Functional networks in emotional moral and nonmoral social judgments

Different aberrant mentalizing networks in males and females with autism spectrum disorders: Evidence from resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging

Previous studies have found that individuals with autism spectrum disorders show impairments in mentalizing processes and aberrant brain activity compared with typically developing participants. However, the findings are mainly from male participants and the aberrant effects in autism spectrum disorder females and sex differences are still unclear. To address these issues, this study analyzed intrinsic functional connectivity of mentalizing regions using resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data of 48 autism spectrum disorder males and females and 48 typically developing participants in autism brain imaging data exchange. Whole-brain analyses showed that autism spectrum disorder males had hyperconnectivity in functional connectivity of the bilateral temporal-parietal junction, whereas autism spectrum disorder females showed hypoconnectivity in functional connectivity of the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and right temporal-parietal junction. Interaction between sex and autism was found in both short- and long-distance functional connectivity effects, confirming that autism spectrum disorder males showed overconnectivity, while autism spectrum disorder females showed underconnectivity. Furthermore, a regression analysis revealed that in autism spectrum disorder, males and females demonstrated different relations between the functional connectivity effects of the mentalizing regions and the core autism spectrum disorder deficits. These results suggest sex differences in the mentalizing network in autism spectrum disorder individuals. Future work is needed to examine how sex interacts with other factors such as age and the sex differences during mentalizing task performance.

Pay What You Want! A Pilot Study on Neural Correlates of Voluntary Payments for Music

Pay-what-you-want (PWYW) is an alternative pricing mechanism for consumer goods. It describes an exchange situation in which the price for a given good is not set by the seller but freely chosen by the buyer. In recent years, many enterprises have made use of PWYW auctions. The somewhat contra-intuitive success of PWYW has sparked a great deal of behavioral work on economical decision making in PWYW contexts in the past. Empirical studies on the neural basis of PWYW decisions, however, are scarce. In the present paper, we present an experimental protocol to study PWYW decision making while simultaneously acquiring functional magnetic resonance imaging data. Participants have the possibility to buy music either under a traditional “fixed-price” (FP) condition or in a condition that allows them to freely decide on the price. The behavioral data from our experiment replicate previous results on the general feasibility of the PWYW mechanism. On the neural level, we observe distinct differences between the two conditions: In the FP-condition, neural activity in frontal areas during decision-making correlates positively with the participants’ willingness to pay. No such relationship was observed under PWYW conditions in any neural structure. Directly comparing neural activity during PWYW and the FP-condition we observed stronger activity of the lingual gyrus during PWYW decisions. Results demonstrate the usability of our experimental paradigm for future investigations into PWYW decision-making and provides first insights into neural mechanisms during self-determined pricing decisions.

Neuroethics 1995-2012. A Bibliometric Analysis of the Guiding Themes of an Emerging Research Field

In bioethics, the first decade of the twenty-first century was characterized by the emergence of interest in the ethical, legal, and social aspects of neuroscience research. At the same time an ongoing extension of the topics and phenomena addressed by neuroscientists was observed alongside its rise as one of the leading disciplines in the biomedical science. One of these phenomena addressed by neuroscientists and moral psychologists was the neural processes involved in moral decision-making. Today both strands of research are often addressed under the label of neuroethics. To understand this development we recalled literature from 1995 to 2012 stored in the Mainz Neuroethics Database (i) to investigate the quantitative development of scientific publications in neuroethics; (ii) to explore changes in the topics of neuroethics research within the defined time interval; (iii) to illustrate the interdependence of different research topics within the neuroethics literature; (iv) to show the development of the distribution of neuroethics research on peer-reviewed journals; and (v) to display the academic background and affiliations of neuroethics researchers. Our analysis exposes that there has been a demonstrative increase of neuroethics research while the issues addressed under this label had mostly been present before the establishment of the field. We show that the research on the ethical, legal and social aspects of neuroscience research is hardly related to neuroscience research on moral decision-making and that the academic backgrounds and affiliations of many neuroethics researchers speak for a very close entanglement of neuroscience and neuroethics. As our article suggests that after more than one decade there still is no dominant agenda for the future of neuroethics research, it calls for more reflection about the theoretical underpinnings and prospects to establish neuroethics as a marked-off research field distinct from neuroscience and the diverse branches of bioethics.

Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory

Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition.

Why do people pirate? A neuroimaging investigation

It is not uncommon for people to openly admit to pirating information from the internet despite the known legal consequences. Those same people are often less inclined to steal the same physical item from a shop. This raises the question, why do people have fewer reservations with stealing intangible items compared to tangible? Using questionnaires and fMRI we provide evidence across three studies as to the differences between tangible and intangible theft. In a questionnaire (Study 1), participants revealed that across different conditions they were more willing to steal intangible compared to tangible goods. Study 2a used fMRI to reveal that a network involved in imagining objects was more active when participants were representing intangible versus tangible objects, suggesting people have greater difficulty representing intangible items. Study 2b used fMRI to show that when stealing tangible objects versus intangible, participants had increased activation in left lateral orbitofrontal cortex, an area typically activated in response to morally laden situations. The findings from the current investigation provide novel insights into the higher prevalence of intangible theft and suggest that differential neural representation of tangible and intangible items may, in part, explain why people are more willing to steal intangible items.

Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality

Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.

An investigation of care-based vs. rule-based morality in frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer's disease, and healthy controls

Behavioral changes in dementia, especially behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), may result in alterations in moral reasoning. Investigators have not clarified whether these alterations reflect differential impairment of care-based vs. rule-based moral behavior. This study investigated 18 bvFTD patients, 22 early onset Alzheimer's disease (eAD) patients, and 20 healthy age-matched controls on care-based and rule-based items from the Moral Behavioral Inventory and the Social Norms Questionnaire, neuropsychological measures, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) regions of interest. There were significant group differences with the bvFTD patients rating care-based morality transgressions less severely than the eAD group and rule-based moral behavioral transgressions more severely than controls. Across groups, higher care-based morality ratings correlated with phonemic fluency on neuropsychological tests, whereas higher rule-based morality ratings correlated with increased difficulty set-shifting and learning new rules to tasks. On neuroimaging, severe care-based reasoning correlated with cortical volume in right anterior temporal lobe, and rule-based reasoning correlated with decreased cortical volume in the right orbitofrontal cortex. Together, these findings suggest that frontotemporal disease decreases care-based morality and facilitates rule-based morality possibly from disturbed contextual abstraction and set-shifting. Future research can examine whether frontal lobe disorders and bvFTD result in a shift from empathic morality to the strong adherence to conventional rules.

Abnormal frontostriatal activity in recently abstinent cocaine users during implicit moral processing

Investigations into the neurobiology of moral cognition are often done by examining clinical populations characterized by diminished moral emotions and a proclivity toward immoral behavior. Psychopathy is the most common disorder studied for this purpose. Although cocaine abuse is highly co-morbid with psychopathy and cocaine-dependent individuals exhibit many of the same abnormalities in socio-affective processing as psychopaths, this population has received relatively little attention in moral psychology. To address this issue, the authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to record hemodynamic activity in 306 incarcerated male adults, stratified into regular cocaine users (n = 87) and a matched sample of non-cocaine users (n = 87), while viewing pictures that did or did not depict immoral actions and determining whether each depicted scenario occurred indoors or outdoors. Consistent with expectations, cocaine users showed abnormal neural activity in several frontostriatial regions during implicit moral picture processing compared to their non-cocaine using peers. This included reduced moral/non-moral picture discrimination in the vACC, vmPFC, lOFC, and left vSTR. Additionally, psychopathy was negatively correlated with activity in an overlapping region of the ACC and right lateralized vSTR. These results suggest that regular cocaine abuse may be associated with affective deficits which can impact relatively high-level processes like moral cognition.

Can beneficial ends justify lying? Neural responses to the passive reception of lies and truth-telling with beneficial and harmful monetary outcomes

Can beneficial ends justify morally questionable means? To investigate how monetary outcomes influence the neural responses to lying, we used a modified, cheap talk sender-receiver game in which participants were the direct recipients of lies and truthful statements resulting in either beneficial or harmful monetary outcomes. Both truth-telling (vs lying) as well as beneficial (vs harmful) outcomes elicited higher activity in the nucleus accumbens. Lying (vs truth-telling) elicited higher activity in the supplementary motor area, right inferior frontal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus and left anterior insula. Moreover, the significant interaction effect was found in the left amygdala, which showed that the monetary outcomes modulated the neural activity in the left amygdala only when truth-telling rather than lying. Our study identified a neural network associated with the reception of lies and truth, including the regions linked to the reward process, recognition and emotional experiences of being treated (dis)honestly.

Obsessive-compulsive disorder--A question of conscience? An fMRI study of behavioural and neurofunctional correlates of shame and guilt

Shame and guilt can be described as 'self-conscious emotions' and are an essential part of the psychopathology in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Our primary aim was to explore whether individuals with OCD are processing shame and guilt differently from healthy individuals (N = 20 in both groups; 50% female; age: 20-40 years) on the behavioural and neurobiological level. For the experimental task, participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance tomography (functional magnetic resonance imaging, 3 T) while imagining neutral, shame inducing and guilt inducing scenarios. In addition to clinical questionnaires, participants were asked to complete questionnaires measuring shame and guilt. The functional data indicate an increased activity in OCD patients in the shame condition in the limbic, temporal and sub-lobar (hypothalamus) areas, in the guilt condition inter alia in frontal, limbic and temporal areas. In summary we found activity in OCD patients in neural networks which are responsible for stimulus filtering, emotion regulation, impulse control and memory. The results from our study may contribute to a better understanding of the origins and maintenance of OCD in association with the pathological processing of shame and guilt on different functional levels.

