirical work reveals how reward incentives can mobilize increased cognitive effort expenditure. Recent theories posit that the decision to expend effort is governed, in part, by a cost-benefit tradeoff whereby the potential benefits of mental effort can offset the perceived costs of effort exertion. Taking an individual differences approach, the present study examined whether one's executive function capacity, as measured by Stroop interference, predicts the extent to which reward incentives reduce switch costs in a task-switching paradigm, which indexes additional expenditure of cognitive effort. In accordance with the predictions of a cost-benefit account of effort, we found that a low executive function capacity-and, relatedly, a low intrinsic motivation to expend effort (measured by Need for Cognition)-predicted larger increase in cognitive effort expenditure in response to monetary reward incentives, while individuals with greater executive function capacity-and greater intrinsic motivation to expend effort-were less responsive to reward incentives. These findings suggest that an individual's cost-benefit tradeoff is constrained by the perceived costs of exerting cognitive effort.

Exploring the applicability of the contextual interference effect in sports practice

This review will consider three key issues considered critical when determining the efficacy of the contextual interference effect when applied to sports practice. First, the issue of complexity is considered in relation to the amount of interference actually needed in the applied sports setting to create effective learning. Second, the traditional underpinning mechanism/s of contextual interference are discussed in relation to recent neurophysiological perspectives on their viability. A counter-position to these dominant theories is also presented drawing on an implicit learning framework. The final issue considers the typical measures of learning used within the contextual interference literature and scrutinizes them relative to the needs of bridging the apparent theory-practice divide. The concluding section then presents a model to measure the degree of contextual interference within the applied setting, which in turn offers both future research directions as well as guidelines for practitioners.

Behavioral representation of cost and benefit balance in rats

Decision making is dependent upon individual motivation. Previous studies showed that animals with higher levels of motivation are more likely to invest more time to acquire larger rewards rather than acquiring smaller rewards with less time to wait. However, little is known about how this motivation mediates the cognitive effort animals devote upon making said decisions in detail. In the present study, we investigated the behavioral response in a goal-directed action under a differential reward schedule by training rats to perform a "Do more, get more" (DM-GM) task using a nosepoke operandum when longer nosepoke durations resulted in correspondingly larger rewards. In general, the subjects learned this DM-GM rule and reached a steady behavioral state within 15days. During the training stage, the rats found the most cost-effective action choice and behaved according to that guideline more frequently than other possible actions. In addition, when the cost-benefit ratio changed, the rats again found a new most cost-effective choice to obtain maximum rewards. Our results demonstrate that there is a "balance point" of cost and benefit in rat valuation system and that this "balance point" not only guides the rats to make the appropriate decision, but that this point can be modified upon new situations to choose a newer optimum action plan.

The troubling science of neurophenomenology

Researchers suggest links between mind-wandering and impaired processing of external task stimuli: mind-wandering results in perceptual decoupling. The primary methodology employed to investigate the effects of mind-wandering requires people to report their conscious state and then predicts prior behavior or neurophysiological responses using the person's self-report. Unfortunately, this method employs reports that occur after the behavior occurs. An alternative methodology employs a word displayed prior to a performance check or catch trial. After the catch trial, participants then report their awareness of the word occurring, attempt to recognize the word, and also report whether they were on- or off-task. We show that participants' explicit and implicit awareness of the pre-catch trial word is independent of self-reports of conscious state. This finding conflicts with the perspective that mind-wandering reports indicate perceptual decoupling. Reports of mind-wandering may alternatively be how people explain behavioral outcomes.