Neural evidence for moral intuition and the temporal dynamics of interactions between emotional processes and moral cognition

Behavioral and neurological studies have revealed that emotions influence moral cognition. Although moral stimuli are emotionally charged, the time course of interactions between emotions and moral judgments remains unknown. In the present study, we investigated the temporal dynamics of the interaction between emotional processes and moral cognition. The results revealed that when making moral judgments, the time course of the event-related potential (ERP) waveform was significantly different between high emotional arousal and low emotional arousal contexts. Different stages of processing were distinguished, showing distinctive interactions between emotional processes and moral reasoning. The precise time course of moral intuition and moral reasoning sheds new light on theoretical models of moral psychology. Specifically, the N1 component (interpreted as representing moral intuition) did not appear to be influenced by emotional arousal. However, the N2 component and late positive potential were strongly affected by emotional arousal; the slow wave was influenced by both emotional arousal and morality, suggesting distinct moral processing at different emotional arousal levels.

Spontaneous default mode network phase-locking moderates performance perceptions under stereotype threat

This study assessed whether individual differences in self-oriented neural processing were associated with performance perceptions of minority students under stereotype threat. Resting electroencephalographic activity recorded in white and minority participants was used to predict later estimates of task errors and self-doubt on a presumed measure of intelligence. We assessed spontaneous phase-locking between dipole sources in left lateral parietal cortex (LPC), precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (P/PCC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC); three regions of the default mode network (DMN) that are integral for self-oriented processing. Results revealed that minorities with greater LPC-P/PCC phase-locking in the theta band reported more accurate error estimations. All individuals experienced less self-doubt to the extent they exhibited greater LPC-MPFC phase-locking in the alpha band but this effect was driven by minorities. Minorities also reported more self-doubt to the extent they overestimated errors. Findings reveal novel neural moderators of stereotype threat effects on subjective experience. Spontaneous synchronization between DMN regions may play a role in anticipatory coping mechanisms that buffer individuals from stereotype threat.

Culture as a variable in neuroscience and clinical neuropsychology: A comprehensive review

Culture is a dynamic system of bidirectional influences among individuals and their environment, including psychological and biological processes, which facilitate adaptation and social interaction. One of the main challenges in clinical neuropsychology involves cognitive, behavioral and functional assessment of people with different sociocultural backgrounds. In this review essay, examining culture from a historical perspective to ethical issues in cross-cultural research, including the latest significant and publications, the authors sought to explore the main features related to cultural variables in neuropsychological practice and to debate the challenges found regarding the operational methods currently in use. Literature findings suggest a more comprehensive approach in cognitive and behavioral neuroscience, including an interface between elementary disciplines and applied neuropsychology. Thus, as a basis for discussion on this issue, the authors analyzed key-topics related to the study of new trends in sociocultural neuroscience and the application of their concepts from a clinical perspective.

Feel between the lines: implied emotion in sentence comprehension

This study investigated the brain regions for the comprehension of implied emotion in sentences. Participants read negative sentences without negative words, for example, "The boy fell asleep and never woke up again," and their neutral counterparts "The boy stood up and grabbed his bag." This kind of negative sentence allows us to examine implied emotion derived at the sentence level, without associative emotion coming from word retrieval. We found that implied emotion in sentences, relative to neutral sentences, led to activation in some emotion-related areas, including the medial prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the insula, as well as certain language-related areas, including the inferior frontal gyrus, which has been implicated in combinatorial processing. These results suggest that the emotional network involved in implied emotion is intricately related to the network for combinatorial processing in language, supporting the view that sentence meaning is more than simply concatenating the meanings of its lexical building blocks.

Love-related changes in the brain: a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Romantic love is a motivational state associated with a desire to enter or maintain a close relationship with a specific other person. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found activation increases in brain regions involved in the processing of reward, motivation and emotion regulation, when romantic lovers view photographs of their partners. However, not much is known about whether romantic love affects the brain’s functional architecture during rest. In the present study, resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI) data was collected to compare the regional homogeneity (ReHo) and functional connectivity (FC) across an “in-love” group (LG, N = 34, currently intensely in love), an “ended-love” group (ELG, N = 34, ended romantic relationship recently), and a “single” group (SG, N = 32, never fallen in love). Results show that: (1) ReHo of the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) was significantly increased in the LG (in comparison to the ELG and the SG); (2) ReHo of the left dACC was positively correlated with length of time in love in the LG, and negatively correlated with the lovelorn duration since breakup in the ELG; (3) FC within the reward, motivation, and emotion regulation network (dACC, insula, caudate, amygdala, and nucleus accumbens) as well as FC in the social cognition network [temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), inferior parietal, precuneus, and temporal lobe] was significantly increased in the LG (in comparison to the ELG and SG); (4) in most regions within both networks FC was positively correlated with the duration of love in the LG but negatively correlated with the lovelorn duration of time since breakup in the ELG. This study provides first empirical evidence of love-related alterations in brain functional architecture. Furthermore, the results shed light on the underlying neural mechanisms of romantic love, and demonstrate the possibility of applying a resting-state fMRI approach for investigating romantic love.

The neuropsychology of infants' pro-social preferences

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Neural correlates of 6-month-old infants’ detection of pro-social agents.

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ERP component P400 over posterior temporal areas index social valence.

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First non-behavioral demonstration of pro-social preferences in young infants.

The current study is the first to investigate neural correlates of infants’ detection of pro- and antisocial agents. Differences in ERP component P400 over posterior temporal areas were found during 6-month-olds’ observation of helping and hindering agents (Experiment 1), but not during observation of identically moving agents that did not help or hinder (Experiment 2). The results demonstrate that the P400 component indexes activation of infants’ memories of previously perceived interactions between social agents. This leads to suggest that similar processes might be involved in infants’ processing of pro- and antisocial agents and other social perception processes (encoding gaze direction, goal directed grasping and pointing).

Increased Visual Stimulation Systematically Decreases Activity in Lateral Intermediate Cortex

Previous studies have attributed multiple diverse roles to the posterior superior temporal cortex (STC), both visually driven and cognitive, including part of the default mode network (DMN). Here, we demonstrate a unifying property across this multimodal region. Specifically, the lateral intermediate (LIM) portion of STC showed an unexpected feature: a progressively decreasing fMRI response to increases in visual stimulus size (or number). Such responses are reversed in sign, relative to well-known responses in classic occipital temporal visual cortex. In LIM, this "reversed" size function was present across multiple object categories and retinotopic eccentricities. Moreover, we found a significant interaction between the LIM size function and the distribution of subjects' attention. These findings suggest that LIM serves as a part of the DMN. Further analysis of functional connectivity, plus a meta-analysis of previous fMRI results, suggests that LIM is a heterogeneous area including different subdivisions. Surprisingly, analogous fMRI tests in macaque monkeys did not reveal a clear homolog of LIM. This interspecies discrepancy supports the idea that self-referential thinking and theory of mind are more prominent in humans, compared with monkeys.

Me or you? Neural correlates of moral reasoning in everyday conflict situations in adolescents and adults

Throughout adolescence, progress in the understanding of the moral domain as well as changes in moral behavior is observable. We tested 16 adolescents (14-16 years of age) and 16 healthy adults (22-31 years of age) on the developmental changes in everyday moral decision making using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Using verbal stories describing everyday moral conflict situations, subjects had to decide between a moral standard or a personal desire. In the moral conflict situations, adolescents not only chose significantly more often the hedonistic alternative than adults, but they also reported higher certainty ratings. Contrasted with everyday social conflict situations that required a decision between a social-oriented behavior and a personal need, moral conflict situations induced an activity increase in frontal areas, the middle temporal gyrus, the thalamus, and the parahippocampal gyrus in adolescents compared to adults. Moreover, a closer look at the moral conflict situations revealed that adolescents showed more activity than adults in brain areas that are also centrally involved in theory of mind (ToM) during morally oriented decisions in contrast to personal-oriented decisions. This indicated that the development of moral reasoning may be strongly correlated with the development of ToM reasoning.

Dissociable neural systems for moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying

Pro-social lying, which serves to benefit listeners, is considered more socially and morally acceptable than anti-social lying, which serves to harm listeners. However, it is still unclear whether the neural mechanisms underlying the moral judgment of pro-social lying differ from those underlying the moral judgment of anti-social lying. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural activities associated with moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. During fMRI scanning, subjects were provided with scenarios describing a protagonist's anti- and pro-social lying and were then asked to judge whether the protagonist's act was morally appropriate. The behavioral data showed that anti-social lying was mostly judged to be morally inappropriate and that pro-social lying was mainly judged to be morally appropriate. The functional imaging data revealed dissociable neural systems for moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. The anti-social lying, which was judged to be morally inappropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex, right middle frontal gyrus, right precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral temporoparietal junction when compared with the control condition. The pro-social lying, which was judged to be morally appropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right middle temporal gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, and the left middle cingulate gyrus when compared with the control condition. No overlapping activity was observed during the moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying. Our data suggest that cognitive and neural processes for the moral judgment of lying are modulated by whether the lie serves to harm or benefit listeners.

Social cognition and the cerebellum: a meta-analysis of over 350 fMRI studies

This meta-analysis explores the role of the cerebellum in social cognition. Recent meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies since 2008 demonstrate that the cerebellum is only marginally involved in social cognition and emotionality, with a few meta-analyses pointing to an involvement of at most 54% of the individual studies. In this study, novel meta-analyses of over 350 fMRI studies, dividing up the domain of social cognition in homogeneous subdomains, confirmed this low involvement of the cerebellum in conditions that trigger the mirror network (e.g., when familiar movements of body parts are observed) and the mentalizing network (when no moving body parts or unfamiliar movements are present). There is, however, one set of mentalizing conditions that strongly involve the cerebellum in 50-100% of the individual studies. In particular, when the level of abstraction is high, such as when behaviors are described in terms of traits or permanent characteristics, in terms of groups rather than individuals, in terms of the past (episodic autobiographic memory) or the future rather than the present, or in terms of hypothetical events that may happen. An activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis conducted in this study reveals that the cerebellum is critically implicated in social cognition and that the areas of the cerebellum which are consistently involved in social cognitive processes show extensive overlap with the areas involved in sensorimotor (during mirror and self-judgments tasks) as well as in executive functioning (across all tasks). We discuss the role of the cerebellum in social cognition in general and in higher abstraction mentalizing in particular. We also point out a number of methodological limitations of some available studies on the social brain that hamper the detection of cerebellar activity.

Valence of emotions and moral decision-making: increased pleasantness to pleasant images and decreased unpleasantness to unpleasant images are associated with utilitarian choices in healthy adults

Moral decision-making is a key asset for humans’ integration in social contexts, and the way we decide about moral issues seems to be strongly influenced by emotions. For example, individuals with deficits in emotional processing tend to deliver more utilitarian choices (accepting an emotionally aversive action in favor of communitarian well-being). However, little is known about the association between emotional experience and moral-related patterns of choice. We investigated whether subjective reactivity to emotional stimuli, in terms of valence, arousal, and dominance, is associated with moral decision-making in 95 healthy adults. They answered to a set of moral and non-moral dilemmas and assessed emotional experience in valence, arousal and dominance dimensions in response to neutral, pleasant, unpleasant non-moral, and unpleasant moral pictures. Results showed significant correlations between less unpleasantness to negative stimuli, more pleasantness to positive stimuli and higher proportion of utilitarian choices. We also found a positive association between higher arousal ratings to negative moral laden pictures and more utilitarian choices. Low dominance was associated with greater perceived difficulty over moral judgment. These behavioral results are in fitting with the proposed role of emotional experience in moral choice.

Testosterone administration modulates moral judgments depending on second-to-fourth digit ratio

Moral judgment involves the interplay of emotions and social cognitions. The male sex-hormone testosterone might play a role in moral reasoning as males are more utilitarian than females in their moral decisions, and high salivary testosterone levels also are associated with utilitarian moral decisions. However, there is no direct evidence for a role of testosterone in moral reasoning. Recent testosterone administration studies show effects on cognitive empathy and social cooperation, which depend on right-hand's second-to-fourth (2D:4D) digit ratio, a proxy for prenatal sex-hormone (testosterone-versus-estradiol) priming. Here, in a placebo-controlled within-subjects design using 20 young females we show that 2D:4D predicts 44% of the variance in the effects of testosterone administration on moral judgment. Subjects who show an increase in utilitarian judgments following testosterone administration have significantly higher than average 2D:4D (relatively high prenatal estradiol priming), while subjects showing more deontological judgments following testosterone administration have near-significantly lower 2D:4D (relatively high prenatal testosterone priming). We argue that prenatally-organized differences in aromatase, i.e. conversion from testosterone to estradiol in the brain, might underlie these effects. Our findings suggest that early neurodevelopmental effects of sex steroids play a crucial role in the activational effects of hormones on moral reasoning later in life.

Communicative versus strategic rationality: Habermas theory of communicative action and the social brain

In the philosophical theory of communicative action, rationality refers to interpersonal communication rather than to a knowing subject. Thus, a social view of rationality is suggested. The theory differentiates between two kinds of rationality, the emancipative communicative and the strategic or instrumental reasoning. Using experimental designs in an fMRI setting, recent studies explored similar questions of reasoning in the social world and linked them with a neural network including prefrontal and parietal brain regions. Here, we employed an fMRI approach to highlight brain areas associated with strategic and communicative reasoning according to the theory of communicative action. Participants were asked to assess different social scenarios with respect to communicative or strategic rationality. We found a network of brain areas including temporal pole, precuneus, and STS more activated when participants performed communicative reasoning compared with strategic thinking and a control condition. These brain regions have been previously linked to moral sensitivity. In contrast, strategic rationality compared with communicative reasoning and control was associated with less activation in areas known to be related to moral sensitivity, emotional processing, and language control. The results suggest that strategic reasoning is associated with reduced social and emotional cognitions and may use different language related networks. Thus, the results demonstrate experimental support for the assumptions of the theory of communicative action.

Sociopathic behavior and dementia

The maintenance of appropriate social behavior is a very complex process with many contributing factors. Social and moral judgments rely on the proper functioning of neural circuits concerned with complex cognitive and emotional processes. Damage to these systems may lead to distinct social behavior abnormalities. When patients present with dysmoral behavior for the first time, as a change from a prior pervasive pattern of behavior, clinicians need to consider a possible, causative brain disorder. The aim is to explore sociopathy as a manifestation of dementia. We searched electronic databases and key journals for original research and review articles on sociopathy in demented patients using the search terms "sociopathy, acquired sociopathy, sociopathic behavior, dementia, and personality". In conclusion, dementia onset may be heralded by changes in personality including alteration in social interpersonal behavior, personal regulation, and empathy. The sociopathy of dementia differs from antisocial/psychopathic personality disorders.

Temporal dynamics of disgust and morality: an event-related potential study

Disgust is argued to be an emotion that motivates the avoidance of disease-causing entities in the physical domain and unacceptable behaviors in the social-moral domain. Empirical work from behavioral, physiological and brain imaging studies suggests moral judgments are strongly modulated by disgust feelings. Yet, it remains unclear how they are related in the time course of neural processing. Examining the temporal order of disgust emotion and morality could help to clarify the role of disgust in moral judgments. In the present research, a Go/No-Go paradigm was employed to evoke lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) to investigate the temporal order of physical disgust and moral information processing. Participants were asked to give a “yes” or “no” response regarding the physical disgust and moral wrongness of a social act. The results showed that the evaluation of moral information was processed prior to that of physical disgust information. This suggests that moral information is available earlier than physical disgust, and provides more data on the biological heterogeneity between disgust and morality in terms of the time course of neural activity. The findings implicate that physical disgust emotion may not be necessary for people to make moral judgments. They also suggest that some of our moral experience may be more fundamental (than physical disgust experience) to our survival and development, as humans spend a considerable amount of time engaging in social interaction.

Empathy in hippocampal amnesia

Empathy is critical to the quality of our relationships with others and plays an important role in life satisfaction and well-being. The scientific investigation of empathy has focused on characterizing its cognitive and neural substrates, and has pointed to the importance of a network of brain regions involved in emotional experience and perspective taking (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, anterior insula, cingulate). While the hippocampus has rarely been the focus of empathy research, the hallmark properties of the hippocampal declarative memory system (e.g., representational flexibility, relational binding, on-line processing capacity) make it well-suited to meet some of the crucial demands of empathy, and a careful investigation of this possibility could make a significant contribution to the neuroscientific understanding of empathy. The present study is a preliminary investigation of the role of the hippocampal declarative memory system in empathy. Participants were three patients (1 female) with focal, bilateral hippocampal (HC) damage and severe declarative memory impairments and three healthy demographically matched comparison participants. Empathy was measured as a trait through a battery of gold standard questionnaires and through on-line ratings and prosocial behavior in response to a series of empathy inductions. Patients with hippocampal amnesia reported lower cognitive and emotional trait empathy than healthy comparison participants. Unlike healthy comparison participants, in response to the empathy inductions hippocampal patients reported no increase in empathy ratings or prosocial behavior. The results provide preliminary evidence for a role for hippocampal declarative memory in empathy.

Deconstructing the brain's moral network: dissociable functionality between the temporoparietal junction and ventro-medial prefrontal cortex

Research has illustrated that the brain regions implicated in moral cognition comprise a robust and broadly distributed network. However, understanding how these brain regions interact and give rise to the complex interplay of cognitive processes underpinning human moral cognition is still in its infancy. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine patterns of activation for ‘difficult’ and ‘easy’ moral decisions relative to matched non-moral comparators. This revealed an activation pattern consistent with a relative functional double dissociation between the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Difficult moral decisions activated bilateral TPJ and deactivated the vmPFC and OFC. In contrast, easy moral decisions revealed patterns of activation in the vmPFC and deactivation in bilateral TPJ and dorsolateral PFC. Together these results suggest that moral cognition is a dynamic process implemented by a distributed network that involves interacting, yet functionally dissociable networks.

Sensitivity and specificity of ventromedial prefrontal cortex tests in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia

BACKGROUND

Behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is characterized by early and substantial ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) dysfunction. To date, however, there is no consensus regarding which tests are most sensitive and specific to assess VMPFC dysfunction in this condition.

METHODS

In this study we compared the sensitivity and specificity of four common VMPFC specific tests (Mini-SEA, Go/No-Go Subtest of the Frontal Assessment Battery, Reversal-Learning Test, and Iowa Gambling Task) at first clinic presentation in two neurodegenerative cohorts (bvFTD, Alzheimer's disease) and age-matched, healthy controls.

RESULTS

We found that the Mini-SEA, evaluating theory of mind and emotion processes, emerged as the most sensitive and specific of the VMPFC tests employed. The Mini-SEA alone successfully distinguished bvFTD and Alzheimer's disease (AD) in >82% of subjects at first presentation. Similarly, the FAB Go/No-Go and Reversal-Learning Tests also showed very good discrimination power, but to a lesser degree. The Iowa Gambling Task, one of the most common measures of VMPFC function, was the least specific of these tests.

CONCLUSION

Sensitivity to detect VMPFC dysfunction was high across all test employed, but specificity varied considerably. The Mini-SEA emerged as the most promising of the VMPFC-specific diagnostic tests. Clinicians should take into account the variable specificity of currently available VMPFC tests, which can complement current carer-based questionnaires and clinical evaluation to improve the diagnosis of behavioral dysfunctions due to VMPFC dysfunction.

The human factor: behavioral and neural correlates of humanized perception in moral decision making

The extent to which people regard others as full-blown individuals with mental states ("humanization") seems crucial for their prosocial motivation towards them. Previous research has shown that decisions about moral dilemmas in which one person can be sacrificed to save multiple others do not consistently follow utilitarian principles. We hypothesized that this behavior can be explained by the potential victim's perceived humanness and an ensuing increase in vicarious emotions and emotional conflict during decision making. Using fMRI, we assessed neural activity underlying moral decisions that affected fictitious persons that had or had not been experimentally humanized. In implicit priming trials, participants either engaged in mentalizing about these persons (Humanized condition) or not (Neutral condition). In subsequent moral dilemmas, participants had to decide about sacrificing these persons' lives in order to save the lives of numerous others. Humanized persons were sacrificed less often, and the activation pattern during decisions about them indicated increased negative affect, emotional conflict, vicarious emotions, and behavioral control (pgACC/mOFC, anterior insula/IFG, aMCC and precuneus/PCC). Besides, we found enhanced effective connectivity between aMCC and anterior insula, which suggests increased emotion regulation during decisions affecting humanized victims. These findings highlight the importance of others' perceived humanness for prosocial behavior - with aversive affect and other-related concern when imagining harming more "human-like" persons acting against purely utilitarian decisions.

Is he being bad? Social and language brain networks during social judgment in children with autism

Individuals with autism often violate social rules and have lower accuracy in identifying and explaining inappropriate social behavior. Twelve children with autism (AD) and thirteen children with typical development (TD) participated in this fMRI study of the neurofunctional basis of social judgment. Participants indicated in which of two pictures a boy was being bad (Social condition) or which of two pictures was outdoors (Physical condition). In the within-group Social-Physical comparison, TD children used components of mentalizing and language networks [bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)], whereas AD children used a network that was primarily right IFG and bilateral pSTS, suggesting reduced use of social and language networks during this social judgment task. A direct group comparison on the Social-Physical contrast showed that the TD group had greater mPFC, bilateral IFG, and left superior temporal pole activity than the AD group. No regions were more active in the AD group than in the group with TD in this comparison. Both groups successfully performed the task, which required minimal language. The groups also performed similarly on eyetracking measures, indicating that the activation results probably reflect the use of a more basic strategy by the autism group rather than performance disparities. Even though language was unnecessary, the children with TD recruited language areas during the social task, suggesting automatic encoding of their knowledge into language; however, this was not the case for the children with autism. These findings support behavioral research indicating that, whereas children with autism may recognize socially inappropriate behavior, they have difficulty using spoken language to explain why it is inappropriate. The fMRI results indicate that AD children may not automatically use language to encode their social understanding, making expression and generalization of this knowledge more difficult.

Neurobiological underpinnings of shame and guilt: a pilot fMRI study

In this study, a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm originally employed by Takahashi et al. was adapted to look for emotion-specific differences in functional brain activity within a healthy German sample (N = 14), using shame- and guilt-related stimuli and neutral stimuli. Activations were found for both of these emotions in the temporal lobe (shame condition: anterior cingulate cortex, parahippocampal gyrus; guilt condition: fusiform gyrus, middle temporal gyrus). Specific activations were found for shame in the frontal lobe (medial and inferior frontal gyrus), and for guilt in the amygdala and insula. This is consistent with Takahashi et al.'s results obtained for a Japanese sample (using Japanese stimuli), which showed activations in the fusiform gyrus, hippocampus, middle occipital gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus. During the imagination of shame, frontal and temporal areas (e.g. middle frontal gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus) were responsive regardless of gender. In the guilt condition, women only activate temporal regions, whereas men showed additional frontal and occipital activation as well as a responsive amygdala. The results suggest that shame and guilt share some neural networks, as well as having individual areas of activation. It can be concluded that frontal, temporal and limbic areas play a prominent role in the generation of moral feelings.

Selective impairment of cognitive empathy for moral judgment in adults with high functioning autism

Faced with a moral dilemma, conflict arises between a cognitive controlled response aimed at maximizing welfare, i.e. the utilitarian judgment, and an emotional aversion to harm, i.e. the deontological judgment. In the present study, we investigated moral judgment in adult individuals with high functioning autism/Asperger syndrome (HFA/AS), a clinical population characterized by impairments in prosocial emotions and social cognition. In Experiment 1, we compared the response patterns of HFA/AS participants and neurotypical controls to moral dilemmas with low and high emotional saliency. We found that HFA/AS participants more frequently delivered the utilitarian judgment. Their perception of appropriateness of moral transgression was similar to that of controls, but HFA/AS participants reported decreased levels of emotional reaction to the dilemma. In Experiment 2, we explored the way in which demographic, clinical and social cognition variables including emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy and theory of mind influenced moral judgment. We found that utilitarian HFA/AS participants showed a decreased ability to infer other people's thoughts and to understand their intentions, as measured both by performance on neuropsychological tests and through dispositional measures. We conclude that greater prevalence of utilitarianism in HFA/AS is associated with difficulties in specific aspects of social cognition.

Beyond arousal and valence: the importance of the biological versus social relevance of emotional stimuli

The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention, memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies showed that (1) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than do socially emotional images, (2) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited cognitive resources, but (3) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images' subjective arousal nor their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in the visual cortex and greater functional connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional images evoked greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger functional connectivity between the amygdala and MPFC than did biological images. Thus, it appears that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe activity.

Functional neuroimaging studies of sexual arousal and orgasm in healthy men and women: a review and meta-analysis

In the last fifteen years, functional neuroimaging techniques have been used to investigate the neuroanatomical correlates of sexual arousal in healthy human subjects. In most studies, subjects have been requested to watch visual sexual stimuli and control stimuli. Our review and meta-analysis found that in heterosexual men, sites of cortical activation consistently reported across studies are the lateral occipitotemporal, inferotemporal, parietal, orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal, insular, anterior cingulate, and frontal premotor cortices as well as, for subcortical regions, the amygdalas, claustrum, hypothalamus, caudate nucleus, thalami, cerebellum, and substantia nigra. Heterosexual and gay men show a similar pattern of activation. Visual sexual stimuli activate the amygdalas and thalami more in men than in women. Ejaculation is associated with decreased activation throughout the prefrontal cortex. We present a neurophenomenological model to understand how these multiple regional brain responses could account for the varied facets of the subjective experience of sexual arousal. Further research should shift from passive to active paradigms, focus on functional connectivity and use subliminal presentation of stimuli.

Moral decision-making, ToM, empathy and the default mode network

Automatic intuitions and deliberate reasoning, sourcing internal representations of our personal norms and values, contribute to our beliefs of what is right and wrong. We used fMRI to directly compare moral (M) and non-moral (NM) decision-making processes using scenarios requiring conscious deliberation, whereby the main character declared an intention to take a course of action. Furthermore, we examined the relationship between BOLD signal, associated with M>NM decision-making, and moral judgment competence, psychopathy, and empathy. We observed greater activity in various parts of Theory of Mind, empathy and default mode networks during M>NM decision-making. There was a trend for high scores on primary psychopathy to correlate with decreased M>NM BOLD activation in an area extending from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to medial prefrontal cortex. We suggest that moral decision-making entails a greater degree of internally directed processing, such as self-referential mental processing and the representation of intentions and feelings, than non-moral decision-making.

Distinction between Externally vs. Internally Guided Decision-Making: Operational Differences, Meta-Analytical Comparisons and Their Theoretical Implications

Most experimental studies of decision-making have specifically examined situations in which a single less-predictable correct answer exists (externally guided decision-making under uncertainty). Along with such externally guided decision-making, there are instances of decision-making in which no correct answer based on external circumstances is available for the subject (internally guided decision-making). Such decisions are usually made in the context of moral decision-making as well as in preference judgment, where the answer depends on the subject's own, i.e., internal, preferences rather than on external, i.e., circumstantial, criteria. The neuronal and psychological mechanisms that allow guidance of decisions based on more internally oriented criteria in the absence of external ones remain unclear. This study was undertaken to compare decision-making of these two kinds empirically and theoretically. First, we reviewed studies of decision-making to clarify experimental-operational differences between externally guided and internally guided decision-making. Second, using multi-level kernel density analysis, a whole-brain-based quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies was performed. Our meta-analysis revealed that the neural network used predominantly for internally guided decision-making differs from that for externally guided decision-making under uncertainty. This result suggests that studying only externally guided decision-making under uncertainty is insufficient to account for decision-making processes in the brain. Finally, based on the review and results of the meta-analysis, we discuss the differences and relations between decision-making of these two types in terms of their operational, neuronal, and theoretical characteristics.

Psychopathy increases perceived moral permissibility of accidents

Psychopaths are notorious for their antisocial and immoral behavior, yet experimental studies have typically failed to identify deficits in their capacities for explicit moral judgment. We tested 20 criminal psychopaths and 25 criminal nonpsychopaths on a moral judgment task featuring hypothetical scenarios that systematically varied an actor's intention and the action's outcome. Participants were instructed to evaluate four classes of actions: accidental harms, attempted harms, intentional harms, and neutral acts. Psychopaths showed a selective difference, compared with nonpsychopaths, in judging accidents, where one person harmed another unintentionally. Specifically, psychopaths judged these actions to be more morally permissible. We suggest that this pattern reflects psychopaths' failure to appreciate the emotional aspect of the victim's experience of harm. These findings provide direct evidence of abnormal moral judgment in psychopathy.